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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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FOREWORD

The present publication contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments in 1982 and is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. The work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1982 is described in its 22d annual report (see Bibliography).

The papers are arranged in chronological order, following a topical list of documents and lists of abbreviations and conferences. Other reference aids may be found at the back of the volume. These include a list of depository libraries, a bibliography, a list of persons, and an index. The papers were compiled and annotated by R. William Nary and Ruth Ihara. Janet Athos provided assistance. Useful suggestions were received from officers throughout the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The technical editing was performed by Vicki E. Futscher and Leo P. Masciana of the Editorial Services Branch, Publishing Services Division, Department of State.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A/[1] — General Assembly
ABM — antiballistic missile
AC[1] — *ad hoc* committee
AC&D — arms control and disarmament
ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACIS — arms control impact statement(s)
AEC — Atomic Energy Agency
AIRS — advanced inertial reference sphere
ALCC — Airborne Launch Control Center
ALCM — air-launched cruise missile
Amb. — Ambassador
ANZUS — Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty Organization
app. — appendix
ASAT — antisatellite
ASW — antisubmarine warfare
ATA — alimentary toxic aleukia
BMD — ballistic missile defense
BW — biological weapons/warfare
C.1[1] — First (Political and Security) Committee of the U.N. General Assembly
Cal. — calendar
CAMDS — Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal Systems
CBM — confidence-building measures
CBO — Congressional Budget Office
CCD[1, 2] — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CCL — Commodity Control List
CD[3] — Committee on Disarmament
CFR — Code of Federal Regulations
CN[1] — [Disarmament] Commission
COCOM — Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls
Cong. — Congress, Congressional
Corr.[1] — correction
CPD — Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CSB — closely-spaced basing
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSR — Czechoslovak Soviet Socialist Republic
CTB — comprehensive test ban
CTBT — Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty
CW — chemical weapons/warfare
D. — Democrat
DE — directed energy
DK — Democratic Kampuchea
DMSO — dimethyl-sulfoxyd
DNA — Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD, DoD — Department of Defense
DOE — Department of Energy
ELF — extremely low frequency
ENDC[1, 4] — Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
ESCOM — Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa
EURATOM — European Atomic Energy Community
EX., Exec. — Executive
FBI — Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS — Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS — foreign military sales
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany
FY — fiscal year
G.A. — General Assembly (of the United Nations)
GLCM — ground-launched cruise missile
GMT — Greenwich Mean Time
GTS — Global Telecommunications Systems
HEL — high-energy laser(s)
HEU — highly-enriched uranium
H.J. Res. — House of Representatives Joint Resolution
H.R. — House of Representatives
IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
ICP — International Comparison Project
INF — intermediate-range nuclear force(s)

Footnotes at end of list.

INFCE — International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
JCS — Joint Chiefs of Staff
km — kilometers
KT, kt — kiloton
LRINF — longer/range intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
MIRV — multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle
MRASM — medium-range air-to-surface missile
MX — missile experimental
NASA — National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSTAR — navigation satellite timing and ranging
NEST — nuclear emergency search team
NNPA — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
NOTAM — notices to airmen and mariners
NPT — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC — Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSC — National Security Council
NTB — nuclear test ban
OES/NEC — Office of Nuclear Exports, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OPM — Office of Personnel Managment
PII — Pershing II
par., para. — paragraph
PB — particle beam(s)
PLO — Palestine Liberation Organization
PNE — peaceful nuclear explosions/explosives
POTAS — U.S. program of technical assistance on safeguards
PPP — purchasing power parities
PRC, P.R.C. — People's Republic of China
PV.[1] — procès verbale (verbatim record)
prt. — print
pt. — part
pub. — publication
R. — Representative/Republican
RB/ER — reduced blast/enhanced radiation
R & D — research and development
RDT&E — research, development, test, and evaluation
Rep. — Representative
RERTR — reduced enrichment in research and test reactor program
res. — resolution(s)
ret. — retired
Rev.[1] — revised, revision
RME — reduction of military expenditures
RV — reentry vehicle
RW — radiological weapon(s)
S. — Senate, Security Council [1]
S–12 [1] — Twelfth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM — surface-to-air missile
SCC — Standing Consultative Commission
SCG — Special Consultative Group
S. Con. Res. — Senate Concurrent Resolution
S. Exec. Res. — Senate Executive Resolution
SIG–DP — Senior Interagency Group–Defense Policy
SIG–FP — Senior Interagency Group–Foreign Policy
SIG–I — Senior Interagency Group–Intelligence
S.J. Res. — Senate Joint Resolution
SLBM — submarine-launched ballistic missile
SNEC — Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination
SS — surface-to-surface
SSBN — submarine ballistic nuclear (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine)
SSOD — Special Session on Disarmament (UNGA)
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Supp. — supplement
TASTEX — Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise
TIAS — Treaties and Other International Agreement Series
TRANSEAVER — TRANSport by SEA VERification
TTBT — Threshold Test Ban Treaty

Footnotes at end of list.

U.K. — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
U.N. — United Nations
UNESCO — United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR — United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNIDIR — United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
US, U.S. — United States
USA — United States of America/United States Army
USAF — United States Air Force
USC — United States Code
USSR — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST — United States Treaties Series
WHO — World Health Organization
WMO — World Meteorological Organization
WP [1] — working paper
ZOPFAN — zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality

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[1] Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conference serviced by the United Nations Secretariat.

[2] Title changed from Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969 with addition of eight new members.

[3] Replaced Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1979.

[4] With addition of eight new members in 1969, title changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL CONFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONS

United Nations and Affiliates

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean

Established as a 15-member[1] body by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII) o Dec. 15, 1972 to further the objectives of the declaration set forth in resolution 2832 (XXVI) of Dec. 16, 1971. Enlarged by addition of new members in following years: 3 new members[2] by resolution 3260 (XXIX) of Dec. 9, 1974, 5[3] by resolution 32/86 of Dec. 12, 1977, and 23[4] by resolution 34/80 B of Dec. 11, 1979. Resolution 36/90 of Dec. 9, 1981 renewed the Committee's mandate and requested its reconvening in 1982. *Three sessions in 1982:* Mar. 1–12 and May 20–28, at U.N. Headquarters, New York; Aug. 3–20, U.N. Office, Geneva; and one additional formal meeting, Nov. 23, U.N. Headquarters, New York (30 formal meetings). *Membership in 1982:* 46. *Chairman:* Sri Lanka (Fonseka). *Vice Chairmen:* Australia (Boyd Indonesia (Ibrahim), GDR (Kahn), Mozambique (Lobo). *Rapportuer:* Madagascar (Rasolondraibe).

Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference

Established by General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII) of Dec. 18, 1973 as a 40 member body appointed by the President of the General Assembly to examine the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference. Convened in 1982 by resolution 36/91 of Dec. 9, 1981. *Two sessions in 1982:* Apr. 5–8; Aug. 23–27. *Chairma* Sri Lanka (Fonseka). *Vice Chairmen:* Peru (Calle y Calle) and Poland (Krystosik). *Rapporteur:* Spain (Zelada and successor Laclaustra).

Committee on Disarmament (CD)

Established in 1978 by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session to replac the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Organized along lines set forth in Paragraph 120 of the Final Document of that session.[5] Two sessions annually. *In 1982:* Feb. 2–Apr. 23; Aug. 3–Sept. 17 (39 formal plenary meetings, 35 informal meetings). *Chairmanship:* Rotated monthly in alphabetical order, by countr *Membership:* The five nuclear powers—China,[6] France,[7] U.K., U.S., USSR and the following 35 non-nuclear weapon states: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, FRG, GD Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. *Ad Hoc* Working Groups: on Chemical Weapons, on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, on International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, on Radiological Weapons, and of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. *U.S., delegation leader:* Fields; *USSR:* Issraelyan.

Disarmament Commission (DC)

Established as a deliberative body and subsidiary organ of the U.N. General Assembly by the Final Act of the Tenth Special Session (par. 118)[8] to succeed the original Disarmament Commission established by resolution 502 (VI) of Jan. 11, 1952. Continuation of its work mandated by General Assembly resolution 36/82 A

Footnotes at end of list.

36/92 B, and 36/97 A, all of Dec. 9, 1981. One session (organizational) in 1981: Dec. 10–11 (2 meetings). *Two sessions (substantive) in 1982:* May 17–28 (5 meetings), Oct. 14 (1 meeting), at U.N. Headquarters, New York. *Membership:* All states members of the United Nations. *Chairman:* Poland (Wyzner). *Vice Chairmen* (8): Bahamas, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Sweden, Zaire. *Rapporteur:* Peru (Fuentes).

Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets

Appointed by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of Dec. 12, 1980. Three sessions in 1981: Feb., July, Nov.–Dec. *One session* in 1982: Mar. 1–12, in New York. *Participants:* Ayewah (Nigeria), Caporaso (Italy), Cars (Sweden), Encinas del Pando (Peru), Gallik (U.S.), Grozea (Romania), Nozu (Japan), Parwoto (Indonesia). *Chairman:* Cars.

Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security

Appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/141 of Dec. 12, 1980, which requested him to bring up to date the 1977 report entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures.*[8] *One session in 1981:* July 20–31. *Two sessions in 1982:* Jan. 18–29; July 19–30, in New York. *Participants* (12): Consalvi (first session, Venezuela), Djokic (Yugoslavia), Ene (Romania), Gonzalez (final session, Mexico), Martinez (first and second sessions, Mexico), de Haan (Netherlands), Kikuchi (Japan), Matejka (Czechoslovakia), Nadel (USSR), Rahman (Bangladesh), Rothschild (Austria), Schmidt (France). *Chairman:* Ene.

Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons

Appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to G.A. resolution 35/144 C of Dec. 12, 1980, and continued pursuant to resolution 36/96 C of Dec. 9. 1981. *Three sessions in 1982:* Feb. 4–22 and July 21–30, at Geneva; Oct. 13–Nov. 22, at Geneva and New York. *Visits to Pakistan and Thailand for on-site collection and examination of evidence:* Feb. 9–22 and Oct. 25–Nov. 10. *Participants:* Ezz (Egypt), Ambeva (Kenya), Javier (Philippines), Guerra (Peru). *Chairman:* Ezz.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Board of Governors, Sept. 17–19, in Vienna.
General Conference, Sept. 20–24, in Vienna.
Membership: 110.
Director General: Blix (Sweden).

Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament

Appointed by the President of the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 35/47 of Dec. 3, 1980 and convened pursuant to it and to resolution 33/71 H of Dec. 14, 1978. One session (organizational), Dec. 1980. Two sessions (substantive) in 1981, May and Oct. *One session in 1982:* Apr. 26–May 14. *Membership:* 78 states members of the United Nations. *Chairman:* Nigeria (Adeniji). *Vice Chairmen* (13): Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Benin, Bulgaria, GDR, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Yugoslavia. *Rapporteur:* Turkey (Ersun).

United Nations General Assembly

Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (Twelfth Special Session)

Convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 H of Dec. 14, 1978. *One session in 1982:* June 7–July 10. *President:* Iraq (Kittani). *Vice President:* Mexico

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Footnotes at end of list.

(García Robles). *Ad Hoc* Committee (committee of the whole) established at 1st plenary meeting. *Chairman:* Nigeria (Adeniji). *Vice Chairmen* (13): Australia (Sadleir), Bahamas (Hepburn), Bangladesh (Rahman), Benin (Hazoumé), Bulgaria (Grinberg), GDR (Herder), India (Venkateswaran), Italy (Alessi), Japan (Okawa), Mexico (García Robles), Morocco (Zentar), Peru (Calle y Calle), Yugoslavia (Komatina). *Rapporteur:* Turkey (Ersun). *Working Groups:* I—Comprehensive Program of Disarmament; II—Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly at its Tenth Special Session.

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

Thirty-seventh regular session: Sept. 20–Dec. 20, 1982.
Resumed thirty-seventh session: May 1983, 6 meetings; suspended May 13, 1983.
Closure of thirty-seventh regular session (122 meetings): Sept. 19, 1984.
Membership: 157
Secretary-General: Pérez de Cuéllar
President, General Assembly: Hungary (Hollai)
Chairman, First Committee: Ghana (Gbeho)

Other Multilateral Meetings

Commonwealth Heads of Government

Regional Meeting III in 1982: Oct. 14–18, at Suva. *Participants* (17): Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, India, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, and Vanuatu. *Chairman:* Mara (Fiji).

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Meetings held originally during July 1973–July 1975 in Helsinki and Geneva. Final Act issued Aug. 1, 1975. First Review Conference: Oct. 1977–Mar. 1978, Belgrade. *Second Review Conference:* Nov. 11, 1980–Sept. 9, 1983, Madrid. *Head, U.S. delegation:* Kampelman.

Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

13th ministerial meeting in 1982: Aug. 22–28, in Niamey, Niger. *Participants:* 38 Islamic states and the Palestine Liberation Organization. *Secretary-General:* Chatti. *Summit meeting:* Aug. 28–30, in Fez, Morocco.

Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Countries Interested in the Promotion of Democracy in Central America and the Caribbean

One meeting in 1982: Oct. 4, in San Jose, Costa Rica. *Participants* (7): Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Costa Rica, United States. *Observers:* Dominican Republic, Panama. *Chairman:* Costa Rica (Volio Jimenez).

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks—MBFR

Negotiations began with preparatory talks in early 1973 and one round of talks beginning in Oct. 1973 at Vienna; three rounds of talks held annually in Vienna since then. *26th–28th rounds in 1982:* Jan. 28–Apr. 8, May 13–July 15, Sept. 23–Dec. 16. *Regular participants:* NATO—Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., U.S., Warsaw Pact—Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, USSR. *Special status participants:* Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania, Turkey. *U.S. delegation head:* Staar; *Soviet delegation head:* Mikhailov.

Non-Aligned Countries

Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau, May 31–June 5, 1982, in Havana.

Footnotes at end of list.

U.S.–Soviet Talks

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF)

Announced on Sept. 23, 1981, by Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko after consultations at the U.N. General Assembly. One session in 1981: Nov.–Dec. *Three sessions in 1982:* Jan. 12 (resumed 1981 session) –Mar. 16; May 20–July 20; Sept. 30–Nov. 30, in Geneva. *U.S. delegation:* Chief—Amb. Nitze; deputy chief—Glitman. *Soviet delegation:* Chief—Kvitsinskiy; deputy chief—Detinov.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks

One session in 1982: Dec. 15–16, in Washington, D.C.
Leader, U.S. delegation: Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy.
Leader, Soviet delegation: Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

Joint U.S.–USSR body established by the Memorandum of Understanding of Dec. 21, 1972,[9] for the purpose of promoting implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed on May 26, 1972,[10] and of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, signed on Sept. 30, 1971.[11] *Three sessions in 1982:* XXI—Mar. 16–Apr. 26; XXII—Sept. 14–Dec. 15; XXIII (ABM Treaty Review)—Nov. 9–Dec. 15, all in Geneva. *Acting U.S. Commissioner,* XXIst sess.: Lasater. *Commissioner,* XXIId–XXIIId sess.: U.S.—Ellis. Commissioner, XXIst–XXIIId sess.: USSR—Starodubov.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

Announced jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 31, 1982. *Two rounds in 1982:* Round I—June 29–Aug. 13. Round II—Oct. 6–Dec. 1, all in Geneva. *U.S. delegation leader:* Amb. Rowny; *Soviet:* Karpov.

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[1] Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia.

[2] Bangladesh, Kenya, and Somalia.

[3] Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique, and Oman.

[4] The resolution decided to add "new members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the recommendation of the *Ad Hoc* Committee." In 1980, 21 new members were added: Bulgaria, Canada, Djibouti, Egypt, France, FRG, GDR, Italy, Liberia, Maldives, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Sudan, U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia. On Mar. 5, 1981, the President of the General Assembly informed the Secretary-General that he had appointed an additional member: Thailand. (A/35/800).

[5] The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session (also known as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament) may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 441 ff.

[6] China took its seat for the first time in Feb. 1980.

[7] France was a member of both precursor bodies, the ENDC and the CCD, but it took no part in either. It took its seat at the CD for the first time in Feb. 1979.

[8] A/32/88/Rev.1 (U.N. Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

[9] The memorandum may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 868–869.

[10] *Ibid.,* pp. 197 ff.

[11] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 634–635.

News Interview With FRG Chancellor Schmidt: Nuclear Weapons, Europe, and the Future of Arms Control [Extracts], January 2, 1982[1]

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For Germany it is a most difficult situation, for already we have some 5,000 American atomic weapons on our soil. Germany is about the size of Oregon, populated not by three million people but by over 60 million people.

Think of a situation where an American Administration puts 5,000 nuclear rockets into Oregon and makes plans for adding some hundreds that could hit the Soviet Union and thereby make Oregon a great target area for Soviet missiles. It was a hard decision. I was instrumental in taking that decision and I am going to stick to it and I am not going to be inhibited by demonstrations.

On the other hand, there might have been many fewer demonstrations if not some loose talk had come out of the U.S., telling the Europeans that we were not living in the postwar period but in a prewar period. That had a psychologically devastating effect.

On the other hand, the attempts to scare the Europeans by the threat to withdraw American military forces from Europe is a futile effort. My first discussion on that subject took place over a quarter of a century ago. Such discussions come and go and come and go. You would abdicate from your leadership role in the Western world and I think that the political elites in the U.S. will always be sober enough not really to consider such a fatal move.

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Let us distinguish between the problem of disposal of nuclear waste, which is a problem, but not by far as urgent as the other problem of getting the ever-growing nuclear potential for devastating other people's countries under control. I am speaking from the point of view of a country that has subscribed to the nonproliferation treaty,[2] and will under any circumstances honor its obligations not to possess, not to acquire, not to produce nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, by that same nonproliferation treaty, the nuclear powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, in Article 6, have undertaken efforts to reduce their nuclear arms. This has not happened so far.

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[1] *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1982. The interview was conducted at Sanibel Island, Florida.

[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Great attempts have been made under the heading of SALT I,[3] SALT II.[4] I have been working with four American Presidents now. Two of them have personally asked very strongly to psychologically and politically assist them with all that was in my power their quest for a completion of the SALT process, which I did, which I tried to do. Nevertheless, both of them were unable to put SALT II to the Senate for ratification, and it is obvious that the time has gone over that now.

In my view, it is imperative that the medium-range nuclear weapons talks go forward, get to results in order to open up the field for negotiations on nuclear strategic weapons of global range.

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I would like to stress that I do not believe in prophecies by politicians. Having said this—Answer 1:

There will not be a world war or another great war between now and the end of the century. I cannot look very far into the next century. But the year 2000 is about the span of my lifetime; I will be 82 in the year 2000, and I think I can look as far as that.

There will be no world war, because the responsibility of governments and the awareness of the danger of war are much greater nowadays than they have ever been in the first three-quarters of the 20th century. And they will get, in the long last, they will have arms reductions and arms control.

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Letter From the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director (Burt) to the *Wall Street Journal:* Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia, January 4, 1982[1]

I share many of the judgments contained in your editorial of Dec. 18 concerning the ABC News documentary on the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. I take exception, however, to the suggestion in that editorial, and in an earlier one on the same subject, that the U.S. has not been pursuing this issue with the vigor it merits.

This administration has accorded the issue of chemical and toxin weapons use the highest priority. Senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Haig, have made numerous public statements calling attention to this abhorrent and illegal activity. At the same time the administration has initiated extensive new bilateral and multilateral contacts to stimulate other governments to accord this issue a similar priority. The U.S. has also raised this matter formally and forcefully with the Soviet Union and with the governments of Laos and Vietnam.

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[3] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

[1] *Wall Street Journal,* Jan. 4, 1982.

The first public expression of U.S. concern over the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan was made more than two years ago. [2] Eighteen months ago the government released a 125-page compendium of evidence of such use. This was updated with another lengthy public release last March. Public efforts were accompanied by private diplomacy. As early as 1978 the U.S. began to raise this issue in diplomatic channels, first with Laos, and subsequently with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In 1980 the U.S. first brought the issue before the United Nations, where we and other concerned governments succeeded in bringing about an international investigation. [3]

On Sept. 13, the government released dramatic new physical evidence [4] which, as Secretary Haig noted, identified toxins as among those chemical agents in use in Southeast Asia. This evidence was made available to the public and to the world community as soon as the tests were completed and the analysis results available. Every effort has since been made to collect additional evidence, and to provide the public with as much detail as possible regarding the sources of our information, the methods of analysis, and the implications of our findings. Far from skirting the question of Soviet involvement, we have carefully and pointedly documented it. Indeed my own testimony of Nov. 10 to the Arms Control subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee laid out the evidence of Soviet involvement in some detail. [5] In this same testimony, I make clear the government's view that the use of toxin weapons is a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[6] of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention [7] and of customary international law.

This [*Last*] month the mandate for the investigation was renewed by the General Assembly. Despite strong Soviet opposition, this move secured the support of 86 nations, 10 more than last year, and 66 more than the handful that supported the Soviet effort to stifle this inquiry. [8] I recognize that no single UN report, no single resolution, no single international investigation will be enough to stop this activity. Yet this recent UN vote represents an essential if modest step in our continuing effort to mobilize a broad segment of world opinion, to protest the use of these barbarous weapons, and to secure cessation of their use.

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 806–807.

[3] A draft resolution was introduced by New Zealand, Canada, France, FRG, Norway, Turkey, and Spain, and adopted as G.A. res. 35/144 C on Dec. 12, 1980.

[4] See the annex to U.S. Representative Kirkpatrick's note to the U.N. Secretary-General, Sept. 15, 1981, *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 422–424.

[5] *Ibid.,* pp. 548–554.

[6] The text of the Protocol may be found *ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.

[7] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[8] G.A. res. 37/98 D of Dec. 13, 1982; adopted by a vote of 86–19–33.

The U.S. has taken a number of initiatives to make information on the use of chemical and toxin weapons as widely available as possible. Journalists have been given direct and extended access to the responsible government scientists, analysts and policy officials. A team of U.S. officials and experts visited Europe in October, where they briefed in detail every allied government on our newest evidence. In each of the capitals visited, the team also met with journalists, scientists and other non-governmental figures with a potential interest in this matter. A similar team met in New York with the UN group investigating the use of chemical weapons to supplement the written submissions the U.S. has made to the UN.

The American government's objective in all these steps has been to put a stop to the use of chemical and toxin weapons against the innocent and defenseless peoples of Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan. I can assure you that we will continue to collect, analyze and make available information on this use so long as that activity continues. We will also continue to press the issue bilaterally, multilaterally and in every feasible public forum.

The U.S. cannot act alone, however, if we are to succeed in publicizing and ultimately in terminating these atrocities. Private individuals and organizations also have a duty to act, and have the possibility to do so effectively. The press can play an indispensable role as an independent source of evidence and analysis. ABC News has demonstrated that it is possible, given determination and initiative, for a private news organization to collect, analyze, and evaluate evidence of the use of chemical and toxin weapons. I am sure you will join us in urging others to give this issue the attention it deserves, as you have done, with a view to stimulating world-wide protest against the use of toxins and other lethal and incapacitant chemical weapons.

Statement by the Department of State: No Sale of Advanced Aircraft to Taiwan, January 11, 1982 [1]

Since the beginning of this Administration, the President has been conscious of the need to carry forward the unofficial, people-to-people relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and he has expressed on many occasions his personal concern for the continued well-being of the people of Taiwan. This Administration has attached a high value to fulfilling the longstanding policy of the U.S. Government with respect to providing such defense articles as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Departments of State and Defense and other national security elements, have been addressing the question of Taiwan's defense needs over a period of many months and have taken into careful consideration the many factors which bear on the judgments which must be made in implementing this policy. On the basis of this study, the Administration has already taken steps to sell Taiwan items necessary for self-defense. We anticipate further steps of this sort.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 1982, p. 39.

A judgment has also been reached by the concerned agencies on the question of replacement aircraft for Taiwan. Their conclusion is that no sale of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan is required because no military need for such aircraft exists. Taiwan's defense needs can be met as they arise, and for the foreseeable future, by replacing aging aircraft now in the Taiwan inventory with comparable aircraft and by extension of the F-5E coproduction line in Taiwan. The details have not yet been worked out. The President has approved these recommendations.

White House Statement: National Security Council Structure, January 12, 1982 [1]

I. National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.

The functions and responsibilities of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The NSC shall meet regularly. Those heads of departments and agencies who are not regular members shall participate as appropriate, when matters affecting their departments or agencies are considered.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the regular members of the NSC, shall be responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing national security policy as approved by me. He shall determine and publish the agenda of NSC meetings. He shall ensure that the necessary papers are prepared and—except in unusual circumstances—distributed in advance to Council members. He shall staff and administer the National Security Council.

Decision documents shall be prepared by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and disseminated by him after approval by the President.

II. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of State

The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy adviser. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved policy.

I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of executive departments and agencies of the United States overseas. Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field under the command of a United States area military commander, and such other military activities as I elect, as Commander in Chief, to conduct exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and which are not of such nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be activities covered within the meaning of this directive.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 18, 1982, pp. 21–25.

The Secretary of State is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

III. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is my principal defense policy adviser. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to me, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

I have assigned to the Secretary of Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the defense policy of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

IV. NSC Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal adviser on intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy, and proposals, as set forth in relevant Executive orders. I have assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and Executive order, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.

The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the intelligence activities, policy, and proposals of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

V. Interagency Groups

To assist the NSC at large and its individual members in fulfilling their responsibilities, interagency groups are established as described herein. The focus of these interagency groups is to establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations, consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC.

A. The Senior Interagency Group–Foreign Policy (SIG–FP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for foreign policy and foreign affairs matters, the SIG–FP is established. The SIG–FP shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State (Chairman); the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

When meeting to consider arms control matters, the Group will be augmented by the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The SIG–FP will:

1. Ensure that important foreign policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate interagency groups, or, if such matters require higher level consideration, report them to the Secretary of State for decision or referral to the NSC;
3. Assure a proper selectivity of the foreign policy/foreign affairs areas and issues to which the United States applies its efforts;
4. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions; and
5. Evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the State Department augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG–FP, shall be established.

B. The Senior Interagency Group–Defense Policy (SIG–DP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for defense policy and defense matters, the SIG–DP is established. The SIG–DP shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy or an Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman); and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

The SIG–DP will:

1. Ensure that important defense policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate interagency groups, or if such matters

require higher level consideration, report them to the Secretary of Defense for decision or referral to the NSC; and

3. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Department of Defense augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG–DP, shall be established.

C. The Senior Interagency Group–Intelligence (SIG–I)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for intelligence policy and intelligence matters, the SIG–I is established. The SIG–I shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman when such departments and agencies have a direct interest in intelligence activities under consideration.

When meeting to consider sensitive intelligence collection activities referred by the Director of Central Intelligence, the membership of the Group shall be augmented, as necessary, by the head of each organization within the intelligence community directly involved in the activity in question. When meeting to consider counterintelligence activities, the Group shall be augmented by the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director, National Security Agency.

The SIG–I will:

1. Establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence;

2. Review such National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget proposals and other matters as are referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence;

3. Review proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations referred by the Director of Central Intelligence;

4. Develop standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities of the United States; resolve interagency differences concerning the implementation of counterintelligence policy; and develop and monitor guidelines, consistent with applicable law and Executive orders, for the maintenance of central counterintelligence records;

5. Consider and approve any counterintelligence activity referred to the Group by the head of any organization in the intelligence community;

6. Submit to the NSC an overall, annual assessment of the relative threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers and from international terrorist activities, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the United States counterintelligence activities;

7. Conduct an annual review of ongoing, sensitive, national foreign intelligence collection operations and sensitive counterintelligence activities and report thereon to the NSC; and

8. Carry out such additional coordination review and approval of intelligence activities as the President may direct.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the departments and agencies represented on the SIG–I, shall be established.

D. Regional and Functional Interagency Groups

To assist the SIG–FP, Interagency Groups (IG's) shall be established by the Secretary of State for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State, for Political-Military Affairs, and for International Economic Affairs. Each IG shall be comprised of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State (Chairman); and a designated representative of the Secretary of Defense. Representatives of other departments and agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. The IG for International Economic Affairs will, in addition to the above membership, include representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative.

IG's for arms control matters will, in addition to the above membership, include a representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms control IG's will be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State or the representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG–FP.

To assist the SIG–DP, IG's shall be established by the Secretary of Defense corresponding to the functional areas within the Department of Defense. Each IG shall be comprised of the appropriate Under or Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chairman); a representative of the Secretary of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other departments and agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

Under and Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Chairmen of the IG's, will assure the adequacy of United States policy in the areas of their responsibility and of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy. They will be responsible for the conduct of interagency policy studies within the areas of their responsibility for consideration by the SIG.

The Regional IG's also shall prepare contingency plans pertaining to potential crises in their respective areas of responsibility. Contingency planning will be conducted in coordination with the Chairman of the

Political-Military IG, with the exception of the military response option for employment of forces in potential crises, which will remain within the purview of the Department of Defense and will be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To deal with specific contingencies, the IG's will establish full-time working groups, which will provide support to the crisis management operations of the NSC. These groups will reflect the institutional membership of the parent body, together with such additional members as may be required to respond to the contingency with the full weight of available expertise.

To assist the SIG–I, IG's shall be established by the Director of Central Intelligence. The IG for Counterintelligence shall consist of representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, National Security Agency; and a representative of the head of any other intelligence community organization directly involved in the activities under discussion. The IG for Counterintelligence will be under the chairmanship of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG–I.

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary or other agency head over personnel from the department or agency concerned serving on IG's—including the authority to give necessary guidance to the representatives in the performance of IG duties—is not limited by this directive.

News Conference Remark by President Reagan: SALT II Treaty Limits on Soviet Union [Extract], January 20, 1982 [1]

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Mr. Skelton. [2] What you're saying is you're going full speed ahead on the arms buildup, at least until we get a verifiable arms control pact.

The President. Yes, until things can develop that we can—in other words, I am very willing to talk arms reduction. And I have, again, promised that during the campaign: legitimate arms reduction.

But let me tell you what—out of the SALT talks, to illustrate what I was talking about. I have been given figures that if the SALT II treaty [3] had been ratified, it would have permitted the Soviet Union to add to its arsenal nuclear explosive power equal to what we dropped on Hiroshima every 11 minutes for the life of the SALT II treaty. Now, how do you call that strategic arms limitation?

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Jan. 25, 1982, p. 61.

[2] George Skelton of the *Los Angeles Times.*

[3] For text of the SALT II Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

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Testimony by the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (Rickover) Before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress: Military Expenditures and Need for Disarmament [Extracts], January 28, 1982 [1]

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Admiral Rickover. I think we are spending too much. I think we should be more selective in our spending. There are certain areas from where it is obvious danger is going to come if it does come. I believe we should concentrate on those areas. When anyone has a large business establishment, it is self-limiting because, if it expands too far, too fast, you stop making a profit. In Government there is no such limitation and there is little strict scrutiny, sir.

EXCESSIVE ROTATION IN JOBS

Consider the situation. In the Defense Department the military changes jobs every 2 or 3 years. On the civilian side, the top people are political appointees and generally come in without experience for short periods of time. So you have two groups constantly rotating jobs and no one ever gets time to find out what is really going on. I believe considerable money could be saved in the Defense Department. There are areas that can be reduced. I do not wish to get into details right now but, you know that I have thought about this matter for many years. I include a number of recommendations in the appendix to my prepared statement.

Senator Proxmire. Well, you have given us a very—

NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

Admiral Rickover. For example, take the number of nuclear submarines. I will hit right close to home. I see no reason why we must have just as many as the Russians. At a certain point there is sufficiency. What is the difference whether we have 100 nuclear submarines or 200? I do not see what difference it makes. We can sink everything on the oceans several times over with the number we have, and so can they. That is the point I am making.

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[1] *Economics of Defense Policy: Adm. H.G. Rickover: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, Part 1*, pp. 42, 62.

There has to be some judgment used. Submarines are very expensive items. They take a lot of time and money to build—taxpayers' money.

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ADMIRAL RICKOVER. Yes, sir. I remember the 1921 disarmament conference. That is the one Charles Evans Hughes helped organize. The United States called that conference and had significant results. An arms race was underway. England, France, and Italy were building many ships and so were we. The conference resulted in the limitation of arms. The treaty expired in 1935. [2]

It would be the finest thing in the world for the President of the United States to initiate another disarmament conference. It can be done. They did it then. The agreement lasted for a period of 15 years. It expired in 1935. By that time Hitler had come to power in Germany and there was no choice of continuing disarmament. Had it not been for him, probably disarmament would have gone on and decreased the amount of armaments even more.

I believe this is a propitious time, since military expenses are eating up so much money. These costs are completely unproductive, and use so much of the people's taxes. This would be a fine thing for the President to do, and I urge you, in your capacity as a Senator, to try to do as I suggest. Make me a member. I will do something. Put me in charge of it and I will get you some results.

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Article by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger): Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 1982 [1]

Last year, on 18 November, President Reagan set down a bold challenge to the Soviet Union—namely to join with the United States in taking an historic step towards reducing nuclear armaments, assuring the security of Europe and strengthening international peace. The President has offered to cancel the deployment of the Pershing II and the ground-launched Cruise missile (GLCM) if the Soviet Union would dismantle its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. [2]

This is the proposal Ambassador Nitze took to Geneva for the 30 November 1981 opening of negotiations with the Soviets on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF). It is a simple, fair and reasonable approach, which offers the best possibility for early progress towards reducing land-based INF missiles—the Soviet systems of most concern to NATO and the US systems whose prospective deployment is of most concern to the Soviet Union. In this article, I would like to discuss the background behind our negotiating approach, as well as some of the principles on which it is based.

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[2] TS 671.

[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb. 1982), pp. 7–11.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

Background

NATO is a defensive alliance. Its strategy and forces are designed solely to prevent aggression through deterrence, and thus far, it has been an unqualified success. The unity and deterrent strength of the Alliance have provided the basis for the unprecedented peace and prosperity enjoyed by Western Europe these past thirty-two years.

However, the ongoing Soviet military build-up increasingly calls into question the Alliance's deterrent capabilities, and thus threatens to undermine the foundation of the peace in Europe. The Soviets have been increasing their forces and capabilities across the entire military spectrum. Two facets of this build-up are of crucial importance. First, the Soviet Union achieved parity with the United States in terms of strategic nuclear forces in the mid-1970s. The total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers—deployed by the Soviets now exceeds that of the United States, and the Soviets are fast approaching equality in the total number of warheads carried by these systems. The momentum now lies with the Soviet Union; it will only be reversed later this decade when the US strategic modernization programme begins to be realized.

At the same time, the Soviets have been enhancing their Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces—an area in which they were already plainly superior to NATO—with the introduction of new systems, particularly the SS-20 missile. The SS-20 is far more accurate, has a quicker reaction time and has a greater range than its predecessors, the SS-4 and SS-5. Most significantly, the SS-20 carries three warheads as opposed to the single warhead carried by the earlier missiles. Thus, while the Soviet force of 600 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles in the early 1970s carried 600 warheads, the 280 new SS-20s and remaining 300 SS-4s and SS-5s deployed today carry over 1,100 warheads (not counting refires), and the Soviets have been deploying on average one additional SS-20 missile with three warheads each week.

The combination of these two factors—Soviet achievement of strategic parity and increasing Soviet superiority in INF—has caused concern on both sides of the Atlantic. In an earlier era of US strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, NATO could afford to be at a disadvantage at the intermediate-range level. That is not the case today. A major concern is that, if the present trend is not reversed, the Soviets might come to believe—however erroneously—that they could break the strategic link between the United States and Europe; and while neutralizing the US strategic deterrent, use their increasing INF superiority to threaten the European members of the Alliance.

Let me emphasize that the US commitment to its European allies has in no way changed. US strategic nuclear forces remain firmly linked to the defence of Europe, and over 300,000 American servicemen provide the living guarantee of this commitment. But in a period when the Soviets have already achieved strategic parity and possess increasing advantages in conventional and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces, the Soviets might mistakenly perceive this linkage as less than credible. Further, they might be tempted to make political or even military use of their advantage in INF, a miscalculation on their part that could be disastrous for us all.

This is precisely the concern—first expressed by European leaders—that prompted NATO's "dual-track" decision of December 1979,[3] a decision agreed to unanimously by the participating Foreign and Defence Ministers. On the one hand, the Alliance decided to redress the growing imbalance in Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces by the deployment of the ground-launched Cruise missile and the Pershing II (the modernization "track"). Concurrently, NATO offered US-Soviet arms control talks, in an effort to negotiate a reduction in systems of this category (the arms control "track").

The goals of the two "tracks" are the same. Both aim to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture by redressing the growing Soviet superiority in INF. It should be emphasized that the "dual-track" decision does not in any way change the fundamental deterrent role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance's overall strategy, nor does it increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. In fact, the US unilaterally withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe in 1980.

The "tracks" are also linked in that it was concern over the NATO modernization plans that motivated the Soviets to agree to negotiations in the first place. Should the Soviets perceive the Alliance to be faltering in its commitment to proceed with modernization, or should they believe that modernization can be halted without limitations on Soviet systems, their incentive to negotiate seriously will be greatly weakened. We therefore must continue to make clear that our modernization programme can only be altered as a result of a concrete arms control agreement.

The US Negotiating Approach

The basis for the US negotiating approach is, of course, the December 1979 decision. That decision specified certain guidelines for the negotiating position. This approach was developed further through an intense and productive period of Alliance consultations. Consultations on INF arms control have been concentrated in NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), a body which I have been privileged to chair since March 1981. In addition, NATO's High Level Group did a significant amount of work last year, producing very useful analytical studies for Alliance consideration in the development of the US negotiating approach.

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[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

The SCG was particularly active between last May's Ministerial in Rome and the opening of negotiations in Geneva, meeting on five separate occasions. These meetings were conducted as a two-way street. We explained our thoughts on the negotiating approach, and listened to the views of the Allies. The views they expressed had an important influence on the evolution of our thinking. I believe the strong support the US negotiating position has received from the Allies provides ample evidence of the fact that their ideas are fully reflected in our position. This process of close consultations between the US and the Allies will be continued as the talks progress.

Let me now outline some of the key principles on which the US negotiating approach is based.

First, we believe the negotiations should proceed on a step-by-step basis toward comprehensive limitations. Our experience has shown that arms control talks have a better chance of success if the subject matter is clearly defined and limited in scope. Such a step-by-step approach offers the best possibility for early progress towards an agreement. Initial success would create a constructive framework and generate the necessary momentum for further progress in subsequent negotiations.

Second, the Geneva negotiations should focus initially on land-based Intermediate-range Nuclear Missiles. We are prepared to cancel deployment of the ground-launched Cruise missile (GLCM) and Pershing II if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20s and retire their SS-4s and SS-5s. We have chosen to concentrate our efforts on these missiles—the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, Pershing II and GLCM—because they are the most threatening systems.

Several factors—the speed, range and the virtual certainty of penetration to target—make ballistic missiles particularly worrying. The SS-20, for example, can strike targets 5,000 kilometers away in about twenty minutes. And unlike the case with aircraft, there is virtually no way to defend against a missile attack. While the GLCM is much slower than a ballistic missile, its low flight altitude and small radar cross section also give it a high probability of reaching its target. It is therefore no surprise that both NATO and the Soviet Union have indicated the most concern over these INF systems. The continued build-up of Soviet INF capabilities, as illustrated most vividly by the deployment of the SS-20 was, as we have seen, a key factor necessitating NATO's December 1979 decision. The Soviets, for their part, have themselves continually expressed concerns over the planned GLCM and Pershing II programmes. Thus, it is most appropriate to focus the negotiations initially on these missile systems.

KEY INF MISSILE SYSTEMS—JANUARY 1982

	USSR			*US*	
	SS-4	SS-5	SS-20	Pershing II	GLCM
Warheads	1	1	3	1	1
Maximum range (kilometers)	1,900	4,100	5,000	1,800	2,500
Launchers deployed	275	25	280	0	0
Warheads deployed	275	25	840	0	0

Note: NATO's planned modernization programme—scheduled to begin deployment in late 1983 and continue through 1988—calls for the deployment of 464 ground-launched Cruise missiles and 108 Pershing IIs carrying a total of 572 warheads.

Third, we believe it is necessary to take a global approach to limitations on land-based INF missiles. Because of the long range and mobility of land-based INF missiles, regional constraints—such as the Soviets publicly advocate—will not prove sufficient. For example, the SS-20 is deployed at bases on both sides of the Ural mountains. As the map illustrates, SS-20s immediately east of the Urals can strike targets on the territory of every European member of NATO. SS-20s based well to the east of the Urals can still strike significant portions of NATO Europe, and even those in the far eastern portions of the USSR, because of their mobility, could readily be moved to within range of NATO Europe.

Thus, an agreement limited in geographic scope to Europe could easily be circumvented. Such limitations on Soviet deployment of the SS-20 would be practically meaningless. Deployment could still take place—without any restriction or hindrance—east of the Urals, where SS-20s would still be within range of western Europe. The Soviet superiority in INF would be maintained and nothing gained for the security of the Alliance.

Fourth, equality is also an important part of our approach to the negotiations. The principle of de jure equality is fundamental to balanced arms control and to an East-West relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity.

Fifth, any agreement reached at these negotiations must be verifiable. The need for effective measures to verify compliance has been demonstrated by past arms control negotiations. When those measures are truly effective, they enhance confidence between the parties, allowing them to enter into agreements affecting their vital security interests. With ineffective measures, uncertainty is increased, and an agreement can become a source of contention rather than a step towards greater stability and understanding.

Sixth, reflecting the strategic unity of the Alliance, we see these negotiations as taking place in the context of US-Soviet Strategic Arms Control efforts.

Finally, the United States will negotiate on US and Soviet systems only. In bilateral negotiations, it would be inappropriate for the US and the Soviet Union to negotiate over the independent nuclear forces of any third country. Acceding to a Soviet request for compensation to offset Third Country forces would similarly be inappropriate and would violate the principle of equality.

Taken together, I believe the principles outlined above form a comprehensive approach to the negotiations, an approach which is both fair and reasonable. The US seeks the dismantling of all SS-20s and the retirement of all SS-4s and SS-5s in return for the total cancellation of its planned GLCM and Pershing II deployments. An agreement based on this proposal would not only increase Alliance security and enhance East-West stability in general, it would constitute an historic step in the effort to reduce the overall level of nuclear armaments.

Some Problems with the Soviet Approach

The US is negotiating in good faith. While explaining our position, we will listen to and consider fully and carefully the proposals put forth by the Soviets. However, let me take a moment to address two regular themes of the Soviet public position and explain the problems we see in the approach apparently behind them.

The first Soviet theme, evident from many of their public pronouncements, is that a balance already exists between NATO and the Soviet Union in "medium-range" weapons, and that the negotiation of reductions and limitations should take this "balance" as a point of departure. We cannot accept that as a basis for negotiations. First, this "balance" is plainly contrived. The Soviets, for example, have omitted large numbers of their own aircraft in eastern Europe and the western USSR which are comparable in range and capabilities to US aircraft they count, such as the F-4. Second, the Soviet "balance" includes Soviet systems in Europe only, while nevertheless including US-based FB-111s. For the reasons stated earlier, we see the necessity of a global approach. And third, the Soviet "balance" includes British and French missiles and aircraft. These are independent strategic systems that the US is not in a position to discuss.

A second theme in Soviet public pronouncements has been the merit of the moratorium on new deployments in Europe which they have proposed. The Soviets have made this suggestion throughout the last two years, most recently during President Brezhnev's November 1981 visit to Bonn.[4] It is a proposal which has been consistently rejected by the members of the Alliance for two fundamental reasons.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 617–620.

A moratorium would freeze the present Soviet superiority in Intermediate-range Nuclear Missiles, with the Soviets having over 1,100 warheads on their 580 SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles while NATO has no comparable missiles. Under these circumstances, what reason would the Soviets then have to negotiate seriously in Geneva? On the contrary, there would be a greater incentive for the Soviets to drag out the negotiations endlessly while enjoying the benefits of the moratorium.

Additionally, a moratorium is not a genuine arms control proposal. As it is limited in geographic scope to Europe, the only constraint on continued SS-20 deployment would be that additional missiles could not be deployed on the European territory of the USSR. But deployment could occur freely east of the Urals, and as the map shows, SS-20s east of the Urals can strike targets on the territory of each European member of the Alliance. Such a moratorium would do nothing to reduce the threat to NATO.

Conclusion

As can be seen, there are significant differences in the approaches the United States and the Soviet Union take to these negotiations. I would be neither honest nor realistic if I did not say these talks will be complex. They touch upon systems and certain issues that have not been dealt with in previous arms control negotiations. We will have to be patient and allow the negotiators time to work out and resolve the differences, if we wish to achieve a truly significant agreement that enhances our security and East-West stability.

On the other hand, one should not be pessimistic about the negotiation's chances of success. The United States and its allies would prefer to see the imbalance in Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces redressed through negotiated reductions. The US is strongly committed to reaching an agreement embodying this outcome at Geneva. This commitment has been affirmed publicly by President Reagan. The Soviets, for their part, are concerned about the planned modernization of NATO's Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces. Thus, both sides have the incentive to work towards an arms control solution.

The US seeks an agreement which is fair and reasonable and which substantially reduces the risk of war and the level of nuclear armaments. The negotiating approach I have outlined above provides the basis for such an agreement.

Interview of Secretary of State Haig: Linkage, Europe, and Nuclear War [Extracts], February 1, 1982 [1]

Q. The Administration initially took a strong stand in favor of linkage—the idea that cooperation between the United States and the

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 1982, pp. 29–30. The Secretary was interviewed for *U.S. News & World Report*, published Feb. 1, 1982.

Soviet Union must be contingent on good behavior by the Russians. In light of this, why are you now continuing arms talks with Russia and even contemplating a summit conference, despite Soviet complicity in the repression of the Poles?

A. First, let me emphasize unequivocally that we have not abandoned linkage in the Polish situation.

With respect to the topic of the INF talks—on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe—and the continuation of those talks, it is clear that the President believes, as I do, that these talks are more advantageous to the West than they are to the Soviet Union. And I don't know any reason why linkage across a broad front in our relationship with the Soviet Union should mean a disadvantage for the West.

The INF talks, after all, are clearly in our interests—given the current missile balance in Western Europe and the threats to Europe involving the SS-20 and other Soviet systems. Beyond that, there's a political-psychological aspect to the question: It would not serve our purpose to substitute demonstrations on nuclear armaments for demonstrations against the Polish crackdown.

Q. Does the same reasoning apply to START—the strategic arms reduction talks? Do you still expect these to begin this spring?

A. Both the INF and START talks are influenced by the overall climate and sense of mutual confidence between the United States and Moscow. That climate has been badly disturbed by the current situation in Poland, and it clearly would have an impact not only on the opening of the START talks but on the conduct of the talks themselves.

At this time we are continuing to prepare ourselves as rapidly as possible for an early initiation of START but not without careful consideration of the impact of the Polish situation, which will clearly influence both timing and substance.

Q. There is continued talk in Washington of the President's interest in a summit meeting with President Brezhnev. Is there danger that the Soviets will see this as a sign that the United States is indifferent to the Polish crisis?

A. No. I think it's awfully important that we sort out the President's view on the principle of summitry from the question of a summit in the near future with President Brezhnev. The President has very clearly emphasized the point that an international crisis may make high-level talks more urgent, but that's a reflection on principle, not necessarily a guide to the current situation.

The President has also made the point of principle that summitry must be well prepared and that the participants must have a fairly good expectation of the outcome under normal circumstances.

In the current climate, I see no prospect for an early summit.

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Q. Are you concerned that the burgeoning antinuclear peace movement in Europe may lead to an unraveling of the Atlantic alliance?

A. I think that European sensitivity—and American sensitivity—to the nuclear question requires that it be handled with great care. Many serious-minded people have important questions about nuclear weapons, and the leadership in our various capitals has a responsibility not only to answer these questions but to deal with them in a serious and responsible way.

Despite the recent demonstrations, I do not believe that they represent the mainstream of thought among the various European publics. Sensitivity varies according to country. I think it is a manageable problem.

Q. What do you see as the root cause of the European peace movement?

A. I would not equate it to neutralism or pacifism, as some have done. I would attribute it to a great sensitivity to all things nuclear, a fear among environmentalists of the dangers emanating from peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as a perception of excess weaponry on both sides.

If one looks at West Germany today and the concentration of Western nuclear weapons in that country, it is a matter of great concern to all West Germans that proliferation continues.

There are other aspects of this question which have aggravated it, such as a change in the strategic balances. Until recently the West could sit rather complacently behind a shield of overwhelming American superiority. That picture has changed, not only in central strategic systems but more recently and more dramatically as a result of the development of the Soviet SS-20—what we call intermediate-range missilery.

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Q. Hasn't the Administration contributed somewhat to Europe's nuclear jitters with talk about winning limited nuclear wars and the possible demonstrative firing of a missile and so on?

A. I don't know any responsible public official who has commented on winning a limited nuclear war.

On the other hand, I think it is also important that when public officials are asked a question, they answer that question as honestly and as directly as possible.

In hindsight, there are a number of things that the United States has done over the last year that probably I would have wished to see us do differently, but I have suggested more than once that none of us has a monopoly on either morality or wisdom.

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Report by Soviet President Brezhnev on His Meeting With the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations [Extract], February 3, 1982 [1]

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Referring to the Soviet-American talks being held in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe, Mr. Brezhnev said that the initial stage of the talks warranted a certain watchfulness on account of the evident unwillingness of the American side [2] to seek a basis for a mutually acceptable agreement. The so-called "zero option" advanced by Washington in the expectation that the Soviet Union should unilaterally eliminate all its medium-range missiles cannot be described as a serious proposal. Furthermore, the NATO decision of December 1979 [3] and the "Reagan plan" run entirely counter to the principle of equality and equal security. They aim at destroying the present military balance both in Europe and on a global scale, to the detriment of the security of the USSR and its allies.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is prepared immediately to agree on the complete renunciation by both sides, East and West, of all types of medium-range weapons aimed at targets in Europe. We can go even further: we are ready to agree on the complete elimination from Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. That would be a real "zero option". The USSR is ready to go that far. If the NATO countries agree to this genuine zero option, then peace in Europe (and perhaps throughout the world) will be set on an unprecedentedly firm basis.

But if the West is not yet ready for a radical solution, said Mr. Brezhnev, we are prepared, as a start, to agree to a sharp reduction by both sides in medium-range nuclear weapons—a very sharp reduction, amounting to hundreds of items. For example, by 1990 the present number of medium-range nuclear weapons on each side could be reduced by two-thirds, or even more, on a gradual basis: in the years immediately ahead, the arsenals of both sides could be reduced by about a third, and later we could go further. In this process, of course, the total number of such weapons in the possession of the NATO powers and the Soviet Union would at all stages remain equal.

It is also well known that the USSR, in its efforts to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement, has proposed that during the period of the negotiations there should be a freeze, both quantitatively and qualitatively, on the medium-range weapons of both sides in Europe. At the same time we would be prepared, even during such a moratorium, unilaterally to reduce some of our medium-range weapons in the European part of the USSR.

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[1] CD/240.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

This, in brief, is our position on the reduction of nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe. We are ready at any time to embody it in an appropriate agreement or, as a start, in a general declaration of principle by the parties, and we continue to hope for a positive reaction from the United States.

No less importance would attach to the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the United States of America on another major contemporary problem, that of the limitation of strategic weapons. The United States Administration has from time to time declared that it is—allegedly—interested in the radical reduction of strategic weapons. In fact, however, Washington never does anything to that end, and under a variety of artificial pretexts is even evading the resumption of negotiations.

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Statement by President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 4, 1982 [1]

On November 18, [2] I announced a broad program for peace. In that address, I stated that the delegation that was about to depart for Geneva for negotiations with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces would carry with it the U.S. proposal, according to which the U.S. would forego the planned deployment of Pershing II and intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles if the Soviet Union dismantled its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles.

On Tuesday, February 2, at Geneva, the United States submitted to the Soviet Union a draft treaty, embodying that proposal, in order to move the negotiations forward as rapidly as possible. Such a treaty would be a major contribution to security, stability, and peace.

I call on President Brezhnev to join us in this important first step to reduce the nuclear shadow that hangs over the peoples of the world.

Statement by the Assistant to the President for Communications (Gergen): Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 4, 1982 [3]

We reject the accusation that the United States is stalling the INF negotiations, and we are familiar with this Soviet proposal for phased reductions from an alleged current balance. The Soviet "balance" is based on selective use of data and is not a meaningful basis for negotiations. We are negotiating in good faith and have made a serious and far-reaching proposal which we believe provides a sound basis for agreement.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 8, 1982, p. 117.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[3] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 8, 1982, p. 118. The statement was in response to the Soviet proposal that U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles

Letter From Romanian President Ceauşescu to Soviet President Brezhnev: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 4, 1982 [1]

On behalf of the Romanian people and the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on my own behalf, I am addressing myself to you with reference to the opening of negotiations in Geneva, between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, concerning the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The Romanian people are profoundly disturbed at the serious situation which has been created in Europe through the accumulation of an enormous arsenal of weapons, and especially nuclear weapons, and the plans to install and deploy new medium-range missiles. You know better than anyone that this is creating the danger of a nuclear war which could lead only to the destruction of civilization, the existence of the world's peoples and life on earth.

All this is rousing great concern, and giving rise to large-scale demonstrations and mass movements among the peoples of Europe, who are resolutely demanding the halting of the emplacement and deployment of new nuclear armaments, the reduction of existing armaments and the freeing of our continent from atomic weapons.

As you know, the Party and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania have, from the beginning, opposed the plans to increase the number of medium-range nuclear weapons and called for the opening of negotiations with a view to preventing the expansion of the nuclear arsenals on our continent, for both sides to make a substantial reduction in such armaments, and for the establishment of conditions conducive to the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of security on the European continent.

In the atmosphere of tension existing in Europe on the eve of the Geneva negotiations, we attached particular importance to your statement, Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, that the Soviet Union is in favour of the permanent abandonment by both sides—East and West—of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe and the conversion of Europe into a continent free from nuclear weapons. [2]

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be reduced by two-thirds by 1990 and also to charges made by President Brezhnev that the United States was not negotiating seriously at Geneva.

[1] CD/235.

[2] *Ante*, Feb. 3.

When the Grand National Assembly discussed these problems at its meeting on 28 November last, it authorized me to appeal to you, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, to use every possible means to reach concrete agreements on the halting of the emplacement and deployment of new nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from Europe—vital problems for the European peoples and for international peace and security.

I have also been authorized to make a similar appeal to the President of the United States of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan.

The Grand National Assembly has further authorized me to appeal to the heads of State and Government of the other countries signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki [3] to make every possible effort to ensure the success of the Geneva negotiations, the cessation of the accumulation of nuclear armaments in Europe and the freeing of the continent from all atomic weapons.

The Grand National Assembly has adopted a similar appeal addressed to all the parliaments, Governments and peoples of Europe and to those of the United States of America and Canada.

We welcome the starting of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, in which the Romanian people place great hopes, as indeed do all the other European peoples and the people of the world at large, and they expect it to be agreed at the outset that while the negotiations are in progress the NATO decision on the emplacement of new medium-range missiles will not be implemented and that the two sides will refrain from the deployment of the existing missiles. Furthermore, the Soviet Union, as you have stated, ought unilaterally to remove some of its medium-range nuclear weapons located in the European part of the territory of the USSR. The Romanian people cherish the hope that the negotiations will result in an agreement leading to the reduction of nuclear armaments to the lowest possible level and to the adoption of measures towards the complete elimination of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, so that Europe will become a continent free of nuclear weapons.

We greatly appreciate the important role played by the Soviet Union and yourself in international life, proving that socialism is inseparably linked with the struggle for peace and disarmament, just as the founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, himself did when he issued the first legislative act of the Soviet Government, the Decree of Peace.

We would like history to be able to record that the Soviet Union, the foremost socialist country, and you yourself, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have acted and made every effort towards the complete success of the negotiations in Geneva, contributing directly to the solution of one of the fundamental problems of our continent, so that the European peoples and all mankind may be saved from the threat of a devastating nuclear war.

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[3] For the arms control portions of the Final Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

I believe you agree with me, Comrade Brezhnev, that now, before the rockets are launched, before the atomic bombs have fallen, before it is too late, in a word, while we are still alive, we must stop atomic armaments and act to save humanity from an atomic war and to defend the lives of our peoples, of all humanity.

The Romanian people and the other European peoples expect that the heads of State, and in the first instance you yourself and the President of the United States of America, will take action to ensure that the two great powers possessing atomic weapons will never use them for military purposes, and that nuclear weapons will be abandoned and the atom used for peaceful purposes only in the interest of the progress, greater well-being and civilization of humanity.

I know that there are many difficult problems to resolve, that a large quantity of armaments has been accumulated and that there is much distrust, but the cause of the peace and security of peoples must be placed above all else. We therefore consider that all the States—all the heads of State and Government of Europe have a great responsibility as regards the successful outcome of the Geneva negotiations.

Romania is prepared to co-operate with the Soviet Union, with the other socialist countries of Europe and with all the States signatories of the Final Act of Helsinki, and to participate directly in the negotiations, in one way or another, in order to contribute effectively to the halting of the emplacement and deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the substantial reduction of nuclear armaments there and the elimination of atomic weapons from that continent.

In view of the particular importance for the disarmament process and for security and confidence in Europe of the creation in different parts of the continent of denuclearized zones and areas of co-operation and good-neighbourliness, Romania is determined also in the future to make every effort to develop its good relations with all the Balkan States and to work for the conversion of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation, free from nuclear weapons.

I would like once more to state my conviction, Comrade Brezhnev, that you will do all that is in your power to ensure that the Geneva negotiations are, from the outset, fruitful and effective and that they result in the stopping of the nuclear arms race, concrete and substantial measures of nuclear disarmament, and the strengthening of peace, security and co-operation in Europe and throughout the world.

In conclusion, allow me to address to you a warm and friendly greeting and good wishes and to express the hope that the good Romanian-Soviet relations of friendship, solidarity and co-operation will develop further, in the interest of our peoples and in the cause of peace and socialism.

Letter From Romanian President Ceauşescu to President Reagan: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 4, 1982 [1]

On behalf of the Romanian people and the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on my own behalf, I am addressing myself to you, the President of the United States of America, with reference to the opening of negotiations in Geneva between the United States of America and the Soviet Union concerning the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range nuclear missiles.

The Romanian people, like the other peoples of Europe, are profoundly disturbed at the situation that has been created in Europe, which is the site of the largest military arsenal history has ever known, consisting both of conventional weapons and of nuclear weapons, which are becoming more and more highly sophisticated.

The plan to place and deploy in Europe new medium-range nuclear missiles is likely further to increase the danger of war and the state of tension on the continent, and this intensifies the disquiet of the European peoples and their determination to take energetic action to prevent the installation and deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments on this continent and to secure the reduction of the existing nuclear potential and the freeing of Europe from nuclear weapons.

The large-scale demonstrations and manifestations in which hundreds of thousands of people of the European countries, including Romania, have been taking part are proof of the will of the peoples of our continent, aware that they will be the victims of a nuclear conflict in Europe, to make the utmost efforts to secure the removal of the danger of war, the halting of the arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race, and the elimination of nuclear weapons of all kinds from this region of the world.

In this context, the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the subject of medium-range missiles in Europe are of particular importance.

When the Grand National Assembly discussed these problems at its meeting on 28 November last, it authorized me to appeal to you, President Reagan, to do everything in your power to ensure that the Geneva negotiations will lead to concrete agreements on the halting of the emplacement and deployment in Europe of new nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of medium-range missiles from this continent.

I have also been authorized by the Grand National Assembly to make a similar appeal to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev.

I have further been authorized to appeal to the heads of State and Government of the other countries signatories of the Final Act of

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[1] CD/235.

Helsinki[2] to make every effort to ensure the success of the Geneva negotiations, the cessation of the accumulation of nuclear armaments in Europe and the freeing of the continent from all atomic weapons.

The Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania has adopted a similar appeal addressed to all the parliaments, Governments and peoples of the countries of Europe and to those of the United States of America and Canada.

We welcome the starting of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva. The Romanian people, like all the other European peoples, expect it to be agreed at the outset of the negotiations that while they are in progress, the NATO decision on the emplacement of new medium-range missiles in Europe[3] will not be implemented and that the two sides will refrain from the deployment of the existing missiles. They also expect the Soviet Union, in accordance with the statement of President L.I. Brezhnev, unilaterally to remove some of its medium-range nuclear weapons located on the European side of the territory of the USSR.[4] Furthermore, the Romanian people hope that the Geneva negotiations will result in an agreement leading to the reduction of nuclear armaments in Europe to the lowest possible level and the adoption of measures for the permanent elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons and also tactical weapons, so that Europe may become a continent free of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I should like to appeal to you, Mr. President, in the name of the Romanian people, to use your authority as leader of the United States of America in order to contribute directly to the smooth conduct of the negotiations and to help them proceed constructively and fruitfully with a view to their successful conclusion, so that they may meet the expectations of the peoples of the world and count as a major event with far-reaching positive implications for contemporary political life.

I believe you would agree with me, Mr. President, that before the missiles go into action, before the atomic bombs are dropped on the continent, now, before it is too late, while we are still alive and can act, we must do all we can to reduce nuclear weapons and eliminate them from Europe, to defend man's fundamental right to life, liberty and peace.

The Romanian people, like the other peoples, hope that the heads of State, and in the very first instance you yourself and the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, will act so that the two great Powers possessing nuclear armaments will never use them, so that they will abandon nuclear weapons and use the atom for peaceful purposes only, in the interest of the progress, the greater well-being and the civilization of humanity.

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[2] For the arms control portions of the Final Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[4] *Ante*, Feb. 3.

I know that there are many difficulties in international life and numerous complex problems that are difficult to resolve, and that many weapons and much distrust have accumulated, but the cause of putting a stop to the arms race and bringing about the relaxation of tension and the reduction of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, must be placed above all else. In this spirit, I feel that all the European States should manifest a special interest and concern for the success of the Geneva negotiations, and should participate in some way in the negotiations. As for Romania, it will continue to co-operate with the United States of America and with the other States for the success of the negotiations, and it is prepared to participate in them in one way or another.

In view of the particular importance for the disarmament process and for security and confidence in Europe of the creation in different parts of the continent of denuclearized zones and areas of co-operation and good-neighbourliness, Romania is determined also in the future to make every effort to develop its good relations with all the Balkan States and to work for the conversion of the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation free from nuclear weapons, and it would welcome help from the United States of America in achieving this goal of the Balkan peoples.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you my warm greetings and good wishes, together with my hope that we may also co-operate in the future towards the development of the relations of co-operation between Romania and the United States of America, in our mutual interest and in the cause of peace, co-operation and international détente.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology (Buckley) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Proposed Sale of U.S. Aircraft to Venezuela, February 5, 1982 [1]

I am pleased, as always, to be here. I welcome the opportunity to discuss Venezuela's request to purchase F-16 aircraft and to explain why the Administration has approved the request and believes the proposed purchase should be allowed to proceed.

Our decision is consistent with the Administration's arms transfer policy and should be viewed in the context of the strategic situation in the world today. Over the last decade, Soviet arms transfers to the Third World have steadily increased. For the last several years, the Soviets have been the largest source of arms for Third World countries, exceeding U.S. arms deliveries in virtually every major arms category, sometimes by two- or threefold and more. Soviet arms transfers to the Third World include sophisticated, high-quality equipment as well as quantity. Indeed, in some cases the Soviets have offered top-of-the-line equipment to their Third World customers even before it moves into the inventories of other Communist countries, such as MiG-25 fighters to Iraq and Nanuchka class patrol craft to Libya.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 1982, pp. 84–85.

In short, in recent years the Soviets have supplied the Third World with more and higher quality arms than ever before.

Soviet arms are the life's blood of Soviet aggression by proxy. In recent years, the Soviets and their proxies have repeatedly used force or the threat of force to expand their influence and frustrate peaceful change. With Soviet arms and support, Vietnamese troops occupy Kampuchea and threaten Thailand; Libya threatens Chad, Tunisia, the Sudan, Egypt, and Morocco; Afghani planes and armored units raid Pakistan; and Cuban troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia threaten regional stability.

Not surprisingly, the worldwide pattern of Soviet aggression repeats itself in this hemisphere. In the last few years, the quantity and quality of Soviet arms sent to Cuba, and through Cuba to others, have sharply increased. In 1981 the Soviet Union flooded Cuba with over 63,000 tons of arms, the largest inflow in 20 years. This is only part of a decade-long effort by the Soviets to modernize Cuba's forces with top-of-the-line aircraft, armored vehicles, rocket launchers, antiaircraft weapons, and even submarines. Ominously, Cuba has recently received additional shipments of advanced high-performance aircraft and a missile-carrying frigate. Nicaragua, which receives Soviet arms, threatens to create forces that far exceed any reasonable needs for defense, and there are now reports that the Sandinista government will receive older MiGs from Cuba.

Meanwhile, Cuba has renewed and redoubled its efforts to export revolution in the Caribbean and Latin America. Cuban-supported forces have taken power in Nicaragua and threaten to destroy El Salvador's best hope for political and social reform. A Cuban-oriented regime heads Grenada. Cuban-supplied and -directed efforts to subvert elected governments have been exposed in Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia.

Soviet and Cuban activities betray an extensive effort to increase their air capabilities. With Cuban support, airfields capable of handling advanced Soviet combat or transport aircraft are being constructed in Grenada and Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the Soviets have already increased the number of their reconnaissance flights from Cuba and their naval presence in the Caribbean Basin.

It is in this worldwide and regional context that we must assess Venezuela's request to purchase on a cash basis eighteen F-16A and six F-16B aircraft. The sale, including initial training, spare parts, and support, will amount to approximately $615 million.

Last summer, President Reagan announced a new conventional arms transfer policy to supplement our own defense buildup and our foreign assistance efforts. The policy was designed to help us counter

Soviet aggression and Soviet proxies and the massive Soviet arms transfers which destabilize regions of strategic importance to the West and stretch our resources to their limits.

This Administration knows that arms are only a small part of any solution. Underlying economic and political problems will not disappear because a country has arms. Nonetheless, there is a constructive role for a sound and well-considered arms transfer policy. As President Reagan's directive stated, "prudently pursued, arms transfers can strengthen us."

Carefully crafted decisions on arms transfers promote our national interests in three general ways.

First, by helping others to help themselves, we allow them to undertake responsibilities in strategic areas that our forces might otherwise have to assume alone.

Second, by supplying others with modern equipment and compatible facilities, we complement the capabilities of our forces, should they have to act.

Third, by proving ourselves a sensitive and reliable supplier, we strengthen our ties with allies and nations that share our concerns.

President Reagan's flexible, case-by-case arms transfer policy will look favorably on a sale that furthers our security in these ways. At the same time, however, our policy requires that we take into account other conditions which would argue against a particular transfer. For example, we would question any transfer which might disrupt relations within a region, overburden a nation's economy, strain the capacity of its military, compromise critical technology, or support violations of basic human rights.

With respect to sales of aircraft, it is the Administration's policy to recommend, when appropriate, consideration of our intermediate tactical aircraft and aircraft especially manufactured for export, rather than those that are more advanced and costly. Nonetheless, there are circumstances in which U.S. national interests are best served by the sale of advanced weapons. In order to be effective, implementation of our arms transfer policy must be responsive to a nation's legitimate needs.

Measured against these criteria, it makes good sense to accede to Venezuela's request to purchase F-16s.

•Venezuela has good cause to wish to insure the future safety of its people, its resources, and the surrounding sea lanes vital to its economy.

•Venezuela currently produces about 1.9 million barrels of oil per day. Other than Mexico, and our own country, Venezuela is the only major source of oil in this hemisphere. If oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were interrupted, Venezuelan oil would be critical to the United States.

•Venezuela is also strategically located. It controls the eastern approaches to the Panama Canal and lies athwart the major sea lanes of the eastern Caribbean, through which run a major portion of our international trade and our imports of foreign oil.

•In the past few years, Venezuela has contributed to regional stability by subsidizing oil prices and providing financial assistance to less well-off nations. Most recently, Venezuela joined with Canada, Mexico, and the United States in the formation of the Caribbean Basin initiative.

•Less tangible, but no less real, is the important role Venezuela plays in the region as an example of a pluralistic and democratic society.

In short, Venezuela is a key source of oil and a strategically located democracy which plays a constructive and growing role in an important region. After 9 years of increasing oil revenues, Venezuela has made a deliberate and carefully considered decision to modernize its air force with aircraft that will serve its defense needs into the 21st century. We should accede to Venezuela's request. To refuse it would be unwise and insulting.

It would also be futile. Venezuela clearly has the resources to go elsewhere. Whether or not we sell our planes to Venezuela, Venezuela will acquire advanced aircraft.

There may be some concern that approving Venezuela's request heralds unrestrained American sales of advanced weapons in the hemisphere. It will not. In several ways, Venezuela is unique. Few other countries are as uniquely situated; few have as good a record on human rights and democratic government; fewer still have the economic resources to buy these planes. We are reluctant to impose, and our experience indicates that less prosperous nations are reluctant to undertake, the immense debt burden which the purchase of top-of-the-line aircraft entails.

In any case, this Administration intends to pursue a judicious and measured approach to all arms requests, assessing them on a case-by-case basis and against a backdrop of total U.S. interests. We are seeking to be both responsive and responsible. U.S. interests in this hemisphere and the world require an arms transfer policy that is both.

We have the opportunity to enhance the future stability and defense of a friendly democracy. In the process, we enhance our own security. This sale meets all of our tests. It strengthens our ties with an important nation, enhances its capabilities, lessens the burdens on the United States, and contributes to the stability of our "third border," the Caribbean.

Venezuela has made a deliberate, measured, and well-reasoned decision to provide for its own defense into the next century. We should respect its choice. As we would not deny ourselves the means to defend our freedom, so we should not deny Venezuela the right to defend its own.

ACDA Report Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Proposed Sale of 24 F-16 Aircraft to Venezuela, February 5, 1982 [1]

An evaluation, prepared by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, of the manner, if any, in which the proposed sale would—(i) contribute to an arms race; (ii) increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of conflict; (iii) prejudice the negotiation of any arms controls; or (iv) adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States. (Section 36(b)(1)(D) of the Arms Export Control Act)

The proposed sale of 24 F-16A/B aircraft (18 F-16A aircraft and 6 F-16B two-seat trainers) to Venezuela is not likely to stimulate an arms race in Latin America. On the contrary, from the U.S. perspective, it is helpful in reinforcing Venezuela's stabilizing role in the Caribbean. In 1981, Cuba received more Soviet weapons than in any single year since 1962. The Cuban aircraft inventory includes over 200 jet aircraft (one squadron of MIG-23 Floggers; MIG-21s, MIG-17s, and MIG-15s). The number of MIG-23 Floggers has recently been increased with the delivery of a second squadron of these advanced aircraft. Possible forward basing of MIG-23s in Grenada or Nicaragua would constitute a serious threat to the stability of the area as a whole. Venezuela has a legitimate need to modernize and upgrade its small force of aging Mirage III/V and Canadian CF-5 aircraft in order to deter attacks on its oil and other resources, and to protect vital sea lanes of communication. Venezuela's oil resources and its control of the eastern approaches to the Panama Canal make it of strategic importance to the United States.

Venezuelan acquisition of F-16s is not likely to generate widespread demands for this aircraft in other Latin American countries, and the cost would probably discourage most other countries in the region from seriously considering its purchase. Further, it should be noted that the sale of F-16s to Venezuela is not a quantum jump in the level of technology in Latin America, since Soviet MIG-23s and SU-22s, French Mirage 50s and F-1s, and British Jaguars are already in the region.

The proposed sale of F-16s is not likely to increase the possibility of an outbreak of conflict in Latin America. On the contrary, we believe that an improved Venezuelan air defense capability would contribute to stability in the Caribbean. Cuba has the potential capacity to project power far beyond its shores. By operating out of Nicaragua and Grenada, where modern airfields are being upgraded or constructed, the latter under Cuban supervision, Cuba could penetrate well into the northern part of South America and throughout Central America and the Caribbean.

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[1] *Proposed Sale of F-16s to Venezuela: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session,* Feb. 5, 1982, pp. 17–18.

While Venezuela generally enjoys cordial relations with other Latin American countries, it has longstanding border differences with Colombia and Guyana, which have expressed concern over the proposed sale. However, Venezuela already has air superiority over these countries, and there is no reason to believe that the Venezuelans would use military force to resolve such disputes. The Administration's policy of strict neutrality in territorial disputes involving Colombia, Venezuela, and Guyana is in no way altered by the proposed sale.

The sale of F-16 aircraft to Venezuela would not prejudice the negotiation of any arms controls in Latin America. There have been no new arms control initiatives put forth for the region in recent years.

The sale of F-16 aircraft to Venezuela, by contributing to stability in the region, supports United States arms control policy. Pursuant to the Administration's arms transfer policy, the proposal to sell these aircraft is based on a careful, thorough review and consideration of a wide range of factors, including arms control factors. The sale advances United States national security and foreign policy interests.

Department of State Fact Sheet: U.S. Program To Deter Chemical Warfare, February 8, 1982 [1]

Background

The Administration's ultimate goal in the area of chemical warfare is a complete and verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Until such a ban can be obtained, our objective, consistent with existing treaties and international law, is to deter the use of chemical weapons. The United States will not use chemical weapons unless chemical weapons are first used against us or our allies. The United States does not and will not possess biological or toxin weapons.

Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs

Soviet military doctrine envisages the use of chemical weapons and acknowledges their value, particularly when used in massive quantities and in surprise attacks.

Of more significance, the Soviet Union and its allies are well prepared to wage chemical warfare and to fight in a chemically contaminated environment. The U.S.S.R. possesses a wide variety of lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and the means to deliver them. They have a busy and expanding chemical proving ground and a large, well-trained chemical organization, with over 60,000 troops, whose status within the Soviet military hierarchy was enhanced during the 1970s. They have invested heavily in individual and collective protection and decontamination equipment, and they train with actual chemical agents.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* May 1982, pp. 58–59. Substantially the same document, minus the section on "Alliance Issues," was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on Mar. 23 as document CD/264.

In addition to extensive Soviet chemical warfare programs, the major accident in Sverdlovsk and evidence in Southeast Asia indicate that the Soviet Union's arsenal also includes toxic substances specifically prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.[2]

U.S. Program in the 1970s

In contrast with the Soviet Union during most of the 1970s, the United States allowed its retaliatory capability to decline, did little to improve defense against chemicals, and neglected relevant defense doctrine and training. In addition, the United States in 1969 stopped the production of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and the filling of new munitions with chemical agents. At the same time, the United States renounced the use of biological and toxin weapons, destroyed all stocks of these weapons, and converted its biological warfare facilities to peaceful purposes.

Arms Control Efforts

While unilaterally restraining our capabilities, the United States made major efforts in the 1970s to eliminate the chemical warfare threat by attempting to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Verification of such a ban is a complex and difficult problem. These efforts stalemated due principally to fundamental disagreement on the tough issue of the need for effective verification of a chemical weapons ban and particularly Soviet intransigence on questions relating to on-site inspections. Negotiations were further complicated by our weakness in this area compared to the Soviets, who possessed a decisive military advantage and had little arms control incentive in the face of the large asymmetry in chemical warfare capabilities. The Soviets did, however, have an interest in negotiations as long as it impeded improvement of U.S. deterrent capabilities.

Requirements for Deterrence

In view of the overall military balance between the United States and the Soviets, we cannot rely on other components of our military capabilities to deter chemical warfare. Consequently, to deter we find we need to improve our chemical weapons capabilities sufficiently to deny the Soviets the significant military advantage they would gain from using chemical weapons. Improving our defenses against chemical weapons is a necessary but not sufficient step to deny the Soviets such an advantage.

Improved defenses can save lives, reduce casualties, and reduce—but not eliminate—significant degradation of military performance in a chemically contaminated environment. The needed protective equipment reduces mobility, slows operations, and makes many tasks difficult or impossible. Reliance solely on improved defenses would leave the initiators of chemical warfare largely free to operate without the constraints imposed by protection; thus yielding them a major advantage and encouraging the use of chemical weapons.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Therefore, in addition to improving our defenses, we must maintain a capability to retaliate with chemical weapons to reduce the incentive to the enemy's first use, since he would also have to operate with the encumbrance of protective equipment. However, our current chemical weapon stockpile—which will ultimately be destroyed—is inadequate to provide an effective deterrent. Most of the current stockpile is not usable because it is stored in bulk containers. Much of the remainder is in ammunition for weapons that have been or will be phased out of service. The current stockpile is also lacking in weapons that can be used against the rear echelons of attacking forces. Finally, the current stockpile presents logistical problems, due to the elaborate safety precautions required in transport, which further restrict its utility.

In 1980, both the defense science board and a senior interagency review group found serious deficiencies in the U.S. chemical weapons posture and recommended an improvement program consisting of both the protective and retaliatory elements of deterrence. They made no recommendations on overseas weapons deployment.

Program Objectives and Requirements

It is the objective of the U.S. chemical warfare program to improve defensive and retaliatory capabilities to deter chemical weapons attack and to provide incentive and gain leverage in arms control negotiations.

Recent U.S. Government program requests include the following.

•The Carter Administration requests for the chemical weapons program increased from $111 million in FY 1978 to $259 million in 1981 to improve defenses against chemical warfare.

•In 1981 the new Administration's FY 1981 Defense supplemental request included $20 million to purchase and install the equipment required to complete the binary production facility authorized and appropriated by the previous Congress.

•The FY 1982 budget request included $532 million for chemical warfare programs, primarily for defense, but no funds for the production of weapons.

The FY 1983 request for the chemical program is $705 million, with over 70% for defense and 10% for disposal of obsolete chemical weapons. The remainder supports the retaliatory element of the deterrence program and includes $30 million for procurement of binary chemical munitions—the 155mm binary artillery projectile and the Bigeye aerial chemical bomb.

The defensive element of the FY 1983 program ($508 million) will improve the quality of all aspects of chemical defense: training, individual and collective protection, detection and warning, decontamination, and medical.

The objective for the retaliatory element of the program ($123 million in FY 1983, including the funds for production) is to maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of chemical warfare. We need not, and will not, plan to match the Soviets in agent/munition quantities and types. The United States will continue to exercise responsible restraint in this area and will make only those improvements necessary to insure that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability.

The binary munitions being developed by the United States contain two nonlethal substances which form the standard nerve gas only when mixed. The considerable safety, security, and logistical advantages that binary weapons offer during the entire life cycle, from manufacturing through storage and transportation to eventual disposal, make binaries the logical choice over unitary munitions for stockpile modernization. Transportation advantages make a strategy of centralized storage and crisis deployment more workable, and there is considerable flexibility in storage and control of the binary components.

Alliance Issues

The allies recognize the chemical threat and are committed by the NATO long-term defense plan to improve their chemical defenses. Our NATO allies have been informed of our intent to improve the U.S. retaliatory capability. This U.S. decision involves development and production only. No decisions or recommendations have been made regarding deployment of chemical weapons. Should it ever be determined that overseas deployment is desirable, there will be full consultation with the nations involved prior to making any decisions.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of U.S. policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Our program supports this goal by improving our military posture sufficiently so that the Soviets will perceive that they have nothing to gain from chemical or biological warfare.

It is worth noting since the end of World War I, all use of toxic chemical weapons has been against unprotected military forces and civilians who could not protect themselves and who had no ability to retaliate. Even in the intense European conflict of World War II following D-Day, Hitler did not use his chemical arsenal. He believed the Allies stood ready to retaliate.

The thrust of all our efforts in this area is to deter the use of chemical and biological weapons and to give incentive to the Soviet Union to join us in our objective of seeking a complete and verifiable ban on the production, development, and stockpiling of such weapons. If we are successful in achieving this ban, we will be able and eager to terminate the chemical weapons program at any time.

News Interview With President Reagan: Defense Spending Needed To Encourage Arms Reductions [Extract], February 9, 1982 [1]

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Mr. Weber. Shifting gears here a little bit, a lot of people seem to be picking your budget apart in terms of the money that you want to spend on the military. Why are you so strong in your support of this additional spending?

The President. I'm strong for military spending for this reason. In the last several years before this administration, the military was literally starved. There is a dangerous window of vulnerability. Even with our military buildup, we will not even be back in the range of ability to stand in the face of our adversaries, the Soviet Union, until the mid-eighties. We will still be below them no matter how much we do now.

But the truth is we're only spending about 6 percent—our military budget is only about 6 percent of the gross national product. In years past, in the fifties and the sixties, this averaged over 9 percent with the military budget. And even in the peace years, without the Vietnam war or the Korean war, it was over 8 percent, almost 9 percent. So, in point of history, we are not up to what used to be considered the normal peacetime budget.

But we have to show our adversaries that we have the will to defend ourselves. They have thought for several years we don't But coupled with that, my idea of the real way to save on defense is with them knowing that they're going to have to accept that we're going to build up to their level for our own security.

I want to sit down—and we already are sitting down with them—to discuss legitimate arms reductions, and that would be the major savings in defense and for both sides. Today they are literally starving their people of consumer products in order to maintain this great military buildup. We think they've been able to get away with this because we've been unilaterally disarming for the last several years. When they see that we mean it—I think a cartoon told it all the other day. There was a cartoon that showed Brezhnev talking to a Russian general and he was saying, "I liked the arms race better when we were the only ones in it."

Mr. Weber. By "them," obviously you're talking about the Russians.

The President. Yes.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Feb. 22, 1982, pp. 181–182. The interviewer was Skip Weber of the Iowa Daily Press Association.

Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before the Committee on Disarmament, February 9, 1982 [1]

Being in this beautiful room, the Council Chamber of the League of Nations—the Sert Room—to recall the artist who painted the murals is always a moving and a chastening experience. The memory of lost battles hovers in the air, reminding us that good intentions are not enough.

Last fall many of you participated in the meeting of Committee I [Political and Security] [2] of the U.N. General Assembly at which I had the honor to present the position of the United States. [3] I shall try not to repeat here what I said on that occasion. But a certain degree of repetition is inevitable in the interest of continuity and desirable in the interest of emphasis. For that I apologize and ask you and my other colleagues to forgive me.

Before Committee I, I noted the abiding support of the United States for the work of the Committee on Disarmament. It has taken one practical step after another to reduce the danger of war, and particularly of nuclear war. We can all draw resolve as well as pride from this record which has given powerful impetus to the arms control movement in general and to the role of the committee and its predecessors in the diplomacy which led the nations to a series of useful agreements—the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, [4] the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, [5] the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971, [6] the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, [7] and the Environmental Modification Convention of 1977. [8]

The Committee on Disarmament is unusual among multilateral organizations both in its mandate and in its methods of work. Its objective is not only to exhort the nations but to develop consensus looking to realistic action on the matters which come before it.

In noting the importance of the committee's work, I do not wish to be misunderstood. The committee cannot and should not force consensus where none exists. A willingness to compromise on nonessentials is one of the most vital and appealing qualities of democracy—it is the basis for social and political life in democratic societies. It is equally important to the possibility of international cooperation. The United Nations exists, after all, as a center for harmonizing the actions of the member states in seeking to attain the purposes of the charter. But compromise on nonessentials cannot and must not mean submerging fundamental differences. The charter is founded on the principle of respect for the equal rights of nations large and small. Consensus should never be sought by asking any nation to sacrifice its fundamental and inherent rights.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1982, pp. 39–45.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] For Mr. Rostow's statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 482–491.

[4] The text of the treaty may be found *ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[5] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[6] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 7–11.

[7] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[8] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

While it may seem paradoxical, the way toward consensus can often be eased by a frank and thorough airing of differences. And, where consensus is not possible, a clear understanding of why this is the case can make an important contribution to eventual agreement. For this reason, among others, the United States will not hesitate to set forth its views on the controversial issues with which this committee deals. We expect others to be equally frank. I assure you that in developing our future positions, we shall give respectful attention to views which differ from our own.

In the spirit of that precept, I should like now to direct attention to the key relationship between the state of world politics and a number of arms control projects which are, or should be, on our agenda. The arms control effort should be a formative influence in the process of world politics and a catalyst for peace. But the converse of that sentence is also true. At any given moment, the state of world politics can all too easily frustrate and overwhelm the potentialities of arms control. That is the challenge faced by all who are working in the cause of peace today.

State of World Politics and Arms Control Agenda

In my remarks last fall before Committee I, [9] I made the point that there is a certain unreality in the traditional discussion of many hardy perennials on the arms control agenda of the General Assembly and of this committee. The reason for this tone of other-worldliness, I said, is that it has become the habit of the United Nations to ignore the central issue in any objective study of the problem of peace—the declining influence of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the behavior of states. This momentous sentence is necessarily the first commandment of the charter. It forbids the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Its prohibition is qualified only by the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense, protected categorically by Article 51 and by the powers of the Security Council.

Yet the last two decades and especially the last decade have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions—actions which have involved the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states in every part of the world. From Southeast Asia to the Caribbean, state after state is under threat or under actual attack. Unprovoked aggressions occur without even the pretext or the excuse of self-defense. Armed bands and terrorists cross political boundaries with impunity to assault the political independence of states.

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[9] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 482–491.

The habit of shameful silence or impotent protest in the face of aggression has many consequences—all bad. Perhaps the most insidious in the long run is its impact on international law. Law reflects the pattern of behavior which a society deems right. Legal norms can survive if they are not perfectly or instantly obeyed, so long as society seeks to enforce them and does so effectively in the end. But when the breach of declared legal norms becomes the rule rather than the exception, when a society gives up any serious effort to insist that its legal norms be obeyed, those declarations cease to be norms in any meaningful sense and become no more than pious platitudes. I ask you to look at a globe and count the number of places where war is raging in violation of Article 2(4), and then consider whether our failure to defend that article strictly and impartially is not, in fact, repealing it as a constitutional principle for the society of nations.

In the view of the United States, this question should be the first item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. If Article 2(4) should become a dead letter, the quest for disarmament would be a quixotic and utopian activity. These are not words I use in a pejorative sense. The spirit of Cervantes and St. Thomas More are indispensable to civilization. Even so, we want arms control to be more than a dream, more than an aspiration. With the world in a state of anarchy, the effort to negotiate arms control agreements would cease to be a practical way for reinforcing and safeguarding peace. It would be nothing more than a despairing protest of the human spirit, a *cri du coeur*, expressing man's yearning for reason and decency in a world which was becoming more irrational and more menacing every day.

Driven by fear or by the lust for power, large and small nations rush to arm, although they continue to recite the litany of disarmament and arms control. It is no wonder, under such circumstances, that we have achieved no significant arms reduction agreements for nearly 10 years.

The basic cause of the declining influence of Article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse of arms control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and the extraordinary military buildup on which it is based.

Soviet propaganda recognizes that the world lives under threat, but it proclaims that the threat to the peace is caused by a supposed "arms race," which takes the form of a Western effort to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union and then start a nuclear war. There is no arms race. The history of the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is clear for all to see. For many years after 1945, the Soviet Union had larger conventionally armed forces than the United States, and the United States had larger nuclear forces. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union continued to increase both its conventional and its nuclear forces, while the United States remained stable in the nuclear sphere and reduced its conventional forces. The United States did not race. On the contrary, it accepted what it described as an effort by the Soviet Union to attain parity and equality, a place in the sun, recognized status as a great power. Once the Soviet Union reached equality, many people in the West believed, it would end its military buildup and settle down to peaceful coexistence under the rules of the charter.

No one in the West can accept such views now. The Soviet Union has attained military parity with the United States by any measure, yet it continues to build its armed forces and to expand its empire by means of force.

In response, the United States, its allies, and many other nations have reluctantly undertaken the burden of modernizing their armed forces in a belated effort to restore the military balance.

The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world. A great deal occurs without benefit of Soviet intervention. But the Soviet Union does exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its sphere of dominance. And the Soviet example tempts other states to commit aggression also, hoping for the immunity from effective response which the Soviet Union has thus far enjoyed in its imperial adventures.

Soviet expansion is not a marginal nuisance at the periphery of world politics. It is, on the contrary, one of the dominant elements determining the course of events. Soviet expansionism seeks to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. In that quest, the Soviet drive has gone too far. It has produced a wave of fear which will become a wave of panic unless we move promptly and effectively to restore Article 2(4) as part of the living law of international politics.

It is the conviction of the United States that the time has come for the peoples of the world and their governments to demand that the Soviet Union accept the only possible rule of true detente—that of scrupulous respect for the provisions of the U.N. Charter regarding the international use of force.

When that view is explained to Soviet representatives, they sometimes respond that we are asking them to give up a foreign policy "rooted in their nature as a society and a state." To that claim, the United States replies that we recognize the right of the Soviet Union to preach the creed of communism at will and in perfect freedom. No democracy could ever consider a different position. What we cannot accept—what the state system cannot tolerate—is the thesis that the Soviet Union has special—and exclusive—right to spread its faith by the sword. No U.N. body, no scholar in any country has been able to reconcile this basic Soviet position with the charter or with the corpus of international customary law on which the charter is based. No state can accept a doctrine which would authorize its neighbors to send armies or armed bands across its frontiers or to send arms to those who would challenge its authority. The Soviet doctrine is an attempt to square the circle. It has failed as a theory. And in practice it stands revealed as incompatible with the necessary conditions of cooperation in the international society of states.

The leaders of the Soviet Union may imagine that they have made great progress toward their goal of dominion. But that belief is an illusion. At enormous cost, the Soviet Union has made significant tactical gains during the last three decades in its quest for empire. But the Soviet effort has transformed its strategic position. It has called into being a vast coalition of nations determined to retain their freedom. It is clear that the Soviet Union can never achieve its purpose, even through war.

The moral of this tragic chapter in 20th century history is clear, and we stress it now while there is time to change course and return to the way of peace.

The highest national interest of the United States in world politics is a system of peace in which all the nations respect the rules of the charter regarding the international use of force. All the other ambitions of our foreign policy—economic stability and progress; the vindication of human rights; the advance of literacy, of education, and of culture; and the encouragement of progressive peaceful change—depend in the end on the achievement and maintenance of peace in that sense.

It is our view that the achievement of a system of peace is equally the highest national interest of every other state. Indeed, through the charter, every state has solemnly promised every other state that peace in this sense is its highest national interest. It should now be obvious—in the phrase of the Soviet former Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov—that peace is indivisible. The dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries. As President Reagan has said, the world cannot justify or tolerate a double standard with regard to the international use of force. All must obey the same rules. In the words of Secretary Haig, "the rules of the charter governing the international use of force will lose all their influence on the behavior of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course."

We hope that this session of the Committee on Disarmament will make a powerful contribution to the cause of peace by calling on the members of the United Nations to rededicate themselves to a policy of strict and unwavering respect for the rule of Article 2(4). The discussion of the problem here, and the pursuit of that discussion at the forthcoming Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) should help to crystallize a new state of public opinion throughout the world—a state of public opinion which could compel all nations to accept the vision which dominated the conference at San Francisco where the charter was approved in 1945, in the shadow of an appalling war.

The significance of what we propose here is brought out by the pattern of Soviet policy in Poland.

It has been clear for several years that, except for a thin layer of party and state officials in Poland, the Polish people have been seeking a new order of things in its homeland—an order characterized by freedom and pluralism in every aspect of the life of the nation. Above all, the Polish people have made it clear that the spirit which sustained the Polish nation between 1792 and 1918 is still unconquerable.

Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe were promised a free choice by the three victorious Allies who met a generation ago at Yalta and Potsdam. President Kennedy said on a famous occasion that "our two peoples, which now live in danger" would not be able to live in peace until the Soviet promise of free choice in Eastern Europe was kept.

But the promises of Yalta and Potsdam for Eastern Europe have not been kept. Those promises of themselves transform the crisis in Poland into a matter of deep and legitimate international concern, especially since the other terms of the postwar understanding have also eroded.

There is another and even more basic international dimension to the crisis in Poland. The military *coup d'etat* in Poland and the imposition of martial law by the military dictator of Poland were acts done with Soviet complicity and participation, under the compelling threat that if the Polish armed forces did not act, the Soviet Union would do so itself. This is a threat and use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the charter, a flagrant breach of the peace in one of the most sensitive and important strategic areas of world politics.

Finally, the United States and its NATO allies have stressed that events in Poland violate the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was signed at Helsinki in 1975. The assurances and the hopes embodied in that document give further ground for the conviction that what is happening in Poland is not a purely domestic problem.[10]

It has been the objective of the United States in the Polish crisis not only to stress the gravity of what is happening but to offer the Soviet Union a peaceful and constructive way to reconcile its security concerns with the legitimate demands of the Polish people. The state system as it developed after 1945 must accommodate itself to peaceful change. If it fails to bend, it will surely break. Therefore, President Reagan, in his statement of December 23, 1981, offered the cooperation of the United States in large-scale programs for effective action that would restore the vitality of the Polish economy, without in any way threatening the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. He recalled the American offer of the Marshall plan in the late 1940s, an offer which Poland first accepted and then was forced to reject. At the same time, President Reagan warned against steps that could let slip the dogs of war. No man can foresee or control the consequence of such developments.

The United States has high hopes for a fair and reasonable outcome of the crisis in Poland. Such a turn in Soviet policy could make many other agreements possible and help prepare the way for a genuine improvement in the climate of world politics and the fabric of the international community.

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[10] The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found *ibid., 1975*, pp. 304–308.

Negotiation of Fair and Balanced Agreements

One of the principal means on which we rely to achieve that goal is the negotiation of fair and balanced agreements for the reduction of nuclear arms, and particularly of offensive nuclear arms. Our policy in such talks, as President Reagan made clear in his speech of November 18, 1981,[11] is to propose whatever reductions are necessary to achieve for each side the equal capacity to deter nuclear war. The policy of equal deterrence would deny to either side the capacity to use or to brandish nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression or political coercion. Measuring deterrence and distinguishing retaliatory weapons from those capable of use as weapons of aggression are complex problems. With good will, they can be solved.

U.S. policy with respect to nuclear weapons currently includes several different elements. With respect to intermediate range land-based nuclear missiles, negotiations have begun in a constructive atmosphere, and consideration is being given to President Reagan's proposal to abolish all such weapon systems, wherever located.

American arms control policy is by no means limited to this aspect of the problem. In his speech of November 18, President Reagan also proposed the early resumption of Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of intercontinental-range missiles, the revitalization of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, and a vigorous attack on the problem of measures for reducing the risk of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. All these proposals, the President said, are based "on the same fair-minded principles: substantial, militarily significant reduction in forces; equal ceilings for similar types of forces; and adequate provisions for verification."

This then is the policy framework within which the United States is working toward arms control. I can assure you that the United States will play its full part in devising solutions for these problems if the Soviet Union, by adopting policies of restraint, makes it possible for the full range of arms control negotiations and other cooperative activities in this field to continue.

These basic pillars of U.S. arms control policy are fundamental to the issues on which this committee has focused much of its attention since its establishment. Foremost among these has been the question of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In the many discussions of this problem here, the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, but unanimity has been lacking on questions of approach and timing.

The U.S. Government has reviewed the question of nuclear testing in the context of its impact not only on arms control efforts but also on the need to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance, bearing in mind in particular the importance of achieving effective verification measures and insuring compliance with any agreed restrictions. It is clear that any consideration of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces. It is equally clear that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. Direct means for achieving progress toward the elimination of the nuclear menace are the restoration of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a reality in world politics, the negotiation of significant reductions in nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of the weapons themselves. Thus, while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term U.S. arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States fully shares the keen concern of members of this committee to move forward rapidly in the effort to remove the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics. The United States will work constructively with the committee in its efforts to achieve this end.

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[11] For text, see *ibid., 1981*, pp. 570-578.

In the area of chemical weapons, the Committee on Disarmament has already done useful work, and the United States commends the chairmen of previous chemical-weapons working groups and the delegations that have participated so effectively in this effort. President Reagan has reaffirmed U.S. support for efforts to achieve a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons and has directed U.S. representatives to participate actively in this important quest. The United States believes that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for work toward a chemical weapons convention. It is the intention of the United States to concentrate its efforts toward the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons in this committee. We believe the working group has successfully completed the bulk of its initial task and, in so doing, has identified important areas of agreement and disagreement. The next step is to see if it is possible to harmonize views on the major elements of an eventual agreement. Such a step is a prerequisite to the achievement of our ultimate objective, and the U.S. delegation, therefore, will support a revised mandate for the working group that will allow it to undertake this essential task.

It is no secret that views diverge widely on the subject of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The United States believes that the chemical weapons working group should devote particular attention to verification and compliance issues, from both a political and a technical standpoint. I urge the members of the working group to apply their expertise and imagination to finding ways to overcome the many complex problems which face us in this area. One such problem is that of undeclared stocks and undeclared chemical weapons production, filling, and storage facilities.

Further, when the chemical weapons experts meet, I urge that, in addition to continuing their work on toxicity standards, they be asked to examine promising technical methods for monitoring the shutdown of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. In this manner, the committee can make use of our collective expertise to try to surmount a major hurdle relating to the verification of an eventual agreement. It is the conviction of the United States that in this, as in other areas, the problem of verifying compliance with arms control agreements requires active cooperation among the signatories and not reliance on national means alone.

While I am on the subject of expert groups, I should dwell for a moment on the work of the group of scientific experts, whose efforts thus far have been pointed toward the international exchange of seismic data. As you are aware, the United States has been an active participant in all the activities of this group. We want this work to continue for as long as useful results are being produced, and we intend fully to support its ongoing efforts. We are aware of the interest which has been expressed by other delegations in an enlarged mandate for the group, one that would enable it to address the possibility of exchanging data on nuclear explosions and on certain other unusual events occurring in the atmosphere. We have also examined this possibility and want to share our views informally with other delegations. The idea here is to increase the ability of the group of scientific experts to make a useful contribution to improving our verification capabilities.

At the last session of the General Assembly, the question of controlling arms in outer space was the subject of a lively debate which resulted in the adoption of two resolutions, both of which put the problem on the agenda of this committee.[12] The United States believes that is an appropriate step. This is a difficult, complex issue that cannot be separated from broader arms control issues. Because of the magnitude of the problems involved, we cannot expect immediate progress in this area. The problem is one that we believe must be approached with extreme care. Its ramifications are legion; so are the pitfalls. Too quick a plunge without adequate prior reflection could be fatal to our objective of achieving a stable environment in outer space. At this stage, the United States is prepared to discuss the issue in a general way in informal meetings of the committee where various points of view and proposals can be thoroughly vented before any further steps are taken.

I have not yet mentioned three items that have been on the committee's agenda in the past and which await final action. I refer to the draft radiological weapons treaty, the question of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them, and the development of a comprehensive program for disarmament. The United States would like to see the radiological weapons treaty completed soon. As we have said many times before, it would not be a major step toward putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but it would be a step and anything we can do in this area should surely be done. More delay can only mean more difficulty in achieving ultimate agreement on this treaty.

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[12] I.e., G.A. res. 36/97 C and 36/99, both of Dec. 9, 1981.

In connection with another issue which has been under active consideration by the committee during its past three sessions—that of the so-called negative security assurances—I reaffirm the unilateral assurance given by the United States at the time of the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. As we said at that time:

> The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state party to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapons state or associated with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.[13]

The United States stands by this statement as a reliable and firm assurance. We have participated, nonetheless, and are willing to continue to participate in the working group which deals with this issue and would join a consensus to reestablish the group. The United States believes that development of a common assurance, as has been suggested, would be extremely difficult, although we are not opposed to this concept.

The committee's task of developing a comprehensive program of disarmament was mandated by the First Special Session on disarmament. It is extremely important. We support this effort and will continue to work constructively toward enunciation of a meaningful program to be presented to the Second Special Session. The United States believes that to achieve the necessary consensus, such a program must be realistic and must reflect the security needs of all states. It should provide guidelines for the actions of states, with an overall goal of promoting world stability and peace.

Compliance With Treaties

Both the increased complexity of modern weapons and the turbulent condition of world politics have highlighted the special importance of compliance with treaties as a factor among the responsibilities of this committee. Trust is an essential ingredient of the condition of peace. Montesquieu spoke of peace as a state of tranquility in which no man need fear his neighbor. Alas, that criterion is not satisfied today in many parts of the world. None of the neighbors of the Soviet Union can say that it feels comfortable about the inviolability of its borders. And more generally, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union radiates anxiety far beyond the states in its immediate neighborhood—to other states which fear the fate of Afghanistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the German Democratic Republic, or Bulgaria. Troubling questions have arisen about Soviet compliance with international agreements concerning chemical and biological warfare. Those questions affect every state in the world community. And they cast a shadow over the possibility of verifying Soviet compliance with treaties on the control of other arms, particularly nuclear arms.

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[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 384.

In 1967, the International Committee of the Red Cross published disturbing evidence about the use of Soviet chemical weapons in Yemen. Now, initial circumstantial evidence that lethal chemical weapons have been used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has been confirmed by new evidence from Southeast Asia—evidence of the use of prohibited lethal mycotoxins, which are particularly cruel and inhumane weapons of war. The production and use of such weapons raises most serious questions about compliance with existing international constraints on such activities, including the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and the 1925 Geneva protocol[14]—to both of which the Soviet Union is a party—and demonstrates the necessity of further consideration of the adequacy of applicable verification and compliance provisions.

It is vital that all countries concerned cooperate to the fullest extent with the work of the U.N. group of experts investigating the matter. It will not suffice simply to call attention to the problems. We deserve answers. The 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk has never been satisfactorily explained. The Soviet Union and its friends and allies have vehemently denied that the Soviet Union is engaged in any way in the use of toxins or other chemical weapons. But it remains altogether unwilling to discuss these matters in detail or to offer the kind of cooperation that might alleviate the legitimate concerns of the world community. Soviet behavior in the face of such inquiries has simply deepened the suspicions and anxiety of all persons of good will. This is a fact of particular importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

It is essential, therefore, that the verification of compliance with arms control treaties be made a central feature of our work program here. Until the nations agree on the principle of far-reaching international cooperation in monitoring and enforcing compliance with such agreements, arms control and disarmament cannot begin to achieve their full potential as programs of peace. The Soviet Union has recently stated that, while it continued to rely primarily on national means of verification of compliance with arms control treaties, it was willing to accept cooperative means of verification where circumstances make such procedures necessary and desirable. The United States welcomes this assurance. And it recalls the fact that in 1947, the Soviet Union made a far more comprehensive statement of its readiness to accept inspection and other cooperative means of verification in the interest of arms control during the consideration of the U.S. proposal for the international control of nuclear energy, known as the Baruch plan.[15] The volatility and fragility of the international atmosphere make it essential that the Soviet Union go beyond President Brezhnev's statement of November 23, 1981,[16] to Foreign Minister Gromyko's earlier and more ample offer.

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[14] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

Thus far, I have alluded only in passing to the Second SSOD. That is because in many respects its shape and the nature of its contribution to our common endeavors cannot yet be clearly foreseen. In no small part, what happens in New York in June will depend upon what happens here between now and then. The committee's work on the comprehensive program of disarmament will be a major input. In that effort, the United States wishes to play an active and energetic role. But, obviously, all does not rest on what we do here. Much will depend on whether the behavior of states conforms to their professed goals and intentions. The work of the second special session will be particularly sensitive to this factor. Let us hope that, to the extent we can influence events, this committee will contribute to a special session which should be marked by a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations in the effort to maintain peace and security for all mankind.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament, February 9, 1982[1]

Mr. Chairman, in its statement of 2 February the Soviet delegation presented its position on the basic questions on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.[2] We deemed it necessary to do so on the opening day of the current session as we seek, from the very beginning, to participate in the work of the Committee in a constructive spirit. If the Committee on Disarmament manages to make progress on specific aspects of the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, it will make a not insignificant contribution to the solution of the basic global problem now facing mankind: the removal of the danger of war. This danger has, unfortunately, not diminished in recent times but increased, which imposes an even greater responsibility on the Committee.

In view of the present international situation, the task facing the Committee is already rather complex. We therefore vigorously condemn the actions of those delegations which seek to render the negotiations in the Committee even more difficult by introducing into them problems totally unrelated to the content of the negotiations and mixing up questions of completely divergent character into a single tangled skein. We are deeply convinced that the Committee's task is to concentrate all its attention on questions relating to the limitation of the arms race, objectively analysing the real difficulties arising in disarmament negotiations, and together to work towards overcoming them.

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[15] The Baruch Plan may be found *ibid., 1945–1959,* vol. 1, pp. 7–16, the Soviet statement, *ibid.,* pp. 85–88.

[16] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 617–620.

[1] CD/PV.152, pp. 39–44.

[2] CD/PV.150, pp. 34–41.

Who will deny that the fundamental danger to the cause of peace at the present time is the reckless acceleration of the arms race and the development of ever newer systems of weapons designed primarily for first strike capability, which is accompanied by the promotion of doctrines based on the waging and winning of nuclear war?

It is true that—improbably—the American delegation in its statement today [3] claimed that there is no arms race. This claim would imply that the United States is not engaging in an arms build-up, is not expanding its arsenals, is not inflating its military budget to gigantic proportions. All this, apparently, is simply an illusion. Let us now turn to the facts as they stand today.

In recent days we have heard about the submission to the legislative bodies of the United States of its draft budget for fiscal year 1983, which clearly reflects a policy of escalating the arms race. It has already become rather a tradition in the United States, as well as in the NATO countries, to greet special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament with sudden increases in military budgets. This was the case in 1978 when, during the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the NATO countries adopted a decision systematically to increase the military budgets of the member countries of that military-political alliance in the succeeding years. This time, too, there is a decision to increase military expenditures—even more. On the eve of the second special session the United States is preparing to adopt a military budget that sets a record for all of the post-war years. According to the budgetary message of the President of the United States, in fiscal year 1983 expenditures on United States strategic nuclear forces alone are to increase from $16 to $23 billion and expenditures for so-called general purpose forces from $88 to $106 billion. The naval and rapid deployment forces will also receive multi-million-dollar increases. Some $6.8 billion are to be spent merely on the construction of aircraft carriers. A total of $258 billion has been requested for military appropriations for the coming year. Clearly, President Reagan's decision to begin producing new types of chemical weapons on a large scale, with an allocation for that purpose of $700 million, can only be seen as some kind of "surprise present" for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mr. Rostow's statement that the

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[3] *Supra.*

United States agrees to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the banning of chemical weapons can hardly sweeten this bitter pill. The result of all this is that the United States' total military expenditures for a period of five years will amount to the truly unbelievable sum of more than $1.6 trillion.

On what, precisely, will these billions be spent?

In early October 1981, President Reagan of the United States announced his "strategic programme" for the 1980s,[4] which not only strengthens and expands previously confirmed plans but also envisages the development and deployment of new weapon systems. The American strategic programme has assigned a special place to the deployment of MX inter-continental ballistic missiles, each of which will be armed with 10 warheads of extremely high accuracy, which will make it possible to destroy heavily-defended targets, i.e. to use these rockets for a "disarming" strike.

The ballistic missiles aboard Trident-2 submarines, the construction and emplacement of which has been approved by the American leadership, will have practically the same military capabilities as the MX missiles. It is also planned to produce, in the 1980s, a qualitatively new strategic bomber, the "B-1B", and to equip the B-52 bomber fleet with strategic cruise missiles of various types. At the same time, intensive activity is under way towards the development of effective anti-missile defence equipment, the creation of the means for waging war in space, the significant expansion and renewal of the chemical warfare potential of the United States and the re-equipment of its land forces at a qualitatively higher level.

An important part in the United States' plans to achieve military superiority is undoubtedly played by the decision to deploy nearly 600 American medium-range missiles in western Europe, which will give the NATO bloc a 3–2 superiority in delivery vehicles of this category and a 2–1 superiority in the corresponding nuclear payload.

All in all, it would seem that the American leaders have great hopes of achieving "victory" in the arms race through qualitative superiority. No less than two-thirds of all federal government expenditures in the United States on scientific research and experimental design work in the coming years will be devoted to the laying of the scientific and technical foundations for the development of new and ever more destructive types of weapons. The production of new weapons systems is also being actively pursued. A clear example of this are the plans relating to cruise missiles. The possible results of such calculations based on technological leadership in armaments was quite correctly pointed out in the statement made here by Mrs. I. Thorsson, the head of the Swedish delegation, on 2 February.[5] It is difficult not to agree with her warnings.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 461–464.

[5] CD/PV. 150, pp. 25–33.

We may legitimately ask, why does the United States need such a gigantic military budget? Why has it adopted numerous programmes for the development of new generations of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction? This question is often answered by a claim that the United States, and in fact the entire NATO bloc, has fallen behind the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries. This claim is entirely false and it can easily be refuted by consulting the facts.

Despite the fact that after the Second World War the world had already witnessed a number of very dangerous upsurges of the arms race, initiated in each case by the United States and its allies—we have several times already provided examples confirming this—in recent years an approximate military balance has nevertheless been reached and it still exists, both between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty countries and those of NATO. This equilibrium exists both in the field of strategic nuclear forces and in the sphere of conventional armaments and armed forces, on a global scale as well as at the regional level.

When the SALT-II Treaty [6] was signed, the USSR and the United States exchanged detailed data on the quantities of their strategic arms. These figures are familiar to the members of the Committee. The Soviet Union had approximately 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles and the United States 2,300. However, in terms of numbers of strategic warheads, the United States had considerable superiority over the USSR—by more than one third. Over-all, however, there was an approximate balance in this field, which was to be further strengthened through the implementation of the Treaty. The situation of approximate equality in this field was, moreover, recognized both in 1979 and later by the most authoritative American leaders.

What has happened since the signing of the SALT-II Treaty? Is it possible to imagine that within the space of one or two years the Soviet Union has been able to achieve superiority, and even more, substantial superiority, in strategic weapons, the development of which requires many many years? The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, was forced to admit, at a meeting with American newspaper editors in Washington on 5 June 1981, that the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in this field was a deliberate invention. "In strategic nuclear forces", he said, "approximate parity continues to prevail between our two countries".

Approximate equality also exists as regards medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, i.e. the basic rocket-borne and airborne nuclear weapons of the NATO countries that can reach targets in the Soviet Union from the territories of western European countries and the waters adjoining Europe, that is, weapons with a range of 1,000 kilometres and more, and the corresponding Soviet weapons of similar range deployed in the European portion of the USSR. The NATO countries have 986 such delivery vehicles for use on the European continent. This includes 723 American planes, 64 ballistic missiles and 55 British bombers, as well as 98 rockets and 46 bombers belonging to France. The Soviet Union has 975 similar military units, including 461 planes and 514 rockets.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

As regards the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe now under way in Geneva, to which Mr. Rostow referred in his statement, an exhaustive evaluation of the situation with regard to those negotiations was given by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his talk with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, [7] which took place recently in Moscow. In view of the importance of what Mr. Brezhnev said on that occasion, the Soviet delegation intends to circulate the text of his remarks as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

No less revealing, too, are the facts about the numbers of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. It is, of course, more difficult to make a comparison in this sphere because of its varied and diverse nature, and the differences in the structure and organization of these forces. But a look at the basic components shows a picture of approximate equality. For example, there are 4.9 million men serving in the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc countries, while the number serving in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is rather less than 4.8 million. As far as the number of tanks goes, NATO has 24,000 units while the Warsaw Treaty countries have scarcely more—25,000 units. As regards air forces, despite the somewhat larger number of military aircraft in the forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries (by a 1.2 to 1 ratio), NATO has superiority in air support capacity (by a 3 to 1 ratio) and in the number of helicopters (by a 1.8 to 1 ratio). The exchange of numerical data at the Vienna talks, the last of which related to the situation as of 1 January 1980, confirms that there is approximate equality in the numbers of land and air forces of the two sides in Central Europe, where the NATO countries have 991,000 men and the Warsaw Treaty countries 979,000.

We could continue this comparison of numerical data confirming that there is an equilibrium. Detailed comparative data on the various types of weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO can be found in a book prepared by the Soviet Ministry of Defence entitled, "Where does the threat to peace come from?". This book was published in Moscow in January 1982 and we can acquaint interested delegations with it. The information given in the book convincingly demonstrates that the balance exists not only on paper but also in fact. Thus, there is no need for the United States to catch up in weaponry as it has not fallen behind the Soviet Union.

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[7] *Ante*, Feb. 3.

Do Western strategic planners know all this? Of course they do. Nevertheless their plans for the building up of armaments of all kinds that are being prepared and adopted today are without parallel in the entire post-war period. And why is all of this necessary? For the very purpose of destroying the balance that has been created and securing military superiority for the United States and the NATO countries over the Soviet Union and its allies. President Reagan stated this goal of the United States rather clearly during his meeting with editors of provincial American newspapers on 17 [*16*] October 1981, in which he said quite frankly that "the Russians will not be able to keep up with us".[8] Many comments in the same vein have been made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, most recently during his current trip to the Middle East region.

The United States' plans to achieve military superiority are matched by actual American policy with regard to the negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The United States broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on such important problems as the limitation of strategic weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, and so forth. In the Committee on Disarmament the initiation of serious negotiations on many key aspects of arms limitation and disarmament has been blocked for as much as a year now.

Any initiative, any step in the sphere of the limitation of armaments that might in some way affect the American programmes relating to the arms race are declared inappropriate. Today we heard that the same applies to the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests—a measure which the overwhelming majority of States have long sought to bring about but which, apparently, "must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces." This, it should be noted, was to apply only to Western States. As soon, it seems, as it is decided in Washington that the establishment of a working group on the prohibition of tests would destroy the entire theory and practice of deterrence, the group cannot be established.

Arthur Cox, writing in today's issue of the *International Herald Tribune*, says the following about the reasons for the United States' negative attitude vis-à-vis disarmament negotiations: "But the more fundamental reason for not moving towards serious negotiations is an unresolved policy debate in the Reagan administration. The majority position is still held by the hawks, who are opposed to genuine arms control and reductions. They prefer to seek the chimera of nuclear superiority. Instead of reducing nuclear weapons, they want to build and deploy the MX, the Trident-2 and the Pershing-2, which some of them claim would enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war. They are struggling to make the use of nuclear weapons a rational means of warfare. The effort is not only extraordinarily dangerous, it is insane."

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[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 467–470.

The NATO countries are trying to cover up their unconstructive approach to disarmament negotiations by making references to events in various regions of the world. In connection with the references to Poland made by Mr. Rostow in his statement today, I should like to state the following.

Attempting in some manner to justify their interference in Polish affairs, the NATO countries vary their story in various ways, claiming that martial law was imposed in Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and that the Soviet Union is generally involved in the current development of the situation in Poland. This is a fabrication from beginning to end.

The measures introduced by the highest authorities in Poland are the result of a national Polish decision; it is the business of the Poles, and only theirs. What could be more authoritative on this subject than the statements made by the Polish leadership?

It should, at the same time, be clear that the fate of neighbouring socialist Poland is not a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people gave their lives to liberate Poland from fascist slavery and this cannot be erased from the memory of either the Soviet or the Polish peoples.

Of course, if one's purpose is to disrupt negotiations and to use every means of dragging out the solution of urgent problems in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race, then of course, any device will do, including references to the situation in one country or another.

The statement we heard today from the representative of the United States, Mr. Rostow, is typical in this respect. Like many of his predecessors in the days of the "cold war", he sees the root of the evil only in "the hand of Moscow". How many such statements have we heard in our time! His statement would also lead one to believe that there are only two States in the world, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and that all other States and peoples have no particular influence on the world situation.

In essence, Mr. Rostow's statement assembled all the basic themes of current American propaganda by means of which that country attempts to justify the United States policy of a gigantic build-up of arms for the purpose of achieving military superiority.

We do not intend to enter into polemics with Mr. Rostow, for that would only distract the attention of the Committee from the vital issues it should be dealing with. I would like, however, to draw attention to the following facts.

Under the smokescreen of completely false statements about an alleged Soviet military threat, the United States is attempting to achieve a military superiority which would be a threat not to the Soviet Union alone. Any country might be or could become the victim of American military might, if the system in that country did not please American ruling circles. We do not wish to follow Mr. Rostow's example by going into a discussion of the situation in various countries where American interference in their internal affairs is now taking place. These countries and regions that are now the sites of crisis situations brought on by the actions of the United States are well known. We would also draw attention to the fact that the proponents of linkages in studying the international situation did not feel it necessary to mention the annexation by Israel of the Golan Heights—an act of aggression that was decisively condemned by the United Nations General Assembly a few days ago, or the continued occupation of Namibia by the South African aggressors, or the bloody crimes of the military junta in El Salvador, or the bloodshed in Ulster that has been going on for years now, and many many other Gordian knots in international life that truly demand immediate solution. We do not, however, think that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate place for discussing these problems, burning issues though they may be, because they are not directly related to the question of the limitation of the arms race. It would not be a realistic approach.

A genuinely realistic approach would be to solve the most acute international problems at the negotiating table, on the basis of equality and equal security, with regard for the legitimate interests of each side. This is the method the Soviet Union advocates, and it was once more authoritatively stated by L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the occasion of his meeting with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament last week. As L.I. Brezhnev stated, the Soviet leadership is firmly convinced that "for any State to base its policy on an assumption of a nuclear war and of victory in such a war is madness, irresponsibility and adventurist gambling with the fate of mankind. Diplomacy demands not entanglements but disentanglements. The Gordian knot of conflict situations and controversial issues in today's world cannot be cut by any sword. The only course is one of patient, constructive negotiations, negotiations ensuring a real limitation and destruction of arms."

This is the approach called for by the Soviet Union.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Kampelman) to the Madrid Conference of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Chemical and Biological Warfare, February 16, 1982 [1]

I rise to reply to a rather surprising statement by the delegate from the Soviet Union at our plenary session last week. The procedural chaos on Tuesday made the exercise of this right of reply inappropriate; our long list of speakers on Friday made it undesirable. I will address myself now to a narrow portion of the delegate's strange criticism of my country. Since this is an informal meeting of the heads of delegation, I will do so with some specificity, comfortable in the knowledge that it will not serve to divert our attention from the violence that has been perpetrated against the people of Poland in violation of the Helsinki Final Act.

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[1] Dept. of State Selected Documents No. 20, "Madrid CSCE Negotiations," pp. 43–45.

The Soviet delegate criticized my government for engaging in chemical warfare preparation. The reason I describe this reference as "surprising" and "strange" is that I would have thought this to be a subject that the Soviet Union would want to keep away from, since they have made every effort to hide from the world their own priority attention to this form of brutality.

All of mankind lives with the horrible reality that the unravelling mysteries of science and technology have so intensified man's capacity to be brutal to man that he runs the risk of destroying himself and his planet. This conference in Madrid is another in a long series of searching steps to seek means of minimizing the threat of war and violence for us and our children. This is why so many of us here have expressed our deep concerns about the tragic developments in Poland.

Reason and conscience demand that we continue to work for agreements and treaties among ourselves to increase the degree of sanity governing relations among states. Principle X of the Helsinki Final Act is based on the premise that if there is to be any confidence in our capacity to begin weaving the fabric of understanding among us so essential to our survival, those international treaties must be looked upon as sacred ones, to be scrupulously observed. [2] When they are not observed, we must, as we did all of last week on Poland, and as we will continue to do, express our outrage and disappointment.

As early as 1925, with the expansion of new frontiers of knowledge, statesmen with vision understood the need to deal with the awful realization that man then had the capacity to unleash poisons in the air. In that year, the Geneva Protocol was signed banning the use of chemical and bacteriological gases. [3]

Science continued to evolve and prove the maxim that the devil too evolves. The more powerful nations, including our own, found themselves in a race to adapt new learning to wartime use. The growing sophistication of bacteriology and chemistry now provided additional instruments of horrible destruction.

The United States, in an effort to inject sanity into the process, unilaterally renounced its use of those weapons in 1969. [4] A sensible solution then emerged: Let us agree mutually to renounce the use of biological or toxic weapons. An international convention toward that end was signed in 1972 by 111 countries. [5] The pledge taken was not to "develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire and retain" these biological weapons.

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[2] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308; for the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

[3] For text of the Geneva protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 591–592.

Most of the world greeted that step with enthusiasm. This was not an arms limitation; it was a disarmament agreement. We knew that the treaty did not provide for ways to insure verifiability, but we were convinced that the treaty would be observed because the alternative was too awful to be contemplated by the rational mind. This proved to be a naive error.

It is with regret, Mr. Chairman, that I bring to the attention of this meeting that the Geneva Convention of 1925 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention have both been seriously and deliberately violated by the Soviet Union. The consequences are most serious. The realization that even in this area the Soviet Union operates without restraint affects our confidence in any agreement signed by the Soviet Union. The need for absolute and unmistakable verification of any agreement to be entered into is now for us unconditional.

But the violation of Principle X of the Helsinki Final Act represented by these transgressions, serious as it is, is not our only deep concern arising from this disregard for international law and human decency. There is an intense moral and practical concern as well.

It is unmistakable that innocent people in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan have been victims of a deadly poison rained down upon them by airplanes carrying, among other lethal agents, potent mycotoxins of the trichothecene group. Death, often with victims choking on their own blood, occurs within an hour after exposure. This biological warfare agent has either been used by Soviet planes and Soviet pilots, or supplied by the Soviet Union to the pilots and planes of others.

Soviet scientists have been working on biological weapons since the 1930s. Judging by its published scientific articles, the emphasis of their work has been on how to produce the poison in massive quantities, rather than on how to create antidotes, or on how to prevent bacteriological attacks. Furthermore, we have sound reason to believe that during 1963–67 the Soviet Union tested its poison gases with bacteriological toxins in combat during Egypt's war with Yemen.

In April 1979, an explosion occurred at Soviet Military Compound No. 19 in Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains. That explosion released a cloud of anthrax spores into the atmosphere. The compound was then and is today the site of a Soviet biological weapons research and production facility. It is reported that more than 1,000 people died in that explosion. The amount of spores released into the air was much too large to be a research sample. It indicated that the Soviets were mass-producing the bacillus. We are aware of five other such facilities in operation today.

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[5] For text of the biological weapons convention, see *ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Refugee victims from the areas of biological poisoning tell tales of either "yellow rain" or "blue rain" or "black rain." The amounts of poison found on the scene and recovered demonstrate that they were manufactured and not produced by nature. The only known factories in the world that manufacture these poisons are in the Soviet Union. Their use, in defiance and violation of international agreements, merits the condemnation of civilization.

Now let me move to the related question of chemical warfare, raised by the Soviet delegate. The record will show that in 1969 the United States ceased the production of all weapons and has today only one chemical weapon production facility, which is no longer usable or used. The record will also show that today the Soviet Union operates at least 14 chemical weapon production facilities. Its armies are better equipped, better organized, and better trained in chemical warfare than any others in the world. Each Soviet combat unit, down to the regimental level, has a sizable chemical warfare contingent. Chemical warfare specialists are assigned at the company level. It is estimated that there are close to 100,000 personnel with chemical warfare training, a training which uses actual chemical agents. Soviet artillery units are regularly equipped with various kinds of chemical warfare shells and other weapons. The Soviet Union has without doubt invested heavily in all aspects of chemical warfare.

My government, therefore, found itself in a position of having unilaterally renounced production of all chemical weapons in 1969 while the Soviet Union recklessly proceeded in an effort to gain world supremacy in this area of warfare. To meet this dilemma constructively, we initiated in the 1970s an attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive and verifiable joint ban on all chemical weapons.

I have been informed by experts that the question of verification is a complex and difficult one. We concluded that on-site inspection was a prerequisite for agreement. We found that the Soviet Union rejected all suggestions for on-site inspection. It appeared to us that the Soviets had no incentive to enter into an agreement with us. They possessed a decisive advantage in this field because of our inactivity and saw no reason to give it up. Nevertheless, they continued to talk, without decision; and we saw that their purpose in going through the form of the negotiation was to impede the ability of the United States to protect its own interests by building an adequate deterrent capability. We concluded that it was essential to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we would now deny them any significant military advantage from using chemical weapons. We would improve our defenses against their use and thereby prayerfully reduce casualties; but it was also necessary for us to maintain a capability to retaliate so as to reduce any incentive that the Soviets might have for the first use of these awful weapons.

It is thus the reluctant policy of the United States to build and maintain a chemical munitions stockpile to deny a significant military advantage to any who would seek to initiate their use. We are making only those improvements necessary to provide us with a credible and effective deterrent. It is our fervent hope that this program will provide an incentive to the Soviet Union to join us in seeking a complete and verifiable ban on the production, development, and stockpiling of all such weapons.

Our objective is not to produce chemical weapons. We have demonstrated the genuineness of that objective by our unilateral action of 1969. Our objective is to achieve a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical warfare. Our unilateral restraint has not worked and has instead only resulted in a significant imbalance between our capability and that of the Soviets. It is necessary for us to try another approach. We are doing so.

The official position of our government was stated in the following announcement from the White House:

> The administration's ultimate goal in the area of chemical warfare (CW) is a complete and verifiable ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Until such a ban can be obtained, our objective, consistent with existing treaties and international law, is to deter the use of chemical weapons. The United States will not use chemical weapons unless chemical weapons are first used against us or our allies. The United States does not and will not possess biological or toxic weapons. [6]

We have had enough self-serving and misleading allegations and assertions by the Soviet Union here and elsewhere. The search for peace will not be achieved by propaganda. The search for peace will be achieved by actions consistent with peace. That is what our delegation has been asking for at this meeting. When we see action which merits a constructive response from us, I want to assure this body that our response will be immediately and generously and enthusiastically forthcoming. Until then we will expose the propaganda for what it is, just as we will continue to use this forum to expose the violations of the Helsinki Final Act, including the violence against the people of Poland, for what they are.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, February 16, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking the floor for the second time at this early stage of the session and I shall be very brief. The reason for my statement today is what the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Rostow, had to say about the CTBT issue in his statement on behalf of the United States delegation a week ago. [2] Against the background of the requests of the overwhelming majority of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament that it should now, finally and long overdue, establish a working group on this the highest priority item on its agenda, I should like to review the part of Dr. Rostow's statement dealing with the CTB.

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[6] Cf. Dept. of State Fact Sheet, *ante*, Feb. 8.

[1] CD/PV.155, pp. 35–36.

In 1977–1978 we were given to understand that the achievement of a CTBT might well be imminent. The three nuclear-weapon States, which had entered into negotiations on the issue in the summer of 1977, all voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution of autumn 1977 which established certain time-frames for such an achievement. [3] It should therefore not be difficult to understand the feelings of disappointment, yes, even resentment, among many of us around this table, when, more than four years later, we cannot even discern the establishment of a Committee on Disarmament working group on the subject. Of course, adding to the depth of our feelings is the fact that the trilateral preparatory negotiations have been dormant for more than one year and a half. The veto right ensuing from the consensus rule in the Committee has been applied *ad absurdum* when it is used to block procedural decisions on setting up subsidiary bodies to deal with items on our agenda.

Now, I want to devote my attention to what Dr. Rostow had to say on this matter in his statement a week ago. True, he did state the United States position in principle, that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue; unanimity has been lacking, however, on questions of approach and timing.

But he went on to say the following, which seems quite startling to me: "Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues." Would this statement imply the United States position to be one of refusing negotiations on a CTBT except in the context of and as a subitem to nuclear disarmament? If that is so, would that be the reason underlying the United States proposal that, in the Committee's agenda for 1982, items 1 and 2 should be merged into one agenda item? I am happy to note that this proposal has been withdrawn; Sweden for one would have opposed it most firmly. Against the prolonged resistance of the United States to establishing a CTBT working group, and against the sentence just quoted, one could easily foresee what would have happened, had the Committee on Disarmament agreed to the United States proposal. The CTB issue would have been sunk to the bottom of the morass of the very complex nuclear weapon issues, not to be raised to the surface until we have reached the millennium of complete nuclear disarmament.

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[2] *Ante*, Feb. 9.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 827–829.

True again, the statement goes on to say that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". I take note of the word "long-term", as the United States has joined repeated decisions to make the CTBT the highest priority item on the Committee's agenda. And it is very difficult to understand how the lumping together of the CTBT and "the broad range of nuclear issues" can be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of, *inter alia*, the United States to a CTBT as expressed in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which reads as follows:

> Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end . . . ,

as well as in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, which reads:

> Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end. . . .[4]

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, which were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs, nor made any announcement of its intention to interpret them in a new and less binding way. The United States is thus, as far as I can see, committed to multilateral negotiations on a CTBT on its own merits.

Let me also note the rather surprising fact that Dr. Rostow's statement did not in any respect take the non-proliferation aspect of a CTBT into account. The risk of nuclear proliferation is, I would have thought, one of the main concerns in this context.

Furthermore, in times past one of the arguments put forward against establishing a CTBT working group in this Committee was the uselessness and the difficulties of running multilateral negotiations in parallel with the trilateral preparatory talks. This is now an invalid proposition, as the trilateral talks have, as I stated earlier, been dormant for one year and a half. It is in fact, in a completely unacceptable situation that the Committee on Disarmament finds itself—one in which the highest priority item on its agenda is not at present and has for quite some time not been under negotiation anywhere.

Two members of the Committee on Disarmament have been blocking the efforts of this 40-nation body to fulfil its obligations under its mandate and agenda. They challenge an increasingly stronger world public opinion in their unyielding resistance to the most reasonable of all requests—that this body live up to its duties and commitments.

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[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

I believe that for most Governments represented in this room the present situation is totally unacceptable.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], February 18, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to express its views on the first item on the agenda, "Nuclear test ban".

It is not by chance that the Committee on Disarmament is starting its work with a consideration of the question of a nuclear-weapons test ban, because this priority issue is indeed extremely important and urgent and its practical solution would meet the vital interests of all mankind.

The question of a nuclear-weapons test ban is one of the most acute amid the complex of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests would place an obstacle in the path of the improvement and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the solution of this problem is further delayed, the accelerated development and production of new and even more destructive types of such weapons will continue.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have actively and consistently advocated and continue to advocate the complete and general cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all States in all spheres for all time; they are in favour of the speediest possible solution of this important and urgent problem.

For a number of years we have urged that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active role in bringing about the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We have supported the proposal of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to carry out negotiations in this regard. In his statement on 15 [*16*] February the representative of the German Democratic Republic proposed a wording for the mandate of such a working group. [2] We share the approach of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite persistent efforts for many years by a large group of countries, and dozens of General Assembly resolutions on this question, multilateral negotiations in the Committee have still not been started owing to the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which have blocked the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group and the commencement of negotiations on this item in the Committee.

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[1] CD/PV.156, pp. 33–35.

[2] CD/PV.155, pp. 6–12.

As you know, at the end of the 1970s trilateral negotiations were conducted on the question of a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. From the very beginning the Soviet Union sought to ensure the success of the negotiations and to this end took important steps to meet its Western partners, introducing detailed proposals on various topics. These negotiations have been broken off by the United States and we can say nothing about their further destiny.

At the same time, taking into account the great interest of the members of the Committee on Disarmament in this urgent matter, the Soviet delegation would like to inform the members of the Committee of the Soviet Union's position on some aspects of the question of the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban.

We believe that the treaty should contain a commitment on the part of each party to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any sphere, as well as to refrain from the instigation or encouragement of or any participation in the conduct of nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere else.

We believe that the treaty should be supplemented by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty and would take into account the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[3] Under the protocol, the parties to the treaty would institute a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and refrain from providing any inducement or encouragement to, granting permission for or taking any part in the carrying out of such explosions until an appropriate procedure for conducting them has been elaborated.

We support the idea that after the treaty enters into force the parties to it should continue without delay to examine the question of a procedure for the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a procedure could be embodied in a special agreement or special agreements and be brought into force through appropriate amendment of the protocol mentioned above.

We believe that in order to ensure that the treaty was without prejudice to any arms limitation agreements concluded earlier, it ought not to touch upon commitments compatible with it that have been undertaken by the parties under other international agreements. In our opinion the treaty should provide a procedure for its amendment and should contain a provision concerning withdrawal from it on grounds of higher national interests.

Recognizing the great importance of questions of verification of compliance with the treaty, we believe that the parties to the treaty should use the available national technical means of verification, as well as the possibility of the international exchange of seismic data. In the elaboration of such measures a leading role could be played and is being played by the Committee on Disarmament, under whose aegis a group of seismology experts has been working successfully for a number of years past.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Other means of co-operation could also be examined, in particular, the exchange of additional seismic data. This would be connected with the establishment and use by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of high-quality national seismology stations with agreed features.

This position was, of course, stated during the trilateral negotiations and it is reflected in the progress report on those negotiations which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.[4]

It can be affirmed that the greater part of the work of elaborating the treaty was done. There remained only two or three questions to be agreed on for the successful completion of the negotiations.

However, the adoption by the West of a policy of intensifying military preparations resulted in the negotiations on this extremely important matter being broken off, and the United States now declares that the entire problem of a nuclear-weapons test ban is not pressing.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the resumption of the trilateral negotiations without delay and is ready to do everything in its power for their successful conclusion. At the same time, as we have stressed many times, the Soviet Union has always supported and continues to support the idea that the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament should be fully used for the successful conduct of multilateral negotiations aimed at putting a stop to nuclear weapons tests in all spheres and by all those who carry them out.

We are also prepared to support the proposals for the submission by the Committee of a report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the situation as regards the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests.

In conclusion, we would like to stress here in the Committee that the Soviet Union would agree to the treaty's entering into force even if initially not all five nuclear-weapon Powers participated in it, but only three—the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In other words we reaffirm our readiness for the treaty to be signed initially by three nuclear-weapon Powers—the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom—and that we should not wait for the adherence to it of China and France. In that case the treaty would enter into force for a definite, agreed period of time and would

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[4] *Ibid., 1980,* pp. 317–321.

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remain permanently in force if the other nuclear-weapon Powers signed the treaty before the expiration of the fixed time.

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Agenda and Program of Work Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament for Its Spring 1982 Session, February 18, 1982 [1]

The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account *inter alia* the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, [2] will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;

II. Chemical weapons;

III. Other weapons of mass destruction;

IV. Conventional weapons;

V. Reduction of military budgets;

VI. Reduction of armed forces;

VII. Disarmament and development;

VIII. Disarmament and international security;

IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;

X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Within the above framework, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following agenda for 1982 which includes items that, in conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its rules of procedure, would be considered by the Committee:

1. Nuclear test ban.
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
4. Chemical weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

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[1] CD/242*.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411–439.

7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
8. Consideration and adoption of:

(a) the special report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament; and (b) the annual report to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

The Committee will conduct its work bearing in mind the contribution that it should make to the success of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

In compliance with rule 28 of its rules of procedure, the Committee also adopts the following programme of work for the first part of its 1982 session:

2–16 February	Statements in the plenary. Consideration of the agenda and programme of work, as well as the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items of the agenda.[3]
17–23 February	Nuclear test ban.
24 February–5 March	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
8–12 March	Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
15–19 March	New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
22–26 March	Chemical weapons.
29 March–6 April	Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7 April– . . .	Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies,[4] consideration and adoption of the special report to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.[5]

Informal meetings of the Committee will be held at an appropriate time during the first part of the session to consider item 7 of the agenda.

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[3] These questions will continue to be considered subsequently, if necessary, at informal meetings of the Committee. [Footnote in original.]

[4] Reports of subsidiary bodies that are ready may be considered earlier. [Footnote in original.]

[5] In accordance with rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure the draft report shall be made available to all Members of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for its adoption. [Footnote in original.]

Informal meetings of the Committee will also be held early during the session to continue consideration of the modalities of the review of its membership, including proposals submitted by members for the improved and effective functioning of the Committee.

In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 (c) of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons established during the 1981 session (CD/220), [6] the Committee decides that further consultations be held on the issues listed in (b) of the same paragraph during the week 15–19 March 1982.

In adopting its agenda and programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

Decision Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament: *Ad Hoc* Working Groups, February 18, 1982 [1]

The Committee decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, the *ad hoc* working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and radiological weapons, which were established on 17 March for its 1980 session, so that they may continue their work on the basis of their former mandates.

In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration, as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an *ad hoc* working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with the view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date.

The *ad hoc* working groups will report to the Committee on the progress of their work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They will also report to the Committee before the conclusion of the second part of its 1982 session.

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[6] For extracts, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 374–395.

[1] CD/243.

News Interview With FRG Chancellor Schmidt: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe [Extract], February 19, 1982 [1]

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Power: Let me ask you about the subject of the Geneva arms control negotiations, popularly known as Theatre Nuclear Force negotiations. One of the original reasons for making the so called double track decision on TNF (ie negotiations and preparations for deployment at the same time), was because it was believed that this would help the passage of the SALT Two agreement. [2] Is it not true that, if you could have foreseen that the SALT Two treaty would not have been ratified, you would have not agreed to the double track decision?

Schmidt: That's wrong. I criticised the Ford administration, but not publicly, for not including medium-range nuclear weapons in SALT Two. Then the Carter administration tried to renegotiate SALT Two, and I told them that SALT Two must include Euro-strategic weapons as well as long-range ones.

The Carter administration, namely Zib Brzezinski, told me that this was none of my business. I reiterated that question a second time with the Carter administration, and got the same answer. Then I went public in a speech in London in October, 1977, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Only then did the Carter administration pay attention to my deep fear that my country was going to become the victim of Soviet military pressure by means of weapons that were targeted against Western Europe, mainly against my own country.

This was the history—my part of the history—behind the double track decision. I did not act on the assumption that SALT Two was to be continued. I proceeded on my clear impression that the two American administrations did not feel it to be necessary to limit a rocket threat into Western Europe.

In the course of 1978 there was a reappraisal in the White House and at the end of 1978, we agreed on a meeting between four Western leaders, Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and myself, in Guadeloupe. At that meeting the American President proposed a plan to develop and deploy American medium-range ballistic rockets on West European soil in order to meet this Soviet threat. The Western participants at that meeting also said: Yes, we accept this as necessary, but we would like to combine this with a serious attempt at negotiations between the West and the East to limit the number of Euro-strategic weapons on both sides. This, in the course of 1979, led to the official "double track" decision of NATO in December. [3]

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[1] *The Guardian*, Feb. 19, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. VII, Feb. 25, 1982, Annex, pp. 3–5. The interview was conducted by Jonathan Power.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[3] For the decision, see *ibid.*, pp. 814–816.

You used the phrase "theatre nuclear weapons." I have always resisted that kind of language. I hate the idea that some people nourish that Europe could or even should in case of war become a separated "theatre" of nuclear warfare, leaving out the United States of America. The whole problem would not have happened if SALT One [4] or SALT Two from the beginning had dealt with medium-range weapons. They are strategic weapons. They can wipe out my own country and nation, just as Western medium-range rockets can wipe out Moscow and great parts of the Soviet Union.

The phrase "theatre weapons" is a belittling phrase which I do not accept. They are strategic weapons and I think it's a great mistake of some American authors, newspaper writers, and political leaders to think of something being strategic only when it matters to the United States of America. This is a strategic threat to the existence of West European nations, and therefore, I have always preferred the term Euro-strategic missiles, or Euro-strategic weaponry.

Power: Hasn't the impact of the SS-20 been grossly exaggerated?

Schmidt: The SS-20 arms build-up goes far beyond the nuclear capacity which the Soviet Union used to have earlier on, especially since those rockets are mobile. They don't need hardened silos and they can show up at any place any time. They have three warheads instead of one, which the older long-range missiles had and which the outmoded SS-4's and SS-5's have.

Since there is now equilibrium of the strategic nuclear threat between Moscow and Washington, the situation has changed a lot from the situation in the early 1960's, when there was an enormous American preponderance. It is not enough to have equilibrium between the vulnerability of the two sanctuaries. You also need equilibrium of the vulnerabilities between Eastern and Western Europe.

I think that President Kennedy was the first to underrate the then foreseeable development. In the early 1960's, he took out his medium-range ballistic rockets from Turkey, northern Italy, and England, in order to get rid of the medium-range ballistic missiles which Khrushchev was about to put into Cuba in 1962. I think this was the first mistake in that field. He wanted to get rid of Soviet medium-range missiles from his very doorstep.

He didn't bother too much whether they were still on the doorstep of Europeans, pointed against Europe. He didn't want to have such medium-range missiles pointed at Washington, but didn't care enough if such missiles were pointed against Paris or London, or Rome or Bonn. The fact is that my country is a non-nuclear country, and will remain a non-nuclear country in the twenty-first century.

On the other hand, we know very well that the Western alliance does need our military contribution, the German armed forces and our territory. We are totally decided about providing both these factors to the alliance but, at the same time we do not want to be considered as a "theatre" of warfare that can be held hostage by the Soviet Union, while excluding the sanctuary of the other great world power.

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[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

So, I think that Carter's proposal which led to the double track decision was the right proposal, and Brezhnev knows very well my decisiveness to adhere to that double track decision.

I think everybody in the world knows it, and it's only because he knows that Germany will stick to that decision that he ever accepted negotiating medium-range weapons in Geneva—a decision which he took 18 hours after Foreign Minister Genscher and myself had made it clear to the whole Soviet Politburo that we would not knuckle under to their threats, or to domestic forces inside Germany. Eighteen hours later they changed their decision, after having for seven months declared that they would never negotiate.

The new American President, Ronald Reagan, not only stuck to our negotiation intention, he carried it out at the Geneva talks, and correctly so—so that the Soviet Union was very eager to see progress. It might happen that they don't lead anywhere. It might lead to a zero solution. Both these extremes are possible, and it is also possible that they end up somewhere in between. But I will stick to my strong belief that it is necessary to establish an equilibrium in that field—and it ought to be found at the lowest possible level.

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Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 23, 1982 [1]

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DEVELOPMENTS IN INF TALKS

It is pleasant to have this opportunity once again to meet with your two subcommittees and to report to you on developments in the talks with the Soviet Union on the control of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Those talks, as you know, are being carried on in the setting of direct appreciation for the problem of controlling and reducing Soviet and American intercontinental nuclear weapons as well.

These two subjects, intermediate-range weapons and intercontinental-range weapons, can never be considered separately, since the longer range weapons can also be aimed at targets in Europe or Japan or other areas of supreme importance to our security. They should be viewed, therefore, as aspects of the same problems—those of nuclear deterrence on the one hand and of alliance solidarity—or what is called decoupling in the jargon of arms control—on the other.

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[1] *Overview of Nuclear Arms Control and Defense Strategy in NATO: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East . . . Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 4–13.

The negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces which began last November 30 in Geneva are an important element in our strategy for establishing and preserving peace. I want today to sketch the background, the development, and the current status of these negotiations in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN NUCLEAR BALANCE

Like most arms control issues these days, INF has to be viewed against the background of the significant change which has taken place in the nuclear balance over the last 20 years. That change has occurred because of the Soviet Union's relentless pursuit of nuclear superiority over the United States both in intermediate-range and in strategic weapons. When the Soviet Union deployed a large number of missiles of intermediate range aimed at Western Europe in the early sixties, we were concerned. That was the source of the celebrated controversy about the "missile gap." At that time, however, the risk to Europe was minimized by the overall American advantage in intercontinental weapons. Our nuclear deterrent was fully and visibly credible, although our advantage in intercontinental-range weapons had already started to diminish by the time we concluded the SALT I agreements in 1972. [2] The United States and its NATO allies nonetheless refrained from raising the issue of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Perspectives changed in the middle seventies, however, and concern became more acute both in Europe and in the United States. Japan and many other countries followed these developments closely. The cause of the change in perspective was obvious, the development of Soviet intermediate-range weapon capacity through the multiple-warhead SS-20 missile program, coupled with the massive Soviet buildup in strategic and conventional forces. The members of NATO concluded they had to react after the Soviet Union ignored repeated Western warnings about the gross imbalance that was being created. Other countries, also ultimately dependent on the American nuclear guarantee, watched the course of events with growing concern.

WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET GRAY AREA WEAPONS

The logic behind the Western reaction to the Soviet gray area weapons, as they were called, is brutally simple: the huge and growing Soviet advantage in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which are of great accuracy and power, is designed to intimidate and paralyze our allies in Europe and elsewhere while the changing balance in intercontinental nuclear weapons makes the American strategic nuclear guarantee less and less credible. At a given point, the Soviet strategists hoped such doubts would become an overwhelming political force dividing our allies from the United States and leaving the United States isolated and impotent in a hostile world. Henry Kissinger and others articulated these anxieties during the late seventies, but the concern would have been just as acute if Mr. Kissinger had never spoken on the subject. It was—and it still is—the most dramatic example we have witnessed since October 1962, the time of the Cuban missile crisis, of the stunning political impact of the existence—not the use, but the existence—of nuclear weapons.

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[2] For text of the SALT I agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

SS-20'S

The Soviets have claimed from time to time that the SS-20 did not disturb the balance on the ground, that it is not more than a modernization and partial replacement of the older SS-4's and SS-5's, which, they say, are to be withdrawn from service anyway and scrapped. The fact is, however, that the SS-20 represents a leap ahead in the INF field, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is a modern, highly accurate missile with three warheads—the SS-4's and 5's had only one—and a range of about 5,000 kilometers. Thus, each SS-20 could hit three targets in NATO Europe, even from bases in Siberia. Moreover, and perhaps even more important, it is mobile. The Soviets have been deploying it along with its associated launch equipment at an average rate of one a week since the beginning of the program. They now have 280 launchers in place with 840 warheads. Add to this the fact that the 300 SS-4's and SS-5's are still in place, and you have a total of nearly 600 long-range INF missiles with over 1,100 warheads, most of which are now aimed at Europe or can readily be aimed at targets in Europe or Japan or at targets which may become critical in the Middle East or elsewhere, depending upon the evolution of the Soviet drive for power. Moreover, the SS-20 has a built-in and survivable refire capability which will be taken into account from the beginning in assessing its destructive capacity.

The implacable growth of the Soviet SS-20 program gave rise to the NATO two-track decision of December 1979.[3] That decision committed the United States to deploy 224 Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile launchers with 572 missiles in several Western European countries and, at the same time, to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviets which might reduce the numbers of these weapons on both sides. From the beginning of our alliance deliberations on this matter, we have agreed with our allies that both parts of the 1979 decision are of equal importance. We have begun the negotiations and are pursuing them vigorously and in good faith. Our allies, for their part, are in agreement with us that preparations for deployment must go forward and that, in the interest of allied security and stability, we must demonstrate that we are prepared to carry out our program, including the beginning of deployments in 1983, unless there is a negotiating result that makes deployment unnecessary. Without that clear determination, the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate seriously.

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[3] The 1979 decision may be found *ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

I should like to expand on this last point, because it is intimately related to the political problems both we and some of our allies—particularly certain of the basing countries—have had to face in respect to the NATO modernization decision. The argument that you have to arm—or be fully prepared to do so—in order to achieve equitable arms control agreements is not an easy one for Westerners to accept, but it is nevertheless, a fundamental axiom of successful arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and it is of critical importance in the present case. As I remarked earlier, the Soviet Union refused to negotiate at all about intermediate-range missiles until the United States with allied approval had firmly decided to make ground-based cruise missiles and Pershing II's and deploy them in Europe. We are negotiating now from a position in which the U.S.S.R. has the advantage of large numbers of weapons in place, while our counter to this threat consists of a program to put offsetting systems into Western Europe starting next year. To be sure, our program is established and well underway, and we have the strong support of our NATO allies for it, despite the political problems it creates for some of them at home. But the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated that it is convinced of the need to negotiate seriously. Until it comes to accept that necessity, for any one of a number of reasons, or for several in combination, we must assume that it will continue to conduct—the INF negotiations, not as part of a quest for stability and peace, a question in which the United States and the Soviet Union necessarily share equal responsibility, but as a tactical effort to divide the United States from Europe, from Japan, and from its other allies and vital interests; to prevent American and Allied military modernization; and to destroy the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. In short, the Soviet Union is not negotiating. It is playing to the galleries of public opinion in the NATO countries, in Japan, the ANZUS allies, and other Western nations.

I am sorry I must report this to you. Ambassador Nitze and his excellent negotiating team are doing their best to overcome these attitudes, and their best is very good indeed—and we in Washington are supporting their efforts in every possible way. But I have no progress to report.

U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION IN INF TALKS

The U.S. negotiating position in the INF talks was stated by the President in his speech of November 18.[4] It is based on a set of ideas fully considered by our NATO allies and fully supported by them. We are approaching the problems of the intermediate-range missiles in the setting of the START problem—that is, the problem of intercontinental nuclear weapons. And we wish to begin with the most destabilizing weapons in this category, the land-based missiles of great accuracy and power, like the SS-20's. We are prepared, as I have said, to cancel our program for the deployment of Pershing II missiles and GLCM's if the Soviets will destroy all of their SS-20 missiles and retire and scrap the older SS-4's and 5's. This proposal is simple and straightforward. And it addresses itself to the systems which are of most concern to both sides. The President has made it clear that we will negotiate in good faith and consider any proposals made by the Soviet Government.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

THE SOVIET POSITION

Not surprisingly, the Soviets have taken a different approach. Mr. Brezhnev laid out a good part of their position in public last November, just before the negotiations began; [5] and Moscow elaborated on it in a public statement early this month. [6] Basically, the Soviet proposals to this point consist of two related ideas: A moratorium for the duration of the negotiations; and a program of equal reductions based on the assumption that the sides are now equal in intermediate-range missiles. The proposed reduction agreement, which would expire in 1990, would reduce each side to 300 "systems" by that year.

The Soviet proposal is confined to the development and deployment of new medium-range systems—that is, those with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers and less than 5,500 kilometers—which are in Europe or "intended for use in Europe," the phrase the Soviets use. And it would be confined also to the improvement of existing systems. The restriction of the Soviet proposal to systems deployed in Europe "or intended for use in Europe," whatever that phrase may mean, is a sufficient ground in itself for rejecting the proposal. There would be no benefit to the stability of the world political system if missiles now targeted on Europe were moved eastward, where they could threaten Japan, South Korea, and other U.S. interests in the Far East. And we must never forget that the SS-20 is mobile. Systems which are moved to the east can also be moved back to the west.

The moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union would last as long, but only as long, as the negotiations for a more permanent agreement continue. Obviously, this proposal would relieve the Soviet Union of any pressure to negotiate seriously.

The Soviet reduction proposals are based on its moratorium scheme. They provide for a program of reductions to be carried out throughout the 1980's: reductions in NATO "medium-range" nuclear systems in the territory of Europe, in waters adjacent to Europe and intended for use against targets in Europe down to 600 NATO systems by 1985 and to 300 by 1990, as the Soviets calculate these figures, with corresponding reductions for the Soviet Union to the same levels. This agreement would expire in 1990 unless renewed.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 524–535, 617–620.

[6] *Ante*, Feb. 3.

The Soviet moratorium proposal would effectively kill NATO's Pershing II and GLCM modernization program, while permitting the Soviets to produce an unlimited number of SS-20's and deploy them in the eastern Soviet Union. Put more simply, it would deprive us of an important means to restore the nuclear balance in Europe—the means we and our allies chose after careful deliberation in 1979 as the most appropriate and effective means to that end. The more nearly permanent agreement the Soviet Union has proposed, coupled with its moratorium proposal, if carried out as the Soviets envision it, would not permit the United States at any time to have Pershing II missiles, GLCM's, or comparable missiles in or near Europe, while it would leave the SS-20 essentially untouched. Under the Soviet proposal the Soviet Union could have 300 SS-20 launchers in European Russia—an increase even beyond their present capabilities in European Russia—and any number of such launchers in Siberia. If British and French systems are counted, as the Soviets insist they must be, the United States by 1990 would be left with virtually no INF systems in Europe, while the SS-20 program could proceed at full throttle. In essence, we are being asked to accept and perpetuate an overwhelming Soviet nuclear advantage based on the rationale that the Soviet Union has more enemies than the United States and thus has a "right" to more offensive systems.

PARITY AN IMPORTANT GOAL

The Soviet spokesmen are still refusing even to consider INF as a global negotiation. Until now they have insisted on talking not about INF but about Euro-missiles. Their goal is transparent.

We remain convinced that true parity between the two leading nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States—true parity, that is, in allowing each side the equal capacity to deter aggression against its vital interests—is of itself an important goal for each nation, indeed, the supremely important goal of its foreign and security policy, if each side is interested in restoring and preserving the system of peace. An INF agreement can make a contribution to parity in this sense. Such an event would in itself be a giant step, as President Reagan said on November 18, toward the possibility of peace.

The Soviet perception of the problem in the INF talks is altogether different from our own. The question of which systems ought to be counted in order to establish a basis for reductions lies at the heart of our difference with them. By counting British and French systems, as well as NATO nuclear-capable aircraft—and by leaving out thousands of the corresponding systems on their side—the Soviets have stated that a rough balance now exists, a balance which would be upset by the projected NATO deployments. Indeed, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Soviet position is that they have been making this argument about a rough balance throughout the period of the SS-20 deployment. They said the same things about balance several years ago when they had only a few of these weapons in the field. Yet, curiously enough, year after year, the Soviet calculation of the supposed balance always comes out at about 1,000 on each side.

QUESTION OF INF BALANCE

The assertion of an existing balance is fundamental to the proposals that the Soviets have made so far, as it is to all aspects of the Soviet position. But we have not yet reached an agreed data base for these negotiations. In alleging that a balance in INF exists, the Soviets chose to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union has an enormous numerical advantage over NATO in the field of nuclear-capable aircraft as well as in the missile field. Their so-called balance seems to omit literally thousands of Soviet aircraft with nuclear capabilities comparable to those of the American aircraft they do include. Instead the Soviets choose to focus attention on America's so-called forward-based systems. When they talk about forward-based systems, as they have since the negotiation of SALT I, the Soviets mean American nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe or on aircraft carriers, whose range permits them to reach the territory of the Soviet Union. The Soviets contend that a qualitative difference exists between our airplanes in this category and their own, because theirs cannot reach the continental United States, while ours can reach the Soviet Union.

This is a most significant argument, which throws a clear light on the Soviet Union's major interest in these negotiations thus far—to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. Soviet spokesmen simply are trying to create a doubt in the minds of our allies—and in our own minds—about the credibility of our basic commitment—that we will regard an attack on an ally or any other vital American security interest as an attack on the United States. One obvious implication of this attitude is the relegation of the countries of Western Europe and other allies to second-class status, their security being less important than that of the superpowers. At the same time, it is a shorthand way of saying that the United States has no business being in Europe. To accept such an argument would be to agree that the NATO alliance rests on a false foundation. But no one knows better than the intelligent strategists and planners of the Soviet political-military establishment that the independence of Western Europe is a vital American security interest. In their doctrine, as I remarked earlier, Soviet control of Western Europe is the first of their military objectives and the key to Soviet dominance in Asia and the Third World generally.

It is hardly necessary to comment on the Soviet proposal, which is a bare-faced claim not to equality but to hegemony. The fact that it has been made at all dramatizes the tragic gravity of the situation. As I carry on this work, Mr. Chairman, I often wonder, to recall Churchill's famous quip, what kind of people do they think we are.

Without going into detail, or trespassing in any way on our agreement with the Soviet Union about respecting the confidentiality of the negotiations, I should now like to set forth briefly for you the most important principles underlying the U.S. position in these talks.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POSITION

First, I should mention that we are focusing on land-based missiles in the upper part of the INF spectrum as the first step in the negotiations. The missiles, as I have already said, are the weapons perceived as most threatening by both sides. Just as we in the West have been deeply concerned by the SS-20 program, the Soviets have reacted most sharply to the projected deployment of Pershing II rockets and GLCM's, although as a negotiating tactic they also profess concern over nuclear-capable aircraft. These weapons, the SS-20's and the Pershing II rockets and the ground-launched cruise missiles, are the weapons to which our negotiators are addressing themselves in the first instance. Their elimination would enhance the security of the alliance and should be the priority objective of the negotiations.

Second, the need to limit systems without regard to location. Although the SS-20 is a large MIRVed system with a range of almost 5,000 kilometers, it is nonetheless sufficiently mobile and transportable so that efforts to ban it with respect to specific regions would not be meaningful. SS-20's deployed east of the Urals can still target NATO Europe, and even those deployed in the far eastern part of the Soviet Union present a threat to the basic security interests of the United States in the Far East, in the Middle East, and because of their mobility, to the NATO allies as well. We must, therefore, seek to ban these missiles everywhere and not only in Europe.

Third, negotiations only on American and Soviet systems. In bilateral negotiations it would be inappropriate for the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate over the systems of any third country. The Soviet Union knows that British and French forces are independent national systems. The United States will not accept anything less than equality in United States and Soviet intermediate-range force missiles and will not agree to include or to compensate for British or French forces. These forces exist and are maintained for absolutely basic reasons of British and French national interest. We respect those interests, and we accept them. We shall do nothing to undermine them in any way. We obviously cannot trim our sails to fit a Soviet view which maintains that Soviet forces must be equivalent to the aggregate of all its potential adversaries throughout the world. This is a claim of a right to hegemony which is not worthy of discussion. The Soviet Union could easily eliminate the basis for such concerns by giving up its aggressive, expansionist course, and undertaking to live by the rules of the United Nations Charter governing the international use of force.

Fourth, equality in outcome: That is the goal for these negotiations, equality in results, equal limitations and equal rights, reductions in order to achieve truly equal deterrent capacity. The principle of de jure equality is fundamental to balanced arms control and to an East-West relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity. This requires the negotiation of equal ceilings and equal rights for both sides. One sided arms control proposals which fail to provide equality as an outcome will not and cannot enhance security.

Our purpose in having nuclear weapons is defensive and deterrent—to prevent aggression against our vital national interests. The Soviet purpose, as we can see vividly in the case of the intermediate-range missiles now targeted on Europe, is to serve as the ultimate engine of the process of nuclear blackmail—a process of expansion involving the use of the credible threat to use propaganda, terrorism, proxy war, subversion, or Soviet troops themselves, under the sanction and protection of what they hope will be Soviet nuclear superiority. It follows that in the INF negotiations, we must pay much more attention to the distinction between retaliatory weapons and weapons which can also be used for purposes of coercion or first strike. Weapons like the SS-20 and the Soviet big intercontinental-range ICBM's are conspicuous examples of such weapons.

EQUALITY IN DETERRENT CAPACITY

This is the fundamental reason why we have proposed dismantling the entire class of Soviet intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in exchange for a promise not to make or deploy Pershing II and intermediate-range ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles. The equality we seek between the United States and the Soviet Union is equality in deterrent capacity. To achieve that result in the area of intermediate-range nuclear weapons fully justifies the President's proposal of November 18.

The Soviet Union criticizes our proposal as unfair and inequitable, indeed, they claim that we have proposed unilateral Soviet disarmament. Soviet representatives stand, so far, on proposals designed to look like programs for equal reductions from an equal base. As I have pointed out, the base is not equal. But even if it were, it would not follow that equal reductions are the only possible road to an equal result. The United States and the Soviet Union are not peasants in a country market haggling over the price of pigs. We are the two leading nuclear powers in the world, possessing arsenals of frightening power and menace. It is our responsibility—our equal responsibility—to do whatever is necessary to draw mankind back from the edge of the abyss. That is the perspective in which we approach the problem of negotiating with the Soviet Union about reducing the menace of intermediate-range and intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Fifth, arms control verification. The history of arms control negotiations, including both their successes and their failures, demonstrates convincingly the need for effective provisions to verify compliance. Such provisions can help to establish confidence within the parties and permit them to enter into agreements affecting their vital security interests. Without such assurance, any agreement would be a source of uncertainty and instability. Soviet secrecy is in itself destabilizing and will have to be overcome if arms control is to succeed. It seems quite clear to me that the arms control agreements we are now seeking—and this, of course, applies to START as well as to INF—cannot rely exclusively on national technical means for verifying compliance. If we are to achieve success, in other words, the Soviets will have to modify their historical resistance to cooperative methods of verification. The Soviet Union has agreed to the principle, although it will continue to place primary reliance on national technical means of verification, as we will also. We have welcomed this Soviet assurance, and look forward to discussing the degree to which cooperation in verification will be necessary. But the fact that cooperation will be necessary seems to me indisputable. Indeed, basing our proposal on a ban rather than on numerical limitations should ease the verification problem in any INF agreement.

Any agreement must, of course, provide against the future deployment of systems comparable to the ones it bans. At the same time, some collateral constraints will be needed to keep the agreement from being undermined by unbound systems of shorter range.

Unless the Soviet leaders see a blinding light on the road to Damascus—and we can hope for such a miracle, but hardly count on it—we must assume that the road ahead will be long, slow, and hard. If the Soviet Union negotiates as it has in the past, we should not look for a break in the negotiating pattern until just before the first Pershing II's are due to be deployed. Until then, we must be steady and patient, keeping American and allied public opinion thoroughly informed, and proceeding methodically with our plans for modernizing our Armed Forces. At this point, neither optimism nor pessimism is justified. Our attitude is one of determination to initiate, to persevere, and to imagine, seeking to understand the Soviet outlook fully and sympathetically, and to take advantage of every opportunity to persuade. It is most unlikely that we shall be able to convince the Soviet Union within the framework of the nuclear equations alone. We are therefore approaching the task of arms control negotiation, as I have emphasized from the beginning of my term of office last June, by viewing arms control as an integral part of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

In that perspective, we know that the Soviet Union has profound reasons to want a period of stability in its relations with the West. Its situation in Poland has grave and far-reaching potentialities. Its economic and social problems are real. Above all, after nearly 65 years of devoting an extraordinarily large fraction of its resources to pursuing the chimera of empire, the Soviet Union ought to be ready to embrace the tasks of peace on the basis of the humanity we all share and our common obligation to avoid the unthinkable horror of nuclear war. I must tell you, however, that unless extraordinary change should occur in the Soviet Union, the present Soviet leadership, or any likely combination of its successors, would accept such an outcome of our negotiating effort only if it is apparent that continuing on its present course will surely confront the Soviet Union with unacceptable risks.

Statement by the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director (Burt) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, February 23, 1982 [1]

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss this Administration's policy on NATO, European security, nuclear deterrence, and arms control. These issues go to the heart of America's relationship with Europe and to the Atlantic partnership which we have together fashioned. This is a partnership among free nations which share a concept of man's place in society and of the manner in which intercourse between societies should be conducted. By bridging the Atlantic with the pledge that an attack on one is an attack on all—and by giving substance to this pledge through the integration of conventional forces, nuclear forces based in Europe, and strategic nuclear forces into a single continuum of deterrent power—this partnership has allowed its members to live in freedom, peace, and prosperity for over 30 years.

The Soviet Union's ambition—reflected in its force posture, its propaganda efforts to derail NATO modernization, and its INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] [2] arms control proposal—is to dissolve this partnership, to turn the United States inward, and to turn Western Europe into a nuclear hostage. The United States and its allies will not allow this to happen. By moving ahead with the implementation of both tracks of NATO's 1979 decision, [3] the alliance is demonstrating its resolve to turn back these Soviet efforts and to preserve the structure of alliance security which has maintained the peace for more than three decades.

December 1979 NATO Decision

The decision of NATO ministers in December 1979 to deploy new U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II missiles in Europe and at the same time to engage the Soviets in arms control negotiations involving intermediate-range nuclear forces provides the framework for any discussion of contemporary NATO nuclear weapons policy. This decision was the culmination of NATO's efforts over several years to come to terms with some fundamental—and troubling—shifts in the strategic environment.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1982, pp. 50–53. Mr. Burt appeared before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] For the NATO decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

One important aspect of this shift was the gradual erosion of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Throughout most of its history, NATO has relied for deterrence on a triad of forces—conventional forces, nuclear forces based in Europe, and strategic nuclear forces. The strategy of flexible response defines the relationship between the three legs of this triad. In response to aggression, NATO would respond at a level appropriate to the nature of the aggression and would retain the option of deliberate escalation should the initial response fail to cause the enemy to cease its attack and withdraw. The conventional forces of the alliance, though inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact, would serve to make a conventional response to non-nuclear aggression credible: Nuclear forces based in Europe would make clear the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in response to Warsaw Pact aggression of any kind and would serve as a visible and credible link to the central strategic forces of the United States, which were, and continue to be, the ultimate deterrent.

Up through the early 1970s, NATO had high confidence that this posture would deter Soviet aggression. While the Soviets had conventional superiority on the ground in central Europe, the alliance had the means to extract a heavy price for any conventional aggression and held the option of bringing the conflict to the nuclear level, where the West had clear-cut superiority, both in theater nuclear forces and in strategic nuclear capabilities.

But as we moved into the mid-to-late 1970s, the West began to lose this nuclear edge both in theater and in strategic forces. The result of this profound change in the strategic environment was that it was no longer clear that the posture NATO had developed and maintained over the past two decades would suffice indefinitely to deter the Soviet Union. In particular, it was feared that the Soviets could come to believe—however mistakenly—that they could threaten to use nuclear weapons based in the U.S.S.R. against our European allies without risking nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland.

These fears were substantiated by developments in the Soviet force posture which demonstrated that they were, indeed, seeking to weaken the link between U.S. strategic forces and European defense. For not only did the Soviets continue their decade-long buildup of conventional and strategic nuclear forces, they introduced in the mid-1970s a new system into their arsenal—the MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] SS-20 missile—whose range and mobility was designed to exploit the new strategic relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and to expand significantly their capability of launching strikes against our allies from the sanctuary of their own territory. This was only part of an across-the-board nuclear modernization program which included new shorter range missiles and aircraft.

The alliance recognized that these developments threatened to undermine the central principle upon which the alliance was formed—that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on all its members—and to decouple the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of Europe. The European allies were the first to express concern about these developments. The United States responded positively. The result was the alliance decision to deploy in Europe new systems which could reach deep into the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate that the Soviet Union could not devastate Europe from a Russian sanctuary and thus to insure the Soviet recognition that any war in Europe would result in unacceptable damage to the U.S.S.R.

When INF modernization is seen in this broader context of Western deterrence strategy, the myths—sometimes expressed here and frequently expressed across the Atlantic—which have come to surround the alliance decision of December 1979 melt away.

•The deployment of cruise and ballistic missiles to Europe does not move NATO away from its strategy of flexible response. Rather, the deployment decision is essential to sustaining NATO strategy. In particular, it will link more firmly the U.S. strategic deterrent to the defense of Europe.

•This deployment was not thrust by the United States upon the Europeans. Rather it represents a considered American response to a widely felt European need for an evolutionary adjustment of NATO's capabilities to take account of the onset of strategic parity and the massive and continuing buildup of Soviet theater forces, such as the SS-20.

•The deployment does not give the alliance a qualitatively new capability. The United States has had systems in Europe capable of striking the Soviet Union since 1952. Rather this deployment will permit NATO to preserve that capability and retain that element of our deterrent strategy despite improvements in Soviet air defense, the aging of our own systems, an increasing need to commit NATO's aircraft resources to conventional roles, and large-scale new deployments of Soviet INF.

•This deployment does not increase the alliance's reliance upon nuclear weapons. Rather, in providing NATO a more balanced nuclear posture, this planned deployment has already permitted a significant net reduction in total nuclear weapons located in Europe.

•This deployment does not represent a step toward the development of a NATO nuclear war-fighting capability. It is the Soviet Union which is developing the capability to fight and win a nuclear war in Europe. This deployment will force upon them the realization that NATO will not fight a war on their terms, will not permit them to regionalize a conflict to exclude Soviet territory, and will not permit them to hold Europe a nuclear hostage.

Role of INF Arms Control

At the same time, NATO recognized that effective arms control could serve the same end—reinforcement of the link between the United States and its allies. When the Reagan Administration took office, it recognized that this "track" of NATO's 1979 decision was equally important. In one of the new Administration's first foreign policy steps, it announced its intentions to pursue both tracks of NATO's December 1979 decision.

Throughout 1981 the Administration conducted an extensive review of U.S. INF arms control policy as part of its overall review of arms control policy. This review, and intense consultations with our NATO allies, culminated in the offer made by President Reagan in his November 18 address, to cancel U.S. plans for deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. [4]

The rationale behind this simple and straightforward proposal is simple: If the Soviets are willing to eliminate the systems of most concern to the West, the United States is prepared to forego deployment of those systems the Soviets declare are of most concern to them—the GLCM and Pershing II. This proposal has the full support of the alliance. It provides the basis for the U.S. position in the ongoing INF arms control negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union which began in Geneva on November 30 of last year.

The principles which guided the United States to adopt this position are worth highlighting because they illustrate the place of our INF objectives in our overall national security policy and underscore our commitment to a militarily meaningful arms control.

•The agreement should focus on the most dynamic and threatening aspect of the threat—longer range land-based INF missiles. A negotiation which attempted to encompass a wide range of other systems would divert attention away from this threat and introduce complexities which would impede our effort to achieve agreement.

•Limitations should be global in scope. Because of the range, mobility, and transportability of modern INF missiles, such as the SS-20 missile, limits applied only to those in Europe would not effectively limit the threat to Europe.

•Limits must be equal. Equality between the United States and the Soviet Union is the only acceptable basis for an agreement. The United States cannot permit the Soviet Union to achieve superiority either through negotiation or through military buildup.

•Third-party systems should neither be limited nor compensated for in any agreement. In a bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiation it would be totally inappropriate to negotiate on systems of countries not present at the negotiating table. The Soviet Union cannot, in any case, expect to be granted the right to maintain forces as large as all others combined, for the pursuit of total security by any country must result in total insecurity for all the rest.

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[4] The President's address is *ibid., 1981,* pp. 570–578.

•Any agreement must be verifiable. Given the smaller size and greater mobility of INF systems, this will be an even greater challenge in INF talks than in those on strategic arms.

The approach chosen by the President, and endorsed by the allies, adheres to these principles.

•The proposal would place limits on those Soviet systems which are of greatest concern to NATO: longer range land-based INF missiles, such as the SS-20, and on those U.S. systems about which the Soviets have expressed most serious concern, the new ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.

•The proposal calls for limits on a global basis, rather than limits confined to a specific, arbitrary region. In seeking the elimination of all SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s, the United States is willing to forgo deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in any part of the world.

•The proposal would set equal limits at the zero level. The Soviets claim that they want major reductions and parity; our proposal puts that claim to the test.

•The proposal has been put forth with verification considerations clearly in mind. A total ban on a system, such as the ban we are seeking on longer range land-based INF missiles, will be easier to verify than any numerical limit above the zero level.

Soviet Approach

The Soviets have their own two-track approach to INF. On one track they seek to decouple the United States from Europe with force deployments. On the other track they seek to do so through arms control and propaganda. Their objective is clearly revealed in the substance of the proposals they have put forward to date.

For years the Soviets refused to place their missiles aimed at Europe on the negotiating table. They argued that since these systems could not strike the United States, but only the European allies, they should be of no concern to the United States. It was only when faced with the prospect of new INF missile deployments in NATO Europe that they agreed to put their systems on the table at all. They have, for example, proposed a moratorium on the deployment of "medium-range" systems in Europe. This proposal is transparently designed to perpetuate the current Soviet monopoly on longer range INF missiles, effectively blocking NATO's planned modernization. In addition, it would do nothing to prevent the Soviets from continuing deployments east of the Urals, deployments which would still pose a threat to our allies. First made public in October 1979 [5] and repeated in various forms since, this moratorium proposal continues to be put forward by the Soviets, but more recently it has been accompanied by another approach designed to serve the same ends, through somewhat different means.

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[5] *Ibid., 1979*, p. 606.

The Soviets publicly outlined this second proposal in TASS on February 9. It calls for reductions in NATO and Soviet "medium-range systems" down to 600 by 1985 and down to 300 by 1990. Included on the Western side would be U.S. aircraft, including carrier-based and land-based aircraft not in Europe, and French and British systems. On the Soviet side the limits would include SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder aircraft in Europe. Excluded would be all Soviet systems outside Europe and aircraft in Europe of comparable range and capability to those U.S. aircraft included. This proposal would give the Soviets the right to have, at the end of nearly a decade of supposed reductions, as many as 300 SS-20 launchers with at least 900 warheads in the European U.S.S.R. alone—a significant increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities, despite their claims of a two-thirds reduction. It would not limit in any way existing Soviet systems outside the European U.S.S.R. These would thus be allowed to increase without limit—and could be further augmented under the loophole allowing the withdrawal of allegedly "reduced" systems from the European U.S.S.R. An SS-20, it must be noted, is rendered no less threatening if it is moved out of Europe but can still reach alliance territory.

The Soviet proposal, in short, would not require the destruction of a single SS-20 missile. Soviet reductions could be accomplished solely by retirement of older systems such as SS-4s and SS-5s, which Brezhnev himself has stated have outlived their useful service life. In short, it is anything but a reduction proposal as far as Soviet forces are concerned.

The Soviet proposal rests on the claim that a "balance" in "medium-range" nuclear arms exists in Europe. They cannot support this claim except by manipulation of the facts—for example by including U.S. systems not deployed in Europe, U.S. systems which do not even meet the Soviet criterion for "medium-range systems," as well as U.K. and French independent nuclear forces. The Soviets ignore the fact that if their nuclear-capable aircraft of comparable ranges are also included in the count, the disparity in their favor is made even worse. The Soviet claim that a balance exists is designed to conceal the Soviet monopoly in longer range land-based INF missiles.

For NATO, on the other hand, the impact of the Soviet so-called reductions proposal would be a severe curtailment of existing capabilities. U.S. longer range land-based INF missiles would be held to the present level of zero. Other U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces would be effectively eliminated from Europe.

The proposed outcome is consistent with an apparent Soviet view that the U.S.S.R. has a right to maintain forces as strong as those of all others combined and, therefore, must be superior to the United States. In sum, the Soviet so-called reductions proposal:

- Would not result in effective arms control,
- Would codify a Soviet nuclear preponderance, and
- Would serve longstanding Soviet political ambitions toward Western Europe, with the decoupling of the United States from Europe as an essential first step, thus turning NATO Europe into a nuclear hostage to the Soviet Union.

Serious negotiations can take place only at the negotiating table. The basic objectives of both sides were made public before the start of talks. The Soviets have since to put details of their negotiating position at Geneva into the public domain, in a transparent attempt to gain public support for their position and to undermine alliance support for the U.S. position. Continued public disclosures must raise doubts as to their true objectives in pursuing these negotiations.

The United States, for its part, remains committed to negotiate seriously and in good faith in Geneva. It remains our conviction that the simple, straightforward U.S. approach, developed in the course of allied consultations, offers the best and most equitable possibility of early agreement leading to real reductions. We have tabled a treaty containing detailed provisions of such an agreement, in an effort to move our discussions in Geneva forward.

Consultations

It is particularly important that the U.S. position in these negotiations enjoy the full support of our NATO allies. These are unique negotiations. They involve, for the first time in a bilateral negotiation, U.S. systems deployed on the territory of our allies and Soviet systems designed to strike our allies', not our own, territory. New, truly effective consultative mechanisms have been created within the alliance in response to the unique nature of these issues: the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Group.

These groups, chaired by the United States and composed of NATO officials, have insured a firm alliance consensus on both tracks of the December 1979 decision. In particular, the position eventually adopted by the United States in Geneva was the result not only of careful work here in Washington but of extensive discussions within the alliance. Both of these groups continue to meet in order to sustain allied support for a viable nuclear posture and for a realistic approach to arms control.

It is critical to underscore the importance of maintaining support for both tracks of the December 1979 NATO decision. The modernization program is a response to a challenge to the central basis of the alliance—that an attack on one is an attack on all. Without visible and continuing support for our modernization efforts, the Soviets would have little incentive to negotiate seriously. It was only in the face of continuing alliance unity behind the modernization program that the Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating table in the first place.

Arms control cannot move forward in a political vacuum. The arms control approach chosen by the United States and supported by the alliance offers a serious opportunity for effective arms limitations to eliminate the threat which made this modernization program necessary. But Soviet behavior in Poland cannot but influence the prospects for progress in these negotiations. Events in Poland cast a long shadow over all aspects of East-West relations and erode the basis for arms control.

The United States remains committed to implementing both tracks of the December 1979 decision and so are our allies. As the depth of this alliance-wide commitment is made manifest, the Soviets must come to realize that they are to be denied their primary political and military objective: to divide the United States from its allies and to shatter the unity which has given NATO its strength and resilience for the past three decades. They must be brought to recognize the need to accept substantial limits on their own forces, if they are to achieve comparable limits on U.S. forces of concern to them. It is in the belief that this recognition will come that we must base optimism for the prospects of the negotiations currently underway in Geneva.

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (Perle) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 23, 1982 [1]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I correctly anticipated that my colleagues, Gene Rostow and Rick Burt would persuasively assess the Soviet approach to these negotiations and, in the course of so doing, demolish the Soviet case. So I will not repeat that ground.

ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL

I would prefer to talk about arms control in general and our experience in the recent past that forms the basis for what understanding we now have of the prospects ahead of us.

In the Department of Defense we deal, most of the time, with technical questions, with questions of weapons procurement and budgets, but these issues of arms control are equally important. Indeed, unlike the technical issues that attend the selection of one weapons system over another, those matters of national priority that resolve into levels of defense spending, clarity about the role of arms control in our national defense is as crucial as confusion about it is pervasive.

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[1] *Overview of Nuclear Arms Control and Defense Strategy in NATO: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Europe and the Middle East . . . Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session,* pp. 54–57.

If we are wrong about the purchase of a plane or a missile or a ship, or if we spend too little for national defense, the effectiveness and capability of our forces will be diminished for however long it takes us to recognize our error and correct it.

But if we harbor illusions about our adversary and build policies of disarmament upon those illusions, if we sign treaties that create the impression but not the reality that our adversaries have joined us in a search for restraint and accommodation, we will set in motion the trends of history that weapons procurement and budget levels may prove powerless to arrest.

It is now more than 12 years since the first round of the SALT I negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland. Twelve years after the talks began, the United States again finds itself involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at limiting the nuclear arsenals of our two countries. In the intervening 12 years a generation of Americans then in the first grade has graduated from high school. And a generation of Government officials have had the benefit of an education about arms control with the Soviet Union.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NEGOTIATIONS

I want to take a moment to discuss some of what we have learned and how we in the Department of Defense intend to apply those lessons to the negotiations that lie before us.

I should say at once that a long and dismal history of disarmament preceded the lessons of the past dozen years. It was a history in which there was little in the way of disarmament that was worthy of the name, the history of disarmament that may be properly described has little more than a story of unsuccessful attempts to bring it about.

I hope that you will forgive me for beginning on a note of skepticism. The task before us is long and hard. We will not make the job easier or our policies wiser by ignoring what has come before or romanticizing about what is to come.

We have learned these last 12 years that Soviet willingness to negotiate is not the same as, and must not be confused with, Soviet willingness to accommodate. The Soviets have demonstrated a capacity to negotiate on arms control while building precisely those nuclear forces that are the subject of negotiation. Whatever they may say about the illegitimacy of negotiating from strength, it is standard Soviet practice to do so.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that Soviet spending on strategic forces actually increased in the period following the SALT I agreement.[2] From two times U.S. spending prior to 1972, Soviet spending on strategic forces increased to three times ours in the years following the 1972 agreements.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

SHIFT IN STRATEGIC BALANCE

Indeed, if one compares United States and Soviet strategic forces over the period during which we have been negotiating strategic arms limitations, the picture that emerges is one of a dramatic shift in the strategic balance.

Twelve years ago the United States was substantially ahead of the Soviet Union in virtually every indicator of strategic power except the number of warheads. Now, 12 years later, the Soviets are ahead of us in each of those same indicators except the number of warheads. And if current trends continue, as they are likely to do, it is only a matter of time—and not much time—before the Soviets will surpass us in number of warheads as well.

A dozen years ago all three major elements of our strategic triad were survivable, even under the most pessimistic assumptions about Soviet strength and American deficiencies. Today our land-based missiles have become vulnerable to Soviet attack, and our bombers face increasingly formidable air defenses that raise serious questions about their ability to penetrate and reach their targets.

The strategic balance is less favorable and more uncertain now than it was then. And all of this has taken place with arms control talks in virtually continuous session.

The United States now faces the prospect of vast expenditures, on the order of $180 billion, not to acquire strategic superiority, which is not our goal, but to restore and protect the security and effectiveness of our strategic deterrent. Our experience since SALT I got underway has shown that the Soviets have tried and have in large measure succeeded to negotiate arms control agreements that permit the continued growth of their strategic forces.

The principal argument of the Nixon administration that the SALT I interim agreement would halt the momentum of the Soviet buildup, to use the phrase most commonly used at the time, was proven false as the Soviets continued greatly to increase their forces within the confines of the agreement. One searches in vain for evidence that the continuing Soviet buildup has been deflected or diminished by the provisions of the SALT I or II agreements.[3]

Of course, it can be argued that in the absence of either or both of these agreements, the increase in Soviet strategic forces would have been even larger and our situation today would be even worse. Indeed, it was the essence of the last administration's argument for the SALT II treaty that the number of Soviet weapons permitted under it, high as that was, would have been even higher without it. Yet that argument assumes that the absence of an agreement would in itself lead the Soviets to go on building strategic forces surplus to their needs, mindlessly adding weapon upon weapon, building for building's sake.

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[3] The SALT II agreement is printed *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

In my judgment, no such assumption is warranted. The Soviets plan the evolution of their strategic forces in order to meet their strategic objectives. They certainly prefer to meet those objectives within the confines of negotiated agreements. But everything we know of the development of Soviet arms control negotiating strategy reinforces the conclusion that they only accept limitations that accommodate their plans and objectives.

MEASUREMENT OF ARMS CONTROL SUCCESS

Mr. Chairman, there is no persuasive evidence of which I am aware that any of the agreements they have negotiated have caused them to change their plans or alter their objectives. In light of our experience, I believe that we ought to measure success in arms control not by comparing the levels agreed upon with the inevitably higher levels the Soviets could build in the absence of an agreement, but by comparison with the levels of forces actually deployed when the agreement takes effect.

In other words, our objective ought to be reductions from current Soviet force levels, and the test of any agreement indeed ought to be whether it diminishes the threat posed by Soviet forces to the United States and its allies. If we reason in the future as we have in the past, we will end up with agreements whose principal effect is to legitimize menacingly large Soviet deployments.

I believe that the term "cosmetic" aptly describes the arms control agreements of the recent past. "Having the capability to beautify" is the definition my dictionary gives of cosmetic, and I should think that the last thing we would desire to do is to beautify the massive nuclear arsenal the Soviets have so intently acquired. If we are to avoid cosmetic agreements in the future, we must insist that any arms control agreement with the Soviets must diminish the Soviet threat to us and to our allies in ways that are measurable and militarily significant.

SIR SAMUEL HOARE

If I may, I should like to conclude with a reflection on an earlier negotiation and one of the participants in it. The words are those of Sir Samuel Hoare. The negotiation took place in Munich in 1938. Writing later in his memoirs, Sir Samuel Hoare had this to say:

> Like Chamberlain, I had been caught up in the toils of the critical negotiation. The longer it went on and the more serious the issue became, the more anxious I grew to see it succeed. This is almost always the course of negotiations. As they proceed, the parties in them become increasingly obsessed with the need to prevent their final failure. If they are to continue, it is necessary to make concessions, and one concession almost invariably leads to another.
>
> The time comes when the question has to be faced, is the substance being sacrificed to the negotiation, and is it not better

> to admit failure rather than make further proposals and concessions. Throughout the Munich discussions I often asked myself whether the slide into surrender had not started.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, as we enter negotiations with the Soviet Union on the control of intermediate range nuclear forces, we are well positioned by an historic proposal by the President of the United States that promises a fair and equitable and a militarily significant balance if it can be achieved.

I would hope as those negotiations continue—as my colleagues have said, and I certainly agree, the road will be long and hard—that we will bear in mind the admonition of one participant in an earlier negotiation.

Reply by Soviet President Brezhnev to a Letter From an Australian Organization, February 24, 1982 [1]

I have read your letter addressed to me and U.S. President Reagan. Your feeling of worry and concern over the continued arms race and the growing threat of thermonuclear war is close and understandable to me.

The party and state leadership of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet people proceed from the assumption that the unleashing of a thermonuclear war would be a crime threatening a catastrophe for the whole of mankind. We have pointed this out on more than one occasion.

As regards the questions put by you, I would like to say the following:

1. You ask for confirmation of the commitment not to be the first ever to use nuclear weapons.

In this connection I draw your attention to the fact that the Soviet Union has already stated that it will never use nuclear weapons against those states which renounce their production and acquisition and do not have them on their territories. We are prepared to give relevant guarantees on a contractual basis as well to any of such non-nuclear countries and urge all the other nuclear powers to assume similar commitments. Moreover, it was the Soviet Union that tabled at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly important and constructive initiative aimed at preventing the first use of nuclear weapons by anyone at any time. The declaration adopted on this basis solemnly proclaims that the states which will be the first to use nuclear weapons will thereby perpetrate the gravest crime against humanity. It was only the United States and its closest military and political allies that did not support the decision meeting the aspirations of the peoples of the whole world.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Feb. 24, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, Feb. 25, 1982, pp. AA1–AA2.

2. Your letter contains the appeal that serious agreements on folding up the nuclear arms race be signed prior to or during the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament. We for our part understand the urgency of taking these measures and will do everything within our power to facilitate the reaching of agreements on this issue.

We believe that the primary task in this field is the prompt achievement of constructive results at the Soviet-American Geneva talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Although Europe lies thousands of kilometres away from Australia, we believe that this task has a global significance because a nuclear conflict in Europe would be bound to escalate into a world conflict.

I also believe it necessary to speed up the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear arms.

The Soviet Union is ready for this at any moment but the American side is incessantly postponing the dialogue on this problem, which worries the whole of mankind. We also consider it extremely urgent to resume the Soviet-American talks on prohibiting chemical weapons, which were interrupted unilaterally by the American side.

The Soviet Union is ready to continue at any moment talks with the United States on limiting military activities in the Indian Ocean, which were interrupted, also by the American side, and which have not been resumed although an agreement to this effect was reached at the summit level in Vienna in 1979.[2] I want to say that we do not see any obstacle to the application of similar measures to the Pacific.

In general, we have never believed it ideal that the navies of great powers roam the waters far away from their own shores for long periods of time. And we are prepared to tackle this problem, but of course to tackle it under the terms of equality and equal security.

3. You raise the question of the need to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests. I should recall that the Soviet Union has not tested them in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space for almost 20 years now, since the relevant treaty came into force.[3] Only China and France of all the nuclear powers have not joined the treaty, and China even continues nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere as well. We are ready to ratify at any moment the 1974 treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests.[4] The ratification, however, is procrastinated by the American side.

As for the Soviet Union, it is ready to reach agreement not only on the complete termination of all nuclear weapons tests but also on ending their further production and on the reduction and subsequent complete elimination of their stockpiles.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* p. 229.

[3] The Limited Test Ban Treaty is printed *ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1974,* pp. 225–229.

4. We are ready to examine without prejudice all the proposals of the other side on disarmament. I can assure you that we study carefully the positions and proposals of the other side and never reject them out of hand. We use only one yardstick in evaluating them, namely, the extent to which they meet the task of averting war and strengthening peace and accord with the principle of equality and equal security.

Socialist countries have achieved military-strategic parity with the capitalist world. This parity is a factor containing the ambitions of the aggressive forces. The hopes to shatter this parity are doomed to failure.

Military parity at the lowest possible levels of armaments—this is our constructive approach to nuclear disarmament in the interests of all the peoples. We are ready to agree to considerable reductions in nuclear armaments. But any violation of equilibrium in this field would be fraught with the breach of stability and jeopardize peace.

In the light of the considerations stated in your letter, I want to stress specifically: We proceed from the conviction that reason will triumph and that nuclear catastrophe will eventually be averted. This cannot be achieved by unilateral efforts alone and vigorous efforts of all the countries and peoples of the world are needed.

I wish all the participants in the peace movement in Australia, whose number, as far as I know, is growing, success in their noble activities for disarmament and for promoting international cooperation.

Congressional Research Service Digest of Fiscal Year 1983 Unclassified Arms Control Impact Statements, March 1982 [1]

INTRODUCTION

The arms control impact statements (ACIS) for fiscal year 1983 consist of 11 in-depth documents and two compilations of abbreviated ACIS. Each in-depth ACIS is organized into six sections: (1) Introduction; (2) program description; (3) stated military requirements; (4) funding; (5) analysis; and (6) summary and overall arms control assessment. The following digests are based on the introduction, analysis, and summary sections of each ACIS and were prepared from the unclassified versions provided to the Congress by the Administration on February 8, 1982. These digests represent restatements of the language of each ACIS and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

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[1] *Fiscal Year 1983 Arms Control Impact Statements: Statements Submitted to the Congress by the President Pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act* (Jt. Com. Prt; 97th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. VII–XVI.

Congressional Research Service. Additional information beyond the scope of these digests is available in the unclassified ACIS published in this volume. The most complete information, especially for the ACIS on space defense programs and others that are largely deleted in the unclassified version, is available in the classified ACIS.

ICBM Programs

Maintaining and improving the capabilities of the U.S. land-based ICBM force—one of the three components of the U.S. Triad of strategic nuclear offensive forces—are necessary for deterrence, to redress an asymmetry in ICBM capabilities favoring the Soviet Union, and to maintain a balance in overall strategic forces. The decision to build the MX missile and to continue upgrading the Minuteman force takes account of the following arms control implications:

—Deployment of the MX and modifications to the Minuteman are consistent with the terms of SALT I and II,[2] which allow modifications of existing weapons systems within specific constraints. The SALT II agreement permits deployment of one new type ICBM.

—Failure to deploy MX could lead to perceptions of Soviet advantage with the following political implications: greater Soviet freedom of action in employment of conventional forces and in the implicit use of nuclear strength for political coercion; changing perceptions of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. military balance among third countries, thus affecting U.S. foreign policy; and a decrease in Allied willingness to deploy GLCM and Pershing II nuclear weapons in Europe.

—All MX deployment options under consideration address the problem of perceived vulnerability. The existence of survivable, secure U.S. retaliatory capabilities will enhance strategic stability.

—Soviet perceptions of the effect of MX on the vulnerability of their overall strategic forces will determine MX's effect on stability; Soviet reliance on silo-based ICBMs for strategic warhead deployment could affect their judgment about MX. If they recognize that the U.S. program emphasizes retaliatory capability, they should find opportunities for enhancing their security through arms control.

—Deployment of mobile ICBMs—particularly a Soviet mobile ICBM—could raise verification problems for both sides. Ground-mobile schemes would require cooperative measures for adequate verification. Negotiated agreement could also help overcome these difficulties for both powers.

—Despite U.S. policy regarding START and INF arms control negotiations, many nonaligned nations criticize intensification of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear arms race on the basis of article VI of the NPT. Progress on START or in INF talks would help mitigate criticisms as well as an eventual weakening of the NPT[3] as a preventor of nuclear weapons spread. Many important non-nuclear weapon states are U.S. allies that rely on the U.S. nuclear arms umbrella and regard modernization as essential; thus, from their viewpoint, U.S. modernization inhibits proliferation.

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[2] The SALT I agreements are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff. The SALT II agreement is printed *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

[3] The Non-Proliferation Treaty is printed *ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

—A viable ABM defense of U.S. ICBMs could improve survivability and is under study. Adopting an ABM defense of the MX could require amending the ABM Treaty or withdrawing from it. On the other hand, the U.S. R. & D. program could reinforce the ABM Treaty by discouraging evasion or abrogation. Soviet ABM deployment would be economically and militarily unsound because U.S. advanced technology provides disincentives for Soviet upgrading or deployment of an ABM system around Moscow or elsewhere by reducing its potential effectiveness in preventing the arrival of ballistic missile re-entry vehicles.

SSBN/SLBM Programs

The Trident submarine, missile, and warhead programs will provide a new class of fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and SLBMs to augment and eventually replace the present Polaris and Poseidon strategic submarines. They have the peacetime mission of deterrence of nuclear war, and the wartime missions of strategic and theater nuclear strikes, as well as deterrence of further escalation. Arms control considerations include the following:

—As U.S. silo-based ICBMs become more vulnerable, SSBNs could become more important in guaranteeing U.S. retaliatory capability and thus help to insure strategic stability.

—Because of the greater range of Trident missiles, U.S. strategic submarines have many times more available ocean operating area. Also, the improved speed and low operational noise of Trident submarines make them even more survivable against Soviet ASW than are existing SSBNs, which are already highly survivable. No pending Soviet ASW developments are likely to pose a significant threat to Trident.

—Trident missile programs could be constrained by the terms of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, [4] which limits the United States and the U.S.S.R. to nuclear tests of no more than 150 kilotons.

—The increased operating room afforded by the Indian Ocean might be of future use to U.S. SSBN/SLBM forces. If a major Soviet ASW breakthrough were to imperil the U.S. ballistic missile submarine force or if the Soviets were to abrogate the ABM Treaty and make major new efforts to build ABMs, the United States might require Indian Ocean launch points to complicate Soviet defenses. Any serious consideration of the Indian Ocean as a "Zone of Peace" or a "Nuclear Free Zone" must consider this potentiality.

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[4] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

—Deployment of Trident II missiles would complement other programs designed to compensate for U.S. fixed ICBM vulnerability and would provide a hedge against possible vulnerability of the other legs of the strategic Triad through the 1990's. Trident II's survivability would enhance crisis stability because it would contribute to an enduring retaliatory force that could inflict damage across the spectrum of Soviet targets.

—Deployment of Trident II could add incentives for the Soviets to reduce their ICBM vulnerability by deploying more ICBMs at sea or in a mobile basing mode; this might enhance strategic and crisis stability. The Soviet response would depend on the speed of U.S. deployment, the cost of changes to the Soviets, and the perceived degree of threat to their silo-based ICBMs.

—SSBN/SLBM programs will not cause verification problems; numbers can be monitored by national technical means.

AIRBORNE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Modernization of the B-52, procurement of the B-1B, deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and development of advanced aircraft technologies will contribute to the continued viability of the bomber element of the strategic Triad.

—Development of cruise missiles, particularly ALCMs, will give the U.S. leverage in future START negotiations. The possibility of a major increase in U.S. strategic capabilities in the absence of SALT reductions, as suggested by cruise missiles and related force improvement programs, could enhance the chances for a balanced and verifiable agreement.

—B-52 avionics system upgrading, ALCM deployment, and B-1B procurement will maintain U.S. airborne strategic offensive effectiveness in the face of improving Soviet air defenses. These systems do not represent a first-strike threat against the Soviets, but their retaliatory capability enhances deterrence and contributes to strategic and crisis stability.

—U.S. ALCM deployment could lead the Soviets to respond by (1) increasing efforts to deploy a defense against cruise missiles and their associated launch platforms; (2) accelerating their development of a cruise missile capability; (3) upgrading their overall existing strategic offensive systems. But Soviet long-range cruise missile development would more likely be in response to Soviet military requirements than in reaction to U.S. ALCM deployment.

—Cruise missiles present troublesome verification problems; future arms control agreements will require more detailed and stringent cooperative measures to ensure adequate verification. In contrast with U.S. efforts to monitor Soviet cruise missile programs, the open U.S. society affords the Soviets considerable advantages in monitoring U.S. programs. The problem of verifying compliance with limits on ALCM carriers, however, is not insurmountable.

—Without offsetting adjustments in U.S. forces, a U.S. decision unilaterally to restrict cruise missile deployment and new bomber procurement would lead to U.S. strategic forces that were not capable of supporting U.S. national security objectives.

SPACE DEFENSE

The Space Defense System program is developing alternative methods of destroying objects in space. The effort involves four functional areas: (1) anti-satellite systems; (2) space systems survivability; (3) space surveillance systems; and (4) command and control. Because the Soviets currently possess an operational ASAT and the United States does not, arms control policy with regard to space defense is under review.

The U.S. space defense program indicates U.S. determination not to permit a Soviet ASAT monopoly; is subject to revision depending on decisions regarding ASAT negotiations; is consistent with U.S. obligations under the Outer Space Treaty, [5] the U.N. Charter, the ABM Treaty, the International Telecommunications Convention, the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, and the Direct Communications Link Modernization Agreement; [6] will not adversely affect other arms control negotiations; and is not likely to lead to third-country development of antisatellite systems.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) research and development program is conducted within the terms of the ABM Treaty and supports U.S. arms control policy by keeping the United States abreast of BMD technologies, thereby hedging against and serving to discourage any possible Soviet breakout from the ABM Treaty. BMD research will provide the technological base from which a system to defend ICBM sites could be developed to support a Presidential decision on deployment. A deployment decision could convince a potential attacker of the pointlessness of any offensive buildup designed to produce a disarming first-strike capability against ICBMs. But ABM deployments could also stimulate an offense-defense competition, including the development and deployment of advanced penetration aids and maneuvering reentry vehicles for offensive forces, as well as increases in force levels, giving each side an incentive to further improve the capabilities of its ABM systems.

By making possible greater confidence in our understanding of the potential of BMD technologies, this program supports continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty, or, if necessary, helps identify those technologies and systems for which a Treaty amendment might be appropriate. The ABM Treaty is scheduled for review and a U.S.–

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[5] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 38–43.

[6] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 635–639.

U.S.S.R. meeting will be held for this purpose sometime after October 3, 1982.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

The term "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces" (INF) was introduced as the United States prepared to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union in November 1981. The systems involved are the Pershing II (PII) and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). The previous term, "Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," was changed to more clearly reflect the scope of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. negotiations and to dispel the idea that the United States viewed Europe as a "theater" of nuclear conflict distinct from the United States. There have been no significant programmatic changes in either the PII or the GLCM programs since submission of the fiscal year 1982 ACIS. The fiscal year 1983 discussion was included because of the high level of interest in INF.

The land-attack, sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) will be deployed on ships and submarines to expand and strengthen U.S. worldwide sea-based forces. The physical similarities between SLCM and GLCM raise a number of related arms control issues.

—In the absence of international agreements to reduce nuclear stockpiles, there is a need to retain and modernize theater nuclear capabilities, especially those such as PII and GLCM which support NATO's strategy of flexible response. The availability of a graduated escalatory ladder enhances deterrence by raising the possibility that aggression at any one level of conflict might either be matched in kind or escalated. Deployments of PII and GLCM add a new dimension to the variety of response options below the strategic level. This helps to insure the linkage between lower response options and the strategic nuclear forces and in so doing makes an effective NATO response more credible.

—The positive effect of U.S. and NATO modernization programs on arms control negotiations has already been demonstrated in the INF talks. In the face of Allied resolve to proceed with INF deployments, the Soviets dropped their preconditions for entering into negotiations.

—The increased survivability of PII, GLCM and SLCM might allow the West to put relatively less dependence on aircraft for the delivery of nuclear weapons, thereby releasing some aircraft for conventional roles. Such increased conventional capability could aid in raising the nuclear threshold, and at the same time improve survivability and stability.

—INF modernization is directed toward lessening perceptions of gaps in the continuum of NATO capabilities and to enhance deterrence, Alliance cohesion, and stability. While there has been agreement on the need to improve INF to counter Soviet gains, there is also some resistance among the Allies to increasing NATO's INF capability owing to the fear that a Euro-strategic balance may be created which would decouple NATO nuclear forces from U.S. strategic forces.

—Development and deployment of warheads for INF missiles and SLCM would not be affected by the Limited Test Ban Treaty; [7] the terms of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit the United States and the Soviet Union to nuclear tests of no more than 150 KT of explosive yield.

—With respect to future arms control agreements, mobile systems such as the Soviet SS-20 and GLCM are likely to present difficulties for verification.

—Like any nuclear modernization program, the PII, GLCM, and SLCM programs entail political costs and carry with them important arms control implications. The United States will continue to ensure that these programs are consistent with overall national security objectives, including the development of future options for limiting strategic and theater nuclear arms to ensure deterrence and global stability.

Short-Range Nuclear Forces

Dual-capable artillery and short-range missiles, the low end of the spectrum of U.S. nuclear weapons, are an important component of NATO's military forces and deterrent posture. They support NATO's doctrine of flexible response which suggests the possibility that a conflict in Europe could be escalated in a controlled way to seek its termination. Because they are likely to be involved in war at an early stage, their deployment raises concerns which have become more prominent as a result of the controversy surrounding the reduced blast/enhanced radiation (RB/ER) feature of certain new warheads being produced for U.S. short-range nuclear systems.

—President Reagan announced on August 6, 1981, that ER weapons would be produced and stockpiled on U.S. territory. There are no plans to deploy ER weapons outside of U.S. territory.

—Effective implementation of NATO doctrine in a manner consistent with announced strategy contributes to stability in Europe, an arms control objective. Modernization of these warheads is also consistent with arms control goals in that range, accuracy, control, and security improvements represent evolutionary changes in existing weapons and are unlikely to affect significantly existing perceptions of these weapons or their relationship to U.S. arms control efforts.

—Front line deployment of these systems has caused concern because the Warsaw Pact could be tempted to attack with its own nuclear systems. However, a Soviet strike probably would be initiated upon indication that NATO intended to use nuclear weapons. If necessary a Soviet strike could be launched to achieve Soviet objectives and would target known nuclear storage sites and deployments, not just LANCE or dual-capable artillery.

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[7] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

—The United States is not party to any treaty or other legal obligation that would inhibit the development, production or deployment of short-range nuclear weapons. Development of these weapons is not affected by the provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

—Failure to modernize short-range nuclear weapons could indicate to Europe a lack of U.S. resolve to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, for Europe's defense. This could weaken European incentives to strengthen conventional forces or cause them to strike on their own, if they believed that the ultimate deterrent was not credible. These modernization programs thus may be seen as demonstrating U.S. commitment, encouraging the strengthening of conventional forces, and therefore raising the nuclear threshold.

Fleet Air Defense Systems

STANDARD missiles are ship-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) intended for surface combatant defense against air-breathing threats. Improvements, such as stand-off jammer suppression, vertical launching systems, and nuclear warheads, are intended to counter new, more capable air-breathing threats to warships. Upgrading conventional fleet air defense capabilities would reduce the prospective vulnerability of fleet battle groups operating in the projected combined Soviet air, sea, and subsurface severe threat environment. By improving the U.S. Navy's capability to perform a variety of vital missions in peacetime and in war, they contribute to the deterrence of war and to international stability, hence furthering arms control objectives.

—The United States is not a party to any arms control agreement which restricts deployment of naval anti-air warfare weapons or their supporting systems. Article VI of the ABM Treaty contains a provision, included at U.S. insistence, which prohibits giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radar an ABM capability; the negotiating record sets forth a list of indicators for judging whether a SAM system has an ABM capability, including phased-array radar and nuclear-armed interceptors. The programs discussed in this ACIS include the first U.S. mating of a non-ABM nuclear interceptor with a phased-array radar system. The Soviets have already deployed SAMs with phased-array radars. It is in the U.S. interest for both parties to the ABM Treaty to avoid steps making verification more difficult. It is difficult to differentiate among systems intended for defense against air-breathing, tactical ballistic missiles, or strategic ballistic missile threats. To constrain U.S. programs without firm categorization criteria could result in the United States being more self-constrained than the Soviet Union in developing high performance air defense systems.

—U.S. naval forces that were only equipped with conventional defenses would present more vulnerable targets for air-launched Soviet attacks. The possibility of a U.S. nuclear response could increase Soviet incentives to exercise forbearance in the use of nuclear weapons against U.S. naval forces. Whether the use of nuclear weapons over an ocean area would lead directly to escalating the associated land campaign is unknown.

MEDIUM-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

The medium-range air-to-surface missile (MRASM) is a conventionally armed, tactical cruise missile for both anti-ship and land-attack employment. The MRASM would provide an improved conventional capability to disrupt such activities as airfield operations, to contribute toward the creation of maritime superiority required to put Soviet naval forces at risk, and to project forces worldwide. By enhancing NATO's conventional posture and U.S. capabilities worldwide, they support deterrence and regional stability.

—SALT II limitations would have pertained only to air-launched cruise missiles with fuel exhaustion ranges of over 600 km; MRASM would not have been considered a long-range cruise missile under SALT II terms. SALT II also would have required externally observable design features to distinguish MRASMs from long-range cruise missiles; this requirement is also met by the systems under discussion. Because MRASM is medium range and conventionally armed, it should not be subject to limitation in future strategic systems negotiations. If negotiated cruise missile constraints were more severe, future arms control agreements could require more encompassing and stringent cooperative measures in order to assure adequate verification.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

The proposed fiscal year 1983 chemical warfare (CW) program includes active RDT&E of both deterrent retaliatory and defensive CW programs; procurement of an improved protective CW capability; initiation of actions needed to modernize the U.S. deterrent retaliatory capability and to dispose of the deteriorating chemical agent stockpile; and maintenance of chemical munitions. The program supports the U.S. objective of maintaining an adequate defensive and deterrent retaliatory capability, increasing the safety of the systems involved, as well as eventually concluding a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons production, development and stockpiling; and contributes to negotiations by allowing the United States to gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control.

—The U.S. CW program is fully consistent with, and complementary to, the pursuit of a CW ban and the U.S. policy of no first use of chemical weapons.

—Congressional and Administration actions to construct and to equip Phase I of a binary CW production facility do not represent a decision to place greater emphasis upon CW but reflect U.S. national security policy to deter war.

—Bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on a comprehensive CW prohibition stalled in 1979 over verification issues; since then, multilateral interest in CW discussions has intensified within the Committee on Disarmament.

—The Soviet Union can easily verify that the United States is actually conducting the CW programs which we openly claim.

—U.S. policy is to pursue chemical weapons arms control and to maintain appropriate military capabilities to eliminate the existing large asymmetry in U.S.–U.S.S.R. CW capabilities, until such time as effective international agreements remove existing and future threats of CW.

DIRECTED ENERGY PROGRAMS

U.S. directed energy (DE) programs represent an effort to explore and, if feasibility is proven, to develop the potential of DE weapons, which would have potential mission advantages over many existing types of weapons against missiles, aircraft and spacecraft targets. While high energy lasers (HEL) and particle beams (PB) differ in state of development and in the technology required to realize them, they have potential for weapon systems of similar operational characteristics. Further, they could have similar implications for the future of the ABM Treaty, possible ASAT negotiations, and space defense issues generally.

—Research conducted to stay abreast of technologies having military potential and to gain insight into what the Soviets and others may be discovering through their own research helps provide confidence that the United States can maintain an adequate balance of forces.

—DE weapons research is not constrained by existing arms control agreements. The ABM Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of all ABM systems and components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. Although the Treaty allows the development and testing of fixed, land-based ABM systems and components based on other physical principles (such as lasers or particle beams), including such fixed, land-based components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, the Treaty prohibits their deployment unless the Parties consult and amend the Treaty.

—DE weapons in an ASAT role are affected by the ABM Treaty, SALT I, and SALT II. These agreements prohibit the actual use of systems to interfere with national technical means used to verify compliance with strategic arms control agreements. They do not prohibit the development, testing, or deployment of systems that could be used in such roles.

—New technologies like HEL weapons could serve arms control interests by encouraging nations to negotiate with one another in an attempt to avoid waging and possibly losing an expensive weapons race. It is not possible to make a reasonable assessment of the net impact of the HEL program on future global or regional stability.

—Although the DE-related R. & D. efforts funded in the fiscal year 1983 budget have no more than marginal arms control effects now, this technology deserves continuing attention in the future.

ABBREVIATED ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS

As in the fiscal year 1982 ACIS, the fiscal year 1983 submission contains two sets of abbreviated ACIS: One for Department of Defense programs and one for Department of Energy programs.

The abbreviated DOD ACIS contains two sections. Section I, listing programs for which ACIS were previously submitted, includes Anti-Ship Missile Systems, Large Area Ocean Surveillance Systems, Strategic Warning and Attack Assessment, Advanced Isotope Separation and Centrifuge Enrichment, and NAVSTAR Global Positioning System. While these programs have continuing arms control implications, they have had no significant changes in funding, program direction, policy, or international developments that would revise the Administration's analysis forwarded in early 1981. The need for updated ACIS will be reevaluated as these programs evolve.

Section II includes other programs which meet congressional criteria for ACIS but for which in-depth ACIS were not prepared. For each program, a brief description is given along with its program element number and R-1 or P-1 report page and line number, as applicable.

Activities within these programs are primarily associated with one or more of the following:

—Programs in too early an exploratory research and development stage to determine with precision their possible arms control implications.

—Programs providing continuing normal support for existing missions or deployed operational systems and organizations.

—Production and procurement of a developed weapon system; nonnuclear munitions, cartridges, projectiles, rockets, etc., and associated equipment; spares and repair parts; associated electronic, communications, training and support equipment; support, storage, industrial and test facilities construction and operations; utility and specialized vehicles, ships, tanks, and aircraft; miscellaneous production charges, first destination charges and out-fitting costs. In themselves, none of the activities in this category is judged to have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations.

—Modification or modernization of an already procured system which does not significantly alter the characteristics of the system from an arms control standpoint.

—Programs which were analyzed as in-depth statements in previous years and found to have little, if any, additional arms control impact.

—Programs involving miscellaneous research, development, testing, and evaluation of programs not otherwise categorized, which are judged to have marginal, if any, impact on arms control policy or negotiations.

The abbreviated ACIS for the Department of Energy programs list those activities related predominantly to normal maintenance and reliability assessment of the nuclear stockpile. Because they do not provide for additional warheads/bombs or for significant changes in characteristics or deployments, none of them is judged to have a significant impact on arms control policy or negotiations. The ACIS lists 24 different nuclear warheads and gravity bombs, with a brief statement about the weapons systems for which they were developed.

Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons in Afghanistan [Extract], March 8, 1982 [8]

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I would like to refer to a particularly heinous aspect of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan. The use of chemical weapons in war is a violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol, [9] to which the U.S.S.R. is a party, and the rules of customary law, which apply to all nations. Analysis of all of the information available leads us to conclude that attacks have been conducted with irritants, incapacitants, nerve agents, phosgene oxime and perhaps mycotoxins, mustard, lewisite, and toxic smoke. Afghan military defectors have provided information on chemical weapons containing lethal nerve agents, where they were stockpiled, and where and when they have been used. This information generally corresponds with refugee reports and recorded military operations. As a result of chemical attacks, 3,042 deaths attributed to 47 separate incidents between the summer of 1979 and the summer of 1981 have been reported.

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Letter From President Reagan to the Congress: Nuclear Cooperation With the European Atomic Energy Community, March 9, 1982 [1]

The United States has been engaged in nuclear cooperation with the European Community for many years. This cooperation was initiated under agreements concluded over two decades ago between the United States and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)[2] and extends until December 31, 1995. Since the inception of this cooperation, the Community has adhered to all its obligations.

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[8] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 375.

[9] The treaty is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 15, 1982, pp. 278–279. The letter was sent to the Speaker of the House (O'Neill) and the President of the Senate (Bush).

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 amended the Atomic Energy Act to establish nuclear export criteria, including a requirement that the United States have a right to consent to the reprocessing of fuel exported from the United States.[3] Our present agreements for cooperation with EURATOM do not contain such a right. To avoid disrupting cooperation with EURATOM, a proviso was included in the law to enable continued cooperation until March 10, 1980, and provide for negotiations concerning our cooperation agreements.

The law also provides that nuclear cooperation with EURATOM can be extended on an annual basis after March 10, 1980, upon determination by the President, and after notification to the Congress, that failure to cooperate would seriously prejudice the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. President Carter made such a determination two years ago and signed Executive Order No. 12193, permitting continued nuclear cooperation with EURATOM until March 10, 1981.[4] I made such a determination last year and signed Executive Order No. 12295, permitting continued nuclear cooperation through March 10, 1982.[5]

The United States has engaged in several rounds of talks with EURATOM regarding the renegotiation of the United States–EURATOM agreements for cooperation, and progress has been made toward clarifying the issues relating to these agreements. EURATOM has agreed to enter the next phase of the discussions, and talks continued this January.

I believe that it is essential that cooperation between the United States and the Community continue and likewise that we work closely with our Allies to counter the threat of nuclear explosives proliferation.

Nuclear proliferation is the most essential issue of modern times. With Soviet cooperation, we could substantially reduce the grim threat of nuclear war that hangs over Europe. We could lift the great weight that the people of Europe currently feel pressing down upon them. I have urged the Soviet Union to join with us in serious and determined negotiations to ease the nuclear burden. I remain hopeful the Soviets will respond positively to our proposals for lessening the prospect of nuclear conflict.

I have determined that failure to continue peaceful nuclear cooperation with EURATOM would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives and would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States. I intend to sign an Executive Order to extend the waiver of the application of the relevant export criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act for an additional 12 months from March 10, 1982.

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[2] 9 UST 1116; 10 UST 75; 11 UST 2589; 13 UST 1403, 1439; 14 UST 1459.

[3] For text of the act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

[4] See *ibid., 1980*, p. 39.

[5] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 69–70.

Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by Seven Communist Countries: Binary Weapons and the Problem of Effective Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, March 9, 1982 [1]

The delegations of the socialist countries to the Committee on Disarmament deem it necessary to draw attention to a number of circumstances that are seriously hindering the elaboration and approval of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

What is involved here are well-known decisions concerning the production, commissioning and, ultimately, stationing on the territories of other countries of a new generation of chemical weapons—binary weapons. Whatever reasons and justifications may be adduced, it is an indisputable fact that the incorporation in arsenals of such weapons with binary charges inevitably leads to a further dangerous spiral in the chemical arms race.

As is well known, the basic difficulty in solving the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons stems from their particular nature: it is the difficulty of separating commercial chemicals from those which can be used for chemical weapons. The emergence of binary weapons will considerably complicate this already difficult problem.

Without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, the authors of this working paper would like to mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee with a view to the elaboration of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Existing information concerning binary weapons leads to the conclusion that the following consequences, in particular, are inevitable:

1. In the long term, the range of chemicals capable of being used as components in these weapons will expand considerably, with a corresponding expansion of the range of binary mixtures of varying effect (not merely paralysis of the nervous system). While, for example, the diversity of conventional chemical munitions is limited by such factors as the stability of chemical agents during storage or the extent to

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[1] CD/258. Submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and the Soviet Union.

which they attack the materials of which, in particular, the munition casing or other storage structures and facilities are composed, it does not seem that those factors will be of such fundamental importance in the case of binary weapons. This will allow the creation of mixtures with the widest imaginable range of effects.

2. It will become possible for many States, and not only States but also individual groups of persons, to produce, acquire and stockpile chemicals for new types of binary weapon. This means that there would be a significant increase in the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons.

3. The positive results of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, both in the Committee on Disarmament and between the USSR and the United States of America will lose much of their value, in particular:

(a) Agreement was reached during the Soviet-United States negotiations on a provision concerning the scope of prohibition, reproduced in the joint Soviet-United States report to the Committee on Disarmament. [2] This provision envisages the prohibition of all types of toxic lethal chemicals, including, of course, binary ones. The report speaks of the obligation ". . . never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful chemicals, or precursors of such chemicals", and the obligation "never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of chemicals released as a result of the employment of these munitions or devices, or equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices". These wordings thus include corresponding prohibitions in respect of binary weapons. The programme of production of binary weapons now envisaged in the United States may cancel out these positive results.

(b) The significance and effectiveness of the toxicity criteria of lethal chemicals agreed upon between the USSR and the United States will be reduced.

4. The further progress of negotiations will face serious difficulties, in particular for the following reasons:

(a) It will be more difficult to ensure the implementation by States parties of obligations not to transfer the chemical weapons and other obligations related thereto, because separating chemicals for commercial purposes from those designed for weapons will become especially difficult, almost impossible;

(b) The question of the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons will become more complex because a definition will have to be provided of chemicals intended for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons;

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 285–289.

(c) Problems of monitoring the implementation of the convention will acquire a qualitatively new nature if binary weapons are produced;

Control itself, both national and especially international, will in many cases become extremely difficult, if not impossible; conditions may emerge for covert stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons purposes and for developing chemical weapons under the guise of commercial production.

> The United Nations General Assembly, taking into consideration the full danger of the development, commissioning and, especially, proliferation of binary chemical weapons, called upon all States in resolution 36/96 B "to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present."

In the present situation the delegations of the socialist countries consider the implementation of this appeal by the General Assembly to be a matter of prime importance.

Joint Resolution Introduced in the Senate: Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Reductions, March 10, 1982 [1]

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war; and

Whereas a freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems is needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war;

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

1. As an immediate strategic arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should:

(a) pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race;

(b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and

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[1] *Congressional Record* (daily), Mar. 10, 1983, p. S1912. The resolution was introduced by Senators Kennedy (D., Mass.) and Hatfield (R., Oregon) and Representatives Markey (D., Mass.) and Conte (R., Mass.). It was sponsored by 17 other Senators and 120 other Representatives.

(c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

2. Proceeding from this freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

Letter From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan: Sale of Trident II Missile System to the United Kingdom, March 11, 1982 [1]

I wrote to your predecessor on 10 July 1980 [2] to ask whether the United States Government would be ready to supply Trident I missiles equipment and supporting services to the United Kingdom on a similar basis to that on which the Polaris missiles were supplied under the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963. President Carter replied on 14 July [3] confirming that the United States Government were prepared to do so, subject to and in accordance with applicable United States law and procedures.

In the light of decisions taken by the United States Government in 1981 to accelerate their own programme to procure Trident II missiles, and to phase out the Trident I programme earlier than had hitherto been intended, the United Kingdom Government have carried out a review of their nuclear deterrent programme. In the light of this review, I am now writing to ask whether in place of Trident I missiles the United States Government would be ready to supply Trident II missiles, equipment and supporting services on a continuing basis and in a manner generally similar to that in which Polaris was supplied. The United Kingdom Government would wish to purchase these missiles complete with multiple, independently targettable reentry vehicles but without the warheads themselves. I propose that, as in the past, close co-ordination should be maintained between the executive agencies of the two Governments in order to assure compatibility of equipment.

Like the Polaris force, and consistent with the agreement reached in 1980 on the supply of Trident I missiles, the United Kingdom Trident II force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and except where the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, this successor force will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western alliance in all circumstances. It is my understanding that co-operation in the modernisation of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent in the manner proposed would be consistent with the present and prospective international obligations of both parties.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 15, 1982, pp. 287–288.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980,* pp. 291–292.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 292.

I would like to assure you that the United Kingdom Government remain wholly committed to the strengthening of the Alliance's conventional forces. The United Kingdom Government have in recent years substantially increased their defence spending and further increases are planned for the future in order to sustain the United Kingdom's all-round contribution to allied deterrence and defence. The economies made possible by the United States Government's cooperation with respect to the supply of the Trident I missile system will be used in order to reinforce the United Kingdom Government's continuing efforts to upgrade their conventional forces.

If the United States Government are prepared to meet this request, I hope that as the next step you will be prepared to receive technical and financial missions to pursue these matters using the framework of the Polaris Sales Agreement where appropriate.

Letter From President Reagan to British Prime Minister Thatcher: Sale of Trident II Missile System to the United Kingdom, March 11, 1982 [1]

Thank you for your letter of March 11. [2]

I am pleased to confirm that the United States Government is prepared to supply to the United Kingdom Trident II missiles, equipment and supporting services as proposed in your letter, subject to and in accordance with applicable United States law and procedures.

The United States readiness to provide these systems is a demonstration of the great importance which the United States Government attaches to the maintenance by the United Kingdom of an independent nuclear deterrent capability. I can assure you of the United States' willingness to cooperate closely with the United Kingdom Government in maintaining and modernizing that capability.

I attach great importance to your assurance that the United Kingdom Trident II force will be assigned to NATO and that the economies realized through cooperation between our two governments will be used to reinforce the United Kingdom's efforts to upgrade its conventional forces. Such nuclear and conventional force improvements are of the highest priority for NATO's security.

I agree that, as the next step, our two governments should initiate the technical and financial negotiations which you propose.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 15, 1982, p. 288.

[2] *Supra.*

Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to British Secretary of State for Defence Nott: Sale of Trident II Missile System to the United Kingdom, March 11, 1982 [1]

In the exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister of today's date, it was agreed that the United States Government would supply Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom. [2] I am writing now to record our joint understanding on specific aspects of the agreed arrangements for the sale of the Trident II (D-5) missile system and associated equipment.

It is understood that the Polaris sales agreement of 1963 and its implementing agreements will be the general pattern for the sale of the Trident II (D-5) missile system.

It is agreed that the United Kingdom will pay a total contribution to research and development for the Trident II (D-5) system equivalent to $116 million in Fiscal Year 1982 dollars, subject to actual payments being adjusted to reflect an agreed inflation index.

It is understood that the United Kingdom acknowledges that waiver by the United States of all charges (other than the administrative charge) in excess of $116 million will fully satisfy the requirement that the United States Government give defense assistance to the United Kingdom defense budget in return for manning by the United Kingdom of Rapier air defense of United States Air Force bases in the United Kingdom, and support and servicing for these Rapier systems. In addition it is understood that the United Kingdom will employ additional savings represented by the remainder of the United States waiver to reinforce its efforts to upgrade its conventional forces.

With respect to procurement of the Trident II (D-5) weapon system, the Department of Defense is prepared to undertake, subject to compliance with United States law and national policy:

—to permit United Kingdom manufacturers to compete on the same terms as United States firms for subcontracts for Trident II (D-5) weapon system components for the program as a whole;

—to ensure that Department of Defense procedures bearing on such competition for such Trident II (D-5) weapon system components are consistent with this general principle; and

—to designate appropriate United States staff in both countries to provide a point of contact for United Kingdom manufacturers, and to offer advice and briefing.

The United States attaches great importance to the maintenance by the United Kingdom Government of an independent nuclear deterrent. I am, therefore, pleased that it has been possible to reach this agreement between our two countries. I regard this arrangement as a significant contribution to the maintenance of stability and peace.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 15, 1982, p. 289.

[2] Printed *ante,* Mar. 11, and *supra.*

Letter From the British Secretary of State for Defence Nott to Secretary of Defense Weinberger: Sale of Trident II Missile Systems to the United Kingdom, March 11, 1982 [3]

Thank you for your letter of today's date dealing with specific aspects of the arrangements for the purchase by the United Kingdom Government of the Trident II (D-5) missile system. [4]

I confirm that my understanding of the agreed arrangements is in accord with that set out in your letter.

Our agreement on this is further evidence of the closeness of the co-operation between our two countries and is a matter of the greatest satisfaction to the United Kingdom Government.

Statement by the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director (Burt): Nuclear Freeze, March 11, 1982 [1]

I would like to make a brief statement with respect to the nuclear freeze resolution which was introduced in the Senate yesterday. [2]

The President and his entire Administration share the concern felt throughout the world over the danger that nuclear weapons pose for mankind. That is why, in his speech of November 18, the President proposed a far-reaching arms control program for seeking equitable and verifiable agreements, which will not just freeze current nuclear and conventional forces but actually significantly reduce them. [3]

In Geneva the United States is now negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis of the President's bold proposal of November 18, which calls for the elimination of the Soviet nuclear systems most threatening Europe in exchange for cancellation of scheduled NATO deployments of comparable intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles.

While we understand the spirit that motivates the freeze efforts, the Administration cannot support the freeze itself. A number of compelling facts argue against a freeze.

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[3] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 15, 1982, p. 289.

[4] *Supra.*

[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* May 1982, p. 42. The statement was read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Dean Fischer.

[2] *Ante.*

[3] The President's statement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 573–574.

•It would freeze the United States into a position of military disadvantage and dangerous vulnerability. Soviet defense investments have far outpaced ours over the last decade. While we exercised substantial restraint, the Soviets' across-the-board modernization efforts have produced new weapons, including new generations of intercontinental ballistic missiles directly threatening our nuclear deterrent. In Europe, Soviet deployments of new intermediate-range missiles have given the Soviet Union an overwhelming advantage over the West in this category of weapons.

•We want verifiable agreements that go beyond freezes to produce real reductions. The freeze proposal, which is neither verifiable nor reduces weapons, is not only bad defense but, as Secretary Haig said yesterday, is bad arms control as well.

•The President needs the strategic modernization program if we are to have a credible chance to negotiate a good strategic arms reduction agreement with the Soviets. The freeze would, of course, kill the modernization program and with it our chances for achieving the reductions that we all seek.

•We have embarked on very important negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces with the Soviet Union in Geneva—negotiations in which the United States is seeking far more than a freeze. Our goal in Geneva is the total elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles. Thus the United States and the NATO alliance must have the flexibility to continue with the two-track approach that NATO agreed to in 1979.[4] The freeze proposal would concede to the Soviet Union its present advantage in intermediate-range nuclear missiles and eliminate any Soviet incentive to reach a fair and balanced agreement that would reduce nuclear weapons in Europe.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, March 11, 1982[1]

Mr. Chairman, our agenda for this week concerns the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, in light of the great interest evidenced in this Committee and the ongoing consultations being conducted by you, Sir, I will speak today regarding items 1 and 2 of our agenda, the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In this context, I want to address the numerous thoughtful questions and suggestions put to my delegation during our informal and plenary meetings on these items and to give the views of my Government on how the Committee on Disarmament might best proceed to consider the question of a nuclear test ban.

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[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[1] CD/PV. 162, pp. 8–9.

The position of my Government regarding a comprehensive test ban has already been clearly stated in this body. The achievement of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives. However, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, such a ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States is actively pursuing the first steps of the programme outlined by President Reagan last 18 November to reduce nuclear weapons.[2] These issues are the most serious issues which any nation—nuclear-weapon State or non-nuclear-weapon State—can address. The elements of United States nuclear arms control policy—including the ongoing negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the preparations to begin strategic arms reduction negotiations—provide compelling evidence of the seriousness which the United States attaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The issue now before this Committee is the most appropriate procedure to follow regarding items 1 and 2 of the agenda. A number of delegations have posed serious questions as to how the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States should be considered in the light of the need for nuclear-weapon States to address amongst themselves issues affecting nuclear disarmament. Doubts have also been expressed as to how this Committee can function as a multilateral negotiating body if it does not address nuclear issues, which we all agree are of primary importance. And, specifically, questions have been raised and suggestions made as to the best way for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed on the nuclear test ban issue.

Let me briefly give the views of my delegation on the issues underlying these questions.

First, my delegation believes the Committee on Disarmament should address every issue which relates to the vital security interests of all States, including the control, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The Committee on Disarmament, the only disarmament body in which all five nuclear-weapon States participate, is an appropriate forum for dealing with the interest in nuclear disarmament—an interest deeply shared by all States. Nevertheless, my delegation continues to believe that establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate on nuclear disarmament would not be a productive step at this time, especially in view of the fact that such negotiations have begun among certain of the nuclear-weapon States. I also recall the numerous occasions on which the nuclear-weapon States have been reminded that they have the primary responsibility for undertaking such negotiations. Therefore, with regard to agenda item 2, while we recognize the legitimate role of the Committee, we continue to believe that these issues should be addressed in informal meetings, as we have done in the past.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

Second, the United States fully shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament must effectively discharge its responsibilities. In evidence of this fact, my delegation is actively engaged in the efforts being made in the Committee to reach agreement on a multilateral convention on the complete prohibition of radiological weapons. Moreover, the Committee is also hard at work in laying the foundations for a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, whose use, sadly, is all too familiar to mankind and whose elimination is an urgent task. President Reagan has stated that achievement of such a prohibition—effective and verifiable—is a goal of the United States and we intend to pursue that goal vigorously in this forum.

Finally, I would like to speak briefly regarding the nuclear test ban issue which heads our agenda. My delegation has, on numerous occasions, made known its views on ways of dealing with this item and has stated that the establishment of a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban issue did not appear to be the most effective way to proceed. At the same time, we have listened attentively to the numerous interventions made on this issue, in keeping with our pledge to consider carefully and seriously the views of other delegations. As is well known, our distinguished Chairman has been engaged in extensive consultations on nuclear questions, including the nuclear test ban. We have participated in those consultations and have carefully considered the positions of other delegations, particularly regarding agenda item 1.

I have already stated the position of my Government regarding the broad issue of a comprehensive test ban and that position remains unchanged. However, my delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament has a legitimate interest in all disarmament issues and an obligation to make a substantial contribution to the disarmament process in all its aspects, including consideration of the issues, such as agenda item 1, on which the negotiation of an agreement, for whatever reasons, may not be propitious at the time.

Foremost among the concerns which surround the question of a comprehensive test ban are the issues of effective verification of and compliance with such an agreement. Indeed, these concerns have been a constant preoccupation of this Committee and its predecessor body for at least a decade.

My delegation believes that the Committee can make a useful contribution in this regard and, further, that work in this area can begin now. Therefore, if a consensus can be developed to establish a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement, my delegation will join that consensus.

I believe that a serious examination of these extremely important issues, in all their aspects, in the Committee on Disarmament would be a step forward. My delegation looks forward to consulting with you, Mr. Chairman, as well as with other delegations on the establishment of such a subsidiary body and the mandate to be given to it.

U.S. Statement on a Proposal for a Nuclear Freeze, March 12, 1982 [1]

The United States has a number of major objectives with regard to the limitation of nuclear weapons:

—The President and his entire Administration share the concern felt throughout the world of the danger that nuclear weapons pose for mankind.

—That is why, as the President outlined in his speech of November 18, [2] he proposed a far-reaching arms control program for seeking equitable and verifiable agreements, which will not just freeze current nuclear and conventional forces, but actually significantly reduce them.

—In Geneva the US is negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis of the President's bold proposal of November 18, which calls for the elimination of the Soviet nuclear systems most threatening Europe, in exchange for cancellation of scheduled NATO deployments of comparable intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles.

—In the area of strategic arms control, the Administration is preparing for START negotiations which we hope will lead to major reductions in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

While we understand the spirit that motivates the nuclear freeze effort, it appears to ignore a number of important considerations.

—It would freeze the US into a position of very substantial Soviet advantage. Soviet defense investments have far outpaced ours over the last decade. While we exercised substantial restraint, the Soviets' across-the-board modernization efforts have produced new generations of ICBMs. The increase in the quantity and quality of Soviet strategic nuclear forces has resulted in US vulnerabilities that have seriously undermined strategic stability. Similarly, in Europe, Soviet deployments of new intermediate-range missiles have given the USSR an overwhelming advantage over the West in these weapon systems.

—The President came into office pledged to restore the military balance required to maintain peace, and the Congress has strongly supported this effort. The freeze would prevent the US from rectifying present vulnerabilities and would perpetuate existing instabilities.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

—The freeze would legitimize current, rather than reduced, levels of arms. It would seriously undercut the prospects of achieving reductions by removing Soviet incentives to negotiate in earnest on substantial arms reductions. US restraint has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union in the past, and the US modernization program provides the best incentive for the Soviets to consider and accept significant mutual reductions through equitable and verifiable arms control agreements. Because the freeze would preclude the US modernization program, it would deprive the US of essential negotiating leverage.

—It would be virtually impossible to verify Soviet compliance with a freeze on delivery systems in the absence of extensive on-site monitoring measures that the USSR has traditionally rejected. Without such measures, the practical result of a freeze could well be that the US would freeze and the Soviet Union would not.

—A freeze would seriously damage Alliance security and arms control objectives. The destabilizing consequences of the Soviet military buildup are understood by our NATO Allies, and our modernization programs are broadly supported by them as essential to correct existing imbalances and to promote a stable deterrent which ensures both US and European security. As we have embarked on very important negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) with the Soviet Union in Geneva, the US and the NATO Alliance must have the flexibility to continue with the two-track modernization and arms control approach that NATO agreed to in 1979. [3] The freeze proposal would concede to the USSR their present INF advantage, and would eliminate any Soviet incentive to reach a fair and balanced agreement that would reduce nuclear weapons in Europe.

It must be stressed that the Administration is committed to going beyond freezes to negotiate real reductions. The freeze proposal, which is neither verifiable nor reduces nuclear weapons, is not only bad defense, but bad arms control as well.

Address by Soviet President Brezhnev: Moratorium on Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe [Extract], March 16, 1982 [1]

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Comrades, the militarist line and aggressive policy of the NATO bloc, headed by the United States, are forcing us to maintain our country's defence capability at the due level. That is a grim necessity of the present-day world, and, of course, it requires diverting considerable resources to the detriment of our plans of peaceful construction.

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[3] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[1] Moscow TASS in English, Mar. 16, 1982; FBIS, Daily Report, vol. III, Mar. 16, 1982, pp. 7–9. Brezhnev addressed the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions.

But as I have already said more than once, we have not spent, nor will we spend, a single rouble more for these purposes than is absolutely necessary for the security of our people, and that of its friends and allies. And we see the future not in the context of any unrestricted stockpiling of mountains of weapons, but in the context of reaching sensible accords with the other side on a mutual lowering of the level of military confrontation.

In this connection, of course, the problem of reducing nuclear armaments in Europe merits special attention. One could say that at present this is the key to ending the growing danger of a worldwide nuclear-missile war.

You are aware, comrades, of the concrete and far-reaching proposals made by the Soviet Union on this score: From the one for reducing by two-thirds the nuclear arsenals of the two sides in Europe and designed for use in Europe, to the one for completely clearing the continent of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.[2] It is also common knowledge that the American side has so far been evading a serious discussion, let alone solution, of these questions, taking cover behind the absurd demand that the Soviet Union should unilaterally disarm, which Washington has, as though in mockery, called the "zero option".

However, we do not lose hope of reaching a sensible accord on the basis of parity and equal security of the sides. Furthermore, we are doing everything we can to this end, both in words and in actions. I can inform you, dear comrades, that, striving to facilitate a just agreement on a major reduction of nuclear weapons by both sides in Europe, and desirous of setting a good example, the Soviet leadership has taken a decision to introduce, unilaterally, a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear armaments in the European part of the USSR. We are freezing, in both the quantitative and qualitative respects, the armaments of this kind already stationed here, and are suspending the replacement of old missiles, known as the SS-4 and SS-5, by newer SS-20 missiles.

This moratorium will be in force either until an agreement is reached with the United States to reduce, on the basis of parity and equal security, the medium-range nuclear weapons designed for use in Europe, or until the time, if and when, the U.S. leaders, disregarding the security of the nations, actually go over the practical preparations to deploy Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in Europe.

Further, we stated earlier that if the two sides reached agreement on a moratorium we would be prepared, as a sign of good will, to carry out a unilateral reduction of the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe as part of the future reduction agreed upon. Now we have decided to take a new step demonstrating our resolve for peace and our faith in the possibility of a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviet Union intends already this year, unless there is a new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce a certain number of its medium-range missiles on its own initiative.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* p. 619 and *ante,* Feb. 3.

In accounting [for] these decisions we are confident that the peoples of the world will appreciate the peaceable intentions and good will displayed by the Soviet Union. We also hope that our Western counterparts in the talks are able to respond to this by constructive steps in a spirit of good will.

At the same time we regard it as our duty to make the following perfectly clear. If the governments of the United States and its NATO allies, in defiance of the will of the nations for peace, were actually to carry out their plan to deploy in Europe hundreds of new American missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of the Soviet Union, a different strategic situation would arise in the world. There would arise a real additional threat to our country and its allies from the United States. This would compel us to take retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States itself, its own territory, in an analogous position. This should not be forgotten.

This circumstance is yet another reminder of how significant the question of a Soviet-American strategic nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreement is for the destinies of peace for lessening the threat of a world-wide nuclear conflagration. As is known, the United States has refused to put into force the treaty on this score that was signed in 1979.[3] Nor has Washington as yet wished to hold further talks on this problem. But the issue is becoming increasingly acute and urgent.

In the first place, implementation of the American plans to station new missiles in Europe could upset—with consequences for the future that are difficult to foresee—the strategic arms balance the sides have reached at the present time.

In the second place, the development by the sides of new types of mass destruction weapons (unless this is stopped on the basis of a treaty) could knock out the ground from under limitation, reduction and control agreements that are now still possible.

Therefore, we call on the government of the United States not to raise artificial barriers to SALT talks and to get down to them in the nearest future. Pending their resumption we would propose that the two sides undertake a mutual commitment not to open a new channel of the arms build-up, not to deploy sea-based or ground-based long-range cruise missiles.

In general, we believe that the situation in the world calls for maximum restraint in the military activity of the two opposing alliances of countries. We would be prepared, for example, to agree to a mutual restriction of naval operations. In particular, we would consider it possible to agree that missile submarines of the two sides should be removed from their present extensive combat patrol areas, that their cruises should be restricted by limits mutually agreed upon. We would also be prepared to discuss the question of spreading confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas through which the busiest shipping routes pass. In short, we stand for the largest possible part of the world ocean becoming a zone of peace in the very nearest future.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

Those are our new proposals on the issue of curbing the arms buildup and averting the threat of another world war. As you see, comrades, our party and the Soviet Government are conscientiously carrying out the people's mandate, are doing everything to justify the hopes of the people of our country, and of all mankind, for a lasting peace, for clear skies above a peaceful Earth.

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News Interview With President Reagan: Moratorium on Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe [Extract], March 16, 1982 [1]

Mr. Gaylord. Mr. President, I wonder if you have any reaction to President Brezhnev's statement of pulling back some Soviet missiles? [2]

The President. Well, yes, I do. It's one more of sorrow than irritation. I think it's time to stop playing these political games. You know, a unilateral freeze leaves them with 300 missiles and 900 warheads aimed at Western Europe—against nothing. And what we're talking about in Geneva and what I spoke about on November 18th, I really mean. We can erase and eliminate that entire threat for both the Soviet Union and the Bloc, the Soviet Bloc, and Western Europe, by a reduction of those missiles down to zero. I'm ready and willing to—well, we *are* meeting on that—I'm ready and willing to meet him on the discussion of the other, the strategic missiles at any time on the same thing.

It just doesn't make sense for the world to be sitting here with these weapons aimed at each other—the possibility of human error and the thing that can happen. But, as I say, this is a pretty easy freeze. You know, there were 250 of those missiles when we started to negotiate—when I made my speech on November 18th. There are now 300. And it's pretty easy to freeze when you're 300–0.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 22, 1982, p. 312. The interview was conducted by Edward Gaylord, Allan Cromley, and Jim Standard of the *Daily Oklahoman.*

[2] *Supra.*

Address by President Reagan: Moratorium on Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe [Extract], March 16, 1982 [1]

Before I begin my planned remarks this morning, I would like to speak again to the question of controlling nuclear arms, a subject of deep concern to all Americans, to our allies, and to the people of the world. The hope of all men everywhere is peace—peace not only for this generation but for generations to come. To preserve peace, to ensure it for the future, we must not just freeze the production of nuclear arms, we must reduce the exorbitant level that already exists.

Those who are serious about peace, those who truly abhor the potential for nuclear destruction must begin an undertaking for real arms reduction. President Brezhnev has proposed a unilateral moratorium on further deployment of SS-20 missiles in Western Europe. [2] Well, I say today, as I said yesterday, and as I made clear on November 18th, a freeze simply isn't good enough, because it doesn't go far enough. We must go beyond a freeze.

Let's consider some facts about the military balance in Europe. The Soviet Union now has 300 brand new SS-20 missiles with 900 warheads deployed. All can hit targets anywhere in Western Europe. NATO has zero land-based missiles which can hit the U.S.S.R.

When President Brezhnev offers to stop deployments in Western Europe, he fails to mention that these are mobile missiles. It doesn't matter where you put them, since you can move them anywhere you want, including back to Western Europe. And even if east of the Urals, they could still target most of Western Europe.

Our proposal, now on the table in Geneva, is that we not deploy any of the intermediate missiles in Europe, in exchange for Soviet agreement to dismantle what they now have there. And that's fair. That is zero on both sides. And if President Brezhnev is serious about real arms control—and I hope he is—he will join in real arms reduction.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 22, 1982, p. 316.
[2] *Ante*, Mar. 16.

Statement by the White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary (Speakes): Moratorium on Deployment of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe, March 16, 1982 [1]

Upon examination, the "unilateral moratorium" offered by President Brezhnev [2] is neither unilateral, nor a moratorium.

The offer, President Brezhnev makes clear, is limited to the European Soviet Union, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. free to continue its SS-20 buildup east of the Urals, well within range of Western Europe. As we have noted on many occasions, given its range and mobility, an SS-20 is a threat to NATO wherever located.

President Brezhnev clearly links his "unilateral" offer to the condition that Western preparations for the deployment of ground launch cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II's, agreed upon in December 1979, [3] do not proceed. This condition, plus the fact that the Soviets have already prepared sites for new SS-20's west as well as east of the Urals, demonstrate that this is a propaganda gesture and that the Soviets do not really intend to stop their SS-20 buildup.

The Soviet SS-20 force already exceeds the dimensions of the expected threat when NATO took its decision of December 1979 to deploy U.S. GLCM and Pershing II missiles in Europe and to seek, through arms control, to reduce planned levels of long-range intermediate nuclear force (INF) missiles on both sides. The Soviets now have 300 SS-20 missiles deployed, with 900 warheads. Brezhnev's freeze proposal is designed, like previous Soviet statements over the past 3 years, to direct attention away from the enormous growth of Soviet capabilities that has already taken place and the enormous preponderance that the Soviet Union has thereby acquired.

It is unfortunate that the Soviets did not choose to exercise real restraint before their SS-20 buildup began. NATO, for its part, has been observing restraint on INF missiles for well over a decade, which the Soviets simply exploited.

In sum, President Brezhnev's offer is neither evidence of Soviet restraint, nor is it designed to foster an arms control agreement. Like previous such Soviet freeze proposals, this one seeks to legitimize Soviet superiority, to leave the Soviet Union free to continue its buildup, to divide the NATO Alliance, to stop U.S. deployments, and thus to secure for the Soviet Union unchallenged hegemony over Europe.

The United States has put forward concrete proposals in Geneva for the complete elimination of missiles on both sides, cited by Brezhnev in his remarks of today. We regret the Soviet Union apparently prefers propaganda gestures to concentrating on serious negotiations in

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Mar. 16, 1982, pp. 321–322.

[2] *Ante,* Mar. 16.

[3] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

Geneva. For its part, the United States, with the full support of its Allies, will continue to implement both tracks of the December 1979 decision on the deployment of new systems to Europe and the pursuit of genuine arms control, which we hope will make those deployments unnecessary.

President Brezhnev's proposal to place limits on the operations of missiles submarines is also not a serious proposal. U.S. submarines, by deploying to extensive ocean areas, are able to remain invulnerable to Soviet attack, and thus constitute a stable deterrent force. Reducing their area of operations in the world's oceans would increase their vulnerability and erode our confidence in their deterrent capability. The Soviet proposal, therefore, is entirely self-serving. Having made a large fraction of our land-based ICBM force vulnerable through their large ICBM buildup, the Soviets in this proposal are attempting to reduce the confidence we have in the sea-based leg of our deterrent.

The proposal for a ban on the deployment of ground-based, long-range cruise missiles is yet another transparent effort to disrupt NATO's 1979 two-track decision. Moreover, in focusing on sea-based as well as land-based, long-range cruise missiles, the proposal ignores the hundreds of shorter range cruise missiles that the Soviet Union currently deploys aboard its warships.

Finally, we want to reiterate the four principles underlying the Reagan administration's approach to arms control. These are to seek agreements that:

1. produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;

2. are equal, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;

3. are verifiable, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based simply upon trust; and

4. enhance U.S. and Allied security, because arms control is not an end in itself, but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981.[4] They underlie our position in the current Geneva negotiations on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missile forces. They also form the basis for our approach to negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of strategic arms—the START talks.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

Decision by the Federal Republic of Germany: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, March 17, 1982 [1]

On 17 March, the first day of the pause in negotiations, the Federal Cabinet discussed the state of the INF negotiations in Geneva.

The Cabinet takes the view that:

1. These negotiations—in comparison with other arms control negotiations—are being conducted rapidly. Both sides have presented negotiation proposals and made their objectives clear. The pause in negotiations is now necessary in order to give both delegations an opportunity to analyse the course of the negotiations thus far, to inform their Governments, and to prepare the continuation of the talks on 20 May.

2. On the first day of the pause in negotiations Secretary-General Brezhnev announced a Soviet decision to introduce a unilateral moratorium on the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the Soviet Union. [2] This decision is similar in content to earlier moratorium proposals made by the Soviet Union. Its becoming effective is made dependent on whether or not the West stops preparations for stationing American pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe. Thus, similar to its predecessors, this Soviet decision aims at preventing the deployment of these American weapons in Europe independent of the course taken by the Geneva negotiations and to preserve the existing imbalance in this area to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

On 16 March 1982 the Government spokesman recalled the fact that the Soviet Union presently has more than 300 SS-20 missiles armed with 900 warheads, of which two-thirds are aimed at targets in Europe. In addition, SS-20 missiles stationed beyond the Ural mountains can reach Western European territory because of their long-range capacity. A moratorium on deployment on its European territory leaves the possibility open to the Soviet Union to continue deploying SS-20 missiles East of the Urals, from where they are no less a threat to Western Europe. Thus, only the elimination of the SS-20 missiles, such as demanded by the West, can remove this threat. The Soviet Union has expanded emplacements on both sides of the Urals where further SS-20 rockets can be deployed.

3. It continues to be of decisive importance for the Federal Government that concrete negotiation results be achieved by the end of summer 1983. It advocates complete renunciation of land-based intermediate-range missiles on both sides. It will assess the importance of the Soviet decision just announced on the basis of this objective. It recognizes in the declaration of the Soviet Secretary-General that the Soviet Union is greatly interested in not having American pershing-2

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[1] CD/269.

[2] *Ante*, Mar. 16.

and cruise missiles deployed in Europe. This interest can only be done justice to by means of an agreed reciprocal "zero solution" as the result of the Geneva negotiations. The Federal Government concludes from this that the negotiations can only lead to success if the Soviet Union has to reckon with the fact that otherwise these American weapons will in fact be deployed in Europe as of the end of 1983.

Statement by the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze), March 18, 1982 [3]

I left London this morning. Yesterday in Brussels I fully briefed our NATO partners on the progress of the Geneva talks on limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The talks have been intense, serious, and businesslike. We have covered at length all the important and difficult issues between us. I have agreed with Ambassador [Yuli A.] [4] Kvitsinskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation, to maintain the confidentiality of the exchanges between us. I can say, however, that I have had the opportunity fully to present the case for the draft treaty which we presented on February 2, which would implement the President's proposal for zero on our side and zero on theirs, with respect to those missiles which are of greatest concern to both sides.

I would like to make one closing comment. I hope that those here at home who are considering various nuclear freeze proposals take fully into account the effect that their proposals, if adopted, would have on our negotiations. If the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles is frozen, there will be no incentive for the Soviet Union to give up theirs; they have virtually completed their planned deployment in Europe of such missiles.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Kennedy) to the International Atomic Energy Agency Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Improving Agency Safeguards, March 18, 1982 [1]

Thank you very much. I appreciate greatly the opportunity to be here and discuss with the committee the International Atomic Energy Agency system and its safeguards system.

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[3] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1982, p. 44.

[4] Brackets in the source text.

[1] *The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade . . ., Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 115–122.

The IAEA is among the most important international organizations, one which the United States was instrumental in establishing and one which we have supported over the years. Its safeguards role is a fundamental part of the international nonproliferation regime.

The treaty of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons requires each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its peaceful nuclear activities. [2]

Similarly, the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, requires each state party to arrange for full-scope IAEA safeguards. [3]

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

It is important at the outset to understand what IAEA safeguards are and what they are not. IAEA safeguards are a technical means of confirming to all countries that each country under safeguards is fulfilling its political obligation.

This requires a system of procedures including records, reports, and inspections, by which the IAEA can verify that specified material and facilities are not being diverted from their declared peaceful purposes.

These safeguards are a critical and indispensable component of the worldwide nonproliferation effort. But they are not the totality of that effort.

IAEA safeguards are principally a detection and warning rather than a prevention or reaction mechanism. The IAEA has no capability to physically prevent diversion and has limited enforcement authority.

The IAEA has no authority or capability to search for nuclear activities away from defined locations. And its safeguards do not involve political judgments by the IAEA as to the dependability or sincerity of nonproliferation commitments.

Safeguards should not be thought of as a system imposed by others. It is in the interest of all states to cooperate with and assist the IAEA in implementing safeguards in an open and convincing manner.

The acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities provides a mechanism for a country to show the world community, including its neighbors, that it intends to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.

Inspection of a country's nuclear facilities by an international organization entails an openness to public scrutiny of a country's activities, capabilities, and intentions that would otherwise be absent.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFEGUARDS

In assessing the effectiveness of safeguards it must be recalled that the IAEA's task has been rapidly changing, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Safeguards were initially applied mainly to research reactors, then to power reactors.

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[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–468.

[3] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Since the mid-1970's IAEA safeguards have been applied to a rapidly increasing number of states as well as to a growing number and variety of facilities.

INSPECTION LIMITATIONS

Recent public discussions of IAEA safeguards have cited a number of limitations without an informed consideration of the degree to which these limitations do or do not diminish safeguards' effectiveness.

For example, that inspected states must agree to the designation of individual inspectors has been presented as a major defect. We do not believe that is the case. Inspected states have a legitimate interest in being able to avoid the designation of individuals objectionable to them, for example, for physical security reasons. In fact, the U.S. Senate considered this provision to be an important protection for the United States under our own safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Besides, safeguards agreements contain a provision protecting against overuse of this right. In practice, designation of inspectors has not been a widespread or serious problem.

We should not overlook the fact that the IAEA safeguards system is a unique compromise of sovereign rights by many nations, one without parallel in any other area of national security. It should be no surprise that this compromise is subject to certain limitations.

DETECTION DEFICIENCIES

At the same time deficiencies have existed in the IAEA's capability to detect diversions of materials, especially in the actual in-the-field application of safeguards.

Sustained efforts by the United States and other interested countries have resulted in significant improvements.

However, there remain problems and weaknesses which require further work to improve the IAEA's effectiveness and to keep pace with nuclear power developments. There still are, for example, problems with the reliability of surveillance cameras, and with the recruitment and retention of qualified inspectors. To assure against significant mistakes or omissions by staff in the conduct of inspections and analyses it is important that adequate redundancies and cross-checks, such as with establishment of the safeguards evaluation unit, are built into the system.

EFFECTIVENESS OF IAEA

Overall, I would like to emphasize that the top management of the IAEA is highly competent and motivated, and there are many excellent and committed staff at all levels of the Agency. We expect the new Director General to continue the improvements of IAEA efficiency and effectiveness.

The political context for IAEA safeguards also is critical. The degree of cooperation from inspected states, any vulnerability of individual inspectors to political pressure, ability of IAEA management to resist possible pressure from inspected states on specific points, and general support of safeguards functions by the Board of Governors all play a part. The overall situation with regard to such factors, also is good.

IAEA FUNDING

Turning to specific budgetary problems within the IAEA which impact on the effectiveness of safeguards, the allocation of resources within the IAEA budget has been a subject of continuing discussion within the Board of Governors. As you know, the budget of the IAEA is funded through both assessed and voluntary contributions, with the majority of technical assistance funded through voluntary contributions. With regard to the regular budget, there are two different assessment scales: one for safeguards and one for the remainder of the IAEA's regular budget. In spite of this arrangement, there continues to be strong sentiment among less developed countries for increased technical assistance funding, and for striking what they consider to be a more equal balance of funding between technical assistance and safeguards.

For our part we have strongly opposed initiatives to alter the assessment formula for safeguards funding, and have also argued strongly, and to date successfully, for increases in the IAEA's safeguards budget. As a counterpart we have accepted some increases in technical assistance. Increases in these two areas have been possible only by exercising restraint in all other areas of the budget and by emphasizing the most efficient use of funds in all areas.

Because of these constraints on the safeguards budget the Agency has experienced difficulties in funding an adequate number of new inspector positions each year to keep pace with the large increase in the number and complexity of facilities under safeguards. Even so, the safeguards staff has grown from 100 in 1976 to 220 in 1981. For 1982, the professional safeguards staff budgeted is 228, of whom 153 are inspectors. Similarly, the safeguards budget has increased from $6.4 million to $25 million in the same period. The regular safeguards budget for 1982 has increased after inflation by 7.1 percent.

Funding such a dramatic increase in safeguards application activities has left little money for development of new safeguards equipment and techniques. It is in this area that the U.S. program for technical assistance to safeguards has been critical. This program is the largest extrabudgetary source of support for safeguards improvements available to the IAEA. In addition, this program has helped to induce other countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union, to institute similar safeguards assistance programs.

U.S. PARTICIPATION

Funds under the U.S. program for technical assistance to safeguards are allocated to tasks proposed by the safeguards staff of the Agency which have been reviewed and approved by a U.S. Interagency Technical Support Coordinating Committee. U.S. expertise and technology are transferred to the IAEA; and in areas where needed technology does not currently exist, this program insures that it is developed. In past years substantial efforts have been devoted to the development of new equipment to make safeguards inspections more effective and efficient. In the current fiscal year the emphasis is shifting to providing the training and expertise needed to implement these improvements.

In addition to our direct support to the IAEA through assessed and voluntary contributions, including the program of technical assistance to safeguards, significant other research and development activities to support international safeguards and U.S. nonproliferation activities are funded through the Department of Energy, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the NRC.

This type of work also provides the technical backup necessary for U.S. experts to be effective participants in IAEA-sponsored meetings of consultants and advisory groups. Through such activity, U.S. participants have been able to influence IAEA safeguards policies on technical matters and to enhance safeguards effectiveness. Continued support of such safeguards R. & D. activities is vital to maintaining that U.S. influence.

Much remains to be done to make international safeguards more effective, and POTAS will continue to be a critical factor in the IAEA's ability to meet its safeguards responsibilities.

However, better equipment is not enough. At the same time that the IAEA is improving the IAEA's technical capabilities, we also need to assure that states fulfill their safeguards obligations and provide the domestic framework necessary for effective and efficient international safeguards.

TIMELY WARNING

Turning next to the technical problems which the IAEA faces in applying safeguards on reprocessing and enrichment plants, substantial work does remain to be done before safeguards on these types of facilities reach the level of effectiveness we desire. But that is to be expected, when the IAEA has only recently begun to apply safeguards on a few relatively small facilities of each type.

I shall discuss in a moment this IAEA experience to date and the work underway to improve these safeguards; but first let me address the concept of "timely warning" and the Agency's timeliness of detection goals.

The specific conditions for meeting this standard of "timely warning," are appropriately not established in the NNPA. The time which constitutes "well in advance" and the means for obtaining that warning will vary depending on such other circumstances as the prior preparations of a potential diverter, the level of sophistication of its other nuclear activities, its ability to hide clandestine activities, and the quality of U.S. intelligence.

Further, IAEA safeguards cannot be exclusively responsible for providing such warning. In most circumstances we would have other, much earlier, warning signals.

The IAEA, nonetheless, has established criteria to implement the objective of NPT safeguards, that is "the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities." These criteria are expressed as goals for detecting diversions of specified quantities of material in a specific time period.

Achieving the IAEA goals at reprocessing plants, especially the timeliness of detection goal, probably will require development and implementation of a dynamic, rather than a static, material accounting system. Only a continuous accounting system, comparable to industrial process monitoring, would permit the IAEA to strike a material balance at short notice whenever the IAEA thinks it is necessary. Efforts to develop the technology have been underway for several years both at the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant in Japan, and at Barnwell, S.C. We continue to work with both the Japanese and the IAEA in this area. Continuous inspection, especially during reprocessing campaigns, such as now occurs, also may be needed.

THE HEXAPARTITE SAFEGUARDS PROJECT

The IAEA has begun inspecting with preliminary techniques the centrifuge enrichment plants in West Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands. But its longer term safeguards approach for these facilities still needs to be agreed upon and implemented. To that end, we are working closely with other countries that have centrifuge enrichment technology and with the safeguards inspectorates of the IAEA and Euratom in what is known as the hexapartite safeguards project. This project is developing the technical basis for an effective and efficient safeguards approach for these facilities. We expect its work to be completed within the next year, resulting in a safeguards approach which should satisfy our concerns about the proliferation risks associated with centrifuge enrichment plants.

POLITICAL TENSIONS

On the subject of current political tensions within the Agency and their impact on its effectiveness about which you asked, we need to resist the intrusion into IAEA matters of extraneous political factors, as occurred last September when the general conference debated whether to suspend Israel from the IAEA. Such politicization ultimately could threaten the ability of the IAEA to perform its tasks, and especially its vital safeguards mission.

For now, however, these disputes have not undermined safeguards and we are guardedly optimistic that a large majority of IAEA member states will continue to recognize that an effective IAEA is in their own security interest and is an indispensable requirement for the expanded international nuclear commerce which many of them seek.

Other political differences more directly related to the responsibilities of the Agency also can be expected to generate controversy between the developed and developing countries within the IAEA. A few states are dissatisfied with the evolution of a safeguards regime largely founded on the NPT, which they believe discriminates against the nonnuclear weapons states. Many developing countries feel that the industrialized world deliberately restricts the free transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, while also believing that their interests are slighted in terms of representation on the Board of Governors, and in high-level Agency secretariat positions.

On such specific issues, we must make clear from the start our opposition to changes that would undermine the Agency's effectiveness. Thus, we opposed, and continue to oppose, Board expansion because it would make the Agency's governing body more unwieldy and therefore less able to meet its responsibilities. We also oppose transferring the funding for technical assistance from voluntary funding to regular budget assessments, an action which would be in conflict with our own budgetary policy.

But we also shall support reasonable changes. For instance, we support Director General Blix's attempt to hire qualified candidates from developing countries for senior IAEA positions as they come open. We are fully behind IAEA initiatives to establish training programs for good and well-qualified candidates.

The interests of developed and developing countries are not diametrically opposed. The effective implementation of IAEA safeguards serves the interests of all countries. We took steps to establish a dialog with a number of developing countries to discuss our respective interests and concerns in a less confrontational environment. During the recent Board of Governors meeting, I personally met with representatives of a number of such countries.

Naturally some countries have been less responsive than others, but there appears to be general agreement that excessive politicization of the IAEA is undesirable and counterproductive. And it is a good sign that at the most recent Board of Governors meeting there was much less political controversy of the sort that marked the last general conference, the Board conducted its business with a minimum of extraneous rhetoric.

We shall continue and intensify these attempts to reduce political controversy, while making clear our readiness to meet the legitimate concerns of the developing countries as we approach this year's general conference in the fall.

Should the Agency become increasingly politicized so that it can no longer meet its responsibilities and especially its vital safeguards mission, the United States would be forced to reassess its role in the IAEA. For now, these disputes have not undermined safeguards. Most important, we believe that many other countries stand ready to work with us to insure that the IAEA remains an effective institution.

IAEA ROLE IN OVERALL U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

Finally, you asked that I describe the proper role and significance of IAEA safeguards in overall U.S. nonproliferation policy.

As President Reagan said last July:

> The problem of reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation has many aspects and we need an integrated approach to deal with it effectively. In the final analysis, the success of our efforts depends on our ability to improve regional and global stability and reduce those motivations that can drive countries toward nuclear explosives. This calls for a strong and dependable United States, vibrant alliances and improved relations with others, and a dedication to those tasks that are vital for a stable world order.[4]

As I have earlier said, acceptance of safeguards is important as a signal of a country's intentions. Effective safeguards are important in verifying that a country is in fact fulfilling its international obligations and in deterring it from failing in those obligations. But critical though IAEA safeguards are, as the President's statement indicates, they are only one component of our nonproliferation effort.

The overall problem requires a variety of measures. These include the political and security relationships to which the President refers as well as intelligence efforts and a responsible nuclear export policy which avoids exports that might contribute to enhanced proliferation risk.

Mr. Chairman, this administration strongly supports the IAEA. This unique international body plays a major role in our nonproliferation efforts, as it has for so many years up until now. We have taken various steps, and plan to take still others, to strengthen the Agency and to assure that IAEA safeguards accomplish their objectives. And while important problems still need to be addressed, very important progress has been made by the IAEA in the recent past.

We shall strive to make the Agency an even better and more effective organization, recognizing there always will be room for further improvement. I warmly welcome the past and present interest of this committee in IAEA safeguards, and will work closely with you in the continued support and strengthening of this essential element of our nonproliferation effort.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 278–280.

Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Improving the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, March 18, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before these two distinguished subcommittees today. Pursuant to your instruction and arrangements for coordination I have made with my friends, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Kirk, my testimony will deal with three themes—the role and significance of IAEA safeguards in our nonproliferation policy, a discussion of ACDA's role in the efforts of our Government to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, and finally, a review of some of the activities carried out by ACDA which are intended to improve safeguards. In my oral presentation, I shall concentrate on the IAEA safeguards and how they can be improved and leave other aspects of the problem to my written statement for the record.

THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign and security policy since we proposed the Baruch plan immediately after World War II, [2] when the United States had a nuclear monopoly. The Soviet Union rejected that creative and far-reaching proposal, but, some 20 years later, accepted the American proposal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [3] The policy of nonproliferation embodied in that treaty remains a pillar of American foreign policy, and a basic security interest of every state in the world. The indefinite proliferation of nuclear weapons would destroy any hope of restoring world public order. Under such circumstances, the circumstances of indefinite proliferation, the State system would become so chaotic, so volatile and so unpredictable as to nullify all plans and expectations.

The international system of inspections conducted by IAEA is the basic structural element of the network of arrangements on which the nations depend to achieve the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. No one has ever suggested that IAEA safeguards are now or will soon become a perfectly efficient safeguard system. Halting the spread of nuclear explosives is inconceivable without the IAEA safeguards, which monitor and verify compliance with agreements about the use and diversion of nuclear materials. I wish we had a verification system at least as good as IAEA in the field of nuclear weapons control. Success in that cooperative international effort requires much more than the IAEA system, which serves as an indispensable deterrent and a warning system. Success in that effort requires intelligence; cooperation among the suppliers; diplomacy at the highest political level in the rare situations when the risk of proliferation becomes acute; and as President Reagan stated in his statement of July 16, 1981:

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[1] *The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards: Hearings Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade . . ., Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 115–150.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

> In the final analysis, the success of our efforts depends on our ability to improve regional and global stability and to reduce those motivations that can drive countries toward nuclear explosives. This calls for a strong and dependable United States, vibrant alliances and improved relations with others, and a dedication to those tasks that are vital for a stable world order. [4]

KEY ELEMENTS OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

Against this background, I should note these key elements of U.S. nonproliferation policy as basic for your purposes today.

REMOVAL OR REDUCTION OF MOTIVATIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

First, we seek to remove or reduce the motivations that nations might have for acquiring nuclear explosives. Regional instability, for example, can lead to insecurities that may cause a state to consider the nuclear option. The nuclear option may be equally attractive to states with predatory inclinations, or strong impulses for revenge. However illusory the nuclear option may be, we must use every tool at our disposal to reduce these motivations. As you are aware, one initiative we are examining is the possibility of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East based on the model of a promising nonproliferation regime for Latin America established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We recognize the difficulties to be encountered as that approach is pursued, but we also know what dire consequences proliferation might portend for that region if that approach is not pursued.

COOPERATIVE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Second, we strongly support cooperative efforts of the international community. We seek increased adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. [5] This past year, three more countries, including Egypt, became parties to the NPT. And the United States also has taken actions related to both of these treaties. On November 23, 1981, the United States ratified protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which calls on states with international responsibility for territories within the zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the treaty to those territories. Further, although not required by the NPT, four U.S. facilities have been selected this past year by the IAEA for the application of safeguards under the U.S. voluntary safeguards offer, and inspections have already been conducted. Implementation of this offer will serve to demonstrate that safeguards are not something that we ask only of others. I might add, that a similar voluntary safeguards offer by the Soviet Union would be most welcome, and could make a most positive contribution to the prospects for world public order.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 278–280.

[5] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

While there are positive elements in the situation, there are many reasons for grave concern. A few critical countries with significant nuclear activities, such as Argentina and Brazil, have not accepted relevant treaties or full-scope safeguards. In some states, all significant nuclear activities are currently under IAEA safeguards, but the situation there could change suddenly because these states have been unwilling thus far to make a national commitment to safeguards for all future activities. Furthermore, in India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Israel there are significant nuclear activities that are not under safeguards. It has become obvious that if our nonproliferation efforts are to succeed, the underlying political issues and the specific security concerns of those countries must be addressed positively by sustained diplomacy involving both great powers and the international community as a whole.

We must also be vigilant with states such as Libya which are a party to the NPT but in other activities have demonstrated a systematic disregard for international norms and indeed a contempt for the rule of law. The Libyan nuclear program is in its early stages of development, but Libya has stated its intentions for acquiring major nuclear facilities beyond those already supplied by the Soviet Union.

RESPONSIBILITY OF SUPPLIER COUNTRIES TO HALT SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The third element of U.S. nonproliferation policy addresses the special responsibility of the nuclear supplier countries in combating the spread of nuclear weapons. Many of us seem to believe that the United States still has a nuclear monopoly, and could deny nuclear technology to other countries by its own unilateral decisions. This state of affairs came to an end a generation ago. But it is common to encounter the notion that the United States can grant or withhold other nations' access to nuclear technology. This kind of reasoning may give some of us a glow of self-righteousness. Moreover, it doesn't work and it is counterproductive. Only a confident partnership among the advanced industrialized nations could hope to carry out the policy expectations of the NPT, in which the entire states system has the same fundamental interest. The United States is committed to working with other states in a coordinated effort to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment or technology where the danger of proliferation exists.

Civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear programs are special instances of this problem. We have tended to view such issues through the spectacles of the past. We must recognize that such activities in the stable industrial democracies simply do not in themselves present a proliferation risk. Where there is no such risk, President Reagan recognizes that we cannot and should not attempt to set back civil reprocessing or breeder reactor development. To suppose that these aspects of the real world are in conflict with our nonproliferation goals is to invite sterile friction based on the illusion of U.S. omnipotence in nuclear affairs.

The true situation is quite different. Unilateral American attempts to impose our views on other states encourage the spread of reprocessing facilities and weaken the possibility of achieving cooperative solutions for the problem. Our ability to gain support from our allies and friends for our nonproliferation objectives is inextricably linked to multilateral cooperation. Only with our friends fully on our side of this issue will we be able to commit the ever-increasing fraction of nuclear materials and technology not controlled by us to peaceful nonexplosive uses, under effective IAEA safeguards and with adequate physical security. I can assure you, we cannot expect much nonproliferation support from our friends if we consider suspending all nuclear exports to them, as some have proposed.

ADMINISTRATION COMMITMENT

Finally, there is an explicit commitment to the IAEA in this administration's nonproliferation policy. President Reagan has said:

> The United States will strongly support and continue to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide for an improved international safeguards regime.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, this discussion of the key elements of our nonproliferation policy has provided a background for evaluating the role and significance of the international safeguards system.

I view nonproliferation in the framework of national and regional security. And I view IAEA safeguards as one of several essential elements in the overall nonproliferation effort, the others being international arrangements, diplomatic actions, export controls, and national technical means. I agree with IAEA's Director General Blix when he said on December 11, 1981, that "IAEA safeguards are measures through which the states, in the exercise of their sovereign will, rely upon an international organization to confirm through inspection that their actions conform to their stated intention not to acquire nuclear weapons," and that "the verification procedures should not be cosmetic but convincing."

DETERRENCE VALUE OF SAFEGUARDS

Where there is little doubt as to most countries' commitment to nonproliferation—and that is true in the overwhelming majority of cases—safeguards serve to reassure the international community of continued compliance with nonproliferation and other "peaceful use" undertakings. The deterrence value of safeguards is aimed at countries that might contemplate diversion of nuclear material or the misuse of a nuclear facility. It follows then that safeguards must be credible, and must be perceived to be credible.

IAEA safeguards do not prevent diversion. They do not serve to apprehend a diverter. They do not allow for searches for clandestine materials or facilities. They, obviously, do not deal with known nuclear facilities that are not under safeguards. In short, they do not address the whole of the proliferation problem. They are necessary but not sufficient.

In my view, it is just as wrong to overestimate the importance of safeguards in nuclear commerce as it is to denigrate the system for not accomplishing objectives for which it was not designed.

STRENGTHENING OF SAFEGUARDS

While much of the recent criticism of the IAEA seems to be based on misunderstandings about the role of the Agency within the nonproliferation regime, it is clear that the safeguards system needs to be strengthened. Continued U.S. efforts on safeguards improvements through relevant R. & D. and close interaction with the IAEA are essential. The nuclear fuel cycle is dynamic; safeguards should be equally dynamic. A great deal of ACDA's energy and imagination are devoted to this task.

We should exercise controls realistically and pragmatically on U.S. materials and technology in order to create and encourage a political climate in which all nuclear materials and technology can be responsibly used. And, our allies and the IAEA should join us in taking the steps necessary to meet the increased demands placed upon the IAEA safeguards system by the expanding nuclear fuel cycle.

ELEMENTS OF ENHANCED COOPERATION PATTERN

Specifically, I see three elements in this pattern of enhanced cooperation that I should emphasize in closing.

First, we need a renewed commitment by the member states to support effective and efficient IAEA safeguards. Voluntarily accepted by states for a variety of reasons, IAEA safeguards must be implemented in a cooperative rather than an adversary climate. For example, while IAEA must of course work within the established legal framework, differences in specific interpretations should be worked out promptly in the interest of effective safeguards and thus in the interest of the country concerned. The IAEA must be able to use cameras even if they are not provided for in an old safeguards agreement. Inspectors must be designated more promptly and without regard to factors not related to their duties. Every effort should be made to submit reports to the IAEA within set time limits. A country's system of accounting for nuclear material should serve effectively to support the activities of the IAEA, and not make them more difficult. Physical inventories of nuclear materials should be taken at the required times in order to provide credibility to the IAEA's accounting system.

Second, we need a strengthened commitment by the member states to provide the international safeguards system with the resources necessary not only to keep pace with the increased number of facilities but also to increase the ability of the Agency to apply effective safeguards at all facilities. For example, the member states must recognize that each nuclear export entails safeguards responsibilities for the IAEA, responsibilities which cost money for inspectors, equipment, and support staff. Each country needs also to support a sufficient number of qualified staff to deal with IAEA matters. And finally, it is essential that the member states develop the new equipment necessary to safeguard effectively and efficiently the additional and often more complex facilities since the IAEA must rely almost entirely on such voluntary assistance.

Third, we need a reaffirmed commitment by the IAEA to pursue its obligations in the most professional manner possible. For example, with due consideration to proper geographical distribution, IAEA safeguards staff should continue to be hired on their qualifications and promoted on their merit. The operation of a worldwide verification system must be supported by a strong base of modern management techniques, logistics and communications. And it should be recognized more explicitly by the IAEA that it provides a service on which the international community must be able to count. I do not agree with those who contend that an international organization is inherently incapable of providing such a service.

Mr. Chairman, many years of devoted effort have gone into the development of IAEA as an effective international agency. It is not perfect, but it is indispensably valuable. In examining the problem of nonproliferation, we must start by accepting the fact—and I believe it is a fact—that we can go forward only by building on what has been achieved already. Throwing out the baby with the bath water has never been a useful or an appealing procedure.

I have offered a number of comments today on the safeguards system in the perspective of ACDA's responsibilities. In the interest of time, I shall leave to the statement I have submitted for the record the details of ACDA's activities in strengthening international safeguards.

Progress Report Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on the Thirteenth Session of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events: Summary of Achievements to March 1982 [Extract], March 18, 1982 [1]

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1. The *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, so as to

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[1] CD/260.

facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, was established in 1976 by the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and has later been maintained by the Committee on Disarmament (CD). Government appointed experts from 34 States and a representative from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) have participated in the work.[2]

2. In its consensus reports CCD/558 of 14 March 1978 and CD/43 of 25 July 1979[3] the *Ad Hoc* Group described how seismological science could be applied, in international co-operation, for a global exchange of seismological data, so as to assist States in their national monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

3. The proposed global system has three main elements:

(a) a network of more than fifty existing or planned seismological stations around the globe, with improved equipment and upgraded procedures for the extraction of data;

(b) an international exchange of these data over the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO);

(c) processing of the data at special international data centres for the use of participant States.

4. The *Ad Hoc* Group has considered several theoretical models of possible future networks as envisaged in CCD/558. In the model with the most effective equipment the network was estimated to be able to detect, with 90 per cent probability, events of body wave magnitude four or greater in the northern hemisphere and body wave magnitude four point three or greater in the southern hemisphere. In their reports the *Ad Hoc* Group observed the importance of increasing the number of sensitive observatories in the southern hemisphere and of providing observatories generally with equipment for digital recording. The Group did not study the verification capability of the system, as this was considered to be outside its terms of reference.

5. The data to be reported from each station or observatory would be in standard form and on two levels:

> *Level 1* with the routine reporting, with minimum delay, of basic parameters of detected seismic signals and
> *Level 2* with detailed records of wave forms provided in response to requests for additional information.

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[2] Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China (participating as observers), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. [Footnote in original.]

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 476–481.

Compared to current seismological practice, increased emphasis would be laid on parameters relevant to event identification and generally strict operational requirements would be set forth as to scope, consistency, reliability and promptness in the reporting. Where applicable, internationally agreed scientific practices would be followed.

The *Ad Hoc* Group specified in detail the parameters to be extracted from the measurements at the observatories. Primarily the parameters would be measured manually but the Group considered the possibilities of computer automated parameter extraction, which would very much ease the burden of work at observatories.

The Group did also report on the format for records to be exchanged on Level 2 and the record specifications necessary to go with them.

6. As regards the initial promptness of the envisaged data exchange, the *Ad Hoc* Group considered that realistic goals are a maximum delay of three to five days in the reporting and processing of Level 1 data and a maximum of four to six weeks for obtaining Level 2 data.

7. For the global exchange of Level 1 data on the basic parameters of the observations, the *Ad Hoc* Group proposed the use of the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), because of its global availability, proven operation and capacity. The GSE has obtained a preliminary acceptance by the 8th Congress of the WMO of its proposal and has also had the benefit of close co-operation with WMO officials in working out details. The capacity of the WMO/GTS would accommodate the additional traffic envisaged. Hours of low meteorological traffic could be employed for the seismic data exchange. However, on low speed GTS circuits in certain areas of South America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific difficulties are foreseen at days of seismological peak load. The *Ad Hoc* Group noted with appreciation that WMO has initiated the necessary actions to upgrade these low speed circuits. The Group also made a detailed study of the format to be used for such a use of the GTS and recommended a version of the International Seismic Code already in use for scientific transmissions over the WMO/GTS.

8. The formats and procedures at present available for exchange of Level 2 data with complete records were studied. They range widely, from mail delivery of seismograms or of magnetic tapes, over facsimile transmissions of graphical recordings to fast transmission of large amounts of numerical data over special telecommunication data links. The WMO/GTS does not have the capacity for exchange on Level 2 as complete records contain too much data. Therefore other and *ad hoc* arrangements must be made for the exchange of Level 2 data according to the facilities available in each case.

9. The purpose of the proposed data centres would be to provide States with easily accessible data on seismic events for national assessments. In particular, the Ad Hoc Group proposed that several international data centres for the collection, processing and dissemination of seismic data should be established, in order to achieve a reliability

acceptable to all. In connection with the use of the WMO/GTS for data exchange it would be desirable to locate such data centres near main WMO communications centres, such as those in Moscow (USSR) and Washington D.C. (USA). The data centres would

(a) receive Level 1 and Level 2 data from the global network of seismic stations via the authorized Government facility of each participating State;

(b) apply agreed analysis procedures to available data for the estimation of origin time, location, depth and magnitude of seismic events;

(c) associate reported identification parameters with these events;

(d) distribute, in accordance with defined procedures and without interpretation of identification parameters, compilations of the complete results of these analyses;

(e) act as archives for reported data and results of analyses of these data;

(f) ask for and forward Level 2 data, if requested.

The centres would have equivalent hardware and software and would perform equivalent processing of all Level 1 data. Processing would be largely automatic, with some interaction from a seismologist. The *Ad Hoc* Group has worked out and reported on detailed technical procedures for phase association, event location, depth estimation and magnitude calculations. The results of the calculations would be reported to States either through the WMO/GTS or by other arrangements. The data centres would issue preliminary bulletins as soon as available data allow an event to be located. Final, detailed results should be distributed within a week of occurrence of the event. The data centres would also establish data banks, for the Level 1 data reported to it, for the event analyses given in bulletins, for signals without associated events and for complete records of requested Level 2 data.

10. After giving the consensus reports CCD/558 and CD/43, which were accepted by States participating in the *Ad Hoc* Group, the Group has devoted itself to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the proposed global exchange of seismological data, and also to the consideration of an experimental test of the whole global system. This work has taken the form of review and analysis of a number of national investigations into relevant matters, some of them of considerable impact and volume. A variety of scientific methods for the analysis of data have been studied and developed, the conditions for reliable data exchange through the WMO/GTS have been studied in two global experiments, the last one engaging twenty participating States. The results of the second experiment need additional investigations. The details of operating data centres have been investigated in depth and experimentally tested. In particular the impact of the very quick development of computer and telecommunication technology available to research institutes and others has made itself felt, suggesting that the efficiency of the envisaged

global exchange system could in principle be greatly increased by the adoption of these new methods. The extent of scientific consensus in the Group about these new developments has, however, not yet been established. Therefore suggestions from the Group about how the original proposal about a global system for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events might be improved in the light of recent scientific and technological progress, would have to await some further work by the *Ad Hoc* Group.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space, Radiological Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction [Extract], March 18, 1982 [1]

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I should like today to make some comments on a number of items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. I shall begin with item 7 of the agenda.

This year mankind will observe the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the conquest of space, which is one of the greatest achievements of science and technology in our century. The progress in this area achieved today cannot be separated from general progress on our planet. The use of outer space in connection with communications, meteorology, navigation, the study of the earth's natural resources and for other purposes is of the greatest value to mankind.

Unfortunately it has to be admitted that outer space is becoming not merely an area for the peaceful efforts of different countries through its exploration and use, but also the arena of an ever-growing military confrontation.

Reflecting the concern of the world community in connection with the danger which the militarization of outer space represents for the whole of mankind, the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted a resolution calling for the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space and requesting the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations with a view to agreement on the text of such treaty. [2]

The outer space problem occupies a special place in the spectrum of disarmament issues. What is most important here is the prevention of a new and even more dangerous spiralling of the arms race in another sphere of vital interest to the whole of mankind. In this connection the implementation of the numerous projects which have appeared in recent years for the creation of a whole series of space weapons designed to carry out strikes on targets in outer space, in the atmosphere and on the surface of the earth would be especially dangerous. Among them the most threatening are the projects the implementation of which might upset the strategic balance that exists in the world and thus increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Foremost of these are the plans for the deployment in outer space of anti-missile systems, based, in particular, on the use of the latest scientific and technical advances in the field of laser and accelerating technology. In the opinion of an authoritative committee of the American Senate, the deployment of laser and so-called "particle-beam" weapons in outer space will provide "the unique potential for changing the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union".

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[1] CD/PV.164, pp. 17–20.

[2] G.A. res. 36/97 C of Dec. 9, 1981.

No less dangerous are the plans for the creation of multiple-use manned spacecraft, capable also of carrying out purely military tasks such as the placing in orbit of reconnaissance, communication, navigation and other satellites for military purposes, and also the testing of new types of outer space weapons and the inspection and destruction of satellites.

It would be a dangerous error, distinguished colleagues, to suppose that if weapons make their appearance in outer space, then the latter will be the sole firing ground and "battlefield", in the spirit of science fiction.

The essentially "earth" character of the outer space armaments under development is evident. This would still further increase the danger of a nuclear conflict, with all its frightful consequences for the whole of mankind, particularly as military space programmes are accompanied by the promulgation of doctrines and concepts proclaiming the admissibility and acceptability of nuclear war, the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons.

There is another aspect to this matter. It is difficult to imagine how much it would cost to create even a small potential for the conduct of military operations in the area of space close to the earth. According to the estimates of experts, the cost of launching a weapons system into orbit is several times greater than the cost of deploying it on the earth's surface. And all this is taking place when, over a considerable part of our planet, people lack the barest essentials for a normal existence.

Then, why do some circles need a new spiral of the arms race in outer space?

The American magazine *Business Week* gives the following answer to this question: "Whoever manages to seize control of outer space—the main arena for future wars—will be able decisively to change the balance of power and this will mean the establishment of world supremacy".

The Soviet Union has constantly opposed the conversion of outer space into an arena for the arms race, and it continues to do so. On 18 [*17*] April 1981, President Leonid Brezhnev stated: "Let the boundless ocean of space be unsullied and free from weapons of any kind. We wish by joint efforts to achieve a great and humane goal—the prevention of the militarization of outer space". [3]

At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union made a proposal aimed at preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space and the conversion of outer space into a source of aggravation of the relations between States. [4] To that end it urged the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We propose that States undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, not to install such weapons on the celestial bodies and not to deploy them in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which may be developed in the future.

The draft treaty also deals with the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, the solution of which is urged by a number of States. Article 3 of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union contains an undertaking not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning of or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States parties to the treaty, if these objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with the provisions of the treaty.

We propose the initiation of negotiations on this matter in the Committee without delay and the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group to this end. We would not object if the mandate of the working group were to include also the recommendations in resolution 36/97 C of the General Assembly with respect to negotiations on the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. At the same time we believe that the Committee's main aim should be to solve the problem of the elimination of the arms race in outer space as a whole, and therefore the question of anti-satellite systems should, of course, be discussed in the context of other measures aimed at achieving this goal.

As the Committee on Disarmament is this week considering the item on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as radiological weapons, we would also like to touch briefly upon this question.

With respect to radiological weapons, we would like first of all to recall that the basic elements of a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons have been under discussion in the Committee for about three years already, which were preceded by two years of bilateral negotiations. Is that not, gentlemen, too much time to have spent on the elaboration of a document on the prohibition of a nonexistent type of weapon? Of course, we do not insist that the draft should be ready by the beginning of the second special session on disarmament at any price, so to speak. But it seems to us that the positions of the participants in the negotiations have so crystallized that the time has come to find solutions.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* p. 168.

[4] *Ibid.,* pp. 334–336.

We understand very well the interest shown by a number of delegations in the problem of the prevention of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities and we are not against the elaboration of appropriate international measures. If we can reach an understanding that such elaboration will be conducted outside the framework of the negotiations on radiological weapons, then we are prepared to seek appropriate forms of arrangement to assure the interested States that their proposals will be the subject of serious negotiations. At the same time we would like to declare again that this problem has nothing to do with radiological weapons. It is an independent problem and a very complicated one, including numerous technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects. The proposal for the elaboration of provisions envisaging a commitment not to attack civilian nuclear facilities is regarded seriously by our delegation and that is why we believe that it merits serious discussion.

As regards the problem of the prohibition of *new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction* as a whole, the basic approach of the Soviet Union to this matter is well known, and we would not wish to repeat it. This problem has been on the agenda of various international bodies for a number of years now, and the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions on it. It seems that nobody denies the real danger of the possibility that the latest achievements of science could be used for the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction if this is not prevented in time. Unfortunately the main thing—the readiness of a number of the leading military States to solve this problem—is lacking. As a result, the years go by without any real progress being made. We therefore consider it a timely and positive development that at its last session the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (36/89) calling upon the States permanent members of the Security Council and also other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on this subject. As is clear from the resolution, such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council.

Such an approach, in our view, would permit the placing of a first obstacle, of both moral and political value, in the way of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. At the same time it does not envisage the immediate conclusion of a formal comprehensive agreement, the advisability of which is questioned by some States. These States, incidentally, have in the past submitted proposals whereby the solution of this problem would be sought in the first instance through the strong condemnation by the world community of the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. We have in mind in particular the United Kingdom proposal of 28 July 1977, [5] to which Ambassador Komives has already referred in detail today. Taking this into account, it would be useful if the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the militarily significant Powers are represented, could discuss possible ways of implementing the appeal of the General Assembly to which I referred. For our part we are ready at any time to enter into contact on this question with all delegations concerned.

We listened with great interest to the comments of Ambassador Komives at today's meeting and we consider that they are in complete accord with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament [6] and with other decisions of the General Assembly. We support his proposals for certain organizational measures, in particular his suggestion for the holding of informal consultations in the very near future.

By way of conclusion to my statement and an appeal to the Committee to take concrete and positive actions towards the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, I should like to resort to plagiarism and end with the words of the Ambassador of Australia, applying them, of course, to the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction: "The history of efforts at disarmament has been too much the history of unseen or lost opportunities. I urge you all, distinguished colleagues, to see and to take with both hands the opportunity that now exists, lest it is no longer here tomorrow."

Statement Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Chairman (Ericsson) of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, March 18, 1982 [1]

The scientists, on the basis of national investigations, presented a number of new results, taking into account recent developments in science as I indicated earlier, brought about largely by themselves; also taking into account developments in communication technology, which is made available nowadays at an ever-increasing speed. There was no disagreement about the so-called scientific content of these presentations. It has, however, been difficult, and in fact so far not possible, to reach a consensus about how these new developments, and the new possibilities which obviously are a consequence of those developments, should be brought into relation to the material which we have in the reports CCD/558 and CD/43.[2] We have not yet found language describing the relationship between these two materials in a way which is agreeable or acceptable to everyone in the Group. It is, as indicated by several distinguished delegates here, very much a matter of the interpretation of the mandate of the Group. Some feel that the mandate restricts the Group to consider modern developments and amendments, improvements—to something which is essentially within the framework of the original proposal. Others interpret the same mandate as giving considerable lee-way in introducing also proposals for fundamental changes in the system. So, it is very much a matter of interpretation of the mandate and therefore, I think, to a large extent, a matter outside the competence of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. In order to describe this in somewhat more realistic terms—less general terms—I indicated to you a while ago that there would be a planned exchange of level 2 data, meaning whole seismological records from the designated seismological stations taking part in the data exchange. This can now be done very quickly and effectively by using modern communication technology and, once the investments are made, the cost of communication is very low. That would ease the effort needed also to put the complete records into the compilations at the international data centre, thus improving the power of analysis there, to my understanding, very considerably. The reports in documents CCD/558 and CD/43 clearly said that the calculations in that data centre should be concerned only with the level 1 data, and that the level 2 data—the whole record—should merely be transported through the data centres to the interested parties. This is the technical description of what has been debated in great detail by the scientists and, as I said, it is very much a matter of how the present mandate is read and understood and therefore, it is to my understanding very much a matter outside the range of competence of the Group of Scientific Experts to decide how to go forward from this point.

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[5] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 458–459.

[6] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 411–439.

[1] CD/PV.164, p. 35.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events, March 18, 1982[1]

I think it would be helpful, in the light of what we have heard today from the distinguished Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts,[2] to recall the terms of reference of the mandate under which the Group is operating, and under which my delegation had anticipated a rather fuller report than the progress report with which the Group has provided us today.[3] This mandate specifies that the work of the Group should include "further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system" envisaged for use in international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. In the view of my delegation, this instruction clearly provides guidance to the Group to avail itself of the latest developments in the fields of seismology, data processing and communications, in order that the international exchange of seismic data might be as efficient and as productive as possible. If this is in question. then this Committee should discuss the matter. The objections of some delegations to the use of the available technology have the effect of imposing artificial filters on the exchange of data, and clearly hamper the work of the Group. My delegation is deeply concerned about this. I hope that it will be possible for the Group of Scientific Experts, in their efforts between now and their next meeting envisioned for this summer, to work closely together on the basis of bringing into their third report to this Committee a full treatment of these developments. A number of States which have been participating in the work of the Group have invested a considerable amount of time and of money with a view to making this system the best available. The United States has supported these efforts, and, as I have stated before this Committee in my address on 25 February,[4] will continue to do so, so long as these efforts are useful. It is our firm view that they are and should continue to be so.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 476–481.

[1] CD/PV.164, p. 36.

[2] *Supra*.

Letter From the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director (Burt) to the *Washington Post:* Use of Chemical Weapons, March 19, 1982[1]

The Post's March 12 editorial inquiring about evidence of the use of chemical and toxin weapons (CW) by the Soviet Union and its allies in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia took us rather by surprise. Its author, it seems, has not only neglected to familiarize himself or herself with evidence released to date by the U.S. government, but also appears unfamiliar with information provided by other governments, other news organizations and, indeed, by *The Washington Post.*

•Beginning in 1980, when the Department of State released 125 pages of documentation and declassified intelligence reports on CW use, the U.S. government has repeatedly added to the information available on this subject. Last March, the department updated that initial compendium.

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[3] *Ante.*

[4] CD/PV.158, pp. 13–14.

[1] *Washington Post,* Mar. 19, 1982.

•On Sept. 23, we released the results of laboratory tests on vegetation taken from the site of a chemical attack in Kampuchea. This contained unnatural levels and combinations of deadly trichothecene toxins.

•In November, we released the results on a similarly toxin-contaminated water sample, from that same site, and on uncontaminated control samples of vegetation, taken from the same general area. We also on that occasion released the results on two separate samples, analyzed to contain toxins, from sites of attacks in Laos.

•In January, we released results of laboratory analysis of blood taken from victims of an attack in Kampuchea, which showed toxin poisoning. We will continue to release data and analysis of this sort as they become available.

Others have also gathered and released evidence of CW use. In 1981, the Canadian government released a report based upon refugee interviews. More recently, ABC News prepared an excellent hour-long documentary that contained not only firsthand testimony on attacks, but film clips of such an attack in Afghanistan. Most significantly, ABC obtained its own sample from a CW attack in Southeast Asia, had it analyzed in an independent laboratory, and found it to contain lethal toxins in combination with man-made substances. This further demonstrated the implausibility of any natural explanation for the presence of these substances at the sites of chemical attacks. Only last week The Post carried a report from one of its own correspondents in Southeast Asia detailing several reports of CW use.

The thrust of The Post's editorial is that the U.S. government should remain silent while thousands of innocent people die in agony, and while tens of thousands are driven from their homeland, until we are able to construct a case so watertight and so extensively documented that even the most skeptical must be persuaded. This is not our view of our responsibility in this matter.

Evidence that lethal chemical and toxin weapons are being used in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia is extensive, growing and widely accessible. For nearly two years the U.S. government has been putting out its information on this subject. We will continue to do so. The Post need not depend upon us, however, to collect its evidence or form its judgments. The Post has the resources, talent and facilities to conduct its own inquiry, collect its own evidence and form its own conclusions. I urge The Post to do so. I am convinced it will come to the same conclusions we have, and I am certain that further independent confirmation of the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia will hasten the day when these atrocities are halted.

Report by Secretary of State Haig to the Congress: Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan [Extract], March 22, 1982[1]

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Introduction

Nearly 7 years ago, reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons began to emerge from Laos. In 1978, similar reports started to come from Kampuchea, and in 1979 from Afghanistan. Early reports were infrequent and fragmentary, reflecting the remoteness of the scene of conflict and the isolation of those subjected to such attacks. In the summer of 1979, however, the State Department prepared a detailed compilation of interviews with refugees from Laos on this subject. That fall, a U.S. Army medical team visited Thailand to conduct further interviews.[2] By the winter of 1979, the United States felt that it had sufficiently firm evidence of chemical warfare to raise the matter with the governments of Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. All three governments denied that a basis for concern over the use of chemical warfare agents existed.

Dissatisfied with these responses, and possessing further reports that lethal chemical agents were in use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the U.S. Government in 1980 began to raise the issue publicly in the United Nations, with the Congress, and in other forums. In August of that year, the State Department provided extensive documentation containing evidence of chemical weapons attacks to the United Nations and also made this material publicly available. In December, as a result of efforts by the United States and other concerned nations, the U.N. General Assembly voted to initiate an international investigation into the use of chemical weapons.[3] This investigation is still underway. To date, the U.N. investigating team has been denied admission to any of the three countries where these weapons are in use.

Despite the volume of information on chemical warfare in Southeast Asia which had become available by 1980, there remained one major unresolved issue—the exact nature of the chemical agents in use. Collection of physical samples was hindered by the remoteness of the then principal areas of conflict—as many as 6 weeks by foot to the nearest international border. Tests for known chemical warfare agents on those samples that were obtained proved consistently negative.

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[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 98, pp. 4–8. The report was also submitted to the United Nations, where it was issued as A/37/157. The Soviet response to the report was issued as A/37/233.

[2] *Use of Chemical Agents in South East Asia Since the Vietnam War: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session,* Dec. 12, 1979, pp. 66 ff.

[3] G.A. res. 36/96 C.

In order to identify the chemical agents in use, U.S. experts in late 1980 began to go back over all the reporting—as far back as 1975—looking for new clues. In particular, they sought to match the reported symptomatology of victims—which commonly included skin irritation, dizziness, nausea, bloody vomiting and diarrhea, and internal hemorrhaging—with possible causes. As a result of this review, the U.S. Government in mid-1981 began to test physical samples from Southeast Asia for the presence of toxins. These substances are essentially biologically produced chemical poisons. Although they have never before been used in war, this was a technical possibility, and it was noted that certain toxins could produce the sorts of symptoms observed in Southeast Asian victims of chemical warfare.

In August 1981, unnatural levels and combinations of lethal trichothecene toxins were detected in the first sample to be tested by the United States for such agents. This consisted of vegetation taken from a village in Kampuchea where an attack occurred in which people had died after exhibiting the symptoms described above. In succeeding months, further samples, taken from the sites of attacks in both Kampuchea and Laos, yielded similar results. So did samples of blood taken from victims of a chemical attack in Kampuchea.

Despite a continued flow of reports, dating back over 7 years, of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and more recently Afghanistan, and despite the still mounting physical evidence of the use of trichothecene toxins as warfare agents, doubts as to the conclusive nature of the available evidence have persisted. These doubts have arisen for several reasons. For one, the evidence of the use of lethal chemical weapons has become available over a period of several years and from a variety of sources. Few governments, journalists, or interested members of the public have been exposed to all of this evidence, nor has it been available in any one place. A second difficulty has been the inevitable need for the U.S. Government to protect some of the relevant information, often gathered at personal risk to individuals who secured it, or obtained through the use of highly sensitive methods.

This report represents an effort of the U.S. Government to correct the first deficiency and to ameliorate the second to the extent possible. In preparation of this report, all of the information available to the U.S. Government on chemical weapons use in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan was assembled in one place. This information was again reviewed, analyzed, cross-indexed, and organized in a coherent fashion. Based upon this comprehensive analysis, a set of conclusions were drawn, conclusions which have since been reviewed and agreed on without qualification by every relevant agency of the U.S. Government.

The evidence upon which this report is based is of several kinds, including:

•Testimony of those who saw, experienced, and suffered from chemical weapons attacks;

- Testimony of doctors, refugee workers, journalists, and others who had the opportunity to question large numbers of those with firsthand experience of chemical warfare;
- Testimony of those who engaged in chemical warfare or were in a position to observe those who did;
- Scientific evidence, based upon the analysis of physical samples taken from sites where attacks had been conducted;
- Documentary evidence from open sources; and
- Intelligence derived from "national technical means."

These sources provide compelling evidence that tens of thousands of unsophisticated and defenseless peoples have for a period of years been subjected to a campaign of chemical attacks. *Taken together, this evidence has led the U.S. Government to conclude that Lao and Vietnamese forces, operating under Soviet supervision, have, since 1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978, used lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea; and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979.*

The implications of chemical warfare in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia are painful to contemplate but dangerous to ignore. This activity threatens not only the peoples of those isolated regions but the international order upon which the security of all depends. Those who today suffer chemical warfare against their homelands are powerless to stop it. The prohibitions of international law and solemn agreement are not self-enforcing. Only an alert and outspoken world community, intent to maintain those standards of international behavior it has so painfully achieved and so tenuously established, can bring sufficient pressure to bear to halt these violations of law and treaty. It is hoped that publication of this report will be one step in this process, the end result of which will be the cessation of chemical warfare and the strengthening of the rule of law in the affairs of nations.

Key Judgments

Laos. The U.S. Government has concluded from all the evidence that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet supervision, have employed lethal trichothecene toxins and other combinations of chemical agents against H'Mong resisting government control and their villages since at least 1976. Trichothecene toxins have been positively identified, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been employed. Thousands have been killed or severely injured. Thousands also have been driven from their homeland by the use of these agents.

Kampuchea. Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins on Democratic Kampuchean (DK) troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978. Medical evidence indicates that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been used.

Afghanistan. Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used a variety of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents on *mujahidin* resistance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. In addition, there is some evidence that Afghan Government forces may have used Soviet-supplied chemical weapons against the *mujahidin* even before the Soviet invasion. Although it has not been possible to verify through sample analysis the specific agents used by the Soviets, a number of Afghan military defectors have named the agents brought into the country by the Soviets and have described where and when they were employed. This information has been correlated with other evidence, including the reported symptoms, leading to the conclusion that nerve agents, phosgene oxime, and various incapacitants and irritants have been used. Other agents and toxic smokes also are in the country. Some reported symptoms are consistent with those produced by lethal or sublethal doses of trichothecene toxins, but this evidence is not conclusive.

The Soviet Connection. The conclusion is inescapable that the toxins and other chemical warfare agents were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through the transfer of know-how, and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea. Soviet military forces are known to store agents in bulk and move them to the field for munitions fill as needed. This practice also is followed in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, as evidenced by many reports which specify that Soviet technicians supervise the shipment, storage, filling, and loading onto aircraft of the chemical munitions. The dissemination techniques reported and observed evidently have been drawn from years of Soviet chemical warfare testing and experimentation. *There is no evidence to support any alternative explanation, such as the hypothesis that the Vietnamese produce and employ toxin weapons completely on their own.*

Methodology

The judgments of this study were arrived at through a rigorous analytical process.

•Every relevant piece of information on reported chemical warfare incidents was reviewed, recorded, and tabulated. Numbers of attacks and deaths were screened for possible duplication. Extensive data on the Soviet chemical and biological warfare program also were reviewed.

•All the test data on physical evidence available to the U.S. Government—including environmental samples and background controls—were reviewed.

•A scientific report on toxins, which concluded that trichothecenes probably were among the agents used in Southeast Asia, was prepared.

•The medical evidence was analyzed, drawing on all available information from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and incorporating the findings of a Department of Defense medical team, which concluded that at least three types of agents were used in Laos.

- Extensive consultations were held with government and nongovernment scientists and medical authorities, many of whom were asked to review the evidence. Experts from other countries also were consulted.

After the data were organized to permit comparative analysis, the study focused on three separate questions.

- Have lethal and other casualty-producing agents been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan?
- What are these agents, and how and by whom are they employed?
- Where do these agents originate, and how do they find their way to the field?

Although the evidence differs for each country, the analytical approach was the same. Testimony of eyewitnesses—date, place, and type of attack—was matched against information from defectors, journalists, international organizations, and sensitive information that often pinpointed the time and place of chemical attacks. In addition, information on military operations in the areas where chemical attacks had been reported was examined to establish whether air or artillery strikes took place or whether there was fighting in the areas where chemical agents reportedly were used. *In all three countries, instances were identified in which eye-witness accounts could be correlated directly with information from other sources on military operations in progress.*

There is no evidence of any systematic propaganda campaign by either the H'Mong in Laos or the Afghan resistance forces to promote the allegation that chemical agents have been used on their people. On the other hand, there were early indications that Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean resistance did engage in an organized propaganda campaign on chemical agent use. These indications made U.S. Government analysts cautious about accepting DK allegations, which increased markedly after the chemical attacks in Laos were publicized. For Kampuchea, therefore, special efforts were taken to confirm such allegations by analyzing sources of information that in no way could be considered part of a propaganda or deception campaign.

Discussion of Findings

In September 1981, the U.S. Government declared publicly that toxins—poisonous chemical substances extracted from biological material—probably were the mysterious lethal agents used for many years in Laos and Kampuchea.[4] The statement was prompted by the discovery of high levels of trichothecene toxins in a vegetation sample collected shortly after a March 1981 Vietnamese chemical attack in Kampuchea. This conclusion, however, rested on a much broader base of evidence than analysis of one sample.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 419–421.

By April 1980, the U.S. Government had already concluded that lethal agents almost certainly had been used against H'Mong tribespeople in Laos. There was less certainty then about the use of lethal agents in Kampuchea, mainly because of the already mentioned suspicions about the propaganda campaign of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean forces, although their claims subsequently were shown to be valid. It was also concluded that chances were about even that lethal agents had been used in Afghanistan. There was little doubt by April 1980 that riot-control agents and some form of incapacitants had been used in all three countries. Since that April 1980 assessment, additional evidence has allowed a much firmer conclusion. There is now no doubt that casualties and deaths have resulted from chemical attacks in all three countries.

What Chemical Agents Are Being Used?

As soon as it was determined that chemical agents had been used, an effort was made to identify the specific agents. To do this it was necessary to collect and analyze at least one of the following: environmental samples contaminated with agents, the munitions used to deliver agents, or biological specimens from victims of an attack. A study by medical-toxicological experts of symptoms exhibited by individuals exposed to toxic agents provides a good indication of the general class of chemical agent used. Thus, the range of clinical manifestations from chemical agents, as reported by a U.S. army investigative team in Thailand, resulted in the determination that nerve agents, irritants such as CS, and highly toxic hemorrhagic chemicals or mixture of chemicals were used in Laos.

Other medical-toxicological personnel who reviewed the evidence and conducted their own investigation reached the same conclusion. They further indicated that toxins such as the trichothecenes were a probable cause of the lethal hemorrhaging effect seen in Kampuchea and Laos. In many cases, symptoms reported by the Democratic Kampuchean forces in Kampuchea and the *mujahidin* in Afghanistan were similar to those reported by the H'Mong in Laos. Moreover, symptoms reported from Afghanistan and Kampuchea indicated that a highly potent, rapid-acting, incapacitant "knockout" chemical also was being used. *Mujahidin* victims and witnesses to chemical attacks reported other unusual symptoms, including a blackening of the skin, severe skin irritation along with multiple small blisters and severe itching, severe eye irritation, and difficulty in breathing—all of which suggests that phosgene oxime or a similar substance was used.

Collecting samples possibly contaminated with a toxic agent during or after a chemical assault is difficult under any circumstances but particularly when the assault is against ill-prepared people without masks or other protective equipment. Obtaining contaminated samples that will yield positive traces of specific chemical agents depends on many factors. These include the persistency of the chemical, the ambient temperature, rainfall, wind conditions, the medium on which the chemical was deposited, and the time, care, and packaging of the sample from collection to laboratory analysis.

Many traditional or known chemical warfare agents are nonpersistent and disappear from the environment within a few minutes to several hours after being dispersed. Such agents include the nerve agents sarin and tabun; the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride; the choking agents phosgene and diphosgene; and the irritant phosgene oxime. Other standard chemical warfare agents—such as the nerve agents VX and thickened soman and the blistering agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewisite—may persist for several days to weeks depending on weather conditions.

The trichothecene toxins have good persistency but may be diluted by adverse weather conditions to below detectable concentrations. To maximize the chances of detection, sample collections need to be made as rapidly as possible after a chemical assault; as with many agents, this means minutes to hours. Under the circumstances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, such rapid collection has simply not been possible. Although many samples were collected, few held any realistic prospect of yielding positive results. It is fortunate that trichothecenes are sufficiently persistent and in some cases were not diluted by adverse weather conditions. Thus we were able to detect them several months after the attack.

Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May 1980. To date, about 50 individual samples—of greatly varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes—have been collected and analyzed for the presence of known chemical warfare agents, none of which has been detected. Based on recommendations by medical and toxicological experts and findings of investigators from the U.S. Army's Chemical Systems Laboratory, several of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothecene group of mycotoxins. Four samples, two from Kampuchea and two from Laos, were found to contain high levels of trichothecene toxins. In addition, preliminary results of the analysis of blood samples drawn from victims of an attack indicate the presence of a trichothecene metabolite of T-2, namely HT-2.

A review of all reports indicates the use of many different chemical agents, means of delivery, and types of chemical attacks. The use of trichothecene toxins has been identified through symptoms and sample analysis. In some cases, however, the symptoms suggest other agents, such as nerve gas, which have not been identified through sample analysis. Significant differences as well as similarities have surfaced in the reports from the three countries. The evidence from each country, therefore, is described separately, with attention drawn to similarities where appropriate.

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Statement by the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel): Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, March 22, 1982 [1]

This morning Secretary Haig transmitted to the Congress a report on "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan." [2] The report is also being provided to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to each member government of that world organization. This report contains the most comprehensive compilation of material on this subject available and presents conclusions which are fully shared by all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government.

The judgments contained in this study were arrived at through a rigorous analytical process.

•Every relevant piece of information available to the U.S. Government was reviewed.

•All the test data on physical evidence, including environment samples and background controls, were gone over again.

•A scientific report on toxins was prepared.

•The medical evidence was analyzed.

•Extensive consultations were held with government and nongovernment scientists and medical authorities, many of whom were asked to review the evidence.

This information was then correlated. The testimony of eyewitnesses—date, place, and type of attack—was matched against information from defectors, journalists, international organizations, and sensitive sources and methods.

Information dating back to 1975, reviewed, analyzed, and correlated in this manner, has led the U.S. Government to come to the following conclusions.

•In Laos, selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet supervision, have employed lethal trichothecene toxins and other combinations of chemical agents against H'Mong resisting government control and their villages since at least 1976. Trichothecene toxins have been positively identified, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been employed. Thousands have been killed or severely injured. Thousands also have been driven from their homeland by the use of these agents.

•In Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins on Democratic Kampuchean troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978. Medical evidence indicates that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve agents also have been used.

•Toxins and other chemical warfare agents have been developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through the transfer of know-how, and fabricated into weapons with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1982, p. 57. The statement was made to news correspondents at the Dept. of State.

[2] *Supra.*

•In Afghanistan, Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents on resistance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. In addition, there is some evidence that Afghan Government forces may have used Soviet-supplied chemical weapons against the freedom fighters even before the Soviet invasion.

The implications of these findings are far-reaching. The use in war of lethal chemical or toxin weapons is forbidden by one of the oldest arms control agreements still in force—the Geneva protocol of 1925 [3]—and by the customary international law which has grown out of that agreement. The possession, manufacture, storage, and transfer of toxin weapons is forbidden by one of the most recent arms control treaties now in force—the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. [4] As this report documents, the Soviet Union and its allies are flagrantly and repeatedly violating international law and international agreement.

Chemical warfare thus poses a threat not only to its immediate victims but to the entire international community, and particularly to those nations least able to defend themselves against such weapons. For the chemical and toxin weapons which the Soviet Union has developed, used, and supplied to its clients are a cheap, convenient, and effective way to subdue, terrorize, and exterminate defenseless peoples. If the world community fails to halt this activity in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, it will have little chance to prevent its repetition in other lands, against other peoples.

As the report states: "Only an alert and outspoken world community, intent to maintain those standards of international behavior it has so painfully achieved and so tenuously established, can bring sufficient pressure to bear to halt these violations of law and treaty." With the publication of this report, the world community has been alerted. The United States will continue to be outspoken. We are confident other nations, as they recognize the danger, will do likewise.

Address by the U.S. Permanent Representative (Kennedy) to the International Atomic Energy Agency: U.S. Nuclear Energy Policy, March 22, 1982 [1]

I would like to share with you this morning some of the thinking that has guided the Reagan Administration's approach to nuclear nonproliferation. In the course of the past year, we have continued to pursue two longstanding U.S. objectives: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries and encouraging the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But we have tried to bring to that task nuclear common sense. Let me elaborate.

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[3] For text of the protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[4] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1982, pp. 69–72. Ambassador Kennedy spoke before the Atomic Industrial Forum in New York.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly committed to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. And just 15 years ago, that principle was embodied in the Non-proliferation Treaty,[2] support for which has been a basic tenet of our foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since—for uninhibited and continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons could only mean the end of world order as we know it. Thus, this Administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, a goal of every administration since the nuclear age began. This goal rests on the valid belief that the increasing spread of nuclear weapons around the globe would trigger many new dangers for American and global security and well-being.

There would be a danger, for example, that desperate leaders in high-stakes conflicts might not be deterred from nuclear blackmail or even the use of nuclear weapons to achieve their objectives. A conventional clash between hostile new nuclear powers in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. And the possibility could not be discounted that such a nuclear clash would threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons could make it easier for a terrorist group to steal or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon to extort political concessions or funds.

Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, however, is not just in the interest of the superpowers. It is in the interest of all countries and regions. Indeed, it is the security of countries in the regions to which nuclear weapons might spread that would be most immediately affected. And the adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by more than 100 countries indicates that the vast majority of the world's nations recognizes clearly that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is essential to their security.

At the same time, the treaty recognizes the importance of making available to all nations the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also are committed to encouraging and facilitating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

President Reagan's October 8 policy statement made clear that this Administration intends to take a positive attitude toward, and to foster increased domestic reliance on, nuclear power without compromising public health and safety.[3] We seek, for example, to lessen the regulatory impediments which have contributed to the reluctance of utilities to purchase new nuclear power plants. We have lifted the embargo on domestic reprocessing, and we are encouraging private sector involvement in this area. We are moving ahead with a demonstration of breeder reactor technology, including completion of the Clinch River breeder reactor. And we are expediting efforts to include the passage of needed legislation to put into operation facilities for waste management.

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[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[3] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 12, 1981, pp. 1101–1102.

Looking abroad, it is clear that, while some opposition exists, many nations are committed to reliance on nuclear energy to meet an important part of their energy requirements. The countries of EURATOM and Japan already have advanced nuclear industries and rely to a considerable degree on electricity from nuclear power stations. And they are moving toward ultimate deployment of the breeder reactor. South Korea and Taiwan already are developing increasingly sophisticated nuclear infrastructures; Egypt and the Philippines are entering the nuclear energy world; and, closer to home, nuclear power is a major part of the energy programs of Brazil and Argentina, while Mexico is planning a major expansion of its ongoing nuclear program.

It is essential that the American nuclear industry play a role in this global nuclear energy future, just as it contributed to the initial development and worldwide deployment of nuclear power. There are those who argue that this is necessary because of the economic and technical benefits of maintaining a healthy U.S. nuclear industry. Contributions to a healthy balance of payments, more jobs, and tax revenues obviously are at stake. But I submit that the strong nonproliferation and security benefits flowing from such a role may be more important.

Because of our position as a leading supplier of nuclear goods, services, and technologies, we have been able to take the lead in global nonproliferation efforts. We were instrumental in creating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1958, in launching the international safeguards system, and in fostering needed agreement on and continuing adherence to the London nuclear suppliers guidelines. Our role as a major supplier also is vital to our current efforts to shape deliberations on assurances of supply and international plutonium storage, now being conducted under auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

A Cooperative Approach

As we look over the decade ahead, the introduction of nuclear power to new countries and regions makes even more essential our direct involvement and participation. For if the United States fails to maintain its position as a leading nuclear exporter, other views on nonproliferation and safeguards will carry increasing weight in shaping global norms and practices; it is by no means certain that these views necessarily would be as strong and consistent as our own.

Thus, we are seeking to remove impediments to the nuclear industry's ability to compete on a fair and equal basis with the nuclear industries of other supplier countries. We also stand ready as a government to facilitate cooperation with other friendly countries, contributing our technology, materials, and know-how in programs appropriate to these countries' evolving energy capabilities and requirements. But let me add, however, lest I be misunderstood, that this Administration has no intention of shading its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation in pursuit of commercial gain.

Over the past year, various changes of approach have been evident in our nonproliferation policy. Previously, we relied to a major extent on a policy of technology denial. This was based on the near theological notion that use of nuclear power abroad was the driving cause of proliferation. But denial has not worked. Indeed, as Gerard Smith and George Rathjens wrote in *Foreign Affairs* last spring, the ". . . policy initiatives of recent years and the NNPA [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act],[4] have had little relevance to real proliferation problems." To deal with those problems, what we need now is not abstract debate about nuclear power but what I like to call nuclear common sense.

Common sense simply means seeing the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. And if we look at the problem in this way, it seems clear that the United States should base its future nuclear nonproliferation policy on the fact that we no longer possess the dominant influence in the nuclear field—scientific or commercial—that we once enjoyed. As mastery of the technology has become more widespread, our ability to convince others to follow our lead, let alone to dictate their nuclear energy choices, has diminished.

We must turn away from the "unilateral" approach, therefore, which characterized our recent dealings with our nuclear partners and emphasize instead a "cooperative" approach—an approach in which we work together to reach agreement as to how our nuclear relations will be conducted. Continuation of "unilateralism" certainly would not help to achieve our nonproliferation goals. And it could sour our broader relations in areas beyond the nuclear sphere.

If we are to look at the world as it really is, we must be ready to treat different things differently, to make legitimate distinctions. In the past, there has been a tendency to lump all countries together—to treat all alike in an unrealistic, perhaps even patronizing manner. This led to rancorous and counterproductive disputes with the EURATOM countries and Japan. But both EURATOM and Japan have excellent, indeed unchallenged, nonproliferation credentials.

They recognize the need for restraint in exports of sensitive items; they have been supportive of efforts to develop international safeguards; they cooperate on other nonproliferation initiatives; and neither Japan nor the non-nuclear-weapons states in EURATOM intend to develop nuclear weapons. These are realities which will be reflected fully in our thinking about how to exercise U.S. consent rights in a manner consistent with the long-term nuclear planning needs of these countries.

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[4] For text of the act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. Brackets in source text.

Common sense also suggests that the level to which a country's nuclear power program has developed may be an important ingredient in defining the nature of our nuclear relations with it. President Reagan has said the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder programs in countries with advanced nuclear programs where such activities will not comprise a proliferation risk. Yet, it is desirable to avoid premature commitment to reprocessing or breeder activity in countries with less sophisticated nuclear programs. We cannot and will not dictate the nuclear energy programs of other countries, but nor should we nor will we encourage advanced fuel cycle activities before they are warranted as a coherent part of an advanced nuclear program.

No one would deny that plutonium is a dangerous substance and that it must be carefully controlled. But wishing it away simply belies the facts. To deal with the world as it is, we must first acknowledge that plutonium is and will continue to be used as a nuclear fuel, even if the extent of that use remains uncertain. In EURATOM and Japan, plutonium fuel is believed by many to be more economical and needed sooner than may be the case in the United States. Breeder development, for example, is well advanced in France and continues to move forward in Japan. The United Kingdom continues its research, and in Germany the decision of German utilities to defray 20% of the cost of completing the Kalkar demonstration breeder signals their desire to keep this option open.

Rather than engaging EURATOM and Japan in theological discussions about the desirability of a so-called plutonium economy, we need to think seriously together with them about how to steer in the safest direction the manner in which reprocessing is undertaken and plutonium used. We need to design rigorous safeguards for such advanced nuclear activities, to try to restrict the actual reprocessing and other fuel cycle facilities to as few sites as possible to insure adequate physical security, and to be prepared to deal with problems of transportation of material and waste disposal. Cooperation in each of these areas will be critical, but such cooperation will not be fostered by talk of suspending nuclear exports to our friends and allies.

Causes Versus Symptoms

If we are to be guided by common sense, we must focus also on the underlying "causes" of a problem, rather than its surface "symptoms." Too often in the recent past, we have focused on the symptomatic aspects of proliferation, rather than its causes. We tried to rely on a policy of denying technological help, in the mistaken belief that such denial would assure that nuclear explosives could not be developed. Instead, we should concentrate on determining why the leaders of a nation might be motivated to move toward nuclear explosives development. It is clear that understanding those motivations, rather than

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focusing on technological capabilities alone, is the key to successful long-term nonproliferation efforts.

There are, for example, a number of highly developed industrial nations which could quickly produce nuclear explosive devices, if they thought that their national security interests demanded it. The fact that they have not done so has little or nothing to do with their technological capabilities. Rather, it reflects the structure and content of their security relationships and the general political climate in which they find themselves.

This is not to say that there are no situations in which a strategy of technology denial is indicated or would be successful. There are such situations. Measures to delay the development of the technical capability to acquire nuclear weapons are a necessary part of U.S. nonproliferation policy. As President Reagan stated, the United States will seek to inhibit the spread of sensitive technology, facilities, and material, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands.

Nonetheless, I repeat, we cannot place our full reliance on a strategy of denial with any assurance of long-term success. Such a policy can buy time and, perhaps, in some cases substantial time. But we must use such time wisely. In particular, we must use that time for new initiatives by the United States and other countries to reduce those underlying motivations that may lead some countries to seek a nuclear explosive capability.

Steps to alleviate military and political insecurity are important and perhaps vital in our effort to lessen the motivation to "go nuclear." And we are taking such steps. The presence of strong and credible U.S. alliances has been critical throughout the postwar period to realizing our nonproliferation objectives, and they will remain so. Equally important are diplomatic initiatives to lessen regional instability and tensions, again using the time made available by technical steps to deal with the more fundamental political roots of proliferation.

Ways must also be found to reduce mutual suspicions on the part of neighboring countries about the longer term intentions of their potential rivals. Implementation of the treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America would contribute to that goal. With that fact in mind, the Administration successfully urged Senate approval of Protocol I of the treaty of Tlatelolco. [5] We would welcome a similar decision by France to ratify Protocol I. We also hope that those countries in Latin America that have not yet done so would see fit to adhere in their own interest and that of their neighbors. We have steadfastly urged countries, not yet parties, to join the Nonproliferation Treaty and are gratified at Egypt's recent accession. [6] Adherence to the treaty can be a major step in reducing mutual suspicion.

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[5] The treaty and its protocols may be found *ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

[6] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 73–75.

The Safeguards Dimension

Acceptance of safeguards on all of its nuclear activities is another way a nation can give concrete expression to its nuclear good intentions. In the words of Director General Blix: "IAEA safeguards are measures through which the states, in the exercise of their sovereign will, rely upon an international organization to confirm through inspection that their actions conform to their stated intention not to acquire nuclear weapons." This requires, Dr. Blix continued, that "the verification procedures should not be cosmetic but convincing."

In assessing the effectiveness of these safeguards, however, common sense dictates that we be wary of the trap of letting "the best" become the enemy of the "good." The ongoing debates about the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards may well be the most dramatic current example of this syndrome. We must, of course, squarely face the problems confronting the International Atomic Energy Agency. Despite continued improvements in the past several years, the capabilities of the IAEA still fall short of what would be desirable in the "best of all possible worlds."

Greater numbers of better trained inspectors and wider use of more advanced safeguards equipment still are needed. Further improvements in the agency's internal management also will yield greater effectiveness. And the agency needs to find ways to streamline its internal lines of communication as well as to communicate better with the world at large. We are thinking about measures which may be helpful, and those of you in the nuclear industry also can and should contribute ideas. But in our efforts to improve, we must avoid exaggerating the agency's weaknesses.

There must be a much clearer understanding of what the agency's safeguards job entails. The agency's objective is to detect and thus deter diversion, not to prevent it. The agency is not a nuclear policeman. And even though there is room for improvement, the agency's overall performance in meeting that objective has been good and is getting better.

Further, as we seek to make the IAEA an ever more effective institution, we must never forget that its credibility in the eyes of the nations of the world is the essential ingredient for its success. Repeated rehashing of old or alleged failings, without fair recognition of the vigorous efforts being made to overcome them, can unfairly, yet surely, damage that credibility.

As we think of how to improve the vital safeguards role of the agency, we must never overlook its special character. Many member states have delegated considerable sovereign authority to the IAEA in a way which makes it unique amongst U.S. agencies. I suggest that alternative arrangements, if they could be forged at all, could be far less adequate.

I am happy to be able to report that the Board of Governors, at its most recent meeting, focused well on the business before it without excessive rhetoric addressing political issues beyond its charter. We hope that this is a harbinger of the future, reversing an unfortunate tendency toward the introduction of extraneous political issues into the deliberation of what is essentially a technical body. For our part we have made clear that we believe that such political debate has no place in the agency's deliberations. We are cautiously optimistic that consensus is building for that premise.

We believe that many other countries will work with us to insure that the IAEA remains a strong institution. And we have indicated our willingness to cooperate in insuring that the agency serves the legitimate needs of all of its member states. That position rests upon our own self-interest and common sense. Without an effective International Atomic Energy Agency, the international nonproliferation effort would be weakened and a fundamental if not irreplaceable basis for nuclear commerce would no longer exist.

The Essence of Nuclear Common Sense

Let me conclude by commenting on a strain of thinking which challenges the underlying concepts of our nonproliferation endeavor. Some outside of the government have proposed that we should begin thinking in terms of living with many nuclear powers, that extensive proliferation is "inevitable." Some even go so far as to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would not be so bad; in the words of a recent paper from the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, "more may be better." Let me just assert that this is not my view nor is it the view of the Administration. It simply does not meet the test of common sense.

It simply is not true that widespread proliferation is inevitable. There is much that can be done to prevent it. It is vital to recall that earlier predictions of a world of 25 or 30 nuclear weapons states by the 1970s have proved fallacious. And we all need be thankful for that. Moreover, the adherence of 116 countries to the Nonproliferation Treaty, too, is a major accomplishment far beyond most predictions.

I also reject the contention that more proliferation may be better. Proliferation can only increase global instability and adversely affect the interests and well-being of many countries. It would threaten the breakdown of the nuclear peace that has characterized the last decades—a breakdown which could result from an accident, miscalculation, or intentional choice.

Next December will mark the 40th anniversary of the first nuclear chain reaction under the stands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago. Since then, we have been confronted with both the promise and the threat of the atom. This Administration is committed to efforts to realize that promise and to control that threat. But to achieve that goal a restored spirit of cooperation within the government, between industry and government, and among the many concerned groups is needed. Not least, we need a greater measure of nuclear common sense.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Management (Kennedy) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, March 24, 1982 [1]

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on behalf of the administration in support of S. 1446, a bill which you and Senator Percy introduced to amend title 18 of the United States Code to implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, [2] and for other purposes. Mr. Chairman, the administration strongly supports early enactment of this measure, which is identical to a proposal submitted on April 7, 1981, by the Department of State.

A similar measure was submitted to Congress by the previous administration on August 22, 1980, but no committee action was taken since this was late in the second session of the last Congress.

On July 14, 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 16 to 0 to approve a resolution of ratification for the Convention and, on July 30, 1981, the full Senate approved it by a vote of 98 to 0.

It is now important that the bill to implement the Convention be acted upon promptly in order to permit the United States to deposit its instrument of ratification for the Convention.

The negotiation of this Convention was a successful U.S. initiative. As early as 1974, the Secretary of State proposed the idea of a convention dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material. In two of the provisions in the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, Congress joined in a call for the negotiation of such a convention.

We all recognize the urgency of taking measures to deal with the worldwide threat of terrorism. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is an important step which addresses one facet of this serious problem. It establishes general levels of physical security that must be provided during international shipment of nuclear material, establishes a general framework for cooperation among States in the recovery and return of stolen material, and defines certain serious offenses involving nuclear material which States that are parties to the Convention are to make punishable and for which offenders will be subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution.

The legislation before you is necessary to implement the latter provisions, and thus must be enacted before the United States ratifies the Convention. Let me review briefly how S. 1446 will implement these provisions.

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[1] *Implementing the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law . . . , Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on S. 1446, a Bill To Amend Title 18, United States Code, To Implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and for Other Purposes*, pp. 8–11.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 129–138.

Under article 7 of the Convention, each State is required to make punishable under its national law serious offenses involving nuclear material, such as theft or robbery of nuclear material, embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material, and demanding nuclear material by threat or force or other form of intimidation. Section 2 of S. 1446 would insert a new section 1445 in title 18 of the United States Code, paragraph (a) of which will enact into U.S. law the offenses set forth in article 7 of the Convention.

Article 8 of the Convention requires each State party to establish its jurisdiction over these offenses when committed in the territory of that State, on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State, or when the alleged offender is a national of that State. The article further requires that each State party establish jurisdiction over an alleged offender present in its territory so that the person may be submitted for prosecution, if not extradited to another State that has jurisdiction over the offense. Paragraph (b) of proposed section 1445 establishes jurisdiction as required by article 8.

Paragraph (c) of section 1445 contains required definitions, and paragraph (d) establishes the authority of the Attorney General to receive assistance from the military in the enforcement of the section. This provision creates an exemption from the prohibition against using the military to enforce the laws—the so-called Posse Commitatus Act. Further, the FBI is given investigative jurisdiction.

As an ancillary matter, section 3 of S. 1446 would revise the definition of international organization in 18 U.S. Code 1116(b)(5), since the current definition contains a technical deficiency which might preclude full implementation of U.S. obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. The current section 1116 only covers crimes against officials of international organizations in which the United States participates, while the Convention requires coverage of crimes against officials of any intergovernmental international organization.

It should be noted that with respect to the establishment of jurisdiction for offenses under proposed paragraph (b)(3) of section 1445, only offenses concerning nuclear material used for peaceful purposes are covered. This is because the Convention itself, in article 2, is limited to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. However, with respect to jurisdiction under paragraphs (b)(1) and (2), nuclear material used for any purpose is covered, since within these traditional areas of U.S. jurisdiction it was thought desirable to cover offenses involving military-use nuclear material as well as those involving peaceful-use nuclear material.

The broad jurisdictional provisions in S. 1446 will help prevent crimes involving nuclear material by making it more difficult for those who commit those crimes to find safe haven anywhere in the world. This approach to crimes deemed of serious international concern has been used in previous conventions to which the United States is a party and for which the Congress has enacted similar implementing legislation. Specifically, similar jurisdictional provisions may be found in the Convention on the Protection of Diplomats, referred to earlier, and its implementing legislation, 18 U.S.C. 1116, and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft—the Hague Hijacking Convention—and its implementing legislation, Public Law 93–366.

The administration submitted a detailed section-by-section analysis of the provisions in this bill with its April 7, 1981, proposal, and I will be pleased to provide a copy for the record.

If there are any technical questions concerning S. 1446 or the Convention which the committee would like addressed, Ronald Bettauer, the Department of State's Assistant Legal Adviser for Nuclear Affairs, who headed the U.S. delegation responsible for negotiating the Convention, and David Kline of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, are accompanying me today and would be pleased to respond.

This proposed legislation not only addresses a matter that the international community has deemed sufficiently serious to take concerted action on; it also addresses a potential U.S. domestic threat. The bill will provide important new tools to domestic agencies concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material.

Mr. Robert Burnett, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Division of Safeguards Director, who is responsible for physical security matters in the licensed sector, will address the domestic threat and the utility of the proposed bill in meeting that threat.

Mr. Troy Wade, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs of the Department of Energy, who is familiar with the activities of the Department of Energy's nuclear emergency search team, the NEST, will address the current U.S. Government response capability to criminal activity involving nuclear material, and how the proposed bill will enhance those capabilities.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to urge that the committee take prompt and favorable action on this bill. The negotiation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was a U.S. initiative that succeeded. But it is difficult for us to urge other countries to join the Convention until we enact this legislation and thereby enable ourselves to ratify it.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons [Extract], March 25, 1982 [1]

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The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. It is a goal to which my Government attaches great importance.

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[1] CD/PV.166, pp. 18–22.

In his statement to the Committee on 9 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, outlined the position of the United States with respect to a chemical weapons prohibition.[2] Today, during one of the two plenary sessions devoted specifically to the subject of chemical weapons, I would like to set forth the United States approach in greater detail.

The United States views the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as a means for increasing our own security and the security of our friends and allies, as well as the security of neutral/non-aligned States. We are seeking to eliminate a real threat by removing real weapons from existing arsenals of potential adversaries. The United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect. They are particularly effective against military forces and civilians in small countries who do not have the means to protect themselves. We are convinced that even as we sit in this room these weapons are being used in current conflicts in remote areas of the world—in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. We must stop the use of chemical weapons and achieve the goal we seek—a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons for all time.

Ensuring that a chemical weapons ban increases security and that, so far as is possible, it does not harm legitimate chemical activities is a heavy responsibility. It is a highly complex and difficult task to strike the proper balance. Toxic chemicals are ubiquitous in modern societies. Today all societies depend heavily on toxic chemicals used as drugs, pesticides and chemical intermediates, to name but a few examples. It is my Government's view that the simple approach used in the past for biological weapons and environmental warfare cannot serve as a model for dealing with the much more complex problems surrounding a ban on chemical weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have already been working on a chemical weapons ban for over a decade. In view of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, it should not be surprising that reaching agreement has proved difficult. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that considerable useful work has been accomplished.

Unfortunately, progress has been very uneven. Far greater progress has been made in defining the scope of a prohibition than in working out arrangements to ensure universal confidence that all parties are complying with their obligations. It is clear that lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance constitutes the key obstacle to successful completion of the Committee's work.

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[2] *Ante*

In this context, I would like to discuss briefly certain events outside the Committee which form an important part of the background for the Committee's discussions of a chemical weapons ban, and which have a great influence on the attitude of my Government. A proper understanding of these events is essential if members are to understand the United States position on this subject.

First, as is well known, the United States has concluded that it cannot any longer postpone steps to modernize its deterrent chemical weapons stockpile. More than a decade ago we shut down all of our chemical weapons production facilities. We have not produced any chemical weapons since that time and have in fact destroyed large quantities of such weapons. We had hoped for reciprocal behavior on the part of the Soviet Union, and believed that progress toward a chemical weapons ban would obviate the need for future production by eliminating the threat our chemical warfare capabilities were designed to meet. Unfortunately, however, the threat not only remains, but is greater than ever. We must take prompt steps to deal with it—to do otherwise would be irresponsible. We would greatly prefer an adequately verifiable treaty, we will continue to work actively for it, but until such an agreement is achieved, it is clear from Soviet actions that we must maintain military capabilities in the chemical weapons field. This approach is consistent with that taken by my Government in other areas where negotiations are under way. Sadly, my Government has concluded that no other approach is likely to produce positive results. I shall not belabour this point. For the information of other distinguished delegates, my delegation is submitting today a working paper entitled, *The United States programme to deter chemical warfare,* [3] which explains in greater detail the several steps we are taking and the reasons behind them. The objective of the United States chemical programme as has been clearly stated, is to maintain the safest, smallest level of chemical munitions which will provide an effective deterrent to a chemical attack by an aggressor. It is not, as some would have you believe, to gain a superiority in these weapons, or even to match the sizeable Soviet capability. I would note in particular that over 70 per cent of our planned expenditures are related to protection against chemical attack.

Allegations have been made in this Committee that the United States is not negotiating in good faith, and that we are deliberately creating obstacles to an agreement by modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities. That is sheer nonsense. United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government. I would also like to make clear that if we are successful in achieving such a ban, we would be willing, indeed eager, to terminate our binary weapons programme promptly.

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[3] CD/264, Mar. 23, 1982; see Dept. of State Fact Sheet, *ante*, Feb. 8.

In addition, some delegations would have others believe that production of binary chemical weapons will make adequate verification of a chemical weapons ban considerably more difficult or perhaps even impossible. This, too, is nonsense. The fact is that all manufacturing processes for chemical warfare agents, whether for conventional, binary, or other multi-component weapons, present the same basic verification problems. Our planned binary systems will produce standard nerve agents which have been discussed extensively in this Committee. They will use the same key precursors used to produce nerve agents by conventional methods. A binary production facility will still contain special devices for handling toxic chemicals. These will not be as extensive as in a conventional nerve agent plant, but this difference will have no real impact on verification. National technical means are not adequate even for dealing with conventional chemical warfare agent plants. As with facilities which produce conventional chemical weapons, an on-site visit to the production facility itself could determine without great difficulty what was being produced and for what purpose. Also, as with conventional chemical weapons, there are precursors involved which are "single-purpose"; that is, they have no commercial application. Such key precursors will have to be dealt with in a future convention, regardless of the type of chemical warfare agent production process in which they may be used.

There is a second series of events which has much more serious implications for the work of the Committee—events which have created grave concerns that existing arms control constraints on chemical and biological weapons are being violated.

The United States now has good reason to question Soviet compliance with the biological and toxin weapons Convention—an arms control treaty negotiated in this Committee's predecessor body. We have compelling evidence of a highly unusual outbreak of anthrax, linked to a heavily-secured military installation, in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979. We have repeatedly, on a bilateral basis, asked the Soviet Union to provide information which would allay our concerns. The response of the Soviet Government—that this outbreak was due to natural causes—is frankly not consistent with the information available to us.

In addition to the Sverdlovsk outbreak, the United States and other countries have evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Soviet and Soviet-assisted forces in contravention of international law. Lethal toxins, whose possession for hostile purposes is prohibited by the biological and toxin weapons Convention, have been found in samples from areas of reported chemical weapons attacks in Laos and Kampuchea.

My Government has just completed an exhaustive review of all the information currently available on the reports that chemical weapons are being used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. We have concluded that lethal and other chemical weapons are being used in all three countries and that a member of this Committee, the Soviet

Union, is directly involved. We will make available to all delegations a copy of the document which outlines our conclusions and the information on which they are based.

This accumulation of evidence, from many different sources, raises a number of serious issues regarding existing and future arms control agreements, particularly in the area of chemical weapons. The need for improved international verification procedures and mechanisms for dealing with compliance issues has been clearly demonstrated. The repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to co-operate in resolving these outstanding issues, which are of great concern to the United States and others, casts a pall over our collective efforts to attain a chemical weapons ban.

These developments have reinforced my Government's determination to ensure that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention are truly effective.

The importance which my Government attaches to verification is well known. This is not an abstract negotiating position. It is a fundamental security consideration. We believe that a capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack is essential for the purpose of helping to deter such an attack. If we are to accept an obligation under a convention to relinquish such a capability, the provisions of the convention must provide an adequate level of confidence that potential adversaries are also relinquishing their chemical weapons capabilities. Let me be frank. We will not accept a convention that cannot be adequately verified and thus cannot be relied upon to eliminate the threat which chemical weapons pose to the security of the United States and others. I cannot conceive that my Government would enter into a convention if serious doubts on this remained.

There is general agreement that a verification system for a chemical weapons convention should be based on a combination of national and international means which would complement and supplement each other. However, fundamental differences exist. Some delegations want to rely almost totally on national technical means and national measures of implementation. Many others, including my own, believe that only international measures, including systematic international on-site verification, can provide the basis for adequate verification. We are convinced that for the foreseeable future, national technical means will be inadequate. Furthermore, national implementation arrangements will not help assure others that national Governments are in compliance. There can be no substitute for co-operative international verification measures, including appropriate provisions for systematic on-site monitoring, agreed in advance in the convention.

Discussions of general approaches to verification have amply demonstrated that these fundamental differences exist in the Committee. One would think that in such a situation, an intensive effort would be made to isolate, and focus on, the problem areas. That is the approach favoured by my delegation and many others. But a number of delegations apparently want to avoid tackling these difficult questions. We do not see how such an approach can lead anywhere. Ignoring problems will not make them less real or less important and certainly does not facilitate their resolution. Meaningful progress toward a chemical weapons convention will depend upon progress in resolving basic verification issues. In my delegation's view, it is not productive to try to draft the text of provisions in other areas when there is not even the basis for a common approach on the verification provisions.

The time has come to move beyond a general discussion of broad approaches to verification. The Committee should now focus on specific verification tasks, one by one, and devote as much time as may be necessary to achieving agreement. The list of tasks outlined in the Canadian working paper, document CD/167, [4] would provide a good starting point for drawing up a list of issues to be addressed. There clearly will not be any simple formula which can be applied in all cases. Because of the variety of verification tasks, a chemical weapons verification system will need to include a variety of measures tailored to suit particular situations.

Finding solutions to the many remaining problems will require active co-operation among all members of the Committee, applying their collective imagination and expertise. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification. In the near future we will submit a concrete proposal to the Committee for a detailed evaluation of this technique as a possible component of a chemical weapons verification system.

The active involvement of technical experts will be needed for understanding both the technical dimensions of the tasks and the technical possibilities for accomplishing them. In this regard, my delegation believes that the principal work of experts in the area of toxicity determination has been completed. The most important need now is for expert advice in the area of verification. We would agree that as a first step, experts be asked to outline this summer possible procedures for monitoring destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and to address several other specific verification-related topics contained in the draft report of the consultations held on 15–19 March.

There is one final point that I want to ensure that everyone understands. My delegation pledges its full co-operation in the Committee's efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban. We are ready and willing to sit down with others to try to find specific solutions to the many specific problems which have to be resolved if a chemical weapons convention is to be achieved. In this regard, some have suggested that one of the most effective ways to achieve rapid progress would be for the United States to resume bilateral negotiations with the USSR. Let me clearly state the United States position on this matter. The possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations remains open, pending a demonstration by the Soviet Union of genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to comply with their obligations under existing agreements. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The ball is squarely in the Soviet court.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 96–103.

We have been seeking an effective ban on chemical weapons for many years. We have no illusions that solutions will be found quickly. But the longer we wait to grapple with the real problems in the area of verification and compliance, the longer it will take. We should not lose any more time.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, [Extract], March 25, 1982 [1]

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For a number of reasons we attach particular importance to our statement today. It concerns the prohibition of chemical weapons i.e. the problem of one of the most dangerous and barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction, the solution of which is awaited impatiently by all mankind and which is rightly listed among the priority issues confronting our Committee.

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to chemical weapons is clear and unequivocal: the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of the proposal for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and it has done and is continuing to do everything in its power in any forum and within any organizational framework where such efforts are made, for the speediest possible elimination of this type of weapon from the arsenals of States.

At the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and subsequently, the Soviet Union drew the attention of the world community to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons were inadmissibly slow. That was not a mere statement of fact but rather an expression of concern for the speeding up of the negotiations. The effective conduct of negotiations and their successful conclusion are needed particularly now in the light of recent events, when an entirely new situation is emerging or has already emerged in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. If no decisive steps are taken today to eliminate chemical weapons, tomorrow it may be too late.

In this connection the most serious factor, leading directly towards a dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and thus undermining the very basis of the negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon, is the United States decision regarding the further expansion and the modernization of its chemical arsenal. The five-year programme amounting to $10 billion includes the mass production of binary chemical munitions and the development of new methods for the use of chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that present United States stocks of chemical weapons include about three million shells, tens of thousands of aircraft bombs, hundreds of thousands of mines and high explosive bombs, it is planned to increase the quantity of chemical charges up to five million units and to replace the types growing obsolete by new ones, and mainly by binary munitions.

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[1] CD/PV.166, pp. 34–42.

The United States decision on chemical rearmament is part of an over-all scheme which includes the initiation of the production of neutron weapons, the plans for the stationing of new American nuclear missiles in western Europe and the general NATO decisions on the expansion of military preparations. According to the latest United States military doctrines, the European region is the most probable arena for the use of chemical weapons. The United States deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, speaking in Congress, stated that it was necessary to equip the United States armed forces with the newest types of chemical weapons in order "to have the possibility of conducting large-scale chemical warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Treaty countries".

We sometimes hear it said, including today in the Committee on Disarmament; that the production and deployment by the United States of new varieties of chemical weapons, and especially binary weapons, are essential in order to guarantee the security of the United States and also its allies, and because the United States is "lagging behind" the USSR in the sphere of chemical weapons, because of the "Soviet threat", and so on. Gentlemen, how often can the same pretexts be used, particularly when they have over and over again been flatly refuted, even by some leading American figures?

The world has already witnessed American discomfiture over the alleged United States lag in the sphere of nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft in the 1950s and over the "United States missile lag" in the early 1960s. Later it turned out for example that the Soviet "missile threat" had been overestimated by some 15–20 times, but by then the United States had already embarked on the mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus laying the foundation for a renewal of the arms race. The United States is now trying to convince us of its "backwardness" in the sphere of chemical weapons. The United States is obviously using these fables to try to persuade American taxpayers to finance its gigantic military programmes.

It is claimed that what is involved is a normal modernization of chemical weapons. In reality, the development of the production of binary weapons introduces a new generation of chemicals into the range of warfare agents.

The other side of the coin consists in the fact that the production of binary chemical weapons will considerably complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions at the current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The work of the Committee at the present session has already confirmed this. Many delegations, both in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group and at plenary meetings, have pointed out the additional difficulties arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons.

In this connection we would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to working paper CD/258, "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons", submitted by a group of socialist countries. [2] The sponsors of the paper, without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation of Bulgaria put forward a number of specific questions which have arisen in connection with the decision on the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. It seems to us that the answers to these questions are of interest to all members of the Committee. The Yugoslav delegation submitted an interesting document on binary weapons in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We agree with the statement of the United Kingdom Ambassador that it is necessary to give careful consideration to the matter of binary chemical weapons before reaching any conclusion. One can also agree with his words that "binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited".

At the same time we can in no way share his opinion that the problems of control as regards binary weapons and as regards chemical weapons with ordinary unitary munitions differ very little from each other, since allegedly the components of binary weapons, designed by their nature to be highly reactive, are related to toxic chemicals also by their aggressiveness with respect to the material of the munition's case. There is no need to be an expert in order to understand that there is a serious inaccuracy here. From unclassified literature it may be learned that there is no correlation between a chemical's toxicity and its activity with respect to the material of the casing. Thus the high reactive capability of these chemicals is of no assistance in the matter of control.

As regards the additional difficulties which arise in connection with the emergence of binary chemical weapons, they include, for example, the ensuring of compliance by States parties with the commitment not to transfer chemical weapons, since the separation of chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals for weapons purposes will become an almost insoluble problem. Difficulties will arise also in connection with the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production of such weapons, because it will be necessary to specify the chemicals for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons.

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[2] *Ante,* Mar. 9.

To illustrate this problem let us take the following example. As components for the synthesis of warfare agents in the binary charges being elaborated and developed in the United States, isopropanol and polysulfide are being used, i.e. common chemical products. Consequently, in order to produce binary munitions the Pentagon has no special need to establish new branches of industry. The other components of the binary synthesis—the chemicals "DF" and "QL"—are somewhat more complicated in their composition, but they, too, without any particular difficulty can be absorbed into the technological processes for the production of organophosphorus pesticides production. In addition, the cases of binary munitions are virtually the same in structure and shape as those of other special munitions (smoke, signal, propaganda, etc.) and they could be produced by factories producing ordinary munitions.

It is quite probable that even at factories producing the separate components of binary systems as well as cases for binary munitions, it will be impossible to determine the real purpose of the products. Thus even if the representatives of an international verification body are admitted to such a plant, they are unlikely to be able to detect anything relating to binary weapons. The conditions will therefore exist for the secret stockpiling and storage of chemicals for purposes of binary weapons—for the production of chemical weapons within the framework of commercial production. We shall, of course, study document CD/265, introduced today by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, but all that we have said shows that there is no justification for the conclusion contained in the statement of Ambassador Ruth that "it is not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification".

The idea of binary weapons allows the possibility of selecting the pairs of components among a wide range of chemicals, which would lead to the emergence of every new varieties and modifications of chemical agents with the most diversified spectrum of effects. This fact means that the establishment of a list of potential chemical agents to be prohibited would become meaningless. How, then, is it possible to dismiss as "nonsense", as the representative of the United States did today, the concern of a large number of States, including a number of Western countries, at the appearance of binary weapons?

We are saying all this now, not in order to give a political assessment of the actions connected with the production of binary weapons. That has already been done, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in resolution 36/96 B, which contains an appeal to States to refrain from the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. As you know, of the 157 States Members of the United Nations, only one voted against this resolution—the United States of America. Here in the Committee on Disarmament we are concerned, first and foremost, about the fate of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and about the effectiveness of any agreements that might be reached at those negotiations.

The same resolution contains an appeal to States to refrain from stationing chemical weapons in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. This appeal, which in particular was also adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is designed to increase the effectiveness of a future agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is important, in our view, that while efforts are being directed towards the elaboration of a convention and also during the first years of its implementation, when stocks of chemical weapons are to be destroyed, no actions should be allowed which could lead to a proliferation of chemical weapons on the globe, and in particular to their stationing on the territories of other States. In the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, the Soviet delegation has already submitted a draft for a provision of the convention on the non-stationing of chemical weapons, either directly or indirectly, on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of the commitment on their destruction or conversion to non-hostile purposes. It would be a good idea also if we were to consider together how to solve the question of the non-stationing of chemical weapons also during the period before the convention enters into force.

I should like now to touch upon questions of verification. We have repeatedly stated, and we reaffirm it again, that we, no less than others, are concerned that the commitments under the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be strictly observed. We do not therefore altogether understand the United States representative's excessive emphasis of the importance of verification questions. Whom was he actually trying to convince?—himself?

The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to express in the Committee on Disarmament the substance of our views regarding the verification of compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons. In order not to repeat myself I will refer to our statement of 31 March 1981. [3] Briefly, our view is that control should be based on national methods of verification, supplemented by international procedures; it should not be accompanied by "total verifications", which are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of States and are detrimental to peaceful industry. Control should in all respects and at all times be commensurate with the real requirements of the convention and ensure the fulfilment of each of the undertakings provided for in it.

The representative of the United States attempted in his statement [4] to present the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a distorted light. He asserted that they rule out international forms of verification. This, like many other things in the statement of the United States delegation, is not in accordance with the facts. I repeat: we are in favour of a combination of different types of control measures. At the same time it is clear from the statement of the representative of the United States that the latter recognizes nothing other than systematic intrusive international verification. That, to be precise, is the true situation.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 124–129.

[4] *Supra.*

How then can we solve this difficult problem, taking into account all these requirements, which are undoubtedly fair in themselves, and on a basis acceptable to all States parties to the future convention? Past experience suggests that the time has come to change somewhat the methods used for the examination and elaboration of provisions on verification.

It seems to us that we could stop discussing in general terms whether preference should be given to national or to international means of verification, whether international on-site inspection should be carried out on a voluntary basis or not, whether such verification should be conducted when necessary, upon demand, by request, according to lots, on a systematic, regular, periodical basis, etc., etc., and pass on to a consideration of verification problems in a more specific way.

We have in mind the following. Clearly under the convention, the States parties will assume a very specific range of obligations. To a large extent these have already been defined. Thus, there is the possibility of considering concretely, for each of these obligations, what forms and types of control would be necessary and to what degree.

For example, States will be obliged to destroy within established periods of time their stocks of chemical weapons. There could be endless discussions, with no common view emerging, as to whether, in connection with this obligation, there should or should not be international inspections at the site of the destruction, whether samples should be taken at the same time, and if so of what kind, how often and by whom, etc. In order to start making some headway, we could proceed differently. We could think carefully about the series of measures necessary in order reliably and effectively to guarantee the destruction of stocks, beginning with those that are the most natural and easy for States to carry out, and passing on if necessary to the more complicated and difficult ones. In other words, whenever a common opinion emerges to the effect that national verification measures may be insufficient, appropriate international procedures could be discussed according to the same principle—that is, proceeding from the relatively simpler to the more complicated measures.

In proposing that we should proceed in this way we are taking into account the extreme difficulty of devising a verification system which, while ensuring the requisite control over compliance with the convention, at the same time meets the need to respect the legitimate security interests of the States parties.

All more complicated and difficult verification measures should be used only in cases where the control measure more acceptable to the State cannot give the desired result i.e. provide the assurance that the convention is being implemented.

This approach takes into account also the important fact that the control measures will be supplemented by various kinds of declarations, the exchange of information and other measures giving States the assurance of compliance with the convention.

Allow me to refer to the words of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, concerning questions of control in connection with a nuclear weapons test ban. In particular he said: "The quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all." Ambassador Okawa further said that the adequacy of any verification system is probably in the last resort a question of political assessment.

Distinguished delegates, we must endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem. It is completely out of place to put forward preliminary conditions, as was done today, in an almost threatening manner, like an ultimatum: either the Committee accepts unconditionally the principles of verification for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that please the United States, or that country will not become a party to the future convention. That is not the language of negotiation. It will lead nowhere. It merely compromises those who resort to it.

I should like to make one general observation. With every new development in the consideration of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Working Group shows a quite natural and lawful tendency to go deeper into the technical points and details. This reflects the progress in its work. At the same time, we would like to warn against too great a passion for discussing various, sometimes strictly scientific and even abstract problems which will merely deflect us from the immediate and priority task of the earliest possible elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons.

The Soviet delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the way in which the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been organized and is proceeding this year. Precisely in accordance with the new mandate, intensive work is being done on individual provisions of the future convention, and comments and working papers are being put forward which contain at times some interesting approaches. We are especially pleased to note all this since the Chairman of the Group is our friend Ambassador B. Sujka.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties mentioned in our statement today, we are optimistic as regards the possibility of achieving progress in the field of chemical disarmament. At the same time we naturally understand that a great deal of work still remains to be done in order to make this progress real. We call upon other delegations to co-operate constructively in this important matter.

In recent years the United States and some of its allies have often tried to envenom the political atmosphere in many international bodies, including the Committee on Disarmament, with baseless slander directed at socialist States. One of the favourite forms of this slander has been references to some kind of involvement of the Soviet Union in alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union has nowhere and never violated any international agreements including those in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Nevertheless the slander continues, as was shown by the statement of the United States delegation at today's meeting. This is done in order to justify before public opinion, including that of their own country, the new spirals in the chemical arms race. The false and fabricated character of this statement is shown among other things by the fact that the initiators of the slander, while shedding crocodile tears over alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol slyly, and of course intentionally, pass over in silence the terrible consequences of their own actions in south-east Asia. The representative of the United States did not say that the crimes of the American soldiery in this region of the world are still having their effects even today. It is true that the United States representative recognized that "the United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect", but he did not dare to admit that the United States itself has made extensive use of chemical weapons, that no State in the world in the whole history of mankind has used chemical weapons on such a scale as the United States. And again, he did not say that the consequences of the crimes of American militarists in south-east Asia are continuing today.

Recently a delegation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR visited Viet Nam, where it examined the conclusions of the studies of the consequences of chemical warfare in that country. Here are some of them. The mass utilization by the United States armed forces of chemical weapons against Viet Nam during the period 1961–1971 caused profound changes in the ecology of the country, greatly undermined the economy and inflicted irreparable damage on the health of the population of Viet Nam. More than 100,000 tons of various chemical agents were used against the people of Viet Nam, including 96,000 tons of phytotoxins and more than 7,000 tons of war gases. Toxic chemical agents were spread over 44 per cent of the tropical forests and jungles and 40 per cent of the cultivated areas of South Viet Nam. In their attacks on large tracts of forests and cultivated lands, the United States armed forces used chemical agents in huge quantities—from 10 to 100 kg per hectare. In recent times, to the many thousands of victims of chemical weapons during the period of the war there have been added the victims of those weapons' so-called long-term consequences. These are people suffering from nervous disorders, skin diseases and more serious illness such as, for example, cancer of the liver. The women of Viet Nam give birth to deformed babies; they are subject to abnormal pregnancies and miscarriages.

Most anomalies observed now in Viet Nam, especially during childbirth, are the result of disorders of the genetic structures caused by dioxine. It should be noted that the nature of the changes in the genetic structures observed in Viet Nam in those of the population who suffered the effects of the "orange mixture" are similar to the changes in the chromosome structures observed in the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who suffered the horror of atomic bombing. Thus at the present time it can be affirmed that as a result of the use by the United States of various types of weapons of mass destruction, there are on our planet two sets of people with disorders of the genetic structures: they are among the inhabitants of Japan and Viet Nam.

It is becoming more and more clear that Americans themselves are among the victims of the chemical warfare carried out by the United States in Viet Nam. The ecological delayed-action bomb which they laid in Viet Nam has transformed itself into a boomerang destroying the very Americans who participated in the war in Viet Nam. Those who carried out chemical attacks are now suffering in the same way as their former adversaries and victims. Thousands of veterans victims of chemical weapons are registered now in the United States.

Those who are now doing their utmost to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have allegedly used chemical weapons wish to pass over the above-mentioned crimes in silence.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, including those at the highest level, in different international bodies have resolutely repudiated this lie. We would like to point out that many eminent scientists and experts, including some in the United States, have found a complete incompatibility of the above-mentioned fabrications with the scientific, medical and technical data. Substantially the same conclusion was reached also by the group of experts who, as is clear both from the document they submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and from press reports, were unable during their official visit to Asia to find any evidence of the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons. Even the most zealous instigators of the anti-Soviet campaign are compelled to recognize the absence of any facts on this score.

Allow me, for example, to quote the *note verbale* of 14 [*15*] September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General: "American experts have studied and evaluated the symptoms described in these reports in order to determine what poisonous substance or substances could have had such effects. They came to the conclusion that none of the known classical chemical warfare agents, either alone or in combination with other substances, could have caused the symptoms that were described or have led, as was reported, to such rapid death."[5] The matter could have been closed there. The soap-bubble burst, but the State Department decided to continue the campaign it had begun.

Nothing is changed and nothing can be changed in this regard by a new opus of the State Department. It is high time for the United States to stop inventing fables about Soviet-made chemical weapons. The insinuations of the Western press and officials about a "Soviet chemical threat" will not become true by being repeated many times. Neither the Western press, nor those who give it biased disinformation have or can have any objective data about the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons because no such facts exist in nature.

Two words about the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union's position regarding the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States has been repeatedly stated by President Brezhnev. We are prepared to resume the talks that have been broken off, but we are not begging for them. We can make headway either with or without negotiations with the United States. But we cannot permit a distortion of the facts.

Typical of such distortion in the statement of the United States representative was the attempt to create the impression that some kind of deadlock had occurred in the Soviet-American negotiations over the question of control. There was no such deadlock in those talks, as is evident in particular from the Soviet-American report to the Committee on Disarmament of 7 July 1980. That report (CD/112) states in particular: "The United States and the Soviet Union wish to inform the member States of the Committee on Disarmament of their *earnest intention to continue* their persistent efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the extremely complex unresolved issues relating to a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to completing successfully the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations and presenting a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest possible time."[6]

How is it possible to talk about a deadlock when in fact the date was given for the next round of talks—January 1981. The United States unilaterally broke off those negotiations in the same way as it broke off many other negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitation questions. They decided to do this, not because of any difficulties which had arisen on one question or another in the course of the negotiations, but in accordance with the general anti-Soviet policy adopted in the matter of armaments by the Government of the United States. That is true on this matter also.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as is shown among other things by their actions in the Committee, are actively participating in the efforts aimed at the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons, and they believe that this type of weapon of mass destruction should once and for all be eliminated from military arsenals.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 422–424.

[6] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 285–289.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, March 30, 1982 [7]

I have asked for the floor in order to make a slight factual correction. The Ambassador of Belgium, Mr. Onkelinx, has just said, if I correctly understood the Russian translation of his statement, that the prohibition of nuclear weapons depends on the solution of the problem of verification and compliance. [8] I must say, as the representative of a State which participated for more than three years in the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests that took place between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, that that is not in accordance with the facts. I should like to refer to the authoritative opinion of the leader of the delegation of the United States of America at the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, Mr. Paul C. Warnke, who writes in today's issue of the *International Herald Tribune:* "The implementation of a freeze could logically begin with the prompt completion of the comprehensive test ban treaty that has been under negotiation with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom since mid-1977". And even more important is what he says next: "All that now stands in the way of an agreed-on total ban on nuclear explosions is the necessary political will." I think that Mr. Warnke is correct and Mr. Onkelinx is not correct.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Nuclear Arms Reductions and the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Equation [Extracts], March 31, 1982 [1]

Twice in my lifetime I've seen the world plunged blindly into global wars that inflicted untold suffering upon millions of innocent people. I share the determination of today's young people that such a tragedy, which would be rendered even more terrible by the monstrous inhumane weapons in the world's nuclear arsenals, must never happen again. My goal is to reduce nuclear weapons dramatically, assuring lasting peace and security.

Last November, I stressed our commitment to negotiate in good faith for the reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. I made a specific proposal to eliminate entirely the intermediate-range missiles.[2] We remain committed to those goals.

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[7] CD/PV.167, p. 44.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 5, 1982, pp. 410–411.

In Geneva we've proposed a treaty with the Soviet Union which embodies our proposals. In Vienna, along with our allies, we're negotiating reductions of conventional forces in Europe. And here in Washington, we're completing preparations for talks with the Soviets on strategic weapons reductions.

We know all too well from past experience that negotiations with the Soviet Union must be carefully prepared. We can't afford to repeat past mistakes—to arrive hastily at an arms control process that sends hopes soaring, only to end in dashed expectations.

Last week a distinguished group of Senators and Congressmen submitted resolutions to the Senate and House calling for major, verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to equal force levels. This is an important move in the right direction, and these points are essential elements of a truly effective arms control agreement—elements which are consistent with the views of this administration. I commend Senators Jackson and Warner and Congressman Carney and all those who joined with them in this important initiative.

I have and I will continue to seek realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security. We can accept no less.

America's national security policy is based on enduring principles. Our leaders and our allies have long understood that the objective of our defense efforts has always been to deter conflict and reduce the risk of war, conventional or nuclear. Together with our partners and the Atlantic Alliance, every President in the postwar period has followed this strategy and it's worked. It has earned the overwhelming bipartisan support of the Congress and the country at large, and it has kept world peace.

Yesterday, with the successful completion of the *Columbia* space shuttle's latest mission, I think we were all reminded of the great things the human race can achieve when it harnesses its best minds and efforts to a positive goal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have written proud chapters in the peaceful exploration of outer space. So, I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on Earth.

There have been four wars in my lifetime. I believe the people want to return to a level of civilized behavior we once knew. Most of all, they want peace, and so do I.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International]?[3]

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[3] Brackets in source text.

Q. Mr. President, the experts say that the Russians are far ahead of us in some nuclear weaponry, and we are far ahead of them in terms of the Polaris missile and so forth. And we also have the capability of swift, massive retaliation against the Soviets. Under those circumstances, why don't we seek negotiations for a freeze now and carry on to reductions? That way we can halt the making of doomsday weapons and save billions to help poor people.

The President. Helen, I know that there are people that have tried to figure this out. The truth of the matter is that on balance, the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority, enough so that there is risk and there is what I have called, as you all know, several times, "a window of vulnerability." And I think that a freeze would not only be disadvantageous—in fact, even dangerous to us with them in that position—but I believe that it would also militate against any negotiations for reduction. There would be no incentive for them, then, to meet with us and reduce.

Let me call your attention to what's going on in Geneva. They have 300 intermediate-range missiles with 900 warheads aimed at all of Western Europe, and that includes northern Africa and the Middle East. And there was no talk of any reduction of those weapons until our allies asked us to supply them with intermediate-range weapons as a deterrent and which would be placed in the countries of Western Europe. And then when I made my proposal last November, the Soviet Union is sitting down and talking with us on that.

If they're out ahead—we're behind, and we're asking them to cut down and join us in getting down to a lower level—there isn't much of an incentive.

Q. Well, are you saying that we are vulnerable now, right today, to a nuclear attack that we could not retaliate on?

The President. That would be possible because of some of our triad retaliation, but the Soviet's great edge is one in which they could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit us again.

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Q. Mr. President, do you think that a nuclear war would be winnable or even survivable and under what conditions?

The President. I just have to say that I don't think there could be any winners. Everybody would be a loser if there's a nuclear war.

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Department of State Paper: Nuclear Freeze Proposal, April 1982 [1]

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, [2] and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

> The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

•*Produce significant reductions* in the arsenals of both sides;

•*Result in equal levels of arms on both sides,* since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;

•*Are verifiable,* because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and

•*Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war,* because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. [3] They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.*

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[1] Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Public Information Series.

[2] *Ante,* Mar. 10.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

•*A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking [illegible] NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

•*A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

•*A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult. The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation.* This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

•*A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces.[4] A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

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[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

•*A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

ICBMs. Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

Sea-Based Forces. The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

Bombers. When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982


Trident
SLBM
ALCM
Trident
(Ohio Class)
SSBN
U.S.
1972
1982
Backfire
Bomber
SS-11
Mod 2/3
SS-N-8
SLBM
SS-17
ICBM
SS-19
ICBM
SS-18
ICBM
SS-N-18
SLBM
SS-N-17
SLBM
Delta I SSBN
Delta II SSBN
Delta III SSBN
Typhoon SSBN
U.S.S.R.
1972
1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile

The following chart compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced twelve new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 [5] is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

Statement by the U.S. Special Representative for Negotiations (Rowny) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee: Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, April 2, 1982[1]

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and to bring you up to date on the status of our preparations for the strategic arms reduction negotiations.

REAGAN'S ARMS CONTROL COMMITMENTS

Candidate Reagan campaigned on a platform committed to verifiable arms control agreements at lower levels of nuclear destructive power.

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[5] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 461–464.

[1] *Strategic Arms Control and U.S. National Security Policy: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs . . . , on Nuclear Arms Control Legislation,* pp. 2–5.

He also stressed the need to restore the country's defenses through a strong and sustained rearmament program. As President, he has continued to stress his commitment to a national security policy of providing for our defense needs and for pursuing arms control.

On October 2, 1981, President Reagan unveiled his strategic forces modernization program which called for improvements in all three legs of the triad, augmentation of our command and control, communications and intelligence capabilities, and accelerated research and development in ballistic missile defenses. This program is designed to provide forces which will enhance the deterrence of war. [2]

On November 18, 1981, the President reaffirmed his commitment to arms control. His zero outcome proposal called for reduction to zero intermediate-range ground-launched nuclear missiles for each side, for significant reductions in strategic offensive forces, and for progress in the limitations of conventional weapons. If the Soviets would accept the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, they could well be on the road to a more secure future. President Reagan also then announced that the United States would begin the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva on November 30 and stated that intensive preparations for the START negotiations were underway. [3]

ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

As the President's negotiator specifically responsible for strategic arms negotiations, I am pleased to provide you an update on the administration's thinking on nuclear arms control issues and our preparations for the strategic nuclear arms reduction talks.

Arms control plays a vital role in the administration's policy. Our objective is to decrease the risk of war, especially the risk of nuclear war. Reducing this risk contributes significantly to our primary objective: defense of the United States and the free world. This objective can be achieved only by deterring the Soviets from using nuclear weapons, either in a preemptory first strike or in an escalation from a confrontation involving conventional forces. The Soviets must be convinced that they cannot escape a devastating defensive response by our retaliatory forces. Such self-defense is a legitimate right. Should the Soviets ever consider an attack, we believe they will be deterred only by our strength. However, we must consider that a nuclear war could occur as a result of an escalation, and not only from a so-called "bolt-out-of-the-blue" attack. Therefore, a high priority goal of U.S. arms control is to enhance stability in times of crises. An arms control agreement which meets the President's criteria, and which results in substantial reductions to equal and verifiable levels, can help provide such stability.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 461–464.
[3] *Ibid.,* pp. 570–578.

ADMINISTRATION APPROACH DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION

There is one big difference in the approach this administration is taking that differentiates it from previous administrations. In the past we continued to delay and postpone systems even though the Soviets did not follow our example. The Soviets continued to build their nuclear and conventional forces at an unrelenting rate over the past 15 years; we did not. As a result, we fell behind. Therefore, we must rebuild our defenses. This will not only correct the vulnerabilities which have developed in our defense posture, but will enhance deterrence and put us in a better position from which to achieve arms control agreements.

Let me elaborate. The Reagan administration sees arms control as an integral component of its overall foreign and defense policies. We shall conduct our negotiations within that framework. We intend to call for negotiations on nuclear weapons which will result in sharp reductions to equal but substantially lower levels of destructive capability. The goals of deterrence and crisis stability would best be enhanced by focusing reductions on the elimination of the more destabilizing weapons systems. The most important of these destablizing weapons are the Soviet heavy SS-18 ICBM's. It is also crucially important that an arms control agreement results in the elimination of the breakout potential of the current Soviet ICBM force.

What do the American people seek of arms control? Polls show that the majority of Americans want to prevent the outbreak of war, and especially nuclear war. These same polls show that the majority of the American people do not trust the Soviets. Accordingly, it is clear that we must insist on effective verification of any agreement we enter into.

VERIFICATION

Let me turn briefly to the details of verification. National technical means, for example, by satellites and through the monitoring of telemetry will not by themselves be sufficient to verify future arms control agreements. New weapons and measures to control them are simply becoming too complicated to be verified by NTM's—national technical means—alone. A verifiable agreement must as a minimum include exchange of data and agreement to cooperative measures which go beyond NTM. Additionally, we cannot rule out the possible need for selective or "on-demand" on-site inspections.

Any agreement we enter into must be carefully drafted so as to close possible loopholes and thus prevent the type of exploitation which previous agreements have allowed.

PRINCIPLES GUIDING NEGOTIATIONS

Our negotiations need to be guided by certain principles: First, that the Soviets respect strength and exploit weakness. Rebuilding our defenses is necessary to enhance our national security, but it is also the only way to provide the Soviets the incentive to negotiate seriously. This cannot be done all at once. We need a sustained commitment to force modernization over a period of years. We must convince the Soviet leadership that we are serious and have the will and determination to meet their challenge. While our goal is to see nuclear weapons reduced on both sides, it is only our determination to deter the Soviets at any level they set that will achieve that goal.

CLOSE COORDINATION OF INF AND START

Turning now to our arms control efforts.

We will negotiate on the two subjects, INF and START, in close coordination with one another. In implementing the Rome communique of 1979 [*1981?*] [4] we said we would negotiate TNF—now called INF—in the SALT—now called START—context. In practice this means the two negotiations, while they will be conducted separately, will be closely coordinated so as to be mutually consistent, complementary, and reinforce each other.

SALT II, by directly limiting just launchers, failed to limit the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons and their destructive power. To correct this shortcoming we will need to limit ballistic missile warheads and the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. We can do this by reductions to substantially lower but equal levels.

I believe the Soviets share our desire to avoid nuclear war. They would like to achieve their objectives by means short of war; for example, intimidation or blackmail. Furthermore, in arms control negotiations we tend to want to solve problems whereas the Soviets view arms control negotiations as but another form of competition. Achieving the agreement we seek will not be easy. However, I believe the Soviets will come to realize that despite our past restraint there is no objective reason why we cannot meet the challenge if they force us to compete. We and our allies have four times the gross national product of the Soviet bloc. They cannot compete with us in any field other than the military. There is no reason why we cannot, if we display the will and determination to do so, compete with the Soviets in the military field as well. This is not a competition we desire, but one which is forced upon us. If we fail to rebuild our forces we will neither take care of our security needs nor achieve our arms control objectives.

Only if we demonstrate this national resolve and persistence can we hope to defend ourselves, to deter and to enhance stability in times of crisis. Only then can we be successful at negotiating a more stable military balance at much lower levels of armaments than exist today. Reducing the risks of war depends on it—we can do no less.

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[4] See *ibid.*, p. 176.

Note From the Soviet Union to the United States: Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, April 5, 1982 [1]

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics finds it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America.

For a certain period of time a slanderous campaign is being conducted in the United States with the participation of government bodies with the aim of imputing to the USSR complicity in the supposed use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. In an attempt to pass deceit for truth, to cast aspersions on the consistent peaceloving course of the Soviet Union and poison still more the international atmosphere, the Department of State of the United States recently published a "report" consisting of a collection of inventions capable of convincing one only of the fact that the American administration has no evidence whatsoever and cannot have any for that matter to support its charges.

The Soviet Union undeviatingly honours its international commitments. Being true to the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] the USSR has never resorted to the use of chemical weapons anywhere itself and neither has it handed over such weapons to other countries. It is the Soviet Union that has called and continues to call on the United States and other countries to reach agreement on banning the development and production of toxic substances and on destroying stockpiles of them under effective control.

With the help of inventions about the use of chemical weapons of Soviet make in Laos and Kampuchea the United States would like to cover up the traces of the terrible crimes that were committed by it against the peoples of Indo-China in the period of military intervention in that region. But the peoples remember this, they remember the hundreds of thousands of people who suffered from the toxic substances that were extensively used by American troops in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, they remember the irreparable damage inflicted by these substances to people, the economy and the natural environment. All this is an irrefutable fact.

It is also a fact that the bands of interventionists in Afghanistan are trying to use chemical weapons of American make. There is material evidence to prove this and it is known.

It is also obvious that the purpose of Washington's propaganda show is to try to divert attention from the plans of the large-scale production of new types of lethal chemical substances, that is preparations for war with the use of these barbarous means of mass annihilation, announced by the American administration.

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[1] Moscow, TASS, in English, Apr. 5, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, Apr. 6, 1982, pp. AA13–AA14. A slightly different version of this note (but substantially the same) was circulated at the United Nations as A/37/173.

[2] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969,* pp. 764–765.

The United States also needed all this slander to conceal its reluctance to conduct talks on the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of them, this being pressingly demanded by the United Nations organisation and the world public. More than that, the government of the United States is working to undermine the existing accords in the field of arms limitation and blocking the attainment of new vitally important agreements.

The people in Washington must clearly realise the entire gravity of the responsibility that they are thus assuming.

The Government of the USSR states its resolute protest to the Government of the United States over the slander that is being spread about the Soviet Union. Such behaviour is unacceptable and impermissible in relations between states.

Address by Secretary of State Haig: Peace and Deterrence, April 6, 1982 [1]

It is a melancholy fact of the modern age that man has conceived a means capable of his own destruction. For 37 years mankind has had to live with the terrible burden of nuclear weapons. From the dawn of the nuclear age, these weapons have been the source of grave concern to our peoples and the focus of continuous public debate. Every successive president of the United States has shared these concerns. Every Administration has had to engage itself in this debate.

It is right that each succeeding generation should question anew the manner in which its leaders exercise such awesome responsibilities. It is right that each new Administration should have to confront the awful dilemmas posed by the possession of nuclear weapons. It is right that our nuclear strategy should be exposed to continuous examination.

Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence

In debating these issues, we should not allow the complexity of the problems and the gravity of the stakes to blind us to the common ground upon which we all stand. No one has ever advocated nuclear war. No responsible voice has ever sought to minimize its horrors.

On the contrary, from the earliest days of the postwar era, America's leaders have recognized that the only nuclear strategy consistent with our values and our survival—our physical existence and what makes life worth living—is the strategy of deterrence. The massive destructive power of these weapons precludes their serving any lesser purpose. The catastrophic consequences of another world war—with or without nuclear weapons—make deterrence of conflict our highest objective and our only rational military strategy for the modern age.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 383. The Secretary addressed Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Thus, since the close of World War II, American and Western strategy has assigned a single function to nuclear weapons: the prevention of war and the preservation of peace. At the heart of this deterrence strategy is the requirement that the risk of engaging in war must be made to outweigh any possible benefits of aggression. The cost of aggression must not be confined to the victims of aggression.

This strategy of deterrence has won the consistent approval of Western peoples. It has enjoyed the bipartisan support of the American Congress. It has secured the unanimous endorsement of every successive allied government.

Deterrence has been supported because deterrence works. Nuclear deterrence and collective defense have preserved peace in Europe, the crucible of two global wars in this century. Clearly, neither improvement in the nature of man nor strengthening of the international order has made war less frequent or less brutal. Millions have died since 1945 in over 130 international and civil wars. Yet nuclear deterrence has prevented a conflict between the two superpowers, a conflict which even without nuclear weapons would be the most destructive in mankind's history.

Requirements for Western Strategy

The simple possession of nuclear weapons does not guarantee deterrence. Throughout history societies have risked their total destruction if the prize of victory was sufficiently great or the consequences of submission sufficiently grave. War and, in particular, nuclear war can be deterred, but only if we are able to deny an aggressor military advantage from his action and thus insure his awareness that he cannot prevail in any conflict with us. Deterrence, in short, requires the maintenance of a secure military balance, one which cannot be overturned through surprise attack or sudden technological breakthrough. The quality and credibility of deterrence must be measured against these criteria. Successive administrations have understood this fact and stressed the importance of the overall balance. This Administration can do no less.

The strategy of deterrence, in its essentials, has endured. But the requirements for maintaining a secure capability to deter in all circumstances have evolved. In the early days of unquestioned American nuclear superiority the task of posing an unacceptable risk to an aggressor was not difficult. The threat of massive retaliation was fully credible as long as the Soviet Union could not respond in kind. As the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal grew, however, this threat began to lose credibility.

To sustain the credibility of Western deterrence, the concept of flexible response was elaborated and formally adopted by the United States and its NATO partners in 1967.[2] Henceforth, it was agreed that NATO would meet aggression initially at whatever level it was launched, while preserving the flexibility to escalate the conflict, if necessary, to secure the cessation of aggression and the withdrawal of the aggressor. The purpose of this strategy is not just to conduct conflict successfully if it is forced upon us but, more importantly, to prevent the outbreak of conflict in the first place.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 678.

Flexible response is not premised upon the view that nuclear war can be controlled. Every successive allied and American government has been convinced that nuclear war, once initiated, could escape such control. They have, therefore, agreed upon a strategy which retains the deterrent effect of a possible nuclear response, without making such a step in any sense automatic.

The alliance based its implementation of flexible response upon a spectrum of forces, each of which plays an indispensable role in assuring the credibility of a Western strategy of deterrence. At one end of the spectrum are America's strategic forces, our heavy bombers, intercontinental missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. Since NATO's inception, these forces have been the ultimate guarantee of Western security, a role which they will retain in the future.

At the other end of the spectrum are the alliance's conventional forces, including U.S. forces in Europe. These forces must be strong enough to defeat all but the most massive and persistent conventional aggression. They must be resistant and durable enough to give political leaders time to measure the gravity of the threat, to confront the inherently daunting prospects of nuclear escalation, and to seek through diplomacy the cessation of conflict and restoration of any lost Western territory. The vital role which conventional forces play in deterrence is too often neglected, particularly by those most vocal in their concern over reliance upon nuclear weapons. A strengthened conventional posture both strengthens the deterrent effect of nuclear forces and reduces the prospect of their ever being used.

Linking together strategic and conventional forces are theater nuclear forces, that is, NATO's nuclear systems based in Europe. These systems are concrete evidence of the nature of the American commitment. They are a concrete manifestation of NATO's willingness to resort to nuclear weapons if necessary to preserve the freedom and independence of its members. Further, the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe insures that the Soviet Union will never believe that it can divide the United States from its allies or wage a limited war with limited risks against any NATO member.

The strategy of flexible response and the forces that sustain its credibility reflect more than simply the prevailing military balance. Western strategy also reflects the political and geographical reality of an alliance of 15 independent nations, the most powerful of which is separated from all but one by 4,000 miles of ocean.

Deterrence is consequently more than a military strategy. It is the essential political bargain which binds together the Western coalition. Twice in this century, America has been unable to remain aloof from

European conflict but unable to intervene in time to prevent the devastation of Western Europe. In a nuclear age neither we nor our allies can afford to see this pattern repeated a third time. We have, therefore, chosen a strategy which engages American power in the defense of Europe at the outset and gives substance to the principle that the security of the alliance is indivisible.

The Task Ahead

During the past decade the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the range of its nuclear forces designed to undermine the credibility of the Western strategy. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped those of the West. The development and deployment of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles now pose a serious and increasing threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] force. A new generation of Soviet intermediate-range missiles is targeted upon our European allies.

In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic and intermediate-range systems into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Backfire bomber, the Typhoon submarine and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the SS-20 intermediate-range missile. In contrast, during this same period, the United States exercised restraint, introducing only the Trident missile and submarine and the slower air-breathing cruise missile.

In order to deal with the resulting imbalances, President Reagan has adopted a defense posture and recommended programs to the U.S. Congress designed to maintain deterrence, rectify the imbalances, and thereby support the Western strategy I have just outlined. His bold strategic modernization program, announced last October,[3] is designed to insure the maintenance of a secure and reliable capability to deny any adversary advantage from any form of aggression, even a surprise attack.

The President's decision, in his first weeks in office, to go ahead with the production and deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, in accordance with NATO's decision of December 1979,[4] represents an effort to reinforce the linkage between our strategic forces in the United States and NATO's conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. A response to the massive buildup of Soviet SS-20s targeted on Western Europe, this NATO decision was taken to insure that the Soviet Union will never launch aggression in the belief that its own territory can remain immune from attack or that European security can ever be decoupled from that of the United States.

The improvements we are making in our conventional forces—in their readiness, mobility, training, and equipment—are designed to insure the kind of tough and resilient conventional capability required by the strategy of flexible response. It is important to recognize the interrelationship of these three types of forces. The requirements in each category are dependent upon the scale of the others. Their functions are similarly linked. The Soviet Union understands this. That is why they have consistently proposed a pledge against the first use of nuclear weapons, an idea which has achieved some resonance here in the West.

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[3] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 461–464.

[4] For the NATO decision, see *ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

NATO has consistently rejected such Soviet proposals, which are tantamount to making Europe safe for conventional aggression. If the West were to allow Moscow the freedom to choose the level of conflict which most suited it and to leave entirely to Soviet discretion the nature and timing of any escalation, we would be forced to maintain conventional forces at least at the level of those of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

Those in the West who advocate the adoption of a "no first use" policy seldom go on to propose that the United States reintroduce the draft, triple the size of its armed forces, and put its economy on a wartime footing. Yet in the absence of such steps, a pledge of "no first use" effectively leaves the West nothing with which to counterbalance the Soviet conventional advantages and geopolitical position in Europe.

Neither do Western proponents of a "no first use" policy acknowledge the consequences for the alliance of an American decision not to pose and accept the risk of nuclear war in the defense of Europe. A "no first use" policy would be the end of flexible response and thus of the very credibility of the Western strategic deterrence. In adopting such a stance, the United States would be limiting its commitment to Europe. But the alliance cannot function as a limited liability corporation. It can only survive as a partnership to which all are equally and fully committed—shared benefits, shared burdens, shared risks.

Another concept which has recently attracted interest is that of a freeze on nuclear weapons. While being sensitive to the concerns underlying this proposal, we have had to underscore the flaws in such an approach. A freeze at current levels would perpetuate an unstable and unequal military balance. It would reward a decade of unilateral Soviet buildup and penalize the United States for a decade of unilateral restraint. As President Reagan stressed last week, such a freeze would remove all Soviet incentive to engage in meaningful arms control designed to cut armaments and reduce the risk of war. [5]

Much of the argumentation for a nuclear freeze revolves around the question of how much is enough. Each side possesses thousands of deliverable nuclear weapons. Does it really make any difference who is ahead? The question itself is misleading, as it assumes that deterrence is simply a matter of numbers of weapons or numbers of casualties which could be inflicted. It is not.

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[5] *Ante*, Mar. 31.

•Let us remember, first and foremost, that we are trying to deter the Soviet Union, not ourselves. The dynamic nature of the Soviet nuclear buildup demonstrates that the Soviet leaders do not believe in the concept of "sufficiency." They are not likely to be deterred by a strategy or a force based upon it.

•Let us also recall that nuclear deterrence must work not just in times of peace and moments of calm. Deterrence faces its true test at the time of maximum tension, even in the midst of actual conflict. In such extreme circumstances, when the stakes on the table may already be immense, when Soviet leaders may feel the very existence of their regime is threatened, who can say whether or not they would run massive risks if they believed that in the end the Soviet state would prevail?

•Deterrence thus does not rest on a static comparison of the number or size of nuclear weapons. Rather, deterrence depends upon our capability, even after suffering a massive nuclear blow, to prevent an aggressor from securing a military advantage and prevailing in a conflict. Only if we maintain such a capability can we deter such a blow. Deterrence, in consequence, rests upon a military balance measured not in warhead numbers but in a complex interaction of capabilities and vulnerabilities.

The Military Balance, Crisis Management, and the Conduct of American Diplomacy

The state of the military balance and its impact upon the deterrent value of American forces cast a shadow over every significant geopolitical decision. It affects on a day-to-day basis the conduct of American diplomacy. It influences the management of international crises and the terms upon which they are resolved.

The search for national interest and national security is a principal preoccupation of the leaders of every nation on the globe. Their decisions and their foreign policies are profoundly affected by their perception of the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the consequent capacity of either to help provide for their security or to threaten that security.

More important still, perceptions of the military balance also affect the psychological attitude of both American and Soviet leaders, as they respond to events around the globe. For the foreseeable future the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union will be one in which our differences outnumber our points of convergence. Our objective must be to restrain this competition, to keep it below the level of force, while protecting our interests and those of our allies. Our ability to secure these objectives will be crucially influenced by the state of the strategic balance. Every judgment we make and every judgment the Soviet leadership makes will be shaded by it.

Thus the Soviet leadership, in calculating the risks of subversion or aggression, of acquiring new clients or propping up faltering proxies, must carefully evaluate the possibilities and prospects for an effective

American response. Soviet calculations must encompass not only American capabilities to influence regional developments but American willingness to face the prospect of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and consequent escalation. American leaders, for their part, must go through comparable calculations in reacting to regional conflicts, responding to Soviet adventurism, and seeking to resolve international crises in a manner consistent with U.S. interests.

Put simply, our own vulnerability to nuclear blackmail, as well as the susceptibility of our friends to political intimidation, depends upon our ability and willingness to cope credibly with any Soviet threat. A strong and credible strategic posture enhances stability by reducing for the Soviets the temptations toward adventurism at the same time that it strengthens our hand in responding to Soviet political-military threats.

Arms Control and Nuclear Deterrence

In no area of diplomacy does the military balance have greater effect than in arms control. Arms control can reinforce deterrence and stabilize a military balance at lower levels of risk and effort. Arms control cannot, however, either provide or restore a balance we are unwilling to maintain through our defense efforts.

Just as the only justifiable nuclear strategy is one of deterrence, so the overriding objective for arms control is reducing the risk of war. The essential purpose to arms control is not to save money, although it may do so. Its purpose is not to generate good feelings or improve international relationships, although it may have that effect as well. Arms control's central purpose must be to reinforce the military balance, upon which deterrence depends, at reduced levels of weapons and risk.

On November 18, President Reagan laid out the framework for a comprehensive program of arms control designed to serve these objectives. He committed the United States to seek major reductions in nuclear and conventional forces, leading to equal agreed limits on both sides. [6] Last week he reviewed the steps we have taken:

•In Geneva we have put forth detailed proposals designed to limit intermediate-range nuclear forces and to eliminate entirely the missiles of greatest concern to each side. This proposal has won the strong and unified support of our allies.

•In Vienna we are negotiating, alongside our allies, on reductions in conventional force levels in Europe. These negotiations have gone on without real progress for over 8 years. Because we are now facing diplomatic atrophy, we must urgently consider how to revitalize East-West discussions of conventional force reductions and stimulate progress in these talks.

•Our highest priority, in the past several months, has been completing preparations for negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms. Here too we will be proposing major reductions to verifiable, equal agreed levels. Here too we will be presenting detailed proposals when negotiations open.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

The prospects for progress in each of these areas of arms control depend upon support of the President's defense programs. This imperative has been caricatured as a policy of building up arms in order to reduce them. This is simply not true. As President Reagan's proposals for intermediate-range missiles make clear, we hope that we never have to deploy those systems. But we must demonstrate a willingness to maintain the balance through force deployments if we are to have any prospect of reducing and stabilizing it through arms control.

Negotiations in the early 1970s on a treaty limiting antiballistic missile (ABM) systems provide an historic example. At the time, the Soviets had already built a system of ballistic missile defenses around Moscow. The United States had deployed no such system. Arms control offered the only means of closing off an otherwise attractive and expensive new avenue for arms competition. Yet it was not until the American Administration sought and secured congressional support for an American ABM program that the Soviets began to negotiate seriously. The result was the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, which remains in force today. [7]

This same pattern was repeated more recently with intermediate-range missiles. For years the Soviets had sought limits on U.S. nuclear forces in Europe but refused to consider any limits upon their nuclear forces targeted upon Western Europe. Only after NATO took its decision of December 1979 to deploy U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles did the Soviet Union agree to put its SS-20 missiles on the negotiating table.

In the area of strategic arms, as well, there is little prospect the Soviet Union will ever agree to equal limits at lower levels unless first persuaded that the United States is otherwise determined to maintain equality at higher levels. It is, for instance, unrealistic to believe that the Soviet Union will agree to reduce the most threatening element of its force structure, its heavy, multiwar-headed intercontinental missiles unless it is persuaded that otherwise the United States will respond by deploying comparable systems itself.

For many opposed to reliance on nuclear weapons—even for defense or deterrence—the issue is a moral one. For those who first elaborated the strategy of deterrence, and for those who seek to maintain its effect, this issue is also preeminently moral. A familiar argument is that, in a nuclear age, we must choose between our values and our existence. If nuclear weapons offer the only deterrent to nuclear blackmail, some would argue we should submit rather than pose the risk of nuclear conflict. This choice, however, is a false one. By maintaining the military balance and sustaining deterrence, we protect the essential values of Western civilization—democratic government, personal liberty, and religious freedom—and preserve the peace. In failing to maintain deterrence, we would risk our freedoms, while actually increasing the likelihood of also suffering nuclear devastation.

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[7] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197–201.

As human beings and free men and women, we must reject this false alternative and avoid the extremes of nuclear catastrophe and nuclear blackmail. In the nuclear age, the only choice consistent with survival and civilization is deterrence.

An eminent theologian once described our age as one in which "the highest possibilities are inextricably intermingled with the most dire perils." The scientific and technological advances so vital to our civilization also make possible its destruction. This reality cannot be wished away.

Americans have always been conscious of the dilemmas posed by the nuclear weapon. From the moment that science unleashed the atom, our instinct and policy have been to control it. Those who direct America's defense policies today share completely the desire of people everywhere to end the nuclear arms race and to begin to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear armament.

Confronted by the dire perils of such weapons, America has responded in a manner that best preserves both security and peace, that protects our society and our values, and that offers hope without illusion. The strategy of deterrence has kept the peace for over 30 years. It has provided the basis for arms control efforts. And it offers the best chance to control and to reduce the dangers that we face.

Deterrence is not automatic. It cannot be had on the cheap. Our ability to sustain it depends upon our ability to maintain the military balance now being threatened by the Soviet buildup. If we are to reinforce deterrence through arms control and arms reduction, we must convince the Soviets that their efforts to undermine the deterrent effect of our forces cannot and will not succeed.

The control and reduction of nuclear weapons, based on deterrence, is the only effective intellectual, political, and moral response to nuclear weapons. The stakes are too great and the consequences of error too catastrophic to exchange deterrence for a leap into the unknown. The incentives for real arms control exist, and we have both the means and the duty to apply them.

Let us be clear about our objectives in the nuclear era. We seek to reduce the risk of war and to establish a stable military balance at lower levels of risk and effort. By doing so today, we may be able to build a sense of mutual confidence and cooperation, offering the basis for even more ambitious steps tomorrow. But above all, we shall be pursuing the "highest possibility" for peace.

Statement by the Indonesian Representative (Sutresna) to the Committee on Disarmament: Destruction of Mustard Gas, April 6, 1982 [1]

I take the floor this morning for the purpose of introducing the joint technical report contained in document CD/270 and submitted by Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning the destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at a site near Bandung, the capital city of the Province of West Java, Indonesia.

It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that, at this juncture in the Committee's work, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands are in a position to submit this report to the Committee with a view to sharing with all other member States the experience of co-operation gained by our two countries in a field related to a subject—that of chemical weapons—which is under consideration by the Committee. We sincerely hope that the report will contribute, in one way or another, to the progress of the work being done by the Committee in this respect.

As you may have noticed from the document, the destruction of this dangerous agent took place three years ago in my country. The report is being submitted at a time when the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, is elaborating provisions of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons relating, in particular, to their destruction and verification. The crux of this prohibition, in the view of my delegation, is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents.

I believe it appropriate to stress that the existence of this mustard agent in Indonesia was an inheritance from the then Government of the Netherlands East Indies, under whose authority this chemical weapon was intended for use in retaliation in the event that chemical weapons were used by the enemy during the Second World War, which was extending to the region. As it turned out, chemical weapons were not used there during that war.

As you are aware, Indonesia underwent physical struggle prior to the proclamation of its independence in 1945 and in the years thereafter. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that the Indonesian authorities should have been completely unaware of the presence of the mustard agent in the country. This also seems to have been the case in the Netherlands.

It was fortunate for the two countries that, in 1975, a Dutch national who had been involved in the dismantling of the plant around 1949 was conscientious enough to bring the matter to the attention of the

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[1] CD/PV.169, pp. 13–16.

Netherlands Government, which in turn informed the Government of Indonesia.

The two main considerations that motivated the decision of the Indonesian Government to dispose of this dangerous agent as soon as possible were:

1. The realization of the serious consequences its prolonged existence might have for the population living in the vicinity and for the environment, especially after the subsequent discovery of a corroded tank;

2. Strict adherence to the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] by Indonesia, a party which did not make any reservations. Indonesia therefore considered that the countries party to this Protocol are obliged to destroy on their own initiative dangerous chemical agents existing in their respective countries or in the territories under their jurisdiction.

For this destruction, the Indonesian Government requested the Netherlands Government, the authority responsible for the existence of this agent in Indonesia, to provide technical assistance; for its part, Indonesia provided logistics and security for the whole operation.

The ensuing co-operation between the Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia in the destruction of this dangerous agent was indeed exemplary and reflected the prevailing excellent and amicable relations between the two countries.

When the Indonesian-Netherlands joint operation came to an end, it turned out that there were still about 2,000 litres of mustard agent at the site. Indonesia took upon itself to destroy them by the hydrolysis method.

It is not my intention to dwell on the technical aspects of this operation, which was called "Obong". However, some of its highlights of a non-technical character are perhaps worth mentioning.

Indonesia, a country which does not possess or manufacture chemical weapons, gained invaluable experience from the destruction operation.

Despite 40 years of storage in the underground shelter, the agent was still potent mustard. This may serve as a reminder that, even after being stored for such a long period of time, the agent still possesses its full destructive capacity. Such agents are at present probably still in the possession of a number of countries.

In a future convention, the need for on-site inspection during destruction is essential to ensure that the destruction of the agent is really carried out in terms of its declared type, quantity and location, thus eliminating possible doubts about the sincerity of the parties concerned.

The destruction of such a quantity of mustard agent using relatively simple equipment in a relatively short period of time might become an element for determining the time-limit for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons of the same category, having due regard for local conditions.

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[2] The protocol is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

For a developing country like Indonesia, such destruction requires technical assistance and expertise from developed countries; this might also be considered as an element of the future convention.

Lastly I wish to submit that the case of Indonesia might also be applicable to other countries which have similar historical backgrounds. In this connection, may I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again the appreciation and gratitude of the Government of Indonesia to the Netherlands Government for the assistance and co-operation extended during the operation.

While I have the floor, may I be permitted to touch briefly on two aspects of the item on chemical weapons to which my delegation attaches great importance.

Many members of the Committee have voiced concern about recent developments with regard to the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons, which they consider might impede the Committee's work on the banning of chemical weapons.

The emergence of these new weapons will undoubtedly add a new dimension to the chemical arms race.

My delegation does not at all question the right of any State to develop and adopt a policy which it conceives would best serve its defence or security interests. But if States have committed themselves to achieving a particular goal in a negotiating forum, it is only logical to expect from them that they will not take action or develop policies which, by their very nature, contravene that same goal, lest the credibility of their pronouncements be diminished, if not undermined. Apparently, what appears to be logic for countries like Indonesia does not appear to be so for others. But, my delegation submits, two wrongs do not make a right.

My delegation has taken note of the statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, on 25 March 1982, in which he gave an assurance that "the United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government". Ambassador Fields further stated that "if we are successful in achieving such ban, we would be willing indeed to terminate our binary programme promptly".[3]

My delegation interprets this assurance as having a dual message. On the one hand, it asks the Committee to work speedily on the prohibition of chemical weapons and, on the other, the United States will strive for the achievement of the goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is the sincere hope of my delegation that this pledge will become a reality in the not too distant future.

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[3] *Ante.*

There have been some objections, raised in this Committee, to the need to include a ban on use in the future convention since the topic was already covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Logically speaking, as the use of chemical weapons has already been prohibited in the Geneva 1925 Protocol, existing stocks should have been destroyed and there should be no point in developing new types of such weapons. The contrary has, regrettably, proven to be true.

This situation, as my delegation sees it, has been mainly due to the following:

Firstly, the reservations made by a number of countries, including the most powerful ones, to the 1925 Protocol on the eventuality of non-compliance with its provisions by an enemy State, have brought about a situation under which chemical weapons continue to be of potential use;

Secondly, the limitative scope of use in the Geneva Protocol, which does not cover other forms of armed hostilities short of war; and

Thirdly, the absence of compliance machinery in the 1925 Protocol has rendered more probable the potential, or even actual, use of chemical weapons.

The continued existence of chemical weapons in the arsenal of States and the reported intention of manufacturing a new type of such weapons only reinforce my delegation's conviction that the ban on the use of chemical weapons in the form which appears in the 1925 Protocol should be strengthened; hence the need to reaffirm the prohibition of the use of such weapons in the comprehensive chemical weapons convention that we are now elaborating.

The importance of the need to include the element of use in the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been further underlined in the Canadian paper contained in document CD/167,[4] in the light of new developments regarding the problems of dual-purpose agents and binary compounds.

Furthermore, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador David Sadleir, spoke very eloquently and in a comprehensive manner on the question of use in the statement he made on 1 April 1982. [5] I have nothing to add to that statement. It suffices for me to recall that Indonesia, together with Australia, Argentina, China and Pakistan, has submitted a proposal for alternative wording for the scope of prohibition of the future chemical weapons convention.

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Van Dongen) to the Committee on Disarmament [Extract], April 6, 1982 [1]

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Mr. Chairman, invoking rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, I wish, like the distinguished representative of Indonesia before me, to introduce the joint working paper CD/270. After the intervention of my distinguished colleague, its subject-matter needs little introduction.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 96–103.

[5] CD/PV.168, pp. 19–24.

[1] CD/PV.169, pp. 17–19.

The Netherlands delegation has two good reasons for welcoming the opportunity to speak today, the first being the fact that, jointly with Indonesia, we can report on something that was actually done and not merely talked about in the disarmament sphere, the second that we can report on a joint effort made by the two countries concerned in an atmosphere of harmony and mutual trust.

Operation "Obong" can be regarded as an implementation "avant la lettre" of a possible chemical weapons treaty. Such a treaty remains of immediate priority for our two delegations and I am happy to note that one may conclude from the active negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons that this appears to be the case for all delegations and that keen interest has been displayed by a number of observers.

An essential element of any CW treaty is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents under adequate international verification.

To generate maximum confidence in a CW treaty, countries should declare all their stocks and if possible start destroying them before the treaty enters into force. This, of course, you realize, would be the optimal scenario. In reality, it is probably too much to expect that all countries will declare their operational stocks before the treaty enters into force, while destruction of *operational* stocks is likely to start only after the treaty has come into force.

At the same time, there are no reasons why *obsolete* stocks should not be declared and destroyed as of now. We know that several countries are in the process of destroying old stockpiles of chemical weapons or have already done so, recognizing the importance of removing extremely toxic materials from the environment. Publicizing such activities may help to build confidence and help other countries in the search for suitable methods of destroying their stocks.

The destruction of chemical weapons and agents is often far from simple. Their extreme toxicity and, thus, the risks involved for the persons working at the destruction site require high safety standards. Transportation of old stockpiles can be dangerous and therefore undesirable. The possibility of adverse environmental effects must also be taken into account. As a result, the entire destruction operation is likely to be costly and time-consuming.

Between the two World Wars, a number of countries produced or possessed mustard agents. After the Second World War, several of them decided to destroy their old mustard stocks. Different destruction methods were designed. These were either highly complex—in part because of the requirement for large quantities of water and/or decontaminants—or entailed the risk of an unacceptable environmental impact.

Examples of the former are the hydrolysis method and the method used by the United States Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS); open-pit burning and ocean dumping are examples of the latter. All methods have their advantages and their disadvantages.

Today, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands present to you a report on their joint operation to destroy a considerable amount of mustard agents. This technical report is contained in document CD/270. The operation described was, of course, adapted to the prevailing specific conditions, but, we are confident, that it also demonstrates that the destruction of mustard agents is a viable fairly simple and cost effective operation that can be carried out without endangering public health or the environment.

My distinguished colleague from Indonesia has already given you the sum of the historical background and I shall try to keep this part of my intervention as brief as possible. The stockpile at the site on the island of Java originally was intended as a deterrent against possible chemical warfare in the region. But as it turned out, chemical weapons were not used in the war that broke out. After the war, the plant that had been in operation to produce this stockpile was dismantled. But the mustard agent itself, stored in sealed tanks in underground shelters, was not destroyed. And only a few people were in possession of all the facts; in particular, neither the Indonesian nor the Netherlands authorities were aware of the existence of a stock of mustard agent. And only in the second half of the seventies was attention drawn to the matter by one of the persons who had been involved in dismantling the plant.

The Indonesian and Netherlands Governments then decided to eliminate the dangerous substance and they agreed that the Netherlands Government would provide technical assistance, including technical experts, and the Indonesian Government would be charged with providing logistics and guaranteeing security during the operation. The Prins Maurits Laboratory TNO in the Netherlands was charged with the provision of the technical assistance.

A fact-finding mission in April 1978 revealed the presence, on a site adjacent to an artillery range and in close proximity to an inhabited area, of *five* steel tanks of 10 cubic metres each in as many underground stone shelters half-filled with water. One of the tanks had corroded to such an extent that the contents had apparently leaked out. Yet no mustard agent could be detected in relation to that tank although decomposition products were present. The other four tanks were found to contain mustard agent, to an estimated total of 35,000 litres.

The presence of such a large amount of mustard agent in close proximity to populated areas and the possibility that the tanks could leak were, of course, of great concern to the Indonesian Government. Consequently, it was decided that the agent should be disposed of as quickly as possible.

Several methods of destruction were considered, taking into account that on-site destruction was necessary since transport of the agent over large distances was evidently too risky. This latter factor limited the available options, in view of restrictions on energy, on water and on material supplies. The methods I mentioned earlier—hydrolysis, the CAMDS and TAMDS methods, open-pit burning or ocean dumping—were therefore rejected. Other methods were also rejected, mainly because they presented disposal problems.

In the end, the decision was made to use a method of controlled incineration. A specially-designed incinerator was built in the Netherlands and shipped to Indonesia. After the Indonesian NBC Defence Corps had made the necessary preparations on the site, the construction and the testing phase started. This phase lasted for about a month. The actual incineration of the mustard agent took place in June 1979. A total quantity of 32,000 litres of mustard agent was destroyed. You will find in the working document a detailed description of the incineration method, as well as of the difficulties encountered in the destruction of part of the stock.

What lessons can be drawn from this operation and the history behind it? The first is that the destruction of considerable quantities of mustard agent under the conditions described can be safely carried out in a reasonably short period of time and with relatively simple equipment.

The second, no less important, is the demonstration of the value of co-operation. We have here a tangible example of a joint, practical effort to help build the basis for a treaty banning chemical weapons altogether.

The third lesson concerns verification. During the destruction operation, due attention was given to a possible verification mechanism. Supposing for a moment that the Obong operation had taken place under a chemical weapons convention, the question of a required type of verification would then, of course, have arisen. And our reply would have been that, with the technology now available, only on-site inspection on a regular basis would have provided adequate proof that the chemical warfare agent had indeed been effectively and totally destroyed. Theoretically, possibilities of remote observation and control exist, but they are still a long way from becoming operational. Much research and development will be required before the feasibility of such a system can be established. For the foreseeable future, only on-site inspection during the destruction will provide adequate verification for the destruction of stockpiles, as in Operation Obong.

These are some preliminary observations as an introduction to document CD/270 jointly circulated by the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Our two delegations intend to arrange for a presentation of a more technical nature in this Committee later in the year.

It goes without saying, and in this I am sure that I can speak for my Indonesian colleague, that both our delegations are prepared to answer any question that may arise concerning this operation.

Paper Submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia to the Committee on Disarmament: Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for Chemical Weapons Verification, April 7, 1982 [1]

Background

In future CW discussions in the Committee on Disarmament it will be important:

—to focus attention on unresolved issues, particularly in the area of verification, and

—find specific areas in which technical experts could contribute to working out an adequately verifiable ban.

One CD activity which could be considered in this regard is a co-operative international technical effort to evaluate remote continual verification ("recover") techniques as a potential component of a CW verification system. This paper outlines the "recover" concept and discusses what activity might be undertaken at the CD.

"Recover" is a unique global data collection network developed with United States Government (ACDA) support for use primarily in nuclear safeguards; it is designed to transmit digital data securely, economically and reliably from sensors installed at a facility in any part of the world to a central facility. The integrity of the data is assured by a tamper-resistant design of its components and the encryption of the data during transmission.

A demonstration system has been deployed since 1980 with sensors at facilities in Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States and a central station at the IAEA in Vienna. Intensive testing was conducted during November 1980 with less frequent testing (weekly instead of daily) continuing to date. The results have confirmed the feasibility of secure, low-cost reliable and timely transmission of data.

The experimental operation of "recover" is under the auspices of the IAEA, which is evaluating it for possible operational use. Representatives of the seven countries have formed an informal group of the participants in the "recover" project under the chairmanship of an IAEA representative. The group is meeting annually to plan and supervise the demonstration, to evaluate the results of the test, to make plans for future activities and to advise the IAEA on the feasibility of incorporating remote monitoring into the international safeguards system. Among the benefits to the participants are the opportunity to contribute in a very tangible manner to the improvement of international safeguards, as well as access in some cases to technology not otherwise available to them.

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[1] CD/271.

While the "recover" system is being developed for nuclear safeguards purposes, the concepts and technology involved may have utility for verification in other situations as well.

Outline of possible project

Co-operative international technical evaluation of "recover"

Agreement could be sought for a co-operative technical evaluation, conducted under the aegis of the CD, of use of "recover" techniques to aid CW verification. A technical panel open to all interested States—including non-CD members—could be established for this purpose. The panel could:

—explore possible specific applications for "recover" (for example, for assisting in the monitoring of mothballed CW facilities);

—promote co-operation in identification of suitable sensors and in development of new sensors which are compatible with the "recover" system; and

—sponsor an international demonstration project in which sensors would be installed in a few selected facilities to provide a realistic test of the monitoring system. (The cost for one facility might be roughly $20,000.)

Two years are likely to be needed to accomplish these tasks. Of course, if it appeared useful to continue, such tasks as sensor development could be extended.

The panel would forward to the CD periodic reports which outlined the panel's technical findings. It would be up to individual States to decide whether to support the use of "recover" as one component of a CW verification system.

Such an effort would be analogous to the IAEA technical evaluation effort outlined above. It could assist in resolving verification issues. It could be a confidence-building activity in which States co-operate to develop and evaluate improved monitoring arrangements.

News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, April 8, 1982 [1]

Western representatives have repeatedly affirmed Western interest in reaching the stated common goal of an agreement in the Vienna negotiations. Unfortunately the situation in these negotiations remains difficult and generally disappointing.

Particularly over the past year there has been no discussion whatsoever of specific facts which would reveal the reasons for the discrepancy on Soviet ground force manpower in the reductions area. The East has failed to respond to the West's data proposal of July 23, 1981, despite repeated Western explanations of the need for a constructive reply. No progress has been made, therefore, toward resolving the data dispute.

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[1] ACDA files.

In addition, the East has continued to advocate a set of associated measures inadequate to fulfill the verification and confidence-building requirements for a reduction and limitation agreement in Vienna.

Notwithstanding this lack of progress on fundamental questions, the East, at the end of the last round, proposed a joint effort to begin drafting either the text of an agreement or a working paper which would later become the basis for a draft agreement. At the beginning of this round, the East put forward its proposals for a first-stage agreement in the form of a draft agreement.

While the Eastern draft agreement of February 18, 1982 contains some useful elements, it clearly reveals that insufficient progress has been made on the key questions of data and associated measures to permit the drafting of a first agreement text.

With regard to drafting in general, Western representatives have repeatedly stated that work on specific texts would be useful and necessary when appropriate, but that drafting could not proceed very far without encountering the yet unresolved questions of data and associated measures. Therefore there would be little point in attempting to draft an agreement before genuine progress on these crucial questions has been made.

We believe joint efforts to start drafting would only be regarded as meaningful after differences existing between both sides on overall issues regarding a reduction agreement have been brought closer to solution and genuine progress made on data and associated measures.

Thus Western participants today invited the East to join in a cooperative effort to broaden areas of mutual understanding with a view to achieving balanced progress in all these fields, which would include a constructive Eastern answer to the Western data proposal of July 23, 1981.

As further tangible evidence of its commitment to progress in the Vienna negotiations, the West today suggested to the East that, in order to provide the best possible basis for future negotiations, the sides should now proceed to take stock of the results achieved so far in areas to which they each attach key importance. We have today proposed suitable procedures for the accomplishment of such a task.

This Western proposal is important since for the first time the sides in these negotiations would jointly prepare a written compilation of their positions which would help clarify areas of agreement and disagreement, and which in turn could facilitate decisions by governments.

The procedures we proposed would ensure that all issues of interest to both sides would be addressed and that work on those issues, including data and associated measures, would progress in parallel.

Western representatives have urged the East to consider this new proposal during the recess and to provide a positive response to it early in the coming round.

News Conference Statement by the Soviet Representative (Mikhailov) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, April 8, 1982 [1]

The just completed round of the Vienna negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe was not an ordinary one. It took place against the background of a sharply aggravated international situation. At the same time its remarkable feature was the new important initiative undertaken by the socialist countries.

Ever broader sections of public in European countries and elsewhere are seized by the cognizance of the present moment's complexity and urgency, of the need for lessening military confrontation and anxiety about the future course of events.

Since the problem of lessening military confrontation lies at the core of the Vienna negotiations, too, the question becomes ever more pressing—also as applied to these negotiations—whether the deadlock in them will be at last overcome and an agreement will be reached initiating practically the process of reducing military potentials of the sides or whether this cause will be found deliberately sunk in the fruitless discussions through efforts of those who would like to use the talks for disguising completely different plans.

The Draft "Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe in the First Stage" introduced by the Polish delegation on behalf of the socialist countries permits to overcome the deadlock and achieve real progress in the negotiations. This Draft contains all the necessary components for the elaboration of a proper mutually acceptable understanding on an equal basis.

With the view to bringing positions closer together and attaining an agreement the Eastern side in many respects took steps to meet our Western partners. The compromise nature of the Draft is reflected in a whole number of its provisions which take into account essential aspects of the Western side's position. To those belong: the two-stage reduction process, reduction only of the ground forces, the compromise nature of the sizes and forms of reduction of the USSR and US ground forces in the first stage, the freezing of the force manpower of both sides (alliances) on a collective basis for the duration of the first agreement, the expression of parity in numerical terms, i.e. of equal collective levels of the armed forces manpower of the sides to be established after the completion of the two-stage reductions, as well as other provisions to which the Western side has attached an increased importance.

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[1] ACDA files.

In the interest of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement the Eastern side has gone fairly far to meet position of the West and it is justified to expect that also the Western side will make a contribution of its own to the attainment of the agreement.

Unfortunately, the West did not this time either show the necessary political willingness to agree on a lessening of military confrontation and tensions. There has been no businesslike or constructive reply whatsoever to the initiatives by the socialist countries.

To be sure, in today's plenary session the American delegation on behalf of the Western participants outlined some procedural considerations. How should we treat them? These considerations, of course, will be considered in the light of whether they can contribute to the progress of the negotiations. However, judging already from a first impression one can say that they do not answer the substance of the Draft Agreement submitted by the East and, moreover, they escape, generally speaking, the task of the practical elaboration of the agreement's text. Nevertheless, we would like to express the hope that the Western side will be able during the forthcoming recess to consider once again its position and make a constructive response to the Draft of the socialist countries.

As regards the Western side's incessant manipulations with its estimates of the Warsaw Treaty forces manpower, they can hardly be regarded otherwise than as artificially invented subterfuge for covering up the Western side's unwillingness to agree on the subject matter of the negotiations.

We believe that the exchange of official data on the numerical strength of the armed forces of the sides which has taken place reflects the real picture and makes it possible to conclude the first agreement. If, however, the Western side is not prepared to accept the existing official data then we should, apparently, set aside the unproductive disputes and search for solution in another way. It is all the more justified since the key issues of the first agreement are in essence solvable independently of the data dispute. As a matter of fact, in order to be assured of the compliance with the agreement it will be sufficient for the sides to know that the forces to be reduced have been actually withdrawn from the agreed area and that no new introduction of forces is taking place.

The Draft presented by the socialist countries fully provides a reasonable assurance of that. It envisages a whole set of carefully weighed and realistic measures, inter alia verification, as well as a special mechanism for consultations which in their totality are intended to guarantee with a sufficient degree of reliability the implementation of the agreement and foster the strengthening of confidence among parties to it.

Assessing objectively the current state of the negotiations one can say that all conditions exist now for working out a joint first stage agreement on the basis of the Draft Agreement put forward by the Warsaw Treaty states. What is only needed is the mutual desire and willingness to do so. And the West, in no less measure than the East, should be interested in lessening the military confrontation. This task can only be solved through joint efforts.

Address by President Reagan: Nuclear War and Strategic Arms Reduction, April 17, 1982 [1]

My fellow Americans:

Throughout our history and particularly in recent years, America's taken on an ever-increasing role as peacemaker—taking the initiative time after time to try to help countries settle their differences peacefully. I don't need to recite the list of diplomatic efforts spanning all administrations in which we've been instrumental in ending war and restoring peace.

Yet, there are some who still ask which nation is the true peacemaker—the United States or the Soviet Union? Well, let us ask them, which country has nearly 100,000 troops trying to occupy the once nonaligned nation of Afghanistan? Which country has tried to crush a spontaneous workers' movement in Poland? And what country has engaged in the most massive arms buildup in history? Or, let's put the question another way. What country helped its World War II enemies back on their feet? What country is employing trade aid and technology to help the developing peoples of the world and actively seeking to bring peace to the Middle East, the South Atlantic, and to southern Africa?

The answer is clear, and it should give us both pride and hope in America. Today, I know there are a great many people who are pointing to the unimaginable horror of nuclear war. I welcome that concern. Those who've governed America throughout the nuclear age and we who govern it today have had to recognize that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

So, to those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, "I'm with you." Like my predecessors, it is now my responsibility to do my utmost to prevent such a war. No one feels more than I the need for peace.

Throughout the first half of my lifetime, the entire world was engaged in war, or in recovering from war, or in preparing for war. Since the end of World War II, there's not been another world conflict. But there have been and are wars going on in various other parts of the world.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Apr. 26, 1982, pp. 503–504. The President spoke from Camp David.

This stretch of 37 years since World War II has been the result of our maintaining a balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the strategic nuclear capabilities of either side. As long as this balance has been maintained, both sides have been given an overwhelming incentive for peace.

In the 1970's, the United States altered that balance by, in effect, unilaterally restraining our own military defenses while the Soviet Union engaged in an unprecedented buildup of both its conventional and nuclear forces.

As a result, the military balance which permitted us to maintain the peace is now threatened. If steps are not taken to modernize our defense, the United States will progressively lose the ability to deter the Soviet Union from employing force or threats of force against us and against our allies.

It would be wonderful if we could restore our balance with the Soviet Union without increasing our own military power. And ideally, it would be a long step in ensuring peace if we could have significant and verifiable reductions of arms on both sides. But let's not fool ourselves. The Soviet Union will not come to any conference table bearing gifts. Soviet negotiators will not make unilateral concessions. To achieve parity, we must make it plain that we have the will to achieve parity by our own effort.

Many have been attracted to the idea of a nuclear freeze. Now, that would be fine if we were equal in strategic capability. We're not. We cannot accept an agreement which perpetuates current disparities.

The current level of nuclear forces is too high on both sides. It must be the objective of any negotiations on arms control to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons.

Since World War II, the United States has attempted to get Soviet agreement to such reductions countless times. We began back when we alone had such weapons. We were never able to persuade the Soviet Union to join in such an understanding, even when we proposed turning all nuclear material and information over to an international body and when we were the only nation that had nuclear weapons.

We're preparing a new arms reduction effort with regard to strategic nuclear forces and are already in negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range missiles threatening Europe. Our objective in these talks is for the elimination of such missiles on the strategic nuclear forces. We will aim on those at substantial reductions on both sides leading to equal and verifiable limits. We'll make every effort to reach an agreement that will reduce the possibility of nuclear war.

If we can do this, perhaps one day we can achieve a relationship with the Soviet Union which doesn't depend upon nuclear deterrents to secure Soviet restraint.

I invite the Soviet Union to take such a step with us. And I ask you, the American people, to support our efforts at negotiating an end to this threat of doomsday which hangs over the world.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, April 23, 1982 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION [2]

1. Taking into consideration paragraph 76 of the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, [3] the Committee on Disarmament considered the question of concluding a treaty on radiological weapons in its 1979 session. During this session, the USSR and the United States submitted their joint USSR/United States proposal on major elements of the treaty. [4] Other proposals were also submitted.

2. Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 34/07 A entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament at its 69th Plenary Meeting held on 17 March 1980 adopted the decision reading, *inter alia,*

> The Committee on Disarmament decided to establish for the duration of its 1980 session an *ad hoc* working group of the Committee with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

3. The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981 at its 105th Plenary Meeting on 12 February 1981 to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

4. During the 1980/1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Imre Kómives (Hungary) held further discussions on the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the Chairman's Consolidated Text (CD/RW/WP.20) and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating the draft provisions for the treaty on radiological weapons (CD/133 and CD/228).

5. The activities of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during that period showed that, while further efforts were made to narrow down the existing difficulties, divergencies still existed, particularly on the scope

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[1] CD/284*/Rev.1. The annex is not printed here.

[2] A list of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers (1979–1982) submitted in connection with the question of radiological weapons is attached as Annex I to this report. [Footnote in original. The report was submitted for transmittal to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.]

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* p. 426.

[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 357–361.

of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and other measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

6. In 1980 and 1981, several specific suggestions were put forward in the Working Group in connection with the scope of the treaty. It was stated that the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be oriented towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of use of radioactive material for hostile purposes.

7. Some delegations argued that there existed a very real risk of mass destruction from dissemination of radioactive substances through attacks on nuclear facilities. Those delegations believed that the treaty on radiological weapons would form an appropriate legal framework for an undertaking not to attack nuclear facilities or to deliberately damage such facilities.

8. Other delegations considered that an obligation to this effect would fall outside the framework of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. It was also felt that an attempt to deal in the same negotiations with the prohibition of radiological weapons and with the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities would complicate the negotiations and make elaboration of any agreement on either matter impracticable. They believed that the issues relating to nuclear facilities were already covered by the Geneva Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol 1), 1977, [5] and that any additional measures to protect nuclear facilities should be considered within the framework of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.

9. Other delegations expressed the view that the existing international instruments on the subject were partial and ambiguous, and that the Committee on Disarmament was fully competent to consider the matter.

10. Some delegations also expressed the view that as a compromise the idea of holding separate negotiations on this question should be reflected in the text of the treaty or in a separate statement.

II. PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ELABORATION OF THE TREATY PROHIBITING RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A. Organization of work and procedures

11. In pursuance of the Committee's decision on subsidiary bodies, on 18 February 1982, [6] (CD/243), the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate. The Working Group held 12 meetings between 20 February and 21 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany). Mr. Guennady Efimov

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[5] *International Legal Materials*, Nov. 16, 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff.

[6] *Ante*.

of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group.

12. At their request, representatives of the following States, non-members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Working Group during its 1982 session: Austria, Norway.

13. In addition to the earlier resolutions the Working Group also took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly which contained an appeal to complete its negotiations in order to allow a treaty to be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament.

14. Following consultations, the Chairman, on 9 March 1982, gave a comprehensive report (CD/RW/WP.25), advancing on a personal basis a certain number of suggestions as to the procedure to adopt, and as to possible compromises for the still unresolved problems.

15. At the suggestion of the Chairman, on 15 March 1982 the Working Group agreed, as a procedural hypothesis and without prejudice to later decisions, to conduct separate meetings on the "traditional" [7] radiological weapons subject matter, on the one hand, and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities on the other (CD/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1).

16. In this connection, some reservations were expressed. Some delegations maintained that such a procedural hypothesis should not be interpreted as signifying the commencement of negotiations on the subject of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Some delegations, while prepared to participate in the meetings, expressed doubts as to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament (or competence of the Working Group) to negotiate the question of protecting nuclear facilities from attack. Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter. Some other delegations made clear that the consideration of that question could, in their view, only be of an exploratory nature at this time. Some delegations believed that the two subjects on which negotiations were being conducted in accordance with the proposed procedure should be treated equally on a non-discriminatory basis with a view to incorporating them in the same legal instrument. Other delegations expressly reserved their position with respect to the number and form of the future legal instrument(s) on the subjects under consideration.

B. "Traditional" RW subject matter

17. The Working Group on Radiological Weapons held three meetings devoted to consideration of the matters related to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter. While some new possible compromise formulations were advanced, the negotiations showed that

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[7] The Working Group agreed that for the purposes of this report the term "traditional" should be employed as a convenient reference to the scope of prohibition envisaged in the joint proposal contained in documents CD/31 and CD/32. [Footnote in original.]

differences still exist regarding, in particular, the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of prohibition, verification and compliance, peaceful uses, relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with nuclear disarmament, and some aspects of the final clauses. Some delegations reminded the Working Group of their view that some draft articles might have to be revised, in view of their intention to have the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities included as an integral part of the Treaty.

18. With regard to the formulation of a definition of radiological weapons and because of the objections by some delegations to the inclusion of an explicit clause excluding nuclear weapons from the treaty, attempts were made to develop a "positive definition" which would not include such a clause. Some specific suggestions were made in this respect (CD/RW/WP.26, 30, 31 and Add.1).

19. Although no formulation was found to be entirely acceptable, from either the technical or legal point of view, the Working Group felt that efforts in this direction should be continued. While some delegations expressed their readiness to participate in those efforts, they still believed that the most effective way to define radiological weapons could be through maintaining an exclusion clause. Other delegations continued to believe that this would amount to a legitimization of nuclear weapons. Some delegations maintained their doubts as to the feasibility of including certain radioactive materials in the definition of radiological weapons.

20. In connection with the scope of prohibition some delegations maintained that the use of the term radiological warfare would depend on the scope of the future treaty. Other delegations felt that the concept of radiological warfare has no place in the framework of such a treaty.

21. The view was also expressed that the treaty should not only address the prevention of the emergence of radiological weapons as a specific type of weapon, but also to the prohibition of the use of radiation from the decay of radioactive materials for hostile purposes.

22. Some delegations maintained that the future treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons should contain an explicit commitment to urgently pursue negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this connection the text of an article for inclusion in the treaty was proposed by the Group of 21[8] (CD/RW/WP.36). Other delegations were of the view that this article was inappropriate for inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty.

23. As regards peaceful uses, there was widespread recognition that the treaty should contain an appropriately balanced article which

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[8] Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiophia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire. [Footnote in original.]

would include a provision relating to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay and a provision stating that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to international co-operation in this field; the Working Group, however, had not completed its consideration of the precise wording of these provisions.

24. On the question of compliance and verification, some delegations were of the view that the procedures provided in the joint USSR/United States proposal correspond to the subject and scope of the treaty on prohibition of radiological weapons and should be fully maintained, including the provision for lodging complaints, in case of an alleged breach of the Treaty, with the United Nations Security Council.

25. Some delegations disagreed with these views and held that the procedures for lodging complaints under the Treaty should not refer to the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations, since such procedures were, in any event, available under the United Nations Charter, and that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be the focal point for complaints and verification matters under the treaty. It was suggested that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be provided with broad investigatory powers so as to include, in the view of some delegations, provisions for on-site inspections. Some delegations advocated a two-tiered structure for the verification régime under the treaty, with a Consultative Committee of Experts as a fact-finding and evaluating body, and a General Assembly of States Parties as a political forum for consideration of alleged breaches of the treaty. It was agreed that the issues of compliance and verification under the treaty needed further consideration.

26. Some delegations pointed out that the detailed elaboration of the provisions on verification and compliance would require the prior solution of the outstanding issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

27. With regard to the final clauses, the proposal was made for a more elaborate procedure to act upon proposed amendments (CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1); the general idea of this amendment was supported by some delegations. While some divergencies persisted as to the time intervals between entry into force and holding of a first and subsequent review conferences, the view was expressed that these differences could, perhaps, be overcome.

28. The view was widely held that the treaty should enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a lower number than 25 hitherto discussed and the number of 15 was advanced in this context, while some delegations reaffirmed their position that the treaty should enter into force upon its ratification by 25 governments, including the nuclear weapon States.

C. Consideration of the question relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities

29. The Working Group also held three meetings devoted to consideration of some issues of relevance relating to the question of protecting nuclear facilities. During these meetings a number of delegations reiterated their reservation as stated in paragraph 16 above. One delegation did not take part in the meetings.

30. The discussion on the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities followed the outline in the working paper CD/RW/WP.33 proposed by the Chairman and centered around the definition of facilities to be protected and the scope of a possible prohibition.

31. The Working Group heard technical explanations from some delegations as to the destructive effects that could result from attacks on nuclear power reactors exceeding a certain minimum thermal power, reprocessing plants and storage facilities of irradiated material and waste. It was pointed out that attacks on such facilities could possibly result in mass destruction, whereas in the case of certain other facilities, attacks on them would not result in mass destruction because of their low inventory of radioactive material or the lack of such inventory. A certain number of divergencies in relation to these issues appeared.

32. Some delegations proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective was, in their view, to prevent mass destruction, there could be no justification to differentiate between civilian and military facilities. They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facilities. However, in their view, mass destruction was not the only criterion relevant to this issue. They argued that an important objective of the proposed instrument was to restore confidence among the countries regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes. This confidence had, in their opinion, been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of a developing country. Therefore, they argued that the scope of the prohibition should include not only the larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter, in their view, would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries. In this connection, a specific proposal on the definition of facilities to be protected was put forward by one delegation (CD/RW/CRP.16).

33. Some other delegations felt that it would create serious and possibly insuperable difficulties to grant protection to all nuclear facilities and that in this context it would be appropriate to introduce a threshold of minimum inventory of radioactivity (and of a minimum thermal power in the case of nuclear reactors) so as to eliminate from the protection facilities which, in case of attack, would not cause mass destruction. In this regard, it was particularly emphasized by these delegations that a prohibition of attacks on facilities, which would not result in any radiological damage, would provide a disincentive to the

use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the benefit of mankind. Some delegations held that the inclusion of military installations would entail very complex problems. A working paper on definition and scope of prohibition was put before the Working Group by one delegation (CD/RW/WP.34).

34. Some delegations noted however that this very working paper stated that "there may be good arguments that all facilities of the kind mentioned above should be protected by a radiological weapons convention be they civilian, military or dual purpose". A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize attacks on certain nuclear facilities resulting in mass destruction and thus contravene the main objective of the prohibition and increase the difficulties of compliance and verification. They also pointed out that the promotion of nuclear energy, at least in the developing countries was not being impeded by public opinion in these countries but by the restrictive policies of certain industrialized countries.

35. On the other hand, it was pointed out that such a comprehensive ban could not be reasonably expected to be successfully negotiated or, alternatively, to receive the necessary number of ratifications to make it a viable and effective instrument of international law, and thus to remove the danger of mass destruction. The delegation, whose Working Paper had been quoted in the preceding paragraph, drew attention to the fact that the Paper in this context also contained the following statement: "The political difficulties of protecting military facilities in an international instrument are obvious, and such facilities therefore seem to have to be excluded from a convention".

36. It was, however, stated by some delegations that such political difficulties as may be involved were not sufficient reason for a partial prohibition. In their view such an approach would leave open the possibility of legitimizing mass destruction in the conduct of warfare.

37. Some other delegations believed many of the arguments advanced above were inaccurate and further had little to do with the issues at hand.

38. The divergencies could not be settled in the course of the three meetings of the Working Group. Some delegations felt that the topic needed further clarification and discussion. They also felt that a detailed discussion on the remaining issues of the Chairman's provisional checklist (CD/RW/WP.33) would also require a solution of these basic differences of view on definition of facilities and scope of prohibition.

Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: Recommendations and Proposals [Extract], April 25, 1982[1]

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A New Departure

We are deeply concerned about trends in the development, deployment, and proliferation of armaments. They are exacerbated by the deterioration in political relations. Unless states manage to reverse them, the world may be heading for catastrophe. Preventive action is therefore needed urgently. The problems we confront are man-made problems. Humanity has it within its power to contain the dangers and embark upon a programme for the reduction and eventual abolition of the forces of destruction. The efforts so far have been too feeble and their results too meagre for this Commission to recommend merely renewed commitment and enhanced endeavour. More of the same will not do. We recognize the constraints which apply, the competing interests and mutual suspicions which permeate international relations. We see the need for a new beginning in the peaceful struggle against war and destruction.

Principles for Action

Common security

All states have a right to security. In the absence of a world authority with the right and power to police international relations, states have to protect themselves. Unless they show mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned.

Nuclear weapons have changed not only the scale of warfare but the very concept of war itself. In the nuclear age war cannot be an instrument of policy, only an engine for unprecedented destruction. States can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be attained only through cooperative undertakings. Security in the nuclear age means common security. Even ideological opponents and political rivals have a shared interest in survival. There must be partnership in the struggle against war itself. The search for arms control and disarmament is the pursuit of common gains, not unilateral advantage. *A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction.*

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[1] A/CN.10/38, Apr. 8, 1983, pp. 138–176. The report was adopted by the Independent Commission in Stockholm on Apr. 25, 1982. It was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission by the Secretary General on Apr. 8, 1983, in accordance with General Assembly res. 37/99 B of Dec. 13, 1982. Members of the Independent Commission were as follows: Olof Palme (Sweden), Georgi Arbatov (USSR), Egon Bahr (FRG), Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway), Josef Cyrankiewicz (Poland), Jean-Marie Daillet (France), Robert A.D. Ford (Canada), Alfonso Garcia-Robles (Mexico), Haruki Mori (Japan), C.B. Muthamma (India), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), David Owen (United Kingdom), Shridath Ramphal (Guyana), Salim Salim (Tanzania), Soedjatmoko (Indonesia), Joop den Uyl (Netherlands), Cyrus Vance (U.S.). The Independent Commission held 12 meetings between Sept. 1980 and Apr. 1982.

General and complete disarmament

In its final document, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament charged the Committee on Disarmament with elaborating a comprehensive programme leading to general and complete disarmament. The Committee completed its task in April 1982. *The Commission strongly supports the goal of general and complete disarmament.* We recognize that this objective will not be realized in the near future. But the ideal of a world in which international relations are based on the rule of law, cooperation, and the peaceful pursuit of political ends must be held high. This is the goal as well as the measure of efforts to reach international agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. To make progress in that direction it is necessary to develop a concrete and comprehensive programme of action reflecting the complex interrelationships of the many critical elements in the present situation. It is necessary to break the impasse and start a downward spiral.

Economic pressures and common security

The economic and social costs of military competition constitute strong reasons for countries to seek disarmament. The costs of military spending are especially onerous in the difficult economic circumstances of the 1980s. These costs, of course, are different for different countries. But some are common to almost everyone: use of government revenues; diversion of scarce scientific and technical skills from social pursuits; denial of investments which could otherwise increase economic growth. The journey towards reversing the arms race will follow a different path for each country. But for all countries the economic prize will be great.

Linkage as an obstacle

The Commission is disturbed by the current international situation Dialogue and moderation appear to be breaking down; tensions ar accelerating. While weapons are not the only source of conflict amon states, competitions in arms exacerbate existing conflicts and assume dangerous and self-propelling momentum.

Deliberate efforts to establish links between specific negotiations fo the limitation and reduction of arms and the general internationa behaviour of one's opponent are inconsistent with our notion o common security. Negotiations for the limitation and reduction o arms require a high degree of continuity and stability. They are no gifts to an adversary or rewards for his good behaviour, but rather means of pursuing common security and profiting from shared inte ests. The task of diplomacy is to limit, split, and subdivide conflicts, not to generalize and aggregate them. Prior political agreement cannot be made a precondition for negotiations about arms limitation. Indeed, agreements on arms limitation and disarmament could make it easier to resolve outstanding issues. *The Commission considers the notion of political linkage an unsound principle which should be abandoned.*

The prospects for arms limitation and disarmament will to some extent always depend on the general political climate. However, all states share an interest in preventing the arms race from dominating their relations and driving them towards armed conflict. Negotiations about, and agreements to limit and reduce, arms can provide an engine for improving relations and restoring confidence. When tensions occur the need for communication and negotiation is particularly strong.

ELEMENTS OF A PROGRAMME FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

The Commission's recommendations, taken together, constitute a broad programme for substantial progress towards arms limitation and disarmament. The recommendations fall into six categories: (1) the nuclear challenge and East-West relations; (2) curbing the qualitative arms competition; (3) assuring confidence among states; (4) strengthening the UN security system; (5) regional approaches to security; and (6) economic security.

1 THE NUCLEAR CHALLENGE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

There will be no winner in a nuclear war. The use of nuclear weapons would result in devastation and suffering of a magnitude which would render meaningless any notion of victory. The size of existing nuclear stockpiles and the near certainty of devastating retaliation make it futile and dangerous to consider nuclear war an instrument of national policy. Nuclear war would amount to an unprecedented catastrophe for humanity and suicide for those who resorted to it.

No victors in a nuclear war

Were they ever to cross the nuclear threshold, nations would be set on a course which does not lend itself to prediction. The very process of destruction would render prior calculations and attempts to exercise control fruitless. We reject any notion of windows of opportunity for nuclear war. Any doctrine based on the belief that it may be possible to wage a victorious nuclear war is a dangerous challenge to the prudence and responsibility which must inspire all approaches to international peace and security in the nuclear age. *We conclude that it is impossible to win a nuclear war and dangerous for states to pursue policies or strategies based on the fallacious assumption that a nuclear war might be won.*

No limited nuclear war

The idea of fighting a limited nuclear war is dangerous. Nuclear weapons are not war-fighting weapons. Once the nuclear threshold had been crossed the dynamics of escalation would inexorably propel events towards catastrophe. Doctrines and strategies of limited nuclear war thus carry dangerous connotations. Their acceptance would diminish the fears and perceived risks of nuclear war and blur the distinction between nuclear and "conventional" armed conflict, thus lowering the nuclear threshold.

Even if it is understood that nuclear war cannot be controlled, nations would feel compelled to attempt to limit war should it begin. Paradoxically, preparations for such contingencies, manifested in the acquisition of certain weapons and control systems, can be dangerous to the extent that they may be interpreted as suggesting the possibility of fighting a limited nuclear war as a matter of deliberate policy.

Deterrence cannot be made foolproof. It could collapse in many different ways: because of a technical accident, a human error or miscalculation, the snowballing effect of a local conflict, among others. Nations must guard against these possibilities through cooperative agreements for emergency communications. But they also must abandon doctrines and preparations for fighting limited nuclear war as a matter of deliberate policy.

Nuclear deterrence cannot provide the long-term basis for peace, stability, and equity in international society. It must be replaced by the concept of common security.

The conclusion is therefore inevitably that nuclear weapons must be eliminated. We are fully aware, however, that this can only be achieved through a gradual process which must be initiated by concrete steps.

1.1 Reductions and qualitative limitations of nuclear forces

Nuclear weapons are part of the established reality. The nuclear arms race continues. In a very real sense a nuclear shadow hangs over all political and armed conflicts in the contemporary age. Most disturbing is the development and deployment of weapons which may lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold with the attendant increased risk of nuclear war. The greatest danger would be for people anywhere to become so used to an open-ended nuclear arms race that they become complacent about the danger involved, or lose faith in their capacity to turn the tide. But nations are not condemned to live by the ugly dictates of nuclear weapons. They have the choice and indeed the responsibility to curb and eliminate the horrendous forces of destruction which nuclear weapons represent.

We believe that there is an urgent need for agreements specifying major reductions of nuclear weapons and restraints on their qualitative improvements, with a view to maintaining parity at the lowest possible level of forces. Stabilizing the nuclear arms race in this way could create a basis for further steps in the direction of stopping the production of nuclear weapons and reaching agreement on their eventual elimination. There is a need to create a downward momentum. Nations cannot confine their efforts to managing the existing high levels of armaments. Major reductions and constraints on qualitative "improvements" must be a dominant theme in future negotiations and agreements.

1.2 Reductions and qualitative limitations in US and USSR strategic forces

Nuclear deterrence can be but a temporary expedient. It provides no permanent solution to international security. The consequences of failure are too terrifying to leave the system unchanged. The world must break with a system which equates the maintenance of peace with holding millions of human beings and the fruits of their labour as hostages for the good behavior of the governments of the nuclear weapon states.

The process of strategic arms limitation therefore is indispensable. It is important, too, because it has become a key factor in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, affecting the very framework and climate of international relations. The 1972 and 1979 SALT agreements constitute an important beginning; they must be preserved and the process continued to provide a downward spiral in nuclear arms. [2]

Negotiations must be resumed without precondition and further delay. The objective of the negotiations must be twofold: *First, the parties should reaffirm the important limitations and restraints that the SALT II Treaty provides, and agree on any necessary clarifications or adjustments of the Treaty in that connection. Second, the parties should seek a follow-on treaty providing for major reductions and qualitative limitations resulting in essential parity at substantially lower and more stable levels of forces. Particular emphasis should be accorded to reductions and qualitative limitations that would reduce fears of a "first strike", an attempt to disarm an opponent or to forestall a possible attack by a preemptive surprise attack. Any new agreement should also contain provisions necessary to assure adequate verification of these reductions and qualitative limitations, and should prohibit deployment of weapon systems which would circumvent agreed limitations and reductions or render verification impossible.*

Successive agreements should point to the eventual elimination of strategic nuclear arms through interim stages that restrict the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states to small, secure strategic forces in consonance with the principle of equal security.

1.3 The anti-ballistic missile treaty must be upheld

The 1972 Treaty Limiting Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is an important agreement designed to lessen the chance of nuclear war and to constrain the strategic arms race from escalating into broader dimensions. It does not suggest that international peace and security should be based on the ability of the great powers to inflict unacceptable destruction on each other. It does reflect the fact that for the foreseeable future there are no effective means of defending against ballistic missiles. States must coexist, therefore, in a condition of mutual vulnerability, making the pursuit of common security a matter of survival for humanity.

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[2] The SALT agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is a substantial and necessary building block in a viable system of common security. Abrogation of the Treaty would undermine the whole strategic arms limitation and reduction process. *The failure to uphold the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could lead to a destabilization of the international situation and a greater risk of nuclear war. We urge that the treaty be upheld.*

1.4 Parity in conventional forces in Europe should be established at lower levels

The major military confrontation between East and West is in Europe and takes place between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The concentration of military power assembled in Europe is the greatest in history. The Commission recognizes the complex interrelationships which exist among the various elements of the armed forces on both sides, nuclear and conventional, as well as between the force postures of the two alliances. A fair appraisal of the East-West balance of forces on the continent of Europe is extremely complicated. So many aspects of economy, geography, technology, traditions, military organization, and threat perceptions are involved. A comprehensive approach to arms limitation and reductions must be adopted in order to assure approximate military parity at substantially reduced levels and to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

We are convinced that a large-scale conventional war in densely populated Europe would be enormously destructive and in all likelihood would escalate to the nuclear level. It would affect not only the nuclear weapon states or allied states, but also neutral and non-aligned countries. War is not an acceptable option for the resolution of political conflict in the nuclear age. *The armies which are poised against each other in Europe today are much larger than would be necessitated by realistic appraisals of basic security needs. Common security would be enhanced by drastic mutual reductions.*

Since 1973 the two alliances in Europe have been negotiating in Vienna about an agreement on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. They have reached consensus on most of the basic principles that would govern an agreement. It would provide for reductions in two phases leading to equal collective ceilings of 900,000 men, a subceiling of 700,000 for land-force personnel in the reduction area, and associated measures designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the agreement and to enhance both sides' confidence. The parties have still to agree on what is the number of troops in the reduction area at the present time, the details of the linkage between the two phases of reductions, and the scope of the associated measures. The Commission considers that the outstanding differences could be resolved satisfactorily provided there were the political will to do so. Continued stalemate will seriously diminish public confidence in negotiations for arms reductions. *We urge that the participating states convene* *a meeting of Foreign Ministers to resolve the differences and conclude an agreement before the end of 1982.*

An agreement specifying parity and reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe should be accompanied by commitments to abstain from moving arms and troops to areas where they would diminish the security of other countries in Europe. Agreement in Vienna on conventional forces in Central Europe would provide a basis for, and facilitate the negotiation of, agreements on withdrawal and reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe. A subsequent agreement on parity of conventional forces in Europe at substantially reduced levels could facilitate more far-reaching agreements on the withdrawal and reduction of nuclear weapons. Such agreements would be more likely if in the negotiations for conventional force reductions the parties were to emphasize reducing those elements of the two sides' military postures which the parties consider the most threatening.

1.5 Reducing the nuclear threat in Europe

The nuclear arsenals in Europe are awesome. Furthermore, the Commission is deeply concerned about those nuclear postures and doctrines which dangerously and erroneously suggest that it may be possible to fight and "win" a limited nuclear war. In the event of a crisis their effect could be to drive the contending forces across the threshold of a nuclear war. The Commission is convinced that there must be substantial reductions in the nuclear stockpile leading to denuclearization in Europe and eventually to a world free of nuclear weapons. A necessary precondition is a negotiated agreement on substantial mutual force reductions establishing and guaranteeing an approximate parity of conventional forces between the two major alliances.

Therefore, *the Commission supports a negotiated agreement for approximate parity in conventional forces between the two alliances. Such an agreement would facilitate reductions in nuclear weapons and a reordering of the priority now accorded to nuclear arms in military contingency planning.*

The Commission has devoted much time and effort to examining various alternative ways for bringing these changes about. [3] Among the alternatives studied was nuclear-weapon-free zones, which are dealt with in Section 5.3 concerning regional security arrangements. It should be remembered in this connection that some countries in Europe do not belong to any of the military alliances and have renounced the acquisition of nuclear arms.

Here we propose a functional approach concentrating on specific weapons and classes of weapon. *Our proposal for the gradual removal of the nuclear threat posed to Europe includes establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone and measures to strengthen the nuclear threshold and reduce pressures for the*

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[3] See Annexe Two: Comment by Egon Bahr. [Footnote in original. The Annexes are not printed here.]

early use of nuclear weapons, and substantial reductions in all categories of intermediate-(medium-) and shorter-range nuclear weapons which threaten Europe.

(a) A battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. We call special attention to the dangers posed by those nuclear weapons whose delivery systems are deployed in considerable numbers to forward positions in Europe. These are known as "battlefield" nuclear weapons. A large portion of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's nuclear munitions in Europe are of this type. The weapons are designed and deployed to provide support to ground forces in direct contact with the forces of the opponent. Their delivery systems have ranges up to 150 kilometres, and are primarily short-range rockets, mines, and artillery. Most of the delivery systems are dual-capable, i.e. they can fire either conventional munitions or nuclear munitions.

Because of their deployment in forward areas battlefield nuclear weapons run the risk of being overrun early in an armed conflict. Maintaining command and control over such weapons in "the fog of war" would be difficult. Pressures for delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to local commanders and for their early use would be strong. The danger of crossing the nuclear threshold and of furthe escalation could become acute. It should be remembered in this connection that the areas close to the East-West border in Central Europ are densely populated and contain large industrial concentrations.

The Commission recommends the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-fre zone, starting with Central Europe and extending ultimately from the northern to th southern flanks of the two alliances. This scheme would be implemented i the context of an agreement on parity and mutual force reductions i Central Europe. No nuclear munitions would be permitted in th zone.[4] Storage sites for nuclear munitions also would be prohibite Manoeuvres simulating nuclear operations would not be allowed i the zone. Preparations for the emplacement of atomic demolition munitions and storage of such weapons would be prohibited.

There also should be rules governing the presence in the zone o artillery and short-range missiles that could be adapted for both nuclear and conventional use. The geographic definition of the zone shoul be determined through negotiations, taking into account the relevan circumstances in the areas involved, but for illustrative purposes, width of 150 kilometres on both sides may be suggested. Provision for verifying compliance with these prohibitions would be negotiate They would have to include a limited number of on-site inspections i the zone on a challenge basis.

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[4] Georgi Arbatov expressed doubts about the arms control value of this proposal nuclear munitions could be quickly reintroduced into the proscribed area. Such agreement which is of small military significance would be difficult to negotiate, and cou create an unfounded impression of enhanced security. In his opinion, other more effecti measures are needed—radical reductions up to a complete ban of all medium-range a tactical nuclear weapons. This would amount to a genuine zero-option for Europ [Footnote in original.]


Initial battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe
kilometres
0
200
400
600
800
Illustrative battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone
ATLANTIC OCEAN
UNITED KINGDOM
EIRE
NORTH SEA
NORWAY
SWEDEN
DENMARK
HOLLAND
BELGIUM
LUX
FRANCE
SPAIN
F.R. GERMANY
GERMAN D.R.
150 km
150 km
150 km
150 km
150 km
150 km
POLAND
U.S.S.R.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
ALBANIA
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
BLACK SEA

The Commission recognizes that nuclear munitions may be brought back to the forward areas in wartime, and that nuclear weapons may be delivered by aircraft and other longer range systems. However, we consider the establishment of the proposed zone an important confidence-building measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce some of the pressures for early use of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with our rejection of limited nuclear war as a matter of deliberate policy.

The agreement for withdrawal of "battlefield" nuclear weapons from the forward zone should be followed by substantial reductions in the number of nuclear munitions in Europe with adequate measures of verification.

(b) Maintain a clear nuclear threshold. To contain and reduce the danger of nuclear confrontation in Europe it is important to maintain a clear distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. We urge the nuclear weapon states to abstain from deploying weapons which blur the distinction by appearing to be more "usable". The so-called "mini-nukes" and enhanced radiation (neutron) weapons both fall into this category. [5]

(c) Reduction of intermediate- (medium-) range nuclear weapon systems. Th Commission welcomes the opening of negotiations between the United States and th Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and urges the parties to give th search for agreement the highest priority. The competitive deployment o these weapons constitutes a serious blow to political and militar stability between East and West, particularly in Europe. *Negotiation should reduce the number of all such weapons to essential parity at the lowest possibl level, preferably at a level which would mean that NATO would forgo the introdu tion of a new generation of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Furthermore, w* call on the parties also to *agree to a ban on deployment of new short-rang nuclear weapon systems to areas from which they could threaten the same targe which are threatened by intermediate- (medium-) range nuclear weapons.*

In addition to an accord on intermediate-range nuclear weapons i Europe the parties should commit themselves to continue negotiation to limit all other nuclear forces which threaten Europe, including se based cruise missiles. All nuclear weapons which are deployed in against Europe, including French and British forces, should be take into consideration. [6]

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[5] Robert Ford, David Owen, and Cyrus Vance comment as follows on the Comm sion's recommendations on enhanced radiation weapons: We do not advocate the ployment of such weapons at this time. We consider, however, that both in th asserted benefits for military effectiveness and in their alleged adverse impact on risk of nuclear war, any incremental effects of enhanced radiation weapons are relativ minor as compared to the basic problems raised by any nuclear weapon. A decision initiate nuclear war, the most momentous decision any political leader would e confront, would not be made more easily or more quickly because enhanced radiat weapons, rather than nuclear weapons of older design, were available for use. [Footn in original.]

[6] Joop den Uyl endorses the proposal of the Commission for the gradual removal the nuclear threat to Europe. He maintains his conviction that an overall balance nuclear arms does not require precise parity of nuclear weapons on every level and every class of weapon. He reaffirms his opposition to the stationing of new nuc weapon systems in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. [Footnote in original.]

1.6 A chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe

The world may be on the brink of a major new arms race in chemical weaponry. The Commission considers chemical weapons particularly abhorrent, and condemns any use of such inhumane weapons.

Chemical weapons (including contact gasses and nerve agents) fall between, and share some of the characteristics of, both conventional and nuclear warfare. They may be dispensed from munitions adaptable to most types of conventional weapon system. They have indiscriminate and unpredictable effects due to weather. Some can persist, poisoning the environment for a long time. It has been estimated that if chemical weapons were used in densely populated Europe, the ratio of non-combatant to combatant casualties could be as high as twenty to one. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons would blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. This would increase the danger of one sliding into the other.

Chemical weapon stockpiles include both bulk storage containers for chemical agents from which munitions can be charged, and such munitions as artillery shells, rocket warheads, aerial bombs, and mines already loaded with chemical agents. Since they are highly toxic, special safety precautions are needed during storage and handling. This is why it is generally assumed that chemical weapons are stored in a small number of central depots in Europe. Information about the possible distribution of chemical weapons to troops in the field is both uncertain and contradictory. The development of so-called "binary" munitions, however, could facilitate their distribution. These munitions are filled with two less toxic chemicals which are combined to create a lethal nerve gas only after the munition has been fired.

The Commission calls for the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, beginning with Central Europe. The agreement would include a declaration of the whereabouts of existing depots and stockpiles in Europe, adequate means to verify their destruction, and procedures for monitoring compliance on a continuing basis, including a few on-site inspections on a challenge basis. The training of troops in the offensive use of chemical weapons also would be prohibited.

1.7 Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe

The Commission considers the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [7] and the follow-up process important to the evolution of the security arrangements in Europe. It points beyond confrontation to cooperation and the pursuit of common security. A system of confidence-building measures relating to military manoeuvres has been instituted and adhered to by the participating states. In the follow-up meeting in Madrid, which will reconvene in November 1982, the participating states are negotiating the mandate for a Conference on Disarmament and Confidence and

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[7] The arms control portions are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

Security Building Measures. *The first phase would be devoted to negotiating agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures which would apply to all of Europe, contribute to military security, be verifiable, and constitute a binding and lasting commitment. The Commission considers this effort an important contribution to the growth of a system and practice of common security in Europe. The second phase should comprise negotiations for substantial disarmament in Europe.*

2 CURBING THE QUALITATIVE ARMS COMPETITION

Competitions in armaments focus as much on the characteristics of the weapons being acquired as on their number. Contrary to the principles of common security, states have sought to guarantee their survival and enhance their influence by developing or purchasing weapons that are more effective and lethal. The nuclear-weapon states continue to develop new kinds of nuclear weapons and new means of delivering them. They are searching for new means of warfare in space and other frontiers of human exploration. At the same time, a growing number of other states are increasing their potential to develop nuclear weapons at some future time.

All these developments aggravate existing political tensions among nations and make more difficult the avoidance and resolution of conflicts. The appearance of new types of military capabilities, no less than the appearance of greater numbers of weapons, can contribute to regional instability, raise fears of war and suspicion of hostile intentions. If nations are to live in common security, qualitative aspects of the arms race, like its quantitative features, must be constrained.

Advances in military capabilities begin in the human mind, proceed in different strands in numerous offices and laboratories. Only when they are near completion do they coalesce in the concrete form of a new weapon. New applications of technology can sometimes be stabilizing, but more often they generate new instabilities and competitions. Large research and development establishments represent vested interests which generate pressures for further research and increased effort.

It is difficult to identify points in the process of military research and development at which nations could agree to exercise restraint and at which compliance with such agreements could be verified. The notable exception is the point at which prototypes of weapons are tested in the field. The possibility of restricting the development of new or improved weapon systems at this critical point should be utilized on a much more extensive scale. Indeed, agreements already have been reached which restrict qualitative aspects of arms competitions at the testing stage; the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty,[8] the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty,[9] the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the 1979 SALT II Treaty.

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[8] The text of the Partial Test Ban Treaty may be found *ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[9] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227.

Moreover, just as in the case of quantitative limitations, nations are unlikely to be willing to exercise unreciprocated unilateral restraint for substantial periods. *The major nuclear-weapon states have a special responsibility, but all nations must seek qualitative restraints. Steps have to be taken in common by nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states, by arms exporters and arms purchasers, by East and West, by great powers and small states.*

2.1 A comprehensive test ban treaty

The conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests would make the introduction of new weapon designs into the armories of the nuclear-weapon states much more difficult. It would be a major constraint on the qualitative development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons. It also could be an important contribution to limiting the improvement of the present stocks of nuclear weapons. Hence it would enhance the acceptability and credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which works to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Commission considers that efforts should be concentrated on the negotiation of a treaty banning all nuclear tests. Such a treaty is needed in order to forestall a new round of nuclear weapon developments which could exacerbate East-West relations, reduce stability, and weaken the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[10]

The Commission welcomes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament in April 1982 to establish an *ad hoc* working group on a nuclear test ban. The Commission trusts that it will soon be possible to negotiate and conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which for more than a quarter of a century has been awaited in vain by peoples the world over.

In further support thereof, we urge that the trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom on a comprehensive test ban be resumed immediately in order to settle the still unresolved issues, including the question of verification. Political will is needed in order to transcend the remaining obstacles. The Commission is of the view that it is possible to establish an effective system of verification and confidence building by arrangements involving the International Seismic Data Exchange, agreed procedures for consultation and on-site inspection, and a network of national seismic stations.

During the period between completion of negotiations and formal ratification of the test ban treaty, all the nuclear powers should participate in a voluntary moratorium on all nuclear tests.

2.2 A ban on anti-satellite systems

Outer space has become an important part of the military competition between East and West. The military machines of the major powers have become increasingly dependent on space-based support. Satellite systems have opened up a wide range of possibilities for verification and warning, for command, control, and communications. If these satellites were threatened, it could result in a substantial expansion of the strategic arms race into outer space, as each side sought to protect its own system.

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[10] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

Between 1977 and 1979 the Soviet Union and the United States discussed a ban on anti-satellite weapons. Time is running out. *The Commission recommends that these negotiations be reopened and that priority be given to a suspension and prohibition of the testing of anti-satellite weapons. It is essential that such a ban go into effect before irreversible technological "progress" has been made. Negotiations also should aim at reaching agreement that would ban the deployment of anti-satellite weapons and require the dismantling of existing systems.*

Further bans on weapons and activities in outer space will undoubtedly be needed. The exploitation of outer space raises a number of complex technical questions and judgements. *The Commission urges the major industrial powers to develop a dialogue with the aim of identifying and preventing military uses of outer space that might constitute threats to international peace and security. This dialogue should lead to negotiated bans and limits on specific weapon systems or entire areas of activity.*

2.3 A chemical weapon disarmament treaty

The existing chemical and biological arms control and disarmament agreements are among the few safeguards against the dangers of an expanded arms race. Use in war of both chemical and biological weapons is prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol[11] and its associated body of customary international law. Possession of biological weapons, including toxin weapons, is outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.[12] But the possession of chemical weapons is not prohibited and a number of states have reserved the right to use them if they are attacked with chemical weapons. The majority of states are parties to these agreements and have under the 1975 Convention committed themselves to continue negotiations "in good faith" to prohibit possession of chemical weapons.

Since the First World War, chemical weapons have only been used in conflicts in the developing world. All reports of alleged use also are limited to Third World countries. Thus a new arms race in chemical weapons poses worldwide dangers, in particular for the developing world.

Pressures to build up stocks of chemical weapons are in danger of subverting the existing accords. *It is vital to accelerate negotiations aimed at extending and strengthening existing agreements by the introduction of a comprehensive chemical weapon disarmament treaty banning such weapons altogether.* This requires resumption of the stalled bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. When these negotiations last were convened, in July 1980, there was agreement in principle on the use of on-site inspection as a verification technique. Bilateral talks do not, of course, substitute for renewed efforts within the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate agreement on a comprehensive chemical weapon disarmament treaty, but would strengthen those efforts.

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[11] *Ibid., 1969,* pp. 764–765.
[12] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.

The negotiations involve complex technical matters and sensitive political issues and will require time to conclude successfully. Therefore *we call in addition for agreement on consultative procedures so that problems arising under the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Warfare Convention can be resolved through international cooperation. Such procedures could include the option of consultative meetings being convened at the expert level under the auspices of the United Nations that would be open to all states.*

A chemical weapon disarmament treaty should contain provisions for a permanent consultative commission composed of all the parties to the treaty and served by a small technical staff. The commission should ensure implementation of the treaty and thereafter monitor continued compliance. It could also be charged with the establishment of an effective complaint procedure.

Appropriate verification must be agreed for each stage of implementation of a treaty on chemical weapon disarmament. Both the declaration and destruction of stockpiles and production facilities and subsequent monitoring of compliance with provisions for non-production of chemical weapons must be verified under adequate international control. Verification measures should include a combination of voluntary confidence-building measures, national verification measures, and agreed international means.

Developing countries have a special interest in ensuring compliance with a treaty banning stockpiles and production of chemical weapons. Since very few developing states have the technology to develop adequate national means of verification, international means are necessary also in order to protect their interest.

Over the past fifteen years scientific understanding of the molecular and cellular processes of life has grown enormously. So far there is no evidence of military exploitation of this knowledge. Should the biological sciences be tapped for military purposes, however, hideous new weapons could emerge. Our well-being and economic and social development could be drastically retarded. *The Commission calls for an international convention which would prohibit any secret development or experimentation in the military applications of molecular biology and its associated disciplines.*

2.4 Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty [13]

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is a critical element in any international effort to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. Progress in this direction demands obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

The problem of proliferation has fallen into two sections, popularly termed "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation. Vertical proliferation refers to the growth of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons held by existing nuclear-weapon states. Horizontal proliferation refers to the spreading of nuclear weaponry to new countries. Efforts to stop both kinds of proliferation resulted in the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, which committed non-nuclear-weapon states to refrain from acquiring such weapons and the nuclear-weapon states to halting and reversing their processes of qualitative and quantitative growth of nuclear weapons.

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[13] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the centerpiece of the widespread international interest in maintaining the presumption against proliferation. One hundred and eighteen states are now parties to the treaty. However, France and China, which are nuclear-weapon states, as well as a number of important countries on the threshold of being able to build nuclear weapons, have so far failed to sign and ratify the treaty. *The Commission urges all states to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.*

Some opponents of the treaty point to its discriminatory nature, accepting nuclear weapons for those five countries which already have them but forbidding others to develop similar capabilities. But, by its very nature, non-proliferation involves a degree of discrimination. The key issue is how this fact of life is handled. The Commission recognizes that the failure of the nuclear-weapon states to make progress towards nuclear disarmament, as promised in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, affects the attitudes and commitments of others. The proposals we have made for a complete nuclear test ban, for the reduction and withdrawal of nuclear arms in Europe and in the Soviet and American stockpiles, are a reflection of our concern to strengthen the treaty's appeal. Failure to stop vertical proliferation will compromise the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

2.5 Safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle

International cooperation is needed in order to reduce the danger that the development and application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy may lead to diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. *Particularly sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle should be placed under international authority. This could include the establishment of international fuel banks, an international plutonium storage scheme, and internationally managed sites for spent fuel storage.* Regional organizations can contribute significantly to such international arrangements, which should be drawn together by the International Atomic Energy Agency through its Committee on Assurance of Supply.

Participants in the 1977–80 International Fuel Cycle Evaluation acknowledged that fuels usable in weapons require special procedures.[14] The Committee on Assurance of Supply of the International Atomic Energy Agency may be developed into a central negotiating and management forum comprising both suppliers and recipient countries.

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[14] Cf., the Report of the Technical Coordinating Committee to the Final Plenary Conference of the INFCE, *ibid., 1980*, pp. 62 ff.

Such cooperation would conform with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which underlines the need for equitable cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2.6 The need to limit conventional arms transfers

The volume of arms transfers has more than doubled during the past decade. Deliveries are now close to $30 billion per annum and orders are substantially higher. More than three quarters of all arms transfers go to the countries of the developing world.

In our view, there is an urgent need for a concerted effort to develop a fair system of guidelines and restraints covering arms exports, based on cooperation among recipient and supplier states.

Supplier states should open talks aimed at establishing criteria by which they could regulate arms transfers on an equitable basis. Restraints need to be defined in terms of quantities and qualities, geography and military circumstances. The guidelines for arms transfer should include such principles as

•No significant increase in the quantity of weapons which are transferred to a region.

•No first introduction of advanced weapon systems into a region which create new or significantly higher levels of combat capability.

•Special restrictions on the transfer of lethal weapons to warring parties, taking into account the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.

•Adherence to the implementation of UN resolutions and sanctions.

•No transfer of particularly inhumane and indiscriminate weapons.

•Special precautions to be taken when transferring weapons, such as hand-held anti-aircraft weapons, which, if they fell into the hands of individuals or sub-national groups, would be especially dangerous.

The United States and the Soviet Union held Conventional Arms Transfer talks in 1977–80. The Commission endorses the resumption of such talks which should include also France, the United Kingdom, and other major supplier states. Another need is for talks between supplier states and recipients in regions where tensions are particularly severe. There is a need for multilateral restraints.

Recipient states should similarly undertake to develop guidelines and codes of conduct designed to curb the flow of arms and avoid arms races. An important beginning was made by eight Andean states in the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 in which they pledged to "create conditions which permit effective limitation of armaments and put an end to their acquisition for offensive warlike purposes in order to dedicate all possible resources to economic and social development."[15] Regrettably, the discussion of specific restraints broke down. However, at a meeting in Mexico City in 1978, twenty Latin American and Caribbean states agreed to exchange information on weapon purchases and work towards a regime of restraints on arms transfers.[16]

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[15] The text of the declaration may be found *ibid., 1974,* pp. 819–822.

[16] *Ibid., 1978,* pp. 533–536.

Recipient states may wish to bar or limit certain types of weapon. They may consider that if those weapons were used in their part of the world they would enhance offensive capacities and introduce incentives for rapid action in a crisis. They may wish, too, to outlaw weapons which are starkly inhumane in their effects. The "rules of the game" will need to be tailored to the specific circumstances of the area in question. Regional Conferences on Security and Cooperation could discuss general principles. States which are participating in zones of peace or similar groupings could decide on more specific guidelines. The latter would have to be adhered to also by the supplier states.

3 ASSURING CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES

Adequate verification is an important part of any agreement on arms limitation or reduction. States are loath to enter into such agreements on the basis of good faith alone. The development of the so-called national technical means gave the parties to arms control agreements confidence that they could monitor compliance with the provisions of treaties adequately. Technologies used to observe and monitor military activities have advanced impressively. Military secrecy still exists, however.

Consequently, monitoring compliance with treaty proscriptions remains an issue in negotiations. There should be a close link between the scope and design of treaties and the means prescribed for their verification. There are no all-purpose forms of verification. Requirements have to be determined in each specific instance. Verification requires cooperative arrangements and, in some instances, on-site inspections.

While the purpose of verification is to provide for timely detection of any illegal, surreptitious activity, it could hopefully also lead to improved confidence among treaty parties and promote compliance with treaty norms.

3.1 Confidence-building measures relating to military expenditure, research and development

Satellites can only detect forces in being or in formation. However, it takes from seven to fifteen years for a modern weapon system to move through the various stages of research, development, testing and deployment. States hedge against the possible future results of decisions other states may have made today, assuming the worst about the decisions of the adversary. Confidence building is necessary if the spirals of suspicion and fear are to be broken.

The greater sharing of information about budgetary expenditure, for example, could enhance confidence. A standardized reporting system has been developed and tried out under the auspices of the United Nations. The 35th General Assembly of the United Nations urged all states to report information about their expenditure for military purposes in accordance with the system. *The Commission urges all states to comply with the resolution of the General Assembly.* [17]

In view of the momentum and vested interests which affect the process of military research and development, *the Commission urges the major industrial powers to conduct a dialogue about questions relating to research and development of all types of military forces.* This would provide an opportunity to voice concerns about the implications of actual and possible programmes, so that the response could be taken into account prior to national decisions about procurement and deployment. The danger of unintended destabilization and aggravated competition could thereby be reduced.

Having outlined a programme for arms control and disarmament in relation primarily to the competition and conflicts among the industrialized countries, we focus on the need to promote international security in a global context with emphasis on the developing world.

4 STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY SYSTEM

We are convinced of the need to strengthen the security role of the United Nations. A new conceptual approach must be developed in order to promote common security in the world at large.

4.1 More effective use of the Security Council and the Secretary General

Within the UN, primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the Security Council. Regrettably, states have tended only to turn to the Council as a last resort when conflict has already, or is on the verge of breaking out. If they are to be persuaded to shed this attitude, *the Security Council itself must enhance its capacity to preempt conflicts. The permanent members, in particular, should seek to foster a close understanding and collaboration among themselves and encourage a mutually supportive partnership with the Secretary General to facilitate initiatives under Article 99 of the Charter.*

Article 99 specifically authorizes the Secretary General "to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". *The Security Council should adopt an initiating resolution explicitly calling upon the Secretary General to bring to its immediate attention potential threats to the peace. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary General should report to the Council on a regular basis throughout the year. There should be a special annual "state of the international community" message to be delivered in person by the Secretary General to a meeting of the Security Council with the Foreign Ministers in attendance.* This message should be delivered at a public session so that all states become aware of the Secretary General's assessment. It should be followed by a private discussion of its implications by the Foreign Ministers of Security Council members. They should attempt to identify specific measures which the Council might take to head off possible conflicts.

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[17] Giorgi Arbatov called attention to the fact that from the Soviet point of view the whole problem is extremely complicated due to differences in military structures, salaries, prices, etc. This recommendation does not in his view provide an adequate basis for comparison and assessment. The Soviet Union consequently, together with twenty other states, abstained from voting on the resolution in question. [Footnote in original. The resolution referred to is 35/142 B of Dec. 12, 1980.]

To help assert the UN's primacy in international peace and security and to enhance the role of the Security Council we believe that it would be useful for the Council to hold occasional meetings outside UN headquarters. This would provide the opportunity for a more focused discussion and consultation on the problems of a particular region.

4.2 Collective security—a first step

A key proposal in our recommendations is the implementation of a modified version of the UN Charter's concept of collective security. Its basis would be political agreement and partnership between the permanent members of the Security Council and Third World countries. Its scope would be limited to Third World conflicts arising out of border disputes or threats to territorial integrity caused by other factors. Its purpose would be to prevent the conflicts from being settled by armed force, and not to pronounce on the substantive issues in disputes. It would be underpinned by an understanding—"concordat"—among the permanent members of the Security Council to support collective security action, at least, to the extent possible, of not voting against it. The cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council is particularly important. Their consent is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.

As distinct from peacekeeping operations, collective security procedures would have anticipatory, preventive, and enforcement elements. They would all be integrally linked, each reinforcing the other.

At the anticipatory and preventive levels three phases of UN action would be necessary:

(i) On being alerted by at least one of the disputing parties to the danger of a possible conflict, the Secretary General would constitute a *fact-finding mission* to advise him on the situation.

(ii) If circumstances warrant, and with the consent of at least one of the disputing parties, the Secretary General would seek the authorization of the Security Council to send a *military observer team* to the requesting state to assess the situation in military terms and to demonstrate the Council's serious concern.

(iii) In the light of the circumstances and the report of the military observers, the Security Council would authorize the induction of an appropriate *UN military force* at the request of one of the disputing states with a view to prevent conflict. This force would be deployed within the likely zone of hostilities, in the territory of the requesting state, thereby providing a visible deterrent to a potential aggressor.

All three phases would be covered by the political concordat among the permanent members of the Security Council whereby they would commit themselves to support particular types of collective security action, and thereby placed on an assured basis.

The introduction of substantial UN forces before the outbreak of hostilities would, in most cases, prevent violations of territory from occurring at all. Nevertheless, there could be situations where violation of territory might still take place with an attack so sudden as to preempt the possibility of effective preventive measures. In such circumstances limited enforcement measures would become necessary. The first objective would be to establish a negotiated ceasefire. The Council would call on the warring parties to cease hostilities and notify them of the dispatch of collective security forces to establish and maintain an effective ceasefire. The parties would be asked to cooperate fully in the achievement of this objective, it being clearly understood that UN forces would have the right of self-defence if attacked by either of the two warring parties.

Full-scale collective security enforcement action would, of course, imply restoration of the *status quo ante* through military means. This is the ultimate deterrent enshrined in Chapter VII of the Charter. Although not realizable in the immediate future, it must remain a goal towards which the international community works.

For the present, other means could be used to ensure that aggression does not prevail. The introduction of a ceasefire should be accompanied by an appeal by the Security Council to the aggressor state to withdraw its troops to its original borders. In the event of a refusal to comply, the Council would immediately consider ways of enforcing its will through the other provisions of Chapter VII, including the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions.

4.3 Process of implementation

We identify the following key components for implementing our approach to collective security:

(i) *Third World support*

The Non-Aligned Movement has long been an advocate of a strengthened UN role in international security. Its support would be critical in facilitating the proposed concordat among the permanent members of the Security Council.

(ii) *A political concordat among the veto powers*

The scope of this concordat would be limited, in both procedural and operational terms. The permanent members of the Security Council would be committed to supporting collective security action in the manner described, and, at least to the extent possible, to not vote against it.

(iii) *An operational structure for UN standby forces*

Article 43 envisages agreements between the UN and member governments on the provision of military standby forces. The Military Staff Committee should be reactivated and strengthened for this purpose. Furthermore, the respective roles of the Secretary General and the Military Staff Committee would need to be carefully considered so as to ensure that enforcement action by the UN is not allowed to become, or perceived by Third World countries to be, a vehicle for great power interference. Standby forces should not be recruited exclusively or overwhelmingly from the forces of the permanent members of the Security Council. We consider it particularly important that a greater number of Third World countries should become potential contributors of standby forces. This objective could be accomplished most readily on a regional basis. Where states of the region deem it suitable, regional or sub-regional cooperation for the establishment, equipping and training of standby forces along the lines that have already been successfully developed by the Nordic states should be actively encouraged.

The presence of standby forces in a particular region where it was thought that enforcement action might be required would mean that they could be rapidly deployed to the scene of the conflict, either to be stationed on the border as a deterrent to aggression or to establish a ceasefire as soon as possible after a violation of territory has taken place. In the case of Africa, arrangements establishing standby forces within the region, moreover, would provide the necessary military infrastructure to enable the Organization of African Unity to effectively contribute to peacekeeping operations which it may have itself initiated, even though the necessary funding and specialized technical support might still have to be provided under UN auspices.

Specifically, in connection with the proposal for establishing a UN collective security system, we envisage that regional organizations could play a vital role in alerting the Security Council and the UN Secretary General to the danger of an imminent threat to the peace and in supplementing UN efforts to maintain peace.

4.4 *Improved capability for peacekeeping*

Since our proposal on collective security will not apply to all conflict situations, there will be continuing need for UN peacekeeping operations. We recommend that a small complement of professional military personnel be included in the staff of the Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs who is responsible to the Secretary General for the coordination and management of all peacekeeping operations.

Participation in peacekeeping operations is not compulsory but voluntary and only a small number of countries have responded to the UN's call in the past. *We believe steps should be taken to encourage wider participation in peacekeeping through:*

(a) *A General Assembly resolution requesting states to incorporate training for peacekeeping as part of their armies' basic training course, assisted by a standard training manual issued by the UN Secretariat.*

(b) *A joint undertaking between states with experience in peacekeeping and an appropriate UN agency to assist in the training and equipping of troops from Third World countries.*

(c) *Regional arrangements to promote units for peacekeeping duties on a standby basis.*

(d) *The stockpiling of certain types of equipment and supplies which are always necessary. This would improve the capacity of the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations at short notice. The major powers should be asked to contribute transportation aircraft and special units for logistic and signals support; other states should be asked to earmark units for medical services, including field hospitals. Contribution of special units would also improve capabilities for disaster relief operations.*

The UN also must be prepared to respond to new kinds of challenges to international peace and security. For example, the emergence of extensive piracy in the areas off South East Asia might suggest the creation of a small UN naval patrol force based on the voluntary assignment of naval vessels and crews to UN duty by member states, and the consent of the littoral states.

4.5 An appropriate funding mechanism with built-in automaticity

The UN has experienced great difficulty in eliciting the financial contributions necessary to pay for peacekeeping operations from some member states, including one or two members of the Security Council. We believe that collective security operations and, for other purposes, peacekeeping ones as well, need to be financed through an independent source of revenue.

We underline the importance of adopting a means of automatic financing that spreads the burden widely and fairly throughout the international community. All will benefit, all should contribute.

Pending agreement on automatic funding from an independent source of revenue, we recommend that the General Assembly should agree on a specified percentage surcharge to be added to the assessed contributions of all member countries to the regular budget. These moneys would be placed in a special reserve fund earmarked for implementing all aspects of collective security operations. Current peacekeeping operations, too, would benefit from a similar approach.

5 REGIONAL APPROACHES TO SECURITY

The Commission's recommendations for strengthening the UN's security system stem from the conviction that there is no alternative to preserving and enhancing the primacy of its role in maintaining international peace. Although Third World countries in recent years have increasingly sought to handle their own conflicts outside the UN, in many of the conflicts neighbouring countries take opposing sides. This demonstrates that a regional approach can often prove inadequate or counter-productive. There are some situations in which a regional forum could provide a more appropriate framework than the UN for arriving at a political settlement, but even in such cases financial and operational limitations at the regional level sometimes work against effective security solutions.

Regional approaches should, therefore, be viewed not as substitutes for UN action, but as a means of complementing and strengthening it. There is a need to develop an operational connection between regional security initiatives and the UN security system. This kind of link, moreover, would be fully in accord with Chapter VIII of the Charter which explicitly anticipates that regions might wish to establish their own arrangements for dealing with matters relating to international peace and security. It makes only two provisos: that these arrangements and bodies must be "consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations", and that "the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security".

There is a great unexplored potential at the regional level not only to meet and resolve actual conflict situations as they arise, but also to promote a general sense of security through cooperative measures with the aim of facilitating disarmament, encouraging policies of mutual restraint and improving the economic welfare of member states. In making the recommendations set out below, however, the Commission has been conscious that the various regions and sub-regions differ widely in respect both of indigenous rivalries and the degree of involvement by the major powers. We fully appreciate that any initiative for regional cooperation will require regional consensus, but we are convinced that consensus can in turn be consolidated and expanded through cooperation.

5.1 Regional conferences on security and cooperation

The Commission recommends that the countries making up the various regions, and in some instances sub-regions, of the Third World consider the convocation of periodic or ad hoc Regional Conferences on Security and Cooperation similar to the one launched in Helsinki for Europe in 1975. Regional Conferences on Security and Cooperation could add new substance to the concept of common security. The priorities must be developed by the countries concerned and reflect the circumstances in the individual regions both with respect to agenda and participation. The Secretary General of the United Nations should be invited to participate.

It is envisaged that the Regional Conferences could provide an overall framework for cooperation not only on matters directly relating to security, but in the economic, social, and cultural spheres as well.

In the area of security, the Conferences could consider such matters as adoption of codes of conduct and confidence-building measures, establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and agreements on arms limitations and reductions. Subsidiary bodies could be set up to deal with aspects of implementing the Conferences' decisions or to carry out any further studies that might be required. Depending on the character of their membership, Regional Conferences might consider it useful, for instance, to establish a Boundaries Commission to investigate and make recommendations on solutions for border disputes or a similar body to look into difficulties arising from the demarcation of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Regional study institutes could be created to analyse security issues of direct relevance to the particular region and to formulate recommendations for the consideration of the Conference; such institutes should be funded by governments and possibly receive a financial input from the UN as well, but should be allowed to operate independently of government direction.

The Regional Conferences would also be the appropriate bodies for launching any regional peacekeeping or peacemaking initiative to meet a given crisis situation. It would, however, be essential for them to keep the Security Council fully informed about any specific security arrangements contemplated. We further recommend that general working procedures for tying regional security arrangements into the UN security system should be formulated. These should preferably be established soon after the Regional Conference is constituted so as to create a standby operational framework for activating cooperation with the UN to cope with conflict situations when it is needed.

In our opinion, the concept of regional security will be unlikely to take root unless it is sustained by programmes for economic cooperation to encourage countries to see themselves as having a national stake in actively working to achieve regional harmony. An important focus of the Regional Conferences must therefore be the establishment of joint projects that are designed to benefit all participating states. The UN's regional economic commissions could have an important part to play in this connection—the Economic Commission for Europe, for example, has performed a valuable function in assisting the development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Involvement of these Commissions would moreover ensure a UN contribution of funds and technical assistance for security-building through economic cooperation. This would provide an effective infrastructure for the link between regional security initiatives and the UN security system.

The Regional Conferences could also consider schemes for regional cooperation on the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy in a manner which would strengthen an equitable non-proliferation regime. Regional cooperation could comprise regional fuel banks, plutonium storage schemes and arrangements for spent fuel management. It could provide structure and substance to general international projects which should be drawn together by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

5.2 *Zones of peace*

The creation of zones of peace has been proposed most notably for the Indian Ocean and South East Asian areas.[18] Within the zone, peace should be maintained by the countries themselves through the peaceful resolution of disputes in a context of political and economic cooperation, as well as mutual military restraint. An essential factor in ensuring its viability, however, is agreement by outside powers to respect its purposes and specific provisions.

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[18] See *Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,* New York, United Nations, 1972, A/RES/S–1012 pp. 14–15; and *Study on All the Aspects of Regional Disarmament,* New York, United Nations, 1981, A/35/416 pp. 15–19. [Footnote in original. The Final Document may also be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411 ff.]

Zones of peace would be a flexible mechanism for developing cooperation at the sub-regional level, while the proposed Regional Conferences on Security and Cooperation could provide a general framework for considering objectives and experiences of the different zones within their region and for establishing links between them. States within the zones could cooperate on developing a code of conduct and confidence-building measures as well as on an agreement to limit arms competition. Some important suggestions along these lines were put forward by the President of Mexico in February 1982 as part of a proposal to further a relaxation of tensions in Central America. The main elements encompass renunciation of all threats or use of force, balanced reduction of military troops in the area, and a system of non-aggression pacts.

It is important to note that the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 on the establishment of South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality was issued by a grouping of countries which had already put significant emphasis on economic, social and cultural co-operation and had formed themselves into the Association of South East Asian Nations to further this objective. Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States started its existence in 1975 as a purely economic grouping and in 1981 its sixteen West African member states adopted a Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters. The Gulf Cooperation Council, established in 1981 with the ultimate aim of achieving unity of their six member countries, has likewise stressed the need to build "coordination, integration and cooperation in all fields".

The Commission considers that the concept of zones of peace could be an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Political difficulties that might seem to militate against [this] *realization in the immediate future should not, in our view, inhibit groups of countries from continuing their work towards the establishment of such zones as a long-term objective.*

5.3 Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The Commission believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region or sub-region concerned, constitutes an important step towards non-proliferation, common security and disarmament. They could provide mutual reassurance to states preferring not to acquire or allow deployment of nuclear weapons as long as neighbouring states exercise similar restraint. This would improve the chances for the region not to become enveloped in the competition of the nuclear-weapon states. The nuclear-weapon states would have to undertake a binding commitment to respect the status of the zone, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states of the zone.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, is a path-breaking regional arrangement in this field.[19] A party to it is not bound, though, until all the signatories have completed ratification, unless it waives this condition. Brazil and Chile have not done so. At present the treaty is in force for twenty-two Latin American states. Argentina has signed but not ratified the treaty. Cuba has neither signed nor ratified. The Commission strongly urges all states concerned to adopt all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the treaty.

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[19] The text of the treaty and its protocols may be found *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Proposals for creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the South Pacific, South Asia and the Middle East have been put forward in the United Nations and have received support in the General Assembly. The process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

Should it prove impossible to agree on legally defined nuclear-weapon-free zones, states could, as an interim measure, pledge themselves not to become the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. The nuclear-weapon states would have to guarantee the countries concerned that they would not be threatened or attacked with such weapons.

6 ECONOMIC SECURITY

The present condition of the world economy threatens the security of every country. *The Commission believes that just as countries cannot achieve security at each other's expense, so too they cannot achieve security through military strength alone.* Common security requires that people live in dignity and peace, that they have enough to eat and are able to find work and live in a world without poverty and destitution.

6.1 The costs of military spending

Military competition reduces both military and economic security. Military spending is part of the problem, not part of the solution. The human cost of military effort has long been apparent in a world where more than 1,000 million men, women and children have no chance to learn to read and write, and more than 600 million are hungry or starving.

But the economic problems of the 1970s and early 1980s make the waste of human effort even more intolerable. The presumed economic benefits of military spending are a dangerous illusion. Increased military spending would make our economic problems worse, not better. Military expenditure is likely to create less employment than other forms of public expenditure, with greater risks for inflation and for future economic growth. These dangers are exacerbated by the peculiar character of the modern military effort, with its increasing emphasis in both developed and developing countries alike on expensive, technologically sophisticated armaments. All but a very few countries now face the most troubling choices in deciding how to spend their limited government revenues—on health programmes or on improving the lives of old people, on unemployment benefits or on investment in economic growth and development, on education or on foreign aid. The costs of military spending must be counted in terms of these other opportunities forgone.

6.2 Disarmament and development

The link between disarmament and development, in the new economic context of the 1980s, is close and compelling. The "crisis" in the world economy described by the Brandt Commission in 1980 has become even more serious. The military tensions analysed in the present report have been a major contributory factor in making the crisis worse. But the process of building common security could help to resolve it. In the first place, for several developing countries, military expenditure, particularly on sophisticated imported weapons, threatens the economic development which is the only basis for lasting security. In the second place, revenues now used on the military could constitute a major source for increasing development assistance by developed and capital-surplus countries. Some governments argue that they cannot increase or even maintain their foreign aid because of competing domestic claims on government resources. These claims are real and urgent. But even a tiny share of the expenditure currently going to military purposes—about $650 billion a year—would go a long way towards resolving the Third World's pressing needs. Third, reductions in military spending would increase the prospects for resumed growth in the world economy, and thus for worldwide economic security. Developing countries need to import the goods and services that developed countries need to export. Resources saved from the military could finance this expansion. We share the view that such economic recovery is an essential investment in future security.

Limiting military competition would have immense benefits for the security of all countries; it would have economic benefits as well. Reductions in military spending will provide resources to reduce poverty and increase social well-being even in the richest military powers. They should also provide resources for development.

Schemes for linking disarmament and development will be different in different countries and regions. In countries with large military expenditures, they should take the form of releasing resources from defence budgets for foreign development assistance. The main military powers spend from four to over one hundred times as much on defence as on foreign economic aid. A ten per cent cut in procurement by the nuclear powers alone would be more than enough to double total foreign aid and other financial flows to the thirty-one least-developed countries. Such rather mechanical calculations would probably not lead to appropriate targets, although there is certainly need for international cooperation in discussing the various possibilities for verifying the switching of resources from the military to development. It might be possible, instead, to devise targets described in physical terms; countries might announce that they would use funds from their defence budgets to build a fertilizer factory, for example, or to contribute to the services of a hundred paramedical workers. It is up to the imagination of people in each country to find ways to participate in such "peace competition".

6.3 Regional conferences on disarmament and economic security

It is essential that people and governments in all regions should participate in finding new resources for development. The Commission urges that one of the first topics for the Regional Conferences described in recommendation 5.1, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, should be disarmament and economic security. *Countries should consider convening a high-level conference to discuss common problems of economic security, and their common interests in reducing the regional costs of military spending.* Such a conference could provide an opportunity to inform people and governments about the economic costs of military competition; to initiate cooperation in providing information and analysis about military spending; to initiate common efforts to achieve more security at less cost.

The Commission urges that the Regional Conferences launch major campaigns to increase public awareness of the dangers of military competition, including the dangers for economic security. Such campaigns should be an initial step in a continuing long-term public-education effort. Their cost could be met with a small fraction of one percent of regional military expenditure. The United Nations should coordinate the efforts of regional conferences and participate actively in the information campaigns.

The Commission finds it unacceptable that a substantial share of the world's scientific potential be devoted to ever more refined forms of destruction, while our countries urgently need research into preventing and curing disease, into new methods of food production, into alleviating the problems of old people, and into preserving the physical environment. The Regional Conferences should consider ways of converting to civilian uses the scientific and technical resources now consumed for military purposes: from research and development workers and facilities in developed and certain developing countries to technicians with scarce industrial skills throughout the world. The real social costs of devoting resources to military spending vary greatly in different regions, and should accordingly be discussed at a regional level. *The Regional Conferences should propose detailed programmes to use military skills for urgent civilian needs in the particular region. Such schemes should include national plans to convert specific military facilities—research establishments or other military installations—to civilian purposes.*

6.4 Common security and common prosperity

We share the conviction of the Brandt Commission that the South and the North, the East and the West have "mutual interests" in economic progress. No country can resolve its problems alone. A reduction in the present high levels of military spending would therefore be in the economic interests of all countries, even those who spend relatively little on their own military efforts.

The principle of common security asserts that countries can only find security in cooperation with their competitors, not against them.

No country can hope to win military advantage by out-running its competitor in an economically costly arms race. All countries are hurt by the economic difficulties of the major economies. Common security is not only a matter of freedom from military fear. Its objective is not only to avoid being killed in a nuclear apocalypse, or in a border dispute, or by a machine gun in one's own village. Its objective, in the end, is to live a better life: in common security and common prosperity.

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Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on the Comprehensive Program of Disarmament [Extracts], April 26, 1982 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Committee decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, [2] envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, [3] with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should continue its work during the 1981 session. [4] In its report on that session, the Working Group, bearing in mind that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues and that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Working Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. [5] The Committee on Disarmament adopted that recommendation at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981. [6] In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982. At its 150th plenary meeting on 2 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament

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[1] CD/283*, pp. 1, 6–9. The annex is not printed here.
[2] CD/PV.69, pp. 10–11.
[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 431.
[4] *Ibid., 1981*, p. 56.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 368–372.
[6] CD/PV. 148, p. 39.

confirmed that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should continue its work during the first part of the 1982 session. [7]

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. During the 1980 session, Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group; Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. Mr. Guennady Efimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group in 1980 and Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, did so in 1981 and 1982.

3. In the course of its 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group held a total of 59 meetings, 10 in 1980, 24 in 1981 and 25 in 1982.

4. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

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III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

6. In 1980, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group adopted an outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CPD/WP.2/Rev.1) consisting of the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble, Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures. [8] That outline constituted the basis for the consideration of the Programme in 1981 and 1982.

7. In 1981, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group completed a preliminary examination of the substantive chapters of the Programme. It decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the elaboration of those chapters in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. [9]

8. In 1982, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group focused on the task of elaborating the texts of the various substantive chapters of the Programme.

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[7] CD/PV. 150, p. 61.

[8] A full account of the work carried out in 1980 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1980 report (CD/139, paragraph 68). [Footnote in original.]

[9] A full account of the work carried out in 1981 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1981 report (CD/228, paragraph 127). [Footnote in original.]

9. With respect to the objectives of the Programme, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate the relevant chapter and designated Ambassador François de la Gorce (France) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted to the Working Group a text that reflected different views on some points. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted that text (CD/CPD/WP.66).

10. At its 50th meeting on 11 February 1982, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group established a contact group to elaborate the principles of the Programme and, at its 51st meeting on 15 February 1982, it designated Ambassador Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its co-ordinator. As in the case of objectives, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on all questions of substance. In addition, differing views were held regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs in the chapter on principles. The contact group agreed that questions concerning the placement of those paragraphs should be decided at a later stage in the context of the whole Programme, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group (CD/CPD/WP.65).

11. With respect to priorities, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate that chapter of the Programme and designated Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted an agreed text which was adopted by the Working Group at its 55th meeting on 1 March 1982 (CD/CPD/WP.62).

12. With respect to measures and stages of implementation which, as previously, were considered in conjunction with each other, at its 54th meeting on 25 February 1982, the Working Group established a contact group to elaborate that part of the Programme and requested the Chairman to act as co-ordinator of the contact group. The contact group prepared a text that grouped measures in a first, an intermediate and a last stage, it being understood that this was without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. An informal drafting group was convened, with Mr. Tariq Altaf (Pakistan) as co-ordinator, with a view to reconciling the alternative formulations contained in that text. The drafting group narrowed the areas of disagreement and, to the extent possible, unified and streamlined some of the alternative texts that were under discussion in the contact group. The text it elaborated was adopted by the contact group on 14 April 1982 with some changes. At its 58th meeting on 15 April 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group as orally amended at that meeting (CD/CPD/WP.71).

13. The same contact group was also charged with the task of elaborating the chapter on machinery and procedures. It submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group a text reflecting differences of view on some points. At its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982, the Working Group

adopted that text with some additions and amendments (CD/CPD/WP.68).

14. At various stages of its consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group focused attention on the question of time frames and nature of the Programme. Divergent views were advanced since the initial stage as indicated in the Working Group's report covering its 1980 session (CD/139, paragraph 68 (13) and (15)). In 1982, these two matters were examined at meetings of the Working Group and of the contact group referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 above. Concerning the question of time frames, it was generally agreed that the Programme should be implemented in the shortest possible time. Beyond that, different views continued to be maintained. On the one hand, it was again stressed that there should be a time frame for the implementation of each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole. It was felt that, otherwise, there would be no standard by which to judge whether progress was being made towards the full realization of the Programme. It was also argued that the acceptance of time frames would be a manifestation of political will to implement the measures contained in the Programme. It was further argued that the implementation of the Programme in an agreed time frame would generate the requisite confidence of the international community and have a positive influence on the climate of international relations by introducing an element of predictability in the process of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it was recognized that only an indicative time frame should be set since in the course of the implementation of the Programme changing circumstances might call for readjustments. On the other hand, it continued to be argued that it would be inappropriate to set a time frame, whether indicative or not, for the implementation of the stages included in the Programme, because the setting of such time frames was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, *a fortiori* with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. In this view, periodic reviews, envisaged as part of the machinery and procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, would give impetus for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme, provide a standard by which to assess such progress, permit its evaluation and the readjustment of the Programme, if necessary. Regarding the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, various views were advanced. One view was that the Programme should be embodied in a legally binding instrument. It was proposed that a solemn Declaration should accompany the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A concrete proposal was made that the Declaration and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should then be signed by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations, and finally noted by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under those provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. Another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should

not be embodied in a legally binding agreement since States cannot be bound to the success of negotiations before such negotiations have begun. But it was considered that a strong political undertaking by States to implement the Programme, for example, in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly, would create the necessary impetus for the completion of the implementation of the Programme at the earliest possible time. Still another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should represent an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament and should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in the disarmament field. It was noted that under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament may serve as a precedent for the adoption of the Programme. While no conclusions were reached on these two matters, it was recognized that the discussions had served to clarify the questions at issue and would thus facilitate the search for generally acceptable solutions.

15. The view was generally held that the deliberations at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will contribute to the harmonization of the divergent positions reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some delegations also felt that their final position with regard to the formulations contained in the draft Programme could only be determined in the light of the content of the Programme as a whole. Other delegations felt that the progress made in the Working Group should have a bearing on the future work, and that their final position on the entire Programme would be determined in the light of the agreement reached on the specific provisions of the Programme, the time frames and a binding commitment to the implementation of the Programme.

IV. CONCLUSION

16. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that is annexed to this report, with the recommendation that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, April 27, 1982 [1]

I. Introduction

1. Taking into consideration paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament [2] which, while noting that negotiations had been proceeding for several years stated that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament has consistently included the item "chemical weapons" on its agenda since 1979. In 1979, before the establishment of the *ad hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the item was dealt with in plenary meetings. In considering this item on its agenda, the Committee has been taking into account the provisions of existing international instruments on the subject as well as all proposals and documents, including draft texts of chemical weapons conventions and joint United States-USSR reports on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, [3] presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. A list of all the documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under the agenda item entitled "Chemical Weapons", as well as of the documents of the Working Group which included working papers and conference room papers, is contained in the annex to this report.

II. Mandate and substantive considerations of the Working Group in 1980 and 1981

2. In 1980, the Committee on Disarmament established an *ad hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the following decision:

> In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an *ad hoc* working group of the Committee to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. [4]

3. Under its 1980 mandate, the Working Group, having agreed to structure its work under the three general headings of "scope", "veri-

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[1] CD/281/Rev.1. The annex is not printed here. The report was submitted for transmittal to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* p. 425.

[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 532–536; *ibid., 1980,* pp. 285–289.

[4] CD/80.

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fication" and "other matters", undertook a substantive examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the basis of this examination, the issues on which convergence of views among participating delegations emerged and those where no convergence of views existed were ascertained.[5]

4. The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981, to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.[6]

5. In 1981, the Working Group carried out a detailed examination of draft Elements of a chemical weapons convention, as proposed by the Chairman. These draft Elements covered the following issues: general provision: general definition of chemical weapons; prohibition of transfer; declarations; destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion; super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes; relationship with other treaties; international co-operation; general provision on verification; national legislation and verification measures; national technical means of verification; consultation and co-operation; consultative committee; amendments; review conference; duration and withdrawals; signature, ratification, accession; and the distribution of the convention. The questions related to definitions and criteria, declaration of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of chemical weapons, plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes in time frames as well as forms of making such declarations were dealt with in annexes to the Elements. The same approach was suggested by the Chairman with respect to the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production, the recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system, as well as the details of the organization and procedures of the consultative committee. The Chairman revised the draft Elements on the basis of statements as well as of that of oral and written comments of delegations. These Elements, as revised by the Chairman, did not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues. The revised text of the Chairman's Elements, together with comments reflecting views put forward by delegations, were attached to the Group's 1981 report to the Committee (document CD/220).[7]

III. Present state in the elaboration of a convention

6. In 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided on the following mandate for the *ad hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons:

> . . . In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 328–334.

[6] *Ibid., 1981*, p. 56.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 368–372.

> their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an *ad hoc* working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiative with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date. . . .[8]

7. The Group, during the first part of its 1982 session, began the elaboration of the provisions of a convention. At the suggestion of the Chairman, it carried out another detailed examination of the revised Elements and of the Comments thereto, with a view to elaborating alternative and supplementary formulations in particular corresponding to the views originally expressed in the Comments. These considerations of the revised Elements were grouped under the three previously agreed headings of "scope", "verification" and "other matters". A number of delegations submitted conference room papers containing new wording corresponding to their views originally reflected in the Comments. In addition, some delegations submitted related proposals in plenary statements and CD documents. Wording was also proposed for certain Elements and Annexes which had not been dealt with during the 1981 session. The Chairman submitted a proposal for the Preamble to a future convention.

8. The process of resolving differences of views continued. There was common understanding that the scope of the prohibition should include all existing and possible types of chemical weapons. The *ad hoc* Working Group examined in greater detail the major outstanding problems of the scope of the prohibition and of questions related to verification. The main differences regarding the scope concern the inclusion of provisions in the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, provisions regarding the applicability of the convention with respect to animals and plants, whether it should include the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the purpose of utilizing the toxic properties of chemicals in combat, and provisions on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States. Questions regarding the balance between national and international verification, the appropriateness of the inclusion of a provision on the use of national technical means of verification, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and the national verification or implementation system, as well as the issues of when on-site inspection shall take place and how a prohibition of binary chemical weapons should be verified remain to be agreed upon. A better understanding was reached of the need to ensure that verification of compliance with the convention be based on an adequate combination of national and international means. Measures relating to the implementation of the convention, such as declarations, were examined in more detail. Specific proposals were also put forward by a number of delegations with a view to improving the possible structure of a future

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[8] *Ante*, Feb. 18.

convention. The revised Elements and Comments included in the 1981 report of the Working Group to the CD as well as the proposals and suggested texts submitted during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session will constitute a valuable basis for the Group's future work.

9. Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman to hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the future convention, the Chairman, at the Group's 1982 session, convened consultations on issues recommended for further examination in the Group's 1981 report. The 1982 consultations dealt specifically with methods to be agreed upon for toxicity determinations in connection with a chemical weapons convention. The Chairman reported to the Working Group that the participants in these consultations unanimously recommended standardized operating procedures for two specific types of toxicity determinations. The Working Group took note of the Chairman's report on the consultations and of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures. The Group agreed on the desirability of continuing consultations to allow for the examination of additional technical questions including some outstanding toxicological issues in relation to a chemical weapons convention.

10. The urgency of achieving real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was unanimously recognized by the Working Group especially in the light of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, the Working Group endorsed the appeal of its Chairman for even more substantive contributions to advance the process of elaborating provisions of the convention at the earliest possible date.

Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons [Extract], April 27, 1982 [1]

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III. PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT

10. In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, [2] the *Ad Hoc* Working Group was re-established to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat

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[1] CD/285*, pp. 4–7. The annexes are not printed here. The report was submitted for transmittal to the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

[2] *Ante.*

of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group held 10 meetings between 26 February and 19 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.

11. In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Working Group decided to continue its efforts on the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the previous *Ad Hoc* Working Group established during 1981 session (CD/215) which stated that: ". . . the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context, further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all, and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character." [3] The attention of the Working Group was drawn to resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-sixth session, as contained in document CD/231, and as referred to in paragraph 2 above.

12. In the conduct of its work, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group decided to concentrate, as at the previous session in 1981, on those alternatives which called for: (a) a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. The Working Group noted that three working papers were previously submitted in connection with the examination of these alternatives by the delegations of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Bulgaria, as contained in documents CD/SA/WP.6, CD/SA/WP.7 and CD/SA/WP.8, respectively.

13. Some general positions were outlined. Certain delegations, members of the Group of 21, expressed their view that the most effective assurance against the use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending this, the complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. A group of socialist States noted that the implementation of measures provided for in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe would be a reliable safeguard for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict and contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States in particular of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Different views were expressed in this connection. Other delegations maintained that these questions were outside the scope of the mandate of the Working Group.

14. During the course of deliberations, the positions and ideas relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 357–363.

weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which were put forward at the previous session, as contained in paragraph 9 above, were reaffirmed in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group by various delegations.

15. The discussion of proposals for a "common formula" focused on the substantive elements involved. Regarding the substance of a "common formula" to be elaborated, different approaches became apparent in the discussions. Under one approach, the nuclear-weapon States would provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States without any conditions, qualifications or limitations. In this connection, a working paper (CD/278*) was submitted by the delegation of China, in which China reaffirmed its position to provide unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their political will necessary to reach agreement on a "common approach" or "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Under other approaches, various criteria would be provided to describe the conditions for the inclusion of non-nuclear-weapon States in the scope of the assurances. The sponsors of documents CD/SA/WP.6 and CD/SA/WP.7, the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan, explained their suggestions for a compromise approach to a "common formula" contained in these working papers. The proposal for reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present was also underlined. Various views were expressed on these suggestions and divergent ideas continued to be maintained.

16. The question of an appropriate form was extensively considered in connection with the efforts to develop a possible "common formula". As in the previous sessions, there was again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. A view was expressed that the Working Group should proceed to the concrete elaboration of such a convention. As in previous sessions, however, it was pointed out that an agreement on the substance of the assurances could facilitate an agreement on the form.

17. The Working Group subsequently took up the idea of interim arrangements, particularly the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution. A working paper, containing a draft Security Council resolution embodying a "common formula" for security assurances (CD/SA/WP.9), was submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands. The delegation of Pakistan also submitted a revised working paper containing a draft resolution for possible adoption by the Security Council (CD/SA/WP.3/Rev.1*). A group of socialist States expressed the view that declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories, could be examined and possibly adopted in the form of an appropriate resolution by the Security Council. Different views were

expressed on these ideas and various comments were made on these proposals. On the one hand, it was held that appropriate interim arrangements would represent progress and create a favourable climate with the view to satisfying progressively the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of security assurances. On the other hand, however, the view was expressed that interim measures, particularly in the form of Security Council resolution, would have no utility and that they fell outside the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group and would merely undermine the necessary climate for elaborating credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations stressed that interim arrangements should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character. In this context, it was emphasized that, while considering alternative ways, the final aim of reaching an international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be constantly kept in mind. Any interim measure or other alternative means for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be judged against its substance and could be justified only in so far as it would constitute a step forward towards this direction.

18. Other ideas were submitted regarding action that could be taken at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on this question. It was suggested that nuclear-weapon States should appropriately revise their unilateral declarations, which could then be taken into account at the second special session. It was pointed out by some nuclear-weapon States that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of, the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

19. A statement by the Group of 21 was circulated to the Working Group, as contained in document CD/280, which *inter alia*, stated that: "The declarations (of some nuclear-weapon States) do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons". It further stated that there is every reason for the neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances to be covered by legally binding assurances and enumerated principles on the basis of which an agreement on this question should be reached. It expressed the view that "further negotiations in the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement". The Group of 21 therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned,

neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States, and which would facilitate agreement on an international instrument of a legally binding character.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. During the past three sessions, negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although the negotiations on the subject in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved, the Working Group has been unable to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

21. In the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations of the Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Weinberger Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Defense Policy and Arms Control, April 29, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, Senators, the President, as is the case with many other Presidents before him, seeks only to insure that we and our allies can pursue our goals in peace, free from intimidation, coercion, and aggression. We perhaps have somewhat different views than some as to how best to achieve those goals, but the goals remain fixed and immutable.

We found when we came in that as a result of a decade of declining defense budgets our conventional forces in Western Europe and

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[1] *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on S.J. Res. 163, 171, 177, 191; S. Res. 242, 323, 343, 370, 391; S. Ex. Res. 5, 6; and S. Con. Res. 81*, pp. 30–34.

Northeast Asia were increasingly falling behind the strength of the Soviet forces, due to the unrelenting and unremitting Soviet buildup. This has occurred over the past 21 years. We also found that the nuclear balance was beginning to tip to the advantage of the Soviet Union, and that diminished the deterrent value of our strategic nuclear forces.

When we examined our military resources, we found we lacked the requisite military capability for adequate nuclear deterrence as well as conventional defense of our vital objectives and commitments. We recognized that we had to take a more realistic view, both of the military threat confronting us, which is growing and growing every day, and of our own capability. We modified our defense policy to fit today's realities, to make it less dangerous, and to gain flexibility and to cope with the threatening and uncertain future.

For example, we abandoned reliance on the dangerous fallacy, as we saw it, of the short war, that any conventional war would necessarily be short because the aggressor would either retreat or the war would quickly escalate to nuclear level, and we tried to adopt safer policies for responding to what we felt might well be ambiguous warnings.

Apart from rectifying deficiencies in strategy, we had to face the fact that our military capabilities would become increasingly inadequate to deter aggression, and so we requested a 5-year increase in defense spending, a substantial increase, Mr. Chairman, one that we recognize as substantial, and at the same time we encouraged our allies to increase their contributions to our common defense. We feel that the security assistance programs and the network of alliances and strengthened friends is one of the best ways of providing a forward defense for ourselves and for all of our friends. In particular the collective security provided by NATO to our North Atlantic allies and to ourselves remains the centerpiece of our national security policy.

I want to emphasize that we continue to attach the greatest importance to NATO and, contrary to some totally erroneous reports that keep recurring and being published, there has been absolutely no diminution in our concern for or our interest in NATO or our feeling that it is and has to remain a critically important part of our entire defense concept.

Our administration is not placing greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, Mr. Chairman. We are in fact increasing the revitalization of our conventional capabilities. Only 15 percent of our budget is devoted to nuclear forces, and even with the strategic rearmament that we feel is essential, that percentage will actually decline. It will never be more than 15 percent.

Our conventional forces must meet both near term and future threats. For the near term we have attached very high budgetary priority to increased readiness and sustainability of what we have. We are continuing prepositioning and prestocking programs that would enhance the timeliness of any military response that we might have to make. We have also a substantial naval force expansion centered around aircraft carrier battle groups and refurbished battleships that we believe will sustain our worldwide presence while reducing the strain on deployed forces and personnel.

We have found that these things must be done, because our allies, and strategic minerals and metals that we must have, are thousands of miles from our shores.

For many years, U.S. conventional force planning and investment was directed primarily toward fighting the war in central Europe, but in light of the strength of the NATO deterrent and our answering devotion to it, we think now it would be important to assume that that might be the only place that the Soviet leaders would choose. We think that they might not choose central Europe necessarily as their primary or only battlefield. We have recognized this in recent years because the Soviet Union has been greatly increasing its ability to project its very considerable and growing military power into the Mediterranean and other vital areas such as the Persian Gulf.

So, without in any way weakening our resolve to defend the central European front, we must be prepared to meet this new dimension of the Soviet threat.

We have supported and will continue to support the NATO Alliance unswervingly. Our own salvation and that of the free world depends on it. The military threat to the alliance is greater today than at any point in its history, and so it needs more support than ever. Unfortunately, the growing nature, the growing diversity, the growing offensive character of the Soviet threat makes it essential that we also look to a number of other areas in the world. We are determined to increase our effort and to encourage our allies to increase their efforts, in NATO, in Japan, and in other parts of the world where we feel the threats may come.

We devote now a little over 5 percent of our gross national product to defense. The rest of NATO averages about 3½ percent, but we have to remember that for many years, when we are not increasing our military spending, other members of the NATO Alliance were. We also have to remember the substantial additional contributions that the NATO allies make. They maintain active forces of about 3 million in their countries, whereas our total worldwide force is about 2 million. They also contribute important infrastructure, and they have contributed a very large amount to the support of Berlin.

Lately we have heard a number of demands, Mr. Chairman, for withdrawal of our forces from Europe or elsewhere, based on some feeling that our allies are not doing enough to share the burden. We have to look at the results of such withdrawals. They would be very serious for us and very serious for the cause of freedom.

Regarding the Pacific, we have a number of fine contributions made by our ANZUS partners. The Philippines provide unhampered use of vital bases, and certainly no one could ever fault the Koreans for not doing enough in their own self-defense. Japan remains the cornerstone of our Asian security policy. They contribute about $1 billion to the cost of U.S. forces annually, and for 4 straight years they have spent over $100 million for new construction for U.S. forces.

Their self-defense forces, though deficient in sustainability, are significant in numbers, and they have adopted for themselves a policy of self-defense and a sharing of the burden with which we concur and which, of course, they will need significantly greater defense assets to realize.

Much has been said recently in public about our nuclear strategy, Mr. Chairman, and much has been said here this morning about it. I think we should again have the record clear. We have taken steps to deemphasize our reliance on nuclear weapons. We are not seeking to restore the U.S. nuclear superiority that we had in the fifties. We are not, over the years, and have not, increased the number of our nuclear weapons. In fact, we have thousands fewer nuclear weapons than we had in 1967. Deterrence remains the fundamental cornerstone of our strategic and indeed our entire national security as it has for the past 30 years.

We entertain, Mr. Chairman and Senators, no illusions about nuclear conflict. Everyone would lose in such an event. It is not a winnable war. Our purpose is to insure that the Soviets understand this point also. We have considerable worries that they are showing a number of signs that indicate they think it could be won. Our purpose is to insure, too, that we have strategic force programs that will survive, give greater stability, and provide incentives for genuine progress in arms control.

The Soviets will continue to have a substantial lead in most of the customary measures of strategic forces, total numbers of systems, total numbers of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential, but the one area in which we still retain some advantage is total numbers of deliverable warheads, largely due to decisions made many years ago to deploy a large number of small SLBM [Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile] [2] warheads and bomber weapons.

The Soviets may equal or surpass us in these areas, too, because they are continuing a very rapid expansion of their strategic nuclear arsenal. The fact is that while we have virtually stood still over the years, the Soviet Union has pursued a dramatic and an unprecedented expansion of their strategic forces beyond any legitimate security needs, and these forces [are] all primarily offensive in character. If this trend is not reversed, it will lead to a marked Soviet strategic advantage that will seriously undermine the credibility of our deterrence in the mideighties.

With respect to arms control, as you all know, President Reagan wants genuine arms reductions, that is to say, real reductions in armaments to equal levels that will provide for greater security and are fully verifiable. Concern has been expressed that our administration has not moved rapidly enough in arms-reductions negotiations, that we have been wasting time. Actually, Mr. Chairman, we have gained time. We have gained time by initiating a coherent, long-term program to improve the stability and the security of our nuclear deterrent force, and this will provide the only basis for negotiations that can lead to real reductions, and the incentives for the Soviet leaders to take our proposals seriously.

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[2] Brackets in source text.

We have gained time by preparing sound proposals that can lead to long-lasting and solid arms reductions agreements, and that can be supported through the prolonged hard bargaining that unfortunately seems to be necessary to reach any agreement with the Soviet Union. Last November, the President proposed to the Soviet Union an agreement that would eliminate completely intermediate range nuclear missile forces which are so threatening to both sides in Europe. [3] In the near future, the President will make similarly far-reaching proposals for intercontinental arms reductions, and he will invite the Soviet Union to commence START.

In the field of conventional arms reductions, we are participating with our NATO allies in the mutual balanced force-reduction negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. These have been going on 9 years, and we are still participating. Our objective in these talks is to achieve significant mutual reductions of conventional forces in central Europe. We are also participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in negotiations whose aim is to decrease the likelihood of surprise attack there.

Just a word as I close, Mr. Chairman, about the freeze. Our administration very much shares the desire of Members of the Senate and House and others to reduce the risk of nuclear war. I have not encountered anyone who wants a nuclear war or who indeed wants a war of any kind. The way to do this, we think, is, of course, to bring about major equitable and verifiable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The best way to achieve that end is to move directly to negotiations aimed at achieving substantial and verifiable and stabilizing reductions.

It is not to freeze forces at the current unequal levels. An unequal freeze would only perpetuate and exacerbate existing military imbalances, decrease our deterrent capability, and eliminate any incentive for the Soviets to agree to real reductions. Only by demonstrating a commitment to maintain our deterrent capability, with or without arms control, will we convince the Soviets that it is in their best interests to join us at the negotiating table to seek agreements on real arms reductions.

If we can achieve them, if we can pursue a policy such as we are now pursuing at Geneva on intermediate range weapons, we can enormously increase the hopes and the aspirations of the world for a very real and lasting peace.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: No First Use and Freeze of Nuclear Weapons, April 29, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be back with you to talk about what is probably the most important subject facing not only this committee but this Nation of ours. As you know, I have been and continue to be a strong advocate of arms control. I do not believe that once you get into nuclear war, that it is very likely that it could be controllable. There would be massive damage in many parts of the world that would change the basic nature of this planet. So arms control is a very important subject that needs to be addressed and addressed very promptly.

I share the worries of many throughout the country expressing concerns of living with nuclear arms and the lack of progress in arms control. I am pleased that the national policy is that we will not do anything inconsistent with SALT II [2] while we move toward further negotiations and reductions.

For 30 years, I have been involved with nuclear weapons; I have conducted many analyses. The last 4 years have been particularly sobering, since I am the person who would normally implement a Presidential decision to use any nuclear weapons. The main question is, how do we stabilize, how do we prevent war, how do we reduce the risks, how do we make major reductions in the nuclear weapons on both sides. I think there are ways we can do it.

I have serious reservations with two current, popular proposals: the first, a declaratory policy on no first use, and the second, a total freeze on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. I would like to just state my reasons for having serious reservations.

Both have seductive appeal. On the surface, they are very attractive. With regard to no first use, it tends to ignore the conventional imbalance in Europe. You can debate as to how much of an imbalance there is; I believe that the imbalance is often overstated. There is one but it is not as great as a lot of people think. If the Soviets ever become convinced that there would never be escalation in Europe to the use of nuclear weapons, that could make conventional conflict more likely, particularly in a crisis.

When we have new leadership in the Soviet Union, it is likely to be more aggressive. To draw attention away from internal problems in the Soviet Union, the leadership may try to externalize—whether by moving against Berlin or whatever else in Europe.

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[1] *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on S.J. Res. 163, 171, 177, 191; S. Res. 242, 323, 343, 370, 391; S. Ex. Res. 5, 6; and S. Con. Res. 81,* pp. 38–40.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Now, it is easy in a peacetime environment, in a cool and reasoned way, for both countries to say no first use. Perhaps both countries would be totally sincere in no first use, but it is a different situation when you are in the middle of a war and you are being defeated, and vital interests are at risk. There would be a great temptation at that time to escalate, whatever you said in peacetime—whether to prevent defeat or for preemption to knock out the nuclear capability of the other side.

So, a no-first-use policy could actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Now, I am not saying it would make it likely, but we are trying to stay as close to a zero probability as possible. And once you start a conflict escalation is possible. So exactly the opposite of what you are trying to achieve with a non-first-use policy may happen—you may end up actually more likely to use nuclear weapons.

Regarding no first use, I am a strong advocate of no first use of force, no use of force to initiate a war. I would hope that the Soviet Union would have this policy. President Reagan said on November 18 that no NATO forces, conventional or nuclear, would ever be used except in response to an attack.[3] The important threshold not to breach is the threshold of conflict, of combat between the East and the West, because if you start combat in Europe, there is nobody who can predict what could happen.

Now, with regard to the freeze, a total freeze on the development and deployment of weapons, I have three concerns. First, in the overall strategic equation, honest, well-informed people can differ as to whether we have parity today or the Soviets have some margin of superiority. There are good arguments on both sides of this issue, but there is no question but that the Soviets have great momentum. They are now completing a massive modernization program, and their forces are substantially less vulnerable than ours.

Even with a freeze, this margin in vulnerability will increase. For example, we depend on our bomber force far more than the Soviets depend on theirs. As Soviet air defenses are improved, our B-52 penetration will deteriorate.

A second concern is this: The Soviets currently have a monopoly on intermediate-range systems in Europe. They have deployed hundreds of SS–20's with three warheads each, with a refire capability, and with great survivability, and we are yet to deploy the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II.

I believe it was a very courageous decision on the part of the alliance in December 1979.[4] I was there at the NATO meeting where the decision was made to go on a two-track approach, a plan for deployment of the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II, coupled with negotiations that hopefully might make it unnecessary for us to have to deploy those weapons.

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[3] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[4] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

I find it very interesting that in Germany last week the Social Democratic Party of Chancellor Schmidt—in a country that is under the gun, a country very concerned about nuclear weapons, and a party very concerned about nuclear weapons—backed up Chancellor Schmidt by a vote of more than 2 to 1 against a freeze.

There is a third concern. A freeze would undermine our INF negotiations in Geneva. It would really terminate those negotiations that are underway which Ambassador Nitze is heading. It would undermine our proposal to go to zero, and would permit the current imbalance to continue.

Finally, there is the issue of verification. We found in SALT II that verification was one of the most perplexing problems, incredibly complex, and the Soviets are not very forthcoming. Neither have they been very forthcoming on the limited test ban treaty, where we are trying to get some information to verify whether or not they have exceeded the TTBT limit.[5] We only addressed a limited number of items in SALT II that had to be verified. If we achieved a total freeze, there would be many, many items to verify. You would end up with one of two things: Either the folly of trusting the Soviets and not having good verification, or having to sit down and negotiate dozens and dozens of individual verification items. This could result in interminable delays, and rather than a proposal that is designed to get things moving right now, it could drag on and on and on as we try to come up with reasonable verification provisions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are working with the administration. I am fully participating in the National Security Council discussions on what should be the U.S. position. We are advocating a significant reduction in nuclear arms. In my mind this would be more meaningful, more stabilizing, more achievable than a total freeze on the development and procurement of weapons and would provide greater assurance to this world that we will not have to use these very deadly systems.

Message From Soviet President Brezhnev to Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War: Threat of Nuclear War, May 2, 1982[1]

It is with great attention that I have familiarised myself with the message sent to me by the participants in the second international congress "Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War" addressed to the heads of state of the USSR and the USA.

I fully share your concern over the alarming situation, which is taking shape in the world today. The danger of war is growing, and this is a direct result of the attempts at opposing strength to common sense, at looking for benefit in confrontation, rather than in cooperation with others.

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[5] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 222–229.

[1] Moscow TASS in English, May 2, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, May 4, 1982, p. AA4.

The Soviet Union calls upon all governments of the world for common sense and responsibility. Many states are overburdened with social, economic, demographic and other problems. It is important to look for ways for their resolution and not strive to unleash a war, including nuclear war. The speculation that a nuclear war can be made limited is only a camouflage of far-reaching plans for unleashing a universal nuclear war.

The use of nuclear weapons irrespective of the scale would be a crime against the entire mankind. Considering this, I share your conclusion that a nuclear war would be fatal for any country and for any people, against which that weapon would be used.

Delivering our planet from the danger threatening it, preserving peace is the supreme duty of the leaders of states to their peoples, to mankind. We should leave to the generations to come not a planet mutilated by explosions, but a flowering one. So that light should not fade over the earth, it is necessary to put up without delay insurmountable obstacles to nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is ready for most radical agreements in this direction with other countries. We have more than once proposed the creation of nuclear-free zones, liquidation in Europe of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. That would be a truly 'zero option' and not the false one, which is often talked about in the West. Here one notion shall not be substituted for another. It takes specific actions here.

The warnings and considerations from scientists—medical men and physicians deserve, as it seems to me, most serious attention. You are concerned for the health and life of people, and through this prism you are looking at the actions of states and their representatives. This, in the final analysis, is, perhaps, the sole correct view, for the essence of the policy of states should be service to the peoples.

Your support for the efforts to limit and reduce nuclear weapons is welcomed in the Soviet Union. Making it understandable to peoples what danger is looming large over mankind, what will be its consequences, means making a considerable contribution to the struggle for preventing that threat, for preventing the measureless evil, which has been accumulated in the nuclear arsenals.

Please convey the best wishes of success to all participants in the movement "Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War" in their noble thoughts and deeds.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology (Buckley) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Control of Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union, May 6, 1982 [1]

I am delighted at this opportunity to respond to your invitation to testify on the role of the State Department in controlling the transfer of militarily critical technology to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. Whatever the record of prior Administrations—Republican as well as Democratic—it is clear that this Administration has placed a very high priority on improving the effectiveness of the executive branch in enforcing export controls. It has launched important initiatives which we believe will greatly improve their overall effectiveness while sharpening the focus on those elements of advanced technology and process know-how which are of the most critical importance to the Soviet bloc. We freely acknowledge that much more needs to be done; and we are actively working with other agencies to improve coordination over a range of issues. It will take time, however, for all these efforts to take hold in particular areas, especially because of the large amount of new data that has had to be gathered by various agencies and the analytical work that has to be done.

National security export controls are a basic element in overall U.S. policy toward the Warsaw Pact countries. To put it bluntly, these controls are a recognition of the fact that the global objectives of the Soviet bloc are inimical to our own and threaten every value for which our nation stands. Therefore, it is simply harmful for us to provide those nations with Western, militarily useful technologies to be turned against us.

The Role of COCOM

As most of these sensitive technologies are not within the sole control of the United States, it has been essential from the outset to achieve among the major Western industrialized powers fundamental agreement as to what technologies are militarily critical and how their transfer to the Soviet bloc should be controlled.

The instrument that has been developed for this purpose is the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls (COCOM) to which Japan and all NATO countries, with the exception of Iceland, belong. COCOM was created in 1949 by informal agreement among its members and has thus been in existence for more than three decades.

COCOM has three major functions.

The first is to establish and update the lists of embargoed products and technologies. Although COCOM lists are not published, they become the basis for the national control lists administered by each member government. The member governments are now preparing for a major review of these embargo lists, which will begin in October.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 1982, pp. 71–73. The statement was before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation.

Second, COCOM acts as the clearinghouse for requests submitted by the member governments to ship specific items to specified end-users in the proscribed countries. The COCOM-proscribed countries are the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact countries, China, and the other Communist countries in Asia.

Third, COCOM serves as a means of coordinating the administration and enforcement activities of the member governments.

The COCOM lists set up fairly specific limits on the technical characteristics above which member governments agree that they will prohibit exports to proscribed countries, unless COCOM itself approves exceptions.

In agreeing to a national request to export items on one of the control lists, COCOM works on the principle of unanimity. No application, in short, is approved if any member state objects. One of the evolved strengths of COCOM is that in over 30 years of operation, there have been very few cases in which a government has exercised its sovereign right to go ahead with exports over COCOM objections. This is all the more remarkable given the absence of any treaty or executive agreement undergirding the organization.

Over those decades, COCOM has generally been successful in inhibiting the overt flow of strategic technology to our adversaries. During the 1970s, however, in the honeymoon days of detente, the United States and the West relaxed controls over a number of embargoed commodities. It was believed that wideranging trade would somehow alter the international behavior of the Soviets and moderate their military investment. During this period, the United States went from being the least to the most frequent seeker of exceptions to multilateral controls. COCOM itself came to reflect such attitudes, and exceptions to the embargo were allowed to thrive. We now know this was a mistake. During the period of detente, the world stood witness to the greatest military buildup in history, along with the increased Soviet adventurism that grew out of an increased self-confidence.

Stemming the Flow of Technology

The Reagan Administration came into office 15 months ago determined to stem the flow of the technology that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were using to improve their already vast war-making capabilities. It was clear that the West's crucial qualitative edge in military systems was being undermined by the Soviet's increasingly aggressive efforts to buy or steal our militarily relevant technologies and equipment.

More precisely, we saw this well-orchestrated acquisition program giving the Soviets:

- A very significant savings in time and money in their military research and development programs;
- Rapid modernization of their defense industrial infrastructure;
- The opportunity to accelerate the closing of gaps between our weapons systems and theirs; and
- The chance to develop, with alarming speed, neutralizing countermeasures to our own technological innovations.

As a consequence, the Administration has initiated efforts to fill in gaps in the multilateral export control system. At the Ottawa summit meeting in July 1981, President Reagan raised the problem of Western technology transfer to the Soviet Union. An agreement at Ottawa to consult on this issue culminated in a high-level meeting in Paris during January, the first ministerial level COCOM meeting since the late 1950s. The other COCOM governments have asked that the results of that meeting be kept confidential, as, indeed, are all COCOM proceedings. I chaired the U.S. delegation to that meeting, however, and I can say that there was a concrete consensus that the member governments should renew their efforts to improve COCOM effectiveness. We have been encouraged by what appears to be a new and more constructive attitude of other COCOM governments and feel that this meeting forms a basis for a revitalization of the COCOM system.

Such a revitalization will take much hard work, and it will take time, among other reasons because COCOM depends on the national administration of controls by 15 individual governments. But some specific steps are underway. Effectiveness, for example, requires precise definitions of many complex technologies. We have made progress toward agreement on a number of specific, technical proposals in this area to tighten the embargo.

The United States is now working on proposals that will expand COCOM control lists into previously uncovered priority industries. These include gas turbine engines, large floating drydocks, certain metallurgical processes, electronic grade silicon, printed circuit board technology, space launch vehicles and spacecraft, robotics, ceramic materials for engines, certain advanced composites, and communications switching and computer hardware and software technology and know-how. This process will continue into the triennial COCOM list review, which will take place this October, when a general reappraisal of everything on the control lists will take place.

We have developed workable proposals for harmonizing the expert licensing procedures of the 15 member states so as to make COCOM decisionmaking more efficient. What we are seeking are ways to bring national enforcement practices to a level of equal effectiveness. These two questions will be addressed at a special COCOM meeting which will convene in Paris later this spring—and the fact that all partners have agreed to that special meeting is testament to our shared goals.

Illegal diversion activities are a problem overseas as well as at home. We have been cooperating with our COCOM allies to improve enforcement and investigative capabilities in this area. The State Department, working closely with our intelligence and investigative agencies, has been channeling appropriate information to other governments to alert them to potentially illegal activities within their borders. We have also encouraged them to increase the investigative resources and the sanctions available for export control enforcement. The Department of Commerce, and in turn the U.S. Customs Service, have detailed officers to the Department of State to support this overseas compliance effort.

COCOM has thus, we believe, made measurable progress toward strengthening strategic export controls since this Administration came into office. But it is also clear that the continuing revitalization process will be long and hard. In attempting to strengthen strategic export controls on exports to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries, we are faced with the perennial problem of securing agreement with all the other COCOM allies on just where to establish the technical cutoffs for commodities and technologies under embargo. Determining in many scores of different technical areas what is sufficiently strategic to warrant control is not an easy task. We do not always agree on what are militarily critical technologies, yet the purpose of the organization is limited to such technologies. Members exercise considerable care to avoid controls whose principal impact would be economic rather than military, and each has its own views and perspective. West European and Japanese economies would, generally speaking, be affected more than the U.S. economy by sweeping controls on manufactured products. But such differences between ourselves and our COCOM allies should not be overemphasized. We should remember that our allies have cooperated with us for over 30 years to control significant amounts of equipment, material, and technologies through COCOM. That is, first and foremost, because we share a common belief that such controls constitute an important element in our mutual defense.

As you know, the State Department is also responsible for administering munitions export controls which cover defense articles and services. Munitions are not approved for export to Warsaw Pact countries. Accordingly, the main issue in administering these controls relates to security concerns and our foreign relations with other countries.

Your letter of invitation mentions that, in an executive branch more effectively organized to shape and enforce export control policy, you envisage a principal and expanded role for the Department of State. We, too, envisage such a role for the Department.

Upon taking office, this Administration undertook a full review of our policy concerning the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries. The State Department was a major participant in this review, which culminated in the COCOM high-level meeting. The State Department led our delegation to that meeting. Since then, on a number of occasions, senior officials at State have discussed with our allies security concerns related to technology transfers. We are persuaded that improved allied cooperation on sensitive technology transfer issues is a realistic objective. There will, of course, continue to be some differences on the details of controls and their application to individual cases. But, with hard work to identify clearly and to justify persuasively what needs to be controlled and how controls should be enforced and administered, such differences, we believe, will be the exception rather than the rule.

Statement to the Senate Committee on Appropriations by the Deputy U.S. Representative (Busby) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, May 6, 1982 [1]

The stated goal of the United States is to achieve a total ban on chemical weapons which is both effective and verifiable. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is charged with the responsibility for achieving that ban.

At present, the United States is party to two conventions relating to chemical weapons. As stated by Mr. Wagner earlier, those are the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. [3]

The Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical weapons. Because a number of reservations were entered to that treaty whereby States reserve the right to retaliate in kind if attacked by chemical weapons, it has in practice become, in fact, a convention which prohibits the first use of chemical weapons. Also, under the terms of the convention the stockpiling of chemical weapons is allowed. So there are stockpiles of chemical weapons in the world today.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, on the other hand, contains a complete prohibition on biological and toxin weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention also contains a provision calling for a continuation of negotiations to achieve a complete ban on chemical weapons. Since 1976, the United States has been seeking to achieve this goal.

We negotiated first bilaterally with the Soviet Union. Those talks made a considerable amount of progress on certain aspects of the future convention. But eventually they broke down on the issues of verification and compliance. Largely they broke down because of Soviet unwillingness to consider seriously U.S. proposals for what we considered to be essential international verification procedures.

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[1] *Binary Chemical Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 93–95.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, 133–138.

WORKING GROUP ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In 1979, in recognition of the difficulties we were having in the bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, the Committee on Disarmament, a multilateral 40-nation disarmament negotiating body in Geneva, established a working group on chemical weapons. Since the establishment of that group, the focus of our efforts to try and achieve a ban on chemical weapons has been there.

We have made some progress in the CD, but again we have run into difficulties with the Soviet Union in trying to get serious discussions going on the questions of verification and compliance.

The administration believes that if we are to have a complete ban on chemical weapons, there must be effective verification provisions. If we are to give up our own capabilities for chemical warfare, we must be absolutely assured that any potential adversary has done likewise, and that we will not be attacked with chemical weapons.

There is, I believe, a legitimate question as to whether the program to resume production of chemical weapons has had a detrimental effect on the negotiations. In our judgment, it has not.

EFFECT OF PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In this regard, there are three areas I might comment on. One is the effect of the program on our allies, particularly our European allies. I can tell you that in the Committee on Disarmament, allied unity has not been affected by our announcement to resume CW production. On the contrary, some of our allies have been up front in trying to counter some Soviet arguments which have been made that the existence of binary weapons would make the verification task difficult.

A second concern is the effect on the neutral and nonalined countries, all of whom we would hope to sign onto a future convention. I would have to say that, by and large, most nonalined members of the Committee on Disarmament are not particularly happy with our decision. I don't believe they would be happy with any decision to produce weapons for which they have no defenses. But at the same time I would say that I think there is widespread understanding of the reasons for our action, and a broad measure of support for our position on the questions of verification and compliance.

PRODUCTION OF BINARIES AS BARGAINING CHIP

As to the effect on the Soviet Union, Senator, I would have to agree with those who say that production of binaries is not really a bargaining chip in the negotiations.

Senator Pryor. It is not a bargaining chip?

Mr. Busby. It is not a bargaining chip per se in the sense that you can take this decision and trade it off for something in the negotiations. But I would agree in general terms with the statement made by Mr. Wagner, that a demonstration of firm resolve on this particular issue can only have a salutory effect on the attitude of the Soviet

Union. In my opinion, such resolve will, in the long term, benefit the negotiations.

Finally, I would simply say that we are committed to seeking a complete ban on chemical weapons. Our ultimate goal is to get a prohibition of these weapons. We want to do it in a way that we can be assured they are, in fact, prohibited. I can't predict how long the negotiations will take. They have taken a long time already. It is a very complex and difficult area. I cannot project what the attitude of our major adversary in the negotiations will be. We are continuing to work toward a ban. We are taking a very active part in the negotiations. We are making some progress.

Report on Reduction of Military Budgets by U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Summary Conclusions and Recommendations [Extract], May 6, 1982 [1]

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7. Based on the analysis of replies from States, the Group reaffirms the conclusions of the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting (A/35/479) that the reporting instrument represents a viable and practical means for international reporting of military expenditures and that such reporting should be carried out on a general and regular basis.

8. On the basis of the replies by States, the Group concludes that:

(a) In order to facilitate the fullest use of the standard reporting instrument by reporting countries, a few minor changes should be made in the instructions of the matrix (see chap. II). It may also be advisable in the future to make further changes in the reporting instrument on the basis of suggestions and comments of reporting countries, taking into account the characteristics of varying accounting and budgeting systems;

(b) The continuous use of the reporting instrument by an ever-increasing number of States with the objective of ultimate universal participation would provide a constantly improving basis for a better assessment of its general usefulness and viability with a view to future agreements on reduction of military expenditures (RME).

9. The Group further concludes that:

(a) In general terms, price changes occur both in the military and the civilian sectors of the economy over periods of time. However, the rates of such price changes may not be the same. This makes it difficult to determine expenditures on military goods and services in constant prices (that is, real military expenditures). Therefore, in order to arrive at estimates of military expenditures in real terms, there is a need to develop price deflators applicable to the military sector in each country.

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[1] A/S-12/7, pp. 9–12. The report was prepared by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets in accordance with G.A. res. 35/142 B of Dec. 12, 1980.

(b) Exchange rates are not an adequate instrument for making accurate comparisons of military expenditures among different States. For this reason, it is necessary to develop a set of parities reflecting the relative purchasing power of different currencies with regard to each State's military sector. Such purchasing-power parities could be developed in several ways using different samples of military goods and services.

(c) The political and technical aspects of international and intertemporal comparisons of military expenditures are closely and continuously interrelated. Furthermore, the political aspects may even be the fundamental ones. The Parties must show the political will and firm determination to arrive at agreed solutions and to provide the data and other assistance needed for comparison and verification purposes. Since several procedures for constructing appropriate price indexes and conversion rates may be used, a common understanding would be needed on the construction of relevant military deflators and purchasing-power parities (PPPs). Given such understanding, it should be possible to resolve the technical problems in a way satisfactory to all Parties.

(d) As in the case of other disarmament agreements, a verification system will be necessary in order to provide assurances that all Parties are in compliance with the agreement. In view of the specific nature of agreements on RME, their verification may require the use of techniques applying to both physical quantities and financial outlays. In fact, a variety of means will probably be required, and reliable assessments may involve a relatively high degree of political understanding and confidence. Nevertheless, in view of the vital impact that agreements on RME can have on the national security of the Parties, provisions for verification should provide said Parties with adequate assurances of compliance.

(e) Negotiations on the RME should proceed on the basis that their results would not diminish any State's security. On the contrary, the security of States would improve by prospective agreements resulting in decreased levels of military expenditures.

(f) Negotiations on RME could lead to agreements among various participating States. Such agreements could be concluded on a global, regional or subregional level, among nuclear-weapon States, among other militarily significant States or among any other States whether they are members of military alliances or not.

(g) Given their high sensitivity in relation to national security, agreements on RME would only function properly if all Parties could, at all times, consider them to be to their advantage.

(h) Preliminary discussions of certain technical problems aimed at reaching understandings on their nature and possible solution should be undertaken by prospective participating States, either in United Nations expert groups or directly among the States themselves. Such discussions could begin at any time and would greatly facilitate negotiations on RME. The Group also considers that greater efforts are needed in order to enable these negotiations to begin as soon as possible.

(i) The efforts on comparability of the countries' main economic aggregates in the International Comparison Project (ICP; see para. 111 below) should be continued. The United Nations may play an important role in increasing knowledge about price movements, quantities and expenditures of various countries. The number of participating countries ought to be increased to include all major powers, if possible. Specific studies should be undertaken along the lines of the ICP in order to improve the possibility of constructing military PPPs, especially those of the main countries.

(j) The successful demonstration of the feasibility of constructing military price indexes and PPPs for different States would contribute much to preparing the ground for future negotiations on RME.

(k) A reliable system for reporting military expenditures, such as the one provided by the standard reporting instrument, would facilitate various proposals to the effect that a share of savings resulting from disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

10. The Group therefore recommends to the General Assembly that:

(a) The reporting instrument should continue to be used by an ever-increasing number of States from different geographic regions and with different budgeting and accounting systems;

(b) The instructions contained in the reporting instrument should be modified according to chapter II, section E;

(c) The Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts and with the voluntary co-operation of States, should undertake the task of constructing price indexes and PPPs for the military expenditures of participating States. This task should encompass a study of the problem as a whole, which would include the following:

(i) To assess the feasibility of such an exercise;
(ii) To design the project and methodology to be employed;
(iii) To determine the types of data required (such as product descriptions, prices and weights);
(iv) To ascertain the willingness of States to participate and to enlist their voluntary co-operation; and
(v) To construct military price indexes and PPPs;

(d) The General Assembly should invite Member States to participate in the above-mentioned exercise, pointing out the vast political and technical implications that would result from such participation for the process of the RME and disarmament measures as a whole, as well as for international peace and security;

(e) The General Assembly should urge Member States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, to help create the necessary conditions for fruitful negotiations on agreements on RME and to recognize that in the process of such negotiations a reasonable availability of statistical data would be required. On this basis, Member States should start negotiations as soon as possible.

Address by President Reagan [Extract], May 9, 1982 [1]

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Arms Reduction

The fourth point is arms reduction. I know that this weighs heavily on many of your minds. In our 1931 *Prism* [Eureka College yearbook], [2] we quoted Carl Sandburg, who in his own beautiful way quoted the mother prairie, saying, "Have you seen a red sunset drip over one of my cornfields, the shore of night stars, the wave lines of dawn up a wheat valley?" What an idyllic scene that paints in our minds—and what a nightmarish prospect that a huge mushroom cloud might someday destroy such beauty. My duty as President is to insure that the ultimate nightmare never occurs, that the prairies and the cities and the people who inhabit them remain free and untouched by nuclear conflict.

I wish more than anything there were a simple policy that would eliminate that nuclear danger. But there are only difficult policy choices through which we can achieve a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible level.

I do not doubt that the Soviet people and, yes, the Soviet leaders have an overriding interest in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union within the memory of its leaders has known the devastation of total conventional war and knows that nuclear war would be even more calamitous. Yet, so far, the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations primarily as an instrument to restrict U.S. defense programs and, in conjunction with their own arms buildup, a means to enhance Soviet power and prestige.

Unfortunately, for some time suspicions have grown that the Soviet Union has not been living up to its obligations under existing arms control treaties. There is conclusive evidence the Soviet Union has provided toxins to the Laotians and Vietnamese for use against defenseless villagers in Southeast Asia. And the Soviets themselves are employing chemical weapons on the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 387. The President was giving the commencement address at Eureka College, Peoria, Illinois.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

We must establish firm criteria for arms control in the 1980s if we're to secure genuine and lasting restraint on Soviet military programs through arms control. We must seek agreements which are verifiable, equitable, and militarily significant. Agreements that provide only the appearance of arms control breed dangerous illusions.

Last November, I committed the United States to seek significant reductions on nuclear and conventional forces. [3] In Geneva, we have since proposed limits on U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, including the complete elimination of the most threatening systems on both sides.

In Vienna, we're negotiating, together with our allies, for reductions of conventional forces in Europe. In the 40-nation U.N. Committee on Disarmament, the United States seeks a total ban on all chemical weapons.

Since the first days of my Administration, we've been working on our approach to the crucial issue of strategic arms and the control and negotiations for control of those arms with the Soviet Union. The study and analysis required has been complex and difficult. It had to be undertaken deliberately, thoroughly, and correctly. We've laid a solid basis for these negotiations. We're consulting with congressional leaders and with our allies, and we are now ready to proceed.

The main threat to peace posed by nuclear weapons today is the growing instability of the nuclear balance. This is due to the increasingly destructive potential of the massive Soviet buildup in its ballistic missile force.

Therefore, our goal is to enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems—ballistic missiles and especially the giant intercontinental ballistic missiles—while maintaining a nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, to underwrite our national security, and to meet our commitment to allies and friends.

For the immediate future, I'm asking my START—and START really means, we've given up on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], START means Strategic Arms Reduction Talks—negotiating team to propose to their Soviet counterparts a practical, phased reduction plan. The focus of our efforts will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—the ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential.

At the first phase, or the end of the first phase of START, I expect ballistic missile warheads, the most serious threat we face, to be reduced to equal levels, equal ceilings, at least a third below the current levels. To enhance stability, I would ask that no more than half of those warheads be land based. I hope that these warhead reductions as well as significant reductions in missiles themselves could be achieved as rapidly as possible.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

In a second phase, we'll seek to achieve an equal ceiling on other elements of our strategic nuclear forces including limits on the ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current American levels. In both phases, we shall insist on verification procedures to insure compliance with the agreement. This, I might say, will be the 20th time that we have sought such negotiations with the Soviet Union since World War II.

The monumental task of reducing and reshaping our strategic forces to enhance stability will take many years of concentrated effort. But I believe that it will be possible to reduce the risks of war by removing the instabilities that now exist and by dismantling the nuclear menace. I have written to President Brezhnev and directed Secretary Haig to approach the Soviet Government concerning the initiation of formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, START, at the earliest opportunity. We hope negotiations will begin by the end of June.

We will negotiate seriously, in good faith, and carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. If they approach these negotiations in the same spirit, I'm confident that together we can achieve an agreement of enduring value that reduces the number of nuclear weapons, halts the growth in strategic forces, and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future.

I hope the commencement today will also mark the commencement of a new era, in both senses of the word a new start toward a more peaceful and secure world.

East-West Dialogue

The fifth and final point I propose for East-West relations is dialogue. I've always believed that people's problems can be solved when people talk to each other instead of about each other. And I've already expressed my own desire to meet with President Brezhnev in New York next month. If this can't be done, I'd hope we could arrange a future meeting where positive results can be anticipated. And when we sit down, I'll tell President Brezhnev that the United States is ready to build a new understanding based upon the principles I've outlined today. I'll tell him that his government and his people have nothing to fear from the United States. The free nations living at peace in the world community can vouch for the fact that we seek only harmony. And I'll ask President Brezhnev why our two nations can't practice mutual restraint. Why can't our peoples enjoy the benefits that would flow from real cooperation? Why can't we reduce the number of horrendous weapons?

Perhaps I should also speak to him of this school and these graduates who are leaving it today—of your hopes for the future, of your deep desire for peace, and yet your strong commitment to defend your values if threatened. Perhaps if he someday could attend such a ceremony as this, he'd better understand America. In the only system he knows, you would be here by the decision of government, and on this day the government representatives would be here telling most, if not all of you, where you were going to report to work tomorrow.

But as we go to Europe for the talks and as we proceed in the important challenges facing this country, I want you to know that I will be thinking of you and of Eureka and what you represent. In one of my yearbooks, I remember reading that, "The work of the prairie is to be the soil for the growth of a strong Western culture." I believe Eureka is fulfilling that work. You, the members of the 1982 graduating class, are this year's harvest.

I spoke of the difference between our two countries. I try to follow the humor of the Russian people. We don't hear much about the Russian people. We hear about the Russian leaders. But you can learn a lot because they do have a sense of humor, and you can learn from the jokes they're telling. And one of the most recent jokes I found kind of, well, personally interesting. Maybe it might tell you something about your country. The joke they tell is that an American and a Russian were arguing about the differences between our two countries. And the American said, "Look. In my country I can walk into the Oval Office, I can hit the desk with my fist, and say, 'President Reagan, I don't like the way you're governing the United States.' " And the Russian said, "I can do that." The American said, "What?" He says, "I can walk into the Kremlin, into Brezhnev's office. I can pound Brezhnev's desk, and I can say, 'Mr. President, I don't like the way Ronald Reagan is governing the United States.' "

Eureka as an institution and you as individuals are sustaining the best of Western man's ideals. As a fellow graduate and in the office I hold, I'll do my best to uphold these same ideals. To the Class of 1982, congratulations, and God bless you.

Statement by Secretary of State Haig Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, May 11, 1982 [1]

The timing of these hearings could not be better. We are about to enter a new phase of strategic arms control. On Sunday the President announced his desire to open Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) by the end of June. [2] We have proposed to the Soviets that the talks take place in Geneva, and I hope we will be in a position to announce a specific date sometime in the next several weeks.

The decision to begin negotiations on strategic arms reduction is a crucial element in the President's comprehensive policy framework for arms control. In November we launched America into an entirely new area of arms control, that involved intermediate-range nuclear forces.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* June 1982, pp. 44–45.

[2] *Supra.*

More recently, we have begun to participate in efforts within the 40-member U.N. Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a total ban on chemical weapons. We are also engaged in discussions in that forum on nuclear testing. In Vienna negotiations on reductions in conventional forces in Europe are underway. In the coming months, we will renew our efforts to make progress there.

Each of these negotiations is important in its own right. Together they present an opportunity to strengthen deterrence and to reduce the risk of war at all levels. But it is important to remember that arms control is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Our objective is to sustain our national security in a changing international environment and in the face of an expanding Soviet force. Arms control can play a very important part in strengthening our security and restraining the growth of Soviet power through mutually beneficial agreements. But arms control can succeed in this task only if it is coordinated in a strategy that employs the other diplomatic, political, and economic assets at our disposal. This means, among other things, that we must demonstrate our will and capacity to maintain the military balance. It means that we should consult closely with our allies. And it also means that we should seek balanced, equal, and verifiable agreements that reduce the risk of war by reinforcing deterrence.

Our preparations for START have reflected these considerations. The President's proposals have also benefited from the lessons of a decade of American experience with the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] [3] process. Ironically, the strategic arms competition so troubling to us all reached new heights during the very period when the SALT negotiations seemed so promising.

We, therefore, developed eight criteria with which to judge alternative approaches to strategic arms control, and these have guided our recent decisions on START.

First, a START agreement must permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military strategy, taking into account the military capability that would be allowed the Soviet Union under such an agreement.

Second, an agreement must be based on the principle of equality. Nothing less than equality is acceptable in the provisions of any future strategic arms limitation agreement for military and political reasons.

Third, a START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces.

Fourth, there must be effective verification with the necessary counting rules, collateral constraints, and cooperative measures.

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[3] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Fifth, an agreement must lead to substantial reductions. We took as a given that whatever unit of account was adopted should lend itself to substantial reductions below current levels of forces and that reductions should be to equal ceilings.

Sixth, we must be able to explain our objectives and proposals in clear and simple terms to insure that our START approach would enjoy broad public support.

Seventh, our approach had to take into account those matters of particular concern to our allies, including the ability of the United States to maintain a credible deterrent, the relationship of the START approach to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotiations, and the likelihood of success.

Eighth, and finally, we needed to devise a sustainable position, which could provide a framework for detailed negotiations and the basis for an eventual agreement, even in the face of initial Soviet resistance. This meant the position needed to be demonstrably fair, mutually beneficial, and realistic.

Based upon these criteria, the President has set a new, more demanding goal for strategic arms negotiations. Our objective is to achieve significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby strengthening deterrence and stability both for ourselves and for our allies and friends.

To achieve this objective, we will propose to the Soviets in Geneva a practical plan for phased reductions of strategic weapons. This plan is designed to reduce the risk of war by securing agreed steps which will enhance the stability of the strategic balance. Such a goal can be achieved best by negotiating significant reductions in the most destabilizing weapons possessed by both sides—their numbers, their warheads, their overall destructive potential. This will be the primary focus of U.S. efforts.

In Geneva the United States will propose that, at the end of the first stage of START reductions, ballistic missile warheads be reduced to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. The United States will propose that, to further enhance stability, no more than half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. We wish to see these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in deployed missiles, achieved as quickly as possible.

The conclusion of such an agreement would provide the best possible basis for negotiations leading to a second-phase agreement imposing equal ceilings on other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels. In both phases we will naturally insist on verification procedures to insure compliance with the agreement.

As President Reagan has noted, these proposals represent a very serious and ambitious undertaking. The sheer physical task of reducing U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and reshaping them to enhance stability will undoubtedly take years of concentrated effort. We believe, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union together can remove the instabilities that now exist and reduce significantly nuclear forces on both sides.

Our ability to achieve these ambitious goals depends, in large measure, on the Soviets' willingness to negotiate seriously and in good faith. How seriously they will negotiate depends, in turn, on their view of how the military and political environment will look without an agreement. If we fail to adopt the President's military modernization program, we will reduce not the nuclear danger but, instead, the chances of reaching an arms control agreement on strategic forces. A demonstrated willingness to maintain the balance, through unilateral efforts, if necessary, is as indispensable to the success of our efforts at strategic arms reductions as INF modernization is to the success of the ongoing talks in Geneva. More than any other single defense or political initiative, the President's strategic modernization program and the Congress' support for the modernization program will make, or break, our attempt to negotiate a reasonable arms control agreement.

The need to maintain the Soviet incentive to negotiate reductions in destabilizing systems would also be undercut by endorsement of many of the nuclear freeze proposals before us. Most proposals would freeze the existing instabilities and perpetuate existing Soviet advantages. They would eliminate the incentives for the Soviets to negotiate toward the even lower levels of nuclear weapons that we can achieve. We want to go beyond a freeze and do better. We believe we can achieve real reductions and thus lessen the risk of war.

We all understand, and share, the anxiety that motivates those who support the freeze. We all agree that we must not miss this opportunity to make a major step toward meaningful arms control and significant reductions. We are concerned, however, that a freeze on nuclear weapons could frustrate our attempts to achieve stability and balance in this critical area.

The discussions and debates on nuclear policy in the Congress and the country reflect both public concern and our capacity as a democracy to discuss the great issues of today. They have helped to focus American attention on the difficult task ahead of us. We particularly support the objectives set by Senators Warner, Jackson, and others for significant reductions in the number of weapons. We hope, however, that this debate will not culminate in fresh battle lines between divided factions but rather a new national consensus in support of the President's proposal for a fair, realistic, and truly beneficial strategic arms agreement.

We feel confident that a better understanding of the needs of deterrence, the state of the military balance, and the possibilities for arms control will result in strong support for the initiatives we have taken to modernize our forces and to reduce the burden of arms, and the risk of war, through negotiation. Such support will be crucial in convincing the Soviets that we are determined to compete and at the same time that we are eager to reach a meaningful agreement. The incentives for real arms control exist. We have both the means and the duty to supply them. As we embark on this vital enterprise, now is the time to rally behind the President's proposals.

Statement by the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, May 12, 1982 [1]

The following is a detailed account of where the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations stood on March 16 when we completed the first round of the talks.

Since the first meeting on November 30, we have been able to present our position fully and to explore the Soviet position in considerable depth.

On February 2 we tabled the text of a draft treaty which embodies the negotiating approach developed in consultation with NATO. Let me review briefly the reduction and limitation provisions of the treaty:

—All SS-20's, SS-4's and SS-5's, as well as all Pershing II's and BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missiles would be destroyed.

—All new land-based nuclear armed missiles with a range between the Pershing II (deleted) [2] and 5500 km would be prohibited.

—The shorter-range Soviet SS-12/22 and SS-23 would be held to existing levels and capabilities, but subject to those restrictions, could be replaced.

—New land-based nuclear armed missiles with a range greater than the SS-12/22 (deleted) but less than the Pershing II would be prohibited.

After tabling our draft treaty on February 2, in the next plenary session with the Soviets we provided a summary article-by-article analysis, and in six succeeding plenary meetings, we elaborated on the meaning and rationale of the major elements of the text. We began this series of statements by describing in detail the scope of the ban provided for in Article III of the treaty text, stressing that it provides for permanent and comprehensive elimination of the most threatening systems, i.e., the Pershing II and BGM 109G for the U.S.; the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 for the Soviet Union; and any similar future nuclear missiles. Next, we explained the reasons for the collateral constraints in Article IV of the draft text, stressing that the constraints on the SS-12/22 and SS-23, as well as the ban on new nuclear missiles between the range of the SS-12/22 and the Pershing II, were designed to prevent circumvention of the Article III ban on longer-range missiles. Our next statement described the definitions and type rules used in the treaty, provided for in Articles II and V, that are designed to clarify the application of the limitations on INF missiles. After that, we described the U.S. approach to verification and the responsibilities of the Standing Consultative Commission, discussing the content of Articles VI and VII in detail and noting that in the future an annex on verification would be tabled. Finally, we described Articles VIII, IX and X on duration and procedures, and the Memorandum of Understanding on data base, designed to set a baseline to clarify common understandings of treaty obligations, to aid verification, and to assist the SCC.

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[1] *Department of Defense Appropriations: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session; Subcommittee on the Department of Defense,* Pt. 4, pp. 812–821.

[2] The word "(deleted)" appears in the source text.

The Soviets have sought to gain our agreement to two statements of general principles. The first, which they presented on December 4, provided for a moratorium on the deployment or preparations for deployment of new or additional medium-range nuclear systems in Europe. On February 4 they tabled the second statement entitled "Statement of (or Accord on) Intentions." This proposal combines the moratorium with their proposal for staged reductions. The main points of the Soviet proposal are:

—The agreement would cover all "medium-range" nuclear arms having a range (combat radius) in excess of 1000 km, which are stationed in Europe and in adjacent seas and oceans, or intended for use in Europe.

—In order to lower the level of such arms possessed by NATO and the USSR, the US and the USSR would agree that the number of such arms be reduced to 300 by the end of 1990. An intermediate level of 600 systems on each side would be reached by the end of 1985.

—The US and the USSR would have the right to determine the composition of the arms reduced by them.

—Within agreed reduced levels, the US and the USSR could carry out modernization and replacement, the scope of which would be determined later. Such modernization and replacement could not prejudice the effectiveness of the obligations, upset the established balance, or lead to unilateral military advantage.

—Destruction would be the principal method of reduction, without precluding the possibility of withdrawal of a portion of the arms behind agreed lines.

—Provisions would be worked out to assure adequate verification of compliance with the obligations.

—The agreement would remain in force until the end of 1990, unless the sides agree to extend its duration.

—For the duration of the negotiations, the sides would refrain from activities involving the deployment of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe and adjacent waters. The sides would freeze their arms already deployed quantitatively and qualitatively, though the existing level might be reduced.

The Soviet proposal is designed to give the impression of meaningful arms reductions. In fact, however, it would maintain and foster Soviet preponderance in INF weapon systems, maintain the Soviet monopoly in INF missiles of longer range, and remove the United States INF presence from Europe. Their proposed agreement would have the following effects:

—The Soviet Union would be permitted to retain 300 SS-20's or other long-range systems in Europe in whatever mix they choose, and an unlimited force outside of the reduction area. The Soviets could continue to replace obsolete forces with modern systems, thus increasing the present level of SS-20's, and to produce and stockpile long-range INF missiles. The SS-20, with its three warheads, would be counted as the equivalent of a single aircraft or single warhead missile.

—Replacement and modernization would only be allowed according to the principle of "missiles for missiles and aircraft for aircraft." Thus, the United States would not be permitted to deploy Pershing II or GLCM in Europe because the United States currently has no such missiles deployed. While the United States could have only aircraft, the USSR could maintain a mix of forces. The USSR would thus award itself a bonus for being currently the one party with INF missiles of longer range.

—British and French nuclear systems would be counted along with US systems in a single aggregate on the NATO side under the ceilings. If the number of British and French systems increased beyond the allowed ceiling, the Soviet Union would be permitted to increase its forces by the same amount. Even though the proposed agreement is bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, the obligations in the agreement would be fundamentally affected by the actions and force structures of sovereign nations not parties to the agreement.

—The Soviet count of "medium-range" nuclear systems in Europe includes 263 British and French systems. Unless those systems were cut back, reduction to 300 on the NATO side would allow the United States to keep no more than 37 systems, virtually eliminating United States long-range INF from Europe.

—To reach the allowed ceilings in Europe, withdrawal beyond agreed lines would be allowed. The Soviets would be free to destroy only obsolete systems and to withdraw excess modern systems.

—On the Soviet side, the agreed line could be farther east than the crest of the Urals. The Soviets have hinted that our concern about INF systems outside Europe can be resolved, but they have offered no explanation of what they mean beyond possible extension of the reduction area eastward. The Soviets have also indicated that they have in mind a line to specify the boundary of the "waters adjacent to Europe."

—The agreement would expire on the same day that its provisions would be fully implemented, December 31, 1990. In other words, United States systems having been virtually eliminated from Europe, Soviet obligations would expire. Soviet systems previously withdrawn from Europe or stockpiled outside the reduction area could legally be returned to Europe at that time.

—The Soviets would place no constraints on shorter-range systems capable of circumventing the limitations on systems with a range over 1000 km such as the SS-12/22 and SS-23.

—While not covered by their "Statement of Intentions," the Soviets have said that, as an alternative, they would be willing to accept a ceiling at a level equal to the aggregate of British and French systems should the United States be willing to remove all its "medium-range" nuclear force from Europe.

The Soviet "Statement of Intentions" is an elaboration of proposals which Brezhnev outlined in Bonn last November on the eve of the negotiations. The additional details provided during the negotiations make even clearer their one-sided nature. The Soviet approach is intended not only to block NATO INF modernization, but also effectively to eliminate all United States "medium-range" nuclear forces, including dual-capable aircraft, from Europe, thereby weakening the link between the defense of Europe and the United States. In our discussions with the Soviets, we have pointed out the unacceptable aspects of their proposal, such as:

—The unacceptability of prohibiting US INF deployments while leaving Soviet SS-20 deployments effectively unconstrained;

—The inadmissibility of including British and French nuclear forces in bilaterally agreed limitations;

—The absurdity of terminating an agreement on the day when it is to become fully implemented;

—The added complexity of including aircraft; and

—The flaws of a regional approach based on location and the "intended" use of weapons rather than their capabilities.

Let me now discuss the major differences in the United States and Soviet approaches in detail.

A basic difference is the position of the two sides as to the facts of the balance. The Soviets maintain, as you know, that there is currently approximate parity between the "medium-range" forces of NATO and the Soviet Union, with each side having about 1000 systems. They use arbitrary criteria and apply them inconsistently to arrive at this result. The alleged existence of a balance underlies the entire Soviet proposal. We have presented data demonstrating the contrary. The Soviets have rejected our proposal that the sides objectively and without preconditions analyze the relevant evidence.

There is a procedural difference over the value of seeking an agreement on general principles, more specifically on their proposal as to the composition of the systems to be limited, or of working toward agreement on a specific treaty text. We have tabled a detailed treaty, while the Soviets have argued that we must first agree on general "guidelines" including an agreement on composition. The Soviets claim that their proposal is based on the principle of equality and equal security. We have maintained that their proposal is inconsistent with that principle, correctly interpreted. We have stressed the principle of equal rights and limits.

With regard to the terms of an agreement, a number of basic differences are apparent. In the first place, the sides differ over the treatment of ground-launched INF missiles of longer range. The United States proposal would eliminate the entire class of such missiles on both sides. The Soviet proposal would permit the Soviet side substantial numbers of them and would even permit their further modernization and improvement, while denying such missiles to the United States.

Second, the sides differ over the types of systems to be limited. The United States proposal focuses on ground-launched INF missiles of longer range. The Soviet proposal includes not only missiles, but aircraft, and not only ground-launched systems, but sea-based systems as well.

Third, the sides differ over the involvement of third country systems. The United States position is that it will neither include nor provide compensation for third country forces in a bilateral agreement. The Soviets insist on counting British and French nuclear forces under an agreed ceiling and insist on the right to increase their forces should British and French forces increase beyond that ceiling.

Fourth, the sides differ over the treatment of shorter-range systems. The United States seeks collateral constraints on shorter-range nuclear missiles to ensure the viability of the ban on INF missiles of longer range. The Soviet Union's proposal is for constraints only on systems with ranges of 1000 kilometers or more and leaves open the possibility of circumvention.

Fifth, the sides differ over the geographic application of the limitations. The United States seeks to eliminate US and Soviet long-range INF missiles without regard to location in view of their range and transportability. The Soviet Union wishes to confine limitations to a geographic area to be specified, with no restrictions on the limited systems outside that area.

Sixth, the sides differ on the duration of an agreement. The United States has proposed a treaty of unlimited duration. The Soviet Union has proposed an agreement that would expire at the end of 1990, on the very day when it would be fully implemented.

Seventh, the sides differ over the specific data on those systems included in each side's proposal. In some cases, the data presented thus far is close, as in the number of missile launchers and Backfires in Europe. In other cases, it is not. For instance, the Soviets maintain that no such system as the SS-23 with a range of 500 kilometers exists. They claim that the range of the Pershing II is 2500 kilometers (deleted). They claim that their Fencer aircraft has a range of less than 1000 kilometers, but that the US F-4 aircraft has a range of greater than 1000 kilometers, while the reverse is true. Also, the number of Badger and Blinder bombers which Soviets have cited is well below the number which we believe to be in their inventory.

It is clear that the Soviets maintain the hope of preventing NATO INF modernization without any significant sacrifice on their part. They are negotiating with one eye on the gallery of public opinion in Western Europe. As long as they think that they can block the NATO modernization decision by playing to that gallery, they will have little incentive to negotiate seriously. When they do become convinced that the only way to affect NATO INF modernization is through a negotiation involving concessions on their part, then we can expect to see movement in their stance. How much cannot be foreseen at this time, however.

The debate in Geneva has been intense, but businesslike. We have achieved somewhat more than might have been expected in this initial round. We have had the opportunity fully to present the principles and facts which are basic to our proposal and the full details of a treaty designed to implement that proposal. We have clarified for the Soviet side the reasons for the provisions in the treaty and the way in which it would function. We have answered the questions of the Soviet side with respect to our proposal and the draft treaty text. Concurrently, we have had an opportunity to question, to analyze, and to rebut in detail the various elements of the position. In my judgment, both sides have benefited from this exchange and have achieved a better understanding of the position of the other.

News Conference Statement and Remarks by President Reagan [Extracts], May 13, 1982 [1]

Arms Reduction

The President. Good evening. I have a statement to read.

Four times in my life, I have seen America plunged into war—twice as part of tragic global conflicts that cost the lives of millions. Living through that experience has convinced me that America's highest mission is to stand as a leader among the free nations in the cause of peace. And that's why, hand in hand with our efforts to restore a credible national defense, my administration has been actively working for a reduction in nuclear and conventional forces that can help free the world from the threat of destruction.

In Geneva, the United States is now negotiating with the Soviet Union on a proposal I set forward last fall to reduce drastically the level of nuclear armament in Europe. In Vienna, we and our NATO allies are negotiating with the Warsaw Pact over ways to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

Last Sunday, I proposed a far-reaching approach to nuclear arms control—a phased reduction in strategic weapons beginning with those that are most dangerous and destabilizing, the warheads on ballistic missiles and especially those on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 17, 1982, pp. 634–636, 639–640.

Today the United States and the Soviet Union each have about 7,500 nuclear warheads poised on missiles that can reach their targets in a matter of minutes. In the first phase of negotiations, we want to focus on lessening this imminent threat. We seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads to about 5,000—one-third less than today's levels—limit the number of warheads on land-based missiles to half that number, and cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level—about one-half that of the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we'll seek reductions to equal levels of throw-weight, a critical indicator of overall destructive potential of missiles. To be acceptable, a new arms agreement with the Soviets must be balanced, equal, and verifiable. And most important, it must increase stability and the prospects of peace.

I have already written President Brezhnev and instructed Secretary Haig to approach the Soviet Government so that we can begin formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms—the START talks—at the earliest opportunity. And we hope that these negotiations can begin by the end of June and hope to hear from President Brezhnev in the near future.

Reaching an agreement with the Soviets will not be short or easy work. We know that from the past. But I believe that the Soviet people and their leaders understand the importance of preventing war. And I believe that a firm, forthright American position on arms reductions can bring us closer to a settlement.

Tonight, I want to renew my pledge to the American people and to the people of the world that the United States will do everything we can to bring such an agreement about.

And now I guess it's time for us to return to the conventional skirmishing, the question time.

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SALT II

Q. Mr. President, if wiping out the nuclear threat is so important to the world, why do you choose to ignore 7 long years of negotiation, in which two Republican Presidents played a part? I speak of SALT II.[2] We abide by the terms the Soviet Union does. Why not push for a ratification of that treaty as a first step, then go on to START? After all, a bird in hand.

The President. Because, Helen,[3] this bird isn't a very friendly bird. I remind you that a Democratic-controlled Senate refused to ratify it. And the reason for refusing to ratify, I think, is something we can't—

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[2] For text of the SALT Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[3] Helen Thomas, White House correspondent for United Press International.

Q. [*Inaudible*]—Republican Senate now.

The President. Well, but we can't ignore that, the reason why it was refused ratification. SALT stands for strategic arms limitation. And the limitation in that agreement would allow in the life of the treaty for the Soviet Union to just about double their present nuclear capability. It would allow—and does allow us—to increase ours. In other words, it simply legitimizes an arms race.

Now, the parts that we're observing of that have to do with the monitoring of each other's weaponry, and so both sides are doing that. What we're striving for is to reduce the power, the number, and particularly those destabilizing missiles that can be touched off by the push of a button—to reduce the number of those. And there just is no ratio between that and what SALT was attempting to do. I think SALT was the wrong course to follow.

Arms Reduction Negotiations

Q. Mr. President, you may know that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said yesterday that your approach might take far longer than the 7 years it took to require—to negotiate SALT II. What sort of timeframe do you anticipate it would take to negotiate these limits on warheads?

The President. Well, I don't know that you could project a timeframe on that, when you look back at the history all the way back to the end of World War II with the Soviet Union on the negotiations. But I do think there is one thing present now that was not present before, and that is the determination of the United States to rebuild its national defenses. And the very fact that we have shown the will and are going forward on the rebuilding program is something that I think offers an inducement to the Soviet Union to come to that table and legitimately negotiate with us.

In the past several years, those negotiations took place with them having a superiority over us and us actually unilaterally disarming. Every time someone wanted a little money for another program, they took it away from defense. And that isn't true anymore.

Yes?

First Use of Nuclear Weapons

Q. Mr. President, there have been calls in recent days for the United States to renounce the existing NATO treaty under which—policy under which we would retaliate against the Soviets with nuclear weapons if they attack Western Europe with conventional arms. Under what conditions could we pledge that we will never be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in any conflict in Western Europe?

The President. I just don't think this proposal that has been made about to renounce the first use of weapons—certainly, there's none of us that want to see them—but I don't think that any useful purpose is served in making such a declaration. And our strategic nuclear weapons unfortunately are the only balance or deterrent that we have to the massive buildup of conventional arms that the Soviet Union has on the western front—on the NATO front. Now, this is why in Vienna we're trying to negotiate with them on a reduction of conventional arms also, because they have an overpowering force there.

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Nuclear Arms Reduction

Q. Mr. President, in your arms proposal, you focus on a central intercontinental missile system to the two sides. If the Soviets were to come back and say they wanted to talk about bombers, about cruise missiles, about other weapon systems, would you be willing to include those, or are those excluded?

The President. No, nothing is excluded. But one of the reasons for going at the ballistic missile—that is the one that is the most destabilizing. That one's the one that is the most frightening to most people. And let me just give you a little reasoning on that—of my own on that score.

That is the missile sitting there in its silo in which there could be the possibility of miscalculation. That is the one that people know that once that button is pushed, there is no defense; there is no recall. And it's a matter of minutes, and the missiles reach the other country.

Those that are carried in bombers, those that are carried in ships of one kind or another, or submersibles, you are dealing there with a conventional type of weapon or instrument, and those instruments can be intercepted. They can be recalled if there has been a miscalculation. And so they don't have the same, I think, psychological effect that the presence of those other ones that, once launched, that's it; they're on their way, and there's no preventing, no stopping them.

Q. Mr. President, there are many arms specialists, however, who say that the multiplication of cruise missiles in particular—those can be put on land, can be put on sea ships, submarines and so forth—also have that same effect; you can't call them back once they're launched. They have very short flight time, and there will be thousands of them.

The President. Well, they have a much longer flight time, actually, a matter of hours. They're not the speed of the ballistic missiles that go up into space and come back down again.

But this doesn't mean that we ignore anything. As I said, we're negotiating now on conventional weapons. But I think you start with first things first. You can't bite it all off in one bite. And so our decision was to start with the most destabilizing and the most destructive.

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Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Nuclear Arms Control, May 13, 1982 [1]

It is both an honor and a pleasure for me to appear before you again to discuss the present phase of the struggle against nuclear war. As I have said many times in this room, it is my conviction that in order to outlaw nuclear war, we must outlaw all aggressive war, since it is impossible to build a firebreak between nuclear and conventional war. But I promise not to preach that sermon today. I shall confine my testimony this time to the President's proposals for nuclear arms reduction, and the principal ideas before you on the same subject.

Soon after I assumed my present position, ACDA undertook a review of our policies towards nuclear arms control agreements, and sought to engage the other agencies with responsibilities in the field in a searching conversation about the contribution such agreements could make to our foreign and defense policy as a whole. One of the important conclusions to emerge from this discussion, as I remarked as early as my confirmation hearings last June, [2] was to highlight the increasing importance of the Soviet lead in ICBMs, and especially in large ICBMs, which has emerged so sharply in recent years.

Analyzing the role of nuclear weapons in modern warfare and world politics, a consensus emerged in the Executive Branch. It is that the most serious foreign policy problem we face is the threat of nuclear coercion based on a credible Soviet capacity to improve its military and political position through a first strike against our ICBM force, our submarines in port, and our bombers on the ground. The menace of nuclear imbalance in that sense is being translated into political currents of great power, as we have seen during the last few years. The deployment of vast numbers of SS-20s is designed to make our flesh crawl, and to induce acute political anxiety in Europe and elsewhere at a time when the American intercontinental nuclear guaranty is being questioned.

Henry Kissinger deepened that anxiety a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers did not commit suicide in behalf of their allies. But political anxieties about the nuclear question would have existed even if Dr. Kissinger had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called "subliminal" emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. They are there. The pressures of Soviet nuclear mobilization have other effects. There has been a conspicuous increase in the number of Americans who are seriously advocating an American return to neutrality and isolation, as if that approach to foreign policy were an available option for the United States. Such American voices have their inevitable echo in Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world dependent upon American protection: the chorus advocating American isolation and accommodation to Soviet power is answered abroad by advocates of neutrality on the one hand, and of nuclear armament on the other.

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[1] ACDA *Arms Control Bulletin*.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 231–244.

Reviewing these studies and discussions, President Reagan therefore decided to make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles the first goal of our arms control effort, and the first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union. These weapons are swift, accurate, destructive, and numerous. No defenses qualify their capacity to destroy, and no American weapon compares in destructive power to the heavy Soviet missiles. We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs in 1972. In 1982, the Soviets have a lead in this crucial area of approximately three to one. It follows that they have the capacity to destroy our ICBMs and other nuclear forces with a fraction of their forces, holding the rest in an ominous reserve which could paralyze our airborne and seaborne strategic forces. Until this Soviet bulge in nuclear power is eliminated, either by arms control or by American modernization efforts,—until, that is, a presumptive Soviet first strike ceases to be plausible, and the Soviet strategic arsenal is confined to the role of deterrence—it will not be possible to restore political stability.

The New York Times recently put the issue well in an editorial entitled "How Much is Enough?" The task of arms control diplomacy, the *Times* said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence, "which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history" and "to forbid the weapons which defy deterrence . . . . That done, the arms race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough."

This view of the matter is the basis for our approach both to the INF talks now going on in Geneva and the START talks the President proposed on Sunday. What we are seeking in these talks, which are closely related in subject matter, is to achieve stability at equal and much lower levels of force—a posture on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy would allow deterrence by the threat of retaliation, but deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on its superiority in ground-based intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In the INF talks, as you know, we have proposed that all the Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles be dismantled. In exchange, we would not deploy our 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe, pursuant to the NATO decision of 1979. [3]

The Soviet Union has bitterly attacked our INF proposal as unfair, in that it would require the Soviets to make a larger reduction than we would be called upon to make. This is hardly the case, since the sacrifice of future weapons is not really different from dismantling existing arsenals. But even if it were true, it would be irrelevant. Arms control negotiations are not bargains among peasants haggling over the price of potatoes. The Soviet Union and the United States, the two leading nuclear powers, are trustees for humanity, and should do whatever is necessary to help lift the cloud of war from the horizon of the future. I am glad to note that six months after President Reagan's speech of November 18 on the intermediate range missiles, [4] European and American opinion, and opinion throughout the Western world, solidly supports the principle of our INF proposals as altogether fair and equitable. After all, no state has a right we must acknowledge to build a military force which could be used only for purposes of aggression.

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[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 814–816.

The President's proposals for the START negotiations are equally sound and equitable. They propose equal ceilings at much lower levels of force—ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles, such a result would genuinely reduce the risk of war, while maintaining an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, two-stage approach to strategic arms reductions. Our START plan is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The focus of our efforts," the President said at Eureka College, "will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles—the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential." [5] The US will propose that, at the end of the first stage, ballistic missile warheads be reduced to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. Furthermore, to enhance stability, we will propose that no more than half these warheads be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw weight. Our proposal will call for these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of US and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current US levels.

In both phases of the START talks, we will insist on verification measures capable of assuring compliance. In the case of provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, we will propose cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that can provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has already assured us—and Mr. Brezhnev has said publicly—that it will accept reasonable verification procedures of this kind to supplement national technical means of verification.

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[4] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[5] *Ante*, May 9.

The broad principles outlined by the President at Eureka College provide a sound and promising basis for the negotiations ahead.

—They give priority to the acute threat to peace and stability posed by the massive buildup of Soviet ballistic missile forces, particularly ICBM capabilities.

—They are fair and balanced. They are based on the principle of equality and aimed at ensuring that each side will have an equal capacity for deterrence. Surely both sides have a powerful incentive to achieve greater stability at equal and substantially reduced force levels.

—Their approach to phasing is practical and realistic. The task of reducing and restructuring US and Soviet forces in order to achieve a more stable balance will take a substantial period of time.

We look forward to the START negotiations, and hope the talks can begin by the end of June.

We also look forward to the second round of the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces which begins next week in Geneva. The first round was devoted to detailed and serious discussions aimed at gaining a clearer understanding of each side's point of view. In this respect, the round was useful, although we cannot yet say there has been progress in reconciling what are still sharply divergent approaches. But, given the pattern of Soviet negotiating practice, there is nothing remarkable in this state of affairs at this point in the cycle.

The US and its NATO allies remain firmly committed to the proposal advanced by the President on November 18 for the complete elimination of long-range INF missiles. I remain hopeful that with continued NATO unity and allegiance to the sound dual-track approach of modernization and arms control—together with greater realism and flexibility by the Soviet side—we can begin to achieve concrete progress in the INF negotiations as the START negotiations proceed.

President Reagan's proposals in START and INF are central elements of the Administration's approach to promoting a more peaceful and secure world. We are fully aware, of course, that alternative approaches to strategic arms control have been advanced in various parts of the country and, indeed, by several members of the Congress.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Administration opposes the idea of a nuclear freeze at current force levels in all its forms.

—By halting our current modernization efforts, such a freeze would perpetuate serious vulnerabilities that have developed in our deterrent posture and therefore freeze a situation of considerable instability.

—It would remove any incentive the Soviets might have to accept the substantial reductions we are seeking both in START and INF.

—And a freeze would constitute, in effect, a unilateral US renunciation of the joint NATO decision of 1979 to modernize Western intermediate-range forces. It would therefore adversely affect allied confidence in US leadership and steadfastness.

What I say about a freeze at current levels applies a fortiori to proposals to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, even if Soviet tanks were rolling across the German plains towards the English Channel.

The American pledge to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend our allies against Soviet aggression has been the basis for the recovery and cultural renaissance of Western Europe, Japan, and many other parts of the world since 1945. For thirty five years, it has been the counterweight to Soviet superiority in manpower, tanks, and other conventional arms. The policy recommended by Mr. McNamara and his friends would deprive NATO of much of its essential credibility. And it would give a new and terrifying impetus to the process of nuclear weapons proliferation.

We are also aware of the interest of some Members of Congress in resurrecting the SALT II Treaty.[6] Advocates of this approach point out that neither the US nor the Soviet Union is currently acting in a way that would undermine existing agreements, and recommend that this situation be formalized.

It is true that both sides are refraining from actions that would undercut SALT II. It is normal practice not to rock the boat unduly during negotiations; and for the time being, it is in the US interest to maintain those mutual constraints. But the ratification of SALT II would be an altogether different matter.

—For the remainder of the Treaty's duration, ratification would legitimize critical Soviet advantages, particularly the buildup in hard-target ICBM capabilities allowed by SALT II. For that reason alone, it would make it impossible for the United States to solve its most urgent security problem; on the contrary, ratification of SALT II would make that problem worse.

—Having SALT II formally in effect would provide a convenient excuse for the Soviets not to negotiate seriously and expeditiously on an agreement actually *reducing* strategic capabilities to *equal* levels.

—Formalizing SALT II would be portrayed by the Soviets as this Administration's endorsement of the idea that the Treaty's framework and basic concepts provide for equality. But they do not: that is why we are proposing new units of limitation in START, based primarily on the number of weapons and their destructive capacity. If we ratified SALT II, we should be in a much weaker position to seek a more equitable framework for START. Those who advocate applying a few quick fixes to SALT II and calling it START are not advancing the national interest.

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[6] The text of the SALT II Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

For these reasons, as well as our continuing fundamental objections to other key elements of the Treaty itself, we oppose ratification of SALT II. SALT II is behind us; we must look ahead. We should focus our energies on achieving real reductions. A prolonged debate on SALT II would only frustrate this objective.

In conclusion, I should like to say that I am hopeful that we now have an historic opportunity to make substantial progress toward reducing Soviet and US nuclear capabilities in a balanced and verifiable way. But if we are to seize this opportunity, we must proceed with determination down two mutually reinforcing paths: we must continue our efforts to make our deterrent forces more secure and credible, while at the same time negotiating vigorously and imaginatively to achieve agreements that, for the first time, promote real stability at levels much lower than exist today.

There has been much talk in the press and in Congress about the "acceptability" or "negotiability" of the principles and guidelines President Reagan has just proposed. Predicting Soviet behavior is not easy, and I am not the seventh son of a seventh son. On this subject, I admire people who can tell us with such assurance exactly what the Soviet Union will and will not accept. On this slippery and elusive subject, I think it is safe, however, to risk two propositions.

First, our proposal is fair. What we seek is in the common interest of mankind. No state can claim the right to coerce another.

Secondly, the Soviet Union did not achieve its advantage in ground launched ballistic missiles in a fit of absence of mind. It spent years of effort and billions of dollars in doing so. And it will give this advantage up only when it is convinced that the alternatives are worse. That is why we say that arms control agreements can only be understood in the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole. The President's speech at Eureka College offered the Soviet Union a far-reaching and permanent program of cooperation, as his Christmas broadcast did a few months ago. It also announced our unshakable determination to defend our interests, and to insist on the fundamental principle, pacta sunt servanda, agreements must be kept, as the bedrock on which peaceful international society is built.

Without the effective implementation of this policy, the essence of our national interest, we may make agreements, but there will be no peace. This is a truth often forgotten by those among us who believe that even a bad agreement with the Soviet Union is better than not having an agreement. For some who take this pernicious view, the situation is hopeless, and making a nuclear arms agreement is simply an act of submission to Soviet supremacy, an acceptance of vassalage on the best terms we can get. For others of this persuasion, perspectives are different. They share the illusion which Senator Muskie expressed on March 18—that negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control is in itself "a restraining influence" on Soviet behavior.

This view is wishful thinking and nothing more. But it is powerful and pervasive. We negotiated about arms control with the Soviet Union throughout the Seventies. It was a difficult period of the Cold War, not only in South East Asia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa, but in the development and deployment of many new and improved Soviet weapons systems. Of course we are in favor of negotiating with the Soviet Union about arms control and every other aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, we are doing so now in Geneva about intermediate range nuclear weapons. But we must not confuse hope with reality. And we must not fall into the treaty trap. Treaties alone do not keep the peace.

But the American people and their leaders are not going to lose their nerve or bend their knees. The threat we face can be countered by the methods of steady diplomacy backed by the calm deployment of deterrent force. We shall pursue arms control agreements with the Soviet Union based on the principle of equal deterrence—agreements which eliminate the destabilizing influence of the most threatening Soviet first-strike forces. But, as Secretary Haig commented the other day, it must be understood that nuclear arms control agreements are of no use if they make the world safe for conventional aggression.

Address by Soviet President Brezhnev: Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons in Europe and on Strategic Arms Reductions [Extract], May 18, 1982 [1]

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Dear friends! You are representatives of that part of our great people who are to shape the country's tomorrow and you more than anyone else are not indifferent to what the country's tomorrow will be. And not only for the Soviet people but for the whole of mankind as well. What is in store for the peoples—peaceful construction, no easy but lofty work to ensure more happy and worthy living conditions or the madness and nightmares of nuclear destruction?

The policy of the most aggressive forces of imperialism nowadays makes one put the question precisely in this way. An answer to it depends on how active and consistent the peaceloving countries' policy will be and on how firmly and concertedly the multimillion masses of people will come out against the course being pursued by the instigators of a new world war, in defence of peace on earth.

A session of the UN General Assembly is to open in New York in three weeks' time. A special one, entirely devoted to disarmament matters. The Soviet Union, for its part, will do everything for the session to be successful.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, May 18, 1982, FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, May 18, 1982, pp. R4–R6.

It is now not enough to speak of peace. Concrete and practical deeds are necessary. A key task today in this respect is to lower nuclear confrontation in Europe, nuclear confrontation which has reached the dangerous limits, and to cease further build-up of nuclear potentials there. One should prevent a real threat of outbreak of a world nuclear conflagration of any moment from coming about in Europe, where world wars originated twice already.

In Geneva soon, the USSR and the USA are to start a new round of negotiations on limiting nuclear armaments in Europe. We shall see how the Americans will conduct themselves—whether they will only take their time again, preparing for the deployment of missiles or will show a desire to reach agreement.

The Soviet proposals on this problem are known. We have declared for full elimination of all medium-range nuclear means in Europe; the West argued that that would mean to go too far. We have suggested reducing such means by more than two thirds; we are being told that this is too little. Well, let us look for mutually acceptable amounts—we are also ready for larger cuts—on a mutual basis, of course.

To facilitate the matters the Soviet Union unilaterally discontinued recently a further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR and decided to reduce a certain number of them. I can report that we are already effecting the reduction of a considerable number of such missiles.

These concrete peaceful actions of our country are regarded approvingly in the world. Some people in the West, however, try to question their importance, too.

It is being asserted, for example, that the decision adopted by the Soviet Union will not prevent us from continuing to deploy our missiles so as to secure that they, let it be from beyond the Urals, could 'reach' West European countries. I can say in all definiteness: No medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in places from which both the FRG and other countries of Western Europe could be within their reach.

A question is also being asked whether the decision adopted by us also envisages a unilateral freeze on the termination of preparation for the deployment of missiles. [Sentence as received. The Moscow Domestic Service in Russian version of Brezhnev's speech, carried at 0718 GMT, 18 May, renders the preceding phrase: . . . the decision adopted by us on a unilateral freeze also envisages the termination of preparation for the deployment of missiles.] Yes, it does envisage this, including an end to the construction of launching positions for such missiles.

One more remark. The government of the USA presses for securing that the USSR freeze, and eliminate altogether, such missiles deployed in the eastern part of our country. This is truly an absurd claim! It is possible to handle questions of missiles—their limitation and reduction. But only through negotiations with those in whose hands are the nuclear means which are opposed by our missiles. And again, of course, on the basis of reciprocity. We do not object to such negotiations. But, understandably, this is a separate question.

The destinies of war and peace in many respects depend on whether or not a Soviet-U.S. accord is reached on limiting and reducing strategic arms. An honest and fair accord, with no detriment to anyone's interests.

As for the Soviet Union, it has invariably come out in favour of the beginning of talks with the object of working out such an understanding without delay and without any strings attached. This is our position which has been, both in public and through diplomatic channels, made known to the American side.

President Reagan, on his part, has now declared that the United States is ready for the resumption of the talks. In our opinion, this is a step in the right direction. It is, however, important that the talks should begin immediately in the right key.

In the same speech the President said that the United States at the talks would be in favour of substantial reductions. Well, we have always been in favour of substantial reductions of strategic arms, there is no need to persuade us in this respect.

But if one looks at the essence of the ideas voiced by the United States President on such reductions, one notes unfortunately that the American position is absolutely unilateral in nature. Above all, because the United States would like in general to exclude from the talks the strategic arms it is now most intensively developing.

It is not without reason that competent people inside the United States immediately stated that this was an unrealistic position, cut off from life and perhaps simply an unsincere position. It is directly prejudicing the security of the USSR and at the same time leaves Washington a free hand in the implementation of American program of stockpiling strategic arms.

One can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that the position stated by the U.S. President is oriented not to searching for an agreement but to providing conditions for the continuation of Washington's attempts to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

What is needed for the talks to proceed successfully and to bring about an agreement?

To put it briefly, this requires, first, that the talks should actually pursue the aim of limiting and reducing strategic armaments rather than be a cover for the continued arms race and the breakdown of the existing parity.

Second, it is necessary that both sides should conduct them with due regard for each other's legitimate security interests and strictly in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security.

Lastly, it is necessary to preserve everything positive that has been achieved earlier. The talks do not start from scratch but a good deal of far from useless work has been done. This should not be overlooked.

We are convinced that only with this approach there can be any hope for reaching agreement on concrete measures to substantially reduce the strategic armaments of both sides.

It is likewise very important to effectively block all the channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race in any form. This means that the development of new types of strategic weapons should be either banned or restricted to the utmost by agreed upon characteristics.

We also have the following proposal:

We would be prepared to reach agreement that the strategic armaments of the USSR and the U.S. are frozen already now, as soon as the talks begin. Frozen quantitatively. And that their modernization is limited to the utmost.

It is also necessary that neither the USA nor the Soviet Union take such actions which would lead to an upsetting of the strategic situation. Such a freeze, an important thing by itself, would facilitate both headway and a radical limitation and reduction of strategic arms. [The Domestic Service version renders the preceding phrase: . . . would facilitate both headway toward a radical limitation and reduction of strategic arms.]

Such is, in brief, our position on the question of strategic weapons.

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North Atlantic Council Communique [Extracts], May 18, 1982 [1]

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2. The Allies are determined to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity in order to assure a balance of forces and to deter aggression and other forms of pressure. On this base, in the interest of peace and international stability, the Allies will persevere in their efforts to establish a more constructive East-West relationship aiming at genuine détente through dialogue and negotiation and mutually advantageous exchanges. Arms control and disarmament, together with deterrence and defence, are integral parts of Alliance security policy.

Substantial improvements in East-West relations depend, however, on the readiness of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries to exercise restraint and responsibility in deeds as well as in words. The continued build-up of Soviet forces across the full spectrum of military capability, the Soviet Union's aggression against the people of Afghanistan, its encouragement and support for martial law in Poland and its destabilizing activities elsewhere in the world contradict Soviet claims to peaceful intentions and weigh heavily on East-West relations.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1982), pp. 28–29. The Council met in Ministerial Session in Luxembourg, May 17 and 18.

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5. Soviet policies confirm the need for the Allies to make all necessary efforts to maintain a strong and credible defence. The Allies can preserve peace only if they have the capability and the will to defend themselves at any level in any region of the North Atlantic Treaty area. This requires a wide range of conventional and nuclear forces designed to persuade any potential aggressor that an attack would be repulsed and would expose him to risks out of all proportion to any advantages he might hope to gain. Deterrence has kept the peace in Europe for over thirty years, and this policy is still valid today. Moreover this policy is essential to bring the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on the reduction and control of armaments.

6. Members of the Alliance have put forward a broad series of proposals aimed at achieving concrete and far-reaching progress in a number of arms control and disarmament negotiations:

—in the context of CSCE, to seek confidence and security building measures covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;

—in the framework of MBFR, to establish equal collective ceilings to be achieved by manpower reductions on the basis of agreed data;

—as regards negotiations on nuclear arms, to eliminate totally United States and Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles and to make substantial reductions in their inter-continental strategic nuclear systems.

The Allies urge the Soviet Union to respond, without further delay, in a positive way to these proposals which are designed to improve security and achieve a military balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

7. The Allies welcome President Reagan's proposal to President Brezhnev to begin the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) by the end of June and urge the Soviet Union to respond positively. The United States intention to seek significant reductions in the strategic armaments of the two countries, particularly in the most destabilizing systems, is a far-reaching but realistic offer that would lead to a significant increase in strategic stability and thereby strengthen peace and international security. Within the START framework, and pursuant to the December 1979 decision [2] on intermediate-range nuclear forces modernization and arms control, [3] the United States is continu-

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[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

[3] In this connection, Greece reserved its position and expressed its views which were recorded in the Minutes. [Footnote in original.]

ing to negotiate with the Soviet Union in Geneva on the basis of an imaginative proposal for the limitation of their respective intermediate-range systems.

The United States negotiating approach offers the chance for fair and effective agreements. The Allies, who remain in close consultation with the United States, support its efforts to reach such agreements.

8. The Allies participating in the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions reaffirm their determination to work for an agreement that strengthens security and peace in Europe through force reductions to equal collective manpower levels in the area of reductions. For negotiations to succeed, it will be necessary for the East to co-operate in reaching agreement on existing force levels, and on adequate associated measures to enhance stability and to verify compliance.

9. The Allies remain committed to developing and strengthening the CSCE process but recognize the severe obstacles posed by persistent Eastern violations of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act,[4] most recently and flagrantly in Poland.

They hope that by the time the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting reconvenes in November, faith will have been restored in the implementation of the Final Act and that it will be possible to adopt a substantive and balanced concluding document covering all areas of the Final Act, including human rights, human contacts and information. They reaffirm their support for a Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe and for adoption at the Madrid meeting of a precise mandate for negotiations in an initial phase of confidence and security building measures that are militarily significant, binding, verifiable and applicable throughout the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

10. The Allies intend to play a constructive part at the forthcoming Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. They hope that discussion there will take full account of the need for openness and adequate verification provisions in all areas of arms control and disarmament. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will continue to work for concrete and verifiable agreements, including a total ban on all chemical weapons.

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[4] The arms control portion of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–305. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1975, pp. 323 ff.

White House Statement: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, May 18, 1982[5]

We welcome President Brezhnev's announced willingness to begin negotiations on substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arms.[6]

We will study Brezhnev's statement in detail, which we have not yet had a chance to do.

With regard to President Brezhnev's proposal to freeze strategic arms as soon as the talks begin:

—As we have said before, a freeze now would codify existing Soviet military advantages; and

—remove Soviet incentives to agree to the substantial reductions which President Reagan has identified as our primary objective in START.

With regard to Brezhnev's proposal to limit additional deployments of intermediate-range missiles:

—This appears to be little more than a reiteration of an earlier Soviet proposal to freeze the current nuclear imbalance in Europe.

—As such, it falls far short of President Reagan's proposal for the total elimination of longer range land-based IFN [*INF*?] missiles on both sides.

Interview With President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks [Extract], May 21, 1982[1]

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European Basing of Missiles

Q. Mr. President, in a few days you will be visiting the four major European partners of the United States in the Atlantic Alliance. Three of these, West Germany, Britain, and Italy, pledged to go ahead and modernize the nuclear weapons of NATO, a decision that was taken in December, 1979.[2] In fact, my country has already started work on our cruise missile bases. How do you assess the contribution of Italy and generally what's the prospect for productive negotiations in the area of intermediate nuclear forces?

The President. I must tell you we're very grateful to Italy for its forthrightness with which it stepped forward with regard to preparations for basing of those intermediate missiles.

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[5] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 24, 1982, p. 667.

[6] *Ante*, May 18.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 31, 1982, pp. 715–716. The President was interviewed by representatives of West European publications.

[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

We know why the missiles have been requested of us by NATO. There are 900 warheads on 300 SS-20 missiles the Soviets have targeted on all of Europe and nothing comparable to counter them. The NATO decision came for Pershing missiles and cruise missiles as a deterrent to prevent the Soviets continuing that monopoly. I know that politically in Europe this was a great problem in a number of countries because of the peace movement. Some people can't quite see that unilateral disarmament is not the road to peace. But Italy was very forthright in coming forth on the preparations. We appreciate it very much. I must also salute the West Germans, the British, and the Belgian Governments for their leadership on this critical issue. President Mitterrand also shares our deep concern over the Soviet buildup.

The very fact that countries of Western Europe have said they were willing to base these missiles and we were willing to provide them is why the Soviets agreed to go to Geneva to meet when I proposed—why don't we negotiate a total elimination of such weapons in Europe? We won't put in the Pershings and cruise missiles if they'll do away with the SS-20s. I don't think they would have ever come to negotiate had it not been for the imminence of that proposal—the fact that we are all going forward.

I would hope that before all those missiles are in place on our side, we would have negotiated an agreement in which they'll be unnecessary and the Soviets will remove theirs.

Strategic Arms Reduction

Q. Are you sanguine about the prospects of these negotiations? Can they be achieved apart and before, perhaps, a larger START agreement?

The President. We've completed our arrangements and proposals here to go forward with the START which has to do with the intercontinental missiles. Again, I believe that we're getting the evidence of willingness from the Soviet Union to at least negotiate, to talk, because we are going forward with the rebuilding of our own military and because our allies have shown their own determination on the intermediate weapons.

In recent years when we were letting our defenses crumble and were virtually unilaterally disarming, there was no incentive for the Soviet Union to meet us in any kind of arms reduction talks because they were engaged in the most massive buildup the world has ever seen at the same time we were apparently not willing to even try and keep pace. I think it was explained in a cartoon in one of our papers recently. It was Brezhnev speaking to a Russian general and he said, "I liked the arms race better when we were the only ones in it."

Q. Mr. President, your speech at Eureka on strategic arms,[3] your administration's previous commitment to the concept of linkage, the concept whereby you link arms control negotiations, East-West trade, summitry with the Soviet Union with political progress by the Soviet Union on things like Poland and Afghanistan—this was conspicuous by its absence. Does this mean that you've abandoned the principle of linkage?

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[3] For the speech, see *ante,* May 9.

The President. No, not at all. And let me point out that in the many times that I've spoken of that concept, I have never particularly linked it to something as specific as arms reductions talks. But it was done in the context of the summit meetings that have taken place with regard to trade and to features of détente. I view it in that context but that doesn't rule it out even for arms reduction talks. I could answer it very briefly. Much of what is concerned in that linkage, some of the very subjects you talked about, are not things that you headline in the paper. The fact that you do not proclaim such subjects or put them up there in the newspaper does not mean that they can't be brought up when you're sitting at a table. I think sometimes that politically to publicly discuss things of that kind makes it politically impossible to get them, where maybe in what I've called quiet diplomacy you secure them.

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Note Verbale From the U.S. Permanent Representative (Kirkpatrick) to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General: Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia, May 21, 1982 [1]

The Permanent Representative of the United States of America presents her compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform him that the United States has further information to provide pertaining to the use of chemical weapons in the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos.

In February 1982, the United States Government received reports that the Vietnamese had conducted a chemical attack at Tuol Chrey, Kampuchea, on 13 February 1982. It is now in a position to provide information, based on analyses of blood samples collected less than 24 hours after the attack, and other human samples, including urine, which is consistent with trichothecene exposure and indicates exposure to a high concentration of T-2 toxin. Specifically, blood and urine samples taken from four victims of the 13 February attack were found to contain T-2 toxin; samples from two of the four also contained its metabolite, HT-2 toxin.

According to eyewitness accounts, the attack occurred following a day-long battle between resistance fighters and Vietnamese forces.

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[1] A/37/234.

Victims reported that the agent was delivered by Vietnamese troops firing 105 mm. artillery shells. Symptoms experienced by those affected included severe eye irritation, prolonged and repeated vomiting episodes, difficult breathing, trembling and severe diarrhea. A first-hand account of this chemical attack, and its results, was provided to *Washington Post* correspondent William Branigin and carried in an article in that paper on 6 March 1982.

Blood samples were taken from two of the victims less than 24 hours after the attack. Blood drawn from Victim A (Prak Reth) showed a level of 18 parts per billion p.p.b. T-2 toxin and 22 p.p.b. HT-2 toxin. Blood from Victim B (Pen Nom) showed levels of 11 p.p.b. of T-2 toxin and 10 p.p.b. of HT-2 toxin. A urine sample from Pen Nom collected on 16 February 1982 was found to contain a trace quantity of T-2 toxin and 18 p.p.b. of HT-2 toxin. These levels are indicative of high levels of toxin exposure.

Additional blood samples were also drawn from Prak Reth and five other victims on 3 March 1982, by a private American physician, Dr. Amos Townsend. Two of the five other individuals who provided samples had detectable levels of toxin still circulating in their blood 18 days after the attack (7 p.p.b. T-2 toxin and 3 p.p.b. T-2 toxin, respectively).

Analyses of blood samples from four control individuals of similar age and background who had not been subjected to chemical attack were negative for the presence of trichothecene mycotoxins. Additional control samples and additional samples from these victims are currently under analysis.

All samples were submitted for analysis on a coded, blind basis, accompanied by appropriate positive and negative controls, to Dr. Chester Mirocha of the University of Minnesota. After extraction, all samples were analysed for products of T-2 metabolism by selected ion monitoring of the corresponding trifluoracetylacetamide derivatives in a HP-5985B gas chromatograph mass spectrometer data system. All analyses were made using positive chemical ionization in methane. Major fragments of T-2 in chemical ionization were 401 and 563; and HT-2 fragments in chemical ionization were 455 and 617.

Positive identification of T-2 toxin and its breakdown product, HT-2, in the blood and urine of these individuals provides further confirmatory evidence of recent exposure to trichothecenes. The unusually high body-fluid levels of toxin (up to 22 p.p.b.) indicate exposure to a high concentration of toxin.

The symptoms attributed by these victims to the chemical agent with which they were attacked on 13 February 1982 are consistent with those caused by trichothecenes. Samples of blood from control individuals of closely matched age and background history who had not been exposed to the chemical agent contained no trichothecenes. Environmental control samples of vegetation, soil, water, corn and rice in the region also were found to contain no trichothecenes. These results indicate that these trichothecenes are not prevalent in the area and that exposure to these toxins in the natural environment is extremely unlikely. In addition, five samples from four separate "yellow rain"-associated chemical attacks in Laos and in Kampuchea have previously been shown to contain abnormally high levels of trichothecene mycotoxins. These facts, taken together, provide conclusive evidence that these trichothecene mycotoxins are components of the chemical agents known in Laos and Kampuchea as "yellow rain". Identification of the other components, including additional toxic molecules and man-made additives such as carrier-molecules, surfactants and possible skin penetrants, is continuing.

The detectable presence of T-2 toxin in the blood of victims 18 days after an attack indicates not only exposure to extremely high levels of toxin, but also seems to indicate further the presence of a storage mechanism for the toxin within the body (as suggested after analyses of earlier blood samples). T-2 toxin is known to bind very strongly to certain cellular constituents, especially the sulfhydryl groups of some proteins (see review by Ueno in *Mycotoxins in Human and Animal Health*, Pathotox Publishers, Inc., Park Forest, Illinois, 1977, pp. 189–207). Therefore, although most of the toxin would be expected to be excreted within 24 hours, small amounts may bind strongly to proteins which remain circulating in the blood for much longer periods of time. The binding characteristic of the toxin may be an important factor in its long-term toxicity, and further scientific study is warranted.

The failure to detect HT-2 toxin in the blood samples collected 18 days after the attack when T-2 toxin was still present may be attributable to differences in the binding characteristics of T-2 and HT-2. It may also of course be attributed to differences in detection capabilities for the two toxins, since levels of T-2 toxin found 18 days after attack were on the threshold of detection limits, and analysis for HT-2 is considerably more difficult. Analysis of additional blood and urine samples from victims should provide the important data necessary to clarify the pattern of distribution, metabolism and excretion of these toxins in humans.

In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 35/144 C of 12 December 1980 and 36/96 C of 9 December 1981, the Permanent Representative of the United States of America requests that this information be provided to the United Nations Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons. Additionally, the Permanent Representative again requests that this submission be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 54 of the preliminary list.

As it has done in the past, the United States will continue to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and the Group of Experts, and will do its utmost to provide additional information and evidence, as it becomes available, and any further appropriate assistance which might facilitate the task of the experts.

Interview of Secretary of State Haig on CBS–TV "Face the Nation": Strategic Arms Reductions [Extract], May 23, 1982 [1]

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Q. There is a report that President Brezhnev has replied to President Reagan's letter about the start of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Could you tell us if that letter goes much beyond what he said in his public speech? [2]

A. I don't think it serves a useful purpose to lay out detailed exchanges in diplomatic channels between heads of state and heads of government. I will confirm there has been a reply. I will also suggest that we anticipate through diplomatic channels—that's at State Department level—to confirm, hopefully before too long, a date for the resumption of our START negotiations.

Q. The letter did not, then, contain a date in itself?

A. Now you're dragging me into disclosures which I don't think, as a matter of practice, is good diplomacy.

Q. What about your possible meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko? Would you expect that by that time or at that time you would set a date for the start of these START talks?

A. It's too early to say, and I don't want to even suggest there has been a meeting confirmed with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York at the disarmament conference, which I'm sure you're referring to.

Q. Yes.

A. There have been some informal discussions at diplomatic levels about the possibility of such a meeting. We, on our part, would welcome it. But that itself has not been fixed.

Q. I'm not exactly trying to drag you into disclosure, but would like to try on another level something which I'm sure every American is concerned about, and that is, in these interchanges, do you detect some motion on the part of the Soviet Union, something that gives the United States reason to be somewhat more sanguine than in the past about arms reduction?

A. I think the response of the Soviets to the President's speech at Eureka College, [3] the public response, Mr. Brezhnev's speech to the *Komsomol,* was basically encouraging. It was also replete with a number of self-serving posturing statements of a propagandistic character.

Q. Soviet boilerplate.

A. Yes, especially as we get into the European-American mutual interest on so-called INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] [4] talks.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* July 1982, pp. 53–54.

[2] The speech, May 18, is printed *ante.*

[3] *Ante,* May 9.

[4] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Q. But you see some reason, some psychological movement, so to speak?

A. Yes, I think from two points of view. Mr. Brezhnev in his speech welcomed the early resumption of talks in general and also accepted the principle of substantial reductions in levels of armaments. One can only be encouraged by that.

Q. You were critical, as was the Administration as a whole, about his proposal for a freeze in strategic weapons at the time the START talks would begin. Some people have suggested that, actually, since the Soviets have a very active program right now, a freeze would not hurt the United States but, in fact, might help it hold off further Soviet programs. But you don't see the logic in that?

A. Not only don't we see the logic, why, we see the counterlogic. The simple facts are that a freeze would lock the United States into positions of inferiority in key areas. No place is that more true than in the Western European nuclear environment, where we are facing some 900 warheads on 300 new mobile systems, with the West having no counterpart whatsoever. Anyone who would suggest that entering into negotiations under such a frozen disadvantage would be an incentive for progress in the arms control I think has somewhat misplaced his logic.

Q. I don't want to get locked into initials here, but the talks you just referred to are on medium-range missiles. As I understood Mr. Brezhnev's proposal, it was for a freeze in the strategic or longer range systems.

A. He has proposed both, as you know—for both systems. As a matter of fact, his speech seemed almost to preoccupy itself with the European arms control question.

Q. Let me ask you something, as an amateur. I mean, these two gentlemen cover the State Department a good deal, and they are used to the language which is somewhat foreign to me. I'm a little bit puzzled—

A. Sometimes it's foreign to me, too. [Laughter]

Q. Foreign to you. Very well. On one hand, I hear you say that SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II is dead in the water; on the other hand, I hear you say that we're observing SALT II. And I'm a little puzzled as to what it means.[5]

A. It means simply that there are certain restraints associated with the SALT II discussions and the draft treaty which both sides continue to abide by.

Q. Not all of them?

A. Not at all. Neither side has entered into the reductions that were visualized. And I made the point in my recent Senate testimony. There is no contradiction in such a thing. Clearly, there were many good aspects of SALT II, and it's in the interest of the United States—and it has thus far been in the Soviets' interest—to maintain those restraints because it provides an international backdrop of greater confidence on which to proceed into the START negotiations.

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[5] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Q. Why, then, would it not make some sense to go ahead and ratify SALT II, start from there and move on to what you want, which is reductions?

A. For the simple reason that we felt that SALT II is badly flawed, badly flawed in a number of areas. It permitted the Soviet Union unusual advantage in the heavy intercontinental missile area. Secondly, there were deficiencies in the verification aspects. Thirdly, there was no Backfire bomber restraint—in other words, it ran free for the Soviet Union.

To go through the processes of ratifying this controversial, flawed treaty would be a detriment to our ability to move on promptly and rapidly with the START negotiations. Beyond that, it would lock in these flaws. And it's a very different thing to start a new kind of negotiation against a backdrop of unresolved issues than to have these disadvantages locked into a formal treaty and then have to work back, as SALT II would seek to do.

Q. If I understand you correctly, then you are willing to accept certain parts of SALT II as having already been negotiated, not necessarily take those in treaty form, but incorporate those parts that are acceptable to you into the START talks. Is that correct?

A. No, that's not correct. What I am saying is that there are certain constraints that were visualized and agreed to in SALT II, and that as long as the Soviet Union continues to abide by those constraints—and thus far they seem to be—we are inclined to do the same thing. But it does not mean that this is an inherent aspect of the START negotiations, which are clear and clean in their own right, and visualize, as the President said, substantial reductions on both sides.

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Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983, May 26, 1982 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 3467) to authorize appropriations under the Arms Control and

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[1] *Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1982: Report . . .*, May 26, 1982 (S. Rept. 97-430; 97th Cong., 2d sess.). For the report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 184-195. The legislation was approved by the President on Oct. 15, *post*.

Disarmament Act, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

PRIMARY PURPOSES

The principal purpose of H.R. 3467 is to authorize appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983. The sum authorized for fiscal year 1982 is $18,268,000, and the sum of $19,893,852 for fiscal year 1983. In each case the sum authorized includes such additional amounts, for each such fiscal year, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

The bill also amends Section 45(a) to streamline security review procedures. The bill also authorizes the Agency to conduct research, development and other studies in regard to all aspects of anti-satellite activities.

COMMITTEE ACTION

Senator Percy introduced, by request, on April 10, 1981, S. 991, to authorize appropriations under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and for other purposes. A hearing was held on the authorization bill on April 8, 1981. The principal witness for the Agency was the Acting Deputy Director, Michael Pillsbury.

The Administration had asked $16,768,000 for fiscal year 1982 and "such sums as may be necessary." Previous Agency authorizations were $18,876,000 for fiscal year 1980 and $20,645,000 for fiscal year 1981.

Administration funding requests—fiscal years 1982 and 1983 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Fiscal year 1981 authorization	$20,645
Fiscal year 1981 appropriation (CR)	17,000
Revised fiscal year 1982 request	16,768
Revised fiscal year 1983 request	([1])
Committee fiscal year 1982 recommendations	18,268
Committee fiscal year 1983 recommendations	([1])

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[1] Such sums as may be necessary.

Senators Percy, Pell, and Cranston recommended to the Committee that the authorized amount for fiscal year 1982 be increased from $16,768,000 to $18,268,000—an increase of $1.5 million. Even with the increase, the amount would be substantially less than amounts authorized by Congress previously—$18.9 million for fiscal year 1980 and $20.6 million for fiscal year 1981. The Committee agreed to the increase to $18,268,000 for fiscal year 1982 and "such sums as may be necessary" for fiscal year 1983. According to testimony received by the Committee, an additional $1.5 million would probably be needed for major arms limitation negotiations for fiscal year 1982. The Committee concluded that this amount should be authorized so that the Administration will be able to move ahead with negotiations when it decides to do so. While the impetus for the increase was to allow adequate spending for resumed negotiations, the Committee was also mindful of the requirement the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have sufficient funds for strategic arms limitation-related research, and work related to monitoring and verification of arms limitation agreements.

The Executive Branch had also asked that Section 45(a) of the Act be amended to permit the use of results of security investigations conducted by the Departments of Defense and State in clearing persons detailed from other agencies.

The Committee agreed to the amendment.

Senator Pressler proposed an amendment to specify that the Agency is authorized to conduct research, development, and other studies in regard to all aspects of anti-satellite activities. In offering this section, Senator Pressler noted the importance of discussions in regard to antisatellite limitations and urged that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's responsibilities clearly include the very important issue of arms control in outer space. The Committee adopted this provision.

The Committee marked up the proposed legislation on May 4, 1981.

On May 5, 1981, the Committee agreed to report an original bill authorizing appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as the Department of State, the International Communication Agency, and the Board for International Broadcasting by a record vote of 13 to 0. The following Senators recorded votes in favor of reporting the bill: Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, and Cranston. S. 1193 was passed by the Senate on June 18, 1981. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency portion was approved as reported by the Committee.

The House did not include its Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization in the comparable House bill. Instead, the House treated the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization as separate legislation. It was reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs May 19, 1981, past the House on June 8, 1981 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 25, 1982.

At a meeting of conferees on S. 1193 on April 29, 1982, it was agreed that the Senate and the House would act on the separate House bill, H.R. 3467, with regard to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency authorization.

The Committee marked up the bill on May 6, 1982. The Committee agreed to incorporate the Senate amendment on anti-satellite research into the bill and to delete the House provision which would have renamed the Agency. The Committee decided to accept the House recommended authorization for fiscal year 1983 of $19,893,000 in lieu of the previous Senate provision of "such sums as may be necessary."

The increase of approximately $1.6 million over fiscal year 1982 authorization represents a modest increase of less than nine percent. It was pointed out by Senator Pell in the markup that present Agency spending strictures have become so severe that the Agency is being forced to consider such options as closing down the computer operations and closing the library. The Committee ordered H.R. 3467 reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute unanimously by voice vote.

Committee Comments

The Committee welcomes the President's new initiative for an early convening of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Clearly, there is strong bipartisan support for a renewed effort to put a cap on the nuclear arms race and to achieve mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals. The Administration has declared its intention to substantial strides in both START and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces negotiations.

Members noted that ACDA is the only agency in the national security sphere within the Executive Branch which is enduring budgetary and personnel cutbacks. When this was pointed out in a hearing with ACDA Director, Eugene Rostow, he agreed that funding was very tight. Present plans of the Office of Management and Budget call for reductions in the ACDA spending from approximately $16.7 million this fiscal year to about $15.2 million in fiscal year 1983. As a result, ACDA full time personnel levels are shrinking from about 300 several years ago to 165 presently and perhaps 154 in fiscal year 1983. To some Members, such a tight budget runs directly counter to the President's arms control initiatives and may serve to undermine them. Since the agency covers the basic cost of the START and INF negotiations—both of which are expected to be in session in 1982 and 1983—ACDA faces real challenges without the necessary funds clearly in prospect. Many Members of the Committee are concerned that such budgetary strictures may soon force the Agency to the point at which it can not function effectively internally or within the national security sphere.

Accordingly, the Committee is maintaining in this authorization its longstanding commitment to ensuring adequate funding for the Agency and for important arms control efforts in which it is involved.

Section-by-Section Analysis

FIRST SECTION—SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1982".

SECTION 2—AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

This section would amend section 49(a) of the ACDA Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) to authorize appropriations for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal years 1982 and 1983. The Administration asked the sum of $16,768,000 for fiscal year 1982 and "such sums as may be necessary" for fiscal year 1983. The Agency's current two-year authorization is $18,876,000 for fiscal year 1980 and $20,645,000 for fiscal year 1981. This section authorizes $18,268,000 for fiscal year 1982 and $19,893,852 for fiscal year 1983. In all instances these amounts are plus additional amounts "as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other non-discretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates."

SECTION 3—SECURITY CLEARANCES

This section amends section 45(a) of the ACDA Act (22 U.S.C. 2585(a)) to permit the Agency, in the case of persons detailed to the Agency from other Government agencies, to use the results of security investigations conducted by the Departments of Defense and State.

The Agency has 44 reimbursable positions which are filled by individuals detailed to the Agency, primarily active duty military officers from the Department of Defense and career Foreign Service officers from the Department of State. Each year there is approximately a one-third turnover among these detailees and each year the Agency must wait many months for officers being detailed from the Departments of Defense and State to report for duty, even though these officers generally are middle to senior grade career officers with many years of service, who hold high-level clearances and often come to the Agency after working on highly sensitive issues.

The reason for this delay is that, as presently written section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act requires the Director of the Agency to arrange full-field background investigations through the Civil Service Commission (now the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)), for all new employees, including "persons detailed from other Government agencies". Based on the results of that investigation, the Director must determine prior to the detailee's entry on duty that the detailee is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. While all career Foreign Service officers and most military officers hold Top Secret clearances, these clearances are based on full-field background investigations conducted by their own agencies. However, at present the Director is precluded from using the results of a full-field background security and loyalty investigation conducted by the Department of Defense or the Department of State for a security clearance determination, because the wording of section 45(a) requires the investigation to be conducted by OPM.

As a result, the Agency must request a new OPM investigation, which takes an average of four months to complete, for every military and Foreign Service officer detailed to the Agency, regardless of whether the individual has been previously investigated by the Department of Defense or the Department of State. Since the service of such detailees is often required on short notice, to staff or backstop delegations to international negotiations or to provide special technical expertise to the Agency, the lengthy delays required for the duplicate investigation required by the Act hamper the Agency in the efficient conduct of its business. The proposed legislation will permit the Agency to accept detailees on the basis of investigations conducted by their own agencies until an update investigation can be completed, if necessary. This is comparable to the practice of most other national security agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State.

With this amendment, the Director will have the option of determining that a proposed military or Foreign Service detailee is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty and allowing him to enter on duty if an evaluation of the results of the full-field background investigation conducted by the Department of Defense or the Department of State justifies such action.

SECTION 4—ANTISATELLITE ACTIVITIES

This section amends section 31(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to specify that the Agency is authorized to conduct research, development, and other studies in regard to all aspects of anti-satellite activities. In offering this section, Senator Presler noted the importance of discussions in regard to anti-satellite limitations and urged that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's responsibilities clearly include the very important issue of arms control in outer space.

COST ESTIMATE

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the following estimates of the cost of this original bill, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., May 18, 1982.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act, the Congressional Budget Office has prepared the attached cost estimate for H.R. 3467, the Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1981, as ordered reported on May 11, 1982.

Should the Committee so desire, we would be pleased to provide further details on this estimate.

Sincerely,

ALICE M. RIVLIN, *Director.*

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

MAY 18, 1982

Bill number: H.R. 3467.

Bill title: Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of

Bill status: As ordered reported by the Senate Committee on
gn Relations on May 11, 1982.

Bill purpose: This legislation authorizes appropriations under the
Control and Disarmament Act for fiscal years 1982 and 1983,
otherwise amends the Act.

Cost estimate:

[By fiscal year, in millions of dollars]

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
function 150:					
thorization amount	18.3	19.9	0		
ss current appropriation	—16.8	0			
Net authorization	1.5	19.9			
Estimated outlays	.8	18.2	4.0	1.5	
function 920:					
timated authorization level	.5	.7			
timated outlays	.5	.7	([1])		

s than $50,000.

Basis for estimate: The estimate assumes enactment of this legis-
by June 15, 1982 and subsequent appropriation of the additional
nt authorized. The net authorization for fiscal year 1982 is the
nt authorized in this legislation less the amount provided for the
Control and Disarmament Agency in the Continuing Appropria-
Act for fiscal year 1982, Public Law 97-92. Outlays are estimated
historical outlay rates. Additional pay and employee benefits
ated in budget-function 920 are based on the pay and benefit
implicit in the authorization amount and baseline pay raise
ptions for fiscal year 1983.

stimate comparison: None.

Previous CBO estimate: The CBO estimate for this bill as report-
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 13, 1981 assumed
ppropriation of the 1982 authorization.

stimate prepared by: Joe Whitehill.

Estimate approved by:

JAMES L. BLUM,
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

In accordance with rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has evaluated the regulatory impact of the bill and has concluded that the legislation provides for no new regulatory activity.

Changes in Existing Law

In compliance with paragraph 11 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

Arms Control and Disarmament Act, As Amended

* * * * * * *

APPROPRIATION

Sec. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

[(1) for the fiscal year 1980, $18,876,000, and
[(2) for the fiscal year 1981, $20,645,000,

and such additional amounts, for each such fiscal year, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.]

"(1) for the fiscal year 1982, $18,268,000.
"(2) for the fiscal year 1983, $19,893,852, and year, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended."

* * * * * * *

Sec. 45. (a) The Director shall establish such security and loyalty requirements, restrictions, and safeguards as he deems necessary in the interest of the national security and to carry out the provisions of this Act. Except as provided in subsection (d) the Director shall arrange with the Civil Service Commission for the conduct of full-field background security and loyalty investigations of all the Agency's officers, employees, consultants, persons detailed from other Government agencies, members of its General Advisory Committee, advisory boards,

ntractors and subcontractors, and their officers and employees,
tual or prospective. In the event the investigation discloses informa-
on indicating that the person investigated may be or may become a
curity risk, or may be of doubtful loyalty, the report of the investi-
ation shall be turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a
ll-field investigation. *In the case of persons detailed from other Government*
encies, the Director may accept the results of full-field background security and
yalty investigations conducted by the Defense Investigative Service or the Department
State as the basis for the determination required under this subsection that the
rson is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty. The final results of all such
vestigations shall be turned over to the Director for final determina-
on. Except as provided in subsection (d), no person shall be permit-
d to enter on duty as such as officer, employee, consultant, or
ember of advisory committee or board, or pursuant to any such
etail, and no contractor or subcontractor, or officer or employee
ereof shall be permitted to have access to any classified information,
ntil he shall have been investigated in accordance with this subsec-
on and the report of such investigations made to the Director, and
e Director shall have determined that any such person is not a
ecurity risk or of doubtful loyalty. Standards applicable with respect
the security clearance of persons within any category referred to in
is subsection shall not be less stringent, and the investigation of
uch persons for such purposes shall not be less intensive or complete,
han in the case of such clearance of persons in a corresponding
ategory under the security procedures of the Government agency or
gencies having the highest security restrictions with respect to per-
ons in such category.

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RESEARCH

Sec. 31. The Director is authorized and directed to exercise his
owers in such manner as to insure the acquisition of a fund of
heoretical and practical knowledge concerning disarmament. To this
nd, the Director is authorized and directed, under the direction of the
resident, (1) to insure the conduct of research, development, and
ther studies in the field of arms control and disarmament; (2) to
make arrangements (including contracts, agreements, and grants) for
he conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of
rms control and disarmament by private or public institutions or
persons; and (3) to coordinate the research, development, and other
studies conducted in the field of arms control and disarmament by or
for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures estab-
lished under section 35 of this Act. In carrying out his responsibilities
under this Act, the Director shall, to the maximum extent feasible,
make full use of available facilities, Government and private. The
authority of the Director with respect to research, development, and

other studies shall be limited to participation in the following insofar as they relate to arms control and disarmament:

(a) the detection, identification, inspection, monitoring, limitation, reduction, control, and elimination of armed forces and armaments, including thermonuclear, nuclear, missile, conventional, bacteriological, chemical, and radiological weapons;

(b) the techniques and systems of detecting, identifying, inspecting, and monitoring of tests of nuclear, thermonuclear, and other weapons **[;]**, *and of all aspects of anti-satellite activities;*

Twelfth Semiannual Report by President Reagan to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, December 1, 1981–May 31, 1982: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], May 31, 1982 [1]

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The Helsinki Final Act and its document on military confidence-building measures (CBM's) commit all signatory states to give prior notification of major military maneuvers, defined as those involving more than 25,000 ground troops. The Final Act also encourages signatories to undertake other CBM's voluntarily, including the invitation of observers to maneuvers, exchange of military visits, prior notification of smaller scale maneuvers (those having fewer than 25,000 troops), and prior notification of major military movements. [2]

Since 1975, all CSCE participants holding military maneuvers of more than 25,000 ground troops have provided prior notification of those maneuvers. "Soyuz-81," a large Soviet exercise, was not notified under CSCE and raised a question in this regard. Further, the information in notifications issued by Eastern states has normally been minimal.

With regard to smaller scale maneuvers, a number of NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned states have given prior notification. In the East, however, only Hungary has given notification of smaller scale maneuvers.

Over the past years, the NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned states have been forthcoming in extending invitations to observers, and in allowing observers the opportunity to understand and follow the maneuvers. NATO members have invited observers to 16 of their 21 major military maneuvers. The Eastern states have invited observers to 7 of their 15 major military maneuvers. Moreover, opportunities provided observers at Eastern maneuvers to view activities remain restricted, particularly in comparison with the treatment accorded observers at Western and Neutral/Non-Aligned maneuvers.

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[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 100, p. 19.

[2] The confidence-building measures of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 305–307.

Prior Notification of Major Military Maneuvers

NATO members conducted no major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops during the reporting period, nor did any Neutral/Non-Aligned state.

One major military maneuver was conducted by an Eastern state, and prior notification was made. Czechoslovakia notified the maneuver "Druzhba-82," involving some 25,000 Czech, Soviet, and Hungarian forces, held in Czechoslovakia from January 25-30. Observers were not invited.

Prior Notification of Smaller Scale Maneuvers

Only Sweden notified a smaller scale maneuver during the reporting period. The maneuver "Norrsken" was held in Sweden from February 28-March 11, involving approximately 23,000 Swedish troops. Observers were invited.

Exchange of Military Visits

Signatory states are encouraged by the Final Act to promote exchanges among their military personnel. There were no such exchanges between the United States and Eastern signatories during this reporting period.

Questions Relating to Disarmament

The Final Act makes no provisions for arms control negotiations but does express the belief of the signatories in the necessity of effective arms control. With respect to security matters directly related to Europe, the United States:

•Participated in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva on the subject of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), in which the United States tabled a draft treaty proposing the elimination of all longer range U.S. and Soviet INF missiles;

•Consulted closely with the Allies regarding the implementation of all aspects of the December 1979 decision by NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers on modernization and arms control involving INF;[3] and

•Participated in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations (MBFR) in Vienna.

•Proposed to begin Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) with the Soviet Union.

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[3] For the decision, see *ibid., 1979*, pp. 814-816.

Remark by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction [Extract], May 31, 1982[4]

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In the quest for peace, the United States has proposed to the Soviet Union that we reduce the threat of nuclear weapons by negotiating a stable balance at far lower levels of strategic forces. This is a fitting occasion to announce that START, as we call it, strategic arms reductions, that the negotiations between our country and the Soviet Union will begin on the 29th of June.

As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. With good will and dedication on both sides, I pray that we will achieve a safer world.

* * * * * * *

Joint Announcement by the United States and the Soviet Union: Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, May 31, 1982[5]

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have agreed to begin formal negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms on June 29, 1982, in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. delegation will be led by Ambassador Edward Rowny and the Soviet delegation will be led by Ambassador V. P. Karpov. Both sides attach great importance to these negotiations.

Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, June 4, 1982[1]

1. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries participating in the May 31–June 4, 1982, Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau, held in Havana, welcomed the convening of the 2nd Special Session on Disarmament to be held in New York June 7–July 9, 1982, and expressed their earnest hope that an all-out effort would be made to have the session respond to mankind's continuous

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[4] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 7, 1982, p. 730. The President spoke at Memorial Day services at Arlington National Cemetery.

[5] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 7, 1982, p. 731.

[1] A/S-12/AC.1/1.

search for peace and pave the way for a world free of wars and poverty.

2. The Ministers recalled that the 1st Special Session on Disarmament, held four years ago at the initiative of the non-aligned countries, was a historically significant event in which, for the first time in the history of negotiations on disarmament, an international disarmament policy had been agreed upon. Nevertheless, the Ministers noted with deep concern that, in spite of all efforts to attain these objectives, disarmament was farther away than ever. They expressed their grave concern over the continuing deterioration of the international situation and the appalling intensification of the arms race, which has brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust.

3. Together with the constant stepping up of the arms race—and especially its nuclear aspect—there has been a steady deterioration in the material well-being and livelihood of millions of the world's inhabitants. The colossal loss of human and material resources squandered on the arms buildup has a direct bearing on the continuing and ever growing economic crises that afflict the world.

The Ministers are convinced that the arms race is incompatible with the search for economic & social development and the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

4. The General Assembly's 2nd Special Session on Disarmament should pave the way for urgent implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the 1st Special Session, thus halting and reversing the arms race—particularly in its nuclear aspect.

The Ministers expressed their deep anxiety over the growing danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, which would have devastating consequences for all mankind. They drew attention to the growing popular movements throughout the world against the production, stockpile and use of nuclear weapons. They emphasized that no doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons can be justified under any circumstances.

The growing public awareness of the perils of a nuclear war and the mobilization of world public opinion against these weapons of mass destruction are positive elements in the current tense international situation.

5. The Ministers expressed their deep concern that, even though the arms race has continued its upward spiral and the threat of nuclear war has increased, negotiations on issues which have been accorded priority—especially nuclear disarmament—have not yet begun. Negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament should no longer be made contingent on further arms buildup but must be resumed without delay. Although the international political climate affects disarmament negotiations, the deterioration of the international situation calls for an intensification of dialogue and negotiation. Disarmament in the present world is not just a matter of security; it is basic to survival.

6. Recognizing each State's right to security and the need to maintain undiminished security, the Ministers reaffirmed that a real and lasting peace could only be created by means of the effective imple-

mentation of the system of security as envisaged in the United Nations Charter. They emphasized the need to establish a world order free of the use or threat of the use of force against sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation, intervention, interference in the internal affairs of States and denial of the inalienable rights to self-determination and independence of peoples and nations under colonial and alien domination in flagrant violation of the UN Charter.

7. In view of the convening of the General Assembly's 2nd Special Session on Disarmament, the Ministers called on all States—especially the nuclear weapons states and other militarily significant states—to reaffirm their commitment to implement the recommendations and decisions of the 1st Special Session on Disarmament, included in its Final Document. They expressed their deep conviction that the next special session on disarmament would also provide an opportunity to renew the solemn commitment of all States to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

8. To ensure the survival of mankind the Ministers urged the special session to adopt urgent measures in order to avoid nuclear war. In this regard, they reaffirmed the pressing need for the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They strongly recommended that, during the session, the nuclear weapon States submit practical suggestions for preventing a nuclear war.

The Ministers declared that, the search for security by the nuclear weapons States, particularly those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals could not be carried out while jeopardizing the existence of human civilization.

9. The Ministers stated that, in view of the critical international situation, the Special Session should lead to the initiation of new negotiations and the intensification of ongoing negotiations on urgent disarmament measures.

They also urged that such negotiations should not interfere with the multilateral negotiations being conducted within the Committee on Disarmament, in view of the right of all States to participate in and contribute to the negotiating process for the attainment of a General and Complete Disarmament under effective international control. Pending the conclusion of specific agreements, the Session should adopt urgent measures to halt the arms race—especially the nuclear arms race—and restore mutual trust and confidence among States, thus paving the way for real disarmament.

10. The Ministers attached special importance to the adoption of a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament during the Special Session for the effective implementation of disarmament measures, according to the order of the priorities established in the Final Document of the 1st Special Session on Disarmament[2] within an appropriate time

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411–439.

frame to ensure realization of the objectives of General and Complete Disarmament.

11. The Ministers reiterated the existence of integral relationship between disarmament and international security and between disarmament and development. They urged the Special Session to give a new, sustained momentum to the attainment of these interrelated objectives so that the final goal of General and Complete Disarmament could become a reality in a world in which international peace and security would prevail and the New International Economic Order would be established and consolidated.

Statement by the Department of State: Reprocessing Spent Nuclear Fuel and Use of Plutonium, June 9, 1982 [1]

You will recall that the presidential policy statement on nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation of July 16, 1981, [2] directed the Secretary of State, in cooperation with other responsible agencies, to give priority attention to efforts to reduce proliferation risks, to enhance the international nonproliferation regime and, consistent with U.S. security interests, to reestablish a leadership role for the United States in international nuclear affairs. Under this mandate, one of the follow-on reviews has focused on approaches for a more predictable policy for exercising U.S. rights to approve reprocessing and use of plutonium subject to U.S. control under our peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.

That review has now been completed, and the President has decided that in certain cases, the United States will offer to work out predictable, programmatic arrangements for reprocessing and plutonium use for civilian power and research needs, in the context of seeking new or amended agreements as required by law. These agreements would involve only countries with effective commitments to nonproliferation, where there are advanced nuclear power programs, and where such activities do not constitute a proliferation risk and are under effective safeguards and controls.

U.S. approval will be given only if U.S. statutory criteria are met and will be valid only as long as these criteria and other conditions in the agreements continue to apply.

It should be noted that the United States has been approving reprocessing requests on an *ad hoc*, case-by-case basis under existing agreements for many years. What the President has now approved is a new approach to granting long-term approvals in certain cases for the life of specific, carefully defined programs, as long as the conditions I have described are met.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1982, p. 52.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.

North Atlantic Council Document on Arms Control and Disarmament, June 10, 1982[1]

As indicated in our Declaration of today,[2] we, the representatives of the 16 members of the North Atlantic Alliance, hereby set out our detailed positions on Arms Control and Disarmament:

Militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements on arms control and disarmament contribute to the strengthening of peace and are an integral part of our security policies. Western proposals offer the possibility of substantial reductions in United States and Soviet strategic arms and intermediate-range weapons and in conventional forces in Europe, as well as of confidence-building measures covering the whole of Europe:

—In the forthcoming Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), we call on the Soviet Union to agree on significant reductions in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, focused on the most destabilizing inter-continental systems.

—In the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) which are conducted within the START framework and are based on the December 1979 decision on INF modernization and arms control,[3] the United States proposal for the complete elimination of all longer-range land-based INF missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union holds promise for an equitable outcome and enhanced security for all.

—Those of us participating in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) will soon present a draft treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to these negotiations and achieve the long-standing objective of enhancing stability and security in Europe. They stress that the Western treaty proposal, if accepted, will commit all participants whose forces are involved—European and North American—to participate in accordance with the principle of collectivity in substantial manpower reductions leading to equal collective ceilings for the forces of Eastern and Western participants in Central Europe, based on agreed data, with associated measures designed to strengthen confidence and enhance verification.

—In CSCE, the proposal for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe as part of a balanced outcome of the Madrid CSCE Follow-up meeting would open the way to increased transparency and enhanced stability in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At the same time, we are continuing our efforts to promote stable peace on a global scale:

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 14, 1982, pp. 783–784.

[2] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1982), pp. 25–26.

[3] The decision may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

—In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements including a total ban on chemical weapons.

—In the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly now in progress, we trust that new impetus will be given to negotiations current and in prospect, especially by promoting military openness and verification, that the need for strict observance of the principle of renunciation of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter will be reaffirmed, and that compliance with existing agreements will be strengthened.

We appeal to all states to co-operate with us in these efforts to strengthen peace and security. In particular we call on the Soviet Union to translate its professed commitment to disarmament into active steps aimed at achieving concrete, balanced and verifiable results at the negotiating table.

Remarks by President Reagan: Measures To Reduce the Risk of War by Accident [Extract], June 11, 1982 [1]

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I am determined to assure that our civilization averts the catastrophe of a nuclear war. Stability depends primarily on the maintenance of a military balance which offers no temptation to an aggressor. And the arms control proposals which I have made are designed to enhance deterrence and achieve stability at substantially lower and equal force levels. At the same time, other measures might be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union to reinforce the peace and help reduce the possibility of a nuclear conflict. These include measures to enhance mutual confidence and to improve communication both in time of peace and in a crisis.

Past agreements have created the hot line between Moscow and Washington, established measures to reduce the danger of nuclear accidents, and provided for notification of some missile launches.[2] We are now studying other concrete and practical steps to help further reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict which I intend to explore with the Soviet Union. It is time we went further to avert the risk of war through accident or misunderstanding.

We shortly will approach the Soviet Union with proposals in such areas as notification of strategic exercises, of missile launches, and expanded exchange of strategic forces data. Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity. We are considering additional measures as well.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 14, 1982, pp. 788-789. The remarks were made in Berlin.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236-238; *ibid., 1971*, pp. 634-639.

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Statement by the Chinese Representative (Huang Hua) to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [Extract], June 11, 1982[1]

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The Chinese Government and people have always stood for genuine disarmament and made positive efforts towards progress in disarmament. Since the 1960s, the Chinese Government has put forward on a number of occasions its views and proposals on disarmament and on strengthening international security. We have always opposed the arms race and the threat or use of force in international relations, and we are against any country's carrying out aggression or expansion by means of superior military strength. We endorse the holding of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear arms. We hope that they will adopt a serious and responsible attitude in the negotiations and produce an agreement that will genuinely help to curb the arms race and prevent the threat of a nuclear war. We hope they will not repeat the pattern of their past negotiations, which left them plenty of room for further improving and developing their respective nuclear arms instead of cutting them back.

In recent years, Chinese representatives have expounded the basic principles of the Chinese Government on disarmament issues at various disarmament meetings. I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm them as follows:

1. Efforts for disarmament cannot be separated from those for the maintenance of international security. They must be combined with those for the maintenance of world peace and security. In order to create a favourable climate and conditions for disarmament and to achieve real progress in this field, it is essential to uphold the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international relations. No country is permitted to seek any form of hegemony anywhere in the world. The use or threat of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any State should be strictly prohibited.

2. The two super-Powers should take the lead in reducing their armaments. Because they possess the greatest nuclear and conventional arsenals and their rivalry and arms race are threatening international

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[1] A/S-12/PV.8 (prov.), pp. 37-42.

peace and security, they bear the primary responsibility for disarmament and should be the first to reduce their armaments. After they have substantially cut back their armaments, the other nuclear States and militarily-significant States should join them and reduce their armaments according to a reasonable proportion and procedure.

3. Nuclear disarmament should be carried out in conjunction with conventional disarmament. It is certainly important to take effective measures to achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament in view of the grave threat to mankind posed by nuclear war, but one should not overlook the fact that conventional arms are used in committing aggression against or otherwise threatening other countries. Only a combination of measures for both nuclear and conventional disarmament can help reduce the danger of war. Simultaneously with nuclear and conventional disarmament, all other types of weapons of mass destruction should be banned.

4. Small and medium-sized countries are all entitled to take what measures they deem necessary to maintain their defence capabilities for resisting aggression and safeguarding their independence. The measures and steps decided on at different stages of disarmament must not prejudice or endanger the independence, sovereignty and security of any State.

5. Disarmament agreements should provide for strict and effective international verification. For the sake of building trust and ensuring full compliance by the signatories, such agreements should include effective verification measures. Sanctions should be applied in the event of any violation of the agreements.

6. All States may participate in the settlement of disarmament issues on an equal footing. As disarmament has a bearing upon the security and interests of all States, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, militarily strong or weak, every State is entitled to participate on an equal footing in the deliberations and negotiations on this matter and in supervising the implementation of the agreements reached.

In view of the strong demand of the people of the world for halting the arms race and preventing a nuclear war, and in conformity with my Government's consistent position on disarmament and the basic principles I just outlined, I should like to put before this session the following essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and for disarmament:

An agreement should be reached by all the nuclear States not to use nuclear weapons. Pending such an agreement, each nuclear State should, without attaching any condition, undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and not to be the first to use such weapons against each other at any time and under any circumstances.

The Soviet Union and the United States should stop testing, improving or manufacturing nuclear weapons and should reduce by 50 per cent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery.

After that, all other nuclear States should also stop testing, improving or manufacturing nuclear weapons and should reduce their respective nuclear arsenals according to an agreed scale and procedure.

Conventional disarmament should be effected simultaneously with nuclear disarmament. As a first step, all States should undertake not to use conventional armaments for intervention or aggression against, or for the military occupation of, any country.

In our view, in order to achieve real progress in disarmament, it is essential to proceed from the present world armament levels and identify the main orientation, targets and objectives of disarmament and to take fair, reasonable and practical measures towards this end.

As the nuclear arms race is continuing unabated and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons has reached a dangerous level of overkill and over-saturation, it is unrealistic to try to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament overnight. Therefore, the first step in nuclear disarmament should be the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, to be followed by their progressive reduction and ultimate destruction. Since nuclear weapons are developed, tested and deployed for possible use, the danger of nuclear war will diminish if all nuclear States undertake not to use them. If the nuclear States refrain from threatening non-nuclear States and undertake unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against them, then these States will have no need to possess nuclear weapons or seek foreign nuclear protection. If a nuclear State does not first ask itself whether it is posing any threat to non-nuclear States, but holds them responsible and demands that they undertake not to threaten it, would that not be as absurd as putting the cart before the horse?

It is certainly not sufficient just to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The possible use of nuclear weapons cannot be precluded merely by prohibition without taking further steps to reduce and finally destroy them altogether. This is why, in our opinion, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons must be linked with their reduction and destruction.

It is our view that conventional disarmament should be effected simultaneously with nuclear disarmament. Given the immense destructiveness of a nuclear war and its grave threat to the security of mankind, it is understandable that people focus their attention mainly on opposing the nuclear arms race and preventing the threat of a nuclear war. But one can only assume two circumstances in which a nuclear war may break out: either the nuclear Powers engage each other in a nuclear war from the very beginning, or they may begin by a conventional war which may escalate into a nuclear conflict. If we direct our efforts solely towards the prevention of a nuclear war and relax our vigilance against a conventional war, that may still leave open the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The super-Powers often use their conventional armaments as a means of aggression and expansion. Obviously, if we neglect conventional disarmament, we will not be effective in preventing the hegemonists from carrying out aggression and expansion by means of conventional arms.

Furthermore, we are of the opinion that priorities should be set for both nuclear and conventional disarmament. The two super-Powers should be the first to reduce their arms substantially, for they possess the biggest arsenals in the world, and only they are capable of waging a nuclear war. Since countries vary in size and military strength, should we require the stronger States to reduce their armaments so as to ensure the security of the weaker ones, or demand equal and simultaneous reduction of arms by all countries? In our view, the threat of war can be reduced only when the two super-Powers take the lead in substantially cutting back their nuclear and conventional armaments. This principle applies particularly to disarmament.

The views I have just outlined indicate the obligation China is prepared to undertake for disarmament. In point of fact, the Chinese Government has long since repeatedly pledged to the world that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it undertakes unconditionally not to use such weapons against non-nuclear States. This amply shows the good faith of the Chinese Government on the question of disarmament. I would like to announce here that, if the two super-Powers take the lead in halting the testing, improving or manufacturing of nuclear weapons and in reducing their nuclear weapons by 50 per cent, the Chinese Government is ready to join all other nuclear States in undertaking to stop the development and production of nuclear weapons and to reduce further and ultimately destroy them altogether.

The basic principles of the Chinese Government concerning disarmament and the essential measures for disarmament I have just outlined emanate from China's foreign policy of peace.

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Statement by French Foreign Minister Cheysson to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [Extract], June 11, 1982[1]

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In the past two years there has been a resurgence in public opinion in Western Europe and the United States of the fear that had been dormant for the past 20 years, the fear of world war and therefore of nuclear war. Faced with such legitimate anxiety, there are two errors we must avoid: confusing pacifism with the unyielding determination to achieve peace, and fanning anxiety.

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[1] A/S-12/PV.9 (prov.), pp. 58–71.

The cause of peace is not served by awakening or exploiting the psychosis of war or by multiplying unilateral proposals of a vague and spectacular nature with the aim of manipulating public opinion. The paths to disarmament can only be taken by means of a realistic and objective analysis of the factors that increase or may increase the threat of a generalized military confrontation.

These factors are inseparably linked: the nuclear over-armament of the super-Powers; the risks of strategic destabilization resulting from the military use of new technology; the imbalance in conventional forces and the threat of surprise attack. In point of fact, to identify the threats to world peace we should cast our minds back to what has kept the peace for 36 years: the certainty that any conflict in Europe, any crisis that fundamentally and profoundly opposes the vital interests of one or the other of the two super-Powers, would trigger a nuclear apocalypse. Yes, it must be said that nuclear deterrence has been the arm of peace wherever it comes into play between East and West. One need only think of what would otherwise have been the consequence of the terrifying imbalance in conventional arms that has persisted in Europe, in particular since the end of the Second World War, at a time when the democratic countries were devoting their principal resources to reconstruction and to improvement of the economic and social conditions of their societies.

But in the last few years the qualitative and quantitative acceleration of the nuclear-arms race has created two threats of major conflict: the possibility of a nuclear first-strike, generalized or, more probably, limited to Europe, by one super-Power hoping thereby to prevent such an attack by the other, aggression by means of conventional or chemical weapons in Europe initiated by a Power convinced that the level of its nuclear means shelters it from the highest form of nuclear retaliation.

Confronted with such real dangers, Utopian or misleading solutions have too often been proposed: total nuclear disarmament; or a universal commitment to non-first use.

Such formulas would greatly compound the threat of war as long as the imbalance in conventional arms and political dissymmetry persists in Europe. Moreover, those who propose them seem to forget the essential provision of our Charter concerning the non-use of force. So what credibility could be given to proposals that would reduce the application of this basic clause to the nuclear threat alone?

These demagogic solutions aside, we are left with three priorities that derive from the strategic analysis of the threat of war: the reduction of nuclear over-armament; the elimination of technology-related destabilizing factors and the reduction of imbalances in conventional weapons in Europe.

Clearly the highest priority must go to the process of de-escalating the nuclear-arms race of the two super-Powers, even if that can be done only gradually. France therefore welcomes the resumption of strategic talks between the United States and the Soviet Union; this is an eminently positive factor.

Nevertheless, our concern over the dizzying increase in the arsenals of the two super Powers persists, for several reasons.

The first is the accumulation by the super-Powers of excessive capacities for nuclear destruction. For a few years one of the great Powers had reduced its effort while the other none the less relentlessly went on strengthening its arms potential, particularly that aimed exclusively at Western Europe. Now the former is obliged to react. If it does not it may be outclassed or it may feel threatened. In this way, with the two parties moving from positions of inferiority to catching up, and then to overtaking each other the arms race destabilizes and terrifies each of the two camps in turn.

Moreover, the arms race is even more disturbing qualitatively: the deployment or the prospect of the deployment of increasingly powerful ballistic weapons is now awakening the fear, often expressed in the past, that stability based on nuclear deterrence might be compromised by the reappearance of the first-strike capability.

In the face of these two dangers it is imperative that the balance between East and West be re-established at a lower and more stable level.

By balance at a lower level we mean that we expect the present negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the negotiations that are to be resumed on strategic arms to lead to a significant reduction of the nuclear potential of the two super-Powers. We expect parity to remain the rule and all levels of capability on both sides to be discussed in the strategic negotiations.

By a more stable balance we mean that priority must be given to the removal of the most destabilizing missiles.

It would clearly be illogical for the two sets of negotiations not to be closely linked. The talks on intermediate-range American and Soviet arms will inevitably bog down if they are not linked organically with an evaluation of other American and Soviet means which, although not based in Europe, are none the less capable of striking targets there.

In such a context, France cannot consider participating directly or indirectly in negotiations that must for the time being remain bilateral. It is only honest to say this as clearly as we always have. It is fair to point out the reason for this. It is a simple matter of common sense. France cannot, in full independence, escape the threat of vastly superior forces other than by nuclear deterrence.

Our means of deterrence have been limited to the absolutely minimum level necessary to prevent anyone from being able to control France, whereas the super-Powers' capabilities are characterized by an excess of superarmament. There is room for reduction of this excess. France cannot fall below the level of credibility without calling into question its security and independence.

It would certainly be otherwise if three conditions were met: first of all, the reduction of the arsenals of the super-Powers to such levels that the gap between capabilities could be considered to have changed in nature; secondly, the quantitative and qualitative limitation of defensive strategic systems, which might one day neutralize nuclear deterrence; and, thirdly, significant progress in the reduction of imbalances in conventional arms in Europe, and the elimination of the threat of chemical warfare.

As for nuclear tests, frankly we can discern no real sign of a genuine readiness on the part of the two super-Powers to abandon them. First one and then the other protests its good intentions, and this has been going on for a quarter of a century. So far these good intentions have never coincided except for the decision that nuclear tests should be carried out under ground.

France also now carries out only underground testing. It could not at this time give that up without endangering an essential element of its independence in this area.

Technological progress can offer new opportunities for disarmament. Observation by satellite, in particular, will no doubt make decisive progress possible in the means of verification. These means should be at the disposal of all.

That was the purpose of the specific proposals made by France in 1978 regarding the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency. [2] In a remarkable report recently presented to the General Assembly the Group of Experts mandated by our Assembly has described the possibilities and the conditions of the attainment of that goal. [3]

France will continue to work for the acceptance of a proposal that has already won widespread support. We regret all the more that the two super-Powers, which currently enjoy a monopoly in military observation from space, have not thought it necessary to inform the international community of the kind of contribution they would be ready to make in this area. In any event, that will not prevent my country from pursuing its aims in the context of technological changes and with the prospect of seeing more States join the "space club".

We cannot forget that technological progress can be used for military ends; the international community must guard against this before it is too late. We are thinking, for example, of new weapons that might jeopardize deterrence, of military activities in space and, in particular, of anti-missile defence and anti-satellite systems.

France has already expressed its support at the Geneva negotiations for an international convention banning anti-satellite weapons. In our opinion, such a convention would fill a real gap in existing treaties. It would make it possible to prevent a qualitative leap in the arms race, stupendously costly for all of us, the long-term implications of which for the stability of the strategic balance would be awesome.

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[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 97.

[3] *The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency* (U.N. Sales No. E.83.1X.3).

Similarly, we believe that any challenge to the treaty on anti-ballistic missiles,[4] the principal success of more than 10 years of bilateral strategic arms limitation talks, would be a far-reaching and lasting step backwards. France would be prepared to associate itself with a general treaty in this area and in organizing the verification of such a treaty if such an approach could consolidate the ban on anti-ballistic missiles.

There are other horrifying weapons which make it possible to circumvent deterrence. I refer to chemical and biological arms. Research now under way in these fields makes this subject one of particular urgency. That is why France attaches special importance to the negotiation of a convention banning the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Such a convention has been the subject of useful technical discussions within the Committee on Disarmament. It is unfortunate that it is still obstructed by the determination of the Soviet Union, which claims not to understand the need for verification. Can there be disarmament and confidence without verification?

Of course, there is already a convention in existence which prohibits the military use of chemical and biological means of warfare. That is the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[5] of which France is the depositary country. But that Protocol does not include specific provisions for verification. France proposes compensating for this deficiency by establishing procedures for the rapid identification of phenomena the symptoms of which call for recourse to specialized medical techniques.

In this field the World Health Organization has both the experience and the international network to take the rapid action necessary to make the essential preliminary evaluation. Thus, in our opinion, that body should be assigned an important role in such arrangements.

These proposals are in no way a criticism of the inquiry which experts are now carrying out concerning certain alleged practices in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. We continue to support that inquiry.

I can confirm here that my Government has asked the French Parliament for authorization to accede to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.[6] My Government intends to support and to propose itself various steps to meet the obvious inadequacies of the provisions of that Convention in the areas of consultations among the parties and of verification.

Lastly, the third potential threat to East-West equilibrium results from the tensions in Europe and from the build-up of conventional weapons in the old world. This is why France proposed, in Madrid, in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe to consider this problem.

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[4] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

[5] *Ibid., 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[6] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

First, confidence must be restored by reducing the threat of a surprise attack; then the present imbalance must be corrected by effective and verifiable reductions of offensive potential. This must be done within the only geographical framework that is meaningful in security terms—that is to say, the entire European continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

These last subjects must be dealt with as soon as the work in Madrid is resumed; the French delegation will contribute to that end. We appeal to our partners in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to ensure that public opinion in our countries will at last have the feeling that we are progressing in a way that is clear and comprehensible to all.

At the beginning of my remarks I spoke of the anxiety that the threat of war has awakened among peoples.

One painful fact stands out: in present times, war affects first and foremost the countries of the third world. The 130 or so armed conflicts since 1945 have all occurred in the southern hemisphere and most of them have set one or more developing States against each other.

Even as I speak now, everyone can hear, as I have already said, the cries of the victims in Lebanon, on the Iranian-Iraqi border, in Central America, in the islands we call the Malouines in French; each of us is thinking of the agony of the peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Namibia and the Western Sahara.

It should come as no surprise, then, to see the increase in the burden imposed on the developing countries in the total of world military expenditures 4.5 per cent of the total in 1969; 7.2 per cent 10 years later; 16.1 per cent in 1980, according to the report by Mrs. Thorsson.

Does this mean that the third world should be disarmed? Such a proposal would be shocking and absurd. While every developing country is forced to overarm, we know full well that globally the third world is underarmed in comparison to the arsenals of the North. Some States in the South are actually critically underarmed in relation to their minimum security needs and this could affect their independence. So the problem is not to disarm the third world; it is, rather to build an international order that will enable each country in the South to ensure its development and security, in independence and in full command of its choices and lines of action.

With that basic objective in view, the following tasks present themselves.

The first is to avoid an aggravation or a change in the nature of existing tensions in many regions of the South. To that end, it is important first of all to prevent East-West rivalry from being artificially grafted onto the quarrels, the disputes, and even the wars in the third world. Some of these are the result of centuries-old differences and conflicts. Others result from injustice, from the inequalities of incomes and land-holding systems, from oppression by certain forces too often a legacy of the colonial period. Be that as it may, France has said all along—and will continue to say for as long as necessary—that respect for the sovereignty of all States and the rejection of all interference in internal affairs are fundamental principles for any international order that is more just, more secure and more conducive to development. France is therefore resolutely in favour of non-alignment, genuine non-alignment. It is acting and will continue to act accordingly in its own policy. It asks that the international community do likewise.

The second objective is to encourage and support the efforts of the States of the South to eliminate tensions and to organize their collective security in a regional framework. How can this be achieved?

One possible line of action, as yet insufficiently explored, concerns regional security agreements. The Charter of our Organization itself establishes a model for this in Article 52, Chapter VIII. May I remind the Assembly of paragraph 1:

> Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action . . .

France maintains that the possibility of creating zones of independence and solidarity should be explored to the full. Who can fail to see the usefulness of paving the way to solutions that could not be reasonably envisaged at another level, for example, controlling local crises, confidence-building measures, commitments to neutrality?

A decisive step in that direction might be the establishment of regional structures making it possible either to move rapidly to set up local forces to monitor peace at the request of the States concerned or to maintain contingents on a permanent basis to verify and even guarantee commitments that have been freely entered into among neighbouring States.

Structures of this kind would make it possible for the States concerned to come to an understanding on mutual respect for their differences, the abatement of tensions, confidence-building measures, arms limitation agreements, the means of monitoring and verifying commitments that have been entered into. At times it might even be necessary to establish networks of observers or even actual forces, on a temporary basis, to monitor peace.

The regional nature of structures and arrangements such as these would remove the possibility of interference by external Powers. The transfer of each local dispute to the two super-Powers, which would otherwise be inevitable, would be avoided. Naturally, specific agreements would be called for among the interested parties outside the framework of any defence link external to the zone, so that the formulas would be established in conditions appropriate to the regions and the circumstances.

The international community should, in support of such positive and responsible actions, resolve to make available for such regional agreements the means of analysis and control deemed necessary by the interested parties themselves. If need be, these means might include those of the international satellite monitoring agency, which has already been mentioned. France would, of course, be prepared to shoulder its part of the responsibility in accordance with conditions determined by the Security Council or another United Nations body at the request and in conformity with the wishes of the interested parties.

The establishment of so-called nuclear-free zones may constitute another application of the regional approach that has just been outlined. France is already on record as favouring this approach in places where the balance of power does not rest on nuclear deterrent forces. Naturally, such zones could be established only by the unanimous and express decision of the States concerned. There could be no question of imposing a decision from the outside, any more than in the case of any other regional agreement.

A commitment dealing with arms, of whatever kind, is, however, only meaningful if its application can be verified in conditions that are reliable and win the confidence of all the parties concerned. The international community should therefore study the possibility of making available to States forming part of limited-arms or nuclear-free zones the technical means that provide such security and confidence. The already considerable accomplishments of the International Atomic Energy Agency—to which France would like to pay a tribute—assure us that these means will be continually adapted to the rapid progress of technology.

It is also important, of course, that regional agreements of this kind should be recognized and respected by all outside Powers. States which decide among themselves to reduce their arsenals and which may agree among other things to renounce the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons should receive every guarantee from the international community against any external nuclear aggression.

Furthermore, France believes that these guarantees should be applied in general to all non-nuclear States. For its part, it states that it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment. In thus moving closer to the kind of guarantee already made by others, France hopes to facilitate the drafting of a Security Council resolution on this issue.

Moreover, the international community should give its support to the establishment of zones of peaceful nuclear co-operation by reconciling the necessary guarantees of non-proliferation with the dissemination of all non-military nuclear technology, without discrimination.

To that end, the countries with this technology should provide the means to set up regional centres for the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear fuels. These centres should furnish groups of States that have freely decided to form nuclear-free zones or nuclear-co-operation zones with privileged access to all the technology relating to the nuclear fuel cycle. The establishment of such zones would thus bring into play elements exceptionally favourable to development. This would be a new form of transfer from armament to development.

As is known, France has decided to co-operate in the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Unfortunately, the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been delayed because several countries of the region have not adhered to it.[7]

My country would take the same favourable attitude if in Africa a decision were taken by the countries concerned to make that continent or part of it a nuclear-free zone. Here, too, it is for the interested parties to discuss the matter and take a decision—and not for an outside Power, however strong its ties of friendship with Africa.

Every year the General Assembly mentions the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Whatever difficulties might be involved, the Secretary-General might usefully make contacts in order to consider the best procedure for moving forward. At a time when war is unleashed in the Middle East it may seem strange to recall this idea, but we should be in no doubt that peace will one day return, and we should recognize that the prospect of co-operation would reinforce the will for peace.

I shall conclude this portion of my statement by mentioning the Indian Ocean. France supports the principle of convening a conference if thorough preparation should indicate that it would be of value.

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Message From Soviet President Brezhnev to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Non-First Use and Freeze of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, June 12, 1982[1]

On behalf of the Soviet Union and of the 269 million Soviet people, I am addressing the United Nations General Assembly convened at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

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[7] I.e., the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For text of the treaty and its protocols, see *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[1] A/S-12/AC.1/10, June 17, 1982. Mr. Brezhnev's message was read to the General Assembly of the SSOD by Foreign Minister Gromyko on June 12; the document containing the message was transmitted to the Secretary-General for circulation on June 16.

The session faces great and responsible tasks. Its agenda includes a number of items of the first importance.

But if we are to single out the most important, the most urgent, the one now worrying people in every corner of the globe and preoccupying the minds of statesmen and public figures in many countries of the world, it is concern for halting the endless build-up of ever more destructive types of weapons, ensuring a breakthrough in the improvement of international relations and averting a nuclear disaster.

Concern for peace is the dominant feature of the Soviet Union's policy. We are convinced that no contradictions between States or groups of States, no differences in social systems, ways of life or ideologies and no transitory interests can eclipse the fundamental need shared by all peoples—the need to safeguard peace and avert a nuclear war.

Today, as never before, purposeful and considered action is required of all States in order to achieve this lofty goal.

Guided by the desire to do all in its power to deliver the world's peoples from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet State solemnly declares:

> THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ASSUMES AN OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

This obligation shall become effective immediately, from the moment when it is announced from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

Why is the Soviet Union taking this step at a time when the nuclear Powers in NATO, including the United States, make no secret of the fact that their military doctrine not only does not rule out the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons but it is actually based on that dangerous premise?

The Soviet Union bases this move on the indisputable fact, which is decisive in the present international situation, that should a nuclear war start, it could mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps the end of life itself on earth.

Consequently, the supreme duty of State leaders conscious of their responsibility for the fate of the world is to exert every effort to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the Soviet Union's decision will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear States. If the other nuclear Powers were to assume an equally precise and clear obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to banning the use of nuclear weapons altogether, a goal advocated by the overwhelming majority of the world's countries.

In the formulation of its policy, the Soviet Union will naturally continue to take into account how the other nuclear Powers act, whether they heed the voice of reason and follow our good example or push the world downhill.

Another objective of the Soviet Union's initiative is to increase trust in relations between States. And that is particularly important in the present international situation, when the foundations of trust have been shaken by the efforts of those who are trying to upset the existing balance of forces, to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies and to destroy all the benefits brought by the policy of détente.

The military and political stereotypes inherited from the time when one side had a monopoly on the atom bomb have become outdated. The realities of today require a fundamentally different approach to the questions of war and peace. The step now taken by the Soviet Union makes it easier to take a different view of the entire complex of problems invoked in the limitation and reduction of armaments, especially nuclear arms, and advances the cause of disarmament in general.

The great achievements of human creative and technological genius enable the world's peoples to open a new chapter in their history. At this moment there already exist boundless opportunities to tackle the solution of such human problems of global magnitude as the struggle against hunger, disease, poverty and many other evils. But that requires making sure that scientific and technological progress is used exclusively to serve the peaceful aspirations of humanity.

The Soviet Union is assuming an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons because it has faith in the power of good sense and believes in mankind's ability to avoid self-annihilation and to ensure peace and progress for the present and future generations.

I should also like to draw the attention of the representatives of States attending the special session of the General Assembly to the following question.

In the search for measures which would actually halt the arms race, many political and public figures of various countries have recently turned to the idea of a freeze—in other words, of stopping the further build-up of nuclear potentials. The ideas advanced in this connexion are not all alike, on the whole, we believe, they go in the right direction. We see in them a reflection of people's profound concern about their destiny. To use a figure of speech, people are voting for the preservation of the highest value in the world, which is human life.

The idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals, as a first step towards their reduction and, eventually, their complete elimination, is close to the Soviet point of view. Moreover, our country has been the initiator of concrete proposals aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Lastly, there is one more issue which, in our view, the General Assembly cannot disregard.

Dangerous as nuclear weapons are, it must be borne in mind that in the arsenals of States there are other means of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. It is frightening to contemplate but nevertheless a fact that the tens of thousands of tons of toxic agents among the armaments of certain countries, a few kilograms would suffice to kill millions of people. And in addition, new programmes for the production of even more sophisticated types of lethal chemical weapons are being launched.

Every effort must be made to eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the earth. The Soviet Union is a devoted advocate of this approach. We are prepared to come to an agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons.

In general, the Soviet Union is in favour of moving ahead in all areas where opportunities exist for limiting and radically reducing armaments, be it in nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction or conventional armaments. There is no type of weapon which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity.

I should like to express my confidence that the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will provide an effective impetus for a cessation of the arms race and a transition to practical measures for real disarmament. In this way it will justify the hopes which the world's peoples are pinning on this thoroughly representative forum.

I wish the participants in the session fruitful work for the benefit of all peoples and of universal peace.

Address by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [Extracts], June 12, 1982[1]

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The message of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,[2] that has just been read out contains a condensed exposition of the Soviet Union's attitude towards the most pressing problem facing mankind today, that is, how to preserve peace.

Peaceful co-existence between States with different social systems and the settlement of all controversial issues among them by peaceful means constitute the underlying foundation of the foreign policy of the USSR. This is the essence of the Programme of Peace for the 1980s adopted by the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

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[1] A/S-12/PV.12, pp. 28–62.

[2] The message is printed *supra*.

This has been convincingly borne out by all the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and its allies, the socialist countries members of the Warsaw Treaty. This is eloquently evidenced by the statements of Leonid Brezhnev, permeated with a profound concern that the nuclear war threat be removed.

Our country is taking yet another step of exceptional importance: the Soviet Union has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is doing so unilaterally. If the other nuclear Powers follow suit, the likelihood of an outbreak of nuclear war will in fact be reduced to zero.

At the time the United Nations was being created, the winds of the world war could still be felt. In the United Nations Charter the founding Member States expressed the people's aspirations by formulating a universal international obligation similar to a vow, an obligation to prevent another war.

The idea of uniting the efforts of the peoples for maintaining international security is the cornerstone of the very foundation of this world Organization. States with different social systems and ideologies fought shoulder to shoulder in the great battle against fascism that sought to impose upon the world the rule of vandals and butchers.

And today no one, particularly no politician at the helm of State policy, can remain indifferent to the clear-cut provisions of the Charter concerning the need to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

It is no wonder then that every year an overwhelming majority of States in the United Nations has been expressing concern lest mankind trip up and fall into the abyss, concern for preserving the most precious thing on earth, namely, peace or, in other words, life.

This session specially devoted to disarmament problems should, in a more distinct way than any of the previous sessions, express the will to rein in the demon of war.

Any responsible political leader, scientist or reasonable person, asked what a nuclear conflict could entail, would give but one reply: the consequences would be catastrophic for all peoples. Is that perhaps an exaggeration? No. Today, hardly any serious person would venture to argue against that.

Is there indeed anyone who would wish to be consumed by the flames of a nuclear war? Just knock at random on any door in any town or village and ask that question. It would be correct to say that there is no nation, big or small, that does not long for a stable peace.

If all that is so, then how can that peace be achieved? One should not expect miracles. One has to work for peace.

It is people who have created not only rifles and grenades but also highly accurate missiles and highly lethal nuclear weapons. That means that people themselves must and can scrap the tools of war, should they so wish. We are convinced that States are equal to that task, provided they pursue a policy of peace.

It is being said that the disarmament problem cannot be solved at one stroke. It is hard not to agree with that. But if that problem is to be solved step by step, one should indeed try to do so, rather than take cover behind rhetoric that frequently serves to conceal everything except a genuine desire to tackle the problem.

The Soviet Union continues to advocate a practical approach to the solution of the problems of containing the arms race, of disarmament and of removing the risk of another war through agreements between States. That is the essence of Leonid Brezhnev's message to the United Nations. The Soviet delegation has come to this session actively to promote that objective as well.

However, another course in world politics is also known to exist. That course is predicated on the continuation of the arms race and on its escalation. Concoctions of all sorts are produced on a grand scale to provide propagandistic cover for that course. One can hear statements to the effect that arms limitation is not enough, that deep and impressive cuts are needed. The words themselves are not that bad. A closer look reveals, however, that it is the Soviet Union—and it alone—that is to make those deep and impressive cuts.

It is also being asserted that, in order to proceed to the reduction and limitation of arms at some future stage, mountains upon mountains of weapons primarily weapons of mass destruction, should be accumulated in the arsenals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and the more the better. Indeed, such weapons are being accumulated with something of an obsession. Washington and the NATO bloc as a whole have announced such militaristic programmes.

The intent behind all this is to upset the existing military balance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, to move into a position of strength, to act from that position and to dictate one's will to others, notably at the negotiating table.

Nowadays, some NATO politicians are talking about the position of strength perhaps even more often than during the cold war. Calls are made from the highest political pulpits of that bloc to the effect that the United States should be ahead of everyone else militarily, that it should and must be in the lead, and that is that. All those statements, interviews, resolutions and communiqués designed to stun people invariably smack of unbridled ambition. In fact, such things are becoming a glut on the market.

At times, such plans are discussed without any great sublety, quite bluntly. More often, however, they are camouflaged. It is asserted, for example, that the Soviet Union has gained an edge in armaments, although that is a fraud, since both facts and figures totally disprove that argument. The obvious intention is to mislead people.

Most recently, word has been spread that the Soviet Union has at its disposal "a most destabilizing factor". What it essentially boils down to is that only one type of weapon—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles—is singled out in the entire range of strategic nuclear arms. These, they say, are the missiles that the Soviet Union should reduce in the first place.

What is behind all this? It is not all that cunning a trick. It is being proposed that reductions should apply to the type of strategic systems in which the USSR has a numerical advantage—if this factor is regarded in isolation, and only in isolation. At the same time, the issue of other strategic arms in which the United States has an advantage, and a big one, such as long-range cruise missiles, on which Washington is known to place particularly high reliance, and strategic aircraft, in which the United States also has a considerable edge, is being deliberately blurred. They are also hushing up the fact that the United States has several times more warheads on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles than the USSR. The United States forward-based systems and the nuclear capabilities of America's NATO allies are totally ignored.

The same approach is taken to medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and with the same purpose in mind—that is, to misrepresent the line-up of nuclear forces of the two sides there, too. Fabrications take the place of truth and are dressed up to look plausible.

What all this adds up to is a desire to wreck the existing parity in the field of nuclear arms, which is determined by the totality of the arms that the two sides possess, rather than by the quantities of some of the individual types. Why is this truth concealed from people? Why is it kept under lock and key? They do not want people to know it. In this way it is easier to secure decisions in favour of the arms race and easier to defend bloated military budgets.

Whenever Washington has something against the weight of certain Soviet missiles, for instance, it immediately starts saying that they destabilize the strategic situation. To set the record straight, it should be recognized that such missiles form part of the over-all equilibrium that has been carefully balanced and agreed by the Soviet Union and the United States over many years of negotiations. That is exactly what they now want to upset.

Once the veil is taken off Washington's strategic arms plan it will be revealed that it is designed to undercut the security of the other side and to retain a completely free hand in implementing its own military programmes. This lopsided and twisted approach is unrealistic and unacceptable.

Actually, it is the unprecedented arms race launched in the United States that constitutes the destabilizing factor. See how fast the wheels of the American military-industrial machine are turning. In effect, the arsenals of that country are being stocked with every possible type of armaments, including such barbaric ones as chemical and neutron weapons. Scientific and technological progress is geared to march in step with the arms race policy. It has been squeezed into a military uniform.

Each day brings new evidence that the United States foreign policy is becoming pervaded more and more with a spirit of militarism. This militaristic frenzy breeds all sorts of frenzied military doctrines. A first nuclear strike is being talked about as if it were something casual or routine, whereas what is involved here is a criminal concept of unleashing nuclear war. The idea that a nuclear war is winnable provided the theatre of that war is moved to some place further away from home—for example, to Europe—is being presented as something of a masterpiece of military strategy.

When one comes to the country where the United Nations Headquarters is located one really finds oneself in an altogether different world. In newspaper articles and television appearances officials of various ranks are driving home but one point: we must go on and on and on arming ourselves so that the United States becomes the world's foremost military Power. In other words, the idea being impressed on people's minds is this: you want peace go all out in preparing for war; dig in, hide yourselves wherever you can, but prepare.

The Soviet Union is in principle against a policy of military superiority. It does not seek military superiority for itself, nor does it grant anyone else the right to do so. Of course, our country is capable in any circumstances of taking care of its security and the security of its allies and friends. Leonid Brezhnev's statements to that effect are well known.

A genuine concern for peace requires the maintenance of the military-strategic balance. It has been ordained by history that such a balance between the two countries should evolve. This has been reflected in the relevant agreements between the USSR and the United States. So would it not be better to use it as a springboard from which to work towards agreement to lower its levels in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security?

Why is that not acceptable? The arguments against that are moulded after a very simple pattern: supremacy over the Soviet Union is needed to keep it in a state of fear. It is as simple as that—to keep it in a state of fear.

But then the Soviet Union would also have every reason to keep the other side in a state of fear. If we are going to talk in such terms, both the strength and the fear should be equally shared by the two sides. It should not be argued We the United States keep the strength, and you keep the fear that is the Soviet Union's share.

We are convinced, however, that this entire fear-strength logic is faulty. The security of either side and of the world as a whole should be built neither on fear nor on a quest for military superiority. The search for agreements, dialogue and mutual confidence should guide and motivate States in their relations with each other. The basis for this is the recognition and maintenance of the existing parity and all possible efforts aimed at achieving a lower and lower level of armaments.

How can Washington's policy of gaining military superiority be explained? It is hard to rid oneself of the impression that someone has been carried away by the imperial dream of dominating the world. How else can we explain the fact that vast areas in one part of the world or another are declared without any grounds whatsoever to be zones of United States vital interests? This is viewed as enough justification for dispatching the navy or an expeditionary force to the other end of the world, to foreign shores and borders closer to other peoples' wealth.

Amid vociferous declarations about the need to defend United States vital interests a naval armada was dispatched to the Persian Gulf. The plan to reimpose a vassal status on Iran by threat and force has fallen through yet the armada is still in that area.

That area is only a stone's throw from the Soviet Union, as can be seen from a look at the map. What conclusion should we draw from this?

What is it that the United States has lost in the Indian Ocean? Why does it need a strategic military base on Diego Garcia? It is developing another springboard so as to threaten the Soviet Union and many other countries from there too.

Nor does it seem to be an accident that the United States has been stubbornly resisting the demands of the littoral States that the Indian Ocean be turned into a zone of peace and disregarding their interests.

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The problems of war and peace should not be treated lightly by anyone. Yet, the reasoning of some politicians apparently continues to go like this since the United States and NATO have the USSR and other socialist countries as partners in the talks on those problems, it remains to be seen whether or not to work for agreement with them, in so far as they belong to a different social system and have a different ideology. It is no wonder that sober-minded people all over the world shrug their shoulders so to speak, when facing the question of how politicians responsible for the conduct of State policy can accept such reasoning. It would be in order to say: could not certain people in Western capitals be more serious in their pronouncements on issues of war and peace? The same applies also to prophecies on the subject of socialism and its future which at times verge on political necromancy.

The situation in the world causes legitimate concern among peoples. It has found its expression in parliamentary debates, discussions at international forums and in the upsurge of a mass anti-war movement for which the Soviet people has profound esteem. The fundamental question is how to counter the policy of war preparations.

There is an answer to that question, and it is a convincing one. The policy of war preparations must be countered with a policy of peace and peaceful co-operation. The instigators of the arms race are out to erode people's will in the struggle for peace, and to sow doubt in their minds as to the outcome of that struggle. We reject that. Faith in the strength and ability of peoples to safeguard peace is inherent in the

Soviet Union's foreign policy. The Soviet people is firmly determined to uphold peace.

Since its birth the Soviet State has drawn inspiration from Lenin's words: "What we cherish most is the preservation of peace." "What we cherish most . . ."; those are truly undying words! Today those words continue to express the most cherished thoughts of the Soviet people, which is engaged in creative effort, they underlie the policy of the USSR, including its foreign policy, our moral ideals, and our spiritual creative endeavour in all its variety.

It has long been recognized that time is the most impartial judge of the policies of States on issues of war and peace. The Soviet people has drawn the sword only against aggressors, to defend the freedom and independence of its country. The feat of our people, who made a decisive contribution to the great victory over the fascist aggressor, will shine through the centuries.

The instigators of the arms race have worked hard to find an argument in favour of that race and in justification of the astronomical figures of military budgets. They have obviously decided that the best thing to do would be to scare people with the threat that purportedly emanates from the Soviet Union, in the hope that they will relax their efforts.

But the deception Washington so frequently resorts to in international affairs is an unreliable foundation for a long-term policy. Fewer and fewer people are being taken in by that deception, even though the propaganda machine continues to churn out one fabrication after another about the Soviet Union's armaments and armed forces and about its foreign policy. Confronted with reality, those fabrications fail the test. The Soviet Union is not threatening any State on any continent. The step announced in Leonid Brezhnev's message today is further convincing proof of that.

The USSR has no claims to a monopoly on proposals conducive to lessening the threat of war. We are receptive to such proposals, even when they are made by politicians whose political views and world outlook greatly differ from our own.

The message emphasizes that the idea of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and eventual complete elimination is close to the Soviet point of view.

The Soviet appeal that agreement be reached without delay on a complete prohibition of chemical weapons has also been prompted by the grave realities of today.

We strongly reject the absurd tales implicating the USSR in the use of those weapons. This fraud bears too obvious a trade mark to allow those who are peddling it to capitalize on it. Obviously they are attempting to conceal their own notorious sins in that respect.

The Soviet Union is submitting to the special session for its consideration a draft document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction."[3]

The draft takes into account other States' wishes, including those that deal with verification. It is our view that a breakthrough in reaching an international agreement could be made on the basis of the Soviet draft.

The Soviet Union is in favour of moving towards solving disarmament problems on a broad front, through negotiations. Negotiations that are currently under way should be revived and those that have been suspended should be resumed and new negotiations should be started in those areas where the situation calls for it.

The current Soviet-United States talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe are being closely watched everywhere. They deal with one of the key problems of European security and, indeed, of international security as a whole.

What is the goal of the Soviet Union? It is to deliver Europe totally from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. If that solution is not acceptable to our Western partners, we are prepared to agree on a total renunciation of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons targeted on Europe. We are also prepared to reduce gradually but substantially, by the hundreds, the medium-range nuclear weapons of both sides, the USSR and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Soviet Union is backing with practical deeds its desire for the Geneva talks to be successful. Our country has unilaterally ceased further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union is already reducing those missiles by a considerable number. We have stated in no uncertain terms that no medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in areas where Western European countries would be within their range.

Now, what about the other side? As we have already said, its attitude is that it is only the Soviet Union that should reduce its medium-range nuclear arms.

The interests of the European peoples require neither confrontation nor an undermining of détente. The right path towards consolidating security and developing co-operation in Europe has been charted in the Helsinki Final Act.[4]

To be true to the spirit of Helsinki means to abide scrupulously by the principles and understandings of the Final Act and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs.

To be true to the spirit of Helsinki means to complete the Madrid meeting successfully, and to crown its work with a decision to convene a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe. As before, the Soviet Union will do its best to contribute to the positive outcome of the Madrid meeting.

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[3] *Post,* June 16.

[4] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975,* pp. 304–398, the complete text is in *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

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There is not a single State unaware of the importance of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on strategic arms limitation and reduction.

The Soviet Union has invariably advocated the resumption of these talks. Now, following the consent of the United States, the opening date for the talks has been agreed upon. This is undoubtedly a positive fact.

However, the SALT II Treaty,[5] already finalized and signed, is known to have been shelved by the American side. Needless to say, that dealt a heavy blow to international confidence and international security.

Two other important treaties between the USSR and the United States limiting activities in the nuclear field—the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests[6] and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes[7]—are yet to be ratified.

It is worth recalling all this at a time when the United States delegation is returning to the table of strategic arms negotiations.

What is most important is that the talks should strike the right note from the very outset. From this standpoint, the position with which the United States side is coming to the talks, as described in Washington's official statements, cannot but give cause for wariness.

In connexion with those statements, it would be proper to point out that our partners in the talks both on the problem of strategic arms and on the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe just cannot assimilate the obvious truth that the Soviet Union and the United States are equally interested in the solution of those problems and in talks on them. It would be a gross mistake to think that the Soviet Union was holding out its hand begging for talks. No. Each side should extend its hand to the other if they both want to discuss their differences and to find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems.

In his recent speech Leonid Brezhnev clearly indicated what is needed for the Soviet-United States talks to result in an agreement.[8] First, the talks should actually pursue the objective of limiting and reducing strategic arms rather than serve as a cover for the continuation of the arms race and to upset the existing parity. Secondly, the two sides should conduct them with due regard for each other's legitimate security interests and strictly in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security. Lastly everything positive achieved earlier should be preserved, including the SALT II treaty. It is also essential securely to block all channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race in any form. This means that the development of new types of strategic weapons should be either banned or limited to the extent possible in accordance with agreed parameters. We are prepared to agree already now that the strategic arms of the USSR and the United States be quantitatively frozen the moment the talks begin, and that their modernization be limited to the maximum extent possible.

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[5] The text of the SALT II Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[6] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[7] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

[8] *Ante*, May 18.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should take any step that could upset the stability of the strategic situation. Aside from its intrinsic importance, the proposed freeze could also be conducive to progress towards a radical limitation and reduction of strategic arms. The Soviet Union has consistently advocated a substantial reduction of those arms.

It is hoped that the other side will give serious consideration to these Soviet proposals. There are, however, some alarming signals. The very moment that the Soviet Union proposes a freeze on strategic arms Washington defiantly announces that the implementation of the programme for the production and deployment of new MX strategic missiles is to be stepped up.

It cannot be denied that today Washington has mastered the art of destroying bridges that could lead to agreement. Building those bridges is far more difficult and important. It will be recalled that Leonid Brezhnev made a concrete proposal to meet United States President Ronald Reagan. The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that a summit meeting should take place and that, of course, it should be well prepared. It is obvious that such a meeting would inevitably centre on the problems of reducing armaments and of disarmament, that is, problems which are also in the focus of this special session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union believes that it would be useful to elaborate and adopt a nuclear disarmament programme to be implemented stage by stage. One of its initial stages could be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons. Many other States also are making statements along similar lines. The Soviet Union is prepared to consider this question in the over-all context of limiting and ending the nuclear arms race.

The consolidation in every possible way of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been and remains a priority task in terms of curbing the nuclear arms race. A situation cannot be allowed to arise in which on the one hand measures would be taken to lessen the threat of nuclear war, while on the other hand nuclear weapons would spread all over the planet. Our approach to this problem takes into account the views of many other States and above all of non-nuclear ones. The Soviet Union is agreeable to placing under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency part of its peaceful nuclear installations, atomic power plants and research reactors.

Non-nuclear countries parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty[9] have been raising the question of guarantees of their security on the part of the nuclear Powers. Their interest is only natural. This question could be solved by concluding an international convention. The USSR is also prepared to conclude bilateral agreements on guarantees with States which do not possess nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territory.

The problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests also calls for a solution. It can be tackled either radically or step by step. The Soviet Union believes that the trilateral talks with the United States and Britain, which were suspended by them at the final stage should be resumed without delay.

An increasing number of States have been declaring that they do not want to have nuclear weapons on their territory. There have been suggestions of the creation of zones free of such weapons. For our part we shall contribute to the search for generally acceptable solutions concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions of the world.

An agreement should be reached to ban the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The draft international treaty on that subject submitted by the Soviet Union has been widely acclaimed by United Nations Member States.[10] Why not begin concrete discussion of it in the Geneva Committee without delay?

The time is ripe for reaching agreement to limit the naval activities of States, especially those possessing powerful navies. A whole range of important issues could be considered in this respect.

The United Nations should speak out against extending the spiral of the arms race into the vast expanses of outer space and the depths of the oceans of the world. The significance of those environments as regards a peaceful future for mankind is growing steadily.

Modern armies are equipped with enormous quantities of weapons which have come to be called conventional. Yet in terms of their purpose and characteristics they are not much inferior to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore this area of the arms race and consequently of the policy of States also requires the most serious attention.

The Soviet Union stands for substantial reductions of the current levels of armed forces and conventional armaments. A situation where many millions of people are withdrawn from the productive sphere and placed under arms cannot be considered normal. To start with, agreement could be reached, for instance, [on] not increasing armed forces and conventional armaments, to be followed by negotiations on their reduction both on a global scale and in specific regions.

With regard to Central Europe, such talks are under way in Vienna. The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, reiterates its appeal to its Western partners finally to get down to work on preparing an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. It is high time to discard the policy of upsetting the balance between the sides in this area as well.

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[9] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[10] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 334–336.

Foreign trade in, and transfers of, conventional weapons are currently running into tens of billions of dollars. Given a sensible approach, this channel for spurring the arms race could also be at least narrowed.

The Soviet-United States talks on this subject were in progress only some time ago, but they were suspended by the United States side, which has developed a sort of conditioned reflex with regard to negotiations on a number of cardinal issues. After two or three years of talks, the United States side breaks them off. The Soviet Union is ready to resume talks on this subject as well.

It is beyond the power of any economist to prove that such acute social and economic problems facing States as unemployment, inflation and growing taxation, could be solved through militarization. The burden of military expenditures is becoming increasingly felt also in the developing countries, on some of which poverty and hunger are known to pay frequent and cruel calls.

Disarmament is a sure path leading not only to a safe but also to a more prosperous life for the peoples. Progress in the field of disarmament would make it possible to release huge resources through freezing, let alone reducing, military budgets. Part of the saving of resources currently devoured by arms production could be used to assist developing States.

The Soviet Union is submitting to this session for its consideration a memorandum entitled "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race".[11] It recapitulates our country's positions of principle as well as its major specific proposals. We express the hope that they will be studied most carefully and supported by the United Nations Member States.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should not become an ordinary event in international relations. This will not happen, given the will of the States represented in this hall. This session will leave a visible imprint on world politics if it gives a significant impetus to solving the most pressing problems of curbing the arms race and of disarmament.

The United Nations has adopted quite a few well-intentioned resolutions yet, no matter how good a resolution may be, it will remain on paper unless followed by deeds. This entirely depends on States and on whether or not they recognize the fact that any chance offered by history in the name of the triumph of life must be seized. That is what the Soviet Union is calling for.

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[11] *Infra.*

Soviet Memorandum Submitted to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Averting the Growing Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race, June 16, 1982[1]

In the present circumstances, at a time of mounting world tensions and the growing risk of nuclear war, no task confronting States is or can be more important than that of working out and adopting effective measures to ease tensions and to strengthen universal peace and the security of peoples.

Today, when States have accumulated enormous stockpiles of arms with colossal destructive power, when the arms race is not only continuing but gaining greater momentum, when ever newer and ever more sophisticated and destructive means of mass annihilation are emerging one after another, it is more than ever incumbent on all States, especially on the major Powers, to show great responsibility, sensible restraint and a thoroughly considered approach in all their foreign-policy moves and actions. They must display a political will to join forces in order to normalize the situation and consolidate positive principles in relations between States.

The Soviet Union, the other socialist States, and most States on all continents are consistently and purposefully acting in line with this policy. They consider it their duty to the world's peoples and to the present and future generations to pursue that policy, and they will continue to abide by it unswervingly in the future.

I.

The latest aggravation of the threat of war has resulted from the fact that in recent years some States have been pursuing a policy inimical to the interests of peace.

Contrary to the commitments to prevent nuclear war which they assumed in the 1970s, they are now saying that a nuclear conflict is admissible or even "acceptable".

Instead of realistically understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to a global nuclear clash, with all the ensuing consequences, they are devising various methods of nuclear warfare, from limited to all-out nuclear war, and deploying their strategic offensive forces on the assumption that they would be the first to use nuclear weapons in the hope of gaining the victory.

In an attempt to discard the only rational policy in today's circumstances, that of maintaining the existing military balance between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the policy of strategic stability, they have opted for a course aimed at attaining military superiority.

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[1] A/S-12/AC.1/11, June 17, 1982.

This course is being lavishly financed: the costs of implementing new military programmes are running not merely into billions, or even tens and hundreds of billions, but into trillions of dollars.

Those funds are to be spent for the production, in addition to the thousands of nuclear weapons already in stock, of many more thousands of new weapons with explosive yields ten, twenty or even one or two hundred times as great as the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Nuclear weapons capable of delivering warheads to hard targets with greater accuracy are being developed. Strategic weapon systems are being made mobile. New strategic systems, especially long-range cruise missiles, have gone into production. Outer-space military systems to be equipped with laser weapons are on the drawing boards. The use of shuttle spacecraft would carry the arms race into outer space. The arsenal of chemical weapons is being modernized and considerably expanded, and the production of a new generation of lethal chemical weapons, the binary weapons, has begun. The effectiveness of conventional armaments is being greatly increased.

New United States nuclear-missile systems are planned for deployment as far away from the territory of the United States and as close to the territories of the USSR and the other socialist States as possible, in order to reduce the time of delivery of nuclear warheads to targets, thereby enhancing the surprise factor in an attack. In practical terms, this is a direct attempt to upset the strategic balance. Current NATO plans to deploy hundreds of new medium-range United States missiles in Western Europe are aimed at doing just that. Forward-based United States systems are also being deployed in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The same purpose is served by the concentration of a major United States naval force with a nuclear capability in the Indian Ocean and the creation in that area of an extensive network of United States military bases, with its main strategic base on the island of Diego Garcia.

One cannot fail to come to the conclusion that all this militaristic activity is designed to provide a material foundation for aggressive strategic concepts based on adventurism and designed by men carried away with militaristic frenzy.

The Soviet Union has warned time and again and declares once more that it will be able, under any circumstances, to do what is needed to protect its security and the security of its allies and friends. As L. I. Brezhnev said, whatever types and quantities of new weapons the United States may produce, "the Soviet armed forces will have appropriate means to counter such weapons". He stressed that the Soviet Union "will be able to give a prompt and effective response to any challenge that may be hurled at it".

Nevertheless, the pursuit of military superiority by the United States and some of its NATO allies is a fact that is having a strong impact on current world developments. This is a dangerous policy, dangerous for all States and peoples.

The policy of seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries and intensifying the arms race has already resulted in serious international complications. It is fraught with the risk of strategic destabilization, that is to say, of upsetting the present military balance.

The continued blocking of negotiations on such important subjects as the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, the limiting of sales and deliveries of conventional armaments, and the blocking of negotiations on anti-satellite systems are links in a chain inextricably connected with the policy of seeking military superiority.

What are the reasons for the lack of progress in the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and for the non-implementation of United Nations decisions aimed at bringing about the prohibition of neutron weapons, renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and negotiations on nuclear disarmament? The reasons are the same. What was it that prevented the Madrid meeting of the States participating in the European Conference from concluding its work early this year and from adopting a decision to convene a conference on security and confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe? It was the same quest for military superiority.

Sometimes an attempt is made to justify the pursuit of military superiority by alleging that it is necessary for strengthening peace and security. The truth is just the opposite: such a course can only diminish the security of all States, including those which pursue it, and make even more menacing the clouds of the nuclear threat hovering over our planet.

There is a different road open to mankind—that of strengthening peace and security, of détente and disarmament. This is an opportunity which must and can be made a reality.

But strong and vigorous action by all States and peoples is needed to avert nuclear war and radically reduce military tensions. What is required above all is a political will for peace, based upon an awareness of the realities of the nuclear age and capable of shaping new approaches and opening new paths towards the elimination of the nuclear threat.

To that end, as stated in the message of L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, *the Soviet Union has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.* [2]

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[2] *Ante*, June 12.

This extremely important action of the Soviet Union is intended to facilitate a turn away from the dangers of today to a more reliable and stable peace and to strengthen people's hopes that a nuclear conflagration will never break out anywhere.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect the other nuclear States to take similar steps following the Soviet Union's decision. That would radically change for the better the entire military and political situation in the world.

The military confrontation will become less critical than it is today, strategic stability will be strengthened, and international trust will again cement relations between States with different social systems.

The strengthening of strategic stability and the steadying of the military balance will also require a wide range of material measures.

II.

The consolidation of the military balance, however important a prerequisite for lasting peace it may be, is not enough to guarantee that mankind will be delivered from the threat of war, especially if the levels of military confrontation are high and continue to grow. It is necessary to go much further, to work to bring those levels down gradually and to limit and reduce armaments—in other words, to give new and strong impetus to current negotiations, to resume those that have been suspended and to initiate new talks dealing with all those subjects. In the present circumstances negotiations on the reduction of armaments and on disarmament constitute the central area of interaction between States in the interests of peace and in the interests of saving mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The human mind, which has created the monstrous nuclear engine of destruction, is capable of finding ways to dismantle it and to deliver mankind from the nightmare it brings. The Soviet Union, like many other States, deems it necessary to work for that end in several areas at once, especially the following:

Elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. In our view, such a programme could include:

—Cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;

—Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;

—Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;

—Gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;

—Total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons should cover all nuclear systems, primarily strategic weapons and medium-range systems.

The Soviet Union would be prepared to agree on a reciprocal basis that even the first step towards reducing nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range should be a major one.

Limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is the view of the Soviet Union that this is one of the most important problems still to be resolved. Negotiations on that problem call for a responsible and serious attitude. The USSR has taken this attitude towards such negotiations, with a view to reaching mutually acceptable agreement.

As L. I. Brezhnev stated, achieving such agreement requires, first of all, that negotiations should actually pursue the objective of limiting and reducing strategic arms rather than serve as a cover for continuing the arms race and upsetting the existing parity. Second, the two sides should conduct the negotiations with due regard for each other's legitimate security interests and in strict conformity with the principle of equality and equal security. Lastly, everything positive that has been achieved previously in that area should be preserved.

Limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. Notwithstanding all the difficulties encountered in the Soviet-United States negotiations on this subject at Geneva, the Soviet Union continues to believe that progress and mutually acceptable agreement should be reached at those negotiations and is doing its utmost to that end.

The Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to agree to a total renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range weapons capable of striking targets in Europe. It could go even further and agree to the total removal of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. If the United States and its allies are not prepared to accept a comprehensive solution of that problem, the USSR could agree to a gradual but very substantial mutual reduction in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons.

It may be recalled that, seeking to contribute to success at the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union declared, as a goodwill gesture, a moratorium on further deployment of its medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. Moreover, it announced its intention, also unilaterally, to remove some of those weapons and has already taken practical steps in that direction. [3]

In the area of nuclear disarmament in general, the USSR is prepared to go all the way, provided, of course, that all the nuclear Powers participate, that is, to agree to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons—strategic, medium-range and tactical.

The funds released at each stage of nuclear disarmament would be devoted entirely to peaceful purposes, including assistance to developing countries.

In elaborating measures of nuclear disarmament, appropriate methods and forms of control that would satisfy all the interested parties and promote effective implementation of the agreements reached would have to be agreed upon.

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[3] See *ante*, Mar. 16.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in all these activities. It is now the turn of the other nuclear Powers, especially the United States, to respond.

Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The long-overdue solution of this problem would mean that the nuclear powers would no longer be in a position to improve nuclear weapons further and to develop new types and varieties of such weapons. At the same time, the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be strengthened.

The problem of nuclear-weapon tests can be tackled either radically or by stages. The Soviet Union is prepared to ratify at any time the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests signed by the USSR and the United States in 1974. [4] With a view to working out a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the multilateral forum of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament should be utilized to the fullest extent. The Soviet side is also prepared to resume immediately the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the conclusion of such a treaty, suspended by the other parties at the final stage of the talks.

Prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. While approaching this urgent task in the context of consolidating strategic stability and the military balance, the Soviet Union believes that it has a direct bearing on matters of nuclear disarmament as well. The greater the certainty that nuclear weapons will not be acquired by States that do not have them at present, the more incentives there will be to curtail existing nuclear capabilities.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that consolidation of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of the régime is equally in the interest of nuclear and non-nuclear countries, since it facilitates the preservation of peace and the security of peoples. The non-proliferation régime has created favourable conditions for broad international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union has invariably supported such co-operation and is actively participating in it.

Many non-nuclear countries have suggested that, within the framework of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons not only they but the nuclear States as well should place some of their peaceful nuclear installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet Union is prepared to accommodate the wishes of non-nuclear countries in this respect also. It declares its readiness, as an act of goodwill, to place some of its peaceful nuclear installations—several atomic power plants and some research reactors—under IAEA control.

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[4] The treaty and its protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

Non-nuclear countries which become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [5] naturally hope that their security will, as a result, be better ensured rather than weakened. They have raised the issue of appropriate guarantees on the part of nuclear Powers. The Soviet Union views this position with understanding and is prepared to conclude an international convention on the subject.

It is also important to achieve international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in countries in which there are no such weapons at present and, in the meantime, refraining from further moves to station nuclear weapons in the territories of other States. This would also help to strengthen the security of non-nuclear countries and consolidate the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-free zones. It is the view of many States that the establishment of geographical zones in which nuclear weapons shall be neither developed nor deployed could play an important role in curbing the nuclear arms race. Following the example of Mexico and other Latin American States which have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, [6] similar initiatives have been advanced by other countries with regard to Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and a number of other regions.

The Soviet Union takes a positive view of those initiatives. As a nuclear Power, it is prepared to help in arriving at generally acceptable solutions concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

III.

Although nuclear weapons possess the greatest destructive potential, other types of weapons pose a grave danger to mankind as well. This makes it imperative that such weapons too should be made the subject of negotiations on their limitation, reduction and elimination.

Prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Like many other States, the Soviet Union is of the opinion that this is one of today's most pressing problems and that it must be solved without delay. By refusing to continue the bilateral talks and thereby nullifying Soviet-United States agreement on a joint initiative on the banning of chemical weapons, [7] the United States has dashed the hopes of the world's peoples for its early solution. It is all the more important, therefore, to intensify joint efforts by States in the Committee on Disarmament to draft an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Such a convention should, of course, provide for strict supervision, which, in addition to the use of national means, would also comprise international procedures, including on-site inspections on an agreed basis.

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[5] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

[6] The text of the Tlatelolco Treaty may be found *ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

[7] *Ibid., 1972,* p. 246.

In the meantime, States should avoid any action that might complicate the talks. It is especially important in this connexion that States should renounce the deployment of chemical weapons in countries in which there are no such weapons at present.

Prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The Soviet Union's proposal on this subject, whose urgency is not disputed by anyone, has been referred by the United Nations General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration.[8] The Committee should proceed without delay to draft alone an international treaty on the subject.

Limitation of naval activities. The Soviet Union has already advanced, alone or jointly with other socialist countries, a number of initiatives designed to limit naval activities in certain areas of the World Ocean. Similar proposals have also been made by some other States.

Those initiatives deal with the limitation and reduction of the levels of military presence and military activities in areas in which conflict situations are most likely to arise. With a view to enhancing stability in those areas, it would be desirable to consider the following points:

—Removal of missile submarines from extensive areas of combat patrol, and confinement of their cruises within agreed limits;

—Limitation of the deployment of new submarine-based ballistic missile systems;

—Renunciation of the deployment of both sea-based and ground-based long-range cruise missiles;

—Extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas through which the busiest shipping routes pass;

—Making the Mediterranean a zone of stable peace and co-operation;

—Strengthening of peace and security in the Persian Gulf area.

The Soviet Union supports the idea advanced by non-aligned countries, of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and is taking an active part in the preparations for an international conference on that subject. It is prepared to resume at any time talks with the United States on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean.

The USSR could even go further in directly limiting and reducing naval arms. It would be desirable in this connexion for States possessing powerful navies to examine jointly the question of their limitation and reduction.

Limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Here too there is a need for serious talks between States that could lead to a substantial lowering of the present levels of armed forces and armaments, both on a global scale and in specific regions. Development of the types of weapons that have come to be called conventional is going ahead at an ever-increasing pace and poses a real danger, aggravating regional instability and plunging more and more countries into the whirlpool of onerous military programmes.

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[8] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 334–336.

The recent conclusion of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects has been a useful step. [9] For that reason, the Soviet Union has been among the first to ratify the Convention and its Protocols. But more sweeping and important tasks are still to be tackled.

One of them is to reach agreement on not increasing armed forces and conventional armaments and thereby lay the foundation for talks on their subsequent reduction.

Another important objective is to agree on the limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional armaments, which currently run into tens of billions of dollars. With a view to reaching such agreement, the Soviet Union is prepared to resume the Soviet-United States talks which were suspended by the United States at the very time when possible approaches to a solution had begun to emerge. The USSR also has no objection to inviting other States to take part in the consideration of the problem of limiting the arms trade.

Reduction of military budgets. This problem has been under discussion in the United Nations and other international forums for many years. Yet actual military expenditures continue to grow rapidly.

At the same time, most States, including the Soviet Union, have been expressing their conviction that the process can and must be reversed.

The reduction of military budgets could be tackled in different ways, in percentage points or in absolute figures, on the basis of radical solutions or gradual progress. One could start by freezing military budgets, a move that could probably be agreed upon with the least difficulty if the political will exists.

Renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes. This is a major and sweeping problem which is not easy to solve. Yet it has been raised by life itself, and it is clearly time to start thinking jointly of ways to solve it. Scientists and experts will obviously have to be invited to participate in its consideration.

Relationship between disarmament and international security. The easing of military tensions, the strengthening of strategic stability and the cessation of the arms race would unquestionably help to ensure greater security for every State. At the same time, serious political and legal measures enhancing the security of States would make it easier for them to take practical steps to limit and reduce armaments.

Progress in disarmament and in strengthening international security should be sought on parallel courses. A sound concept of security at the end of the twentieth century requires strong action to ward off the emergence of armed conflicts, including nuclear conflicts, rather than drawing up strategic charts for their escalation.

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[9] *Ibid., 1980,* pp. 440–452.

In the military field such action means steps to end the arms race; in the political and legal field, it means the settlement of international conflicts and crises through negotiations and the consolidation of the principle of the non-use of force; and in the moral and political field it means primarily the renunciation of any propaganda for nuclear war and of sabre-rattling in any flare-up of international tension. The Soviet Union advocates steady and consistent progress along all these lines.

In the same context, a problem whose solution is long overdue relates to the conclusion of a *world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.* The examination of that question in the appropriate United Nations bodies must be moved off dead centre.

Disarmament and economic development. The arms race is the only sphere of human effort in which material resources are being squandered unproductively and on a gigantic scale. Those resources should be used to solve the socio-economic problems facing the world's peoples, to raise their well-being and to develop culture rather than to manufacture engines for the destruction of human beings.

The possibility of allocating significantly greater resources than today to assist developing countries in eradicating the backwardness they inherited from the times of colonialism depends primarily on the rechannelling to peaceful purposes of the resources currently absorbed by the arms race.

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The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is confronted by demanding and urgent tasks of great magnitude. Member States will have to discuss the most vital and pressing problems of arms limitation and disarmament. That discussion must give fresh impetus to practical efforts to solve those problems. This is a direct duty of the United Nations stemming from its Charter and from its main purpose of saving the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Soviet Proposal Submitted to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, June 16, 1982 [1]

Chemical weapons are a barbaric means of destruction. Such weapons have already taken tens of thousands of lives and have maimed millions of people. At present, the threat of massive use of much more horrible types of chemical weapons is looming over mankind.

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[1] A/S-12/AC.1/12, June 17, 1982. Also submitted to CD July 21, 1982 as CD/294.

The world's peoples are demanding that this should be prevented and that the very possibility of the use of chemical weapons should be ruled out by prohibiting their production and destroying accumulated stockpiles.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of this. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the USSR has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone. [2]

Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union is submitting to the States Members of the United Nations for their consideration the following basic provisions of a convention on the subject.

I. SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION

General provisions

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never, under any circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons and undertakes to destroy or divert to permitted purposes the accumulated stocks of such weapons and to destroy or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

Definition of chemical weapons

For the purposes of the Convention "chemical weapons" means:

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal and harmful chemicals, and their precursors, except those intended for non-hostile purposes or for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes;

(b) Munitions or devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of the chemicals released as a result of the employment of such munitions or devices, including those with binary or multicomponent charges;

(c) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connexion with the employment of such munitions or devices.

Other definitions

For the purposes of the Convention:

1. The definitions of the terms "super-toxic lethal chemical", "other lethal chemical" and "harmful chemical" shall be based on specific criteria of toxicity (lethality and/or harmfulness) for each of these categories of chemicals (shall be specified in the Convention on the basis of the levels agreed upon in the Committee on Disarmament).

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[2] The text of the protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

2. "Permitted purposes" means non-hostile purposes and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

3. "Non-hostile purposes" means industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, law-enforcement purposes or purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

4. Such terms as "a chemical", "an incapacitant", "an irritant", "a precursor", "capacity" and "a facility" are also subject to definition in the Convention.

Prohibition of transfer

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes:

(a) Not to transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, any chemical weapons;

(b) Not to transfer any super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants or irritants, or their precursors to anyone, directly or indirectly, even for permitted purposes, except to another State Party;

(c) Not to assist anyone, or to encourage or induce anyone, directly or indirectly, to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.

Non-stationing

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to station chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, in the territories of other States and also undertakes to recall all its chemical weapons from the territories of foreign States if they were stationed there earlier (dates for the fulfilment of this obligation shall be specified in the Convention).

Destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to destroy its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons or divert them to non-hostile purposes in quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons shall be begun by each State Party not later than 2 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after the State has become a Party to the Convention.

The first operations for destruction may, as a display of goodwill be carried out by each State Party possessing chemical weapons as early as the initial stage of the functioning of the Convention.

Elimination or temporary conversion of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons

1. Each State Party undertakes to eliminate or dismantle facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons.

2. Operations for eliminating or dismantling facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons shall be begun not later than 8 years, and completed not later than 10 years, after a State becomes a Party to the Convention.

3. Any State Party to the Convention shall have the right, for the purposes of destroying stocks of chemical weapons, to convert tempo-

rarily facilities previously used for the production of such weapons and also to carry out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a specialized facility or facilities built for such purposes.

Permitted activities

1. Each State Party to the Convention shall have the right to retain, produce, acquire or use for permitted purposes any toxic chemicals and their precursors, in types and quantities consistent with such purposes.

2. The aggregate quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes which are produced, diverted from stocks or otherwise acquired annually or are available shall at any time be minimal and shall not, in any case, exceed one metric ton for any State Party to the Convention.

3. Each State Party which produces super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes shall concentrate such production at a single specialized facility, of appropriate capacity which shall be subject to special agreement.

Protection of the population and the environment

In fulfilling its obligations connected with the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and the elimination of means of their production, each State Party shall take all necessary precautions for the protection of the population and the environment.

Promotion of development goals

The Convention shall facilitate the creation of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development of the Parties and for international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities. The possibility of interference with areas of activity unrelated to the purposes of the Convention shall be precluded.

II. DECLARATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

1. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, to declare:

—Whether or not it possesses chemical weapons and capacities for their production;

—The magnitude of its accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and capacities for their production;

—The volume of transfers to anyone of chemical weapons, of technological equipment for their production, and of relevant technical documentation which took place after 1 January 1946;

—Whether or not there exist in its territory stocks of chemical weapons, and in what quantities, or facilities for the production of chemical weapons, and with what capacities, which are under the control of, or have been left by, any other State, group of States, organization or private person.

2. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, declare that it has ceased all activities relating to the production of chemical weapons or the transfer to anyone of such weapons, of technological equipment for their production and of relevant technical documentation.

3. Each State Party undertakes to declare, not later than 6 months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's accession to it, its plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons, and to declare, not later than one year before the commencement of the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for producing chemical weapons, its plans for their destruction and dismantling, stating the location of the facilities.

4. Each State Party which carries out the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons at a facility (facilities) temporarily converted for such purposes or at a specialized facility shall declare the location of the said facility (facilities) within the time period provided for in the plan for the destruction of the said stocks.

5. Each State Party which carries out the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specialized facility shall declare its location before the date of the commencement of the facility's operation.

6. Each State Party shall undertake:

(a) To submit periodic notifications concerning the implementation of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the available stocks of chemical weapons and of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. Where such operations are carried out earlier than provided for in the plan, the State Party shall submit appropriate notification;

(b) To submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons; the location of the facility to be destroyed or dismantled shall be stated in the appropriate notification;

(c) To submit, not later than 30 days after the destruction or diversion of stocks of chemical weapons and after the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, appropriate statements to that effect.

7. Each State Party shall undertake to submit annual declarations concerning the following substances produced, diverted from stocks acquired or used:

—Super-toxic lethal, other lethal and harmful chemicals for purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;

—Super-toxic lethal chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons;

—Other lethal and harmful chemicals for industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and irritants for purposes of law enforcement.

8. States Parties shall proceed from the assumption that chemicals and precursors produced, acquired, retained and used for permitted purposes, when they represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to purposes connected with the use of chemical weapons, must be included in appropriate lists. Each State Party shall undertake to present annually information on the chemicals and precursors of chemicals included in those lists.

9. Each State Party shall undertake to submit notifications concerning each of its transfers to any other State Party, where not prohibited by the Convention, of super-toxic lethal chemicals, incapacitants and irritants and of other chemicals which could be used as components for chemical weapons with binary or multicomponent charges.

10. The above-mentioned declarations, plans, notifications and statements shall be submitted to the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention. Their contents and the procedure for drawing up the required lists are to be defined in the Convention.

III. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVENTION

General provisions on verification

1. States Parties to the Convention shall base their activities relating to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention on a combination of national and international measures.

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take any internal measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to prohibit and prevent any activity under its jurisdiction or control that is in violation of the provisions of the Convention.

3. To monitor the fulfilment of obligations provided for in the Convention, any State Party may establish a Committee of National Verification (a national verification organization) which is vested with the necessary juridical rights and whose composition, functions and methods of work shall be determined by the State Party to the Convention in accordance with its constitutional norms.

4. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention by other States Parties, any State Party shall have the right to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.

5. Each State Party shall undertake not to impede, through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties.

6. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States Parties, as well as through the services of the Consultative Committee of States Parties to the Convention.

Consultation and co-operation

1. The States Parties undertake to consult one another and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of the Convention or in connexion with the application of its provisions.

2. The States Parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the Convention.

3. Consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter. Such procedures may include the use of the services of appropriate international organizations in addition to those of the Consultative Committee.

4. In the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

Consultation Committee of States Parties to the Convention

1. For the purpose of carrying out broader international consultation and co-operation, exchanging information and promoting verification in the interests of compliance with the provisions of the Convention, the States Parties shall establish a Consultative Committee within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force. Any State Party shall have the right to appoint its representative to the Committee.

2. The Consultative Committee shall be convened as necessary and also at the request of any State Party to the Convention within 30 days after the request is received.

3. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Consultative Committee, its possible subsidiary bodies, their functions, rights, duties and methods of work, its role in on-site inspections, forms of co-operation with national verification organizations and other matters are to be elaborated.

Fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the Convention. On-site inspections

1. Each State Party shall have the right to request, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, from another Party which is suspected of violating the Convention information on the actual state

of affairs. The State to which the request is sent shall provide the requesting State Party with information in connexion with the request.

2. Each State Party may, bilaterally or through the Consultative Committee, send to another State Party which is suspected of violating the Convention a request for an on-site inspection. Such request may be sent after the possibilities of fact-finding within the framework of paragraph 1 of this section have been exhausted and shall contain all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the request.

Requests may, in particular, be sent in connexion with notifications concerning the destruction of accumulated stocks of chemical weapons and concerning the destruction and dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons. The State Party to which such a request is sent may treat the request favourably or decide otherwise. It shall inform the requesting State Party in good time about its decision, and if it is not prepared to agree to an inspection, it shall give appropriate and sufficiently convincing explanations.

3. Within the period of destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of the stocks of chemical weapons, a possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the destruction of stocks at a converted or specialized facility (facilities) shall be provided for.

4. The Convention shall provide for the possibility of carrying out international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at a specified facility.

Procedure for lodging complaints with the United Nations Security Council. Provisions of assistance

1. Any State Party which has reason to believe that any other State Party has acted or may be acting in violation of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention shall have the right to lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. Such complaint shall include all relevant information and all possible evidence supporting the validity of the complaint.

2. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the results of the investigation.

3. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide assistance or support assistance being provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State Party which requests it if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed or is possibly being exposed to danger as a result of the violation by another State Party of obligations assumed under this Convention.

Relationship with the Geneva Protocol of 1925

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting, or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,[3] or under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.[4]

IV. CONCLUDING PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

Provision shall be made for a procedure for the signing of the Convention, its ratification and entry into force, arrangements relating to a depositary, as procedure for the accession of States to the Convention and withdrawal from it, machinery for amendments to the Convention, dates for holding conferences to review its implementation and the status of such conferences.

Address by President Reagan to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament [Extract], June 17, 1982[1]

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In the nuclear era, the major Powers bear a special responsibility to ease these sources of conflict and to refrain from aggression. That is why we are so deeply concerned by Soviet conduct. Since the Second World War, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of the Yalta agreements leading to domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin wall—a grim, gray monument to repression that I visited just a week ago. It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Afghanistan, and the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland. Soviet-sponsored guerrillas and terrorists are at work in Central and South America, in Africa, the Middle East, in the Caribbean and in Europe, violating human rights and unnerving the world with violence. Communist atrocities in South-East Asia, Afghanistan and elsewhere continue to shock the free world as refugees escape to tell of their horror.

The decade of so-called détente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history. They increased their defence spending by 40 per cent while American defence spending actually declined in the same real terms. Soviet aggression and support for violence around the world have eroded the confidence needed for arms negotiations.

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[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

[4] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[1] A/S-12/PV.16, pp. 4–13.

While we exercised unilateral restraint, they forged ahead and today possess nuclear and conventional forces far in excess of an adequate deterrent capability.

Soviet oppression is not limited to the countries they invade. At the very time the Soviet Union is trying to manipulate the peace movement in the West it is stifling a budding peace movement at home. In Moscow, banners are scuttled, buttons are snatched and demonstrators are arrested when even a few people dare to speak out about their fears.

Eleanor Roosevelt, one of our first ambassadors to this body, reminded us that the high-sounding words of tyrants stand in bleak contradiction to their deeds. "Their promises" she said, "are in deep contrast to their performances".

My country learned a bitter lesson in this century: the scourge of tyranny cannot be stopped with words alone. So we have embarked on an effort to renew our strength, which had fallen dangerously low. We refuse to become weaker while potential adversaries remain committed to their imperialist adventures.

My people have sent me here today to speak for them as citizens of the world, which they truly are, for we Americans are drawn from every nationality represented in this chamber today. We understand that men and women of every race and creed can and must work together for peace. We stand ready to take the next steps down the road of co-operation through verifiable arms reduction. Agreements on arms control and disarmament can be useful in reinforcing peace; but they are not magic. We should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems. Simply collecting agreements will not bring peace. Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept; otherwise, we are building a paper castle that will be blown away by the winds of war. Let me repeat, we need deeds, not words, to convince us of Soviet sincerity should they choose to join us on this path.

Since the end of the Second World War the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals:

In 1946, in what became known as the Baruch Plan, the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority.[2] The Soviets rejected this plan.

In 1955, President Eisenhower made his "Open Skies" proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance.[3] The Soviets rejected this plan.

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[2] For the Baruch Plan, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 486–488.

In 1963, the limited test-ban Treaty came into force. This Treaty nded nuclear-weapon testing in the atmosphere in outer space or nder water by participating nations.[4]

In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ook effect.[5] The United States played a major role in this key effort o prevent the spread of nuclear explosives and to provide for international safeguards on civil nuclear activities. My country remains leeply committed to those objectives today, and to strengthening the non-proliferation framework. This is essential to international security.

In the early 1970s, again at United States urging, agreements were reached between the United States and the USSR providing for ceilings on some categories of weapons.[6] They could have been more meaningful if Soviet actions had shown restraint and commitment to stability at lower levels of force.

The United Nations designated the 1970s as the First Disarmament Decade, but good intentions were not enough. In reality, that 10-year period included an unprecedented build-up in military weapons and the flaring of aggression and use of force in almost every region of the world. We are now in the Second Disarmament Decade. The task at hand is to assure civilized behaviour among nations. To unite behind an agenda of peace.

Over the past seven months the United States has put forward a broad based comprehensive series of proposals to reduce the risk of war. We have proposed four major points as an agenda for peace:

elimination of land-based intermediate-range missiles;
a one-third reduction in strategic ballistic missile warheads;
a substantial reduction in NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces; and
new safeguards to reduce the risk of accidental war.

We urge the Soviet Union today to join with us in this quest. We must act not for ourselves alone but for all mankind.

On 18 November of last year I announced United States objectives in arms control agreements: they must be equitable and militarily significant, they must stabilize forces at lower levels and they must be verifiable.[7]

The United States and its allies have made specific, reasonable and equitable proposals.

In February, our negotiating team in Geneva offered the Soviet Union a draft treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We offered to cancel deployment of our Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for Soviet elimination of their SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. This proposal would eliminate with one stroke those systems about which both sides have expressed the greatest concern.

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[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[6] I.e., the SALT I agreements. The texts may be found *ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.
[7] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 570–578.

The United States is also looking forward to beginning negotiations on strategic arms reductions with the Soviet Union in less than two weeks. We will work hard to make these talks an opportunity for real progress in our quest for peace.

On 9 May I announced a phased approach to the reduction of strategic arms.[8] In a first phase, the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side would be reduced to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining warheads would be on land-based missiles. All ballistic missiles would be reduced to an equal level at about one half the current United States number.

In the second phase, we would reduce each side's over-all destructive power to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current United States level. We are also prepared to discuss other elements of the strategic balance.

Before I returned from Europe last week, I met in Bonn with the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We agreed to introduce a major new Western initiative for the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. Our approach calls for common collective ceilings for both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After seven years, there would be a total of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined. It also includes a package of associated measures to encourage co-operation and verify compliance.

We urge the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact to view our Western proposal as a means to reach agreement in Vienna after nine long years of inconclusive talks. We also urge them to implement the 1975 Helsinki agreement on security and co-operation in Europe.[9]

Let me stress that for agreements to work both sides must be able to verify compliance. The building of mutual confidence in compliance can only be achieved through greater openness. I encourage the special session on disarmament to endorse the importance of these principles in arms control agreements.

I have instructed our representatives at the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament to renew emphasis on verification and compliance. Based on a United States proposal, a committee has been formed to examine these issues as they relate to restrictions on nuclear testing. We are also pressing the need for effective verification provisions in agreements banning chemical weapons.

The use of chemical and biological weapons has long been viewed with revulsion by civilized nations. No peace-making institution can ignore the use of those dread weapons and still live up to its mission.

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[8] *Ante.*

[9] The arms control portions of the Helsinki agreement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308; for complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

The need for a truly effective and verifiable chemical-weapons agreement has been highlighted by recent events. The Soviet Union and its allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925,[10] related rules of international law and the 1972 biological weapons Convention.[11] There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as to the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, against their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors.

Evidence of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements underscores the need to approach negotiations of any new agreements with care.

The democracies of the West are open societies. Information on our defences is available to our citizens, our elected officials and the world. We do not hesitate to inform potential adversaries of our military forces, and ask in return for the same information concerning theirs.

The amount and type of military spending by a country is important for the world to know, as a measure of its intentions and the threat that country may pose to its neighbours. The Soviet Union and other closed societies go to extraordinary lengths to hide their true military spending not only from other nations, but from their own people. This practice contributes to distrust and fear about their intentions.

Today the United States proposes an international conference on military expenditures to build on the work of this body in developing a common system for accounting and reporting. We urge the Soviet Union in particular to join this effort in good faith, to revise the universally discredited official figures it publishes and to join with us in giving the world a true account of the resources we allocate to our armed forces.

Last Friday in Berlin I said that I would leave no stone unturned in the effort to reinforce peace and lessen the risk of war.[12] It has been clear to me that steps should be taken to improve mutual confidence and communication and lessen the likelihood of misinterpretation.

I have therefore directed the exploration of ways to increase understanding and communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in times of peace and of crisis. We will approach the Soviet Union with proposals for reciprocal exchanges in such areas as advance notification of major strategic exercises that otherwise might be misinterpreted; advance notification of ICBM launches within, as well as beyond, national boundaries; and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data.

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[10] For text of the Geneval Protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969,* pp. 764–765.
[11] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 133–138.
[12] *Ante,* June 11.

While substantial information on United States activities and forces in these areas already is provided, I believe that jointly and regularly sharing information would represent a qualitative improvement in the strategic nuclear environment and would help reduce the chance of misunderstandings. I call upon the Soviet Union to join the United States in exploring these possibilities to build confidence and I ask for your support of our efforts.

One of the major items before this special session is the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We support the effort to chart a course of realistic and effective measures in the quest for peace.

I have come to this hall to call for international recommitment to the basic tenet of the United Nations Charter—that all Members practice tolerance and live together in peace as good neighbours under the rule of law, forsaking armed force as a means of settling disputes between nations. America urges you to support the agenda for peace that I have outlined today. We ask you to reinforce the bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact and to rededicate yourselves to maintaining international peace and security and removing threats to peace.

We who have signed the United Nations Charter have pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory or independence of any State. In these times when more and more lawless acts are going unpunished—as some Members of this very body show a growing disregard for the United Nations Charter— the peace-loving nations of the world must condemn aggression and pledge again to act in a way that is worthy of the ideals that we have endorsed. Let us finally make the Charter live.

In late spring 37 years ago, representatives of 50 nations gathered on the other side of this continent in the San Francisco Opera House. The League of Nations had crumbled and the Second World War still raged, but those men and nations were determined to find peace. The result was this Charter for peace that is the framework of the United Nations.

President Harry Truman spoke of the revival of an old faith—the everlasting moral force of justice prompting that United Nations Conference. Such a force remains strong in America and in other countries where speech is free and citizens have the right to gather and make their opinions known. President Truman said:

> If we should pay merely lip service to inspiring ideals, and later do violence to simple justice, we would draw down upon us the bitter wrath of generations yet unborn.

Those words of Harry Truman have special meaning for us today as we live with the potential to destroy civilization.

> We must learn to live together in peace, he said. We must build a new world—a far better world.

What a better world it would be if the guns were silent; if neighbour no longer encroached on neighbour and all peoples were free to reap the rewards of their toil and determine their own destiny and system of government—whatever their choice.

During my recent audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II, I gave him the pledge of the American people to do everything possible for peace and arms reductions. The American people believe forging real and lasting peace to be their sacred trust.

Let us never forget that such a peace would be a terrible hoax if the world were no longer blessed with freedom and respect for human rights. The United Nations, Hammarskjold said, was born out of the cataclysms of war. It should justify the sacrifices of all those who have died for freedom and justice. "It is our duty to the past," Hammarskjold said, "and it is our duty to the future, so to serve both our nations and the world".

As both patriots of our nations and the hope of all the world, let those of us assembled here in the name of peace deepen our understandings, renew our commitment to the rule of law and take new and bolder steps to calm an uneasy world. Can any representatives here deny that in so doing they would be doing what the people—the rank and file of their own countries—want them to do?

Is it not time for us really to represent the deepest most heartfelt yearnings of all our people? Let no nation abuse this common longing to be free of fear. We must not manipulate our people by playing upon their nightmares; we must serve mankind through genuine disarmament. With God's help we can secure life and freedom for generations to come.

Note Verbale From the Permanent Mission of Canada to the U.N. Secretary-General: Expert Report on Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Southeast Asia [Extract], June 21, 1982 [1]

The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Secretary-General's note dated 26 January 1981, requesting Member States to submit information on alleged use of chemical weapons in accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980.

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[1] A/37/308, June 25, 1982, Annex I and Annex II, pp. 1–15.

The Government of Canada remains concerned that reports continue to be received regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and the possible violation of both the 1925 Geneva Protocol [2] and the 1972 Biological Weapons Treaty. [3] It will be recalled that, in March 1981, Canada submitted to the Secretary-General in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 35/144 C information volunteered by refugees in Thailand on the alleged use of chemical weapons.

In the continued belief that States have a responsibility to assist the research of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General, whose mandate to investigate reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons has been extended by General Assembly resolution 36/96 C of 9 December 1981, the Canadian Department of External Affairs invited Dr. Bruno Schiefer, Chairman of the Toxicology Group of the University of Saskatchewan, to undertake an independent study. Dr. Schiefer is one of the foremost Canadian authorities on the study of mycotoxins. The Permanent Mission of Canada, therefore, has the honour to enclose Dr. Schiefer's report. It is hoped that it will provide a useful scientific contribution to the investigation now underway by the Group of Experts.

Dr. Schiefer's report is based on the results of a two-week visit to Thailand in February where he held discussions with Thai Government authorities, Thai scientists and Canadian Embassy officials, in addition to visiting refugee camps on the Laotian and Cambodian borders with Thailand. In these locations, Dr. Schiefer collected control samples and conducted interviews with victims of alleged chemical attacks. His report concludes that events which are reported to have taken place at the time of the alleged chemical weapon attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring phenomena. Neither mycotoxins nor diseases naturally occurring in South-East Asia can explain the reported symptoms of victims of the alleged chemical weapons attacks. The symptoms described, however, are consistent with tricothecene mycotoxicosis. The report suggests, furthermore, that although certain types of mycotoxins occur in Thailand, and probably also in surrounding countries, there are no naturally occurring diseases with the symptomatology of trichothecene mycotoxicosis.

Canada believes that it is important that the United Nations investigations carried out in accordance with resolution 36/96 C be as thorough as possible, both for humanitarian reasons and to maintain the credibility of existing agreements relating to CW/BW use. In this connexion, Dr. Schiefer's report, in its final conclusion, identifies an urgent need to improve the verification and control procedures for chemical and/or biological weapons in order to determine if they are being used.

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[2] For text of the protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

The Government of Canada supports the conclusions of Dr. Schiefer's report and hopes that the research contained therein will be of use to the Group of Experts in the conduct of their investigations.

STUDY OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The events that are reported to take place at the time of alleged chemical warfare attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring diseases. Neither mycotoxicosis nor other diseases occur in Southeast Asia which might be able to cause the rapid onset of symptoms or the effects on all sorts of forms of life (human, animal and plant life) that is reported to occur.

2. Judging on the basis of eyewitness reports it appears that three different types of agents have been employed as warfare agents, one of them being "Yellow Rain".

3. Most of the features described with "yellow rain" attacks are consistent with trichothecene mycotoxicosis.

4. The symptoms described are more consistent with Stachybotryotoxicosis, a disease caused by macrocyclic trichothecenes, rather than with symptoms attributed to other trichothecenes.

5. Although certain types of mycotoxins (e.g., aflatoxin, ochratoxin and possibly zearalenone) occur in Thailand and probably also in surrounding countries, there are no naturally occurring diseases with the symptomatology of trichothecene mycotoxicosis.

6. There is an urgent need to improve the verification and control procedures for chemical and/or biological warfare.

1.0 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

1.1 Conduct observations, if possible on-site, to determine whether or not chemical or biological agents have been used.

1.2 If a *prima facie* case is considered to exist, attempt identification as to the possible agent.

1.3 Determine existence or level of natural occurrence of mycotoxicosis in Thailand.

  1.3.1 Determine whether *Fusarium* spp. or other fungi capable of producing trichothecenes do occur in Thailand.

  1.3.2 Determine which types of mycotoxicoses occur in Southeast Asia.

1.4 Determine occurrence of other epizootic diseases in Thailand and surrounding countries.

1.5 Make any other observations or suggestions deemed necessary.

2.0 BACKGROUND

2.1 *Introduction*

There have been reports since May, 1976, of the use of some sort of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapon (CW) in Laos against the Hmong tribesmen. The first allegations of CW use in Kampuchea were received about August, 1979.

In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution (35/144C) authorizing the Secretary General to establish a group of experts to investigate reports of the alleged use of chemical weapons and to report their findings (see Document A/36/613).

2.2 *Canadian Aspects*

Canada's interest covers the broad spectrum of international and national considerations. The Canadian approach to the problem has been developed on the basis of need for an objective examination of the available evidence. To this end, the principal investigator was asked to conduct this study.

2.3 *Details*

The principal investigator, Dr. H.B. Schiefer, visited Thailand from February 12 to 28, 1982, and conducted "on-site" inspections close to the Thailand-Kampuchea and Thailand-Laos borders. He interviewed victims and refugees, received reports from various scientists, physicians and Thai authorities, and investigated the general disease pattern in Thailand, with particular reference to mycotoxicoses.

During his stay, the principal investigator gave a lecture on "Mycotoxicosis, With Particular Reference to Trichothecene-Mycotoxicoses" at Chulalongkorn University. This lecture was attended by approximately 50 scientists. The lecture was repeated at Kasetsart University and was attended by 40 Thai veterinary pathologists who were having their regular bimonthly meeting at the time.

The principal investigator distributed about 50 copies of a booklet: "Mycotoxicoses—Summary of Pertinent Facts", which had been written for this purpose, and numerous copies of reprints were made available to Thai scientists and physicians in Ban Vinai Refugee Camp either through the Embassy or by direct mailing.

2.4 *Acknowledgements*

The principal investigator wishes to express his warm appreciation to the various Thai government and private authorities who extended cooperation to him thereby enabling him to carry out his investigation in the shortest possible time.

3.0 GENERAL SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DURING FEBRUARY, 1982

The month of February is in the middle to later part of the "dry" season in Southeast Asia, and therefore the time for military operations.

3.1 In *Kampuchea*, the Vietnamese-Kampuchean troops made a concerted effort to break down the remaining Khmer Rouge resistance.

On February 11, 1982, a Vietnamese aircraft crash-landed inside Thailand in the area of Pong Namron [4] (location 1 on map, following page). On February 13, 1982, "the Vietnamese forces fired artillery shells with gas canisters into areas around Khao Din (Kampuchea)".[4]

A few days later (Feb. 15, 1982), five Thai border patrol policemen were killed during a clash with about 300–400 intruding Vietnamese soldiers inside Thailand. [5] A spokesman of the Thai Supreme Command said that the Vietnamese were in pursuit of Khmer Rouge. This incident took place at Ban Saptali, which is also in the Pong Namron district (1 on map). On February 19, 1982, [6] a twin-propellered airplane, coming from Kampuchea, sprayed a light yellow chemical dust over Ban Saptali and four other villages, again in the Pong Namron district. [6] This attack took place 8 km inside Thailand. The villagers were evacuated.

A day later, it was reported [7] that the yellowish chemical "is unlikely to be 'Yellow Rain' ". The collection of the substance was carried out without any safety measures, and leaf samples as well as parts of a tin root were sent to a number of laboratories in Bangkok, including the Department of Clinical Microbiology, Siriraj Hospital, and the Armed Forces Institute of Medical Sciences.

A few miles north of the site of this attack, heavy fighting continued inside Kampuchea, close to Aranj Prathet (Nong Pru) (map location 2), which is the area where a Khmer Rouge camp was visited by the principal investigator on February 19, 1982. During the visit, the distant noise of artillery shelling was very noticeable.

Various leaf and soil samples were collected in the Khmer Rouge camp. These samples were forwarded to laboratories for further investigation.

3.2 With respect to *Laos*, Thai border patrols were on alert, but no particular noteworthy incidents took place and it appeared that a number of Hmong had gone from their refugee camps into Laos.

Leaf and soil samples were collected from two locations close to the Mekong River. Again, the samples were forwarded to the appropriate laboratories.

3.3 *Within Thailand*, other military operations were carried out by the Thai army. Heavy fighting broke out in the south of Thailand in an attempt to eradicate the communist insurgents who control a good part of the hills around Surat Thani, approximately 300 km north of the Thai-Malaysian border. Other skirmishes took place in the Thai-Burma-Laos triangle.

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[4] The Nation (Bangkok) Feb. 17, 1982. [Footnote in original.]

[5] The Nation (Bangkok) Feb. 19, 1982. [Footnote in original.]

[6] Bangkok Post and The Nation, Feb. 21, 1982. [Footnote in original.]

[7] The Nation (Bangkok) Feb. 22, 1982 and Bangkok Post, Feb. 24, 1982. [Footnote in original.]


THAILAND
LAOS
Samrong
Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey Province
Sisophon
Siemreab
Batdambang
Batdambang Province
Pailin
2
1
KAMPUCHEA
Pouthisat
Pouthisat Province
Phnom Penh
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
Gulf of Thailand
KAMPUCHEA
Area of reported chemical attacks
0 25 50 kilometers
0 25 50 miles

4.0 RESULTS

4.1 *Evidence Suggesting That Chemical Warfare Agents Were Used*

The first- and second-hand eye witness reports (see Appendix I) and the numerous reports on the alleged use of chemical warfare agents, [8] attest to the fact that "something is going on". Although one has to take into consideration the possibility of exaggeration in some of the refugee reports, and further that some of the "eye witness" reports may be fabrications under the influence of personal messages or radio broadcasts by the Khmer Rouge or Hmong leaders, one has to give serious attention to the apparently never-ending flow of reported incidents. It appears highly unlikely that the essentials of all the reports are products of imagination, fabrication or propaganda.

There is no indication of occurrence of diseases in Thailand which naturally affect, at the same time, all kinds of species such as humans, other mammals, birds or plants (see Appendix IV). Considering the geographic, climatic and general living conditions, this is probably also true for the surrounding countries. Therefore, it is highly improbable that the events reported by the refugees could be due to natural circumstances.

4.2 *Types of Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents That May Have Been Used*

4.2.1 *Introduction*

Although the principal investigator has certain reservations with respect to the categorization of the agents that have allegedly been used, a certain general consensus appears to be developing in that at least three different types of agents may have been employed:

"Yellow"—Apparently causes skin rashes, difficulty of breathing, vomition, hemorrhages and eventually death in humans. Death of animals and plants occurs within 14 days.

"White"—Causes headaches, blurred vision, vomition and very rapid death both in humans and animals.

"Green"—Causes difficulty with vision, numbness and a feeling of general disorientation.

4.2.2 *Agents Other Than "Yellow Rain"*

The principal investigator is neither experienced nor qualified to comment on the agents that have been described as "white" or "green"; therefore, no judgment is passed on these two types of agents.

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[8] —First Canadian Submission to the Experts' Group through the Secretary General in March, 1981;

—Various US submissions to the UN;

—Report of the Group of Experts to Investigate Reports of the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, A/36/613, 36th UN General Assembly, 20 Nov. 1981;

—Seagrave, S. Yellow Rain. A Journey Through the Terror of Chemical Warfare. M. Evans & Co., New York, 1981. [Footnote in original.]

The "yellow" agent, however, causes a number of symptoms that have a certain similarity with diseases caused by the mycotoxins of the trichothecene variety.

4.2.3 *Evidence Suggesting That Mycotoxins May Have Been Used*

Many features of "yellow rain", as described in eye witness reports (see Appendix I), are rather suggestive of trichothecene mycotoxicosis. However, when comparing symptoms and other findings of Alimentary Toxic Aleukia (ATA) and Stachybotryotoxicosis (see Appendix III) with the features described by witnesses of the alleged chemical attacks, it is evident that there are more similarities between Stachybotryotoxicosis and "Yellow Rain" than between ATA and "Yellow Rain".

ATA is a disease due to ingestion of trichothecenes and it takes some time for most symptoms to develop. Stachybotryotoxicosis in man, on the other hand, is associated with inhalation and percutaneous absorption of the toxins. Death, at least in animals, occurs very rapidly due to these mycotoxins.

Inhalation of grain, hay or straw dust containing mycotoxins is also associated with inhalation of proteins acting as antigens, causing an allergic pulmonary reaction known as "intrinsic alveolitis". Repeated exposure to aerosols containing both the macrocyclic trichothecenes and the proteins would enhance the reaction to these substances and lead to chronic pulmonary disease known as intrinsic alveolitis[9] which eventually leads to chronic lesions known as pulmonary fibrosis. In this context it is interesting to note that many alleged victims of "Yellow Rain" complain about respiratory problems many months after the initial attack.[10]

The possibility that "Yellow Rain" may contain trichothecenes is further corroborated by reports of the effects on plants. The toxic effects of trichothecenes on plants are well documented,[11] and from the interviews (see Appendix I), the principal investigator gained the impression that plants became yellow and died within a period of 10-14 days after a "Yellow Rain" attack. Further, it has been said that pigs which ate these yellow leaves started to vomit, an observation that would support a diagnosis of trichothecene toxicosis (see "Interviews", Appendix I).

The hypothesis that mycotoxins (trichothecenes) have been used in gas attacks is also supported by recently released information from the United States Mission to the United Nations. It was stated[12] that a metabolite of T-2 toxin, the deacetylated T-2 toxin form called HT-2 toxin,[13] was found in the blood of two alleged victims.

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[9] See Appendix III (Chapter 4.0). [Footnote in original.]

[10] Verbal communications from various physicians working in refugee camps. [Footnote in original.]

[11] Reiss, J. Effects of mycotoxins on higher plants, algae, fungi and bacteria, pp. 119-143 in: Mycotoxic Fungi, Mycotoxins, Mycotoxicoses. An Encyclopedic Handbook, Vol. 3. T.D. Wyllie and L.G. Morehouse, eds. Marcel Dekker, New York and Basel, 1978. [Footnote in original.]

[12] United States Department of State, Special Report #98: Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Report to the Congress from Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., March 22, 1982. [Footnote in original.]

Another aspect in support of the hypothesis that trichothecenes have been used is the level of mycotoxins found in some samples from foliage which was analyzed by Dr. J. Rosen, Rutgers University.[14] Dr. Rosen found deoxynivalenol (vomitoxin), T-2 toxin and diacetoxyoscirpenol concentrations of 50 ppm; in addition, zearalenone was found. Those levels are unusually high when compared with findings of trichothecenes in mouldy feeds.[15]

Not consistent with the assumption of T-2 toxin and similar trichothecenes as principal causative agents are the reports of immediate death after spraying of "Yellow Rain". This group of trichothecenes will not cause immediate death unless one would assume that a vehicle, like DMSO[16] was used to facilitate the entrance of trichothecenes into the body. As of the day of writing of this evaluation there have been no reports of finding DMSO in any of the samples of alleged chemical warfare attacks. However, in this context it is worthwhile to mention that most victims have stated that the gas "smelled like garlic" or a similar spice. The literature is replete with descriptions of abnormal odor sensations, like garlic, in more than 50 percent of patients who received DMSO treatments for a variety of diseases.[17] A smaller percentage of DMSO-treated patients also experienced nausea, vertigo, and difficulties with vision.[17]

4.3 *Natural Occurrence of Mycotoxins in Southeast Asia*

It follows from Appendix IV, that the only mycotoxicoses known to occur naturally in Southeast Asia up to this time are aflatoxicosis and ochratoxicosis. Other mycotoxins may indeed occur, as they do in other countries of the world, but the same rules of probability would have to be applied to Thailand and Southeast Asia as they are applied in other countries. It is well documented that in Canada, for instance, almost all known mycotoxins can be found in food or feed commodities if one looks for them, but at the same time we do not have any reports of epizootic or enzootic occurrences of mycotoxicosis, save a few incidences of trichothecene-toxicosis in animals. These enzootics are observed on a local basis and, while being a serious threat to the livestock industry, they have never reached epizootic proportions, nor have there ever been reports that various forms of life, such as human, animal and plant life, have succumbed to naturally occurring trichothecenes within a time span of up to 10–14 days.

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[13] Ellison, R.A., Kotsonis, F.N. *in vitro* metabolism of T-2 toxin. Appl. Microbiol., *27*, 423–424, 1974. [Footnote in original.]

[14] Transcript of ABC-TV News: Rain of Terror, Dec. 21, 1981. [Footnote in original.]

[15] Ueno, Y. Trichothecene Mycotoxins: Mycology, Chemistry, and Toxicology. Chapter 10, pp. 301–353 in: Adv. Nutr. Res., Vol. 3. H.H. Draper, ed. Plenum Press, N.Y., 1980; and personal observations during five years of feed testing in Saskatoon. [Footnote in original.]

[16] DMSO = Dimethylsulfoxyd. [Footnote in original.]

[17] Dimethyl-Sulfoxyd: DMSO; Internat. Symp. Nov. 8–19, 1966, Vienna; G. Laudahn and K. Gertich, eds. Saladruck, Berlin, 1966. [Footnote in original.]

4.4 *Natural Occurrence of Diseases That Cause Rapid Death in Humans and Animals*

As described in Appendix V, anthrax, botulism and rabies are epizootic diseases that occur naturally in Thailand and probably also in surrounding countries. Cattle intoxications due to plant poisons are not uncommon, neither are other diseases that are prevalent in subtropical countries. None of these diseases occur with nearly the rapidity that is reported from the alleged chemical warfare attacks.

4.5 *Suggestions for Verification Procedures*

Diseases due to mycotoxins are a relatively new field of research and the numerous difficulties that are encountered during the elucidation of natural mycotoxin outbreaks are well documented in the literature.

In order to determine whether mycotoxins might have been used as warfare agents, a thorough knowledge of the naturally occurring mycotoxicoses is the basis from which aimed investigations have to start. Appendix VI provides some suggestions on how one might proceed.

4.6 *Comments on the UN Experts' Report*

Although the UN experts were of the opinion that their report was inconclusive, one has to admire the thoroughness and objectivity of the approach. However, a number of minor misinformations have found their way into the report which are briefly discussed in Appendix VII.

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Statement by the Director of the Department of State Office of Nuclear Export and Import Control (Stoiber) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Controls on Exports of Nuclear-Related Goods and Technology, June 24, 1982 [1]

I am Director of the Office of Nuclear Export and Import Control, in the Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. In this capacity, I also serve as Chairman of the Interagency Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittees to provide the views of the Department of State on the complex subject of U.S. Government controls over nuclear export transactions which do not involve licensing action by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

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[1] *Controls on Exports of Nuclear-Related Goods and Technology: Hearing Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 13–19.

Before responding to the specific questions raised in your letter of invitation to this hearing, I would like to discuss briefly a few matters which will provide a context for your consideration of the procedures and policies which apply to this important aspect of U.S. nuclear commerce.

DIFFICULTIES IN SUCCESSFUL CONTROL

At the outset, I would like to emphasize this administration's firm position, shared by past administrations, that a key element of a successful nuclear nonproliferation policy is implementation of an effective system for controlling transfers of items which can contribute significantly to nuclear explosives development—including those not designed or prepared solely for use in sensitive nuclear facilities—for example, enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water plants. However, I should add that maintaining such a control regime is exceptionally difficult. There are several reasons for this difficulty.

First, there are many thousands of common industrial products that may be extremely useful or even essential for the construction of sensitive nuclear facilities or for explosives development. For example, two essential materials for the construction of a nuclear re-processing plant are not controlled by the United States, or any other supplier nation. These are concrete and stainless steel. But no one would seriously suggest that we ought to attempt to control exports of concrete and stainless steel to forestall sensitive nuclear development by another nation. These admittedly extreme examples pose the dilemma: How to draw a reasonable line between items which it is sensible to control, and those which, though useful for sensitive facilities, are so generally available that they cannot be effectively controlled. Determining how deeply our export control efforts should reach into the trade in such dual-use items is much more complicated than defining items specifically designed and usable only for nuclear uses—the kind of items controlled under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing system.

The second dimension of the dual-use issue I would like to discuss involves our relations with other suppliers. No matter how refined and effective the U.S. control regime may be, unless other potential suppliers of such commodities apply similar restraints, our nonproliferation objectives will remain frustrated.

We have approached this problem in two ways. First, on an ad hoc basis, we routinely alert other supplier nations about specific export transactions we learn about which may raise nonproliferation concerns. We have received very good cooperation on such matters from other suppliers, but they have emphasized the need for detailed information on which to base their export control decisions, something we are not always able to provide. However, there have been some occasions when other suppliers disagree with our assessment that a particular export poses a proliferation risk. This highlights the point I am trying to make; namely, that unilateral controls are not adequate.

Second, during the past year we have conducted a series of bilateral discussions with other nations which may be in a position to supply items useful for sensitive facilities. Department of Energy and ACDA representatives have participated in these discussions. Our discussions have included all major European supplier nations, Canada, and Japan. Our purposes in these exchanges have been to explain the U.S. system of controlling dual-use items, to determine how other supplier nations implement controls in this area, and to discuss how to improve coordination between the United States and other suppliers to prevent the export of sensitive items to nations of proliferation concern. As a result of these conversations, it has become clear that the U.S. export control system for dual-use items is much more sophisticated and well developed than those of other supplier nations. Most other nations have established an interagency coordinating body similar to our Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination, which reviews potentially sensitive exports. However, they have pointed out two different types of impediments to their effective control of sensitive items, which pose less of a problem in the U.S. system.

First, some countries have told us that their legal systems make it difficult to control items unless they are defined with great specificity in their laws and regulations. For that reason they would have great legal difficulty applying the kind of end-use or end-user concepts which enable us to restrain the export of sensitive items even though we do not list them precisely in Federal regulations. Second, some nations have indicated that because they are non-holders of a sensitive technology they sometimes have difficulty knowing whether a given item should be closely reviewed. There is little the United States can do about the first difficulty, aside from urging that additional items be listed by foreign suppliers. But, on the second problem, we have furnished other suppliers with our control lists, have explained why we control certain items, and have offered to supply additional detailed technical information to enable them to make informed export control decisions. These efforts have the best chance of success if we continue to pursue them on an informal, bilateral basis, rather than in large, formal gatherings, which have produced negative reactions in the past.

We will continue our cooperative efforts with other suppliers, both on individual export cases and on the broader issue of developing effective machinery for control of sensitive exports. In this regard I would emphasize the adjective "cooperative." Nothing would be more damaging to our efforts to secure effective supplier action on sensitive transactions than to adopt unilateral measures in this area, without consultation and prior agreement that such measures should be adopted. In this regard, congressional supporters of nonproliferation can assist our efforts with recommendations and oversight of administration efforts. Therefore, we would hope the Congress could avoid adding a new layer of regulatory procedures and requirements to a highly structured interagency process which we believe is basically functioning well and is in the process of being improved still further.

I would now like to respond to the specific questions you posed to the Department of State.

ROLE AND PROCEDURES OF THE SNEC

The subcommittees have expressed interest in how the Subgroup of Nuclear Export Coordination [SNEC] [2] functions in identifying and stopping non-NRC-licensed nuclear-related exports that pose proliferation risks.

The SNEC was established in the summer of 1977 as a Subgroup to the National Security Council, NSC, Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation to meet the perceived need for a "working level"—that is, Office Director—forum where controversial or sensitive nuclear export matters and issues could be reviewed and discussed.

Participants in the SNEC are: (1) The Department of State which chairs; (2) the Department of Energy; (3) the Department of Commerce; (4) the Department of Defense; (5) the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and (6) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If circumstances warrant, other agencies may be invited to participate. There are no restrictions on the number of participants from each agency, within reason, provided all have appropriate security clearances. There is no quorum, although the SNEC normally operates on a consensus basis with the concurrence of all participating agencies needed for export approvals. State is represented by the Office of Nuclear Exports of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs [OES/NEC]; DOE by the Office of International Security Affairs, Defense programs; Commerce by the Division of Policy Planning of the Office of Export Administration; DOD by the Office of Policy Planning [Nuclear Affairs] International Security Affairs; ACDA by the International Nuclear Affairs Division; and NRC by the Office of International Programs.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 [3] which amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, provided in sections 126a(1) and 57.B. a statutory basis for an interagency coordinating body to monitor nuclear exports licensed by the NRC or authorized by the Department of Energy. The role of SNEC as a body to resolve interagency differences on nuclear exports was set forth under section 5 of the "Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978." I would like to offer for the record a copy of these procedures. [4]

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

[4] Not printed here.

The SNEC acts on an advisory basis only and its recommendations are not formally binding upon any agency. Subgroup agendas, minutes, and discussions during meetings are classified and are exempt from release under section (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act for the protection of predecisional interagency views which are an integral and necessary part of the review process, quite apart from the specific national security classification of a matter under discussion. Final recommendations on specific applications including reasons for denials and conditions, if any, for approvals, are unclassified.

The SNEC meets at intervals of approximately 3 weeks to review proposed nuclear-related exports which could conceivably pose a proliferation risk. The SNEC, as noted, serves as a forum for review and discussion of nuclear export policy issues and specific case applications. The SNEC can review NRC license applications, DOE subsequent arrangements and 10 CFR 810 applications and Department of Commerce license applications since Commerce controls a far wider range of commodities and technology than either DOE or NRC.

The Department of Commerce publishes a Commodity Control List [CCL] of various items, equipment and materials under its regulations—15 CFR 37—which, because of their significance for national security, nonproliferation, foreign policy or short supply reasons, require a validated license for export. Of the items on the CCL, some 60 items controlled for nonproliferation reasons have been included in a "Nuclear Referral List". We note, however, that even some items on the Nuclear Referral List have other, nonnuclear uses.

All Commerce export license applications that have any actual or potential nuclear related use are reviewed by DOE. In this review process DOE follows policy guidance from the State Department, SNEC, and other sources. DOE refers most of the cases it reviews back to Commerce for licensing action because the country, end-use, end-user or the nature of the items in question make clear the lack of any proliferation significance. For some cases where it is clear that an item would present a proliferation concern or where export would be contrary to U.S. policy, denial is recommended. The remaining cases which raise some question of proliferation significance are referred by DOE to the SNEC for consideration. DOE reviews on the order of 8,000 cases a year. Of that number only about 200 to 300 are referred to the SNEC. Other agencies may also refer cases to the subgroup for review.

In reviewing Commerce license applications for exports of possible proliferation concern the SNEC takes into account a range of factors, including: (1) Past practice concerning supply of the commodity in question to the intended recipient country and end user; (2) equivalent commodities already in the recipient country and available to the end-user; (3) foreign availability; (4) available intelligence information regarding activities of proliferation concern on the part of the recipient country and the end-user; (5) technical capabilities and significance of the commodity to be exported; (6) foreign policy considerations of which the primary ones are nonproliferation; and (7) applicable statutory criteria.

If, on the basis of its review of the factors described in the preceding paragraph and any other relevant considerations, the SNEC determines that a proposed export involves significant proliferation risk, a recommendation for denial of the export will be made to the licensing agency.

If participating agencies are unable to reach agreement as to the disposition of a particular export application in the SNEC, the "Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978" provide a series of steps which can be taken to resolve the disagreement. The matter can be referred to the successor to the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation, a body comprised of Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries charged with oversight of nuclear proliferation and export control responsibilities in each of the concerned agencies. If resolution of the disagreement proves impossible at that level, the matter can be referred to the Cabinet level and even to the President.

EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA

With that summary, Mr. Chairman, I would like to move to some other questions you have raised. The subcommittees have asked to what extent, if any the recent decision to approve Commerce licenses for the export to South Africa of nuclear end-use items for health and safety purposes may undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

In the view of the Department of State, recent selected exports of nuclear-related items to South Africa have made a positive contribution to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. First, it should be emphasized that exports of nuclear fuel or especially designed parts and components from the United States to South Africa for nuclear uses cannot be made unless and until the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and U.S. policy have been met. For significant items licensed by the NRC this would require South Africa to agree to place all nuclear activities in that country under international safeguards—a step which the South African Government has declined up to now to undertake—and to adhere to the NPT.[5] Therefore, nuclear-related commerce under NRC license with South Africa can only be conducted on a very modest scale.

Since early 1981 several Commerce licenses have been approved for the export to South Africa of items which are nonsensitive from a proliferation standpoint for use in IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities for purposes related to health and safety. For example, two hydrogen recombiners were approved for export to South Africa for use at the Koeberg facility. This is an item whose only possible use is for nuclear powerplant safety based on post-TMI criteria. These few exports were only approved after careful case-by-case consideration in the SNEC and review by each concerned agency. Approval in each case was conditional upon the receipt of nonproliferation assurances from the Government of South Africa.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

In view of the very small number of nuclear-related exports, their inherently nonsensitive nature and the stringent limitations placed upon such approvals, they have in no way undermined U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

Rather, approval of these few limited exports have helped the United States continue a dialog with the Government of South Africa on nuclear issues. We have repeatedly made clear to other nations, including South Africa, the depth of the U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation goals. That policy is clearly established in U.S. law, which this administration is determined to implement effectively. Our ability to persuade other nations to act consistently with these nonproliferation objectives requires that we continue to talk to them and that when we talk they listen with some receptivity. Willingness to consider favorably a small number of nonsensitive transfers to South Africa's nuclear program can serve as an inducement to the South Africans to be more forthcoming on nonproliferation issues.

Current U.S. law properly preserves our ability to keep the door open for negotiations on these vital nonproliferation issues by permitting export of a slender range of Commerce licensed nuclear-related items, conditional on the receipt of adequate assurances. It would be a mistake to limit our negotiating ability through further restraints on international commercial relations.

The subcommittees also inquired about the assurances that State worked out for Commerce-licensed nuclear-related exports to South Africa and asked how these differ from assurances required for other countries that do not accept full-scope safeguards. In addition to the assurances given by the South African end-users for all Commerce-licensed exports, formal written assurances have been obtained by the U.S. Embassy from the South African Foreign Ministry. These assurances are tailored to the individual application but normally confirm that there will be: (1) No use other than that stated in the export license application; (2) no nuclear explosive use; and (3) no retransfer without prior U.S. consent. Right of access for inspection of the installed item has been obtained for U.S. officials when deemed appropriate. Other assurances have been obtained to meet special circumstances. The assurances obtained from the South African Government as a condition for approval of Commerce-licensed nuclear-related exports are essentially the same as those requested from other non-NPT party governments for approval of similar exports, and in some cases have been considerably stronger.

SALES THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES

You have noted that DOE authorization procedures currently allow the sale of U.S. nuclear technology through third countries to Pakistan and other nations which have not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards. You have asked to what extent this type of sale interferes with foreign policy objectives of keeping nuclear technology out of the hands of countries that pose serious proliferation risks. You have also requested the views of the State Department as to what steps, if any, are believed necessary to stiffen the DOE authorization procedures.

Current DOE procedures allow U.S. companies and their licensees to participate in a wide range of nonsensitive nuclear activities in most non-Communist bloc countries, without a case-by-case review. This general authorization has been in effect since the Atomic Energy Act was amended in 1954. A general authorization permits U.S. companies and their licensees to assist non-Communist bloc countries in such activities as uranium mining and milling; UF-6 conversion; fuel fabrication; reactor design, construction and operation; architect engineer services and training programs for foreign personnel conducted both within and outside the United States.

DOE regulations include a list of nations, currently consisting primarily of Cocom countries, which are excepted from this general authorization, and with which such assistance can take place only upon specific authorization.

The Departments of State and Energy have reviewed this matter and agree that revisions to the part 810 general authorization should be promptly adopted. These regulatory amendments are in the final stages of interagency consideration, which we would expect to complete in the very near future. Once this process has been completed, we would plan to provide a detailed briefing to interested Members of Congress.

For the countries on a revised list, there would be a case-by-case review for each proposal by a U.S. firm to engage in nuclear cooperation involving nonsensitive technology. This would permit us to identify proposed transactions such as transfer of light water reactor technology to Pakistan by a licensee of a U.S. firm. In instances where we identify proliferation issues, we would supplement domestic regulatory action with informal diplomatic measures to alert other suppliers to our concerns.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to the subcommittee's questions.

Statement by the ACDA Deputy Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control (Turrentine) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Controls on Exports of Nuclear-Related Goods and Technology, June 24, 1982 [1]

In July of last year President Reagan issued a statement that the further proliferation of nuclear explosives would pose a severe threat to international and regional stability, and to the security interests of the United States and other countries. [2] In his address last week to the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament, he again emphasized the concern of the United States over this problem and expressed a strong commitment to nonproliferation objectives. [3] The executive branch is keenly aware of the strong congressional interest in nonproliferation, and particularly of the involvement of these two House subcommittees over the past few years. As a representative of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA], [4] I welcome the opportunity to appear before you on the important issue of nuclear export control.

This administration believes that whether the international community is ultimately successful in preventing the spread of nuclear explosives will depend on our ability to improve regional and global stability and to reduce those motivations that can drive countries toward nuclear explosives. United States and international nuclear export control efforts can help to promote these objectives by insuring that such exports do not enhance nuclear explosive capabilities in countries of proliferation concern. The question of U.S. controls over nuclear exports not licensed by the NRC is an important feature of this effort, and is a subject that has been and continues to be a major interest to ACDA.

AGENCY ROLES IN LICENSING

We believe that the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC) plays a particularly important role in preventing U.S. assistance to the nuclear programs of states of proliferation concern. Most SNEC attention focuses on so-called "dual-use" items or equipment which have legitimate nonnuclear applications, but which—to quote the Export Administration Regulations (378.2)—"could be, if used for purposes other than that for which the export is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes."

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[1] *Controls on Exports of Nuclear-Related Goods and Technology: Hearing Before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 27-31.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278-280.

[3] *Ante*, June 17.

[4] These and following brackets are in the source text.

It should be made clear how the responsibility for controlling these "dual-use" items differs from NRC-licensed items. Controls over virtually all NRC-licensed items are required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] [5] which is the foundation of the international nuclear export control regime. Article III.2 of the NPT requires all states party to the treaty not to provide "source or special fissionable material, or equipment, or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material" to any non-nuclear-weapon state unless they are under IAEA safeguards. In order to implement this obligation, a group of NPT party states met as the so-called Zangger Committee and agreed upon a "Trigger List" of items, [6] the export of which would require the application of safeguards. Thus, in general, NRC licenses equipment and material which relate to the acquisition or production of fissile material. These items also have specialized nuclear uses—and thus are not "dual-use"—and the IAEA can apply safeguards to them.

The Department of Commerce, on the other hand, licenses sophisticated "dual-use" items which if misused could contribute to the actual manufacture of a nuclear explosive—in contrast to the production of the fissile material. A so-called Nuclear Referral List has been developed from the Commodity Control List of equipment and materials needed to design, test, and manufacture nuclear explosives. Examples of such equipment include computers, high-speed cameras, flash X-ray units, and high-precision metal-working lathes.

The listing of these items should make apparent their difference from NRC-licensed items. Particularly noteworthy is that NRC-licensed items all trigger the application of IAEA safeguard over any fissile material involved or processed. In practice, NRC-licensed items usually go to safeguarded facilities which have agreed upon inspection procedures. In contrast, IAEA safeguards are not relevant to dual-use items which could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive. For example, items such as computers or metal-working machinery supplied to a railroad would not be expected ever to involve nuclear materials.

Such Commerce Department controls facilitate U.S. ability to fulfill its obligation under article I of the NPT "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any nonnuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices." NRC controls basically implement article III.2 of the NPT by requiring the application of IAEA safeguards, and thus help to insure that civil nuclear exports do not contribute to the development of nuclear explosives. Commerce controls permit the review of other items that could assist a country in manufacturing nuclear explosives.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[6] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 17–23.

The application for a license to export any item on the Nuclear Referral List is subject to careful review by the Commerce Department, which coordinates with DOE to determine which of these applications pose particularly important concerns and should be referred to the SNEC.

It is the ACDA view that the SNEC functions well at reviewing exports of nuclear equipment, materials or services that could pose proliferation risks. In general, we are satisfied that cases of proliferation concern do get referred to the SNEC, and that the SNEC itself serves an extremely valuable function by focusing interagency attention on the proliferation issues associated with particular exports. It provides an opportunity for analysts directly involved in nonproliferation intelligence and the current thrust of U.S. nonproliferation policy to interact with individuals responsible for commercial, economic, and licensing issues.

In a comparative context, the U.S. system of nuclear export controls is one of the best national systems in terms of its effectiveness and comprehensiveness. In particular, the United States has a better legal basis for controlling dual-use nuclear exports than most other Western supplier states. In addition, the U.S. review process which includes evaluation of end-users and end-uses is the most comprehensive and has, in fact, been emulated by other states.

It should also be noted that SNEC actions have also served as the basis for international efforts to prevent sensitive nuclear exports from going to states of proliferation concern. Whenever SNEC turns down an export, it considers foreign availability and, when appropriate, will transmit export alerts to other supplier states requesting their cooperation.

ACDA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SNEC

ACDA contributes to the effective operation of the SNEC in two particularly noteworthy ways. First, since ACDA staff closely follow the proliferation intelligence relating to individual "problem" countries, particularly their purchasing efforts, they are able to take an active role in formulating an appropriate U.S. response. This is done in very close cooperation with State and DOE. In practice, working-level cooperation with State is so close that on many issues and projects, State and ACDA decisionmakers may in effect be working with a joint staff. In this joint effort, ACDA often provides intelligence information and a review of the past history of a problem country's programs, including any previous concerns and actions taken. Here ACDA frequently serves as a link between the intelligence community and the SNEC.

ACDA's second contribution to the SNEC is linking specific export control decisions to nonproliferation policy concerns. Each agency represented on the SNEC has its own organizational perspectives and review procedures. At ACDA, the International Nuclear Affairs Division and the Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division work exclusively on nuclear nonproliferation. As such, they are closely involved in formulating and implementing all aspects of United States and international nuclear nonproliferation policies. ACDA's representatives to the SNEC bring this awareness of existing and developing U.S. policy to bear on SNEC items.

The substance of the subcommittees' questions on DOE authorization procedures is being addressed in more detail by the other witnesses. ACDA understands the concern over the reexport of such U.S. technology, and we are participating actively with other executive branch agencies in reviewing the problem. We expect the review to be completed shortly, and the Congress will be fully informed.

EXPORTS TO SOUTH AFRICA

Your letter of invitation also posed a question about recent decisions on certain Commerce-licensed items to be exported to South Africa. ACDA supported such exports for nonproliferation reasons. Clearly South Africa presents significant problems for our nonproliferation policy. The most important nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives in South Africa continue to be to secure its adherence to the NPT and to have South Africa accept safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. Until South Africa accepts such safeguards, the United States is legally prohibited from any significant nuclear cooperation with South Africa. If we are ever to secure our major nonproliferation objectives with regard to South Africa, the necessary first step is to at least talk. In particular, technical discussions are necessary on how safeguards would be implemented at South African nuclear facilities. The export of certain dual-use items with appropriate assurances can be part of a step-by-step process to secure our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Such exports cannot contribute in any measurable way to a nuclear explosives program. However, they can constitute an indication of U.S. willingness to be cooperative if South Africa moves toward acceptance of safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities or adheres to the NPT. It also puts the burden on South Africa to indicate a similarly forthcoming attitude if it desires more significant nuclear cooperation in the future.

Because of the importance of the SNEC, ACDA has made SNEC support one of the major priorities of its staff. While no member of the staff works exclusively on the SNEC, ACDA normally sends three representatives to SNEC meetings, including the Chief of the International Nuclear Affairs Division. Prior to each SNEC meeting, the agenda is reviewed and items are sent to appropriate country analysts or technical experts for comments. If necessary, ACDA will contact the appropriate intelligence or technical services for information. The amount of staff time devoted to the SNEC varies considerably from meeting to meeting, depending on variables such as the size of the agenda, the need to do technical analysis, the need to review or find the appropriate intelligence information, and the likelihood that the export may be the source of extended SNEC consideration.

Finally, it should be repeated that the United States has an excellent system of nuclear export controls. The United States is not the weakest link through which nuclear exports flow to problem countries. In this larger international context, while it is certainly important that the SNEC continue to function effectively, it is perhaps even more important that the United States continue its ongoing efforts to encourage other nuclear supplier states to develop equally effective and stringent export control systems. I would add that working to support and strengthen the international nuclear export control regime has been and continues to be a major focus of ACDA's nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

Statement by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, June 25, 1982 [1]

This afternoon we held the latest in a series of National Security Council meetings focused on arms control. At the conclusion of the meeting I gave final approval to the instructions the American negotiating team will carry to Geneva, where negotiations will begin next Tuesday, June 29, on Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START).

Our team will be headed by Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, an outstanding soldier-diplomat, who has participated actively in developing the far-reaching START proposals we have made, and in which the entire world is placing so much hope.

An historic opportunity exists to reverse the massive buildup of nuclear arsenals that occurred during the last decade. We must do all we possibly can to achieve substantial *reductions* in the numbers and the destructive potential of the nuclear forces. As our proposals emphasize, we must seek especially to reduce the most destabilizing elements of the strategic arsenals. We must ensure reductions that are verifiable, that go to equal levels, and that enhance stability and deterrence and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war.

I do not underestimate the formidable nature of this task. But I believe it is in the interest of the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire world to engage fully in this effort. I have the highest confidence that Ed Rowny and his team will work faithfully and tirelessly toward this goal.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 28, 1982, p. 840.

Statement Submitted by the United States to the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: World Disarmament Campaign, June 28, 1982 [1]

1. The United States delegation welcomes this opportunity to discuss the World Disarmament Campaign. We intend to participate constructively in Working Group III to attempt to ensure that a World Disarmament Campaign reaches all peoples in all regions of the world.

2. As President Reagan has repeatedly emphasized, most recently before the special session on 17 June, the United States is committed to meaningful arms control including militarily significant reductions in nuclear weapons.[2] To further that process, and to build confidence among nations and peoples, the United States believes that the open availability of relevant information on disarmament and security matters is vital. The United States itself, as a free and democratic country, publicly makes available vast amounts of information in these areas.

3. We believe that excessive secrecy and censorship can create only mistrust and misunderstanding among the peoples of the world; they are the true enemies of peaceful relations among nations. An informed public is the best guarantee against such misunderstanding.

4. To foster a climate of openness, President Reagan has offered President Brezhnev an opportunity to speak to the American people on our television, if he will allow President Reagan the same opportunity with the Soviet people. He has also called on Soviet and American journalists to exchange views on major events on each other's television. In addition, as you will recall, on 17 June, President Reagan proposed the convening of an international conference on military expenditures to build on the work already accomplished in developing a common system of military expenditure reporting. Only in such a climate of openness can public understanding of these vital questions be enhanced.

5. It is in this context that we address the World Disarmament Campaign. It is essential that the General Assembly carefully consider and establish the objectives, priorities and modalities for the Campaign before it gets underway.

6. As is well known here, my delegation broke consensus on resolution 36/92 B on 20 November 1981 in the First Committee. As we explained then, we were disturbed that problems of ensuring the effectiveness and possible impartiality of the World Disarmament Campaign had not been seriously addressed, much less overcome. Such a Campaign blurs the distinction between open and closed societies, and such a Campaign inevitably would tend to focus on public opinion in free societies—where numerous private bodies already exist

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[1] A/S-12/AC.1/51. The statement was transmitted as an annex to a letter from Acting Permanent Representative Adelman to the Secretary-General.

[2] *Ante.*

with aims identical to those of the framers of resolution 36/92 B. The United States also emphasized then that "mobilizing world public opinion"—as opposed to supplying facts and expert views—is an activity singularly unsuited to this Organization, which is after all an assemblage of Governments.[3]

7. The United States continues to have these concerns, as we noted in the Preparatory Committee on 19 May 1982 (A/AC.206/SR.38, p. 7). In addition, we pointed out that all decisions with financial implications should be handled in an appropriate manner. None the less, now that a decision has been taken to launch such a Campaign and to adopt in due course specific plans for such a Campaign, the United States delegation believes that it is mandatory to ensure that a balanced and universally applicable, and fiscally responsible programme is in fact executed.

8. As our explanation of vote on resolution 36/92 B foreshadowed, one overriding objective that we must endeavour to build into the Campaign is an effect to disseminate information and encourage a searching discussion on disarmament in all societies. While we harbour no illusions as to the serious obstacles that will tend to frustrate that objective—a subject on which we will speak—we are nevertheless heartened to see that the general and tentative outline for a World Disarmament Campaign prepared by the Centre for Disarmament and submitted to the special session under the symbol A/S-12/27, recognized that the "Campaign will have to be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner".

9. We must now explore how to translate this lofty goal into a concrete programme of action. In this connexion, we will be particularly interested in learning precisely how the Centre for Disarmament is to ensure broad access to and the presentation of a variety of viewpoints in all societies. Clearly the preparation of specific plans to ensure universal access by the Campaign will be essential; equally important will be careful and impartial monitoring of such plans, to ensure that access is not being frustrated. During the coming discussion of the World Disarmament Campaign we will be joining others in seeking ways to ensure that the world public will be able to receive information on disarmament directly. Obviously, as the draft programme for the World Disarmament Campaign notes, programmes should be planned which have greatest effect, notably by utilizing the mass communication media.

10. A second major concern of the United States is that the Campaign have as its objectives the dissemination of factual information and the stimulation of informed discussion reflecting a variety of viewpoints, with the aim of educating participants. The United Nations is an assemblage of nations representing a wide variety of differing viewpoints. The Campaign must reflect this fact. It is, therefore, inappropriate for the United Nations to "mobilize" or "mold" public

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 607–608.

opinion or to espouse one particular point of view on complex and often controversial arms control and disarmament topics. When, however, people are exposed to a free and open discussion and a variety of opinions, they will be free to form their own views on these vital topics on an independent basis.

11. A third concern is that certain activities envisaged in the draft programme of action, such as awards to non-governmental organizations or individuals, a film peace prize and an international songwriting contest, do not further the Campaign's stated objective of providing information in a "balanced, factual and objective" manner. Contests are by definition subjective undertakings, especially when the judges hold widely differing points of view.

12. Finally, we should wish to affirm that in keeping with financial stringencies, the Campaign should also seek, whenever possible, to use existing resources, such as those of the Department of Public Information and UNIDIR. We assume that, where existing resources may not meet prospective campaign efforts, then such efforts if undertaken would be financed through the voluntary pledges which we understood would be the mainstay of the Campaign.

13. We should like to advance the following specific suggestions:

(a) *Multilateral and bilateral discussion.* Since, as has often been stated in the United Nations context, the major nuclear Powers bear a special responsibility for progress in disarmament, the opinions of the leaders of these two Powers are especially important and pertinent for the world community. President Reagan has offered President Brezhnev the opportunity to address the American people on television in exchange for the chance to speak to the Soviet people on Soviet television. This important dialogue should not be limited to the two nations but should be made available to the people of all nations. The Campaign could, therefore, make audio-visual tapes and transcripts of such statements available in all regions of the world. Also, President Reagan has called on Soviet and American journalists to exchange views on major events on each other's television. This dialogue might be expanded to include relevant experts who are not journalists. This proposed exchange of views also could be disseminated widely. Similarly, because misunderstanding and mistrust still exist in all regions of the world, representatives of other nations where fundamental differences still exist, could be invited on a reciprocal basis to visit and discuss the vital questions of disarmament and security. Such discussions might assist in opening a constructive dialogue and lessen the chances of conflict and might also be televised.

(b) *Regional seminars and literature dissemination.* In order to enable the regional seminars envisaged in subsection 2.3 of document A/S–12/27 to be most effective, the seminars should include representatives of major geographic regions and philosophical persuasions. In addition, these seminars (e.g., of parliamentarians, journalists, etc.) should be televised to reach the maximum number of people. Relevant material provided by Governments, recognized international studies and peace institutes, and other organizations might be disseminated in connexion with the seminars, or might be disseminated separately in the Campaign.

(c) *Implementation.* An impartial group should be appointed to review the implementation of the Campaign, notably to assess the impact of the Campaign and determine whether materials, television broadcasts and the like are in fact reaching the intended audiences.

Proposal Submitted by the United States to the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: International Conference on Military Expenditures, June 28, 1982 [1]

1. As long as some States continue to obscure their military expenditures behind a curtain of secrecy, it will be difficult to take practical steps in international consideration of military expenditures. In recent years, successive United Nations expert groups have developed a standardized instrument for reporting national military expenditures and have begun to develop techniques for comparison and verification. The United States has actively supported this effort and has publicly provided our military expenditure data to the United Nations, most recently on 11 August 1981 (A/36/353).

2. Unfortunately, to date only 15 other nations have submitted data using the United Nations standardized reporting instrument.

3. Therefore, in his 17 June address to the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, President Reagan proposed that an international conference be convened under United Nations auspices to build on past United Nations efforts to develop a common reporting and accounting system on military expenditures, including those pursued in the consideration of reduction of military budgets. We believe that such a conference would contribute towards building mutual trust and confidence and would be an important step in the process of disarmament. The relevant portion of the President's statement follows:

> The democracies of the West are open societies. Information on our defences is available to our citizens, our elected officials and the world. We do not hesitate to inform potential adversaries of our military forces, and ask in return for the same information concerning theirs.
>
> The amount and type of military spending by a country is important for the world to know, as a measure of its intentions, and the threat that country may pose to its neighbours. The Soviet Union and other closed societies go to extraordinary

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[1] A/S-12/AC.1/52. The proposal was transmitted as an annex to a letter from Acting Permanent Representative Adelman to the Secretary-General.

lengths to hide their true military spending not only from other nations, but from their own people. This practice contributes to distrust and fear about their intentions.

Today, the United States proposes an international conference on military expenditures to build on the work of this body in developing a common system for accounting and reporting. We urge the Soviet Union, in particular, to join this effort in good faith, to revise the universally discredited official figures it publishes and to join with us in giving the world a true account of the resources we allocate to our armed forces.[2]

4. The United States believes an international conference on military expenditures should:

(a) Review the progress of United Nations groups of experts, particularly as regards the reporting, comparison and verification of military expenditures;

(b) Review the implementation of resolutions aimed at universal reporting of military expenditures according to the United Nations standard reporting instrument and examine the reasons for the lack of widespread reporting;

(c) Consider modalities for encouraging wider participation and achieving universal reporting;

(d) Consider possible means for further refinement in the standard reporting instrument and for the comparison and verification of data;

(e) Prepare new means for publicizing the submission of data in accordance with the reporting instrument;

(f) Consider ways in which accurate military expenditure information could be disseminated and used to promote peace and international stability and to increase openness on matters affecting collective security.

Proposal Submitted by the United States to the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons, June 28, 1982[1]

1. During the past several years, disturbing reports have reached the outside world that toxins and other lethal chemical weapons are being used in conflicts against people in remote regions of the world. The international community made clear its concern over these reports in creating the United Nations Group of Experts to conduct an impartial investigation of the evidence. The Group of Experts to Investigate

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[2] *Ante*, June 17.

[1] A/S-12/AC.1/53. The proposal was transmitted as an annex to a letter from Acting Permanent Representative Adelman to the Secretary-General.

Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons was established in accordance with resolution 35/144 C of 12 December 1980. Its mandate was renewed by resolution 36/96 C, adopted on 9 December 1981. The Group of Experts has endeavoured to carry out its mandate but has been prevented from doing so by its inability to visit the countries where chemical attacks have taken place. The Group itself has said, in order to reach definitive conclusions, it requires "timely access to the areas of alleged use of chemical warfare agents" (A/36/613, p. 35).

2. For these reasons, the twelfth special session of the General Assembly should call on the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, to grant full and free access to areas where chemical attacks have been reported so that the Group of Experts can conduct the effective, independent investigation mandated by the General Assembly to ascertain the facts concerning the use of chemical weapons in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.

Letter From President Reagan to the Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations (Rowny): Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, June 29, 1982 [1]

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age—the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.

I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 5, 1982, pp. 845–846.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.

I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us. For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have personal attention.

Remarks by President Reagan: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Nuclear Freeze, and Trident Submarine [Extracts], July 1, 1982 [1]

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Strategic Arms Reduction

Q. Mr. President, my question is: The change in command at the State Department could impede the progress of the START talks, at least for openers. How does the White House and START negotiators intend to deal with this?

The President. As a matter of fact, if I had thought that such a thing as this could have impeded in any way our legitimate effort to get a reduction in the strategic nuclear weapons, I would have not accepted, but fought against accepting, the resignation. It had nothing to do with anything of that kind, and I am convinced that we're going forward with the best opportunity that we've had in a long time, in a number of years.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 5, 1982, pp. 858–860. The President was meeting with editors and broadcasters from the western region.

In recent years in our efforts—first of all, I don't know how many people are aware that since the war—since World War II, this country has proposed and tried to secure arms reductions and limitations and so forth of various kinds 19 times with very little success. I think part of it in recent years has been because we ourselves embarked on a program of unilateral disarmament, and the Soviet Union was out to catch up. We at the end of World War II were the only truly superpower in the world. We were the ones who still had no industrial damage done to us by the scars of war. Our military was intact and had not suffered as great a loss as those who had been in prior to our going into the war. And we tried from that vantage point, as we all know, to bring about these reductions.

I believe now that our military buildup and the fact that we have shown the will, the ability to go forward with a military buildup, is what has brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table as quickly as they came. And it's this that we think will keep them there. I think it's best explained by a cartoon recently that one of your papers ran, and that was a cartoon of Brezhnev speaking to a Russian general, and he was saying, "I liked the arms race better when we were the only ones in it."

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Nuclear Arms Freeze

Q. Mr. President, relative to your arms control initiative, the coordi
nators of the California nuclear freeze program are suggesting that i
you're serious about reducing nuclear arms, the obvious place to star
is with a stop. And they wonder whether you would accept that an
supporting the California nuclear freeze on the ballot in Novembe

The President. Jeff, I think the only problem that I have with th
freeze is, I know the people are sincere and all, but they've got th
freeze at the wrong end of the negotiations. The Soviet Union do
have a decided edge on us and does have, at the moment in strateg
weapons, a nuclear—a building, a production capacity greater tha
ours. They had three assembly lines going. We have none. The la
administration closed down the only assembly line for them in 197

This—a freeze is just fine. And that's very much a part of STAR
Once we get down on an equal basis and to a vastly reduced level
and, as you know, the talks that started several months ago, the IN
talks in Geneva having to do with the intermediate-range missiles th
are aimed against the cities of Europe, while there is nothing to mat
them until our NATO allies get the Pershing missiles and the cru
missiles from us—and so we've advocated there a total zero ba
They eliminate their SS-20's and -4's and -5's; we won't place th
Pershings or those cruise missiles.

And, again, I think they came to the table only because they know we're building those Pershings and those cruise missiles and the European allies of ours said that they would station them in their countries. And they accepted our invitation immediately.

But the freeze now, I think, would make this country dangerously vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.

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Trident Submarine

Q. By way of a follow on that, sometime next month, the U.S.S. *Ohio,* the first Trident nuclear submarine, will move into its home base at Bangor, Washington, on Hood Canal, not far from Seattle. What would you say to those individuals who are strongly opposed to such a large and lethal weapons system, not only to it, but to the idea of basing it in Seattle's backyard, so to speak?

The President. Well, it's got to be based someplace. [*Laughter*] But I think we've proven over the years that there is no risk—well, you can never say that there is no risk, any kind of accident, sometime or other, could happen. But we've had nuclear-powered vessels. We've had nuclear weapons. We have nuclear weapons being carried airborne and so forth. I can't see that there's a legitimate reason why that should be denied a base.

I think the safety provisions in those weapons has made them virtually fool-proof to any accident. There's quite a procedure that has to take place before they can be detonated. And so I cannot see anything that would cause them to be—they probably have a higher level of safety than normal munitions, explosive munitions, have.

Q. If I could follow on that, what would you say it would take for you to decide that further deployment of the Trident subs would not be necessary?

The President. Well, this is a part of the START talks.

We started with the land-based missiles, because we felt they were the most destabilizing. I can tell you our thinking and why we based the decision, which was my own. The missile is the thing that the person's—the average—when I say destabilizing, the average person can foresee, whether accidentally or not, or inadvertently or not, someone pushes a button and 30 minutes later a city blows up in our country or, if it's the other way, in theirs.

Submarines and airplanes carrying such missiles are conventional type weapons in themselves that have got to put themselves in position. In other words, they can be intercepted and destroyed in normal warfare without that 30-minute doomsday threat. Now, this doesn't mean that they shouldn't be eliminated.

But we've set out first to reduce those destabilizing ballistic missiles and then to reduce the others at the other level. And what we have come up with is a proposal that no more than half of the warheads that each country would have under the terms of this treaty would be land-based. And the other half—surface vessels carry missiles now as well as submarines, on both sides.

But, again, it would depend on these negotiations and this treaty, because I can assure you, the Soviet Union is progressing in the development of nuclear-firing submarines to the point that the latest word we have is one they've built that is as long as one of our aircraft carriers.

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Fact Sheet on U.S. Space Policy: Arms Control and Antisatellite Capability [Extracts], July 4, 1982[2]

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—The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security.

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—The United States will proceed with development of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, with operational deployment as a goal. The primary purposes of a United States ASAT capability are to deter threats to space systems of the United States and its allies and, within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary the use of space-based systems that provide support to hostile military forces.

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Statement by ACDA Director Rostow: Tabling of Western Draft Treaty at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, July 8, 1982[1]

President Reagan, in his speech to the *Bundestag* in Bonn on June 9, stated that the alliance had agreed on a new proposal designed to give new life to the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in central Europe.[2] At their recent summit meeting, NATO leaders announced that the Western participants in MBFR "will soon present a draft treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to these negotiations and achieve the long-standing objective of enhancing stability and security in Europe."[3]

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[2] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 12, 1982, pp. 873, 875.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 1982, p. 53.

This morning in Vienna's Hofburg Palace, where the MBFR plenary sessions take place, the West formally tabled its draft treaty. This new initiative is the result of an effort by this Administration to develop an arms control approach on the question of conventional forces in central Europe which calls for substantial reductions—reductions which, if implemented, could reduce the risk of war in central Europe. The U.S. delegation in Vienna is headed by Ambassador Richard Staar.

As the President stressed in his speech to the *Bundestag*, this new Western proposal on conventional force reductions is an important complement to previous U.S. initiatives taken in the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), both of which are now in session in Geneva. Thus, the comprehensive arms control program launched by President Reagan in his November 18th speech of last year[4] has now culminated in three specific proposals in the categories he listed. The proposals all meet the criteria set forth in that speech; namely, that there must be substantial, militarily-significant reductions in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification.

The primary Western objective in MBFR continues to be the establishment of parity at significantly lower levels of forces in central Europe.

Currently, the Warsaw Pact has some 170,000 more ground forces in central Europe than the West. This disparity is one of the most destabilizing factors in the military situation in Europe. Its elimination, through the establishment of parity, could reduce the capability for sudden aggression and thereby lessen the risk of war, including nuclear war, in Europe.

The new initiative differs from previous Western proposals in that it provides for one comprehensive agreement in which all direct participants would undertake, from the outset, a legally binding commitment to take the reductions required for each side to decrease to the common collective ceiling of 700,000 ground force personnel for each side. This reduction would take place in stages and would be completed within 7 years. Each stage of reductions would have to be fully verified. Under this new approach, the West will be making stronger reduction commitments than we have ever proposed before.

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[2] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 14, 1982, p. 779.
[3] Printed *ante*, June 10.
[4] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

There is no change in the Western position that the sides must agree on the number of troops present in the area and subject to reduction before signature of any treaty. Without agreement on the size of the forces to be reduced and limited, an MBFR treaty would be neither verifiable nor enforceable. In the draft treaty, starting force levels for each side would be identified at time of signature.

The Western draft treaty incorporates the package of confidence-building and verification measures proposed by the West in 1979. These measures are designed to help verify reductions and limitations and to enhance security and stability by reducing the risks of miscalculation and misperception.

In sum, the draft treaty tabled by the West in Vienna takes into account Eastern arguments and interests while meeting this Administration's requirement that arms control agreements result in real reductions to equal levels. It offers the opportunity of achieving concrete results in the negotiations in furtherance of the agreed objectives of enhancing stability and security in Europe and complements our efforts in other arms reduction negotiations.

This is the first time that a Western proposal in the MBFR negotiations has been tabled in the form of a draft treaty. Doing so underscores Western seriousness in the negotiations and readiness to bring about substantial reductions.

News Conference Statement by the Western Participants in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks: Western Draft Treaty, July 8, 1982 [1]

In the MBFR Plenary Session of 8 July 1982 in Vienna, the head o
the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Dr
Walter Boss, on behalf of the West, unveiled a major new initiative, i
the form of a single agreement, for the ground force reductions neces
sary to reach a combined common collective ceiling of approximatel
900,000 ground and air force personnel in the reduction area.

The Western draft treaty reflects the experience gained in the pas
nine years of negotiations and takes into account Eastern concern
particularly with regard to the linkage issue.

Faced with a stalemated situation in Vienna, due largely to th
absence of agreement on data, associated measures and linkage, an
despite Western efforts to resolve these issues, most recently in th
December 1979 proposals, the NATO Allies participating in th
Vienna talks undertook a reassessment of the status of the negoti
tions and of the Western position. This reassessment concluded th
the continuing and enhanced importance of conventional arms contr
in Central Europe required that the impasse in the Vienna talks

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 4 (Sept. 1982), p. 19.

overcome and that the long-standing Western objective of parity at lower levels of military manpower on the two sides in Central Europe remained valid. Our objective should be pursued more urgently. These conclusions are embodied in the draft treaty which offers the opportunity of achieving concrete results, stemming from substantial militarily-significant reductions in Central Europe, in the attainment of our agreed objectives of enhanced stability and undiminished security for all participants in the negotiations in Europe.

These are some of its major features:

The draft treaty provides for one comprehensive agreement in which all direct participants would undertake a legally-binding commitment to reach a combined common collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 ground and air force manpower, including a common collective ceiling of approximately 700,000 ground force manpower in four stages within a seven-year period.

The treaty provides for staged implementation of the reductions to these common collective ceilings with collective limits being observed on the ground forces of each side after each intermediate stage. Each stage must be fully verified and carried out on the basis of agreed data. The Western set of confidence-building and verification measures, together with provisions relating to flank security, which was tabled in 1979, remain an integral part of the draft treaty.

Starting manpower totals for both sides would be specified in the treaty. Thus, the overall size of Eastern and Western reductions needed to reach the common collective ceilings would be established and specified in the treaty at the time of signature of the treaty. This, of course, confirms the need for agreement on data from the outset.

Concluding Document of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Conclusions [Extract], July 9, 1982 [1]

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III. CONCLUSIONS

57. The tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, was an event of historic significance. The special session was convened in response to a growing concern among the peoples of the world that the arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race, represented ever-increasing threats to human well-being and even to the survival of mankind. At that

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[1] A/S-12/32, pp. 22–24. The General Assembly approved the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session* (i.e., the Second Special Session devoted to disarmament) as the Concluding Document of that session by decision on July 10. (A/S-12/PV.28, pp. 13–15).

session the international community of nations achieved, for the first time in the history of disarmament negotiations, a consensus on an international disarmament strategy, the immediate goal of which was the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race. The final objective of the strategy was to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The conviction that all peoples had a legitimate right to expect early and significant progress in disarmament and a vital interest in its success led to the United Nations being given a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.

58. The historic consensus embodied in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S–10/2)[2] was rooted in a common awareness that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constituted much more a threat to than a protection of mankind. It was also based on recognition that the time had come to put an end to that situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the current level of armaments. The Final Document recognized that in the contemporary world, the security of States could be greatly enhanced by effective action aimed at preventing nuclear war, ending the arms race and achieving real disarmament. Progress in disarmament would significantly contribute to pursuing the goals of economic and social development, particularly of developing countries. The consensus embodied in the Final Document sought to place disarmament negotiations in a unified perspective and became a most significant and integral part of the context within which negotiations on disarmament have been pursued.

59. In the course of the twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly has noted that developments since 1978 have not lived up to the hopes engendered by the tenth special session. Despite the efforts that have been made by the international community to implement the decisions and recommendations of that session on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level, including action in the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament, and steps that have been taken on some specific measures contained in the Final Document, the objectives, priorities and principles there laid down have not been generally observed. The Programme of Action contained in the Final Document remains largely unimplemented. A number of important negotiations either have not begun or have been suspended, and efforts in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums have produced little tangible result. There has been some progress in certain negotiations and bilateral negotiations in the nuclear field have been initiated. The arms race, however, in particular the nuclear-arms race, has assumed more dangerous proportions and global military expenditures have increased

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[2] The Final Document may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

sharply. In short, since the adoption of the Final Document in 1978, there has been no significant progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and the seriousness of the situation has increased.

60. The Final Document stated that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. The past four years have witnessed increasing recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, military intervention, occupation, annexation and interference in the internal affairs of States and denial of the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination. The period has also witnessed other actions by States contrary to the Final Document. The consequent tensions and confrontations have retarded progress in disarmament and have in turn been aggravated by the failure to make significant progress towards disarmament.

61. It was stressed that in a world of finite resources there is an organic relationship between expenditures on armaments and economic and social development. The vastly increased military budgets since 1978 and the development, production and deployment, especially by the States possessing the largest military arsenals, of new types of weapon systems represent a huge and growing diversion of human and material resources. Apart from the significant capital costs that these military expenditures represent, they have also contributed to current economic problems in certain States. Existing and planned military programmes constitute a colossal waste of precious resources which might otherwise be used to elevate living standards of all peoples; furthermore, such waste greatly compounds the problems confronting developing countries in achieving economic and social development.

62. The General Assembly regrets that at its twelfth special session it has not been able to adopt a document on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and on a number of other items on its agenda. However, on two agenda items, relating to the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament and the World Disarmament Campaign, there are agreed texts (see annexes IV and V) [3] for consideration and appropriate action by the General Assembly. The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action. Taking into account the

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[3] *Infra*, and July 9.

aggravation of the international situation and being gravely concerned about the continuing arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, the General Assembly expresses its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, the prevention of which remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The General Assembly urges all Member States to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals designed to secure the avoidance of war, in particular nuclear war, thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered. The General Assembly also stresses the need for strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations in accordance with the Final Document and to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body. In this regard the Committee on Disarmament is requested to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session on its consideration of an expansion of its membership, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness.

63. Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

64. The other items on the agenda on which the special session has not reached decisions should be taken up at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly for further consideration.

65. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussion of disarmament problems, which it has undertaken at the special session and in which representatives of Member States—among them some heads of State or Government and many Foreign Ministers—have participated, and the active interest shown by peoples all over the world will provide a powerful impetus to Member States to redouble their efforts in the cause of disarmament. The General Assembly hopes that the World Disarmament Campaign, which it solemnly launched at the opening meeting of the special session, will further contribute to the mobilization of public opinion to the cause of disarmament and the strengthening of international peace and security. In this regard the campaign should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in

all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions.

66. The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held at a date to be decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

Concluding Document of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Annex IV—United Nations Program of Fellowships on Disarmament [Extract], July 9, 1982 [1]

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1. The United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament was established by the General Assembly at the initiative of Nigeria during its first special session devoted to disarmament in 1978 in order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries. The specialized training of government officials undertaken within the framework of the programme since its inception in 1979 has become one of the more concrete results of the special session.

2. The result of the implementation of the programme thus far, including the continuing contribution to disarmament negotiations by former fellows, confirms the view that the programme has justified the hopes which inspired its establishment. In view of the growing interest which continues to be manifested in the programme by an ever-increasing number of States, an expansion of the programme in terms of its content and number of awards has become desirable. To this end, the Working Group recommends that the General Assembly should decide:

3. (a) to commend the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme of fellowships on disarmament has been conducted so far;

(b) To endorse the report of the Secretary-General on the programme as contained in document A/S-12/8 and Corr. 1;

(c) To continue the programme;

(d) To increase the number of fellowships from 20 to 25 from 1983 onwards;

(e) To request the Secretary-General to continue to apply the same criteria of objectivity and balance in drawing up the future programme for fellowships as he has done so far, in accordance with the guidelines established by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session (resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978);

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[1] A/S-12/32, Annex IV, p. 1. The General Assembly approved the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session* as the Concluding Document of that session by decision on July 10 (A/S-12/PV 28, pp. 13–15).

(f) To express its appreciation to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Sweden for inviting fellows to their countries to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the over-all objectives of the programme, as well as providing additional information sources and practical knowledge for the fellows; in this connexion, to welcome the offer of the Government of Japan to enable participants in the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki and encourage other Member States to extend similar support for the programme;

(g) To request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session the financial implications of awarding 25 fellowships for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations, taking into account the necessary staffing requirements to meet the level of activities and structure of the programme and bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

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Concluding Document of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament: Annex V—World Disarmament Campaign [Extract], July 9, 1982 [1]

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 7 June 1982, the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, launched a World Disarmament Campaign under United Nations auspices in conformity with the principles laid down in paragraphs 15 and 99 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 and bearing in mind the measures contemplated in paragraphs 100 to 107 of that document. [2] The World Disarmament Campaign is intended to promote public interest in and support for the goals set out in the paragraphs referred to above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Recognizing

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[1] A/S-12/32, Annex V, pp. 1–4. The General Assembly approved the *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session* as the Concluding Document of that session by decision on July 10 (A/S-12/PV.28, pp. 13–15).

[2] For the Final Document, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful measures of arms limitation and disarmament and the need for it to be well informed to discuss and debate all points of view relating to disarmament issues, its objectives and conditions, the General Assembly is aware of the public concern at the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and its negative social and economic consequences, as expressed in the oral and written presentations addressed to the second special session devoted to disarmament by non-governmental organizations and research institutes. Taking into account the operational guidelines and modalities defined in the reports of the Secretary-General contained in documents A/36/458 and A/S-12/27, the World Disarmament Campaign should be conducted on the following basis.

II. Objectives

2. The Campaign has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament as stated in the Final Document adopted at the first special session, with particular reference to the priorities and measures set out by its Programme of Action, the decisions taken at the second special session, the views expressed by Member States, and the recommendations in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.[3]

3. The Campaign should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner.

4. The universality of the Campaign should be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war.

5. The United Nations system, Member States with respect for their sovereign rights, and other bodies, in particular non-governmental organizations, all have their roles to play in achieving the objectives of the Campaign.

III. Contents

6. The United Nations information and education activities conducted in accordance with the principles and purposes [of] the Charter of the United Nations must be global in scope and content, and use those means of communication which are most appropriate in reaching the largest number of people. Although the means of informing and educating may vary from region to region, the basic thrust of the activities for the Campaign should be equally effective in all regions of the world. The elements of the Campaign should be of such a nature that they could be implemented at the global, regional and national levels.

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[3] G.A. res. 34/75 of Dec. 11, 1979.

7. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to make available to the public in all States, and on as wide a scale as possible, through the United Nations information centres, United Nations Development Programme offices or other appropriate United Nations offices, the substance of the statements in the general debate at the second special session as soon as possible in the official languages of the United Nations. Similarly, the texts adopted at the first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament should be brought to the attention of the public in all countries.

8. Member States should be encouraged to co-operate with the
United Nations in the implementation of paragraph 4 above to ensur
a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects o
disarmament and to avoid dissemination of false and tendentiou
information. In carrying out the Campaign, emphasis should be place
on the relationship between disarmament and international securit
and between disarmament and development, given the benefits th
could be derived from the reduction of military outlays and the reallo
cation of released resources for socio-economic development.

9. In this regard, the Campaign should provide an opportunity f
discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating
disarmament issues, objectives and conditions.

10. The Campaign should encourage bilateral and multilateral e
changes on the basis of reciprocity and mutual agreement and give t
widest possible dissemination to such exchanges, for example, amo
government officials, experts, academicians and journalists of differi
countries.

11. The Campaign should give full consideration to the role of m
media as the most effective way to achieve wide access to the pu
with a view to promoting a climate of understanding, confidence
co-operation conducive to peace and disarmament.

12. In view of the fact that Disarmament Week has played a us
role in fostering the objectives of disarmament, the week starting
October should continue to be widely observed as Disarmam
Week.

IV. MODALITIES

13. In the light of the guidance given at the second special ses
the United Nations should provide the substance of informatio
and generally co-ordinate the implementation of the World Disa
ment Campaign which should be carried out at the global, reg
and national levels under the United Nations auspices. The Secre
General is urged to take the necessary steps to ensure that all a
priate resources available, human, financial and material, withi
United Nations system are adequately co-ordinated in order to fu
the objectives of the Campaign as set out above.

14. Taking into account the existing mechanisms of co-ordin
and in view of the need for reinforcing co-ordination, the Cent
Disarmament should provide the central guidance in co-ordinati

Campaign activities within the United Nations system and in maintaining liaison with the governmental and non-governmental organizations and research institutes. The Centre should also provide the substance of the information material to be disseminated in the implementation of the Campaign. Within the Campaign, the Department of Public Information should play its role as assigned by the General Assembly in utilizing its expertise and resources in public information to ensure its maximum effectiveness.

15. The Campaign should facilitate and complement existing programmes of information, research, education and training in the areas of disarmament. The promotion of such programmes should be encouraged, particularly in the developing countries, and the United Nations and its agencies should be instrumental in this process.

16. Considering the ongoing activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting disarmament education as a distinct field of study and the materials produced thereby, the programme of action to be implemented by the Campaign should set out appropriate tasks for UNESCO in its fields of competence and in co-ordination with the Centre for Disarmament. The United Nations information centres should be drawn into the process of giving the widest possible dissemination to the materials for distribution, particularly among those countries where the existing facilities are not adequately utilized or equipped, bearing in mind the special needs of the developing countries in this respect.

17. Every effort should be made to ensure an equitable and timely distribution of materials in accordance with the principle of conducting the Campaign on a universal basis.

18. The General Assembly commends the Secretary-General for outlining a programme of a World Disarmament Campaign as contained in document A/S–12/27 and requests him to submit to the Assembly at its thirty-seventh regular session the specifics of such a programme, taking into account the views expressed by Member States during the second special session.

19. Specific proposals for inclusion in the Campaign were made by delegations pertaining to: the holding of a world conference on the role of mass media; instituting a council of consciences representing eminent personalities in the spiritual, scientific, cultural and philosophical field; world-wide action for collecting signatures in favour of measures to prevent a nuclear war, curb the arms race, and for disarmament; installing in the United Nations the documentation and materials concerning Japan's atomic experiences; banning of war movies and war toys; televising or disseminating in other effective ways, addresses and discussions by world statesmen of various regions and philosophies; and disseminating in an unhindered way a range of relevant materials provided by Governments and recognized international studies institutes.

20. The Secretary-General is further requested to submit at each subsequent regular session of the General Assembly for its review, a

report on the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign during the preceding year, and to convey to the Assembly the relevant views of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, taking into account the tasks the Assembly may further entrust to it.

Financial implications

21. Bearing in mind the need for additional human, financial and material resources which may be necessary to implement an effective World Disarmament Campaign, the Secretary-General is urged to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh regular session a report in this respect. Member States are invited to supplement available United Nations resources with voluntary contributions to carry out the objectives of the Campaign on a world-wide basis. Voluntary contributions made by non-governmental organizations, foundations and trusts and other private sources would also be welcome.

22. Member States should co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of all the recommendations mentioned in this document.

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Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Nuclear Arms Reductions [Extract], July 12, 1982 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration an original joint resolution with respect to nuclear arms reductions, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the joint resolution do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

The purpose of the joint resolution is to express the Congress's full support for the President's recent initiatives on the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and to formalize an interim policy on mutual SALT restraint that will contribute to stability and continuity while the United States pursues the far-reaching reductions in nuclear weapons it seeks in START. The resolution also recommends positive steps related to crisis stability, non-proliferation and nuclear testing and urges the President to take a position with respect to the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty [2] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. [3]

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[1] *Nuclear Arms Reductions: Report, Together With Minority and Additional Views, To Accompany S.J. Res. 212* (S. Rpt. 97–493; 97th Cong., 2d sess.), July 12, 1982, pp. 1–13. Not printed here are the minority views of Senators Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and Cranston (pp. 14–26) and additional views of Senators Pell and Dodd (p. 27) and Senator Helm (pp. 28–82).

[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[3] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The following resolutions were referred to the Foreign Relations Committee and were considered and consolidated into an original joint resolution:

S. Res. 323—Concerning STOP Talks.

S. Res. 343—Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to beginning strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

S. Res. 370—Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to a halt by the United States and the Soviet Union of further production and deployment of nuclear warheads while beginning strategic arms negotiations.

S.J. Res. 163—Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Reductions.

S.J. Res. 171—With respect to nuclear arms reductions.

S.J. Res. 177—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

S.J. Res. 191—To achieve a nuclear freeze and reductions.

S. Con. Res. 81—To express the sense of the Congress that the President should promptly hold a summit meeting with leaders of the Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to seek control and reduction of nuclear weapons.

S. Con. Res. 99—Expressing congressional support for broadening the scope of the U.S. arms control process.

S. Res. 242—Regarding SALT II.

S. Res. 391—Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the policy of the United States Government during the period of negotiations for a START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) treaty.

S. Exec. Res. 5—Directing the Committee on Foreign Relations to report to the Senate the SALT II Treaty.[4]

S. Exec. Res. 6—Concerning the consideration of the SALT II Treaty.

The Foreign Relations Committee held five days of hearings related to the consideration of the above resolutions, as follows:

April 29, 1982—Global-U.S. Strategy (Administration Witnesses).

April 30, 1982—Strategic Nuclear Balance (Public Witnesses).

May 11, 1982—Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals—Administration and Congressional Witnesses (2 Sessions).

May 12, 1982—Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals—Congressional and Public Witnesses (2 Sessions).

May 12, 1982—Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals—Administration Witnesses (Executive Session—Top Secret).

May 13, 1982—Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals—Public and Administration Witnesses (2 Sessions).

In addition to hearing Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Committee received testimony from a number of other officials of the Executive Branch, eleven Senators and Congressmen who were sponsors of the principal arms reduction resolutions and proposals, and thirteen witnesses from the private sector, including two former Secretaries of Defense.

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[4] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff

On June 9, 1982, the Committee met for the purpose of marking-up S. Res. 242, S. Res. 323, S. Res. 343, S. Res. 370, S. Res. 391, S. Con. Res. 81, S. Con. Res. 99, S. J. Res. 163, S. J. Res. 171, S. J. Res. 177, S.J. Res. 191, S. Exec. Res. 5, and S. Exec. Res. 6. During the mark-up, the following record votes were taken:

A Pell–Cranston amendment calling on the United States to pursue a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems was disapproved by a vote of 7–10. Those in favor of the amendment were Senators Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. Those voting nay were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler and Zorinsky.

A Glenn amendment declaring that the United States and the Soviet Union should, as a first step in the START process, negotiate a formal agreement to refrain from actions which would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agreements was disapproved by a vote of 7–9. Ayes: Senators Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. Nayes: Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler and Zorinsky.

A Glenn amendment urging the President to provide the Congress with his recommendations with respect to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty was disapproved by a vote of 7–9. Ayes: Senators Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd. Nayes: Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler and Zorinsky.

By a vote of 12–5, the Committee ordered favorably reported an original joint resolution to the Senate in lieu of the thirteen resolution it had under consideration. Those voting in favor were Senators Percy Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwit Pressler, Pell, Zorinsky and Dodd. Voting against were Senators Bide Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas and Cranston.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

A. General overview

The Committee hearings and mark-up on the various nuclear ar reduction resolutions took place against the backdrop of an extraor nary public debate on issues related to nuclear war and arms cont The heightened American awareness of and mobilization against horrors of nuclear war has been reflected in petitions, seminars, to meetings, public demonstrations, and state and municipal referen Although there is great diversity among the public organizations individual citizens participating in this grassroots movement, theme has been recurrent: an insistence that the United States and

Soviet Union move without delay to negotiate an agreement that would end the nuclear arms race.

In response to the public demand for prompt action on arms control, hundreds of Senators and Representatives joined in sponsoring or co-sponsoring one or another of the thirteen resolutions on arms control that were introduced during the spring of this year. On March 10, 1982, Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, joined by eighteen other Senators, introduced a joint resolution (S.J. Res. 163) which called upon the United States and the Soviet Union to decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze, followed by efforts to agree on progressive incremental reductions in each side's nuclear inventory. A companion resolution, co-sponsored by over 100 Congressmen, was introduced in the House.

Speaking that same day, Secretary Haig termed the Kennedy–Hatfield resolution "not only bad defense and security policy, (but) bad arms control policy as well." In a State Department press briefing on March 11, Richard Burt, Director of the Politico-Military Affairs Bureau, cited four arguments against the freeze: (1) that it would freeze the United States into a position of military disadvantage and dangerous vulnerability; (2) that it was virtually unverifiable; (3) that it would remove Soviet incentives to negotiate substantial reductions; and (4) that it would concede the Soviets its present advantage in intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.[5]

In the weeks following the Administration's rejection of the Kennedy–Hatfield freeze proposal, twelve other resolutions related to nuclear arms reductions were submitted in the Senate and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee. Several of these resolutions sought to define the U.S. objectives in START. One such resolution, introduced by Senators Jackson and Warner, was co-sponsored by 59 other Senators and praised by President Reagan as "an important move in the right direction." The Jackson–Warner resolution (S.J. Res. 177) called on the President to propose a long-term, mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces.

Other resolutions recommended associated arms control measures, including positive steps related to non-proliferation, crisis stability, nuclear testing and the scheduling of a Reagan/Brezhnev summit. A separate group of resolutions focused on the relationship of the SALT II Treaty to START. In general, resolutions in this category recommended one of three possible approaches to keeping the SALT II limitations in place while START is conducted: formalizing U.S. policy with respect to continued de facto restraint, proceeding with formal ratification, or negotiating the terms of joint SALT adherence during an interim period.

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[5] *Ante.*

B. Recent administration initiatives on START

During the course of the Committee's consideration of the thirteen arms reduction resolutions, the Administration moved forward with a number of positive initiatives on START. In a major speech on May 9 at Eureka College, Illinois, President Reagan announced that he had written President Brezhnev and proposed that the START negotiations be initiated at the earliest possible opportunity.[6] The President outlined an ambitious, two-phase negotiating approach, with the initial priority effort to concentrate on achieving a one-third reduction in ballistic missile warheads, of which no more than one half could be land-based. In a subsequent phase, the United States would pursue equal, but significantly reduced, ceilings on other elements of strategic weaponry, including throwweight.

The President cautioned that the goal of reducing and reshaping each side's strategic forces to enhance stability would be neither quickly nor easily accomplished but pledged that the United States would negotiate seriously and carefully consider all proposals made by the Soviet Union. With reciprocal good faith shown by the Soviets, the President expressed confidence that the two sides could achieve an agreement "that reduces the number of nuclear weapons, halts the growth in strategic forces, and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future."

In a Memorial Day address at Arlington National Cemetery, President Reagan announced that START would begin in Geneva on June 29, and that the United States would refrain from actions which would undercut existing SALT agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.[7] In a joint announcement released that day, the United States and the Soviet Union confirmed that the U.S. delegation would be led by Ambassador Edward Rowny and the Soviet delegation would be led by Ambassador V. P. Karpov.[8]

C. Committee comments on the nuclear freeze proposal

By a vote of 7–10 the Committee rejected an amendment which would have recommended that the United States pursue a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems at the same time it was pursuing the aforementioned U.S. objectives in the first phase of START. Some Committee members questioned the verifiability of a freeze. Others were concerned that it would let each side keep what they now have and would thus continue, and perhaps exacerbate, current U.S. strategic vulnerabilities while removing Soviet incentives to negotiate substantial reduction in START.

A number of members were especially concerned that a nuclear freeze would undermine the Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations in Geneva and, in effect, concede a marked Soviet superiority in land-based missiles of this range deployed in Europe. An additional concern was that a freeze would preclude the modernization of U.S. nuclear systems such as bombers and ballistic missiles submarines, but not restrict the development of more advanced Soviet non-nuclear capabilities, including air defenses and anti-submarine warfare systems.

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[6] *Ante.*

[7] *Ante.* May 31.

[8] *Ante.* May 31.

While Members praised the freeze movement for catalyzing public debate throughout the United States on arms control, it was the opinion of the majority of the Committee that the joint resolution, as adopted, would commit the United States to pursue a better and more far-reaching goal, that of significant reductions.

D. Paragraph-by-paragraph analysis

Para. (1): Support of the President on START.—It is the view of the Committee that the President's efforts to achieve a START agreement providing for verifiable, equitable and militarily-significant reductions in strategic offensive arms deserve the full support of the Congress and the American people. The Committee welcomed the view expressed by the NATO foreign ministers in their May 18 communique that the U.S. proposal for significant reductions in the strategic armaments of the two countries represents "a far-reaching but realistic offer that would lead to a significant increase in strategic stability and thereby strengthen peace and international security."[9]

Although the Committee recognizes that START will be complex and difficult, it believes that the negotiations warrant a determined and persistent effort. Moreover, the Committee is confident that should President Reagan succeed in achieving a treaty with the Soviet Union that attains the basic objectives outlined in his Eureka College speech, the Senate would act with dispatch to provide its favorable advice and consent.

Par (2): Initial focus on the most destabilizing systems.—The Committee agreed to support and endorse the President's plan to place the first priority in START on reaching agreement on significant reductions in the most destabilizing types of strategic weaponry, that is, highly accurate and MIRVed strategic ballistic missiles. The Committee believes that these reductions should, among other limitations, provide initially for equal ceilings, at sharply reduced levels, on the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and the aggregate number of warheads deployed on these systems, an objective which parallels the goals outlined by the President in his Eureka speech. The Committee accepted an amendment proposed by Senator Pell that there should also be agreement providing subsequently for further significant, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weaponry in a manner which enhances stability and deterrence.

It is not the Committee's intent to imply that an initial agreement of this nature must be limited to these most destabilizing systems. The

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[9] *Ante*

Soviet Union will obviously have its own agenda for the negotiations, and the President has said that he will consider all Soviet counter-offers. The Committee supports the decision of the Administration that additional reductions, including, possibly, limitations on missile throwweight, are best reserved for a follow-on phase on START.

The Committee recommends that once agreement is obtainable in START's first-phase, it should be promptly concluded and submitted, in the form of a Treaty, to the Senate for its advice and consent. This approach was outlined by Secretary Haig on May 11 when he testified that,

> Our hope would be that if we could conclude or achieve the substantial reductions required in Phase I and we could move right ahead and conclude such an agreement, that would provide a very construction [*constructive*] base to get into the even more substantial reductions visualized in Phase II.[10]

Para. (3): Establishment of an interim restraint regime.—The purpose of paragraph 3 of the Resolution is to formalize the announced policy of the Reagan Administration on interim SALT restraint, and in doing so make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States government is unified in its determination to exercise restraint so long as the Soviet government behaves in a comparable way. It is the intention of the Committee thereby to strengthen the position of the President in the START negotiations. President Reagan articulated this policy in his Memorial Day speech at Arlington National Cemetery, declaring:

> As for existing SALT agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.[11]

This Presidential announcement confirmed at the highest level the policy that had been articulated on several previous occasions by Secretary of State Haig. For example, on May 11, 1982, the Secretary testified, "We do not intend, as long as the Soviet Union does not, to undercut the restraints that were visualized in SALT II. That has been and remains our position."[12] During a hearing on November 4, 1981, Secretary Haig noted that Secretary Weinberger had testified on the previous day that he did not foresee a military requirement to depart from this policy and declared that "clearly the arms control and geopolitical aspects of the question favor that we continue to maintain this policy."[13]

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[10] *Ante.*

[11] *Ante*, May 31.

[12] For this point in substance, see *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session . . .*, p. 128.

[13] *Strategic Weapons Proposals: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session, on the Foreign Policy and Arms Control Implications of President Reagan's Strategic Weapons Proposals*, Pt. 1, p. 88. See also pp. 64 and 68. For General Jones' statement, see p. 51; for Weinberger's statement, see pp. 5 and 12.

In November, General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised the Committee that in the absence of a mutual SALT restraint policy, "uncertainties would grow as to the total number of [Soviet] weapons systems, the production rates, and so on. There would be a number of factors involved in our future planning if there were no constraints at all. So we [the Joint Chiefs] [14] support the Administration's position that we do nothing to undercut SALT as long as the Soviets do not do anything inconsistent."

On November 3, 1981, Secretary Weinberger testified before the Committee that there are no near-term conflicts between the President's five-part strategic modernization program and this interim restraint policy. In contrast, such interim restraints are tangibly and immediately constraining on the Soviet Union. For example, as long as the Soviets observe a policy of not undercutting SALT II, they are precluded from increasing the number of reentry vehicles deployed on specific missile types above the levels specified in the treaty, an option with adverse strategic consequences for the United States which they could otherwise readily pursue.

The Committee is aware that some commentators have questioned whether the so-called "Dense Pack" MX basing option would contravene the President's interim restraint policy. However, the "Dense Pack" concept is at a very preliminary stage of study and has not been approved by the Defense Department, the President or the Congress. Until the exact configuration of a possible "Dense Pack" basing mode is decided, the Committee cannot address the question of whether its deployment would undercut existing SALT agreements if, at the time of such deployment, this interim restraint regime were still in effect. In this regard, it should be emphasized that if the United States were at some point to decide to proceed with the development and deployment of "Dense Pack," the system could not be operational before 1986–87, which is beyond the specified expiration date of the SALT II Treaty and, therefore, beyond the period during which the restrictions contained in this Resolution would be legally binding. (See the discussion of duration below.)

The Committee does not intend by this Resolution to preclude later decisions by the Congress to authorize or appropriate funds for the development, procurement or deployment of "Dense Pack" or any other weapons system. Such decisions must, of course, be taken on the basis of a full evaluation of all aspects of a proposal, including, pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, its impact on arms control policy and negotiations.

The Committee understands the Reagan Administration's formulation of not "undercutting" the SALT agreements as applying to actions which would contravene the agreements in a substantial and irreversible manner. While this standard would obviously not apply to every provision of the agreements, it would clearly cover a range of actions, such as the testing of existing ICBM's or SLBM's with numbers of warheads in excess of those permitted under the SALT II provisions or by the testing of more than the one new type of ICBM missile permitted. It would not, however, include the restrictions contained in the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty since the agreed term of that document has already expired.

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[14] Brackets in the source text.

Beyond these general assumptions, the Committee has not attempted to define or elaborate in detail all the hypothetical acts by either side which could arguably undercut the SALT agreements. The Committee believes that the President should have considerable flexibility and discretion in making such judgments, relying upon the best evidence of the intelligence community and the advice of his Administration, and including consultations with this Committee and other appropriate committees of Congress. The President can and should take all relevant circumstances into account, including the degree of restraint demonstrated by the Soviet Union in its force deployments and the strategic force requirements of the United States. It is the intention of the Committee that the Resolution should not give rise to any private standing or cause of action to challenge the actions of the Executive Branch in the courts.

With respect to the SALT I Interim Agreement,[15] the Committee notes that the Reagan Administration has already announced its intention to continue to take the steps necessary to remain within the limitations of that agreement. On May 11, Secretary Haig pledged that the United States would dismantle the SLBM launchers on a third Polaris-class submarine to remain within the Interim Agreement ceiling on aggregate SLBM launchers which otherwise would be exceeded with the commencement of sea trials by the *Michigan,* the second Trident-class submarine. The Committee would expect that the United States would, under this interim restraint policy, continue to respect the SALT I ceilings on total SLBM and fixed, land-based ICBM launchers, provided the Soviet Union continues to do the same.

The Committee also believes, as stated in an amendment to the Resolution proposed by Senator Mathias, that questions or concerns which may arise regarding specific Soviet actions which could be construed by the United States as undercutting the SALT agreements should continue to be raised in accordance with the procedures generally employed for that purpose under this and previous administrations. In particular, the United States should make every possible use of the opportunities afforded by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to discuss issues presented by the interim restraint regime. The Committee believes that the availability and use of the SCC has been a significant factor in the continued maintenance of SALT I restraints during the five years since the expiration of the Interim Agreement. As the Resolution states, additional diplomatic channels should be employed if the SCC is not available or appropriate for this purpose. The Committee would expect to have close consultations with the Administration on such matters.

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[15] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

The Committee did not consider it appropriate in the Resolution itself to prescribe an absolute limit to the duration of the interim restraint regime. Since the purpose of such an approach is to maintain some stability of expectations in the interim period while a START treaty is being concluded, its duration will undoubtedly depend on the length of time required to negotiate such an agreement. However, it is not the intention of the Committee that the binding effect of this Resolution should necessarily extend beyond the originally agreed upon termination date of the SALT II Treaty itself, December 31, 1985, or beyond the point at which these interim restraints are replaced by START limitations, whichever occurs first. Continuing a policy of restraint vis-a-vis SALT II may be deemed to be in the U.S. national interest after December, 1985, especially if the START negotiations are still in progress. In this case, the Congress and the President might elect to formally renew or extend this provision of law. In any event, the maintenance of this regime should be a matter for continuing review by both the Executive and Congressional branches in light of the overall national security interests in the United States.

With respect to the unratified SALT II Treaty, the Committee notes that President Reagan's formulation of not "undercutting" existing SALT agreements is generally consistent with the applicable standard for a treaty signatory under international law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,[16] which is the generally-accepted source of international standards on such matters, speaks of the need for treaty parties to refrain from "acts which would defeat the object and purpose" of an agreement after it is signed and until final action is taken on ratification. Although President Reagan has made clear that he has no intention of seeking ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the agreement is formally still pending before the Committee.

With respect to the SALT I agreements, the President's formulation as applied to the SALT I Interim Agreement is also generally consistent with previous statements on reciprocal restraint made by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Agreement itself expired on October 3, 1977, both countries made clear their intention to take no actions inconsistent with its provisions provided that similar restraint was exercised by the other country. However, the other principal agreement concluded as a result of the SALT I negotiations, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 (along with its 1974 Protocol), is a treaty of unlimited duration which remains in full force and effect. In accordance with Article XIV of that agreement, the United States is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the treaty. Unless the United States concludes at some future time that the treaty no longer serves the interests of the United States and takes the necessary steps to revise or withdraw from it, the United States and the Soviet Union are both bound to abide by its terms in all respects, not simply to refrain from actions which might undercut the treaty.

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[16] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

It may be that additional steps can and should be taken to strengthen the interim restraint regime contemplated by this Resolution. The Committee believes, for example, that mutual confidence would be considerably enhanced by an authoritative Soviet declaration paralleling President Reagan's Memorial Day pledge, and recommends that the President encourage the Soviets to issue such a statement. It may be possible for the President to conclude a formal agreement with the Soviet Union not to undercut existing SALT agreements. However, it was the view of the Committee that this option should be left to the judgment of the President. If the President should find it possible to conclude a limited, interim agreement which simply incorporates his formulation, it is the intention of the Committee that this Resolution should provide the affirmative legislative authority contemplated in Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.[17] In this regard, enactment of this joint resolution increases the President's options in dealing with the Soviet Union.

In summary, the language of paragraph 3 of this Resolution is fully consistent with the national security interests of the United States and the strategic modernization objectives of the Reagan Administration. Furthermore, it preserves the necessary flexibility and discretion of the President of the United States during critical arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Committee regards the enactment of this interim restraint policy into law as a significant step in the effort to stabilize the nuclear balance during the period until a new START Treaty can be negotiated.

By setting forth the President's statement in a joint resolution, to be considered by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, the Committee intends that it will have the full force and effect of law. The Committee expects that the President will take all necessary steps to ensure that the law is observed and adhered to fully by the Departments of State and Defense and all other relevant departments and agencies. The Committee and the Congress should give rise to any private standing or cause of action to challenge the actions of the Executive branch in the courts, the Committee and the Congress as a whole can be expected to exercise full oversight responsibilities to ensure compliance with the letter and spirit of the Resolution. The Committee expects that all members of the Executive Branch will, in good faith, adhere to the provisions of the Resolution and will take the initiative to inform the Committee and other appropriate committees and members of Congress before taking any decision or action which might jeopardize this commitment.

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[17] Section 33 of the act (22 U.S.C. 2573) provides in part that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States." [Footnote in original.]

Para. (4): Recommendations on broadening the scope of arms control.—The Committee's intent in including this paragraph in the joint resolution was to emphasize that whatever level of strategic weaponry is maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union, the two sides have a crucial stake in pursuing every effort to promote crisis stability, prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons states, and create additional barriers to the acquisition or use of nuclear devices by terrorists.

Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) were adapted from language in the Jackson–Warner resolution and draw upon a number of specific confidence-building proposals advanced in recent weeks by Senators Jackson, Warner, Nunn, Cranston, and Hart. The Committee agreed to preamble language suggested by Senator Pell which stresses the contribution that such proposals can make in maintaining arms restraint and crisis stability. These proposals include:

(1) Establishment of a multi-national military crisis control center for monitoring and containing nuclear weapons used by third parties or terrorist groups;

(2) Development of a forum for joint U.S./U.S.S.R. sharing of information related to the possible use of nuclear weapons by third parties of terrorist groups; and

(3) Development of U.S./U.S.S.R. confidence-building measures for crisis-stability and arms control to include:

a. An improved U.S./U.S.S.R. communications hotline for crisis control;

b. Enhanced verification procedures for any arms control agreements;

c. Measures to reduce vulnerability of command, control and communications on both sides; and

d. Measures to lengthen the warning time each nation would have of potential nuclear attack.

Although the joint resolution does not specify which of these suggestions should be proposed to the Soviet Union, the Committee believes that all appear promising and warrant the close consideration of the Administration. In this regard, the Committee commends the President for his announcement on June 11 in West Berlin that the United States will propose a package of confidence-building measures in START, including an upgrading of the "hot-line" and a more comprehensive exchange of information related to missile testing.[18]

The Committee also encourages the Administration to cooperate more closely with the Soviet Union and other nations on common nonproliferation interests, including the establishment of additional measures by nuclear supplier nations.

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[18] *Ante.*

The Committee considered an amendment introduced by Senator Glenn which recommended that the United States propose to the Soviet Union and other nations practical measures to involve the other nuclear weapons states in the arms control process at the earliest appropriate time. In accepting the amendment, the Chairman proposed, and Senator Glenn concurred, that the word "earliest" be deleted to avoid any possible misinterpretation concerning past Soviet claims on the so-called "compensation" issue. In adopting this language, the Committee rejects the Soviet position in the Geneva Intermediate Nuclear Forces negotiations (or a future Soviet position in START) that they are entitled to compensation due to the Allied strategic forces.

Para. (5): Review of the TTBT and PNE treaties.—This paragraph of the joint resolution urges the President to decide promptly whether the Senate should proceed with ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, which have been pending for over five years. Despite repeated efforts over the past year and a half, the Committee has been unable to persuade the Administration to take a position with respect to the ratification of these treaties.

In June, 1981, ACDA Director Rostow declared that he favored ratification and pledged to press the Administration for a rapid review of several issues related to the treaties.[19] However, on May 13, 1982, Dr. Rostow testified that although he had "been altogether faithful" to his pledge, his efforts to gain a decision had "run into a profound stone wall" from some officials in the Administration who wished to retain the option of conducting high yield weapons tests.[20]

The weight of the testimony received during the Committee's hearings on the arms reduction resolutions, including that of former Defense Secretaries Schlesinger and Brown, indicated that ratification of the two treaties would be in the national security interest of the United States, a recommendation which has also recently been communicated to the Committee by former Presidents Ford and Nixon.

In view of these developments, four members of the Committee, Senators Percy, Pell, Pressler and Cranston (the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Arms Control Subcommittee), wrote to the President on May 27, 1982 urging his support of the two agreements. In this joint resolution, however, the Committee is not taking a position with respect to ratification, but rather urges that the Administration conclude its review of these treaties and promptly report its recommendation thereto.

During the mark-up, the Committee defeated by a vote of 7–9 an amendment offered by Senator Glenn that would have included the

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[19] *Nomination of Eugene V. Rostow: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session.* . . . p. 31.

[20] *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals* . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 381.

SALT II Treaty among the pending treaties cited in this paragraph which the Committee was asking the President to review with respect to ratification. In the opinion of the Committee, the President's views on the question of ratifying SALT II were fully known and had been restated in recent weeks in speeches and press conferences. In a letter dated May 5, 1982, signed jointly by Secretary Haig and Acting Secretary of Defense Carlucci, the Administration advised the Senate that "the SALT II Treaty is not in the national security interest of the United States and should not be ratified." During the mark-up, a State Department official confirmed that this letter still accurately reflected the position of the Administration on this question.

Nonetheless, in response to a request by Senator Glenn, the Chairman stated that the Committee would ask the President to provide the Committee with a letter explaining in detail why he believes that ratification of the Treaty should not be pursued. This request has been transmitted to the Executive Branch.

Para. (6): Elimination of all nuclear weapons.—Section 2 of the 1951 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, declares that "an ultimate goal of the United States is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments." In creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the act directs ACDA to "deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament."

Paragraph (6) of the joint resolution, which is adapted from a similar paragraph in the Jackson/Warner resolution (S.J. Res. 177), reaffirms this ultimate goal of U.S. arms control policy. Its inclusion in the joint resolution is intended to express the Committee's commitment to a dynamic and continuing arms reduction process, one which carries beyond the initial efforts to bring the arms race under some control and leads eventually to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.

This paragraph also underscores the crucial linkage between the U.S. commitment to continuing nuclear arms reductions and our efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons states. Only if the rest of the world is convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union are dedicated to reducing, and eventually eliminating their inventories of nuclear weapons will non-nuclear states forgo acquiring similar capabilities.

COST ESTIMATE

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that there will be no budgetary impact from the passage of this Resolution. The following estimate was provided by the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1982.

HON. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed the Senate Joint Resolution with respect to nuclear arms reductions, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 9, 1982.

Based on this review, it is expected that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation.

Sincerely,

ALICE M. RIVLIN, *Director.*

REGULATORY IMPACT AND CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In accordance with Rule XXVI, paragraphs 11(b) and 12 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee concludes that there will be no regulatory impact from the passage of this joint resolution. There will also be no repeal or amendment of existing law.

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Statement by the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director (Howe) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Chemical Weapons, July 13, 1982 [1]

I am pleased to have the opportunity to address foreign policy and arms control aspects of chemical weapons. The policy of the United States in this area is clear. Our goal remains to stop the current use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and to obtain a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of them.

Arms Control Efforts

The Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which the United States is a party, prohibits in war the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of biological methods of warfare. [2] Unfortunately, the agreement bans only the use of chemical weapons—not their possession. It is, furthermore, essentially a ban only on first use, since most of the important military powers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have reserved the right to retaliate in kind to an enemy's use of chemical weapons. Our eventual objective is the achievement of a new, multilateral treaty that bans chemical weapons altogether and requires effective verification and compliance.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 409. The statement was delivered before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs.

[2] For text of the protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

Achievement of such a treaty would be a significant milestone for mankind. But it will not be easy. The critical obstacle to forward movement has been Soviet intransigence on verification and compliance issues. Any effective chemical weapons agreement must insure the destruction of chemical stocks and must contain adequate monitoring provisions so that no party clandestinely retains or produces chemical weapons. Recent Soviet violations have underlined the absolute necessity for effective verification and monitoring of any chemical weapons agreement.

As a means of moving the process forward, we have shifted our effort from bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament. The bilateral negotiations, begun in 1977, lapsed in deadlock in mid-1980. The Soviet Union was unwilling to accept reasonable provisions for verifying the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and disposition of their places of manufacture. In addition, the Soviets were not prepared to agree to effective procedures for assuring continued compliance.

For these reasons, we are focusing our current efforts in Geneva. It is the role of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament to develop multilateral arms control agreements. The United States is an active participant in ongoing efforts there toward elaborating a comprehensive agreement banning chemical weapons.

We have conducted this arms control effort against a background of unilateral restraint. Since 1969, we have not manufactured any lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons. Successive U.S. administrations have repeatedly assured that we will never initiate chemical warfare.

Soviet Buildup

However, our restraint has not been matched by the Soviet Union. During this same 13-year period, the Soviets have continued to strengthen their military chemical warfare capability. This Soviet buildup extends well beyond reasonable deterrence requirements.

This threat to our security has recently been brought into sharper focus by the actual use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and chemical and toxin weapons in Southeast Asia. Compelling evidence was presented to Congress on March 22 [3] and May 13 of this year; that evidence continues to accumulate. We are analyzing indications that these attacks are continuing unabated, despite international efforts to stop them. Such attacks are illegal. The use of chemical weapons is a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of international law. Possession alone of toxin weapons is a violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. [4] On June 17, 1982,

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[3] *Ante.*

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

President Reagan specifically called attention to such violations in his address to the Second Special Session of the United Nations Devoted to Disarmament.[5]

Unfortunately, our numerous demarches to the Soviets have been rebuffed. Despite overwhelming evidence, the Soviets continue to deny these illegal acts are taking place. A paper of rebuttal, attributed to experts from the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health, and other Soviet organizations, which was submitted to the United Nations on May 21,[6] has been described in a recent issue of *Science* magazine, an independent, nongovernmental scientific publication, as containing "extravagant conjectures."

Despite this discouraging background, we remain actively interested in achieving our goal of a universal and comprehensive chemical weapons ban. We intend, in the upcoming session of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in July, to explore fully all areas of the Soviet proposal recently submitted to the U.N. special session on disarmament. Preliminary analysis of this proposal indicates that most of it is not new. However, it contains a few elements of potential interest. The significance of these new elements is not clear; it would be premature to conclude that there had been a breakthrough. Frankly, we have not resumed the bilateral discussions because there is little prospect for productive negotiations under existing circumstances. Should the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to accept genuinely effective verification and compliance arrangements, and should they demonstrate a willingness to abide by existing international obligations on chemical, biological, and toxin weapons, the prospects for serious bilateral work would be enhanced.

U.S. Initiatives

All executive agencies of this Administration concerned with national security, as well as previous Congresses, have concluded that we can no longer forego modernization of our chemical warfare deterrent, which is a modest one measured against Soviet capabilities. Our national security policy must address the realities of the world we live in. Our military forces must have the capability to deter threats to ourselves and our allies. This requires maintaining adequate U.S. stocks. It also requires improvement of protective and defensive measures against chemical attack, which is the primary emphasis of our program.

The report to Congress on the U.S. chemical warfare deterrence program submitted by the U.S. Department of Defense in March of this year presents our situation in detail. The difficult decision to modernize our chemical weapons capability was undertaken only with reluctance, after long and painstaking examination of our obsolete and deteriorating assets. The Congress, which actually moved ahead of the executive branch in encouraging modernization of our chemical deterrent, continues to review each step of this program carefully.

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[5] *Ante.*

[6] A/37/233.

U.S. Cooperation With Allies

The United States has kept its allies fully informed of its program and of its decisions, over the past several years, to begin modernization of U.S. chemical warfare capabilities. In March 1981, we informed our allies of the Administration's decision to seek funding for the facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. In February of this year, we informed our allies of our decision to seek funding for production. We believe it is inappropriate to ask allies to share responsibility for a U.S. national security decision and have not done so. No allied government has expressed opposition to these steps or otherwise commented on the substance of the decision to seek funds for production.

For many years, it has been agreed NATO doctrine that an effective chemical warfare retaliatory capability is an essential part of the continuum of deterrence. We have informed our allies, as we have informed the Congress, that there has been no decision on forward deployment of binary chemical weapons, and none is currently under consideration. Our allies have been assured we will consult fully with any other nation involved prior to making such a decision. Since it will be several years before production begins, and several years thereafter before stockpiles are accumulated, no consideration of deployment elsewhere is likely for some time to come. Our allies understand and accept that we have no plans at this time to deploy any binary chemical munitions in any foreign country.

Our allies, like ourselves, are committed to seeking through arms control a complete ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Together we are pressing for progress toward such an agreement in the U.N. Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. They also recognize that the principal hurdle to be overcome is that of verification and the need to assure effective compliance.

The Need for Deterrence

We are well aware that chemical weapons are an emotional issue, in allied countries as well as our own. But as leader of the free world, the United States has a particular obligation to demonstrate resolve in maintaining the peace. One can debate whether possession of a particular weapon will deter the use of similar weapons by others, and one can debate what types and levels of arms should be maintained. But debate about chemical warfare has yet to identify a deterrent that does not include a chemical weapons component, without posing the additional risks of undesirable escalation or unacceptable accommodation. The history of World War II bears witness to the effectiveness of chemical weapons as a component of such a deterrent. According to postwar testimony by enemy officials, Allied possession of chemical weapons effectively deterred the Axis powers from using their chemical weapons, though they had accumulated large stocks.

In sum, we seek to achieve through negotiations a verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. Until success is achieved, we must reduce or eliminate Soviet incentives to use chemical weapons against us or our allies. This can be done by modernizing and maintaining an adequate chemical warfare deterrent posture. Our chemical weapons modernization actions do not represent a decision to place greater emphasis upon chemical warfare, nor do we plan to match Soviet capabilities. Our objective is to have the safest, smallest level of chemical munitions that provides us the deterrent we need.

News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, July 15, 1982 [1]

As you know, Western participants tabled in Vienna on July 8, 1982, a draft treaty text, which represents a major comprehensive move by the West in these negotiations. [2] It incorporates a basic Western compromise to the East on one of the fundamental questions at issue here, that is, the Eastern requirement of legally-binding reductions and limitation obligations to be assumed from the outset of an agreement by all direct participants. The Western draft proposal was discussed in some detail at last week's press briefing, and I will not cover the same ground now.

Before taking your questions, however, I would like to make several general remarks about the significance of the Western move, which takes into consideration all proposals made to date and, of course, Eastern concerns.

Over the past nine years of our negotiations, three fundamental issues have emerged whose resolution is necessary for the achievement of a reduction and limitation agreement: (1) the absence of data agreement on Eastern forces in the reduction area; (2) the lack of agreement on a set of associated measures which would provide the verification and confidence-building elements necessary in a reduction and limitation agreement; and finally (3) the linkage problem, which the East has defined as the requirement for contractual, treaty obligations to be assumed by all direct participants from the outset of an agreement.

The West's compromise proposal resolved the question of linkage. Under the Western treaty proposal, all direct participants pledge as part of the agreement to implement the total ground force personnel reductions of their respective sides to reach the common collective ceiling of approximately 700,000 ground force personnel, and a combined common collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 on ground and air force personnel. Thus, there is an immediate contractual treaty link between the beginning of reductions and the achievement of a common ceiling, with each side, at time of signature, stating the amount of reductions it will take to reach the common ceiling.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] See Western statement of July 8, *ante*.

In addition, the Western proposal meets underlying Eastern concerns that some direct participants would take only symbolic reductions and that there could be a concentration of military power by any one participant. Along with the contractual commitment by each direct participant with major formations in the area to take a significant share of the overall reductions to the common collective ceilings, Western participants, at the time of signature, would make public the intra-Alliance decision on the breakdown of overall Western reduction quota under the agreement, giving an authoritative indication of the precise amount of the reduction shares of individual participants. Western participants would also state that they will not be found wanting in their individual contribution to the common defense regarding the maintenance of overall ground and air force manpower levels, thus meeting Eastern concerns about the possibility of a sharp change in the correlation of forces on the Western side.

The two remaining major issues of data and associated measures are still to be resolved. But here too, the new Western proposal has altered the negotiating situation and facilitated possible agreement.

First, the East has already acknowledged the need to agree on data for the establishing of the size of the reductions needed to reach the common ceiling. Since the new Western proposal provides for all reductions, and I emphasize all reductions, to the common ceiling in one agreement, the East should now recognize the need for data to be agreed from the outset of the agreement.

Second, the associated measures in the new Western proposal incorporate the basic elements of the set of measures tabled in December 1979. The East has heretofore argued that the size of initial reductions envisaged in the December 1979 proposal did not warrant all the measures proposed by the West. Even on the basis of its own criteria, however, the East should recognize here as well that a full set of measures is required from the beginning of a single agreement which incorporates binding obligations by all direct participants to take substantial reductions to reach the common collective ceiling.

Western participants fully expect the East to recognize the significance of this major Western compromise move and they call on the East for comparable moves with regard to the two remaining fundamental issues of data and associated measures.

News Conference Statement by the Eastern Spokesman (Sharkov) at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, July 15, 1982 [1]

In his statement the Head of the Soviet Delegation, Ambassador Valerian P. Mikhailov, noted that the Socialist countries are persistently searching for ways and means to cease the arms race. The Soviet Union has unilaterally suspended the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the country and on it own initiative is reducing a certain number of its missiles. Of particular importance is the decision made by the USSR on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons which was announced in L.I. Brezhnev's message to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This move serves as a stimulus for the consideration and solution of issues related to the limitation of the arms race at all international fora, including the Vienna negotiations.

In summing up the results of the round which has come to an end, the Soviet Representative said that the submission by the Eastern side of the draft "Agreement on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe" had placed on a practical plane the possibility of attaining agreement on the first stage of reductions. In this draft the Socialist countries took into account the Western position on numerous issues. However, the Western partners, on their part, failed to display the necessary reciprocity. Reading the draft treaty tabled by them shows that, while this draft contains an opportunity for resolving the issue of interphase linkage, it does not provide any answer on other important aspects of the negotiations. According to the new Western proposals, in the first stage, when the Soviet Union and the United States reduce and limit their forces, other direct participants in this stage do not undertake any commitments to reduce or to freeze their armed forces manpower. The numerical strength of the air forces personnel is not only exempt from reductions, but also is not even limited by an upper maximum level. The form of reductions of Soviet and US forces in the first stage, inequitable to the Eastern side, is also maintained.

In a certain respect the Western draft even drags the negotiations backwards. Contrary to the mandate of the talks, it does not provide for a reduction of armaments. Nor does the Western proposal facilitate finding a way out of the data labyrinth.

The concept of the so-called asymmetry of the reduction obligations, embodied in the Western draft, in fact runs counter to the principle of undiminished security for any party. In this one cannot fail to see a desire to obtain unilateral advantages for oneself to the detriment of the security interests of the other side.

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[1] ACDA files.

The Representative of the USSR recalled that the public opinion of the Warsaw Treaty countries asks anew why the Socialist states should reduce their forces in the amounts which are incomparably greater than those for the NATO counties? Why armaments are not reduced? Why should Soviet forces be withdrawn in major military formations and US forces in some uncertain units and subunits and even individually?

In conclusion, Ambassador V.P. Mikhailov said that the actual state of affairs at the negotiations at present is such that two drafts lie on the negotiating table. The draft of the Socialist countries continues to provide good reference points for attaining an agreement. The Eastern side believes that there still exists an opportunity for reaching a positive outcome in Vienna and this opportunity should not be missed.

Letter From President Reagan to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (O'Neill): Production of the MX Missile, July 16, 1982 [1]

I am writing to you and your colleagues to enlist your support in a bipartisan effort that I feel is essential to our national security and indeed the security of the free world in the troubled decades ahead. We have begun to negotiate with the Soviet Union what we earnestly hope will be an equitable and verifiable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. I know that you will agree with me that we must maintain a position of unity and strength during these talks which are so vital to mankind.

Last fall I presented my Strategic Modernization Program to you for approval. [2] I am pleased to say that since then we have taken the critical first steps needed to put the plan into action. Our initiatives for bomber modernization, strategic communications improvement, the Trident II program, and strategic defense are well under way. Implementation of our plan for ICBM modernization, however, is not keeping pace with the overall program. I believe that we need positive and prompt action to correct that situation.

With respect to M-X basing, I set forth a plan for resolving this issue by the spring of 1984. The Senate has now asked us to modify this plan. In its recent Defense Authorization Report the Senate expressed a desire for us to select a permanent basing mode by December of this year. I believe we can, with your help, meet that date.

As you know, however, the Senate failed to authorize the production funds needed to begin the production of the M-X missile itself. I cannot over-emphasize to you the serious negative impact this can have on our negotiations with the Soviets and our modernization program. Failure to authorize these funds will delay the program a year and increase the cost. Thus, it is essential that the House act to approve the production funds and that this action prevail in conference.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, July 26, 1982, pp. 916–917. The text of the letter was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on July 19.

[2] For the President's announcement of this program, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 461–464.

I believe that we must make a solid commitment this year to deploy the M-X missile. We simply cannot allow the land-based leg of the triad to remain vulnerable. We must also show our Allies that we can make the hard decisions necessary to modernize our strategic nuclear capacity—decisions that promise to have great influence on the pace of ongoing Theater Nuclear Force modernization initiatives within NATO. And while it is my intention that the M-X not be a "bargaining chip" in the START negotiations, we need to secure the powerful leverage that a commitment to produce the M-X would provide as we begin effective arms reduction talks with the Soviets. Finally, we need to capitalize on the sizeable investment of some $4.5 billion that has already been made in the M-X program. These goals can only be achieved if decisive action is taken now to proceed with M-X production and deployment.

As you review this issue, I want to assure you that we intend to propose a final basing mode for the M-X by December. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the approval of basing funds before the basing mode is announced in December. I recognize that concern and will cooperate fully if the Congress wishes to place restrictions on the use of these funds until the basing decision is made in December. I urge you, however, to send a clear signal of strong U.S. resolve to the Soviets by fully authorizing and appropriating the funds I have requested for the M-X, especially those funds needed to begin production of the M-X this year. I need your full support of this vital program so that we can make the critical decisions we must in December to implement this much needed element to our modernization program. I further urge you to support restoration of the research and development budget for Ballistic Missile Defense to the level I have requested so that this program can maintain its proper place in relation to the M-X.

Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Nuclear Weapons Freeze and Reductions, and Approval of the SALT II Agreement, July 19, 1982 [1]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 521) calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and for approval of the SALT II agreement, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the joint resolution do pass.

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[1] *Calling for a Mutual and Verifiable Freeze on and Reductions in Nuclear Weapons and for Approval of the SALT II Agreement: Report, Together With Minority and Supplemental Views, To Accompany H.J.*

PURPOSES OF THE RESOLUTION

The purposes of the resolution are (1) to call for prompt approval of the SALT II agreement,[2] and (2) to mandate objectives for the conduct of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union that began on June 29. Much as the legislation ratifying the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) I[3] did for the SALT II Treaty, H.J. Res. 521 mandates objectives for the conduct of the START negotiations. These objectives are specified in H.J. Res. 521 and described in the committee comment.

COMMITTEE COMMENT

The Committee on Foreign Affairs believes that progress in arms control and reduction is essential. Congress has a clear responsibility to help formulate and develop a START negotiating posture that contributes to such progress. Since Congress will have to approve the eventual final product of START, it should help form the U.S. negotiating posture if arms reduction is to receive broad bipartisan support.

H.J. Res. 521 accomplishes this purpose in two ways. First, H.J. Res. 521 establishes approval of SALT II as a vital step to further progress in arms control and reduction. Second, it mandates objectives for the conduct of the START negotiations, including a complete halt to the nuclear arms race and the achievement of a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery system.

APPROVAL OF SALT II

Approval of the SALT II agreement would result in significant arms limitations, controls, and reductions. For example, with SALT II approved, the Soviets will have to reduce their operational missiles or bombers by at least 250 systems, which is 10 percent of their existing operational nuclear forces. By contrast, no existing operational U.S. forces will have to be reduced since the United States is presently under the SALT II ceiling of 2,250. Without approval of SALT II, the Soviets could retain these 250 systems, replace them with more capable systems, or add to them and could have as many as 3,000 launchers by 1985 or one-third more (750 missiles or bombers) than the SALT II limit of 2,250.

Under SALT II, the Soviets can deploy a maximum of 820 launchers of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) intercontinental ballistic missiles which the Reagan administration has properly identi-

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Res. 521, Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office (H. Rpt. 97–640; 97th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 1–21.

[2] The SALT II agreement is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[3] The SALT I agreements are printed *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197 ff.; the legislation approving their ratification is *ibid.*, pp. 505, 681–683.

fied as the most threatening weapons to U.S. national security in the near term. Far from legitimizing this number, SALT II sets a verifiable limit on it. Without SALT II, it is estimated that the Soviets would have more than 920 such weapons by 1985, or at least 100 more than authorized under SALT II limits.

SALT II prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of rapid reload systems. Without SALT II, the Soviets could continue their efforts to develop a rapid reload system that could ultimately enable them to fire and reload an ICBM silo before that silo can be destroyed by a U.S. cruise missile or bomber-carried weapon.

SALT II also makes significant contributions to assuring adequate verification of its provisions. These include:

(*a*) A prohibition on interference with "national technical means of verification";

(*b*) A ban on the electronic coding of intelligence related to the agreement;

(*c*) Counting rules that increase U.S. confidence in determining whether a particular Soviet missile in a silo has one or more than one warhead;

(*d*) Soviet agreement to provide figures on their own offensive forces; and

(*e*) Regular U.S.-Soviet exchanges of information and continued compliance with its provisions through the Standing Consultative Commission.

As part of its firm commitment to adequate verification of SALT II, the committee emphasized in H.J. Res. 521 that SALT II should be approved provided adequate verification capabilities are maintained. The committee is convinced that the improved verification capabilities in the agreement make SALT II adequately verifiable.

The committee notes that the Reagan administration has already agreed to adhere to the terms of the SALT agreement provided the Soviet Union does likewise. As such, it is wholly consistent to move ahead with formal approval. In fact, only by approval of, not adherence to, can the Soviet reductions and improved verification measures produced by SALT II be realized.

In adopting H.J. Res. 521, the committee believes that the most appropriate vehicle for approval of SALT II is by executive agreement. Just as SALT I was an interim agreement, SALT II is also of limited duration (it expires in 1985) and therefore is suitable to be submitted as an executive agreement.

Finally, the committee regards as invalid the argument that SALT II ratification will undercut START. SALT II took 7 years to complete and was negotiated by three Presidents—two Republican, one Democratic. The Reagan administration has recognized that START will not be a quick, easy negotiation and that START must build on the experiences and successes of the past. SALT II approval is the best possible foundation for START and increases the chance for success by formalizing agreements already adhered to by both sides. This is particularly crucial in light of an imminent Soviet leadership succession.

In short, many of the objectives of START as outlined by the Reagan administration can be significantly advanced by approval of SALT II. SALT II would reduce the number of deployed missiles aimed at the United States. It would also limit Soviet warheads and throw weight. Finally, SALT II would reduce the tensions, cost, and instability of the arms race. The agreement deserves the support of the Congress and the executive branch and is the best available baseline for the conduct of START.

OBJECTIVES FOR START—A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The second major contribution of H.J. Res. 521 is the establishment of general objectives for the conduct of the START negotiations. The guidelines for START in H.J. Res. 521 are:

(1) Pursuing a complete halt to the nuclear arms race.

(2) Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems.

(3) Giving special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(4) Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(6) Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles into the START negotiations.

The objectives for START outlined in H.J. Res. 521 incorporate the central elements of the nuclear freeze proposal. While much has been made of the grass roots nature of the freeze movement and its growing political popularity, far too little attention has been paid to the fact that a mutual and verifiable United States-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze is a sensible and workable arms control proposal.

A United States-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze is based on three fundamental principles. First, it is grounded in the consensus view that nuclear parity presently describes the overall nuclear balance between the two superpowers. Second, a freeze must be mutual to be successful. Third, a freeze must be adequately verifiable.

The existence of parity has been confirmed by high-ranking officials in both Republican and Democratic administrations. Officials of the Reagan administration have also acknowledged this fact. None of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their willingness to trade overall U.S. capabilities for those of the Soviet Union.

This consensus view is confirmed by the current structure of United States and Soviet strategic forces. While the Soviet Union has more

ICBM and SLBM launchers, the United States has more heavy bombers and more strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has an advantage in missile throw weight, the United States has an edge in missile reliability. The United States also has a far greater number of SLBM's and heavy bombers ready to launch at any one time.

Much discussion in the past few years has centered on the possibility of a "window of vulnerability" whereby the Soviet Union could theoretically destroy U.S. missiles in their silos in a first strike, leaving the United States the choice of destroying the Soviet Union in a second strike, knowing the United States could be similarly devastated in a third strike, or reaching an unfavorable political accommodation with the Soviet Union.

This scenario, the committee believes, is divorced from reality. To destroy the 1,052 U.S. ICBM silos, the Soviet Union would need at least 2,000 perfectly coordinated warheads, all of them spaced and timed to avoid mutual destruction by the phenomenon of "fratricide," which can cause the nuclear explosions of some warheads to affect other warheads before detonation.

In addition the largest Soviet flight test has involved less than 1 percent of the number of missiles that would be required for a disarming Soviet first strike. Even if all of these extreme obstacles were overcome, the Soviet attack would kill 7–15 million Americans immediately and perhaps up to 20 million more through secondary effects.

These casualty rates are 10–20 times the number of American combat deaths in World War II. To assume that, first, the President would blithely ignore the incoming Soviet missiles and not order U.S. ICBM's launched, and second, not retaliate when faced with 17–35 million American deaths, is an incredible scenario with no basis in reality.

Finally, the "window of vulnerability" is reciprocal. While the Soviet Union has more ICBM launchers, it has achieved this advantage by placing 75 percent of its strategic nuclear forces in vulnerable ICBM's. The United States has placed only 24 percent of its nuclear weapons in its ICBM force. Aside from providing the United States with a staggering, versatile retaliatory capability, existing U.S. short-range attack missiles and Minuteman III ICBM's give the United States significant counterforce capability against three-quarters of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. In contrast, the majority of U.S. retaliatory weapons are on station in invulnerable submarines. Thus, the theoretical window of vulnerability is a two-edged sword and makes any first strike a dangerous gamble with unacceptable risks.

The inescapable fact of effective nuclear parity in United States-Soviet nuclear arsenals leads to the second fundamental concept on which a freeze is based. That is, a freeze must be mutual to be successful.

The nuclear freeze as proposed in H.J. Res. 521 will not unilaterally preclude any defense program proposed by the Reagan administration. Issues such as when to implement a freeze and how to deal with replacement of older nuclear systems must be negotiated in the START framework. A freeze agreement would come after negotiations which will be mutual and will not be unilateral. Furthermore, under H.J. Res. 521 a freeze would follow approval of SALT II, which would have the effect of freezing the Soviet nuclear arsenal at least 10 percent below its current level. With SALT II approved, a freeze would further stabilize the nuclear arsenals of both countries.

Contrary to the contention that the United States has engaged in unilateral disarmament during the 1970's, both the United States and the Soviet Union made major improvements in their strategic nuclear forces in the 1970's. While in the last decade, the Soviet Union deployed 5 new ICBM's, the United States outproduced the Soviet Union in numbers of warheads by 1,100, introduced Poseidon and Trident SLBM's, and added over 1,000 short-range attack missiles to the B-52 bomber force.

These improvements on both sides have brought nuclear arsenals to a level well beyond what is needed to preserve deterrence. The central reality of the strategic balance today is that neither side can start and win a nuclear war. One Poseidon submarine with Trident missiles can cause at least 25 million Soviet fatalities, 5 million more than the Soviet Union suffered in World War II. Standard computations of destructive power continue to show that each of the three legs of the U.S. strategic triad can kill one-third of the Soviet population and destroy two-thirds of its industry even after a Soviet first strike.

New U.S. weapons as bargaining chips are alleged to be necessary to achieve prohibitions on new Soviet weapons. But by banning new Soviet nuclear weapons en bloc, the freeze renders this theory obsolete. Soviet efforts to gain a unilateral advantage in nuclear weaponry during START would be blocked. Near-term Soviet advantages in nuclear weapons systems production would be blunted.

Arming in order to disarm brings only higher levels of nuclear forces. The history of previous arms control negotiations is replete with examples of weapons programs which began as bargaining chips and became virtually impossible to control once production began. The failure to prevent the development and deployment of bargaining chips in past arms control negotiations have undermined the security of both sides, symbolized by the failure to prohibit MIRV capability in the SALT I negotiations. This led weapons systems originally intended directly to vulnerable ICBM forces on both sides [*sic*].

The third fundamental principle on which a United States-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze is based is that of verifiability.

Testing and deployment on Soviet systems can be effectively verified by U.S. national technical means. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Undersecretary of Defense for Research, Development, Testing, and Engineering William Perry stated "at the nuclear weapons production stage, the United States has been able to monitor Soviet activities at the design bureau and production plants so that every Soviet ICBM test has been predicted before it

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occurs." Beyond national technical means, the Soviet Union has agreed to unmanned seismic stations and on-site inspection procedures in the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such procedures would prove highly useful in the verification of a mutual and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze.

It should also be pointed out that uncertainties in verification of nuclear weapons production can be compensated for by the high confidence in verification regarding testing and deployment. Furthermore, a freeze would mean a stop to all activities in any weapons program to be included so that the detection of even one new missile or aircraft would be evidence of a violation. This simplifies the verification over that required for monitoring a ceiling. In assessing adequate verification, the threshold that should be established is confidence that any violation that would significantly affect our security would have a high probability of being detected.

In short, the fact of nuclear parity makes a mutual and verifiable weapons freeze a workable and attractive proposal. Such a freeze will halt another round in the arms race, that would not benefit U.S. security.

OTHER OBJECTIVES FOR START

The committee realizes that a mutual and verifiable freeze on United States-Soviet nuclear arsenals is not an end in itself. For this reason, H.J. Res. 521 also calls for substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions proceeding from a freeze. These reductions can best be achieved after a freeze has been negotiated to halt the nuclear arms race. During the negotiations on a freeze, the approval of SALT II will provide the best baseline to proceed with freeze negotiations.

Another START objective sought by H.J. Res. 521 is the negotiation of limits on destabilizing weapons that would make a United States-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze more difficult to achieve.

The committee intends that every effort be made in the negotiations to reach agreements limiting the development of destabilizing weapons or technologies.

Destabilizing weapons are those which have the capability of destroying the other side's strategic nuclear weapons thereby reducing confidence in their deterrent value. Weapons with a combination of high accuracy, multiple warheads, large explosive force, and short flight time are the most threatening of these weapons, since they have the potential capability of destroying protected hard targets like ICBM silos and command posts in a disarming first strike.

Faced with such threats to their strategic weapons, both superpowers would be under pressure in times of crisis to adopt a launch-on-warning policy, thereby greatly increasing the danger of a crisis or even an accident leading to a full-scale nuclear war.

Other weapons such as antisubmarine warfare technologies and sophisticated air defenses which could prevent nuclear weapons from being launched or reaching their targets could also be destabilizing if breakthroughs in these technologies provided high confidence in their success, and it is the committee's intent, therefore, that every effort should be made to reach agreement on such systems as well.

Finally, the committee believes that the START framework should incorporate ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. These missiles are inextricably linked to strategic nuclear forces on both sides. Such incorporation would strengthen the linkage between U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces and therefore strengthen the political cohesiveness and unity of the NATO alliance. The committee also believes that the final product of START should be consistent with existing U.S. commitments to NATO defense, including the decision in December, 1979 to both deploy and seek control on long-range theater nuclear forces.

The United States must maintain close consultations with the NATO allies in order to insure that a common position on START can be developed within NATO.

In conclusion, the committee strongly reiterates that H.J. Res. 521 is a bipartisan arms control approach. A majority of both committee Democrats and Republicans have supported this joint resolution and believe it establishes the objectives that best insure the results at START that the American people have demanded.

COMMITTEE ACTION

As part of its regular and comprehensive legislative oversight on arms control issues, the committee through its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, held six hearings on U.S. nuclear arms control and national security policy. Three hearings were held jointly with the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on February 22 [*23*], March 19 [*18*], and March 22. Three additional hearings were held separately by the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs on April 2, May 11, and May 17.

The list of witnesses follows:

Tuesday, February 22 [*23*], 1982: Hon. Eugene V. Rostow, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Hon. Richard R. Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; and Hon. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense.

Thursday, March 19 [*18*], 1982: Hon. Raymond Garthoff, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Foreign Policy Program, and former U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria; Dr. Lynn Davis, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs; and Leon Sloss, Consultant, Leon Sloss Associates, and former head, Strategy Targeting Planning Group, Department of Defense.

Tuesday, March 22, 1982: Hon. Harold Brown former Secretary of Defense.

Friday, April 2, 1982: Hon. Edward L. Rowny, Chief Negotiator and Head of U.S. Delegation for Arms Control Negotiations; Hon. Richard R. Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; and Hon. Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense.

Tuesday, May 11, 1982: Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York; Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Massachusetts; and Hon. Albert Gore, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Tennessee; Hon. Berkley Bedell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa; Adm. Noel Gayler (USN, Retired), former Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, and former Director of the National Security Agency; Howard H. Hiatt, M.D., Dean, Harvard School of Public Health, and Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School; and Ms. Randall Forsberg, Director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Brookline, Mass.

Monday, May 17, 1982: Hon. Jim Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa; Hon. Thomas J. Downey, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York; Hon. Toby Roth, a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin; Hon. William Carney, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York; Dr. McGeorge Bundy, Department of History, New York University, and former National Security Advisor; Roger Molander, Executive Director, Ground Zero; and Adm. Gene R. LaRocque (USN, Retired), Director, Center for Defense Information.

The range of issues reviewed by these hearings included:

—U.S. nuclear arms control policy and its effect on the NATO alliance, including the status of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva;

—the Reagan Administration's strategic modernization program and its relationship to U.S. negotiating posture;

—the extent to which the Administration has recognized the positive benefits of arms control in enhancing U.S. national security interests; and

—the role of Congress in shaping U.S. nuclear arms control policy through legislative action.

As evidence of the extent of congressional and public concern over the issue of nuclear arms control, a total of 21 resolutions and bills embodying various approaches to the question were introduced during the 97th Congress prior to the Committee's markup and referred to the Committee for further action. The list of resolutions follows:

H.J. Res. 433, 434, and 476—Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons.

H.J. Res. 443—With respect to nuclear arms reductions.

H. Con. Res. 295 and 297—Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions of their nuclear weapons in a manner which would contribute to peace and stability.

H.J. Res. 474—To provide for United States ratification of the SALT II agreement.

H. Con. Res. 338—Urging the President to notify the Congress before any action is taken that does not conform with the SALT II agreement.

H. Res. 249—Calling for an international nuclear weapons ban.

H. Res. 444—Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President of the United States should propose to the Soviet Union that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles designed for war and that verification safeguards be adopted by both countries.

H. Con. Res. 151 and 269—To express the sense of the Congress that nuclear war represents the world's greatest potential health hazard and that all nuclear weapons in the world should be eliminated.

H. Con. Res. 258—To express the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should engage in a balanced, mutual reduction of their nuclear weapons, that all countries should reduce their nuclear arsenals, and that greater efforts should be made to control the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not possessing such weapons.

H. Con. Res. 270—Expressing the sense of the Congress that action must be taken to freeze the nuclear arms race.

H. Con. Res. 277—Expressing the sense of Congress that there should be an immediate mutual freeze of the nuclear arms race.

H. Con. Res. 280—Expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons.

H. Con. Res. 287—Expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race and an eventual reduction in the number of nuclear weapons and the size of conventional forces.

H. Con. Res. 305—To express the sense of the Congress that the President should enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union and other nations to eliminate nuclear weapons.

H. Con. Res. 351—Urging that negotiations be initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union with the purpose of freezing and then reducing nuclear weapons arsenals to an equal and verifiable level.

H. Con. Res. 358—Regarding the negotiation of nuclear arms reduction.

H.R. 6636—To prohibit United States economic assistance for Warsaw Pact countries until the Soviet Union and the United States have signed a nuclear arms limitation agreement which provides for significant and verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons.

On June 22 and 23, the committee marked up the various resolutions, using H.J. Res. 443 as the basic markup document. On June 23, Chairman Zablocki, along with 20 cosponsors, introduced a clean bill, which incorporated Committee amendments to H.J. Res. 443. The clean bill, House Joint Resolution 521, was ordered favorably reported that same day by a vote of 28–8.

TEXT OF H.J. RES. 521

The text of H.J. Res. 521 as approved by the committee follows:

[H.J. Res. 521, 97th Congress, 2d session] [4]

JOINT RESOLUTION calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and for approval of the SALT II agreement

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union have not strengthened international peace and security but in fact enhance the prospect for mutual destruction;

Whereas on May 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that he had written to Soviet President Brezhnev to propose negotiations to achieve an agreement that significantly reduces the number of nuclear weapons, enhances stability, and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future; [5]

Whereas the SALT II agreement mandates the prompt reduction of Soviet strategic forces by two hundred and fifty-four deployable strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; imposes significant restrictions on Soviet multiple-warhead deployable intercontinental ballistic missiles, and on warheads for these missiles, in terms of numbers and throw-weight; prohibits equipment for rapid reload of intercontinental ballistic missile silos; and in these and other verifiable respects improves the ability of the United States strategic forces to carry out their deterrent mission;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have observed the SALT II agreement since its signing;

Whereas adequate verification of compliance has always been an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement; and

Whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems would greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately begin the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and those talks should have the following objectives:

(1) Pursuing a complete halt to the nuclear arms race.

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[4] Brackets in the source text.

[5] *Ante.*

(2) Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems.

(3) Giving special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(4) Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages, or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(6) Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles into the START negotiations.

In those negotiations, the United States shall make every effort to reach a common position with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies on any element of an agreement which would be inconsistent with existing United States commitments to those allies.

SEC. 2. The United States shall promptly approve the SALT II agreement provided adequate verification capabilities are maintained.

REQUIRED REPORTS SECTION

Cost estimate

H.J. Res. 521, if enacted, would not involve any additional direct cost to the U.S. Government.

Inflationary impact statement

The enactment of this resolution will have no impact on inflationary forces.

Statements required by clause 2(l)(3) of House Rule XI

A. Oversight findings and recommendations.—In addition to the hearings cited above, Members of Congress and congressional staff have conducted onsite inspections of U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities, as well as participating in numerous briefings and other discussions dealing with strategic arms control. As a result of these oversight activities, the Committee recommends that House Joint Resolution 521 be approved.

B. Budget authority.—The enactment of House Joint Resolution 521 will create no new budget authority.

C. Committee on Government Operations summary.—No oversight findings and recommendations which relate to the measure have been received by the Committee on Government Operations under clause 4(c)(2) of rule X of the rules of the House.

D. Congressional Budget Office cost estimate.—The following letter has been received from the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, D.C., June 24, 1982.

Hon. Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed H.J. Res. 521, calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons and for approval of the SALT II Agreement, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 24, 1982.

Based on this review, it is expected that no additional cost to the government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this legislation.

Sincerely,

Raymond C. Scheppach
(For Alice M. Rivlin, Director).

Minority Views of Hon. William S. Broomfield, Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, Hon. Larry Winn, Jr., Hon. Robert J. Lagomarsino, Hon. Robert K. Dornan, and Hon. Henry J. Hyde

Seldom has a majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee been so unsound in its reasoning and timing concerning national security issues as it has in the adoption of H.J. Res. 521. The resolution calls for the approval of the SALT II Treaty and a freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons before sharp reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of both countries can be negotiated.

We in the minority favor reductions in nuclear stockpiles now and endorse the President's strategic and theater arms reduction proposals as the only plan for a real decrease in nuclear weapons.

In approving H.J. Res. 521, the majority has ignored the effects it will have on the United States-Soviet strategic balance and the NATO–Warsaw Pact theater balance, and ignored the influences this resolution is likely to have on ongoing negotiations and modernization programs to restore the balance. We believe this resolution misunderstands what arms control means.

In its rush to express approval for SALT II, the majority has consistently minimized the inherent flaws of the Treaty. The SALT II agreement allows the Soviet Union 308 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This unilateral advantage in nuclear capability has effected a change in the strategic balance so stark in its consequences that to permit the Treaty to enter into force would mean condemning for the foreseeable future substantial elements of our deterrent forces to Soviet destruction. It would make the United States and its allies vulnerable to coercion, blackmail, and worse. That the Soviets have made compromises in the Treaty is irrelevant to the central reality of their unilateral advantage in heavy ICBMs and the impact of these ICBMs on the nuclear balance. Moreover, failure to include the Soviet Backfire Bomber in the strategic aggregates was an egregious negotiating error that significantly tilted the balance in favor of the Soviet Union. Is it any wonder that the United States Senate during the Carter Administration refused to legislatively consent to the agreement?

Members of the majority have made much of the fact that the SALT II Treaty calls for reductions in the number of Soviet launchers. What they fail to mention is that the Soviets would no doubt dismantle older strategic systems while expanding their nuclear capability in new and various ways. Under SALT II, the warheads on Soviet ICBMs alone could have grown to 8000, an increase of more than ten percent. In this respect, the SALT II Treaty is the authentic child of the entire strategic arms limitation process. During the past decade, in which strategic arms limitation agreements have been in force or under negotiation, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. The Soviets have introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including several variants of their recently deployed SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, as well as the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire Bomber. By contrast, the United States has exercised restraint unobliged by treaty and introduced only one new missile-submarine system (the Trident) and one new variant of the Minuteman ICBM. This trend in the growth of Soviet nuclear capability under the terms of SALT I and SALT II was completely harmful to the security interests of the United States, its allies, and global stability.

Just as important, as its military capability has grown, the Soviet Union's willingness to resort to force has increased. The Soviets have used force directly and through proxies. They have intervened in areas farther and farther from their borders. If SALT II contained no destabilizing inequities in its provisions, we would be well-advised to reject the Treaty on this basis alone: the strategic arms limitation process has allowed enormous growth in nuclear arsenals and failed to restrain increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior.

The Executive Branch is not certain it can even verify the Treaty. Administration spokesmen have repeatedly testified that the SALT II Treaty is ambiguous concerning verification. Inadequate terms for verification, Ambassador Rowney recently remarked, were a great flaw in the SALT II accord. Moreover, former head of the National Security Agency and former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Bobby Inman, recently stated that there was valid criticism in the Congress that our ability to verify arms control treaties in the last decade was "thin." Also, arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the Soviet Union cannot be based simply on trust. The Soviets have already made deceptive statements during the SALT I and SALT II process concerning heavy ICBM deployment, SLBM quantities, mobile ICBMs, and cruise missile ranges. They have continued to conceal and camouflage missile deployments in violation of the agreements, as well as to encrypt missile telemetry signals. As a result, we must have effective means of verifying that the Soviets are honoring the terms of the SALT II agreement. Unverifiable agreements benefit no one. One need only witness Soviet use of internationally outlawed chemical agents in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Such unverifiable agreements increase uncertainty, tensions and risks. Arms control agreements that cannot be effectively verified are unacceptable.

Unfortunately, the majority has deemed fit a Treaty that is unacceptable as an instrument of nuclear stability, arms control, and, hence, peace. The need for a new approach to nuclear arms control is evident. The approach should be based on specific principles of stability and effectiveness. Four principles immediately suggest themselves due to the record of the strategic arms limitation process. These principles are as follows: first, equality in each side's levels of forces to undo the destabilizing advantages granted to the Soviet Union in SALT agreements; second, reductions in the high levels of armaments to counter the destructive consequences of the Soviet Union's decade-long arms buildup; third, enhancement of the security of the United States and its allies; and fourth, verifiability. These are the principles on which the President's arms control negotiations are based. They guide negotiations with the Soviets at the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions talks in Vienna, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Talks in Geneva, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks also in Geneva.

The minority in the House Foreign Affairs Committee strongly believes it is inadvisable to attempt to resurrect the SALT II agreement, especially while START negotiations are under way.

The minority of the Committee also dissents from the majority's call for a nuclear freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons before sharp reductions to equal, mutual, and verifiable levels can be made. The simultaneous requirements of H.J. Res. 521, first, to put into force an unequal, unverifiable arms control agreement condoning large increases in nuclear capability and, second, to enact a nuclear freeze before deep reductions can be negotiated, guarantees that inequities in the strategic balance which so threaten United States security now will continue and will probably worsen. Indeed, the controversial SALT II agreement has so many fatal flaws and has caused so many responsible Congressmen and Senators to question the national security implications of endorsing the agreement, that should SALT II be reopened for Congressional consideration, it would require long and tedious debate with so many resulting modifications that renegotiation would certainly be required. In the interim, so much time will have been lost that the stockpile of nuclear weapons will have grown even larger. The additional requirement to negotiate a freeze as a precondition to arms reductions would further delay START and allow both nations to amass greater numbers of weapons.

We reject the nuclear freeze, as provided by H.J. Res. 521, as a dangerous and misleading proposal for the following reasons:

1. A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability. It would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our strategic nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup of the last ten years. In addition, a freeze would mean that we and our European allies would have no way to off-set Soviet nuclear superiority in intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe.

2. A freeze as a pre-condition to meaningful reductions is not good arms control. The United States should not seek a cap on nuclear deployments at current levels. Current levels of nuclear arms are far too high. We need significant reductions leading to a stable and sane military balance. The United States has already proposed the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and significant reductions in strategic arms. A freeze undercuts each of these proposals and would give the Soviets no incentive to negotiate reductions.

3. Also, such a freeze would seriously jeopardize American leadership and credibility within the NATO alliance. In 1979, we and our allies agreed to a dual track approach combining arms control negotiations and deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces to balance those of the Soviet Union. A freeze would be a unilateral American withdrawal from this agreement without providing any solution to the problem of imbalanced forces.

4. Finally, a freeze cannot be verified, without on-site inspection, which the Soviets have never agreed to. For example, it would be extremely difficult to verify a prohibition on improved warhead yields, improved throw weight, or even new missiles.

In short, the portion of the resolution calling for a nuclear freeze conforms to none of the principles which should underlay arms control agreements. The SALT II-Nuclear Freeze resolution will formalize nuclear arsenals at excessively high levels, will make permanent a destabilizing strategic and theater nuclear imbalance, and will completely frustrate serious efforts to reduce arms. The alternative to such disastrous outcomes is to support the President's principled arms control approach.

We in the minority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee endorse the President's strategic and theater arms reduction proposals. We in the Congress, in a bipartisan fashion, have already expressed our support for the President's proposals for the Intermediate Nuclear Force Talks in Geneva. We also support as strategic arms control objectives the reduction of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third to about 5,000, the reduction of the total number of all ballistic missiles to about one-half the current U.S. level, and a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level. We support the Administration's proposals, as outlined before the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, to build confidence and increase communication with the Soviets in order to prevent accidental nuclear war.

In summary, we in the minority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee believe that H.J. Res. 521 not only places the United States in a position of further military disadvantage with the Soviets but also undermines the Administration's arms control efforts to achieve—first and foremost—agreed reductions to equal, mutual, and verifiable levels. Clearly, if our delegates, in concert with our NATO allies, are to have any probability of success in furthering the U.S. position to reduce nuclear arms with the Soviets, they cannot do so with one hand tied behind them. We believe that the security of the United States and the negotiations with the Soviets can best be furthered by bipartisan support for the President's agenda for peace which includes far-reaching initiatives for arms reductions and control.

William Broomfield.
Ed Derwinski.
Larry Winn, Jr.
Bob Lagomarsino.
R. K. Dornan.
Henry J. Hyde.

Supplemental Views of Hon. Edward J. Derwinski

This is one of the last Committee reports to which I will add my views. I have also signed the Minority Views to this report thus associating myself with those excellent comments. However, there are some further points that I believe should be made.

Any agreement signed by the Soviets, as the minority views correctly point out, must be subject to strict verification. In view of the long Soviet record of deception and violation of treaties, any other course would be reckless. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its direction of repression in Poland, and its employment of chemical and biological weapons in Asia are only a few of its most recent violations of treaties and conventions. Alexander Ginzburg, the former Soviet political prisoner now in the U.S., said this about agreements with the Soviets:

> * * * take a look at how the Soviet Government complies with any of their bilateral agreements. If they won't live up to their commitments even in such a simple and humanitarian agreement in which we were exchanged, how can you expect them to comply with SALT?

One of the aspects of the debate on the nuclear freeze that I find objectionable is the persistent tendency in certain quarters to equate the United States with the Soviet Union. The culprit is the Soviet Union; the culprit is not the United States. The dangerous military and political situation that has existed in the world since the end of World

War II has been fomented by the USSR and its Communist allies, not by the U.S. In my opinion, it has been the fact of a strong nuclear arsenal in U.S. hands and the willingness of the U.S. to use it, if necessary to defend the vital interests of the Free World, that has kept the world free both from total Soviet domination and from nuclear war.

The Soviet Union is a military superpower—there is no question about that. It has marshalled the greatest war machine the world has ever known but it has assembled this huge offensive force at cruel cost to all the peoples in its vast empire—Russians, and the non-Russian peoples, Balts, Armenians, Ukrainians, Tartars, comprising the rest of the subject peoples of its far-flung domain. But the Soviet Union is only a military superpower—it is an economic weakling. "The Soviet state may have the head and shoulders of a superpower," as the Economist on August 30, 1980 said, "but its feet are made of numbly incompetent clay."

Preliminary statistics show that at this point in 1982, the Soviet economy produced even less than in 1981. Industrial output and labor productivity in important categories are down and agricultural yields have declined. Even official Soviet figures show growth rates lower than at any time since World War II. Further declines in this decade are likely. In the words of the Russian dissident, Andrei Sakharov:

> The necessity for profound economic and social reforms in the USSR is obvious to many people in the country, but attempts to carry them out collide with the resistance of the ruling bureaucracy and everything goes on as before, the same old slogans. Meanwhile, the military-industrial complex and the KGB are gaining in strength threatening the stability of the entire world, and super-militarization is eating up all our resources.

While they cannot even feed their own subjects, the Soviets have relentlessly pursued their wars of aggression, promoted terrorism worldwide, repressed the urge for freedom in Poland and the other Eastern European satellites and unleashed a cruel and barbaric war on the Afghan people. Chemical and biological warfare is not the least of their crimes in violation of numerous treaties and conventions. The red flag flutters over the Soviet imperial domain as its deadly yellow rain falls on its farthest reaches.

There are failures, nonetheless, in the application of this tyrannical system. According to Cord Meyer, in the *Washington Star* on November 22, 1980, Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer who defected to the British, told the Times of London two years ago how the rigid application by the Soviets of Communist doctrine in African tribal societies in Angola and Ethiopia, for example, resulted in disasters. Only the introduction of Cuban armed forces could save the situation for the Soviets.

Internal control throughout the Soviet Union is maintained by tyranny and terrorism and Communist domination is extended into its neighboring states. This network of captive nations embrace those within the USSR itself, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzahn, and of belatedly recognized significance, the subject Moslem peoples, the Kazakh, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, and so on. Indeed, in a certain context, the Russians are themselves captives of Communism. Outside the immediate frontiers of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea) comprise both a national and an ethnic imperium. Soviet troops are now methodically killing Afghans to draw their country into this bitter league.

On another plane is Soviet repression of religious groups. The Catholic and Orthodox Churches of the Ukraine have been wiped out as have the Catholic Church in Lithuania and the Protestant churches in Latvia and Estonia. Jews throughout the Soviet Union are persecuted. Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses, two tiny sects, are repressed. The Moslems, as noted above, a huge minority, are discriminated against and persecuted.

In the short run, dictatorships such as the Soviet Union have an advantage in that they can issue orders which must be followed; whereas in a democracy such as ours, policies require broadbased public support to be effective, which often takes time in developing. But in the long run, chronic weaknesses of the Communists in the economic field, especially agriculture, coupled with the many years in which basic freedoms have been denied the populace, with great frustration boiling beneath the surface, are the real weaknesses the Soviets cannot overcome.

This massive empire, held together by repression and fear, is a powerful and dangerous adversary. It is itself, however, in danger of explosion. The pressures are immense. Nothing must be done to afford the Soviet Union advantage in its expansion or aid its adventures abroad. It must be held in check, no matter what.

My concern is that as Soviet failures mount its penchant for creating chaos abroad or for foreign adventures may increase. As its weaknesses grow, it may fall back on its one undisputed strength—military force. The immense power of its war machine stands as a cold reminder that the Soviet challenge is grim, immediate and real.

It was not so long ago, December 14, 1979, that Milovan Djilas wrote in Belgrade, that "Stalin's shadow is still spreading and hovers over the entire globe. It will continue to grow until Soviet expansionism is finally contained." It must be contained.

According to Dr. Mark E. Miller, author of "Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine," recently published study of Moscow's drive for military superiority, "The Soviet Union is intent upon attaining an ability to surpass the United States at any level of military conflict and at any stage of escalation, from local conventional warfare to an all-out nuclear exchange."

"* * * the Soviet leaders almost assuredly do not want or plan a nuclear war if at all possible to avoid," Miller said. "They make clear their full awareness of the terrible destructiveness that would ensue for the Soviet Union itself. Their preferred strategy," he continued, "is to face the United States with such a level and diversity of military superiority as to paralyze the will of this country to defend its vital interests while the USSR steadily expands its global power." We must not permit ourselves to become paralyzed.

The Soviet Union clearly is pursuing its own unique quest. To equate its course of action with our own would be a travesty. Our goal in renewing America's strength is to keep the peace while the Soviet mission is aggression and aggrandizement. Reflect upon the misery inflicted upon Afghanistan. Think only of the actions in Laos and Cambodia of the Soviet surrogate, Vietnam.

The Soviets have offered no peaceful solutions in the Middle East. They have armed and trained guerrillas and terrorists, instead. They have exacerbated tensions and promoted chaos. They have prepositioned huge stocks of weapons in areas controlled by their allies—Syria, Libya and in PLO controlled areas of Lebanon—for purposes that can be easily guessed. They have supported both sides in the bloody Quixotic Iraq/Iran war.

Far afield, they have propelled their puppets, armed and armored, into Ethiopia and Angola. They promote the Moscow brand of "national liberation" in Nicaragua and pursue its goals in El Salvador's guerrilla warfare.

Pavel Litvinov, a Soviet dissident who was sent to Siberia following his organization of a peaceful demonstration against the arms race, had something to say about peace movements which is relevant to proposals for a nuclear freeze as well. According to the New York Times of June 6, 1982, "The main source of danger and instability in the world is the Soviet Union," he said. Unless Americans support a peace movement in the Soviet Union, the Western peace movement "will serve only the interests of the Soviet Union, which are not necessarily to preserve peace," Mr. Litvinov said.

To accept the thesis that the United States is an equal threat to world security and peace is to deny history. What is needed is a reduction in nuclear armaments as proposed by the Administration. To freeze Soviet superiority would be to invite World War III.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI.

SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON. JIM LEACH

As a supporter of the nuclear freeze approach, I am pleased by the Committee's adoption of this approach in H.J. Res. 521. I am also pleased that the Foreign Affairs Committee has gone on record in support of SALT II; however, I was disappointed that the amendment I introduced in Committee providing for SALT II to be ratified as an

Executive Agreement, failed to receive majority support. This amendment, modeled after H.J. Res. 474 introduced by Representative Downey and myself, would represent the first substantive step toward reconsideration of SALT II in Congress.

Ratification of SALT II as an Executive Agreement admittedly would be an unusual procedure, but it is not without historical precedent. Both the annexation of Texas into the Union as a state and the annexation of Hawaii as a territory were ratified by Joint Resolution passed by simple majorities of both Houses—not by the normal treaty process. Moreover, the offensive weapons section of SALT I, which is still observed by both sides, was passed this way in 1972. The House has the opportunity to fill this vacuum left by Senate inaction, and to serve national security by going on record in approval of SALT II.

This proposal is premised on the likelihood that the negotiation of a strategic arms accord based on the proposals outlined by President Reagan in his Eureka College speech will be an exceedingly difficult and time-consuming endeavor. If nothing is done to contain the strategic arms race in the interim, the further development of destabilizing weapons on both sides may increase the danger of a nuclear war and complicate prospects for eventually reaching agreement on substantial reductions of the kind proposed by the President. The far-reaching nature of the START proposal makes it more, rather than less, important that the existing restraints on the arms race be maintained and formalized.

The logic of this course is underlined by the fact that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are abiding by SALT's key provisions, except that the Soviets are not required to destroy more than 250 launchers that they would be obligated to dismantle if the Treaty were ratified. As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently observed: "I have great difficulty understanding why it is safe to adhere to a nonratified agreement while it's unsafe formally to ratify what one is already observing."

Plainly, the U.S. is less well-off without SALT II than it would be if ratification went forward. It is naive to assume that the Soviets will long stand still as we develop more weapons. History shows that lacking treaty restraint the Soviet Union will commit at least as much as we do to further weapons development. It is also naive to assume that future arms control negotiations can take place without close reference to what has been agreed to during the course of the SALT II negotiations carried out under three administrations.

The principal flaw in SALT II is that it does not go far enough. While the accord may not be perfect, it is better than nothing. SALT II is an essential building block for more comprehensive agreements.

The best means of building the mutual confidence that must underlie strategic arms reductions is to ratify an existing agreement, the fruit of years of negotiations, that so serves our mutual interest that it has thus far been informally observed by both sides even in the absence of formal ratifications. There is no more appropriate starting point for START negotiations than ratification of SALT II.

Accordingly, I am giving serious consideration to offering an amendment to H.J. Res. 521 which would provide for ratification of SALT II as an Executive Agreement and am hopeful that, in the event such an amendment is offered, it will be successfully passed by the full House.

Letter From President Reagan to Members of the House of Representatives: Proposed Resolutions on a Freeze of Nuclear Weapons, July 23, 1982 [1]

Less than a month ago, we embarked on a major effort with the Soviet Union to negotiate a reduction in the strategic arsenals of both sides and thus to reduce the risk of nuclear war. I view this initiative as one of the most important and challenging of my Presidency, and I am determined that the United States will do everything in its power to achieve an effective, equitable, and verifiable agreement. The American people will not be satisfied with anything less.

As we engage in the sensitive and complex START negotiations with the Soviet Union, we need to demonstrate that the American people and Congress are behind the proposals carried by Ambassador Rowny to Geneva. The bipartisan resolution recently introduced by Congressmen Broomfield, Carney, and Stratton [2] will make clear to the Soviets that the American people are united in seeking substantial reductions to equal and verifiable levels in the arsenals of both sides, and reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. I strongly support the resolution.

We must not allow this opportunity to reach an agreement on substantial nuclear force reductions to be lost. I am concerned that the resolution reported earlier by the House Foreign Affairs Committee [3] will signal to the Soviet Union that we are willing to accept something less than these reductions; that is, a freeze that leaves dangerous asymmetries in the nuclear balance and a return to the flawed SALT II agreement. [4] Both these provisions would seriously undercut our negotiating position and reduce the chances for achievement of our START objectives.

With your support, we can achieve the goals we have set and enhance the prospects for peace and stability. I urge you and your colleagues to support the substitute resolution sponsored by Congressmen Broomfield, Carney, and Stratton.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Aug. 2, 1982, p. 957.

[2] For text, see H.J. Res. 521, *post,* Aug. 5.

[3] *Ante,* July 19.

[4] The agreement is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

Message From President Reagan to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 1981, July 26, 1982 [1]

I am pleased to transmit to you the 1981 Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [2] I believe that this report, the first submitted by my Administration and the 21st submitted since the creation of the Agency, marks a real coming of age and maturity in our approach to arms control and disarmament.

In 1981, we began the first in a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) talks, begun by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze's team in November, are a model for future negotiations with the Soviet Union.

It is our intention to deal with the most potentially destructive and politically destabilizing weapons first. In the INF talks, begun in Geneva, we are seeking to have the Soviet Union dismantle its intermediate-range nuclear weapons in exchange for our pledge not to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles as requested by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in December 1979. [3]

Subsequently, in the period to be included in next year's annual report, we have undertaken major new initiatives in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), and in seeking reductions in conventional arsenals in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). These and other important arms control initiatives of my Administration are reviewed in my address of June 17, 1982, to the United Nations' Special Session on Disarmament, [4] provided for your further information in an annex to the attached annual report.

Rather than seeking upper limits in arms control treaties, we seek to bring about real arms control through negotiated reductions. We are dedicated to reducing the threat of nuclear war by gradually reducing nuclear arsenals so that only those weapons which can reasonably guarantee mutual deterrence remain.

I am firmly convinced that the road we are following is both rational and realistic. We have analyzed the Soviet approach to military strategy and the threat posed by Soviet forces. We have concluded that arms control must play a vital role in the conduct of our foreign policy and as a complement to our policy of deterrence.

We are committed to deterrence. We shall stand by our Allies and friends, and we shall consult with them regularly as we go about the business of reestablishing our conventional and nuclear deterrent forces. Deterrence has worked in Europe for more than 35 years.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Aug. 2, 1982, p. 959.

[2] *U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1981 Annual Report: Message From the President of the United States* (Jt. Com. prt.; 97th Cong., 2d sess.).

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

[4] *Ante.*

As you read through this 1981 Annual Report, I hope you will find, as I did, that the measured and considered approach to arms control, made possible by an exhaustive review and analysis, has, for the first time, resulted in a well considered program to reverse the trends of the past and bring about lasting peace.

We intend to pursue arms control and disarmament through agreements that are understandable, verifiable, and equitable. I am certain that I shall be able to call your attention to similar progress in future annual reports.

Statement by the Department of State: Supply of Nuclear Fuel to India, July 29, 1982[5]

In the context of Prime Minister Gandhi's visit this week the Governments of India and the United States have significantly enhanced the friendly relations between the two countries by agreeing to resolve the matter of supply of low enriched uranium to India's Tarapur atomic power station.

The two governments, after consulting with the Government of France, have reached a solution which envisages the use of French-supplied low enriched uranium at Tarapur while keeping the 1963 agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation[6] in effect in all other respects, including provision for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency][7] safeguards. This solution will serve non-proliferation interests and meet India's need for nuclear fuel for the Tarapur station.

An exchange of notes formalizing this solution will take place during the forthcoming visit to the United States of Dr. H. N. Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India.

Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Test Ban Treaties, July 29, 1982[1]

We are here, of course, in response to your call, to help clarify the confusion caused by regrettable and most misleading stories in the media during the last week or so about our nuclear testing policy. I am sorry that the regular and agreeable rhythm of our consultations has been disrupted by this episode. But I am philosophical about leaks, following the wise counsel of John Quincy Adams, one of the greatest of our Secretaries of State, who wrote to his friend William Van Murray on July 7, 1798, in these terms:

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[5] *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1982, p. 58.

[6] 14 UST 1484; TIAS 5446.

[7] Bracket in source text.

[1] ACDA Arms Control Bulletin.

> The circumstances which you mention proving that your private letters in cypher to the Secretary of State cannot escape the inspection of persons (not) entitled to them, is provoking. Our Government (I'm ashamed to say it, but it is a lamentable truth) our Government has in fact no more retention than a sieve. Everything leaks out, either through treachery or ungovernable curiosity or misplaced confidence. There is not the least safety for a man to tell them anything that he is not willing to have proclaimed upon the house tops. I have complained again and again upon the subject, but to no purpose. I now give up the point, and take it for granted that secrecy is not understood to be a property of good Government with us, and mean to act accordingly.[2]

Thus it has been, is, and I suppose always will be. And there is no use getting too worked up about it.

However, the results of the leak in this instance make life somewhat more difficult than it usually is.

Let me start by saying that most of the stories in the media stand our policy on its head. The President has not changed our position with respect to the Comprehensive Test Ban. It remains what it was last October when I said, before the First Committee of the General Assembly:

> Halting nuclear tests has been an issue before this Committee, (that is the First Committee) the CD, and its predecessors for many years. High hopes have been attached to the proposal, and no one can question the goal it is designed eventually to achieve. Of course, the United States Government supports that long term goal. But a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. We shall cooperate fully in appropriate procedures to examine the problems the proposal presents. However, international conditions have not been propitious and are not now propitious for immediate action on this worthy project.
>
> As we consider the question of a nuclear test ban, we should keep in mind that in order for such a ban ultimately to be effective, it must be verifiable. And must be concluded under conditions which ensure that it would enhance rather than diminish international security and stability.[3]

I expounded that policy again before the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on February 9, 1982.[4] We are now cooperating fully in the program of a working group of that Committee, exploring the problems of a possible comprehensive test ban, and especially those of verifying compliance with its terms.

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[2] Ford, Worthington Chauncey, ed. *The Writings of John Quincy Adams.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913, vol. II, p. 335.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 482–491.

[4] *Ante.*

The notion of a Comprehensive Test Ban has been a long-term goal of United States foreign policy since the Eisenhower Administration and, in fact, if you count the Baruch Plan [5] which would have had an even more drastic effect on nuclear weapons or on nuclear technology, it goes back to the Truman Administration. This Administration supports its essential idea. But some of the problems concerning a CTB which existed then still exist today.

It was President Eisenhower who decided to pursue the CTB in 1957. In 1958, an experts group met in Geneva and the initial results were, to quote Glenn Seaborg, "euphoric." Let me quote from his recent book:

> "Little attention was paid," Glenn Seaborg writes, "to these weaknesses in the generally euphoric reaction to the results of the conference. . . . A very strong impression had been created that speedy agreement on a controlled test ban was within easy reach. The future was to tell another story." [6]

The problem was that after the Geneva conference, experts in laboratories and elsewhere started to study seriously the verification and possible compliance issues and realized that a CTB would be extremely difficult to verify. Moreover, as the bleak winds of the Cold War dispelled the glow of the Camp David meetings, it became apparent that there was more to ending the risk of nuclear war than the grand gesture of a test ban. That is why the Kennedy Administration lowered its sights and chose instead to negotiate the Limited Test Ban Treaty, LTBT, [7] and why the Nixon and Ford Administrations chose to pursue the TTBT and PNE treaties.

With regard to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 [8] and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Uses of 1976, [9] our policy has changed. We have taken a long and positive step in the direction which you, Mr. Chairman, and several of your colleagues have urged so persuasively. Following our last colloquy on the subject two or three months ago it proved possible to achieve general agreement within the Government on the proposition which has been so misleadingly reported in the media. Considering the various proposals put before it, the Administration has decided to go forward with ratification of the present treaties if and when we achieve a satisfactory agreement with the Soviet Union improving their verification arrangements. We are not proposing to renegotiate the treaties, or to engage in a prolonged exercise in diplomatic ballet, but to seek practical progress towards this end in a low key way.

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[5] For the Baruch Plan, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 7–16.

[6] Seaborg, Glenn T., *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif.; University of California Press, 1981, p. 13.

[7] The Limited Test Ban Treaty text may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[8] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[9] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

As I said here as early as my confirmation hearings a year ago, I have been committed to recommending ratification of these treaties as soon as we achieve satisfactory verification arrangements. [10] As you have pointed out a number of times, Mr. Chairman, verification with a high range of possible error cannot be considered satisfactory. Now the President has approved this position. I know you are pleased.

The question of nuclear testing verification has been under study for many months. I do not anticipate it will take long now for us to decide on the verification proposals we will make to the Soviet Union. Of course we had not anticipated discussing this subject with you until we had come further down the road. But that view of the scenario was changed by the leak to the press.

Under the terms of the TTBT and PNET texts as they currently stand, we are unable to conclude with certainty that the Soviets are or are not observing the 150 KT testing limit, as the CIA witnesses have just explained to you. Indeed, we have real concerns about a number of tests conducted by the Soviets since the TTBT and PNET agreements were signed. We are considering a number of ways to improve the verification provisions of the two treaties so that we can significantly reduce this margin of uncertainty.

Moreover, the climate of opinion on verification has changed greatly during the last year or so, in response both to growing doubts about Soviet compliance with arms control treaties and to recent more positive Soviet statements on the matter, no doubt in response to Western concerns on the subject. Last August, we told the Soviet Union that NTM would have to be supplemented, as necessary, in the negotiations then ahead of us by cooperation between the two nations. Mr. Brezhnev responded publicly in November, in his interview in *Der Spiegel*, accepting this in principle. [11] Since then Mr. Brezhnev's statement has been confirmed diplomatically, and we have also had Mr. Gromyko's recent announcement in the UN SSOD II, suggesting on-site inspections as a mode of verification, [12] and the evolution of the MBFR talks.

When we have developed a specific set of proposals, and the President has approved them, we shall promptly initiate discussions with the Soviets. In these discussions we will suggest incorporating improved verification procedures into the protocols of both treaties. If we are successful, I anticipate that the Administration will recommend to this Committee and to the Senate that both the TTBT and the PNET be ratified. For the time being, we intend to continue to observe the 150 KT testing limit set out in both of these agreements if the Soviets exercise similar restraint.

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[10] *Nomination of Eugene V. Rostow: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, First Session*, . . . p. 31.

[11] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 524–535.

[12] *Ante*, June 16.

Statement by the ACDA General Counsel (Richstein) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Legality of Unilateral Arms Restraint [Extract], July 30, 1982 [1]

* * * * * * *

The letter of invitation to appear before you expresses the concern of the subcommittee that the "proposed resolution seeks to circumvent the treatymaking process by providing de facto ratification of the SALT agreements [2] through an instrument requiring only a simple majority in the Senate and improperly involving the House of Representatives."

A careful reading of Senate Joint Resolution 212, together with the accompanying report (S. Rept. No. 97–493), [3] indicates that the intent of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was to give the "full force and effect of law" to President Reagan's policy of interim restraint provided the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. The President's statement, as quoted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, declared—and I would like to say I am quoting from the Senate report and I fully agree with what has been said here today about what the President actually said.

But quoting from the Foreign Relations Committee report, it declared:

> As for existing SALT agreements, we will refrain from activities which undercut them as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.

Senate Joint Resolution 212, if enacted, thus would give the effect of law to a unilateral statement of policy. It would, however, although requiring compliance by the President, confer no rights upon the U.S.S.R. to demand enforcement. For this reason, it would not be equivalent to ratification of SALT II. Further, it would create no binding international obligation to extend the SALT I interim agreement.

Nevertheless, the effect that the proposed resolution would have on the authority and responsibility of the President for the negotiation of strategic arms control agreements needs careful consideration. Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." It is clear from both the language of the Constitution and the practice that has developed under it that it is the President who is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and negotiates the treaties which are sent to the Senate for advice and consent. By giving legally binding effect to the President's announced policy of interim restraint, the proposed resolution would affect the President's ability to negotiate strategic arms agreements in the START and INF talks currently underway in Geneva.

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[1] *Treaty Ratification Process and Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on S.J. Res. 212, a Joint Resolution With Respect to Nuclear Arms Reduction*, pp. 85–87.

[2] These agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff., and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[3] *Ante*, July 12.

As long as our commitment not to undercut SALT is a statement of national policy, and not legally binding, it will remain clear to the Soviets that we do not agree with them that parity exists between the strategic arms of each side. Once that policy becomes a law, however, our ability to negotiate the President's proposed strategic arms reductions proposal to correct the current strategic imbalance will be adversely affected. The proposed resolution would not allow the President to modify the existing policy even for considerations of supreme national interest. The resolution could thus inhibit the development and deployment of new weapons systems necessary to our national security in the event that these systems might be considered to undercut the SALT agreements. Furthermore, the language of the President's statement, while perfectly appropriate as a general statement of policy which can be developed and used in a flexible way over the course of time, is vague and possibly unworkable as a legal standard which must be strictly applied and interpreted under U.S. law. The proposed resolution would thus tie the President's hands in his attempt to carry out his responsibilities in vital areas of our foreign policy.

I am aware that the subcommittee is also considering questions that relate to whether the joint resolution presents separation of powers questions insofar as it allows the House of Representatives to become involved in matters relating to treaties. I note in this regard that there is a long-established practice by which a majority of both Houses may consent to executive agreements. Indeed, in 1844 the State of Texas was admitted to the Union and in 1898 the territory of Hawaii was annexed by the United States, not pursuant to a two-thirds vote of the Senate, but through joint resolutions with the approval of the President. A more immediate example is that of the SALT I interim agreement, which was presented to the Congress as an executive agreement and was approved by joint resolution after a majority vote of both Houses.

Finally, on section 33, in its letter, the subcommittee also expressed its concern whether Congress has the authority under section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 to lay aside SALT II and revive SALT I. Section 33 of the act prohibits any action that:

> * * * under this or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless

> authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.[4]

The language and legislative history of the act make clear that section 33 is confined to legally binding arms control arrangements effected by international agreements entered into pursuant to the act or other law. This section was designed to preserve, and not to alter, the respective constitutional authority and prerogatives of the two branches with respect to international arms control obligations. Indeed, it could hardly have been otherwise. Congress, after all, has no power to modify the Constitution. Accordingly, since approval of the SALT agreements has not been requested by President Reagan, the joint resolution cannot be used to require the President to accept an international agreement that he does not seek. Since a joint resolution cannot become law without the President's signature in any event, nothing Congress can do could even superficially threaten the President's inherent authority in the field of foreign affairs. The Senate, equally, can preserve its prerogatives by the simple expedient of refusing to vote for Senate Joint Resolution 212.

In summary, although I do not, as I have indicated in my discussion, necessarily agree with certain of the specific concerns raised in your letter, I share the subcommittee's general concern about the effects of the proposed resolution.

Department of State Report: Conventional Arms Transfers in the Third World, 1972–1981 [Extract], August 1982[1]

Sales and deliveries of major conventional arms—tanks, warplanes, artillery, and naval ships—to the developing nations have led to rising arms inventories and growing military capabilities in the Third World. Some of these have been stabilizing, some destabilizing; some in the U.S. national interest, and some not. Many nations, large and small, engage in the transfer of arms as part of their foreign policies, but the U.S.S.R., the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, West Germany, and the East European Communist nations are by far the most significant suppliers.

The United States, however, is not, by any reasonable measure, the leading supplier of weaponry to the Third World that many people believe it is. If they illustrate anything, trends in the Third World arms trade illustrate the degree of U.S. restraint. In the first half of the decade covered by this report, which included the last years of the Vietnam war, the United States delivered larger quantities than other exporting nations or groups of nations in 7 of the 12 categories of major conventional weapons used in this report. In the second half-decade, however, the United States did not lead in any category and in one category (missile-equipped patrol boats) during these years did not export anything at all. The Soviets, by contrast, led in four categories between 1972 and 1976 and in the last half-decade led in seven. Similarly, the major West European arms exporters as a group were first in only one category of arms between 1972 and 1976 but between 1977 and 1981 led in five categories.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1961,* p. 487.

[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 102, pp. 2–3.

We ourselves are partly to blame for the misconceptions that abound on this subject. First of all, nowhere else in the world are arms transfers the subject of so much governmental disclosure, of such intensive legislative scrutiny, or so extensive a public debate. This is as it should be, because we are a free society and because decisions to supply or not to supply weapons to states not firmly linked to us by shared history, values, and security alliances must be made only after the most serious deliberation. Secondly, our reports of "military sales" include a large proportion of transactions having little directly to do with the transfer of arms. For example, military sales, as normally reported, include construction (sometimes of hospitals), training, and various management services, along with weapons systems and their spare parts and support equipment. But one result of this way of doing business, as contrasted with that of other nations, is the impression of the United States as the Third World's leading armorer. That impression, as the following report makes clear, is significantly off the mark.

We recognize arms transfers as a legitimate and sometimes necessary instrument of foreign and national security policy. To suggest, however, that the U.S. Government in this or in past Administrations has sought indiscriminately to press arms upon Third World nations is not supported by the facts. Other nations do not disclose the nature and levels of their foreign military sales or assistance to the same extent. Our knowledge of their activities, particularly those of the Communist states, is not complete. The data on their arms transfers contained in this report must, therefore, be regarded as the best minimum, but nonetheless reliable, estimate we can make.

Few activities are as difficult to measure as arms transfers. Data are incomplete, and estimates in monetary terms, the most commonly used measure, are fraught with many problems. These difficulties include the large differences in the composition of arms sales and security assistance programs from one arms-exporting nation to another, down to such technical problems as accurate foreign exchange conversion and varying prices charged in different situations for any given foreign weapons system, particularly the more expensive ones.

For these reasons, the following report presents arms transfer data primarily in terms of the numbers of major conventional weapons systems delivered to the Third World over the decade 1972–81. Because they are concrete, these data are less subject to analytic misinterpretation and technical problems than dollar estimates. Further, it is more difficult for any arms supplier to conceal, for example, the delivery of a squadron of interceptor aircraft than it is to hide the existence, substance, and value of an arms agreement. Our data base from this perspective, while still not all encompassing, is more nearly complete. And the numbers involved in this mode of estimating are more tangible and thus more easily understood.

The following report makes clear that, while dollar estimates of arms transfer agreements have in fact been rising, constant dollar estimates have been more nearly level over the past decade, though both have fluctuated widely from year to year (Figure 1). Actual deliveries of the major conventional weapons systems covered in this report show the absence of any significant upward trend (Figure 2), although many of the newer systems are significantly more effective—as are the defenses against them.

FIGURE 1
Dollar Value of Arms Agreements



FIGURE 2
Total Arms Deliveries



The data demonstrate that far from the popular image of upwardly spiraling conventional arms trade, that trade, at least as measured by the number of weapons actually delivered, is at best erratic but reasonably level over any significant period of time. They do not, however, take into account reductions in Third World arms inventories caused by war losses, obsolescence, or simple inability to maintain and repair increasingly complex and expensive equipment. Data in numbers of weapons cannot, of course, take account of increases in the sophistication, military effectiveness, and cost burden of modern weapons. Thus, the rising cost of modern military equipment may well serve to restrain aggregate transfers to the poorer countries if not actually to reduce them.

Figure 3, summarizing the categories of major weapons delivered to the Third World over the past decade from all sources, bears this out. Naval vessels and ground force weapons deliveries were nearly level over the decade (though again varying widely from year to year), and military aircraft show a slight downward trend.

FIGURE 3

Ground Weapons, Naval Vessels, and Military Aircraft Delivered



Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate quite clearly the second major conclusion we draw from these data: The United States is not, by and large, the leading source of major items of military equipment to the Third World. Figure 4 shows U.S. transfers of military aircraft and helicopters, for example, clearly declining from a Vietnam war peak at the beginning of the decade. By contrast, Soviet and other European Communist aircraft transfers rose rather steadily over the same period to levels roughly three to four times those of the United States in recent years. West European and other suppliers constitute another very substantial source of military aircraft during this entire period, delivering more than twice the U.S. levels of recent years.

Figure 5, showing deliveries of major items of ground force equipment, also underscores the wide margin by which Soviet deliveries in this area have exceeded those by the United States over much of the decade. It is further evident that these transfers varied widely from year to year and that here also, there is no clear upward or downward trend.

Figure 4 combines Soviet and other European Communist transfers, which is an appropriate basis for comparison given the responsiveness of Warsaw Pact actions to Soviet policy direction. Figure 5, by contrast, counts Warsaw Pact transfers in the "Other" category, yet even then, Soviet deliveries alone significantly exceed those of the United States.

FIGURE 4
Military Aircraft Delivered



FIGURE 5
Major Ground Weapons Delivered[1]



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[1] Tanks, self-propelled guns, light armor, and artillery.

[2] Includes European Communist countries excluding U.S.S.R.

Finally, Figure 6 demonstrates the substantial degree to which Soviet and Soviet plus other European Communist deliveries of the tanks and self-propelled guns have exceeded those of the United States.

This report makes clear that several popular misconceptions about the U.S. role in arms transfers to the Third World are not based on fact. And it will thus provide a more accurate footing for future debates over U.S. policy. It does not, however, help us determine the wisdom of particular arms transfers. Those decisions can only come from the informed public and congressional consideration of Administration proposals that is uniquely possible in the United States. To insure that that consideration is as well-informed as possible, the Congress has been and will continue to be provided more detailed classified reports on conventional arms transfers to the Third World as required by the Arms Export Control Act. [2]

FIGURE 6
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns Delivered



This report is intended to be the first of a regular series, making public as much of such data as is possible. It, as well as the classified reports presented to the Congress, presents conclusions and data which are fully shared by all relevant agencies of the U.S. Government.

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[2] Extracts of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 386–430.

Letter From President Reagan to the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (Price): Proposed Resolutions on a Freeze of Nuclear Weapons, August 3, 1982 [1]

I want to commend you for your leadership during the recent House of Representatives consideration of the Department of Defense authorization bill. I greatly appreciate your efforts to restore and maintain this Nation's defense capabilities.

It is imperative that we maintain a position of unity and strength during the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) currently under way with the Soviet Union. House action on the Defense authorization bill reflected strong bipartisan commitment to our national security efforts, and I am sure that commitment will guide your efforts in the House-Senate conference.

I have previously written you expressing my concern that the House Foreign Affairs Committee "nuclear freeze" resolution [2] will undermine our negotiating position with the Soviets during the START talks, by placing the United States in a dangerous position of disadvantage and removing the incentive for serious negotiation by the Soviets. I hope you will urge your colleagues to reject this proposal and pass instead the Broomfield–Carney–Stratton resolution, [3] which will show the Soviet Union that the Congress supports our effort to accomplish meaningful arms reductions.

Thank you again for your continuing support of our national defense.

Congressional Conference Report: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983 [Extract], August 3, 1982 [4]

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The Senate bill authorized appropriations of $18,268,000 for fiscal year 1982 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1983 for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It also permitted the Agency to accept the results of security investigations conducted by the Departments of State and Defense in the case of persons detailed from other Government agencies. In addition, section 404 authorized the Agency to conduct research, development, and other studies with regard to antisatellite activities.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Aug. 9, 1982, pp. 998–999.

[2] For text, see "Proposed House Joint Resolution 521" of Aug. 5, *post.*

[3] For text of the Broomfield–Carney–Stratton resolution, see H.J. Res. 521, *post,* Aug. 5.

[4] *Authorizing Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983 for the Department of State, the United States Information Agency and the Board of International Broadcasting (H. Rept. 97–693; 97th Cong., 2d sess.),* pp. 50–51. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the authorization is printed *ante,* May 26; the House Foreign Affairs Committee report may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 184–195. The final act is printed *post,* Oct. 15.

The House amendment contained no comparable provision. However, the House passed H.R. 3467, the Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1981, on June 8, 1981. This bill authorizes $18,268,000, and such additional amounts as may be necessary for increases in employee benefits and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates, for fiscal year 1982, and $19,893,852 for fiscal year 1983. This bill also contains provisions for use of security clearances of the Departments of State and Defense when applied to persons detailed to the Agency. H.R. 3467 also changes the Agency's name to read "United States Arms Control Agency."

The conference substitute contains no provision on these issues. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported the House bill, as amended, to the full Senate.

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Statement by the ACDA Nuclear Safeguards Division Chief (Menzel) Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Science and Technology: ACDA External Research for International Nuclear Safeguards, August 3, 1982 [1]

It is an honor for me to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss the external research program for international safeguards, funded and implemented by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In my oral presentation I shall address in abbreviated form the scope, effectiveness, and cost of our research program; the mechanisms to coordinate our program with those of other U.S. agencies, other countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency; and, last, our plans for next year. With your permission, I shall provide for the record detailed information on individual projects and expenditures.

Mrs. Bouquard. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record, Dr. Menzel.

Dr. Menzel. Thank you. ACDA's external research program for international safeguards, initiated in 1968, is specifically designed to provide relevant information on international safeguards to U.S. policymakers, to explore innovative safeguards approaches for potential use by the IAEA, and to support the U.S. effort in strengthening IAEA safeguards. The program is characterized by exploring the feasibility of new concepts and new technology, often with the close cooperation of one or more foreign governments and/or the IAEA.

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[1] *Technical Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation: Safeguards: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session,* Aug. 3 and 4, 1982, pp. 51–54.

Our current research program for international safeguards is planned for $836,000 or 41 percent of ACDA's total external research budget. The allocation of safeguards from our total research funds has remained fairly constant over the last 6 years, when one takes into consideration the safeguards programs of other U.S. agencies and the fact that fluctuations do result from variations in the start of specific projects. An overview of the relevant data for the period of fiscal year 1976 through fiscal year 1982 is included in table 1 of the written statement.

The scope of our safeguards research program is broad. Individual projects of the program fall within four major project areas, namely: fuel cycles and facilities; systems development; instruments and methods; and remote verification. An overview of the project area allocations for fiscal year 1976 to fiscal year 1982 is shown in table 2 of the written statement. The individual project titles and amounts for fiscal year 1982 are listed in table 3.

Within the broad scope of the program, the nature of individual projects is diverse. It ranges from development of fiber-optic seals to the design of features for heavy water production plants to facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards; from providing experts on a regular basis to the IAEA to assist in safeguards system development to the demonstration of instant-film, remote-diagnostic surveillance systems; from studying the feasibility of remote verification techniques to documenting the detailed negotiating history of IAEA safeguards documents. To illustrate this point, table 4 of the written statement provides the individual project titles for fiscal year 1968 through fiscal year 1975, and those for fiscal year 1976 through fiscal year 1981 are listed in table 5.

ACDA's safeguards research program is carried out by a cadre of physical science officers dedicated to IAEA safeguards matters and thoroughly versed in nuclear technology and international safeguards. These professionals keep abreast of the latest developments in safeguards concepts and technology in the United States and abroad, and they assure proper coordination of our program with that of other U.S. agencies and the IAEA. This is accomplished through daily interaction with cognizant U.S. agencies and with individuals in the international safeguards community; through formal U.S. interagency groups which meet on a regular basis and were already mentioned by others; through participation in meetings of professional societies and in various IAEA-sponsored technical groups and symposia; and through the framework of bilateral consultations with other governments. The frequent interaction of our staff with the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA continues to serve as the focal point of our work.

We believe our safeguards research program to be effective. Naturally, as in any research program oriented toward innovative concepts and the use of new technologies, it is not always possible to predict the degree of utility or the impact of a particular product. Sometimes it does take years for a new idea to bear fruit. ACDA's pioneering work in fiber-optic seals provided the basis for recent R&D efforts sponsored by others. Our work on isotopic correlation techniques for use at reprocessing plants has resulted in techniques now in use at the IAEA, and the related resin bead method for sample analysis is expected to be in use shortly. Also, the R&D on spent fuel bundle counters and on doorway monitors provided the experience necessary for today's systems being developed for the IAEA through several support programs. Finally, in our research on remote verification techniques, known by the acronyms RECOVER and TRANSEAVER, we are using current technology in international communications to open new vistas in cooperative verification for safeguards, physical security, and possibly additional arms control agreements in nonnuclear areas.

One example of the impact of our program is a series of contracts with Battelle Memorial Institute, through which ACDA has provided, since 1973, support to the IAEA in the area of systems analysis. Specifically, this effort has concentrated on certain key elements of IAEA safeguards, namely inspection planning and the evaluation of inspection activity and results. The statistical manuals and the computational procedures developed have been particularly well accepted because they are theoretically sound and at the same time recognize the practical needs of the inspector and the analyst. The output of this effort has also included formal documents such as the Safeguards Technical Manual, informally reported statistical methods and computer programs now in routine use by the IAEA, and direct assistance to the Safeguards Evaluation Section in establishing evaluation procedures for the effectiveness of inspection and verification activity.

Another example of the utility and the anticipatory nature of our research program is the series of four projects started late in fiscal year 1977 on safeguards implementation at heavy water production plants. The work proved to be particularly relevant and timely, since in October of 1981 an agreement entered into force between Argentina and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in relation to the heavy water production plant supplied by Switzerland.

Finally, the scope and effectiveness of our program in providing current information for the U.S. interagency community is illustrated by a study we initiated last year. With the entry into force in December 1980 of the U.S./IAEA safeguards agreement [2] and the initiation of IAEA safeguards in selected U.S. facilities, the opportunity arose for the United States to gain firsthand experience in safeguards implementation. One of the facilities selected by the IAEA for safeguards is the low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication plant of the Exxon Nuclear Co. in Richland, Wash. In order to insure the availability to the U.S. Government of factual information on how safeguards are actually being implemented, ACDA contracted with Exxon to document in detail the IAEA safeguards inspection activities being carried out at the Exxon plant. The reports from this contract, which is still underway, are made available to other U.S. agencies concerned with safeguards.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 738–775.

Let me now turn to a project area for which ACDA has entered into a formal research agreement with the IAEA, and for which ACDA has expended a considerable fraction of its research resources for the last 4 years; namely, remote continual verification, or RECOVER for short. With the advances in communications technology and with the increased demands being placed upon the IAEA safeguards system, we feel that remote verification could play a substantial role in a range of safeguards situations as an adjunct to site verification.

The objective of the RECOVER program is the improvement of international safeguards through the remote monitoring of safeguards sensors and the secure transmission of safeguards data to central or local IAEA offices. For additional details on RECOVER, I want to mention that Mr. John Walsh wrote a very informative article in the July issue of Science, and that the General Accounting Office has underway an extensive review.

Very briefly I also want to mention the TRANSEAVER project, which combines RECOVER-type components with satellite and communications and navigational equipment, with penetration-resistant shipping containers, and with remotely monitorable sensors to provide continual monitoring of the location and integrity of nuclear material containers at sea.

Finally, for next year, fiscal year 1983, ACDA's budget submission to Congress includes $5,952,000 for external research. However, $4,800,000 of this amount are connected with the possibility of funding the program on reduced enrichment for research and test reactors in the budget of ACDA instead of DOE. This leaves $1,152,000 for the continuing research program in fiscal year 1983, with $310,000 of that allocated for safeguards. Although this is substantially less than the amount for fiscal year 1982, it is anticipated that the slow start in the current fiscal year and the consequent initiation of many of the projects just prior to fiscal year 1983 will permit us to bridge the gap until early fiscal year 1984. These factors enter into planning for ACDA's fiscal year 1984 budget, which is currently in preparation.

I do hope that my testimony today has served to provide information of interest to the subcommittee. I am, of course, ready to answer your questions and, as you may wish, provide additional written material for the record.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Committee on Disarmament, August 3, 1982 [1]

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We have come together again—we, the club of 40 nations—committed, through the votes of our countries over the years in the United Nations General Assembly, to carry out successful multilateral disarmament negotiations. Have we come together more happy, more satisfied with the state of things than when we adjourned at the end of April?

Between that date and today lies the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Anyone pledged to the cause of disarmament would, I believe, be prepared to agree with my judgement, that we are not more happy than three months ago. The remaining impression today is that those Governments which are genuinely committed to disarmament, as *the* cause of this generation of mankind—and the Swedish Government belongs to those—will have, following the five weeks in New York, to redouble their efforts, with the aim of achieving a decisive breakthrough in the fairly immediate future in disarmament talks. Otherwise the end result will only be one. And let us admit that difficulties exist, obstacles exist, even adversaries of disarmament exist to make results infinitely hard to achieve. We experienced all of it during the five memorable weeks that we spent at the second special session in June and July. What should our judgement be on the events that have passed since the Committee adjourned in late April?

The weeks in New York were weeks of agony and anguish. And at the end, on Saturday, 10 July, we listened to an impressive list of speakers wishing to give their final views on why so much went wrong during these weeks.

There is indeed very much to be said in negative terms about the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. But I do feel it of importance to emphasize that most of what happened and what did not happen could have been foreseen in advance. Let us remember that the first special session, four years ago, needed six weeks of work, under severe strain and almost to the point of collapse, to achieve the ultimate adoption of a Final Document that has, with full justification, been called of historic importance. [2] This happened at a time when international relations, and relations between the two Superpowers in particular, were infinitely better than now. The second special session was faced with the task of managing, in a period of five weeks, to deal successfully with two main issues, of such magnitude and containing such controversial elements, debated and negotiated over for years, that an unbelievable amount of trust, confidence and goodwill would have been required to cope with it. We all know that under prevailing circumstances this was simply not so. The task before the second special session was comparable to a request by the United Nations that the two Superpowers should change their basic strategic concepts overnight.

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[1] CD/PV.175, pp. 34–40.

[2] The Final Document is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411–439.

Thus, the necessary prerequisites for reaching beyond the 1978 Final Document simply did not exist. But, in my judgement, four things were achieved at the second special session.

First, the session did adopt, by consensus, a concluding document, containing as its final part 10 paragraphs of political conclusions.[3]

Secondly, it adopted guidelines for the World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched at the opening meeting of the session.[4]

Thirdly, it acted as a catalyst for one of the most impressive manifestations of free popular movements ever witnessed, not only in New York but wherever opinion can be freely expressed.

Fourthly, it assured the continuous consideration of the items on its agenda by transmitting them to the forthcoming regular General Assembly session and, if necessary, to subsequent sessions. No proposals are finally killed.

Let me say a few more words on some of these achievements.

The concluding document is not a bad document. On the contrary it is, under the circumstances, a very good one. It states the history of the past four years in clear political terms. It contains, furthermore, a number of political statements adopted by consensus on issues which up to the very last moment were heavily contended by the major military Powers. What is even more important, considering indications that some of these Powers were wavering in their dedication to the 1978 Final Document, is the unequivocal and unanimous reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of this document, as well as their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations established in its Programme of Action.

Most unfortunately, I shall have to return, in very sad terms, to this particular point in a few minutes. This is due to something which became abundantly clear during the five weeks of the second special session but which indeed is not a new phenomenon. I shall dwell briefly on this matter as it is, beyond doubt, the main reason behind our failures so far in multilateral disarmament negotiations. As anyone could guess, what I am aiming at is the attitude of the Superpowers towards these negotiations, the Powers which have, through their policies of negligence and obstruction, blocked progress for years, the Powers which prefer secret bilateral talks behind closed doors, denying this multilateral body the right and the possibility to negotiate the highest priority items on its agenda, the Powers which disregard politically, although not legally, binding United Nations resolutions, on which they themselves have voted in favour, the Powers which through their behaviour display their arrogance towards the world around them.

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[3] *Ante*, July 9.

[4] *Ante*, July 9.

What has happened—and not happened—so far in the field of disarmament negotiations in the nuclear age is to me evidence of the lack of insight, and imagination, of these Powers. As a small piece of evidence, I shall quote one sentence from the letter which President Reagan sent to General Rowny, the Chairman of the United States delegation to the START talks which opened on 29 June here at Geneva:

> As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the USSR are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace.[5]

I want to say in all sincerity that, judging those Powers by their performance so far, which is one of an accelerating nuclear arms race, the majority of the peoples of this earth entertain grave distrust in these self-appointed "trustees for humanity". We have the right to be equal partners, for two reasons:

1. The nuclear-weapon States have shown that they are unable to free themselves from a situation characterized by a morally and politically insoluble dilemma.

2. All States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, militarily aligned, neutral or non-aligned, share the common fate of a possible nuclear holocaust.

Against the background of what we have witnessed over the years and, most recently, at the second special session, of obstructionist Superpower policies, I could not believe my ears when I heard the United States delegate on the last day of the session say:

> The United States is proud of its record in disarmament.[6]

Nor could I but disagree with the USSR Ambassador to the United Nations when, on the same occasion, he spoke of the constructive approach of the delegations of the socialist countries and further stated that their positions accord with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the States and peoples of the world.[7] It is, of course, deeds, and not words, that count when the performances of the Superpowers are assessed. And the deeds of the USSR speak against the words of the USSR at the United Nations.

One glaring example of the intransigence of the Superpowers, in this particular case especially of the United States, assisted by the United Kingdom, is of course the behaviour before, during and after the second special session, regarding the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, justly considered the key issue of nuclear disarmament and thus the highest priority item on our agenda. This key issue has, as we all know, a tragic history. So far, all efforts to get genuine negotiations started have been in vain. At the second special session also, the resistance continued, blocking attempts to have texts adopted which were watered down to a bare minimum. Disparaging remarks made on that occasion about the usefulness of a CTBT on the part of the resistant States might make us wonder about the seriousness of their recent agreement to initiate CTB discussions in a working group of this Committee.

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[5] *Ante.*
[6] A/S-12/PV.28, p. 58.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

It will, of course, again be recalled that, at the second special session, even these States joined the consensus decision to adopt the concluding document which, in its paragraph 62, states the following:

> The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action.

However, two weeks ago, 10 days after their support of this consensus document at the United Nations, the Reagan Administration decided, 19 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, not to resume the trilateral CTB negotiations. This is grave news. Not that we particularly need the tripartite talks, which were, anyhow, only preparatory to multilateral negotiations in this body on our highest priority item. But the sense of the United States decision seems to be to postpone into the distant future any serious consideration of a CTBT.

Perhaps we should not be surprised, as we were given advance notice, for example in the memorable speech on 9 February by Dr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in this very chamber. He then stated that the *ultimate* desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, and that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". But he went on to say something more stunning, and I quote him again:

> Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. [8]

How can the lumping together of the CTB and "the broad range of nuclear issues" be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of the United States to a CTBT, in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, [9] where parties pledged to seek the achievement of the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", a pledge which was confirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968? [10]

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[8] *Ante.*

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963,* pp. 291–293.

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, that were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs. From its recent action, however, must we draw the conclusion that the United States does not *want* a CTBT, that through continuing nuclear testing it aims at continuing the murderous nuclear arms race? But is the United States now prepared to face a situation where it will be accused of violation of legally binding international commitments freely entered into? When these commitments were made in 1963, through the ratification of the partial test-ban Treaty by a Senate vote of 80 to 19, the late Senate Republican leader Everett M. Dirksen said:

> I should not like to have written on my tombstone: "He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step." [11]

The next step seems to be in the distant future. What will be written on the tombstones of those responsible for this deplorable fact?

Of course, there are also practical political considerations to be made by the United States, relating to its glaring refusal to accept full scope multilateral negotiations on a CTBT. This Superpower should be aware of the rapidly mounting, and fierce, opposition among non-nuclear-weapon States against the obstruction by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. What will happen at the third NPT Review Conference in 1985, three years from now, if by that time we do not have a multilaterally negotiated CTBT? Will the United States take the risk of the collapse of the NPT, the only barrier, however deficient, that the international community possesses against horizontal nuclear-weapon proliferation?

No, we should not have been surprised at President Reagan's decision two weeks ago. We had been given early warnings. But we are deeply sorry and shocked that it was taken *after* the second special session, *after* the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session. However, following this new act of disdainful disregard of consensus decisions at the United Nations, the United States is providing cheap ammunition to its main adversary. It does make action on the international stage unnecessarily easy for that Power.

Let me state emphatically, that, in accordance with Sweden's persistent policy, for us a CTBT retains its full importance both as a means to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a demonstration of the possible interest of the nuclear Powers to finally initiate an era of mutual nuclear restraint.

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[10] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[11] *Congressional Record*, vol. 109, pt. 12, p. 16791.

It also remains our view that the goal is, and must be, to achieve a complete test ban of unlimited duration. Although we support what must be called a moratorium in this context, i.e. a test ban of limited duration, we consider it only an instrument to promote the negotiation of a permanent CTBT under strict international verification. In this context, let me stress that Sweden does not believe in internationalizing a Threshold Test-Ban Treaty [12] of the kind concluded in 1974 but not yet ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a Treaty could not restrain a feared horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms and is of little concern to developed nuclear Powers which could legitimize—probably for a long time—their intense continued development of nuclear weapons within the generous threshold allowed. It would amount to another smokescreen for unlimited testing. I say this with some emphasis as I understand the latest move of President Reagan to be to look for changes in that Treaty in order to further strengthen protection against violation of its limits. This would only serve the purpose of showing some zeal in the search for some measures of arms control while in reality there would be none.

The Working Group now established should be utilized to the full to investigate all relevant aspects of a CTBT. The Committee on Disarmament should bear in mind that the task of the seismic expert Group in important respects would assist and underpin the activities of the Working Group. In this context, let me also stress the desirability of allowing the expert Group to consider and report also on the most modern data acquisition and analysis methods available and of enlarging its possibilities for looking into further ways of verifying a test ban, such as through the detection and measurement of airborne radioactivity.

As the work of the CTBT Working Group unfolds, Sweden intends to reintroduce at an appropriate moment relevant parts of its 1977 draft CTB treaty text, [13] together with new parts which take into account developments since then and the comments made in the Working Group, so as to again provide the Committee with a complete and contemporary draft CTBT text.

The brevity of this session of the Committee on Disarmament will probably only allow for limited progress on the other high priority item of chemical weapons, on which a lot of useful work has been performed during the last two years. In so far as there was a need for new political signals, we have noted with considerable interest the outline of a draft convention presented to the General Assembly at its second special session by the Soviet Union. As it seems to contain or reflect a number of features discussed by this Committee, it would be our hope that it represents a genuine will to negotiate difficult issues and is not intended merely to politically counter certain dispositions in the chemical weapons field by the other Superpower. We are looking forward to discussing these questions in greater detail in the chemical weapons Working Group.

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[12] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974,* pp. 225–229.

[13] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 112–115.

The chemical weapons field appears to my delegation to be one area of negotiation where there is still hope for agreement, however complicated the substance. This opportunity must be used to the full by the Committee and its Working Group. Needless to say, it will take the active co-operation of the Superpowers not only in the Committee but also through a resumption of their bilateral negotiations. We for our part are prepared to make every effort to contribute to a solution of outstanding problems. We would not be opposed, *inter alia,* to continuing work beyond the scheduled working period of the Committee, if this appears desirable to achieve decisive progress.

This leads me on to a few words on the procedures and activities of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been reaffirmed as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Sweden does not believe that we should allow a discussion on this matter to develop into a great procedural debate, which would deprive the Committee of much of its precious negotiating time. On the other hand it would be futile to deny that certain improvements and changes could be brought about through informal consultations. At this point let me make the following brief comments.

We have some doubts about making this body a permanent around-the-year negotiating forum. Even the present work-load of the Committee strains the capacity of a developed and technically advanced country like my own. A further extension of working schedules and programmes would be likely to overextend smaller delegations and would only favour those large States or groups of States whose sincere disarmament interest there is sometimes reason to doubt.

But there is, as I said, room for improving the efficiency of our work. Thus, the use of plenary meetings for making repeated general statements could be questioned. Much stricter priorities should be set for the time allocated to working groups. Whereas it would seem highly advisable to provide additional meetings for the negotiations on chemical weapons and the CTBT and perhaps also for outer space, we should somewhat limit time allotted to some other working groups, not because the issues that they are dealing with are in themselves of secondary importance but because they are unlikely to yield results unless a change of wills and minds occurs. This could in due course be ascertained through informal consultations.

Let me also recall Sweden's firm view, which we share with many other members of the Group of 21, that the consensus rule of the Committee should not any longer be allowed to be misused in procedural matters, such as in blocking the setting up of working groups requested by a large majority of Committee members.

Much has been said and much will have to be said about the imperative need for a change of wills and minds, first and foremost in the leading military Powers. We have waited for that change a long time. Quite a number of us have recently gained new hope, not because of any signs of such a change, but because of the appearance of a new and, hopefully, significant political force, the sharply awakening public awareness of the tremendous risks that this and coming generations run, if we allow the leaders of the world to continue their present course. For a growing number of people, for a swiftly growing number of people, the issue has changed from being one of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival. It is a matter of rapidly increasing awareness of what a nuclear weapon actually *is*. For the first time since 1962, when Herman Kahn published his well-known book, people are thinking about the unthinkable. One of the reasons: they have suddenly understood that they will have to do so, because military and political leaders, by talking about "controlled nuclear counter-attacks", "protracted conflict periods", have made the unthinkable thinkable, i.e. by the logic of nuclear doctrines, nuclear weapons are becoming usable. And people understand that this trend will have to be stopped for the sake of survival.

The forceful and broadly based popular peace movements in West Europe and North America are what George Kennan recently called the most striking phenomena of the early 1980s, having already had an influence on events. They were very much present during the second special session, and their activities during these weeks were more impressive than anyone could have expected. No one who participated, as I did, in the 12 June orderly, peaceful and gay mass demonstration of 800,000 people for disarmament and peace, will ever forget what role individual concerned citizens are able to play, and will continue to play in the struggle for fairness, decency and peaceful relations among nations. What has, by some, been called the dismal failure of the second special session must never be allowed to overshadow the compelling need for all people of good will to form an international disarmament constituency, to join forces for the achievement of a safe and peaceful world and the betterment of human conditions everywhere.

To relieve mankind of present dangers of extinction is the task of this generation of men and women. A few weeks ago I listened to a moving testimony to this compelling task by a well-known American Roman Catholic priest, the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh. He said:

> I experienced something almost like a religious conversion. For thirty years I have been deeply engaged in trying to create a better world, in the face of extreme poverty in Asia, Africa and Latin America, working to alleviate world hunger, to oppose the denial of human rights at home and abroad, working against tropical diseases afflicting hundreds of millions of humans, against illiteracy and for education—and suddenly it dawned on me—if we do not eliminate the nuclear threat, all of these other

problems will be irrelevant, for there will be no more humans on earth to have problems.

When the same consciousness is awakened around the world, there will be no political leader, in any leading military Power, who can withstand it. Disarmament will be the idea whose time has come.

Statement by President Reagan to the House of Representatives: Arms Reduction Resolution, August 5, 1982 [14]

I congratulate the House of Representatives for today endorsing a resolution on arms control that signals to the Soviet Union the American people's determination to seek peace through arms control agreements that will effectively reduce the nuclear arsenals of both sides.[15] The United States arms reduction proposals are now a part of serious negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva. Today's vote provides strong support for our negotiators, led by Ambassador Edward Rowny and Ambassador Paul Nitze.

In particular, I salute the efforts of Congressmen Bill Broomfield, Bill Carney, and Sam Stratton in authoring the resolution that passed tonight and in gaining its passage. Our negotiators join me in expressing appreciation for the statesmanlike position taken by those who supported this resolution, and I ask all Members of Congress to join in our continued efforts to maintain the security of our country while seeking meaningful arms reductions.

Proposed House Joint Resolution 521: Freeze and Reduction of Nuclear Forces, August 5, 1982 [1]

Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union have not strengthened international peace and security but in fact enhance the prospect for mutual destruction;

Whereas on May 9, 1982, President Reagan announced that he had written to President Brezhnev to propose negotiations to achieve an agreement that significantly reduces the number of nuclear weapons, enhances stability and opens the way to even more far-reaching steps in the future; [2]

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[14] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 9, 1982, p. 1005.

[15] The resolution as passed is *post*, Aug. 5.

[1] H.J. Res. 521. This is the resolution introduced by Representative Zablocki, as amended on the House floor, which did not pass. The resolution that passed is printed *infra*.

[2] See *ante*.

Whereas the SALT II agreement mandates the prompt reduction of Soviet strategic forces by 254 deployable strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; imposes significant restrictions on Soviet multiple-warhead deployable intercontinental ballistic missiles and on warheads for these missiles, in terms of numbers and throw-weight; prohibits equipment for rapid reload of intercontinental ballistic missile silos; and in these and other verifiable respects improves the ability of the United States strategic forces to carry out their deterrent mission; [3]

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have observed the SALT II agreement since its signing;

Whereas adequate verification of compliance has always been an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement; and

Whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems would greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war:

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, that, consistent with the maintenance of essential equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union should have the following objectives:

(1) Pursuing a complete halt to the nuclear arms race.

(2) Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, not as an end in and of itself but as a logical first step toward achieving nuclear arms reductions.

(3) Giving special attention to destabilizing weapons.

(4) Providing for cooperative measures of verification, including provisions for on-site inspection, to complement National Technical Means of verification and to ensure compliance.

(4) [*sic*] Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability.

(5) Preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

(6) Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles into the START negotiations.

In those negotiations the United States shall make every effort to reach a common position with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies on any element of an agreement which would be inconsistent with existing United States commitments to those allies.

Sec. 2. The United States shall continue to adhere to the SALT II agreement so long as the Soviet Union adheres to that agreement and so long as it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue to adhere to that agreement.

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[3] The text of the SALT II agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

Sec. 3. Consistent with pursuing the overriding objective of an immediate freeze, nothing in this resolution shall be construed to prevent the United States from taking advantage of concurrent and complementary arms control proposals.

House Joint Resolution 521: Freeze and Reduction of Nuclear Forces, August 5, 1982 [1]

Whereas the most serious challenges facing the American people, who are a people of peace, are the preservation of freedom and the prevention of war, with particular reference to nuclear war, by accident, miscalculation, or design;

Whereas the consequences of a continued arms race and the accompanying increased risk of nuclear war are unacceptable, it is imperative that the highest priority be given to the successful completion of the START negotiations in a timely fashion;

Whereas the American people share the yearning of the world's people for reductions in nuclear armaments;

Whereas the Soviet Union, by its actions in Poland and Afghanistan, and through its refusal to abide by international chemical weapons agreements, has created threats to world peace;

Whereas sizable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far lower level would enhance stability and the maintenance of peace;

Whereas the Congress has expressed its mandate in Public Law 92-448 that the United States should not enter into a nuclear arms accord that provides for force levels inferior to those of the Soviet Union;

Whereas the stated policy of the United States Government is to negotiate verifiable reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union began formal negotiations in November 1981 in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces;

Whereas in May 1982 the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations welcomed the President's proposal to cut stockpiles of long-range nuclear missiles as "a far-reaching but realistic offer" that could lead to "fair and effective agreements";

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[1] *Congressional Record* (Daily), Aug. 5, 1982, pp. H 5360–5361. This is the substitute resolution sponsored by Representative Broomfield which was approved by a vote of 273 to 125, with 36 not voting. When submitted by Representative Broomfield as an amendment to the original draft resolution submitted by Representative Zablocki, the vote was 204 to 202, with 1 answering "present" and 28 not voting. For the original resolution submitted by Zablocki, as amended on the House floor, which did not pass, see *supra*.

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union began formal negotiations on June 29, 1982, in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear armaments: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (1) the Congress supports the initiation of the strategic arms reduction talks and urges the Soviet Union to join with the United States in concluding an equitable and verifiable agreement which freezes strategic nuclear forces at equal and substantially reduced levels.

(2) The Congress reaffirms support for Public Law 92–448 which states that the United States not enter into an arms accord which provides for force levels inferior to those of the Soviet Union.

(3) To encourage arms restraint and stability, the United States should propose to the Soviet Union and other nations practical measures to—

(A) reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation;

(B) prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists; and

(C) halt the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(4) The Congress insists that any arms control agreement must be fully verifiable as our national security cannot be based on trust alone.

Agenda and Program of Work Adopted by the Committee on Disarmament for Its Summer 1982 Session, August 5, 1982 [1]

In compliance with rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1982 session: [2]

3–6 August	Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session, as well as of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies.
9–13 August	Chemical Weapons.

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[1] CD/304.

[2] The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons began its work on 20 July. [Footnote in original.]

16–20 August	Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament.
23–27 August	Nuclear Test Ban.
30 August–1 September	Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
2–3 September	Effective International Arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
6–7 September	New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.[3]
8–9 September	Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.
10–14 September	Consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies. Consideration and adoption of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Plenary meetings shall be scheduled on a weekly basis, keeping in mind the workload of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

In accordance with previous decisions of the Committee (CD/292 para. 17) informal meetings shall be held during the second part of the session on ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee's operations.

Meetings of the *ad hoc* working groups will be convened after consultations between the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman of the *ad hoc* working groups according to the circumstances and needs of the various groups.

As decided by the Committee at its 167th Plenary meeting, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events shall meet from 9 to 20 August.

The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons will hold consultations with delegations on technical questions from 2 to 6 August.

In adopting its programme of work, the Committee has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

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[3] Informal meetings of the Committee shall be held during this week under item 5 of the agenda "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons," with a view to examine proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue. Participation of experts will be welcome in these proceedings. The informal meetings will be open to States not members of the Committee and to their respective experts. [Footnote in original.]

Document Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands: Questions Concerning the Soviet Proposal on Basic Provisions of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, August 9, 1982 [1]

Non-stationing (I)

(1) Why is a specific provision for "non-stationing" provided? To what period after entry into force of the Convention would this provision apply? How is it envisioned that this provision would be verified?

Promotion of development goals (I)

(2) What precise activities (examples) are understood by "international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities"?

Declarations of harmful chemicals (II.7)

(3) How could declaration of harmful chemicals be realized without interfering with the operation of a large section of the commercial chemical and pharmaceutical industry?

(II.8)

(4) What substances (examples) are envisaged to be included in the list suggested in paragraph 8?

General Provisions on Verification (III)

(5) What specific procedures are referred to in the phrase "international measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations"?

(*Consultative Committee,* paragraph 2)

(6) How is it to be decided when convening the Consultative Committee is "necessary"?

Fact-finding procedure relating to compliance with the Convention. On-site inspections

(7) (paragraph 1) What information is the State which receives a request obligated to provide?

(8) (paragraph 2) What procedure applies after a challenged State Party refuses a request for an on-site inspection? Who will decide whether explanations are "appropriate and sufficiently convincing"?

(9) (paragraph 2 *bis*) Under this approach is it necessary to have suspicion of a violation before submitting any request for an on-site visit in connection with a notification concerning the destruction and dismantling of a chemical weapons production facility?

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[1] CD/308. The Soviet proposal, submitted to the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament and resubmitted to the Committee on Disarmament, is printed *ante,* June 16.

(10) (Fact-finding procedure, etc., paragraphs 3 and 4) Would international on-site inspection be agreed in advance in the Convention? To what does the word "possibility" refer?

(11) Would the international on-site inspections referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 be conducted under the aegis of the Consultative Committee?

(12) (paragraph 3) In its working paper of 3 August 1977[2] the Soviet Union states that verification of the destruction of CW stockpiles serves the following main purposes:

> To establish
> (a) the fact of the destruction of an agent of a certain type,
> (b) the quantity of the agent destroyed, and
> (c) the quality of this agent,

and to produce appropriately documented results of the verification.

Are the "systematic international on-site inspections" proposed by the Soviet Union designed to achieve these goals?

(13) What is meant in this connection by an "agreed quota"? What does the quota refer to (number of stockpiles, amount of weapons, total number of visits, total number of man-days, number of visits per site, etc.)? How is the quota to be agreed upon? (In the Consultative Committee?)

(14) On what principle would the quota be based?

(15) If question (12) were, in principle, to be answered in the affirmative:

> Would this require a detailed account of the weapons, stockpiles and production facilities within the framework of the declarations to be provided according to II, 1 and 3?

(16) Do the "international on-site inspections" include the possibility of near-site use of technical means of verification of the destruction process of chemical weapon stockpiles?

(17) Why are "systematic international on-site inspections" requested only for the destruction of stockpiles, but not for "the destruction and dismantling of facilities"? Is there a difference between "destruction" and "dismantling" of production facilities?

(18) As the destruction of production facilities is to be completed only 10 years after the State concerned becomes a Party to the CW convention (see I item 7 "elimination . . . of facilities"): How is non-production to be verified in the meantime in production facilities which have been mothballed or in which CW stockpiles are being destroyed?

(19) Under paragraph 4, why is the word "systematic" not used? In other words, what is the difference between "systematic international on-site inspection" (paragraph 3) and "international on-site inspection" (paragraph 4)?

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977,* pp. 475–478.

(20) Do we understand the provision in paragraph 4 correctly as intending to guarantee that the maximum amount of supertoxic agents permitted (l t) is not surpassed? What is meant in this connection by "quota"? How is it to be ascertained that the upper limit is not exceeded?

(21) If the interpretation given in question (20) above is correct:

> How is international verification of the permitted quantities to be ensured if international on-site inspections are limited to special production facilities which may produce permitted quantities of supertoxic agents, while verification through international on-site inspections of the production of other chemical plants producing precursors for supertoxic substances can only take place if the State concerned agrees?

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, August 12, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, at the plenary session on Tuesday I emphasized the importance my Government attaches to the subject of chemical weapons. On 8 February of this year President Reagan stated that "the ultimate goal of US policy is to eliminate the threat of chemical warfare by achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons". [2] Today I wish to comment on the current status of our efforts in the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a chemical weapons ban and also to give the views of my delegation as to what is required if progress is to be made. I will also outline the general points which we believe should form the basis of a chemical weapons convention.

Our meeting today is one of the two plenary meetings dealing with a chemical weapons ban. Since the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons has already been in session for more than three weeks, it provides a good opportunity to take stock of the Committee's efforts to elaborate a chemical weapons convention. And, since a significant amount of time remains this summer for further work, we have the opportunity to check our progress and make mid-course corrections, if necessary.

Although my delegation is disappointed at the over-all pace and organization of our work, the chemical weapons Working Group is entering upon a more intensive and productive phase. The decision to resume discussions on chemical weapons two weeks before the Committee itself reconvened was clearly a wise one. It enabled the members of the Working Group to devote more time and energy to the subject than is possible once the regular session begins. A certain momentum was achieved under the able chairmanship of Ambassador

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[1] CD/PV.178, pp. 7–11.

[2] See Department of State Fact Sheet of Feb. 8, *ante*.

Sujka during those two weeks, which my delegation hopes will continue through the entire session.

For the first time, the Working Group has acted to deal with some of the key problems which must be resolved if a convention is to become a reality. The creation of so-called "homework groups" to discuss specific problems and to identify possible approaches to overcoming them is a step in the right direction. Also, for the first time the consultations with technical experts have tackled some of the major technical issues related to verification. I had the pleasure of attending one of their sessions on verification and destruction and found the interest high and the proceedings business-like.

A number of delegations have made important and interesting proposals regarding a chemical weapons ban in the Committee this year. Last spring, the delegations of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany presented detailed working papers on the subject of verification (CD/244 and CD/265). The Soviet document containing "basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention [3] is potentially useful in our discussions.

These are the positive elements. However, much remains to be done, and my delegation is not entirely satisfied with the Committee's work on chemical weapons so far this summer.

My delegation came prepared to do serious business. This has been difficult because a number of delegations, including several particularly influential ones, apparently wish to avoid dealing with the key obstacles to the elaboration of a convention. Although most delegations are pressing to come to grips with the fundamental verification and compliance issues, a few still try to divert attention to less important questions. Unless this difficulty can be overcome and the Committee can proceed to deal with the key verification and compliance issues in a concrete, task-by-task manner, as I proposed here last March, we will not get very far.

Serious business has also been frustrated because the position of the Soviet delegation on verification and compliance issues remains unclear. We have heard that their delegation has new flexibility regarding on-site inspection provisions, an area crucial to real progress in this Working Group. We have been looking forward to receiving a clear explanation of how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in meeting the verification concerns expressed by my delegation and many others. We were disappointed that such elaboration of the Soviet position was not presented when working paper CD/294 was tabled. But we are hopeful that such explanations will be forthcoming soon, so that the Committee can take them into consideration in its work this summer. For our part, we are ready to deal seriously with any and all constructive proposals regarding verification, whether from the Soviet delegation or any other.

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[3] *Ante*, July 21.

Finally, our work has been hampered because of the complexity of the Committee's agenda. For many delegates, the subject of chemical weapons is only one of many issues with which they must deal. We can understand and sympathize with these delegations but we must utilize the time available for work on chemical weapons in the most efficient manner. We are prepared to explore new procedures which will allow the work on a chemical weapons ban to proceed as rapidly as possible.

As a specific suggestion, my delegation believes that more effective use should be made of technical experts. For example, the most recent series of technical consultations has demonstrated that attempting to compress the consultations into one week is ineffectual. Since most experts are in Geneva for at least two weeks, consideration should be given to scheduling adequate time for in-depth discussion of issues directly relevant to the efforts of the Working Group. We should expect concrete results from these discussions.

This morning, as I have done on other occasions, I want to emphasize the serious attitude of the United States toward achieving a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. I have in the past stressed the importance which is attached to such a ban at the highest levels of our Government.

We are active in all aspects of the Working Group's efforts. We have augmented our delegation. We have brought a number of specialists to Geneva for the consultations with technical experts. And we have made and will continue to make creative proposals for dealing with the important verification questions. But in this day and age of inflated rhetoric some scepticism apparently remains about our true intentions. Our goal should be clear to all. It is the goal established by President Reagan—to achieve a complete and effective ban on chemical weapons.

Let me outline now some general points which we believe should serve as a basis for an effective agreement.

The scope of any future agreement should prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, retention or transfer of chemicals, munitions and equipment for chemical weapons purposes. Certain other activities and capabilities which contribute to an offensive chemical weapons capability should be prohibited. In addition, the agreement should ban any assistance or encouragement to others to obtain or produce chemicals or munitions for chemical weapons purposes.

In our view, the agreement should cover super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, and precursors of such chemicals. We do not believe it necessary to include herbicides or riot control agents.

A general purpose criterion should be incorporated in the agreement, along with specific toxicity criteria to supplement such a criterion.

One of the key disputes in the Working Group is whether or not to include a ban on the use of chemical weapons. The United States supports in principle the banning of any use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. At the same time we believe that care must be taken to avoid undermining the 1925 Geneva Protocol.[4] Therefore, we believe consideration should be given to including in a convention a reaffirmation of the Protocol and of supplementary undertakings. Furthermore, we believe that the verification and compliance provisions should allow for a fact-finding inquiry into alleged uses of chemical weapons.

Let me turn now to issues relating to the declaration and elimination of stockpiles and facilities. The declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and chemical weapons production and filling facilities should provide base-lines for monitoring purposes. Thus, any agreement should mandate prompt, detailed declaration of any chemicals, munitions and specially designed equipment in chemical weapons stockpiles. The agreement should also mandate prompt and detailed declaration of any facilities designed or used for the production of any chemical which is primarily used for chemical weapons purposes or for filling chemical munitions. Such facilities should be declared even if they are or were dual-purpose facilities designed or used in part for other purposes, such as civilian production. Declarations of stockpiles should include the chemical name and quantity of agent, munitions, equipment possessed, and the exact stockpile location. Declaration of production and filling facilities should include the nature of each facility, its capacity and exact location.

In this area the agreement should also provide for confirming declarations of stocks and facilities, for immediate and verifiable closure of facilities, and a ban on construction of any new facilities. Declared stockpiles and facilities should be destroyed over a ten-year period according to an agreed schedule and agreed procedures.

The agreement should also provide for agreed controls under which the declared chemicals with legitimate peaceful applications could be used for such purposes.

As the Committee is already well aware, my Government places particular emphasis on effective verification provisions. To be acceptable to the United States, the verification provisions of a chemical weapons convention must provide confidence that other parties are complying with all provisions of the convention. For the foreseeable future such confidence cannot be obtained by national technical means alone. In some situations, mandatory, extensive and carefully-specified on-site inspection will be needed. A chemical weapons convention will therefore require a verification system based on a combination of national and international measures. Included in international measures must be provisions for systematic international on-site inspection.

In particular we believe that there should be agreement in advance in the convention that the following activities, as a minimum, shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification:

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[4] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

Destruction of declared stockpiles, on a *continuous* basis until destruction is completed;

Disposition of declared production and filling facilities, under agreed procedures, until the facilities have been destroyed;

Permitted small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for protective purposes, under agreed procedures, for as long as a facility is maintained for that purpose.

Furthermore, the agreement should provide for the creation of a consultative committee of parties with verification responsibilities.

Agreed procedures should be included for a fact-finding investigation under the auspices of the treaty parties in the event that suspicious activities were reported. A more practical arrangement than a meeting of the full consultative committee should be provided for initiating and carrying out such an inquiry.

We believe that the complaints procedure should incorporate the obligation to co-operate in resolving compliance issues expeditiously. This should include an appropriate right of on-site inspection at subject sites. A means for redress if the issue is not satisfactorily resolved should also be provided.

The agreement should include constraints specifically designed to reduce monitoring difficulties, and should contain effective confidence-building measures. Further, there should be provisions for exchange of information on the production and use of specific commercial chemicals, including precursors, which might be diverted to chemical weapons purposes.

Finally, and this is a particularly important point, there should be effective provisions for dealing with the possibility of undeclared stockpiles and facilities.

At our spring session, I noted with sorrow that the Committee's efforts to ban chemical weapons were taking place under the long and dark shadow of the use of chemical weapons in current conflicts. I wish I could today report that this heinous practice had ceased. Unfortunately this is not the case. The use of prohibited toxin weapons and lethal chemical agents in south-east Asia and chemical warfare in Afghanistan continue. As President Reagan said when he addressed the second special session:

> The Soviet Union and their allies are violating the Geneva Protocol of 1925, related rules of international law and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. There is conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has provided toxins for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and are themselves using chemical weapons against freedom fighters in Afghanistan. We have repeatedly protested to the Soviet Government, as well as the Governments of Laos and Viet Nam, their use of chemical and toxin weapons. We call upon them now to grant full and free access to their countries or to territories they control so that United Nations experts can conduct

> an effective, independent investigation to verify cessation of these horrors. [5]

There is an important lesson for the Committee to be drawn from this dreadful experience. Any new agreement must have effective provisions for ensuring compliance. The existing chemical weapons and biological weapons conventions do not have adequate verification and compliance provisions. They are being violated. We must not succumb to any temptation to conclude a convention which does not ban these weapons completely, effectively, and verifiably. We simply must never make that mistake again.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, August 12, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, in accordance with its programme of work the Committee on Disarmament is today discussing an issue which requires particular consideration and attention on the part of all delegations represented here. The exceptional importance of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons is self-evident.

The times are past when the danger represented by chemical weapons was, as it were, overshadowed by the horror and dread that nuclear weapons inspired in mankind. For who today is not aware that modern chemical weapons also have a frightening capacity to sow Black Death on earth? Chemical weapons are, moreover, particularly barbaric because they endanger above all the unprotected civilian population. There is a real and growing threat of the widespread use of chemical weapons. Thus the question is whether we are going now, immediately, to put a stop to the chemical arms race orgy, or whether we are going to miss the opportunity, perhaps irrevocably.

The Soviet Union is decisively in favour of the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons. As President L.I. Brezhnev said in his message to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "Everything must be done to ensure that chemical weapons have no place on earth. The Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of this goal. We are prepared to reach an agreement without delay on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stocks of such weapons". [2] The Soviet Union confirmed that this was its approach to the matter by putting forward the "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". [3]

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[5] *Ante*, June 17.

[1] CD/PV.178, pp. 22–30.

[2] *Ante*, June 12.

[3] *Ante*, June 16.

The Soviet delegation has distributed the text of these "Basic provisions" as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament and also of its Working Group on Chemical Weapons (document CD/294/CD/WP.35). Today we wish formally to introduce this document.

The Soviet document was prepared taking into account the results of the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons between 1976 and 1980 and of the negotiations that took place in the Committee on Disarmament during that same period and subsequently. While it naturally reflects the Soviet position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it incorporates many valuable and sound proposals of other States and with respect to a number of the most important aspects it takes into account the positions of our negotiating partners.

If the essence of the Soviet document were to be summarized in a few words, it could be said that what it amounts to is a translation into the language of the provisions of a convention of the desire of the USSR to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons and so far as possible to remove the obstacles to the adoption of a convention by putting forward for consideration on the really crucial, and I repeat crucial, but controversial aspects of the convention, flexible solutions which take account of the various points of view and, we believe, make it possible to reconcile them.

Allow me to go into the Soviet document in somewhat greater detail. First of all I should like to emphasize that this is not a comprehensive text of a future convention, but rather its basic provisions. In other words, the Soviet draft offers possible formulations or what appear to us to be *mutually acceptable approaches* to the formulation of the principal provisions of the future convention. It is not designed to provide answers to many questions concerning details of the future convention. It aims primarily at helping to resolve key issues—the scope of the prohibition, confidence-building measures, verification of compliance and other questions. Unfortunately, as you all know, there has not up to now been any general agreement on these. It seems to us that the draft text we have submitted provides a basis for the achievement of consensus precisely on the key aspects of the convention.

I would remind you that the Soviet draft proposes that the future convention should consist of four main sections—on the scope of the prohibition, declarations and confidence-building measures, ensuring compliance with the convention and the concluding provisions of the convention. Allow me now to touch upon some matters relating to the various sections of the Soviet draft.

I shall not enumerate them, for they are probably well known, the more so since, as I have already said, in many cases they reflect a common standpoint—they reflect the positions of the Soviet-American joint proposal. It was no surprise to us, therefore, that the statement by the United States delegation indicated certain positions which are in fact also reflected in the Soviet draft basic provisions. What is there to say about the scope of the prohibition? What do we want to emphasize in this section of the future convention?

Scope of the prohibition. Here we believe it is particularly important that the future convention should include a prohibition of weapons with binary or multi-component charges, as referred to in paragraph (b) of the definition of chemical weapons under section I of the Soviet draft. We attach particular importance to this matter as we consider that the appearance of binary chemical weapons will represent a qualitatively new stage in the chemical arms race, a stage which could vitally affect the entire prospect for the prohibition of this type of weapon. We have talked about this a number of times already, and our views are shared by many other delegations. These views were confirmed, moreover, by the consultations with technical experts, which made it clear that by contrast with the production of supertoxic weapons in factory conditions, in which the traditional types of such weapons are manufactured on the basis, as a rule, of the same chemicals of known composition, in the development of binary systems of chemical weapons their production may involve new chemicals of various classes and in a wide variety of combinations. The uncertainty from the standpoint of the detection of compliance or non-compliance with the convention becomes many times greater as a result of the possibility of the appearance in the future of various kinds of binary weapons in addition to supertoxic lethal systems. Furthermore, binary systems of chemical weapons make it difficult to monitor their production and stockpiling by groups of States belonging to military blocs. Some members of a bloc may in the future be parties to the convention while others may not, and the provisions of the convention would thus not apply to the latter.

It is obvious that the development of the production of any type of binary weapon will bring new generations of chemicals into the range of chemical substances capable of being used as the components of such weapons, and States parties to the convention will be confronted with the extremely difficult problem of how to set a limit distinguishing chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals which could—and I repeat could—be used in binary systems of chemical weapons. It cannot be excluded that this problem might arise in connection with other substances in addition to organophosphorus compounds.

It must also be pointed out that the components used in binary systems constitute a special kind of precursors. They differ from the precursors used in industrial conditions chiefly in that they are not simply the raw materials for obtaining lethal chemicals but practically already prepared chemical weapons when they are in combination with special devices or constructions.

Thus, it must be recognized that binary varieties of chemical weapons based on the latest advances in science and technology represent an incomparably more serious danger and create incomparably greater difficulties in the determination of the scope of the prohibition as well as in the monitoring of compliance with that prohibition, than do so-called unitary chemical weapons.

It is obvious that there is no way around these problems and the only thing to do is to tackle the solution of them in a serious manner. What kind of a convention would it be if it were to deal only with obsolescent types of chemical weapons that are being removed from arsenals and ignored the more modern types of such weapons which are being developed by at least one State? We have heard repeated assurances from the United States delegation and a number of other States that binary weapons will be subject to absolute prohibition under the convention. These are fine words. But they are still not enough. It is essential that the problems arising in connection with binary weapons should be resolved both in the process of the consultations with technical experts and in the Committee as a whole.

The participants in the consultations, and no doubt all members of the Committee also, have obviously noted that we, the Soviet delegation, are interested, for example, at the practical level, in the problem of the prevention of the concealed manufacture, either in the guise of commercial manufacture or via a "division of labour" among States, of components of binary systems, special-purpose additives for such systems, including catalysts, and also devices and constructions specifically intended for binary systems. We have raised the question how to identify for the purposes of the convention those areas of chemistry and chemical technology where the emergence of new, as yet unknown systems of binary weapons is possible; and how to devise methods for the detection of stockpiles of binary weapons that might already exist if, that is, in defiance of the General Assembly's decision States had embarked on the production of binary weapons? We have not received answers to these questions from any delegation, including that of the United States.

With regard to the section on the scope of the prohibition, I should like to draw attention to the fact that there are no provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the Soviet draft, for a simple reason: the use of chemical weapons is unconditionally and absolutely prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.[4] The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of all stocks will deprive States, so to speak, of the material basis for violating the 1925 Protocol inasmuch as they will not even have any chemical weapons. We therefore believe that if there is a real rather than a feigned desire to strengthen the regime for the non-use of chemical weapons established by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, then the fundamental thing to do is to direct all efforts towards the speediest possible conclusion of the convention we are working on. Let us suppose that, with a convention in existence, suspicions arise concerning the use of chemical weapons. This will automatically give rise to a suspicion of the violation of one or of several of the obligations entered into by States under the convention, namely, the obligations not to develop, produce, transfer or retain chemical weapons and to destroy all stocks thereof. In short, it seems to us that this question, which has been posed and blown up in a rather artificial and unjustifiable manner, becomes all the more complicated when it is proposed in the context of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to solve questions relating to other international agreements. This merely further complicates a task that is already complicated enough.

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[4] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

The second main section of the Soviet draft, entitled *"Declarations and confidence-building measures"*, reflects the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to ensuring implementation of the convention on the basis of international co-operation. I do not intend now to dwell on all the declarations and confidence-building measures we have proposed; I should simply like to stress that they are all closely linked with the verification measures and should be viewed as forming a whole. I should like merely to draw attention to the undertaking by States parties that is provided for in our draft to submit appropriate notifications three months before the initiation of the implementation of each stage of the plan for the destruction or diversion to permitted purposes of stocks of chemical weapons and of each stage of the plan for the destruction or dismantling of facilities which provide capacities for the production of chemical weapons, and not later than 30 days after the completion of such operations to submit statements to that effect also.

I wish also to draw attention to the provision providing an undertaking by States parties to the future convention to submit annual declarations concerning basic categories of chemicals produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used. This important provision is, of course—and I should like to stress this—stated in the Soviet draft in general terms, and needs to be elaborated, but we believe that at the present stage we should agree on such undertakings in a broad way and go into the details of the actual provisions later.

The Soviet draft also provides for the drawing up through collective efforts of lists of chemicals and precursors which represent a special danger from the viewpoint of their possible diversion to use for chemical weapons purposes. It also proposes that notifications should be submitted concerning transfers by one State party to another of chemicals which could be used as components for binary weapons, and so forth.

As is clear from the foregoing few examples, all the measures we propose are aimed at giving the parties to the convention the assurance that it is being complied with.

Allow me now to dwell on *questions of verification*. I should like once again to reiterate our conception of the matter of the monitoring of implementation of an international agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are in favour of strict and effective but not intrusive verification. We are in favour of a verification which gives

States the assurance of compliance with the convention but which will not at the same time engender mutual suspicion or in any way lead to a worsening of the relations between States.

As we have already stated more than once, we consider that effective implementation of the convention can be ensured by national monitoring, by national technical means of verification, supplemented by certain international procedures including on-site inspections on a voluntary basis or what some call challenge verification. However, in view of the decisive importance of the destruction of stocks, and wishing to provide for ourselves and for all other future parties to the convention, an additional assurance that no party is committing a violation of this most important undertaking, in the end, in some measure and simply to accommodate the positions of many of our partners in the negotiations, we considered it necessary to provide for the possibility of carrying out systematic international on-site inspections, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota, of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities.

We have also provided for a special verification procedure for the permitted production of supertoxic lethal chemicals at a specialized facility. This is on the understanding that such a facility will continue to exist even when total chemical disarmament has been accomplished and no chemical weapons as such remain on earth. In those circumstances, it would of course be extremely dangerous if someone should attempt to abuse the trust of other States and use that facility for the secret production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The Soviet "Basic provisions" provide for a very wide range of possible actions by States parties to the convention for the purpose of establishing confidence between them on the matter of the implementation of the convention and the monitoring of compliance with the obligations flowing from it, such as: a declaration by States as to whether or not they possess chemical weapons; the declaration of stocks of such weapons and capacities for their production, and of plans for their destruction or diversion to permitted purposes and plans for the destruction and dismantling of facilities, stating the location of the facilities; information concerning progress in carrying out the declared plans with notifications prior to the start of each stage of their implementation and also following the completion of the operations concerned. According to the Soviet provisions, such measures would be carried out by national verification bodies, by national technical means, if they possess such means or, in the case of other States which have an agreement to that effect, on the basis of information received through the use of those means, and lastly by the international verification body with the conduct of on-site inspections on the basis of a documented request as well as of systematic international inspections carried out, for example, on the basis of an agreed quota as I mentioned earlier. Our approach ensures confidence in the implementation of the convention while at the same time it is not burdensome.

In connection with the matter of the verification of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility, some delegations have put forward proposals, firstly, for permanent on-site inspections (with international inspectors staying at the facility day and night throughout all the years during which stocks are being destroyed), and I believe this was referred to today in a statement, and secondly, for the installation at the facility of so-called "black boxes" which would collect and process information and transmit it by radio telecommunications.

Let us suppose for a moment that such a verification system had been established. There would be inspectors permanently stationed at the facility concerned, who could not leave it even for a second; there would be "black boxes" in every corner, and the people working in the facility would be stumbling over them; but let us suppose that this had been done. It would then be necessary seriously to ponder the question of what would be the results of the most meticulous and thorough verification of the progress of the destruction of stocks at a specialized facility if a State had not made a full declaration of its stocks. Or supposing a State after declaring the stocks that are to be destroyed at a specialized facility, then proceeds to conceal part of the stocks and does not submit them for destruction at the facility, or pretends that it has destroyed them?

Would it not be simpler to assume that, if it has such dishonest intentions, a State will merely fail to declare that part of its stocks which it does not intend to destroy, and no amount of day and night permanent inspection will be of any avail whatsoever.

No other method of international verification except inspection on grounds of suspicion in such a case will help to establish the truth. We should also reflect on how to take account, for our purposes, in the drawing up of measures for verifying the destruction of stocks, of the fact that any specialized facility of such a kind must have its own strict and clear technological regulations, specific parameters for the entry of chemicals and output of the products of their destruction, its own extensive range of devices for process management and control, and so forth.

In short, while appealing for a greater objectivity in the work on the provisions of the future convention relating to verification, we are gratified to note that some delegations are beginning to seek more realistic approaches. To mention just one example, the document on verification submitted by the delegation of Canada (CD/167) [5] contains a whole series of interesting points, one of which says in effect that in the drawing up of various control measures the starting point should be minimum levels of intrusiveness in the internal affairs of States. It is to be hoped that in the positions of all delegations a spirit of realism and constructiveness will in the last resort prevail.

Mr. Chairman, in connection with the submission of the Soviet draft basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, a number of delegations have requested us to answer some questions. We consider this an expression of interest in the Soviet document and express our gratification and thanks to those delegations for that interest. We have repeatedly explained our position on key questions of the convention, including, we hope, at today's meeting.

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[5] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 96–103.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, in its document of 26 July,[6] referred to our working paper CCD/539 of 3 August 1977,[7] which stated that the main purpose of monitoring the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons should be to establish: (a) the fact of the destruction of an agent of a certain type; (b) the quantity of the agent destroyed; and (c) the quality of this agent. The delegation asked us: are the systematic international on-site inspections designed to achieve these goals?

We answer this question in the affirmative. It should be explained that in our 1977 document the principle of national verification is taken as the basis, but we see no reason for opposing national verification to international verification. We are in favour of a harmonious combination of the two types of verification.

We have also been asked, and not only by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, to explain what is meant by an "agreed quota". In the "Basic provisions of a convention", the carrying out of international on-site inspections at specialized facilities (of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes) on the basis of an agreed quota is proposed as one—I repeat, one—of the possible forms of such inspections. This does not mean that we are not prepared to consider other possible forms too. Obviously when agreement has been reached on procedures which are acceptable to all, we shall then have to work out in detail together the contents of such procedures. On a number of other specific issues the Soviet delegation intends to give a reply in the Working Group during the consideration of the relevant provisions of the future convention. I will say, however, at once, that in our opinion many questions call for joint answers, especially when they concern such matters as systematic international on-site inspections, on which in the past many different proposals have already been put forward by quite a large number of States.

We prefer the method of bilateral and multilateral consultations with interested delegations in a joint search for answers to the questions which arise in the course of negotiations. For the information of members of the Committee I will say that the Soviet delegation has already conducted a series of such extremely useful bilateral consultations, in the course of which we ourselves asked questions and we answered the questions of our partners, and we intend to continue this practice. We think that this is far more effective than something more like a quiz game—you know: question, answer, question, answer. Anyone really interested in finding joint answers will find a constructive partner in the Soviet delegation. I repeat, we are ready to search for answers to any questions which arise in the course of the negotiations, including those concerning the Soviet draft.

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[6] CD/265.

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977,* pp. 475–478.

I should like to refer to another matter. Every now and then an attempt is made to steer negotiations into the labyrinth of secondary questions at a time when agreement has not been reached on the major questions. Take, for example, these problems of verification. While there is quite a high degree of agreement on the question of scope and, as we believe, the outlines of possible formulations on the scope of the prohibition are emerging, this is not yet the case with regard to verification issues. Nevertheless we sometimes get bogged down in a discussion of highly specialized aspects of verification. We propose that agreement should be reached on basic approaches, where this is possible, of course, and then on the basis of such agreed approaches—general approaches—we can work out the details.

The Soviet draft "Basic provisions", whose significance has been acknowledged by almost all delegations in the Committee, are a demonstration of the Soviet Union's interest in the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and evidence of its goodwill. At the same time, we should also like particularly to stress the fact that we are hoping—we are very much hoping—for a demonstration of goodwill from the other side also.

This refers in particular to the United States delegation, which the other day, and also today, expressed in the Committee its "disappointment" because, allegedly, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries do not wish to take part in serious discussions. The slightest acquaintance with the work of the Committee, of its working groups and contact groups, would suffice to arrive at quite the opposite conclusion. It would seem that some members of the Committee are judging others by themselves. We, for example, are not in the habit of agreeing, on the one hand, to the setting up within the Committee of a working group on a priority aspect of disarmament—a nuclear-weapon-test ban, in this instance—and then of stating bluntly that the time is not yet ripe for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Judge for yourselves: who takes a serious approach to the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and who does not?

We should like to ask the United States delegation a simple and direct question, which certainly does not call for the assistance of experts: how does it see its own path towards the achievement of mutually acceptable solutions, and its readiness to take account of the position of other participants in the negotiations, including the Soviet Union? Negotiations can be successful if all those taking part in them strive for mutually acceptable solutions—we repeat, mutually acceptable solutions.

At the end of his statement, the representative of the United States, referring to the need to ban poisonous substances, could not resist the temptation to employ a peculiar type of poisonous substance—falsehood and calumny—right in the middle of our meeting; even the reference to the President does not in any way alter the fact that a poisonous cloud was released in this room. We regret this, as once again the assertions by the United States of its attachment to chemical disarmament were placed in doubt by the United States delegation itself. The reasons for this importunate repetition of lies are well known. One of them—and probably the main one—is to justify the United States' policy of chemical rearmament. It is enough to mention a single fact: the United States document (CD/264) speaks openly of the advantages of binary weapons, which the United States is today proceeding to produce on a large scale.

I should like to say, finally, that the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent and priority task. All delegations have tirelessly repeated this. We want to go further, and to propose concrete steps towards the fulfilment of this priority task.

In the first place, we consider it essential that the activity of the Working Group, under the able guidance of our friend, Ambassador Comrade Sujka, should not be suspended for almost six months (i.e. from practically the beginning of September, when the Committee's session is to end, until the end of February, when the Group will in effect be able to resume its work). We are opposed to this long interval. We are ready to agree to any generally acceptable arrangement. The Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons could continue its work now; it could resume work after a short interruption, or, lastly, it could resume its work at the beginning of next year, as happened this year in the case of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

In the second place, we consider that it would be useful to establish a date, even if only an approximate one, for the completion of work on the convention for the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this connection it should be borne in mind, *inter alia,* that the chemicals industry is developing today not daily but literally hourly. A few years ago, the problem of the prohibition of binary chemical weapons did not exist; no one was talking about it. It has now arisen in connection with the well-known decision of the United States Government, and this has greatly complicated the negotiations. This, too, has been mentioned today by all speakers with the sole exception, I believe, of the first speaker. Who, I ask, can guarantee that while we are squandering precious time, and discussing sometimes doubtful problems, new and still more dangerous types of chemical weapons will not appear, and all the work we have done so far will have been in vain, will come to naught.

We are pressed for time, gentlemen, on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Joint Communique by the United States and China: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan, August 17, 1982[1]

1. In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China,[2] the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

2. The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

3. Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972, and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

4. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981, represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

5. The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "Two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 23, 1982, pp. 1039–1040.

[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 762–763.

the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979, and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States–China differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

6. Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

7. In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

8. The development of United States–China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China.

9. In order to bring about the healthy development of United States–China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.

Statement by President Reagan: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan, August 17, 1982 [1]

The U.S.–China joint communique issued today embodies a mutually satisfactory means of dealing with the historical question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. [2] This document preserves principles on both sides and will promote the further development of friendly relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China. It will also contribute to the further reduction of tensions and to lasting peace in the Asia/Pacific region.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 23, 1982, pp. 1040–1041.
[2] Printed *supra*.

Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communique will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan.

In working toward this successful outcome we have paid particular attention to the needs and interests of the people of Taiwan. My longstanding personal friendship and deep concern for their well-being is steadfast and unchanged. I am committed to maintaining the full range of contacts between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan—cultural, commercial, and people-to-people contacts—which are compatible with our unofficial relationship. Such contacts will continue to grow and prosper and will be conducted with the dignity and honor befitting old friends.

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.[3] Arms sales will continue in accordance with the act and with the full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in the communique regarding China's "fundamental" policy, and it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind. The position of the United States Government has always been clear and consistent in this regard. The Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waver from this fundamental position.

I am proud, as an American, at the great progress that has been made by the people on Taiwan over the past three decades, and of the American contribution to that process. I have full faith in the continuation of that process. My administration, acting through appropriate channels, will continue strongly to foster that development and to contribute to a strong and healthy investment climate, thereby enhancing the well-being of the people of Taiwan.

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[3] P.L. 96-8, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14 (Title 22, § 3301-3316).

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holdridge) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Joint Communique by the United States and China, August 18, 1982 [1]

Yesterday the United States and the People's Republic of China simultaneously issued a joint communique. [2] During the past months, the Administration has benefited from consultations with members of this committee on this sensitive subject. I am glad to be able to continue our discussion of these issues in a public forum. I would also like to express our appreciation for the way the committee has cooperated with us in maintaining the confidentiality of our discussions with the Chinese; this has been vital, and we appreciate it.

As we went into these negotiations we had two things in mind—our historic obligations to the people of Taiwan and our important and growing relations with the People's Republic of China. Throughout the entire period of our discussions with Beijing we were guided by these dual considerations. It is a fundamental national interest of the United States to preserve and advance its strategic relations with China. At the same time, we have obligations to old friends; and we are not going to turn our back on them.

I am glad that we have been able to arrive at a communique with the Chinese that demonstrated their recognition of our determination on this score. Despite the difficulties it obviously causes them, they were willing to join with us in a *modus vivendi* which will enable us to continue our relationship because of the important interests involved for them. Such an outcome is of vital importance to our national interest. Three administrations before us have worked very hard to establish and expand this relationship, and we would have been derelict if we had not made every effort to find a way around the problem that threatened it.

A Valued Relationship

I think it would be useful to take a few minutes to examine the reasons why we value this relationship so highly. One of the major reasons is strategic. Prior to 1971 we had a hostile relationship with China. It was costly. We fought the Chinese in Korea. We almost came to a major war over Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese worked hand in hand with the Soviets against us in Vietnam. We had to maintain a naval presence between Taiwan and the mainland. China identified itself with support for guerrilla movements on the soil of many of our allies and friends. Furthermore, a large part of our defense resources were allocated on the premise of a hostile China.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 413.
[2] *Ante*, Aug. 17.

Last, and perhaps most important, these 1 billion people were not identified with our interests as we faced the Soviet Union.

Starting in 1971 we have changed this situation. Thanks to a productive relationship between the United States and China, Taiwan has never been more secure and prosperous. We no longer have to plan for China as an enemy. We can now think about China as a country with which we might cooperate in certain significant areas. China's relations with our allies in Asia have improved. These 1 billion people are cautiously moving into the mainstream of the world's cultural and economic life. Their isolation is dissolving. Trade has increased. Eight thousand Chinese students are now studying in the United States. Investment opportunities are opening and our parallel interests in containing the Soviet Union have been repeatedly reaffirmed.

All of these things represent solid, vital benefits to our security and well-being. We were not going to let these achievements disappear into rancor and hostility if we could possibly avoid it. We went after both of the objectives I mentioned at the outset, and I believe we have succeeded.

Reaffirming Fundamental Principles

Let me now turn to yesterday's communique. The communique reaffirms the fundamental principles which have guided U.S.–China relations since the inception of the normalization process over 10 years ago. This reaffirmation is significant; it illustrates the strength and the durability of these principles.

On this foundation, the United States established relations with China which have been economically beneficial to us and which have greatly enhanced our vital strategic interests. At the same time, we have maintained and strengthened our commercial and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan. We have achieved these important goals without impairing the security of the people of Taiwan, and, indeed, because of these improved relations between China and the United States, Taiwan has never been more secure.

The communique also addresses an issue which was not resolved at the time of normalization of relations—the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. During discussions leading to normalization, China demanded that arms sales be terminated. We refused. I can say here that our negotiations almost foundered over this issue. China ultimately agreed to proceed with normalization despite this disagreement but reserved the right to raise this issue again. When it did so, we agreed to engage in discussion to determine whether an understanding could be reached. The alternative to our agreeing to hold such discussions would clearly have been the beginning of a process of deterioration in our relations—deterioration that could have led us back toward hostility since the issue itself was volatile and basic. We would have been irresponsible had we allowed such a process to start.

We undertook these discussions, therefore, with the hope that a formula could be found which would permit the continued growth of our relations with China, but also with the firm resolve that there were principles regarding the security of Taiwan which could not be compromised. Those principles, embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act,[3] commit the United States to sell to Taiwan arms necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

Aware of our consistent and firm opposition to the use of force against Taiwan, the Chinese during these discussions agreed to state in very strong terms their policy of pursuing a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and described this policy as "fundamental." The Chinese insisted, however, that we agree to the ultimate termination of arms sales. We refused because the level of our arms sales must be determined by the needs of Taiwan and we could not agree to a termination date, as the Chinese demanded, which might impair our ability to meet those needs.

At the same time, we recognized that China's peaceful policy bore directly on the defense needs of Taiwan. So long as that policy continued, the threat to Taiwan would be greatly diminished. As I have just noted, assurances of such a continuity were provided when the Chinese began to describe their peaceful policy on the resolution of the Taiwan question as, as I have just said, "fundamental," which contains the connotation of unchanging and long term. We were thus able to consider a policy under which we would limit our arms sales to the levels reached in recent years and would anticipate a gradual reduction of the level of arms sales. We were not willing, however, to adopt such a course unconditionally.

While the Chinese were willing to state their peaceful policy in strong terms, they at first resisted any relationship between that policy and our arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese resisted this relationship because of their view that the sale of arms to Taiwan constitutes an interference in China's internal affairs. We rejected any language to this effect in the communique.

We also stressed that as a matter of fact and law, any adjustments in our arms sales to Taiwan had to be premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy. We therefore maintained, and the Chinese ultimately agreed, that the statement of our policy in paragraph 6 be prefaced by a phrase that related it to the continuation of China's peaceful approach. This is the genesis and purpose of the phrase "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides" which precedes our statements in that paragraph. Thus, our policy is predicated on China's commitment in paragraph 4 to a peaceful approach and our acknowledgment of that approach in paragraph 5.

Let me summarize the essence of our understanding on this point: China has announced a fundamental policy of pursuing peaceful means to resolve the longstanding dispute between Taiwan and the mainland. Having in mind this policy and the consequent reduction in the military threat to Taiwan, we have stated our intention to reduce arms sales to Taiwan gradually, and said that in quantity and quality we would not go beyond levels established since normalization. This follows from a literal reading of the communique. While we have no reason to believe that China's policy will change, an inescapable corollary to these mutually interdependent policies is that should that happen, we will reassess ours. Our guiding principle is now and will continue to be that embodied in the Taiwan Relations Act: the maintenance of a self-defense capability sufficient to meet the military needs of Taiwan, but with the understanding that China's maintenance of a peaceful approach to the Taiwan question will permit gradual reductions in arms sales.

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[3] P.L. 96–8, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14 (Title 22, § 3301–3316).

Questions have been raised concerning whether the wording of the communique adequately conveys the meaning which we ascribe to it. I believe that it does or I would have recommended against its approval. The present wording evolved from 10 months of intense negotiations in which fundamental principles were at stake on both sides. The language necessarily reflects the difficult compromises which were reached.

We should keep in mind that what we have here is not a treaty or agreement but a statement of future U.S. policy. We intend to implement this policy in accordance with our understanding of it. I hope I have made that point abundantly clear in my remarks today. I can further assure you that, having participated closely in the negotiations, I am confident that the Chinese are fully cognizant of that understanding.

Returning now to the document itself, let me recapitulate and emphasize a few key features.

First, the document must be read as a whole, since the policies it sets forth are interrelated.

Second, as I have previously noted, the communique contains a strong Chinese statement that its fundamental policy is to seek to resolve the Taiwan question by peaceful means (paragraph 4). In this context, I would point out again that the reference to their "fundamental" policy carries the connotation in Chinese of "unchanging and long term."

Third, the U.S. statements concerning future arms sales to Taiwan (paragraph 6) are based on China's statements as to its fundamental peaceful policy for seeking a resolution to the Taiwan question and on the "new situation" created by those statements (paragraph 5). This situation is new because, for the first time, China has described its peaceful policy toward Taiwan in the terms I have outlined. Thus, our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan. This is indicated by the words at the beginning of paragraph 6 that "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states . . ." We have no reason to think that the Chinese will change this fundamental policy, but if they should, we would, of course, reexamine our position.

Fourth, we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan and the statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the communique do not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination. The U.S. statements are fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, and we will continue to make appropriate arms sales to Taiwan based on our assessments of their defense needs, as specified by the act.

Substance of Discussions

So much for what is in the actual communique. Over the past several months, there has been considerable speculation about the substance of our discussions with the Chinese. As you know, we have not felt free to comment on such speculation while our talks were underway. Therefore, it might be useful at this point to clarify our stand on a number of issues which have surfaced in such speculations.

As to our position on the resolution of the Taiwan problem, we have consistently held that it is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. It follows that we see no mediation role for the United States nor will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.).

I would also call your attention to the fact that there has been no change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The communique (paragraph 1) in its opening paragraph simply cites that portion of the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the P.R.C. in which the United States "acknowledged the Chinese position" on this issue (i.e., that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China).

It has been reported in the press that the Chinese at one point suggested that the Taiwan Relations Act be revised. We have no plans to seek any such revisions.

Finally, in paragraph 9 the two sides agree to "maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest." This should be read within the context of paragraphs 8 and 9, which deal with the two sides' desire to advance their bilateral and strategic relations. It should not be read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan.

We hope and expect that this communique, and the step forward which it represents in the resolution of U.S.-Chinese differences on this issue, will enhance the confidence of the people of Taiwan, whose well-being and prosperity continue to be of the utmost importance to us. From the President on down, we have acted in a way which seeks to enhance the future security and prosperity of the people of Taiwan, and I call your attention to the emphasis on this matter in the President's statement which was released simultaneously with the release of the communique yesterday.

Removal of the arms question as a serious issue in U.S.–China relations will help to insure that both countries can continue to cooperate on mutually shared international objectives, e.g., deterring Soviet aggression in East Asia and removal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. It will ease fears by American friends and allies that the general peace and stability in the Asia/Pacific region could be undermined. By defusing the difficult issue of arms sales, we will open the way for an expansion of U.S.–China relations in a broad range of economic, cultural, scientific, and technological areas as well as in people-to-people contact.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a paragraph from the statement issued by President Reagan yesterday:

> Building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long-term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia. It is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communique will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan. [4]

News Interview With Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, August 19, 1982 [1]

Following are the answers by USSR Defense Minister, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Ustinov to questions by a TASS correspondent:

Question: For more than half a year the Soviet Union and the United States are conducting talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe. How are these talks progressing and what could you say about the positions of the sides?

Answer: On agreement between the sides these talks are of a confidential nature and, obviously, making public all that is being done and said at them would not be conducive to their purpose. The Soviet Union seriously takes this arrangement. This, unfortunately, cannot be said of the American side. Recently, there appeared in the Western press, in particular the American and West German press, reports disclosing the content of the talks, and in the process a serious distortion of the Soviet position is made.

I understand the big interest shown by the public in the content of our position at the talks. In Geneva the Soviet Union made proposals providing for the creation of a vast European zone of the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms from the Arctic Ocean to Africa, from the mid-Atlantic to the Urals Mountains. It is proposed to reduce in this zone the existing medium-range nuclear weapons (with a range of 1,000 kilometres and up, but not inter-continental ones) so that after five years of this agreement the USSR and NATO would have not more than 300 units of weapons of this class each. All types of medium-range nuclear weapons would be subject to reduction—both missiles and planes. It would be prohibited to deploy in the zone nuclear weapons of new types, including, of course, both American "Pershing-2" missiles and cruise missiles.

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[4] *Supra.*

[1] Moscow TASS in English, Aug. 19, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, Aug. 20, 1982, vol. III, pp. AA1–AA2.

The Soviet proposals do not provide for any whatsoever commitments for third countries. But taken into account in the aggregate level of 300 units of medium-range weapons along with the American ones are also the missiles and planes of Britain and France. The Soviet Union cannot ignore the fact that these weapons are included in the composition of the medium-range nuclear weapons of NATO countries. They are targeted against the USSR and its allies.

Our proposals provide for the implementation in Europe also of relevant measures to limit nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 kilometres. It goes without saying that such limitations of numerous armaments would be in the interests of all European states. We also proposed for the medium-range nuclear weapons outside of the European zone of their reduction and limitation to be deployed in such a way that these weapons of one side could not reach targets of the other side in the said zone.

As to the position of the United States, it continues to cling to the notorious "zero option," that is the complete liquidation of all Soviet ground-based medium-range missiles. This proposal, that was made before the commencement of the talks, is clearly designed to torpedo the reaching of agreement. The United States does not want to reduce by a single unit both its own medium-range nuclear weapons and those of its allies. It is even pressing for increasing their number. At the same time the United States demands of the Soviet Union the unilateral liquidation of ground-based missiles which it has possessed for already more than twenty years. These missiles are a part of the balance of forces in Europe that was formed and established long ago.

The Soviet Union, and this has been stated at the highest level, will not unilaterally reduce its medium-range nuclear weapons, something the Americans are pressing for. At the same time it is working persistently for the success of the talks with the United States on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and strategic arms in general. Our proposals open a real possibility of a substantial reduction of arms. The Soviet Union also confirms its readiness to free Europe of nuclear arms, both medium-range and tactical ones.

Question: Lately contentions are being circulated quite often in the West on a high level that the United States supposedly "lags" behind the Soviet Union in the field of strategic arms. What could you say to this?

Answer: This is a deliberate distortion of the essence of the matter. Contentions about the "nuclear superiority" of the USSR are being used to delude people.

It is common knowledge that from the moment the United States got nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was compelled in the interests of its defence capability and the security of its allies only to reply to the actions of the United States and NATO which were putting into service ever new and newer varieties of nuclear charges and means of their delivery. The approximate parity of forces that has formed between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, continues to exist today both in the field of strategic and other nuclear arms, and in the field of conventional forces. The existence of an approximate balance was repeatedly admitted by many political and military leaders in the West, especially those who know well the substance of the issue. The fact of the existence of the balance of forces found its reflection also in the relevant Soviet-American agreements. We note once again that in reality no "nuclear lag" of the United States exists. Those who are trying to present the approximate parity as a "lag of the United States" are doing it with one purpose—to cover up the totally unjustified nuclear arms race.

What is happening in reality? A very eloquent statement was made by the United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In an interview to American journalists on August 9th he candidly stated that all the activities of the Pentagon are directed at attaining superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and at concluding it on terms advantageous to the United States. He said that the nuclear capabilities of the United States should be superior to those of the Soviet Union at all stages of such a war.

The Soviet Union rejects as a matter of principle the course of attaining military superiority. It does not aspire to it but neither does it recognise such a right in the case of anybody else. The military-strategic balance reached between countries of socialism and the world of capitalism serves as a factor restraining the ambitions of aggressive forces. Military balance on the lowest possible levels of armaments—such is the USSR's constructive approach to nuclear disarmament.

The mutual freezing of nuclear arsenals would be an important first step in stopping the nuclear arms race. This would rule out the possibility of the building up of nuclear armaments and create favourable preconditions for the speediest adoption of effective decisions to reduce and limit nuclear arms. It would lead to a strengthening of trust between states and to stability of the situation.

Soviet Memorandum Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Averting the Nuclear Threat and Curbing the Arms Race, August 19, 1982 [1]

In the present circumstances, at a time of mounting world tensions and the growing risk of nuclear war, no task confronting States is or can be more important than that of working out and adopting effective measures to ease tensions and to strengthen universal peace and the security of peoples.

Today, when States have accumulated enormous stockpiles of arms vith colossal destructive power, when the arms race is not only coninuing but gaining greater momentum, when ever newer and ever nore sophisticated and destructive means of mass annihilation are merging one after another, it is more than ever incumbent on all States, especially on the major Powers, to show great responsibility, ensible restraint and a thoroughly considered approach in all their oreign-policy moves and actions. They must display a political will to oin forces in order to normalize the situation and consolidate positive rinciples in relations between States.

The Soviet Union, the other socialist States, and most States on all ontinents are consistently and purposefully acting in line with this olicy. They consider it their duty to the world's peoples and to the resent and future generations to pursue that policy, and they will ontinue to abide by it unswervingly in the future.

I.

The latest aggravation of the threat of war has resulted from the ct that in recent years some States have been pursuing a policy imical to the interests of peace.

Contrary to the commitments to prevent nuclear war which they ssumed in the 1970s, they are now saying that a nuclear conflict is dmissible or even "acceptable".

Instead of realistically understanding that any use of nuclear weapns would inevitably lead to a global nuclear clash, with all the nsuing consequences, they are devising various methods of nuclear arfare, from limited to all-out nuclear war, and deploying their rategic offensive forces on the assumption that they would be the rst to use nuclear weapons in the hope of gaining the victory.

In an attempt to discard the only rational policy in today's circumances, that of maintaining the existing military balance between the SSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, e policy of strategic stability, they have opted for a course aimed at taining military superiority.

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[1] CD/315.

This course is being lavishly financed: the costs of implementing new military programmes are running not merely into billions, or even tens and hundreds of billions, but into trillions of dollars.

Those funds are to be spent for the production, in addition to the thousands of nuclear weapons already in stock, of many more thousands of new weapons with explosive yields ten, twenty or even one or two hundred times as great as the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

Nuclear weapons capable of delivering warheads to hard targets with greater accuracy are being developed. Strategic weapon systems are being made mobile. New strategic systems, especially long-range cruise missiles, have gone into production. Outer-space military systems to be equipped with laser weapons are on the drawing boards. The use of shuttle spacecraft would carry the arms race into outer space. The arsenal of chemical weapons is being modernized and considerably expanded, and the production of a new generation of lethal chemical weapons, the binary weapons, has begun. The effectiveness of conventional armaments is being greatly increased.

New United States nuclear-missile systems are planned for deployment as far away from the territory of the United States and as close to the territories of the USSR and the other socialist States as possible, in order to reduce the time of delivery of nuclear warheads to targets, thereby enhancing the surprise factor in an attack. In practical terms, this is a direct attempt to upset the strategic balance. Current NATO plans to deploy hundreds of new medium-range United States missiles in Western Europe are aimed at doing just that. Forward-based United States systems are also being deployed in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The same purpose is served by the concentration of a major United States naval force with a nuclear capability in the Indian Ocean and the creation in that area of an extensive network of United States military bases, with its main strategic base on the island of Diego Garcia.

One cannot fail to come to the conclusion that all this militaristic activity is designed to provide a material foundation for aggressive strategic concepts based on adventurism and designed by men carried away with militaristic frenzy.

The Soviet Union has warned time and again and declares once more that it will be able, under any circumstances, to do what is needed to protect its security and the security of its allies and friends. As L.I. Brezhnev said, whatever types and quantities of new weapons the United States may produce, "the Soviet armed forces will have appropriate means to counter such weapons". He stressed that the Soviet Union "will be able to give a prompt and effective response to any challenge that may be hurled at it".

Nevertheless, the pursuit of military superiority by the United States and some of its NATO allies is a fact that is having a strong impact on current world developments. This is a dangerous policy, dangerous for all States and peoples.

olicy of seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union and
saw Treaty countries and intensifying the arms race has al-
sulted in serious international complications. It is fraught with
of strategic destabilization, that is to say, of upsetting the
nilitary balance.

ontinued blocking of negotiations on such important subjects
omplete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the
on and destruction of chemical weapons, the limitation and
nt reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean, the
of sales and deliveries of conventional armaments, and the
of negotiations on anti-satellite systems are links in a chain
oly connected with the policy of seeking military superiority.

are the reasons for the lack of progress in the talks on the
of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and for
mplementation of United Nations decisions aimed at bringing
prohibition of neutron weapons, renunciation of the devel-
of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction,
tiations on nuclear disarmament? The reasons are the same.
s it that prevented the Madrid meeting of the States partici-
the European Conference from concluding its work early this
from adopting a decision to convene a conference on security
dence-building measures and disarmament in Europe? It was
quest for military superiority.

nes an attempt is made to justify the pursuit of military
y by alleging that it is necessary for strengthening peace and
The truth is just the opposite: such a course can only dimin-
ecurity of all States, including those which pursue it, and
n more menacing the clouds of the nuclear threat hovering
planet.

s a different road open to mankind—that of strengthening
security, of détente and disarmament. This is an opportuni-
must and can be made a reality.

ong and vigorous action by all States and peoples is needed
nuclear war and radically reduce military tensions. What is
bove all is a political will for peace, based upon an aware-
e realities of the nuclear age and capable of shaping new
s and opening new paths towards the elimination of the
reat.

end, as stated in the message of L.I. Brezhnev, General
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
ion and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
to the second special session of the United Nations General
devoted to disarmament, *the Soviet Union has pledged not to be the
uclear weapons.* [2]

1982.

This extremely important action of the Soviet Union is intended to facilitate a turn away from the dangers of today to a more reliable and stable peace and to strengthen people's hopes that a nuclear conflagration will never break out anywhere.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect the other nuclear States to take similar steps following the Soviet Union's decision. That would radically change for the better the entire military and political situation in the world.

The military confrontation will become less critical than it is today, strategic stability will be strengthened, and international trust will again cement relations between States with different social systems.

The strengthening of strategic stability and the steadying of the military balance will also require a wide range of material measures.

II.

The consolidation of the military balance, however important a prerequisite for lasting peace it may be, is not enough to guarantee that mankind will be delivered from the threat of war, especially if the levels of military confrontation are high and continue to grow. It is necessary to go much further, to work to bring those levels down gradually and to limit and reduce armaments—in other words, to give new and strong impetus to current negotiations, to resume those that have been suspended and to initiate new talks dealing with all those subjects. In the present circumstances negotiations on the reduction of armaments and on disarmament constitute the central area of interaction between States in the interests of peace and in the interests of saving mankind from the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The human mind, which has created the monstrous nuclear engine of destruction, is capable of finding ways to dismantle it and to deliver mankind from the nightmare it brings. The Soviet Union, like many other States, deems it necessary to work for that end in several areas at once, especially the following:

Elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. In our view, such a programme could include:

—Cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;

—Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;

—Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;

—Gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;

—Total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons should cover all nuclear systems, primarily strategic weapons and medium-range systems.

The Soviet Union would be prepared to agree on a reciprocal basis that even the first step towards reducing nuclear weapons, both strategic and medium-range should be a major one.

Limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is the view of the Soviet Union that this is one of the most important problems still to be resolved. Negotiations on that problem call for a responsible and serious attitude. The USSR has taken this attitude towards such negotiations, with a view to reaching mutually acceptable agreement.

As L. I. Brezhnev stated, achieving such agreement requires, first of all, that negotiations should actually pursue the objective of limiting and reducing strategic arms rather than serve as a cover for continuing the arms race and upsetting the existing parity. Second, the two sides should conduct the negotiations with due regard for each other's legitimate security interests and in strict conformity with the principle of equality and equal security. Lastly, everything positive that has been achieved previously in that area should be preserved.

Limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. Notwithstanding all the difficulties encountered in the Soviet-United States negotiations on this subject at Geneva, the Soviet Union continues to believe that progress and mutually acceptable agreement should be reached at those negotiations and is doing its utmost to that end.

The Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to agree to a total renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range weapons capable of striking targets in Europe. It could go even further and agree to the total removal of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. If the United States and its allies are not prepared to accept a comprehensive solution of that problem, the USSR could agree to a gradual but very substantial mutual reduction in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons.

It may be recalled that, seeking to contribute to success at the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union declared, as a goodwill gesture, a moratorium on further deployment of its medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR. Moreover, it announced its intention, also unilaterally, to remove some of those weapons and has already taken practical steps in that direction.[3]

In the area of nuclear disarmament in general, the USSR is prepared to go all the way, provided, of course, that all the nuclear Powers participate, that is, to agree to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons—strategic, medium-range and tactical.

The funds released at each stage of nuclear disarmament would be devoted entirely to peaceful purposes, including assistance to developing countries.

In elaborating measures of nuclear disarmament, appropriate methods and forms of control that would satisfy all the interested parties and promote effective implementation of the agreements reached would have to be agreed upon.

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[3] *Ante*, Mar. 16.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in all these activities. It is now the turn of the other nuclear Powers, especially the United States, to respond.

Complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The long overdue solution of this problem would mean that the nuclear powers would no longer be in a position to improve nuclear weapons further and to develop new types and varieties of such weapons. At the same time, the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be strengthened.

The problem of nuclear-weapon tests can be tackled either radically or by stages. The Soviet Union is prepared to ratify at any time the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests signed by the USSR and the United States in 1974.[4] With a view to working out a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the multilateral forum of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament should be utilized to the fullest extent. The Soviet side is also prepared to resume immediately the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the conclusion of such a treaty, suspended by the other parties at the final stage of the talks.

Prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. While approaching this urgent task in the context of consolidating strategic stability and the military balance, the Soviet Union believes that it has a direct bearing on matters of nuclear disarmament as well. The greater the certainty that nuclear weapons will not be acquired by States that do not have them at present, the more incentives there will be to curtail existing nuclear capabilities.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that consolidation of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons of the régime is equally in the interest of nuclear and non-nuclear countries, since it facilitates the preservation of peace and the security of peoples. The non-proliferation régime has created favourable conditions for broad international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. The Soviet Union has invariably supported such co-operation and is actively participating in it.

Many non-nuclear countries have suggested that, within the framework of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons not only they but the nuclear States as well should place some of their peaceful nuclear installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet Union is prepared to accommodate the wishes of non-nuclear countries in this respect also. It declares its readiness, as an act of goodwill, to place some of its peaceful nuclear installations—several atomic power plants and some research reactors—under IAEA control.

Non-nuclear countries which become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[5] naturally hope that their security will, as a result, be better ensured rather than weakened. They have raised the issue of appropriate guarantees on the part of nuclear Powers. The Soviet Union views this position with understanding and is prepared to conclude an international convention on the subject.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[5] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

It is also important to achieve international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in countries in which there are no such weapons at present and, in the meantime, refraining from further moves to station nuclear weapons in the territories of other States. This would also help to strengthen the security of non-nuclear countries and consolidate the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-free zones. It is the view of many States that the establishment of geographical zones in which nuclear weapons shall be neither developed nor deployed could play an important role in curbing the nuclear arms race. Following the example of Mexico and other Latin American States which have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[6] similar initiatives have been advanced by other countries with regard to Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and a number of other regions.

The Soviet Union takes a positive view of those initiatives. As a nuclear Power, it is prepared to help in arriving at generally acceptable solutions concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

III.

Although nuclear weapons possess the greatest destructive potential, other types of weapons pose a grave danger to mankind as well. This makes it imperative that such weapons too should be made the subject of negotiations on their limitation, reduction and elimination.

Prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Like many other States, the Soviet Union is of the opinion that this is one of today's most pressing problems and that it must be solved without delay. By refusing to continue the bilateral talks and thereby nullifying Soviet-United States agreement on a joint initiative on the banning of chemical weapons, the United States has dashed the hopes of the world's peoples for its early solution. It is all the more important, therefore, to intensify joint efforts by States in the Committee on Disarmament to draft an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Such a convention should, of course, provide for strict supervision, which, in addition to the use of national means, would also comprise international procedures, including on-site inspections on an agreed basis.

In the meantime, States should avoid any action that might complicate the talks. It is especially important in this connexion that States should renounce the deployment of chemical weapons in countries in which there are no such weapons at present.

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[6] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 69–83.

Prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The Soviet Union's proposal on this subject,[7] whose urgency is not disputed by anyone, has been referred by the United Nations General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration. The Committee should proceed without delay to draft alone an international treaty on the subject.

Limitation of naval activities. The Soviet Union has already advanced, alone or jointly with other socialist countries, a number of initiatives designed to limit naval activities in certain areas of the World Ocean. Similar proposals have also been made by some other States.

Those initiatives deal with the limitation and reduction of the levels of military presence and military activities in areas in which conflict situations are most likely to arise. With a view to enhancing stability in those areas, it would be desirable to consider the following points:

—Removal of missile submarines from extensive areas of combat patrol, and confinement of their cruises within agreed limits;

—Limitation of the deployment of new submarine-based ballistic missile systems;

—Renunciation of the deployment of both sea-based and ground-based long-range cruise missiles;

—Extension of confidence-building measures to the seas and oceans, especially to areas through which the busiest shipping routes pass;

—Making the Mediterranean a zone of stable peace and co-operation;

—Strengthening of peace and security in the Persian Gulf area.

The Soviet Union supports the idea advanced by non-aligned countries, of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and is taking an active part in the preparations for an international conference on that subject. It is prepared to resume at any time talks with the United States on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean.

The USSR could even go further in directly limiting and reducing naval arms. It would be desirable in this connexion for States possessing powerful navies to examine jointly the question of their limitation and reduction.

Limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Here too there is a need for serious talks between States that could lead to a substantial lowering of the present levels of armed forces and armaments, both on a global scale and in specific regions. Development of the types of weapons that have come to be called conventional is going ahead at an ever-increasing pace and poses a real danger, aggravating regional instability and plunging more and more countries into the whirlpool of onerous military programmes.

The recent conclusion of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects[8] has been a useful step. For that reason, the Soviet Union has been among the first to ratify the Convention and its Protocols. But more sweeping and important tasks are still to be tackled.

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[7] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 334–336.

[8] *Ibid., 1980,* pp. 440–452.

One of them is to reach agreement on not increasing armed forces and conventional armaments and thereby lay the foundation for talks on their subsequent reduction.

Another important objective is to agree on the limitation of sales and deliveries of conventional armaments, which currently run into tens of billions of dollars. With a view to reaching such agreement, the Soviet Union is prepared to resume the Soviet-United States talks which were suspended by the United States at the very time when possible approaches to a solution had begun to emerge. The USSR also has no objection to inviting other States to take part in the consideration of the problem of limiting the arms trade.

Reduction of military budgets. This problem has been under discussion in the United Nations and other international forums for many years. Yet actual military expenditures continue to grow rapidly.

At the same time, most States, including the Soviet Union, have been expressing their conviction that the process can and must be reversed.

The reduction of military budgets could be tackled in different ways, in percentage points or in absolute figures, on the basis of radical solutions or gradual progress. One could start by freezing military budgets, a move that could probably be agreed upon with the least difficulty if the political will exists.

Renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes. This is a major and sweeping problem which is not easy to solve. Yet it has been raised by life itself, and it is clearly time to start thinking jointly of ways to solve it. Scientists and experts will obviously have to be invited to participate in its consideration.

Relationship between disarmament and international security. The easing of military tensions, the strengthening of strategic stability and the cessation of the arms race would unquestionably help to ensure greater security for every State. At the same time, serious political and legal measures enhancing the security of States would make it easier for them to take practical steps to limit and reduce armaments.

Progress in disarmament and in strengthening international security should be sought on parallel courses. A sound concept of security at the end of the twentieth century requires strong action to ward off the emergence of armed conflicts, including nuclear conflicts, rather than drawing up strategic charts for their escalation.

In the military field such action means steps to end the arms race, in the political and legal field, it means the settlement of international conflicts and crises through negotiations and the consolidation of the principle of the non-use of force; and in the moral and political field it means primarily the renunciation of any propaganda for nuclear war and of sabre-rattling in any flare-up of international tension. The

Soviet Union advocates steady and consistent progress along all these lines.

In the same context, a problem whose solution is long overdue relates to the conclusion of a *world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.* The examination of that question in the appropriate United Nations bodies must be moved off dead centre.

Disarmament and economic development. The arms race is the only sphere of human effort in which material resources are being squandered unproductively and on a gigantic scale. Those resources should be used to solve the socio-economic problems facing the world's peoples, to raise their well-being and to develop culture rather than to manufacture engines for the destruction of human beings.

The possibility of allocating significantly greater resources than today to assist developing countries in eradicating the backwardness they inherited from the times of colonialism depends primarily on the rechannelling to peaceful purposes of the resources currently absorbed by the arms race.

* * *

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is confronted by demanding and urgent tasks of great magnitude. Member States will have to discuss the most vital and pressing problems of arms limitation and disarmament. That discussion must give fresh impetus to practical efforts to solve those problems. This is a direct duty of the United Nations stemming from its Charter and from its main purpose of saving the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Fourteenth Session of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts To Consider International Cooperative Measures To Detect and Identify Seismic Events [Extract], August 19, 1982 [1]

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6. During its tenth session, the *Ad Hoc* Group agreed to establish five study groups in order to achieve an appropriate compilation, summarization and assessment of the experience acquired through national investigations and co-operative studies in areas relevant to its work. These open-ended study groups each deal with a specific issue, and are each headed by a convenor and a co-convenor, as follows:

(1) Seismological stations and station networks: Dr. Basham (Canada), Dr. Schneider (German Democratic Republic)

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[1] CD/318.

(2) Data to be regularly exchanged (Level 1 data): Dr. Harjes (Federal Republic of Germany), Dr. Waniek (Czechoslovakia)

(3) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level 1 data through WMO/GTS: Dr. McGregor (Australia), Dr. Yamamoto (Japan)

(4) Format and procedures for the exchange of Level 2 data: Dr. Husebye (Norway), Dr. Christoskov (Bulgaria)

(5) Procedures to be used at international data centres: Dr. Dahlman (Sweden), Dr. Alewine (United States of America)

7. The *Ad Hoc* Group discussed summaries of national investigations presented by the convenors and made recommendations for the further pursuance of this work. These summaries were presented in the form of draft chapters for a formal report of the *Ad Hoc* Group under its present mandate.

With regard to Study Group 1, Seismological stations and station networks, the Group noted the rapid developments in many countries with respect to seismograph facilities, and considered it important for the *Ad Hoc* Group to act as an on-going repository of up-to-date nformation on these developments. The Group also noted areas in which additional scientific and technical developments are needed, ncluding:

(a) studies on the use of seismographs on the ocean bottom to mprove the detection and identification capability for seismic events n the southern hemisphere;

(b) widespread digital recording of data from seismographs;

(c) the deployment of additional seismograph stations located in the outhern hemisphere, especially South America and Africa.

With regard to Study Group 2, Level 1 data extraction, national nvestigations have indicated the need for, and importance of, further esearch with a view to automate these procedures. The *Ad Hoc* Group notes, however, that complete automation of these procedures may be difficult and therefore also recommends research into interactive proedures for Level 1 parameter extraction. Here it is understood that in he future the participating stations in the proposed global network would be equipped with digital recording devices.

With regard to Study Group 3, Level 1 data exchange through the WMO/GTS, the *Ad Hoc* Group has so far conducted two trial exhanges within this data communications system. The first such exhange took place from 6 October to 28 November 1980, with the articipation of 14 countries, and the second exchange was conducted rom 2 November to 11 December 1981, with 21 participating counries. The *Ad Hoc* Group has reviewed the results from these two xperiments, which have shown that the WMO/GTS system has the otential of fully satisfying the aims of rapid and undistorted transmission of Level 1 data for the proposed global system. The Group ees, however, the need for additional experiments using the WMO/GTS to test other aspects of the possible international exchange of ata, especially the transmission of the complete set of Level 1 parameters. The Group noted the advice of the WMO that significant improvements in transmission could be expected only if the *Ad Hoc* Group were to use the GTS on a regular basis. Some States have already indicated their intention to do so. However, the Group notes that regular usage or participation in more extensive tests of the GTS poses organizational problems for some potential participant States.

With regard to Study Group 4, Level 2 data exchange, several national investigations have shown that rapid exchange of such data can be achieved using dedicated satellite communication or dial-up connections on telephone lines, without any particular restriction on the amount of such data that might be requested. At present, however, no standard format for digital Level 2 seismic data has been agreed upon. The *Ad Hoc* Group notes that, with regard to Level 2 data exchange, it will be necessary to take into account the practical conditions particular to each country. The Group recommends that further experimental investigations on transmission of Level 2 data be undertaken both on a national and co-operative international basis.

With regard to Study Group 5, International Data Centres (IDCs), the *Ad Hoc* Group has reviewed several national investigations dealing with the scientific and technical aspects of procedures to be employed at such centres. Preliminary results have been obtained using automated procedures for Level 1 seismic data analysis in the IDCs to be established for the proposed global system. The Experts of the *Ad Hoc* Group agreed that automatic Level 1 data processing in the IDCs is one of the most complex problems for the proposed global system. Results of national investigations indicate, however, that in principle it is possible to solve this problem. National investigations presented to the Group have also shown that due to recent technical advances, application of agreed analysis procedures to Level 2 data for the estimation of origin time, location, magnitude and depth of seismic events at data centres is now technically possible. So far, however, no agreement in the Group has been reached on the assessment of the results of these national investigations with regard to their relevance to the envisaged global system, in particular at International Data Centres.

8. The national investigations so far considered were seen as relevant to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system and to the further elaboration of instructions for an experimental test of that system.

9. The Group, in particular, considered the foreseen Third Report which is to be about recent developments in seismology and improvements in associated techniques to the extent that they are relevant to the envisaged international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events, as described in CCD/558 [2] and CD/43. [3] The Group

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 103–110.

[3] *Ibid., 1979,* pp. 476–481.

has observed that certain such developments are rapid and their results can turn out to be useful for the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system and for the further elaboration of instructions for an experimental test of this system.

10. The *Ad Hoc* Group also discussed the schedule for its further work. It considered that in the light of the time needed for national investigations and co-operative studies and for the reliable assessment of their results, it needs to conduct additional work before submitting a full formal report in compliance with its present mandate. The *Ad Hoc* Group envisages submitting its Third Report during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. The *Ad Hoc* Group suggested that the next session, subject to approval by the Committee on Disarmament, should be convened from 7–18 February 1983, in Geneva.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Venkateswaran) to the Committee on Disarmament, August 19, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, as diplomats we ought to be immune to the fact of transience which rules our lives. For no sooner does a glimmer of understanding begin to dawn concerning the subject-matter of one's assignment, no sooner does one begin to enjoy close and personal rapport with one's colleagues than it is time to bid farewell. Work relating to this Committee has been only a part of my responsibilities here as Permanent Representative of India. However, I have all along entertained a deep and abiding interest in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament and learnt to respect and admire the diplomatic skills and personal qualities of all the representatives whom I have had the good fortune to work with during my all too short assignment in Geneva.

This Committee is a unique body. Its responsibilities are immense. But what is encouraging to us all is the talent and dedication with which the cause of disarmament is being pursued within this Chamber. In the final analysis, we are all constrained by the policies of our respective Governments. But we, too, have an influence on those policies. We, too, contribute to that over-all perspective within which our own national policies are framed. The intimate web of close and personal relationships which tie us together here without regard to our political persuasions or ideologies is the best guarantee for success in our common endeavours. On the eve of my departure from Geneva, may I wish all my close friends and colleagues round this table great success in those endeavours. I shall carry with me to my next post fond memories of our association and a continuing preoccupation with the tasks that we have laboured together to accomplish in the past two years. May I also express my gratitude to those who have expressed their good wishes for success in my new assignment as India's envoy to China.

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[1] CD/PV.180, pp. 23–30.

Since I spoke last, several delegates have referred to the results, or should I say lack of results, from the recently concluded second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Some of our colleagues have tried to minimize the grave implications of the failure of that session. It has been suggested that perhaps we went to that session with far too many expectations and that the failure to live up to those expectations need not be assessed as being in any sense evidence of the failure of the multilateral process. Once again, we have heard members calling upon us to be realistic and pragmatic. We are admonished to avoid rhetoric and ringing appeals. Instead we are asked to concentrate on what is practical and feasible.

In the past my delegation, along with many others, has had occasion to question the so-called realism and pragmatism which are extolled by some members here as virtues essential to success in disarmament efforts. We have all heard of the phenomenon referred to as the revolution of rising expectations. In the last 20 years, the cause of disarmament has in fact witnessed what may be called a veritable revolution of declining expectations. In 1962, the great powers themselves were negotiating treaties on general and complete disarmament which would have resulted in the total elimination of armaments and armed forces within a period not exceeding 10 to 12 years. In contrast, we are told today that to attempt to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament as even a mere framework for disarmament negotiations is too ambitious a task. Representatives of the same delegations were arguing in the early 1960s that it was precisely because of the continuing stress and strain in the international situation that it was necessary to engage in intensive disarmament negotiations. Today, they are again the ones who call us unrealistic because in the face of a tense international situation we call for the only rational course of action available, that is, the path of dialogue and negotiation.

I would like to ask a fundamental question. Who determines what is realistic and practicable? For the majority of delegations represented in this room, it is the reality of the continuing threat of a nuclear holocaust which needs to be given the most priority attention. Again, for an overwhelming number of delegations here, it is nuclear disarmament which ought to be the focus of our collective negotiating effort. This realization stems from the indisputable fact that nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction whose use would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind and threaten our very survival. How, then, can we be accused of being unrealistic or impractical? The truth of the matter is that it is the great powers supported by their allies who are attempting to reserve to themselves the exclusive privilege of determining what is realistic and what is practical. Any delegation which expresses a viewpoint that is different is immediately branded as being unrealistic or worse, as engaging in rhetoric. As the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka pointed out in his thought-provoking statement of 5 August 1982:

> This attitude of some powers, in our view, stems from their conviction that disarmament, particularly work on nuclear disarmament, is best restricted to bilateral or at most trilateral negotiations. It signifies their determination to treat States that are not militarily significant as of marginal value, at best, in disarmament negotiations. Their attitude stems from a mistaken notion that the wielding of nuclear weapons power gives them an exclusive right to determine how, when, where and to what extent disarmament will be negotiated.[2]

This, I submit, is really the crux of the problem we face today here in this Committee.

Several delegations have emphasized the importance of building confidence and mutual trust among States as the basis for progress in disarmament. There is an aspect of confidence, however, which needs to be clarified here. To us, international confidence implies a certain consistency and predictability in the approach which States take on the question of disarmament. We have been told time and again that disarmament is a complex business which will take a long time to achieve. This is all the more reason why we need to have confidence that a certain strategy adopted by consensus by the international community will continue to hold good over a period of time. This is not to argue for a static concept of disarmament; rather it is to argue for a multilateral approach which would ensure that any changes in the strategy are the result of prior and mutual consultations among States.

This is not merely an academic question. In the early 1960s, a certain unambiguous approach to disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, was put forward by some of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. This approach consisted of freezing the actual armament situation as it stood at a particular point in time and then gradually working towards zero armaments. In putting forward this philosophy the United States delegate in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee stated in 1962:

> Fundamentally, it is that the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military positions of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning.[3]

Many agreed with this approach. It was felt that while we are engaged in negotiations on disarmament, the problem itself should not be allowed to become more complicated. In a spirit of serving the larger good and the interests of the international community, many countries accepted restraints which were discriminatory and unequal. In fact, India itself put forward as early as 1964 a proposal for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We stated that the international community should immediately adopt as an urgent measure an agreement which would, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, but at the same time freeze the arsenals of nuclear weapons of the existing nuclear-weapon States. This would still have left the nuclear-weapon States in possession of enormous quantities of nuclear weapons which would be capable of destroying mankind several times over. We were, however, prepared to accept such a situation in the hope of giving an impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament. But this was not to be. Why? Because some of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies interpreted non-proliferation as implying a freeze only on those who had no nuclear weapons to start with, without accepting any corresponding obligations or responsibilities on the part of those who did possess such weapons.

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[2] CD/PV.176, p. 28.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, p. 384.

It was the same approach to disarmament which had earlier led to widespread support for concepts such as the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. Here again, it was argued that the process of nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon States would somehow be assisted by agreements among States in those regions of the world where there are no such weapons at present not to acquire or accumulate nuclear weapons.

This approach could be summed up in a graphic manner by quoting what was said by the representative of Canada in a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee:

> Between the phase of the building up of armaments and the hoped-for phase of reducing armaments, there has to be a point of time at which you stop—like changing the movement of a motor-car from forward to backward.

The international community was persuaded that this was the correct approach to disarmament. Several agreements were accordingly concluded on the basis of this general philosophy of a freeze. One wonders what happened to the enthusiastic espousal of freeze proposals which were made in the 1960s. Is that earlier enthusiasm to be explained by the fact that the freeze approach, as applied by its original advocates, would confirm and perpetuate the division between a handful of militarily powerful States on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other? Have our fears been confirmed that the militarily powerful States and their allies insist on one set of rules for themselves and another for the rest of us?

The freeze approach is a logical one. But it has been applied selectively to ensure that limitations apply only to those who do not possess significant military potential. Over the last two decades, the nuclear-weapon States and their allies have accepted no restraints on their own military potential. While the vast majority of the countries of the world have either signed the NPT [4] or unilaterally declared that they will not manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, this has not led to any limitation or reduction in the nuclear arsenals in the possession of the nuclear-weapon States. Similarly, the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones is being actively encouraged, while in Europe, where the highest concentration of both nuclear and conventional weapons exists, the accumulation of nuclear arms continues at an accelerated pace. If I may quote a distinguished predecessor of mine, the efforts of the major powers so far have been mainly directed at disarming the unarmed without accepting any restraints on themselves.

It was the same philosophy of freezing the existing situation before tackling the question of the reduction and elimination of weapons that led to the question of a nuclear test ban being accorded the highest priority in disarmament negotiations. India was itself an early and consistent advocate of the early conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. It was the late Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru who called for a stand-still agreement on nuclear testing by the nuclear-weapon States as early as 1954. [5] We recognize that the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban will not result in any reduction in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. It may not even result in the slowing down of the accumulation of nuclear armaments. However, in line with the general philosophy that the international community has accepted concerning its approach to disarmament, we consider a nuclear test ban desirable because it would bring to a halt the further qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and at the same time serve the important purpose of preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The unequal situation which is inherent in the present division of the world between a handful of nuclear-weapon States possessing the means of global destruction on the one hand and the non-nuclear rest of the world on the other, would nevertheless remain. We have been prepared to accept this situation on the assumption that this will be only a temporary state of affairs before the achievement of nuclear disarmament and eventually the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

In the light of these self-same considerations, we also welcomed the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, [6] even though it was limited in its application.

It is strange therefore that today efforts are being made to reject this consistent approach to disarmament outlined in the earlier part of my statement precisely by those who have been its most enthusiastic advocates over the past two decades. The United States, for example, has announced that it no longer considers a nuclear test ban as a priority issue but regards the conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban as a long-term objective which must be part and parcel of the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. France and China have also regrettably expressed the view that a nuclear test ban can only be achieved within an integrated programme of nuclear disarmament and, more specifically, only after substantial reductions have been achieved in the existing nuclear weapon arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States. While we welcome the setting up of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban within the Committee on Disarmament, we cannot fail to point out the inherent limitation on our work in this regard in view of this negative approach that is being taken by the United States of America and by France and China. It is a matter of particular regret to us that the delegations of France and China are not prepared even to participate in the work of this *Ad Hoc* Working Group despite the fact it has such an anaemic and limited mandate. The arguments that they have put forward are not convincing and our delegation agrees with the view expressed by the Netherlands Ambassador in his statement of 17 August when he said:

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[4] *Ibid.*, *1968*, pp. 461–465.
[5] *Ibid.*, *1945–1959*, vol. I, p. 410.
[6] *Ibid.*, *1963*, pp. 291–293.

> We are fully aware of the argument advanced by China and by France that the envisaged CTB Treaty would tend to freeze the situation in favour of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. We do not contest it. But we should like to point out that this argument applies even more pointedly to the non-nuclear-weapon States possessing the industrial and scientific capability of providing themselves with a nuclear armoury. The danger of nuclear weapons is such that we have difficulty in accepting the thesis that for some States, further testing to enhance their nuclear capability remains necessary before a halt can be considered.[7]

Similar arguments have been put forward concerning the process of nuclear disarmament. To our mind, the international community had accepted by consensus that the process of nuclear disarmament must be carried out in stages which correspond to a certain logical sequence. This logical sequence is set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.[8] It also incidentally corresponds to the philosophy of disarmament espoused by the delegations of the United States and its allies in the early 1960s, namely, that there has to be a cessation of the nuclear arms race followed by a process of reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It was on this basis, for example, that the United States proposed a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in 1964.[9] During the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, however, and later, at the second special session itself, it became clear that for the United States and some of its allies this approach was no longer valid. We were in fact told that significant reductions in nuclear-weapon stockpiles should come first. We were also informed that a freeze on existing levels of nuclear weapon arsenals could not be accepted because this might result in a freeze on existing military imbalances which must be rectified before disarmament could be contemplated.

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[7] CD/PV.179, p. 15.

[8] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* p. 421.

[9] *Ibid., 1964,* p. 8.

The question arises then as to what are the implications of this new approach to questions of nuclear disarmament. If all States followed the same logic inherent in the approach put forward by the United States and that declared by France and China, then disarmament would no longer be a credible goal. Each one of us could then insist to the extent possible on acquiring military power at least as awesome as the most powerful amongst us before embarking upon the course of disarmament. My country does not accept this logic and would urge others, too, to reject this approach as untenable and to return to the only sane and rational course possible in the circumstances, namely, that which looks upon the achievement of disarmament in well-conceived phases and which must commence basically with freezing the situation as it exists today with respect to nuclear weapons.

If a few countries are not willing to accept what they regard as the freezing of perceived inequalities, then the rest of the countries of the world would need to review whether there is any point in their accepting the present inequalities which apply to them for the sake of an elusive goal of disarmament. The acceptance of the present inequality is rendered tolerable only and only if the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament continue to be a credible one.

This brings me back to the point with which I began the argument—the issue of confidence. Today we are faced with a situation where the most powerful States think nothing of changing the terms of reference within which multilateral disarmament negotiations must be pursued. By making unilateral and drastic alterations in their approach to the most urgent and sensitive issue of disarmament, they undermine the very basis of confidence among States. If we cannot have any degree of certainty concerning the parameters within which we pursue disarmament, how can nations accept any restraints on their decisions concerning armaments? Each one of us in that case would be obliged to plan our security on the basis of multiplying mistrust of the intentions of other States; and the result would certainly not be conducive to the achievement of disarmament.

I would now like to turn to the vital issue of the prevention of nuclear war. We have been gratified by the positive response from several delegations to our proposal for the setting up of an *ad hoc* working group on the prevention of nuclear war. Indeed, this is a matter which deserves our close and urgent attention. The distinguished Ambassador of Italy, in his statement at the plenary meeting of our Committee on Tuesday, 17 August, while referring to our proposal, underlined the need for preventing all wars, whether nuclear or conventional.[10] He also argued that in many cases, conventional wars could escalate to a nuclear threshold and therefore we must take this into account in dealing with the problem of preventing a nuclear war.

To call for practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war is not tantamount to encouraging wars using conventional weapons. Certainly, my delegation has never suggested that measures to prevent a nuclear war should somehow transcend the prohibition on the use of force contained in the United Nations Charter. Does a prohibition on chemical weapons, which we are all trying to achieve agreement upon, imply that the use of all other weapons is somehow legitimate? Do the prohibitions accepted by the international community on the use of certain inhumane conventional weapons imply that the use of other weapons is thereby sanctioned? No. I am afraid that those who use such arguments against giving adequate consideration to measures for the prevention of nuclear war are being both inconsistent and contradictory.

The Ambassador of Italy referred to conventional armed conflicts that could escalate into nuclear war. We share his concern. Let us discuss the problem. It has consistently been our view that the respective roles of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard need to be clarified. Conflicts in the developing world could be avoided and contained if the great powers resisted the temptation to use the developing countries as pawns in their power game. Equally, developing countries need to steer clear of great power rivalry and confrontation. All this may be relevant to the prevention of nuclear war and we, for our part, are willing to discuss the problem in its entirety. We do have the impression, however, that some of our colleagues seem allergic to the very mention of the prevention of nuclear war. Each time we speak of the dangers of nuclear war, they counter with assertions that conventional wars are also terrible. Did we ever claim that conventional wars are not terrible? Did any one of us here say that the prevention of nuclear war gives a licence to engage in conventional wars? However, one terror is not cancelled out by another. Nuclear war is not less terrifying because conventional wars are also terrifying. Nuclear war is not less of a threat to the survival of mankind merely because conventional wars have been more frequent in the recent past. Try as we may, we cannot get away from the simple and stark reality that any use of nuclear weapons would probably mean the end of humanity and civilization as we know it. What we are therefore asking this Committee to do, is to face up to this reality and come up, hopefully, with some practical remedies. To those who would accuse us of being impractical and unrealistic in making proposals that could contribute to the cause of the survival of mankind, we would answer by referring to Ambassador Okawa's statement of 5 August 1982, in which he said:

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[10] CD/PV.179, p. 14.

> My delegation, and I hope many other delegations, listened carefully to the fervent pleas of the Japanese NGO representatives who spoke from their personal experiences in the atomic bombings of 1945. I trust that their simple and stark messages were registered deeply in the minds of their audience.
>
> Surely these appeals should be constantly borne in mind by us, as members of the Committee on Disarmament, when we pursue our duty of accomplishing . . . effective disarmament measures—notably nuclear disarmament measures—and we must endeavour to achieve what progress we can during this short session in moving forward in that direction.[11]

No one can doubt the extreme urgency of dealing with this prob-
em. Just a couple of days ago we learnt that at least one nuclear-
veapon State is reportedly planning to be prepared to fight and win a
o-called protracted nuclear war. That nuclear-weapon State may draw
p such doomsday strategies exclusively in the context of its rivalry
vith its perceived nuclear adversary. But it is all of us also who will
erish if a full-scale nuclear war breaks out. Do the potential victims
ave no say at all in this matter? India is a country of 700 million
eople. We have a democratic system of Government with a Parlia-
ient of freely elected representatives. Supposing tomorrow a repre-
entative asks the Government what steps it has taken to ensure the
ifety and survival of the Indian people in case a nuclear war breaks
ut; what should the response of my Government be? Are we to start
gging tunnels at this stage to shelter 700 million people in case a
iclear war breaks out? Or should we also acquire a so-called deter-
nce capacity to threaten others with annihilation in an illusory
irsuit of our own security? I ask those who oppose our proposal to
t up an *ad hoc* working group on the prevention of nuclear war, to
ll us what answers they expect our Government to provide to our
ected representatives. After all, they too have democratically elected
overnments and should thus be in a position to appreciate our
lemma. It is intolerable that our survival should be hostage to the
iims of a handful of powerful States. And yet it is the democracies
the world which deny us the opportunity to determine our own
stinies—which I was taught to believe was and is a fundamental
inciple of democracy.

We are glad, therefore, that this afternoon these and other matters
ll be discussed in an informal meeting of this Committee. It is my
pe that the considerations I have put forward in all sincerity and
nkness will permit us to reach a quick agreement on a procedure to
al with this vital and urgent issue. A positive decision on our
oposal to set up an *ad hoc* working group to negotiate practical
asures for the prevention of nuclear war would be clear evidence of

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CD/PV.176, p. 14.

the relevance of this Committee as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. It would re-establish the Committee's credibility in the eyes of the international community.

Before I conclude, I would like to join other speakers in this Chamber who have condemned Israel's brutal aggression against Lebanon. There can be no conceivable justification for the appalling loss of lives of innocent men, women and children caused by the indiscriminate use of military power by Israel in Lebanon. Those who have consistently called for a strict observance of the principle of the non-use of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter as a precondition for progress in disarmament seem to make a glaring exception in the case of the Israel: terrorist adventurism in Lebanon. India joins others in calling for an immediate and unconditional end to Israeli aggression in Lebanon and the early restoration of the inalienable right to nationhood of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Chairman, the time comes now for me to bid farewell to you and through you to all the distinguished representatives round this table. It has been both an honour and a privilege to serve as part of this august body and I have been fortunate to enjoy the best of relations with all my colleagues here. I would in particular like to express my deep gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary to this Committee, for his valuable advice and guidance. I hope that the Committee will continue to benefit from his vast experience and diplomatic skills in the fulfilment of the crucial tasks that lie ahead.

In saying farewell, I must also express my warm appreciation to members of the Centre for Disarmament who have been always ready to provide support and assistance whenever required. I am sure my successor will continue to enjoy the same excellent relations with all our colleagues in this Committee and the members of the secretariat that I have myself been fortunate enough to enjoy.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], August 24, 1982 [1]

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The complete and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important problems in the general complex of measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war. Its solution would mean setting up a real obstacle in the way of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types and systems of such weapons. It is known, too, that tests are used for verifying combat readiness and for increasing the efficiency of existing nuclear munitions. The cessation of further tests would impede this process and thus really contribute to a lowering of the military efficiency of nuclear weapons, which would lead to a decline in the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and an increase in the stability of the strategic situation both on a regional and on a global scale.

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[1] CD/PV.181, pp. 16–17.

We are glad that many delegations share this point of view. As the representative of the Netherlands rightly put it at the Committee's meeting on 17 August, "A comprehensive test ban would strengthen the security of all States, create conditions for a gradual de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and draw closer the goal of undiminished security at a progressively lower level of armaments. Moreover, a universal agreement to cease nuclear testing would enhance confidence between States". [2]

Bearing all this in mind, we think that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important measure for the limitation of the nuclear arms race. It would, at the same time, strengthen the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime since it would deprive States seeking to possess nuclear weapons of the possibility of carrying out tests, which is an indispensable stage in the production of such weapons.

Acting in accordance with this approach, the Soviet Union has consistently made efforts—and will continue to do so in the future no less persistently, in spite of the endless zigzags in the positions of the United States and certain other nuclear-weapon-Powers—to secure the conclusion of a CTBT. That is our steadfast position. I believe that the consistency of our approach and our numerous constructive initiatives and proposals on this problem are obvious to everyone.

The President of the United States recently announced his decision not to resume the trilateral talks on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom which were broken off by the United States. [3] At the same time the decision was taken not to ratify the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests [4] and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes [5] which were signed respectively in 1974 and 1976.

Obviously, there is no need to assess these decisions. World public opinion as well as many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have already given a due assessment of them. In fact in the United States itself a number of political figures of high standing whom we all know well, former directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of United States delegations at negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, colleagues of

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[3] *The New York Times*, July 20, 1982, p. 1.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[5] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

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ours such as William Foster, Gerald Smith, Paul Warnke, Ralph Earle, Adrian Fisher and Herbert York have stated their refusal to support the United States Administration's decision which, they have stressed, "casts doubt upon the sincerity of the United States in the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva and in other arms control negotiations".

Two other nuclear-weapon Powers, too, France and China, have made their "contribution" to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests, in announcing a few days ago, that they would not participate in the negotiations on this issue in the Committee on Disarmament.[6]

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its meetings in this—to put it bluntly—not very favourable situation.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are ready, in spite of this situation, to participate constructively in the activity of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which is of course in the first instance required to define, in relation to the subject under consideration, "issues relating to verification and compliance", as the Group's mandate states. Verification cannot be considered in a vacuum, abstractly. There should be a clear understanding that the issues relating to verification and compliance will be examined as applying to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution acceptable to all parties of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States.

The future work of the Group will show how serious the other nuclear-weapon States are in their approach to its work. Even now, in view of the recent decision of the United States Administration on the subject of nuclear weapon tests, a question arises, and we put it to the Committee: will not the United States try to use our Committee and the negotiations being started in it on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as a screen to deceive world public opinion while at the same time speeding up such tests?

The Soviet delegation would like to state very clearly that we have no intention of tolerating a situation in which the Committee on Disarmament is used for such improper purposes.

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[6] France, CD/PV.176, p. 22, and CD/PV.178, p. 41; China, *ibid.*, pp. 40–41.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, August 24, 1982[1]

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In resolution 36/84 adopted on 9 December last year, the General Assembly, *inter alia,* urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to bear in mind that "the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee", and also to support the creation of "an *ad hoc* working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests". We hope that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group which the Committee set up on 21 April of this year in connection with item 1 of its agenda entitled, as we all know, "Nuclear test ban", will keep very much in mind in the discharge of its functions the objective set by the General Assembly in the resolution to which I have just referred, for that objective alone is fully in keeping with the commitments entered into in the 1963[2] and 1968[3] Treaties to which reference is so often made in our discussions.

My delegation considers that it would be pointless once again to review here the background to this question, which stretches back over more than a quarter of a century: it was in 1954 that Nehru for the first time raised the question of ending nuclear-weapon tests.[4] The preamble to resolution 36/84, which I mentioned at the outset and which is included in the annexes to the Secretary-General's letter reproduced in document CD/231 of 2 February 1982, contains a summary, no less significant for being condensed, of the salient aspects of that background. Furthermore, the position of my delegation, which has on countless occasions considered this item both in Geneva and in New York, essentially coincides, as I have said a number of times but will repeat once more today, with the views expressed by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1972, when he stated before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

> I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement . . .
> When one takes into account the existing means of verification . . . it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban . . .

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[1] CD/PV.181, pp. 18–23.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[3] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

[4] *Ibid., 1945–1959,* vol. I, p. 410.

> The potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests.[5]

Bearing the foregoing in mind, I believe that the best I can do in this statement—and what I shall do in the remainder of it—is to quote from some testimony, chosen from among the enormous number of statements which have been made by prominent persons in the United States, the only nuclear Superpower which has for some time been showing clear signs of unwillingness to abide by the undertaking unequivocally set forth in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty. The testimony which I shall read out dates from the same period as the views of the Secretary-General which I have just recalled, and is taken from the United States Senate official records of the hearings of the relevant Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 and 1972.

The first testimony which I shall quote is that of Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as it was the first in the hearings. He said the following:

> It is indeed good to hear that Senator Edmund Muskie, as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, will be holding hearings on the underground test question—the first since 1963.
>
> At that time, as Science Advisor to President Kennedy, I participated in the decisions leading up to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Important as a first arms control measure, this treaty was nevertheless a compromise made necessary by the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreement on the number and mode of on-site inspections required to monitor an underground test ban. Actually, there was no technical reason why we should not have concluded a comprehensive test ban treaty at that time. We now know that only political considerations on both sides prevented reconciliation of the minor differences that existed at the time.
>
> Today, the feasibility of an underground test ban is even greater. It was recently announced that a scientists' panel at a test detection conference of the Advanced Research Project Agency of the Defense Department concluded that progress in seismology now makes it possible to distinguish all but the smallest tests from earthquakes. A test ban agreement without on-site inspection, therefore acceptable to the Soviet Union and practical to implement, would now appear possible.
>
> It is increasingly recognized, moreover, that there is no longer real reason for these underground explosions—if there ever was—since the ABM warhead for which the tests are chiefly designed may already have been made obsolete by changes in United States policy . . .
>
> At the same time, progress in test detection techniques make serious East-West talks on an underground test ban a priority.

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[5] CCD/PV.545, pp. 8–10.

> Already, public pressure for this treaty seems to have increased the credibility of our position at the SALT talks. I hope these hearings will serve to stimulate a new United States initiative toward this imperative measure of arms control. We desperately need to bring the arms race under control. We need to concentrate our hopes, energies, and resources more on constructive things and less on fear-motivated, hopeless weapon systems such as the ABM. Here is an opportunity for our nation to exercise judgment, restraint, and leadership through a modest but important step toward a more rational world.[6]

That is the end of what I want to quote from the statement by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The second testimony from which I should like to quote, which is dated 14 July 1971, is that of Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, who was for several years the alternate representative of his country to the United Nations in New York, and from 1958 to 1960 none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva. I have selected from that testimony the paragraphs which I shall now read out, because they appear to me to be of particular interest for this multilateral negotiating body:

> Speaking both on behalf of a distinguished group of citizens who have organized the Task Force for The Nuclear Test Ban, and from my own experience as Chief of the United States Delegation to the Conference on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Geneva from 1958 to 1960, I fervently hope that these hearings will at long last put us back on the road to a comprehensive East-West test ban and thus signal the end of the nuclear arms race.
>
> There is increasing evidence that the security of the nation will not be strengthened through further development of nuclear weapons. Underground testing, therefore, may and should become obsolete.
>
> However, it is hardly necessary to warn that severe opposition must be expected—and not chiefly from the Russians . . .
>
> I can testify that President Eisenhower was dedicated to the goal of a ban on all nuclear tests. Several times during my years at Geneva, it seemed the test ban agreement with the Russians could be concluded. Each time, however, obstacles arose which even the President, with all the power of his office, could not overcome. I believe the following brief analysis of the tactics used by the opposition could serve to alert us to the hurdles we should be prepared to surmount, as once more a test ban agreement is in sight.

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[6] *Prospects for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, First Session, on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,* July 22 and 23, 1971, p. 5.

Naturally, since the United States insisted on the need for on-site inspection, the Soviet resistance to inspection presented a continuing difficulty in the negotiations. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the discussions at the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958, United States scientists said they were impressed with the sincerity of the Soviet delegation . . .

In my view, our difficulties in reaching a test ban arose in part from within, not from without. The principal opposition originated from that complex of defence establishment agencies, including the Atomic Energy Commission, which are responsible for the United States weapons programme. It was clear that the military elements of the executive branch were thoroughly opposed to the treaty . . .

In August 1958, the Conference of Experts at Geneva, including both the Western and the Soviet delegation, completed their "technical" report. The American technical delegation believed that for the first time they had obtained Soviet agreement to the principle of international inspection and to a control system which would make a test ban feasible. At that point, our anti-ban forces immediately went to work. AEC scientists produced "new data" on high-altitude tests, decoupling, and the "big hole" theory. Eventually, their exaggerations were proved invalid. Nevertheless, their delaying tactics succeeded. Our East-West agreement was postponed and a new conference convened to consider the revised data . . .

By March 1960, it appeared once more that the talks to devise an effective detection system had been successfully concluded. The two Western leaders, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower, had agreed to join the Russians in a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, policed by the system of 180 control posts devised at Geneva. Clandestine underground tests down to the level of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be detected through a system of seismic instruments and a quota of on-site inspections. There would be a joint moratorium on all small tests below this "threshold", since they could not be easily identified. Moreover, the two leaders did not believe clandestine tests of this size could produce results which could have a major effect on either nation's strategic posture. A joint research project to discover detection methods for these small tests would be initiated.

Only the final details of the agreement remained to be worked out at the "summit" meeting planned for May 1960 in Paris. Since I knew at first hand the strength of the opposition to the test ban, I was concerned that plans for the "summit" should go forward without interruption . . .

After all the delays . . . , however, it appeared all efforts to delay the agreement would fail, and as the date for the "summit" approached, there was widespread expectation that a test ban would be concluded. Just two weeks before the "summit", you will recall, an American U2 spy plane was shot down by Soviet rockets. In the resulting confusion of mutual suspicions and recriminations, hostility replaced the pre-summit détente. Khru-

> shchev left Paris after one meeting, denouncing President Eisenhower, the summit collapsed and the treaty was postponed again.
>
> The central mystery, which the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could not solve, remained. Why were the provocative U2 flights continued at a sensitive period when the capture of the plane could rupture chances of a détente? . . .
>
> As far as our Joint Chiefs were concerned, the issue of effective inspection was a smokescreen. Continuation of an aggressive underground test programme was, for them, a prerequisite. Ultimately, they prevailed.
>
> It is on the basis of this personal experience that I believe the public must have all the facts if we are to end the arms race. I am reassured that the Congress is conducting these hearings. Despite the record of the past, by being alert to the tactics of those who oppose a nuclear test ban, I believe that their opposition can be overcome.
>
> Inaccurate evidence will no longer be acceptable as a basis for decision. The true reasons for the objections will be recognized. The evaluation that American weaponry is already sufficient for defence, that a test ban can be agreed without endangering American security, and that the risks involved are now acceptable, is of overriding public interest.[7]

That is the end of my quotation from the statement made at the hearings before the United States Senate by Ambassador James Wadsworth who, as I said at the beginning, was none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva.

To conclude these quotations, I am going to read some paragraphs chosen from the statement made by someone whom, I am sure, many of my distinguished colleagues will well remember for, apart from playing a prominent part in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the 1960s, he was head of the United States delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977 and 1978 and to this Committee in 1979 and 1980. I am referring to Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher who, in May 1972, said the following:

> My testimony is directed primarily to the political significance of a comprehensive test ban. I do not believe, however, that we are dealing with a situation in which we have to rely on political assets to overcome military liabilities because I am persuaded, on the basis of expert testimony, that from the point of view of weapons development, a test ban is, on balance, advantageous to the United States. The experts with whom I have consulted, and whom you have heard, have made it clear that, even allowing for the possibility of some cheating in relation to small underground tests, the relative position of the United States to the USSR would be more favourable under a comprehensive test ban, monitored

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–8.

> solely by national means, than it would be under the present circumstances which permit testing through a much wider range of yields.
>
> The political advantages of a comprehensive test ban are considerable. As this committee is aware, the United States in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by President Kennedy, pledged itself to continue negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons test explosions. This commitment was reaffirmed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiated under President Johnson and ratified by President Nixon. Thus, three administrations have undertaken this commitment.
>
> It is clear to me that other countries of the world take this commitment of ours quite seriously. In the particular context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty I have grave doubts that it will have any success in persuading certain potential powers to seriously consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty as long as we are conducting an extensive series of underground tests . . .
>
> We have heard a good deal about verification and doubtless will hear more. But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only a part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? Is our over-all security better with a comprehensive test ban even though there is some risk of a few small clandestine tests, or without a ban, which allows the Russians to test at all yields, encourages additional nations to acquire nuclear weapons and continues indefinitely the arms race? If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that our present capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes should be satisfactory to permit us to move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty . . . .[8]

That is what Ambassador Fisher said in 1972 at the Senate hearings.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group which has just been set up will undoubtedly be able to find in the testimony that I have just reviewed a rich source of inspiration, which will help it to carry out its work in such a way as to ensure that it is in keeping with the aims which have been pursued in vain by all the peoples of the world since the middle of this century. Those statements may also help members of the Group to have a clear understanding of the need to ensure that the question of verification is not used as a "smoke-screen", as it was put in one of those statements, and also of the need for the United Nations General Assembly and world public opinion to be fully informed of developments on this issue to which, quite rightly, for so long now "the highest priority" has been attached among the various nuclear disarmament issues.

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[8] *Toward a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, Second Session, on S. Res. 230 . . . and S. Res. 273 . . . .* May 15, 1972, pp. 67–68.

Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the *Los Angeles Times:* Nuclear War, August 25, 1982 [1]

I am increasingly concerned with news accounts that portray this Administration as planning to wage protracted nuclear war, or seeking to acquire a nuclear "war-fighting" capability. This is completely inaccurate, and these stories misrepresent the Administration's policies to the American public and to our allies and adversaries abroad.

It is the first and foremost goal of this Administration to take every step to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, for we do not believe there could be any "winners" in a nuclear war. Our entire strategy aims to deter war of all kinds, but most particularly to deter nuclear war. To accomplish this objective, our forces must be able to respond in a measured and prudent manner to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. That will require the improvements in our strategic forces that the President has proposed. But it does *not* mean that we endorse the concept of protracted nuclear war, or nuclear "war-fighting." It is the Soviet Union that appears to be building forces for a "protracted" conflict.

The policy of deterrence is difficult for some to grasp because it is based on a paradox. But this is quite simple to make the cost of nuclear war much higher than any possible benefit. If the Soviets know in advance that a nuclear attack on the United States would bring swift nuclear retaliation, they would never attack in the first place. They would be "deterred" from ever beginning a nuclear war.

There is nothing new about our policy. Since the awful age of nuclear weapons began, the United States has sought to prevent nuclear war through a policy of deterrence. This policy has been approved, through the political processes of the democratic nations it protects, since at least 1950. More important, it works. It has worked in the face of major international tensions involving the great powers, and it has worked in the face of war itself.

But, for deterrence to continue to be successful in the future, we must take steps to offset the Soviet military buildup. If we do not modernize our arsenal now, as the Soviets have been doing for more than 20 years, we will, within a few years, no longer have the ability to retaliate. The Soviet Union would then be in a position to threaten or actually to attack us with the knowledge that we would be incapable of responding. We have seen in Poland, in Afghanistan, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere that the Soviet Union does not hesitate to take advantage of a weaker adversary. We cannot allow the Soviet Union to think it could begin a nuclear war with us and win.

This is not just idle speculation. The Soviet Union has engaged in a frenzied military buildup, in spite of their economic difficulties. They have continued to build greater numbers of nuclear weapons far beyond those necessary for deterrence. They now have over 5,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs, compared to about 2,000 only five years ago. They have modified the design of these weapons and their launchers so that many of their land-based missiles are now more accurate, more survivable and more powerful than our own. They have also developed a refiring capability that will allow them to reload their delivery systems several times. They have elaborate plans for civil defense and air defense against any retaliation we might attempt. And, finally, their writings and military doctrine emphasize a nuclear war-fighting scenario. Whatever they claim their intentions to be, the fact remains that they are designing their weapons in such a way and in sufficient numbers to indicate to us that they think they could begin, and win, a nuclear war.

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[1] *Los Angeles Times*, Aug. 25, 1982.

In the face of all this, it is my responsibility and duty as secretary of defense to make every effort to modernize our nuclear forces in such a way that the United States retains the capability to deter the Soviet Union from ever beginning a nuclear war. We must take the steps necessary to match the Soviet Union's greatly improved nuclear capability.

That is exactly why we must have a *capability* for a survivable and enduring response—to demonstrate that our strategic forces *could* survive Soviet strikes over an extended period. Thus we believe we could deter any attack. Otherwise we would be tempting them to employ nuclear weapons or try to blackmail us. In short, we cannot afford to place ourselves in the position where the survivability of our deterrent would force the President to choose between using our strategic forces before they were destroyed or surrendering.

Those who object to a policy that would strengthen our deterrent, then, would force us into a more dangerous, hair-triggered posture. Forces that must be used in the very first instant of an enemy attack are not the tools of a prudent strategy. A posture that encourages Soviet nuclear adventurism is not the basis of an effective deterrent. Our entire strategic program, including the development of a response capability that has been so maligned in the press recently, has been developed with the express intention of assuring that nuclear war will never be fought.

I know that this doctrine of deterrence is a difficult paradox to understand. It is an uncomfortable way to keep the peace. We understand deterrence and accept the fact that we must do much more in order to continue to keep the peace. It is my fervent hope that all can understand and accept this so that we can avoid the sort of sensationalist treatment of every mention of the word "nuclear" that only serves to distort our policy and to frighten people all over the world. Our policy is peace, and we deeply believe that the best and surest road to peace is to secure and maintain an effective and credible deterrent.

The purpose of U.S. policy remains to prevent aggression through an effective policy of deterrence—the very goal which prompted the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance, an alliance which is as vital today as it was the day it was formed.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, Nuclear Disarmament, and Deterrence [Extract], August 26, 1982 [1]

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At our plenary meeting last Tuesday, this Committee was provided with two examples of statements that, unfortunately, contribute to hindering, rather than advancing, the vitally important work of the Committee. Rhetoric designed to mask rather than to illuminate the real issues we face does not serve any helpful purpose. I do not believe that statements such as these, which attempt—through selective quotation from free statements made by free men in a free press—to lay blame where blame clearly does not lie, advance the true cause of a more peaceful world.

The two statements to which I am referring were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Mexico. [2] The Soviet statement was one to which all delegations can attribute certain motives. The second can only be understood as an attempt at creating a narrow, and biased, view of history in order to show, or attempt to show, that the position of my Government on the question of a nuclear test ban is somehow unfaithful to the true national security interests of the United States.

I should like briefly to respond. For any United States administration, the most fundamental issues it must address—both for the American people and for the entire world—are issues involving nuclear weapons. So long as threats to the security of the United States and its allies exist, in particular nuclear threats, the United States has no choice but to rely upon a strategy of deterrence. This strategy which holds that our strategic arsenal must be adequate to deter any deliberate attack on the United States or our allies, has been endorsed by every United States President since President Eisenhower. It is inconceivable that the United States would take unilateral steps to weaken that deterrent. But at the same time, the United States will pursue in good faith through negotiations effective measures to reduce those threats, and ultimately to eliminate them. It is clearly in our interest to do so.

Our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Garcia Robles, treated us to a highly selective history lesson. Three quotations from distinguished Americans, speaking as private citizens some 10 years ago, were used to illustrate his view of history. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, has sought to use the same tactic by citing contemporary reports from the press. A quick search through the lengthy and readily available public record in the United States would yield quotations from equally distinguished Americans who held, or hold, other views.

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[1] CD/PV.182, pp. 24–25.

[2] The statements, of Aug. 24, are printed *ante*.

I will not undertake counterquotes, as our time is too valuable to be used in such idle pursuits. Moreover, such an exercise would miss the point. It would obscure the realistic perspective which guides the actions of my Government. Let me say a few words about this perspective. In June 1946, the United States, then the sole nation possessing nuclear weapons, boldly took the initiative by offering to place these weapons under United Nations control. Mr. Bernard Baruch, in proposing the plan which bore his name, said poignantly, "We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead". [3] The Baruch plan was endorsed by a majority of the United Nations, but effectively blocked by a Member Nation which was a short time later to launch the nuclear arms race. The acquisition by the Soviet Union of nuclear weapons and its behaviour led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a regional collective defence body permitted under the terms of the United Nations Charter. This perspective embodies many patient efforts that have been made over the past quarter of a century by the United States to control nuclear weapons. These include: the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963, [4] the outer space Treaty, [5] the non-proliferation Treaty, [6] the sea-bed Convention, [7] and the strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. [8] This perspective embodies also the extensive efforts made by my Government to make available throughout the world the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and its support for the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its essential system of international safeguards. Our perspective has another side as well, and that is the record of behaviour of the Soviet Union. We recall the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Our perspective is coloured by Soviet acquisition of enormous quantities of nuclear and conventional weaponry in the 1970s at a time when the United States was exercising restraint during the so-called period of détente. We are also cognizant of the Soviet development of an anti-satellite weapon, and their consistent pattern of adventurism and aggression, most recently by their brutal invasion of Afghanistan.

Given this perspective, what position would any reasonable person expect the United States to take? Are we to react by disarming unilaterally? By putting our faith in the goodwill of the Soviet Union and throwing caution to the winds? No responsible American official could ever contemplate such actions.

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[3] For the Baruch Plan, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959,* vol. I, pp. 7–16.
[4] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.
[5] *Ibid., 1967,* pp. 38–43.
[6] *Ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.
[7] *Ibid., 1971,* pp. 7–11.
[8] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff; *ibid., 1979,* pp. 189 ff.

But mutual reductions in the levels of armaments—both nuclear and conventional—are clearly in the interest of the United States. These reductions can free economic resources for better purposes in the world. Our economic systems—given the opportunity—can create great benefits for the world at large. The requirement to sustain a contest with the Soviet Union in the military arena is most certainly not a welcome one. Bullets do not feed children or build hospitals.

Let there be no question about the commitment of my Government to nuclear arms control and nuclear arms reductions. No delegation in this chamber can be oblivious to the fact that two vitally important negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are under way to achieve these ends. Let there be no question about the commitment of my Government to the achievement of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. Let there be no question about the willingness of the United States to pursue the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations under way in Vienna. And let there be no question about the commitment of my country to its international obligations, under agreements to which it is a party, in particular the non-proliferation Treaty. In the light of the strategic arms reduction talks and the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces—efforts for which the United States took the initiative—I fail to see how any Government could argue that my Government somehow considers Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty to be a dead letter, as some delegations have asserted here during our 1982 session. With regard to the issue of a nuclear test ban, we have consistently declared it as a long-range objective but one which must be considered in the broad range of nuclear arms control measures, and the over-all security interests of the United States. My delegation is prepared to participate actively in the work of the NTB Working Group, and I join our colleagues who have spoken this morning in urging early agreement on a programme of work for that body.

It is regrettable that some delegations seem to approach the work of this Committee as a game—as political theatre where the objective is to make debating points and embarrass those who take opposite positions. My delegation certainly does not share that view. Whether popular or unpopular, this delegation will continue to take positions which are based on serious national interests and a realistic view of the world in which we live.

Statement by the Sri Lankan Representative (Clarke) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space, August 31, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, it is both an honour and a responsibility to appear before you today, to discuss military activities in the last and greatest arena of human affairs. Although this meeting is concerned with the prevention of an arms race in outer space, prevention is only one aspect of the problem. As the mathematicians would say, it is necessary but not sufficient. I shall also discuss the positive uses of space technology for strengthening international security.

Before doing so, may I very briefly give my qualifications for addressing you. I became a member of the British Interplanetary Society in 1934, and was later its Chairman. In 1951 I presided over the first London meeting of the International Astronautical Federation and I have known most of the leading figures in the field. Only two months ago, I had the privilege of being hosted at "Star Village" by my friend Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov and his colleagues. I have written more than 30 books on space, and this month spoke at UNISPACE '82 as a member of the Sri Lanka delegation.

Back in 1945, as a Royal Air Force officer, I wrote the paper that outlined the principles of satellite communications. A few months later, my essay "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare" won first prize in a competition set by the *Royal Air Force Quarterly*. It has been a strange experience reading that paper again after almost 40 years, and I would like to quote the lines of Shelley with which the essay began:

> "Cease! Drain not to its dregs the urn of bitter prophecy.
> The world is weary of the past,
> Oh, might it die or rest at last!"

Nevertheless, "bitter prophecy" is indeed what we are concerned with today. So first, I must request you—if you have not already done so—to read Jonathan Schell's book *The Fate of the Earth*, which is the most convincing account yet given of the realities of nuclear warfare. It should be required reading for every statesman.

And yet Carl Sagan has summed up the implications of this entire book in a single chilling sentence: "World War Two once a minute, for the length of a lazy summer afternoon."

One other reference: I hope that you can arrange to see the BBC's recent *Horizon* science programme, "The Race to Ruin", which showed the first test of laser weapons on airborne targets and interviewed both American and Russian scientists on the possibilities of war in space.

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[1] CD/PV.183, pp. 13–18.

This month at UNISPACE '82, there was some confusion as to precisely what is meant by the "militarization of space". There are very few of man's artefacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes; what matters is the *intention.* It is impossible to define a class of devices and say that "These must not be developed, because they can be employed offensively".

Let me give an example: few things would seem more remote from military affairs than the geodetic satellites used to detect minute irregularities in the earth's gravitational field. At first sight, this would seem to be of interest only to scientists; nevertheless, these subtle variations are of vital concern to the designers of intercontinental missiles, because unless the earth's gravitational field is accurately mapped, it is impossible to target a missile with precision. Thus purely scientific satellites, by greatly increasing the accuracy of warheads, can have a major impact on strategy. Yet does anyone suggest that they be prohibited?

Even meteorological satellites, one of the most benign of all applications of space technology, because they have already saved thousands of lives, are of obvious military importance.

Similarly, communications satellites would play an absolutely vital role in military operations. Yet neither represents a direct threat to peace.

Just as military helicopters can be used for disaster relief work, so some military space systems can be positively benign. Indeed, we might not be alive today without the stabilizing influence of the reconnaissance satellites operated by both the United States and the USSR.

Let me remind you of a piece of recent history: in the early 1960s, there was a vigorous campaign in the United States claiming that the USSR was far in advance in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The so-called "missile gap" was a major theme in the Kennedy-Nixon campaign, and millions of words were written urging that the United States start a crash programme to overcome the Soviet Union's "enormous" lead.

That missile gap was a total illusion—destroyed when American reconnaissance satellites revealed the true extent of Soviet rocket deployment. President Johnson later remarked that reconnaissance satellites had saved the United States many times the cost of the space programme, by making it unnecessary to build the counter-force originally intended.

By a fantastic coincidence, just yesterday I discovered President Johnson's actual words, and I quote:

> We were doing things we didn't need to do; we were building things we didn't need to build; *we were harbouring fears we didn't need to harbour.* (My italics.)

However, in a sense, that information may have come too late. One can picture the feelings of the Soviet military planners when contemplating this American debate. *They* knew they did not have the weapons the United States claimed, so what was the purpose of the exercise? Were the Americans deliberately creating an excuse to rearm? That might have seemed the most plausible assumption—but in fact, ignorance rather than malice was the explanation. In any event, the Soviet Union decided it must produce the missiles which, at that time, existed only in the imagination of the Americans. So the seeds of a space arms race were planted, almost a quarter of a century ago.

It is possible to play a numbers game with payloads and launching to prove almost anything. Statistics indicate that the Soviet Union has now launched about twice as many "military" payloads as the United States—by 1981, roughly 860 against 420. Does this mean that the Soviet Union is twice as aggressive as the United States? Not at all, because the Soviet Union's reconnaissance satellites are planned to operate for only a few weeks whereas the much bigger American satellites remain in orbit for many months. So the *quantity* of American reconnaissance information is probably much greater than that of the Soviet Union, a point to which we will return later.

However, photographic or television reconnaissance is limited by cloud conditions; only radar can give all-weather coverage. And only the USSR has used radar satellites, powered by *nuclear reactors* to reconnoitre the movements of ships at sea, as was revealed when Kosmos 954 crashed in Canada in 1978.

Another area of confusion and controversy is that of Landsats or earth resources satellites, which give superb views of our planet, of enormous value to farmers, industrialists, city planners, fishermen—in fact, anyone concerned with the use and abuse of Mother Earth. The United States has made its Landsat photographs, which have a ground resolution of roughly 80 metres, available to all nations. Not surprisingly, there has been some concern about the military information that these photographs inevitably contain. That concern will be increased now that Landsat D has started operations with a resolution of 30 metres; I was stunned by the beauty and definition of the first photographs when they were shown to us at UNISPACE a few weeks ago. The French SPOT satellite will have even better resolution (10–20 metres) and this is rapidly approaching the area of military importance, although it is nowhere near (perhaps by a factor of one hundred) the definition of the best reconnaissance satellites under favourable conditions.

There is a continuous spectrum between the abilities of the earth resources satellites and the reconnaissance satellites, and it is impossible to say that one is military and the other is not. What matters is, again, intention.

One may sum up the situation by saying that although these satellites may be annoying to some nations, they are not aggressive: and that is the essential factor.

More confusion has now been created by the American space shuttle, which has been heavily criticized in the Soviet Union. It is perfectly true that many of the shuttle's missions will be military—yet it is as potentially neutral as any other vehicle.

The one new factor the shuttle does introduce is that, for the first time, it gives a space-faring power the ability to examine, and perhaps to retrieve, satellites belonging to somebody else, thus opening up prospects of "space piracy"—as the Soviet Union has put it. However, one cannot help thinking that fears on this score have been greatly exaggerated. If you do not want anyone to capture your satellite, it is absurdly simple to boobytrap it and thus to destroy, with very little trouble, an extremely expensive rival space system.

From past experience, I would venture a prediction in this area. When only the United States possessed reconnaissance satellites, there was a great outcry in the Soviet Union about these "illegal spy devices". When the Soviet Union also possessed them, this cry was suddenly stilled. In the same way, when the Soviet shuttle is launched, perhaps we will hear no more talk of space piracy . . .

The essential point is that all these systems—communications, meteorological, geodetic, reconnaissance, and the shuttle itself—though they represent some degree of *militarization* of space, are still, for the moment, defensive or even benign. Some countries may be upset by certain applications, but they can all live with them, accepting their benefits as well as their disadvantages. The new factor which has now entered the discussion is that of deliberately destructive space systems, i.e. weapons.

It seems to have been forgotten that the first weapons were introduced into space almost 20 years ago by the United States, which exploded several nuclear warheads above the atmosphere in tests of a possible anti-satellite system. This approach was abandoned when it led to the discovery—only recently *re*discovered, to the consternation of military planners—that a few nuclear blasts in space could knock out *all* satellites, simply by the intensity of the radiation pulse.

The fact hovers ominously over all discussions of space weapons systems. A desperate country could blind and cripple all its enemy's satellites—as well as everyone else's—by a few large nuclear explosions above the atmosphere.

Such lack of discrimination has led to a search for precision weapons. Since as far back as 1968, the Soviet Union has made more than 20 tests of a non-nuclear anti-satellite destroyer, or ASAT, which hovers near its victim and explodes in a shower of fragments. In June 1982, it tested this satellite system for the first time in conjunction with large-scale ballistic missile launches from silos and submarines.

The interesting question arises—why are the Russians so concerned with developing an ASAT system, with its obvious destabilizing implications? One can only assume that the Soviet Union, which is able to obtain a great amount of information about the United States military establishment by old-fashioned techniques (such as buying trade magazines on the news-stands), realizes that reconnaissance satellites are much more vital to the Americans than to itself.

Predictably, the United States has not been indifferent to this Russian lead. President Reagan has now announced the development of an ASAT system much more advanced than the Soviet satellite-killers; indeed, it introduces a new dimension into space warfare.

The American weapon is launched, not from the ground but from high-flying aircraft, thus jumping up out of the atmosphere to home on a satellite as it passes overhead. This makes it very flexible and extremely difficult to intercept, as it could be launched from any point on the earth at very short notice.

Doubtless, scientists in the Soviet Union are attempting to find a counter to this system and so the insane escalation of weapons will continue—unless something can be done to check it.

Neither the United States nor the USSR-ASAT systems will be operational for some years, so perhaps there is a last chance to prevent the introduction of offensive (as opposed to defensive) systems into space. The importance of halting this arms race before it gets truly under way will be emphasized when one realizes that these planned ASATs are only the primitive precursors of systems now being contemplated. For a horrifying description of the next phase of space warfare I refer you to the recently published *High Frontier* study directed by General Daniel O. Graham. This envisages building scores of orbital fortresses to intercept oncoming ICBMs before they could reach their targets. Such a system would cost not billions, but hundreds of billions of dollars and of course would only be a stepping stone to something even more expensive, which is the "Star Wars" just mentioned by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria.

Which leads inevitably to the subject of laser and particle beam weapons. Now that the long-imagined "death ray" is technically possible, it has been seized upon as a solution to the problem of defence against nuclear missiles. A vigorous debate is in progress over the practicability of such systems and the consensus appears to be that although they are theoretically possible, it will be decades rather than years before they can become operational, except for relatively close-range purposes.

However, I am always suspicious of negative judgements, because I remember vividly the debate in the United States over the possibilities of long-range rockets in the late 1940s. Let me quote again the notorious pronouncement made by the chief American defence scientist, Dr. Vannevar Bush, in 1945:

> There has been a great deal said about a 3,000 mile high-angle rocket . . . I don't think anyone in the world knows how to do such a thing, and I feel confident that it will not be done for a long period of time to come . . . I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would leave that out of their thinking.

The American public did; but the Russians didn't.

If something is theoretically possible, and someone needs it badly enough, it will be achieved eventually, whatever the cost. And when one side develops a new system, the other will try to outdo it. The two Superpowers are both led by intelligent and responsible men, yet they sometimes appear like small boys standing in a pool of gasoline—each trying to acquire more matches than the other, when a single one is more than sufficient.

It is no longer true that wars begin in the minds of men; they can now start in the circuits of computers. Yet the technologies which could destroy us can also be used for our salvation. From their very nature, space systems are uniquely adapted to provide global facilities, equally beneficial to all nations.

As you are well aware, in 1978 the French Government proposed the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency to help enforce peace treaties and to monitor military activities.[2] This has been the subject of a detailed study by a United Nations Committee (see United Nations document A/AC.206/14 of 16 August 1981) conducted by Hubert Bortzmeyer. The conclusion is that such a system could well play a major role in the preservation of peace.

The operational and political difficulties are obviously very great, yet they are trivial when compared with the possible advantages. The expense—one or two billion dollars—is also hardly a valid objection. It has been estimated that its reconnaissance satellites saved the United States the best part of a *trillion* dollars. A global system might be an even better investment; and who can set a cash value on the price of peace?

However, the United States and the Soviet Union, anxious to preserve their joint monopoly of reconnaissance satellites, are strongly opposed to such a scheme. the British Government is also lukewarm, to say the least.

Nevertheless, we have seen that in matters of great, though lesser, importance, such as international communications, it is possible to have extremely effective co-operation between a hundred or more countries, even with violently opposing ideologies. Intelsat is a prime example, as on a smaller scale is Intersputnik, and in the near future Arabsat will establish its regional space system. There is no doubt that the resources exist in the Third World, independently of the space-faring powers, to establish an international monitoring system—if the will exists.

I like the name PEACESAT, and although that has already been pre-empted by the Pacific Radio Network using the satellite ATS 1, I will use the term, with due acknowledgement, for the remainder of this talk.

Reactions at UNISPACE '82 and elsewhere suggest that the PEACESAT is an idea whose time has come. Those who are sceptical about its practicability should realize that most of its elements are present, at least in rudimentary form, in existing or planned systems. The French SPOT satellite, with a ground resolution of 10–20 metres, has already been mentioned. Whether the Superpowers wish it or not, the facilities of an embryo PEACESAT system will soon be available to all countries in the near future.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 97.

May I remind my Russian and American friends that it is wise to co-operate with the inevitable; and wiser still to *exploit* the inevitable.

PEACESATS could develop in a non-controversial manner out of what Howard Kurtz, their long-time advocate, has called the Global Information Co-operative.

This could be a consortium of agencies for weather, mapping, search and rescue, resources and pollution monitoring, disaster watch, information retrieval and, of course, communications. No one denies the need for these facilities. If they were provided globally, they would inevitably do much of the work of a PEACESAT system. The only extra element required would be the evaluation and intelligence teams needed to analyse the information obtained.

The organization, financing and operation of a PEACESAT system has been discussed in the United Nations report, to which I refer you. It is not a magic solution to *all* the problems of peace: there is no such thing. But at least it is worthy of serious consideration, as one way of escape from our present predicament—all of us standing in that pool of gasoline, making our Mutual Assured Destruction ever more assured. To quote from General Graham of the High Frontier Project: "We should abandon this immoral and militarily bankrupt theory . . . and move from Mutual Assured Destruction to Assured Survival . . . Should the Soviet Union wish to join in this endeavour . . . we would, of course, not object . . ."

I would like to end, as I began, with the conclusion of my 1946 essay, "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare".

> The only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker . . .
>
> Upon us, the heirs to all the past and the trustees of a future which our folly can slay before its birth, lies a responsibility no other age has ever known. If we fail in our generation, those who come after us may be too few to rebuild the world when the dust of the cities has descended, and the radiation of the rocks has died away.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Yu Mengjia) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space, August 31, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, today, I wish to make some preliminary remarks on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The rapid development of space science and technology has greatly raised man's ability to conquer the universe and utilize its potentialities. At present, space science and technology are being gradually and effectively applied to man's production activities and various aspects of man's life, thus constituting an important element in the acceleration of nations' economic development, the improvement of people's living conditions and the promotion of social progress.

But the development of outer space science and technology has also raised questions causing us concern and apprehensions. The tendency to start an arms race in outer space between the Superpowers has become obvious. Credence is given by the Superpowers to the concept that "whoever controls the universe can control the earth". They have engaged themselves in active research on and the utilization of outer space and the development of outer space weapons. The Soviet Union started its development of anti-satellite weapons more than 10 years ago, and up to now, it has already conducted dozens of experiments. The United States is reportedly also taking effective measures to intensify its research activities and plans the deployment of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. Various indications point to the fact that the development of outer space weapons constitutes an integral part of the global strategy of the USSR and the United States. These two countries are competing with each other to extend the arms race to outer space, thus increasing the danger of war. This has already caused widespread anxiety among peace-loving people throughout the world. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held recently in Vienna, numerous countries urged the Superpowers immediately to cease activities leading to an arms race in outer space and expressed the hope that the Committee on Disarmament would adopt effective measures to this end as soon as possible.

China has all along held that outer space is the common environment of mankind and that space technology represents a great achievement in the development of science and technology. All countries should explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes and refrain from turning it into a new arena of the arms race. We agree with the views of the majority of the member States that the Committee on Disarmament should establish a working group as soon as possible so as to adopt all practicable measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. As is known to all, at present there exists a huge gap between States in space science and technology, especially in regard to their military application, and only the United States and the Soviet Union have the necessary conditions for it. Therefore, in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, they have unshirkable special responsibilities.

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[1] CD/PV.183, pp. 42–43.

With regard to the mandate of the proposed working group, we are of the view that it should be authorized to consider and negotiate on the issue of the complete prohibition of outer space weapons. The future legal instrument on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space should be comprehensive. It should ban all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and it should not only prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space but also the testing, production and use of any type of outer space weapons because the mere prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space would leave leeway for the testing and use of weapons in outer space and in consequence the complete prevention of an arms race in outer space would not be achieved. Some States have proposed that the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be discussed first. As a practical step, this proposal seems to deserve our exploration.

Article by the Assistant Secretary of State Designate for European Affairs (Burt): The Evolution of the U.S. START Approach, September 1982 [1]

The United States and the Soviet Union first began negotiations on the limitation of strategic nuclear forces in November 1969, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). While this dialogue produced some modest accomplishments, the high hopes and expectations of the early 1970s were never realized. From the perspective of reducing the level of nuclear armaments and securing a stable nuclear balance, the SALT process proved a disappointment. Despite the efforts of three US administrations, the growth of Soviet strategic forces during the 1970s was unprecedented.

The Reagan Administration came to office in January 1981 determined to do better: to negotiate balanced and verifiable arms control agreements that would actually reduce the levels of nuclear weapons on both sides and make a meaningful contribution to securing a stable nuclear balance. President Reagan immediately ordered an in-depth review of arms control policy, to examine the lessons of SALT and to explore alternative solutions to the problem of reducing strategic nuclear forces. Following completion of this review, the President decided to make a significant departure from the past course of US-Soviet negotiations. In his 9 May speech at Eureka College, he announced the new US approach.[2] Rather than seeking an agreement which would do no more than codify and marginally influence the growth of strategic forces, the US would make a proposal for substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 4 (Sept. 1982), pp. 1-7. Also Dept. of State Current Policy No. 436.

On 29 June the United States and the Soviet Union opened the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in Geneva. The US Delegation, led by Ambassador Edward Rowny, carried with it the proposal outlined by the President. This approach is bold yet realistic. Underlying it are the objectives of enhancing deterrence and securing a stable US-Soviet nuclear balance at substantially lower levels of forces.

The role of US strategic forces is to deter attack against the United States or its allies and thereby maintain peace. To deter successfully, it is necessary to convince a potential aggressor that the risks and potential costs of his aggression far outweigh any gains he might hope to achieve. The strategic balance therefore is a crucial element in a potential aggressor's calculation of the relative benefits and costs of his action.

The strategic balance is based not merely on an assessment of numbers, but on system capabilities, command and control as well as force trends. In calculating the balance, it is also important to examine qualitative factors such as a particular system's survivability (or the reverse, its vulnerability to attack by the other side) and its ability to reach its target against potential defences. Strategic forces which can survive a first strike and successfully retaliate against a broad range of targets are required for deterrence and stability.

The subject is complex, and specialists have varying views and interpretations of the current state of the strategic nuclear balance and the significance of particular measures of strategic power. However, all can agree on one essential fact: the combined effects of the shifts in the strategic balance over the past fifteen years have favoured the Soviet Union and have been to the disadvantage of the United States. In particular, the growing vulnerability of US land-based intercontinental missile force provides the Soviet Union a margin of superiority in this area.

In the mid-1960s—before the SALT dialogue was begun—the United States held unquestioned superiority in strategic nuclear forces. It was completing deployment of over 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and forty-one nuclear submarines carrying 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). While the Soviet Union deployed a sizeable force of ICBMs, their numbers were fewer. Moreover, the Soviet Navy was only beginning to deploy modern ballistic missile-carrying submarines. In the category of heavy bombers, the US B-52 force was numerically several times the size of its Bear/Bison counterpart, and even more superior in terms of capability.

By mid-1972—when the SALT I agreements (the treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms) were signed [3]—the Soviet Union had caught up the United States in several indices of strategic capability, and in the number of ballistic missiles had taken the lead, deploying some 2,000 as opposed to 1,700 for the US. The US still maintained a significant advantage in heavy bombers, though that lead had declined somewhat due to the retirement of older US aircraft. The combination of the Soviet numerical lead in ballistic missiles and the US advantage in heavy bombers left a rough equality between the two sides in total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. However, due to its multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) programme, the United States still held a substantial lead in the number of ballistic missile warheads, in the order of two-to-one, and in total strategic weapons (ballistic missile warheads plus bomber weapons).

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[2] *Ante.*

The Soviets unfortunately were not content with the achievement of rough equality and continued their massive build-up. As a result, today the Soviet Union equals or surpasses the United States in most significant quantitative measures of strategic capability. The total number of Soviet ballistic missiles has climbed to some 2,350. The US total, on the other hand, has fallen to about 1,600 due to the retirement of older Polaris SLBMs. The Soviets have closed the gap in ballistic missile warheads, with each side now possessing about 7,500 (on average, Soviet warheads are more destructive). While the US B-52 force has continued to age and further decline in numbers, the Soviets introduced the modern Backfire bomber. Now, the two sides thus have roughly the same number of strategic bombers.

The Soviet build-up and the erosion of US strategic superiority are outlined above. In the late 1960's and early 1970's there was a conscious decision by the United States to allow the Soviet Union to attain equality in strategic forces. American strategic thinking had come to the conclusion that superiority would be difficult and costly to maintain, and, in any case, was not necessary to support a US defence posture based on the objective of deterring war. Further, it was believed that strategic parity could provide the basis for a stable East-West relationship. Thus the United States tacitly agreed to accept parity with the Soviet Union.

By any objective measure, the Soviets achieved rough equality in strategic nuclear forces in the early to mid-1970s. What is disturbing is that throughout the decade, the Soviet build-up showed no sign of slowing, but continued unabated. Through the 1970s to the present, the Soviet strategic programme has had, and continues to show, a tremendous amount of momentum. Since 1972, the Soviets have introduced three new ICBM types (the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, all with the capability of carrying MIRVs), four new SLBMs (the SS-N-8, SS-N-17, SS-N-18 and SS-N-20, the latter two capable of being

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[3] The text of the SALT I agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.

MIRVed), three Delta class ballistic missile submarine types, the Typhoon ballistic missile submarine and the Backfire bomber.

During the same period, the United States exercised a significant degree of unilateral restraint. Once the MIRV programmes for the Poseidon SLBM and Minuteman III ICBM were completed in the first half of the 1970s, the US slowed or cancelled a number of strategic programmes. The Cruise missile programme was cut back and delayed, as was construction of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine for the Trident SLBM. Development of the MX ICBM was slowed and the Carter Administration decided to cancel the B-1 bomber programme. The Soviets gave no sign that they were prepared to reciprocate this restraint; on the contrary, the pace of their strategic programmes clearly indicated that they were not.

The Soviet build-up and the adverse changes in the strategic balance occurred during the same period as the US-Soviet negotiations on strategic forces. This is not to say that there were no benefits from the SALT process. However, following the high hopes created for arms control during the SALT I process, SALT II proved a clear disappointment.[4] Indeed, it was during the negotiation of SALT II that the Soviet build-up reached new heights. This was a period not only of adverse change in the strategic balance against the United States, but also one during which the stability of the balance began to be threatened by the introduction of Soviet systems with the capability to destroy US retaliatory systems, i.e., the threat posed by Soviet MIRV ICBMs with warheads large enough and accurate enough to destroy US ICBMs in their hardened silos.

When the Reagan Administration took office in January 1981, it ordered a major in-depth review of US security and arms control policies. In doing so, four key objectives were outlined for US arms control policy:

—*Security.* Arms control is not an end in itself, but should enhance the security of the United States and its allies while at the same time reducing the risk of war.

—*Militarily significant reductions.* Arms control efforts should seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear systems and military forces, not simply to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.

—*Equality.* Arms control agreements should bring about mutual reductions to equal ceilings for similar types of forces. Equality is fundamental to balanced arms control, deterrence and stability and to a US-Soviet relationship based on mutual restraint and reciprocity.

—*Verifiability.* Arms control agreements should contain effective measures for verification that ensure both sides comply with its provisions. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence necessary to accept an agreement providing for deep reductions in forces fundamental to its national security. Effective verification is particularly important for Western security given the closed nature of the Soviet system.

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[4] The text of the SALT II agreement and associated documents may be found *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

A number of major arms control initiatives were launched by the US as different aspects of the overall review were completed. In November 1981 the President proposed the "zero/zero" approach for the US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), offering to cancel deployment of Pershing II and the ground-launched Cruise missile in return for the elimination of Soviet SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.[5] Early in 1982, the US introduced into NATO a new approach to the East-West negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), which became the basis for the West's July initiative in the Vienna talks.[6] And in May, the President announced the US approach to START.[7]

As part of its review of strategic arms control policy, the US painstakingly examined the course of the SALT process and looked at new approaches to achieve actual reductions in the levels of nuclear arms. The SALT II agreement was not considered to be an acceptable long-term framework for strategic arms reduction because of a number of critical shortcomings and asymmetries embodied in that treaty. The most basic fault of SALT II was the fact that it would permit substantial growth in both sides' strategic forces, rather than mandatory reductions. Another major shortcoming was the fact that SALT II's unit of account was the launcher; no direct limitations were applied to the number of warheads permitted each side, even though warheads are a better measure of capability than launchers. Under the terms of the treaty, the Soviet Union could have actually increased the number of its ballistic missile warheads significantly. A major asymmetry was the codification of a unilateral Soviet right to maintain some 300 heavy ICBMs. Another asymmetry: the Soviet Backfire bomber was not counted under the aggregate total for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles specified by the treaty, despite its intercontinental capability. Finally, the protocol to the treaty, even though it would have expired by now, set the undesirable precedent of limiting US intermediate-range systems, e.g., the ground-launched cruise missile, without imposing limits at all on comparable Soviet systems such as the SS-20.

In view of these inadequacies, the Administration concluded that it would be inappropriate to seek ratification of SALT II. Renegotiation was considered, but the US decided it would be a better use of time to take a new approach to the problem of reducing strategic forces rather than trying to renegotiate SALT II so as to rectify its shortcomings and make it an acceptable agreement. Nevertheless, President Reagan's START proposal builds upon the SALT process. Indeed, the President has stated that in order to create a positive atmosphere for START negotiations, US policy will be to take no action that would undercut existing agreements, provided the Soviets exercise equal restraint.

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[5] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 570–578.
[6] *Ante*, July 8.
[7] *Ante*, May 9.

The US considered ways to use reductions to enhance the stability of the strategic balance. Certain systems, because of their capabilities and characteristics, can undermine that stability. Likewise, other systems with different capabilities and characteristics can contribute to a stable balance. Systems which threaten the other sides' forces with quick pre-emptive destruction are destabilizing because they undermine the other side's confidence in its deterrent capability. In a crisis situation, this could result in a temptation to use these systems first out of a fear of losing them.

Ballistic missiles are thus more destabilizing than slow-flying bombers. This is because ballistic missiles have short flight times (in the order of thirty minutes for ICBMs, less for SLBMs), carry multiple warheads and are being made continually more accurate, thus making them increasingly suitable for pre-emptive attack against the other side's nuclear forces. Bombers and cruise missiles, on the other hand, have very long flight times (seven to ten hours), thereby making them inappropriate weapons for a first-strike attack. In the same sense, ICBMs are more destabilizing than SLBMs, due to the larger size and greater accuracy of land-based missiles. Moreover, existing ICBMs are deployed in fixed sites, thus making them vulnerable to attack—perhaps even inviting it in a crisis. Missile-carrying submarines, due to the difficulties of their detection, are practically invulnerable. SLBMs do not run the risk of being lost if not used promptly in a crisis situation.

Thus the large number of MIRVed ICBMs in the Soviet strategic force is of particular concern to the United States. The Soviets have deployed some 150 SS-17, 300 SS-18 and 300 SS-19 missiles in the last ten years. These missiles can carry at least four, ten and six warheads, respectively. The SS-18 and SS-19 warheads are large enough and accurate enough to threaten US ICBMs in hardened silos. In fact, the Soviet Union now has a capability to destroy most of the US ICBM force in a first strike using only a portion of its ICBM force. Their possession of this capability threatens to destabilize the strategic balance, undermines confidence in the US deterrent posture, and would decrease stability during crises.

The President's proposal is based on a two-phased approach to the reduction of strategic armaments. In the first phase, the United States will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third, to about 5,000 warheads for each side, of which no more than one-half (2,500) would be deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles. At the same time, the US also seeks to reduce the number of deployed ballistic missiles on each side to 850 missiles. For the second phase, the United States will consider further reductions in these areas, while at the same time reducing the overall destructive power of the two sides' forces to equal levels. Included in this would be a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current US level.

A number of elements of the US approach merit particular attention. First, we have chosen to focus on ballistic missile warheads as well as deployed missiles as the units of account as these provide a much more meaningful measure of strategic capability than just launchers, the unit of account in SALT I and SALT II. This makes inherent sense—an approach based on launchers alone would equate a Soviet SS-18 carrying ten warheads with a US Minuteman II carrying a single warhead. The launcher limits in SALT I in no way hindered either side's efforts to increase the number of its ballistic missile warheads. In fact, total deliverable Soviet warheads increased by almost four times over the period between 1972, when SALT I was signed, and 1982, when START opened. And SALT II, while putting a ceiling on the number of warheads permitted on any single ICBM and SLBM, would have permitted further increases in the existing total number of warheads.

In the second phase, the US will seek additional constraints, including equal limits on throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important factor in the strategic balance—it is the large throw-weight of Soviet ballistic missiles which gives them the potential to carry large numbers of warheads with high yields and thereby threaten our land-based forces. Constraints which force the sides toward systems with less destructive potential (i.e., lower throw-weight) are in the interests of stability.

The US approach focuses on ballistic missiles for definite reasons. Simple reductions in any category of strategic forces may not necessarily increase stability; in some cases, it may decrease stability. It therefore makes good sense to focus reductions on those elements of strategic forces that pose particular threats to stability. Ballistic missiles, above all ICBMs, thus merit special attention. Given their fixed locations, ICBMs are vulnerable to pre-emptive attack while at the same time, their accuracy and large warheads provide precisely the means for executing such an attack.

A number of criticisms have been directed at the US approach, to which I would like to reply. First, it is charged that the US proposal is one-sided and by focusing on ballistic missiles would discriminate against the Soviet Union. This is simply not so. There now exists a rough equality in the number of ballistic missile warheads, so the US proposal would force equal reductions by both sides. Granted, the Soviet Union would have to make larger cuts in its ICBM force than the US. This results from the Soviets' relatively greater reliance on ICBMs. In any event, it would be dangerous to give formal legitimation to the massive Soviet build-up in these destabilizing systems. The US, for its part, would be forced to make deeper reductions in its SLBM programme, given the relatively greater US dependence on sea-based systems.

A second charge is that the US proposal would force the Soviet Union to restructure its strategic forces away from the traditional Soviet reliance on ICBMs. This is true, but is it bad for the Soviet Union?

Today, only the United States faces the situation where its land-based missiles are vulnerable to preemptive attack. But this will not remain the case in the future—as technology advances, warheads are becoming more accurate. The Soviet ICBM force will not remain invulnerable forever. Thus the vulnerability of land-based missiles is a matter over which both sides should be concerned. Indeed, a number of Soviet experts are beginning to recognize this potential problem. A primary attribute of the US proposal is that it will force a relative shift away from ICBMs, resulting in a less destabilizing force structure on both sides. This is in the Soviet interest as well as our own.

A third charge is that the US proposal would exclude heavy bombers and cruise missiles from limitation. This charge is unfounded. President Reagan has made it clear that "nothing is excluded" from the negotiations, and that the United States will negotiate in good faith and consider all serious Soviet proposals. We are prepared to treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner in the context of our phased approach. At the same time, ballistic missiles pose a greater threat to stability than do these slow-flying clearly second-strike systems, and should be accorded appropriate priority in the negotiations.

The US refusal to accept a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons has also been questioned. We oppose a freeze for a number of reasons. First, it would prevent the US from implementing steps to redress certain deficiencies which are emerging in its strategic forces, deficiencies which undermine the strategic balance. These steps are now critical given the unilateral—and unreciprocated—restraint exercised by the United States in the latter half of the 1970s. Moreover, the Soviets are clearly concerned about the US strategic modernization programme. Going forward with the US modernization programme gives them a strong incentive to negotiate seriously in START. Were the US to accept a freeze at current, unequal levels, what motivation would the USSR have to accept significant reductions to equal ceilings? Another reason for our opposition to the freeze is that it is just not good enough. We do not want to cap the existing levels of strategic arms, we want major reductions in those forces. Further, developing an effective and verifiable mutual freeze with the Soviet Union would not be a simple matter. It would involve long and complicated negotiations. Both sides' time and energies will be better spent pursuing an agreement providing for significant, equitable and verifiable reductions.

The START approach announced by President Reagan in May reflects the criteria for sound arms control and is fully consistent with the Administration's arms control principles. It provides for militarily significant reductions to equal levels of forces for the US and USSR. It will enhance US and allied security—as well as that of the Soviet Union—by reducing the risk of war and helping to secure a stable strategic balance. Finally, the US will be proposing verification measures that ensure each side has confidence in the other's compliance with the treaty.

Recognizing the strategic unity of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States has kept the allies fully informed of the development of the principles of our arms control approach and of the specifics of our START position. The US proposal was soundly endorsed by Foreign Ministers at the May Ministerial in Luxembourg, and by Heads of Government at the June Summit in Bonn. The documents of both meetings [8] called on the Soviet Union to join with the United States in pursuing significant reductions in strategic forces with a focus on the most destabilizing systems.

The United States will keep the allies fully briefed on START developments. This process was begun with Ambassador Rowny's briefing of the North Atlantic Council on 18 June, prior to his travelling to Geneva for the opening of START. Such consultations will be held periodically during the course of the negotiations.

The START negotiations will be complex. They touch on forces and subjects central to the vital national security interests of the US and USSR. At the same time, I am optimistic about their chance of success. While the Soviets have been publicly critical of our approach, such public posturing is not uncommon, and they have not rejected the concept of significant reductions. As they learn the details of our position in Geneva, I hope they will come to realize that our proposal offers the USSR substantial benefits.

The START process is now underway. The United States is fully committed to fair and balanced arms control, and has made a good faith proposal to the Soviet Union. If the Soviets reciprocate this attitude, we have the opportunity to arrest the arms race and reverse it—to begin down the road to the genuine reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Japanese Working Paper Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament: Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear Facilities, September 1, 1982 [1]

1. The purpose of this working paper is to indicate a possibility of solving the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities within the framework of a Radiological Weapons treaty, with a view to facilitating deliberations on, and the early conclusion of a RW treaty.

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[8] *Ante*, May 18 and June 10.

[1] CD/323.

2. Japan has 24 nuclear power stations, 6 nuclear-fuel processing facilities and 1 reprocessing plant on its small expanse of land territory and is firmly resolved to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. For Japan, therefore, it is a matter of great concern to ensure the security of these nuclear facilities and we consider that the prohibiting of attacks against such facilities by international agreement would be of considerable significance in this regard. We also believe that achievement of such agreement would be a matter of similar interest to many other countries with nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes on their territories. Expressing such a view in the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, Prime Minister Suzuki stated as follows:

> It is a matter of great concern for countries of the world to be relieved of anxieties in regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is important in particular, to ensure and guarantee the security of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, and Japan hopes that international efforts towards this end will be successful. My country, for its part, wishes to contribute positively to these efforts. [2]

3. In the course of the deliberation of a RW treaty in the Committee on Disarmament, the Swedish delegation submitted a proposal that a future RW treaty should include a provision on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. [3] Japan appreciates the intention of this Swedish proposal from the viewpoint mentioned in 2 above.

Recognizing the importance of both the conclusion of a so-called "traditional" RW treaty and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, we have prepared an outline of a draft protocol on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities as an optional protocol to the RW treaty (see Annex).

4. Japan proposes to deal with this question in the form of an optional protocol to the RW treaty for the following reasons:

(1) Both a RW treaty and the proposed provisions on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities would aim at minimizing the damage which may be caused by dissemination of radioactive materials. They are, however, of a different nature in that the former would prohibit "weapons", while the latter would prohibit an "act"—the act of attacking nuclear facilities. It has become clear that the attempt to solve these two questions of a different nature by using one vehicle (a RW treaty) presents difficulties to many delegations and constitutes one of the factors making the achievement of a RW treaty difficult.

(2) We believe, therefore, that one way to respond to the keen interest existing in the international community in both these questions is to attain an agreement on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in a separate instrument, while retaining a link to the

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[2] A/S-12/PV.5, p. 27.

[3] For the Swedish statement introducing this proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 143–148.

RW treaty by making it an optional protocol within the framework of the treaty.

(3) This proposal is put forward in response to the call of the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Wegener, for a "compromise mechanism", and it is strongly hoped that it will be of some help in finding a way out of the present impasse in the efforts to achieve a RW treaty.

5. A view has been expressed that the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities should be dealt with in the context of the 1977 Additional Protocols[4] to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.[5] However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the said Additional Protocols, which have their own background, prohibit attacks only on nuclear power stations.

6. With regard to the scope of the prohibition, namely which nuclear facilities should be protected from attack, Japan considers that out of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes at least all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards should be protected.

7. We fully understand the idea that nuclear facilities in general should be protected from attack. Therefore, it is proposed that a paragraph to this effect be included in the preambular part of the protocol.

8. We are well aware that the conclusion of the proposed protocol as an international agreement would have complex implications for the security of states and would also involve a number of difficult technical problems of a legal nature. These would certainly require further examination and study.

9. It should also be pointed out that Japan has no intention to exclude the possibility of dealing with the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in an independent and separate treaty.

ANNEX

OUTLINE OF DRAFT PROTOCOL ON THE PROHIBITION OF ATTACKS AGAINST NUCLEAR FACILITIES (OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS)

The States Parties to this Protocol,

1. *Recalling* that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

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[4] *International Legal Materials*, 16 Nov. 1977, No. 6, pp. 1391 ff. and 1442 ff.

[5] TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365; 6 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516; 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 287.

2. *Taking into account* the gravity of possible damage to the civilian population by radioactive contamination that could ensue in the case of an attack against a nuclear facility,

3. *Expressing* a general desire that nuclear facilities should not be attacked as a matter of principle,

4. *Recognizing* the importance of providing international protection to peaceful nuclear activities carried out under international control,

5. *Believing* that the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities on which IAEA safeguards are applied would contribute to the protection of the civilian population and the promotion of peaceful nuclear activities,

6. *Desiring* that such prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities would supplement the measures provided for in the Treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons the purpose of which is to prevent damage by dissemination of radioactive materials.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each State Party to this Protocol undertakes not to make the object of attack any nuclear facilities on which IAEA safeguards are applied and which are located within the territory of any other State Party, under the jurisdiction of such other State Party or under its control anywhere.

ARTICLE II

The term "nuclear facilities on which IAEA safeguards are applied" means any nuclear facilities on which the application of IAEA safeguards is provided for in an agreement with the IAEA.

ARTICLE III

In order to facilitate the identification of nuclear facilities protected under Article I, these facilities may be marked with a special sign (to be agreed upon).

ARTICLE IV

(Provisions on a complaint procedure, the registration of nuclear facilities to be protected, scope of protection, duration of the Protocol, amendments, withdrawal, review conferences and other matters shall be included if necessary, or relevant provisions of the RW treaty shall be made to apply with appropriate modifications.)

Statement by the French Representative (de Beausse) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space [Extract], September 2, 1982 [1]

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My statement today will be on the subject of the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

In an earlier statement, on 20 April last, [2] the French delegation stressed how important it felt it to be that the Committee should proceed, in accordance with resolution 36/97 C, to a thorough examination of the problems involved in the prevention of the deployment in outer space of weapons which might, in the not too distant future, have profoundly destabilizing effects.

At that time, like other delegations, we emphasized that what was needed first was agreement, in relation to outer space, on the meaning of certain terms, such as the word "weapons", which are often used ambiguously, as well as an exchange of views to determine priorities for our discussions.

The very interesting statements we heard at the plenary meeting devoted to this item on our agenda revealed not only, as might have been expected, that positions on this subject differ greatly, but also that this is an important problem which should be considered more thoroughly at the Committee's next session. France, as it indicated on 20 April last, is in favour of the establishment of a working group provided it has a structured agenda which will enable it to consider the various aspects of the problem methodically. France would also be in favour of a meeting of experts at the beginning of our next session, in the same way as was done so successfully in the case of chemical weapons.

Of the important aspects of the matter that were brought up during the discussion, I would like to draw particular attention to the following four points:

Recognition of our Committee's special responsibility in the attempt to achieve a multilateral consensus on the problems of the extension of the arms race to outer space;

The inadequacy of existing legal instruments, in view of current and foreseeable developments in technology;

The uncertainty surrounding the idea of the immunity of space objects; and

The constraints resulting from the long-standing and now irreversible use of outer space for both civilian and military purposes.

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[1] CD/PV.184, pp. 7–12.

[2] CD/PV.172, pp. 16–19.

Recognition of the role of the Committee on Disarmament

In addition to the two competing resolutions, 36/99 and 36/97 C—France was one of the sponsors of the latter—which were adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, we now have, as several speakers have noted, the consensus reached at the United Nations Conference, UNISPACE '82. It is to be hoped that this will have put an end to a potentially harmful situation which would have led to a regrettable duplication of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and that of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

We hope that we can interpret the settlement of this conflict of competence as recognition of the complexity of the space element and its growing importance in the consideration of matters relating to the balance of forces and international security. This recognition should lead to acceptance of its corollary, namely, the fact that questions concerning the arms race in outer space now no longer concern the two major space Powers only, even if those Powers clearly have a particular and direct responsibility in this regard because of their existing or potential military capabilities.

It is true that the importance attaching to the work of our Committee is also connected with the inadequacy of the existing legal instruments in view of the foreseeable developments in technology.

Contrary to a widely held opinion, technological developments in the next 10 or 20 years are fairly easy to foresee: space programmes respond as much to the internal logic determined by the extent of the technical and financial investments put into them as to political promptings.

For more than a quarter of a century, outer space has been seen essentially in terms of support for military means of observation and communication. The parallel with the early days of aviation is, moreover, quite remarkable in this respect.

Even if new laser-weapon or directed-energy systems are at present still far from being technologically feasible or economically viable, it seems likely that the idea of the orbital platform, either manned or automatic, capable of use for both civilian and military purposes, will become a reality. Both the orbital rendezvous techniques practised by the Soviet Union for some years and the capacities of the United States space shuttle point in this direction.

In other words, the essential problem up to now has been (and it still is) that of the immunity of the space segment of land-based weapons systems from possible pre-emptive enemy attacks. Although it is true that the space segment is specifically designed for a particular purpose (for example, data transmission, analysis of the environment in which land-based troop movements are taking place, the detection of positions), it is functionally indissociable from a land-based network of communications and control systems. Furthermore, it has no purpose except as part of a complex military organization.

The moment outer space can itself become the scene of specific military activities, whether these are directed against other space objects (such as enemy satellites) or against land-based activities (the trajectories of ballistic weapons, for example), the problem of the arms race in outer space takes on an entirely new dimension.

In view of these possibilities, therefore, one of the most important aspects of our discussions ought to be to consider which of the three roles that it is possible to assign to outer space is to be chosen:

(1) That of a demilitarized "sanctuary", after the manner of Antarctica, the sea-bed and the moon;

(2) That of a "support area" for civilian and military land-based activities, to be used in accordance with its specific characteristics and advantages;

(3) That of a specific new "battlefield" in which space-based systems would attempt to destroy or cripple one another, in all likelihood as a prelude to—the most optimistic among us say as a substitute for—confrontation on earth.

The first idea—that of making outer space a sanctuary or totally demilitarizing it—is obviously no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to it.

The second idea—outer space as a support area for a mixture of civilian and military activities—is the one which prevails today and ought, therefore, in our view, to be considered as a basic element in our work.

The third idea—outer space as a staging ground for specific confrontations—is one technological possibility. It remains to be seen whether it is desirable.

It may be argued that, all in all, it is preferable to transfer to outer space a rivalry that may cause untold damage to the surface of the earth; that it would be possible, there, to reduce dependence vis-à-vis nuclear ballistic missiles; and that competition between defensive weapons systems (ABMs based on orbital platforms) in outer space would, all in all, be preferable to the present situation in which the balance between offensive weapons must constantly be re-established as one side or the other becomes more or less vulnerable.

Although theoretically attractive, these arguments take no account of the facts. First, even if such space technologies become operational, it is unlikely that they would be reliable enough to justify less dependence on land-based systems: ABMs stationed in outer space would in all likelihood constitute only a first line of defence.

Secondly, it is doubtful whether, in such a situation of competition for the military domination of outer space, one of the Superpowers would tolerate the superiority of the other for any length of time. In that context, therefore, the very vulnerability of systems stationed in outer space would be a great inducement to the launching of preventive attacks.

It is thus not enough to say that weapons systems in outer space would not threaten the earth and that in any event the prospects for such systems are too distant and problematical to justify their consideration at the present time. The international community should adopt a consistent approach to the question of the arms race in outer space.

In the French delegation's view, this means that the international community should set itself the following two objectives:

Not to allow outer space to become the point of departure for acts of aggression; and

To protect space vehicles and, in particular, ensure the immunity of satellites.

The first objective, which, as we have seen, relates to technologies of the future, can be achieved only if the second, which involves tons of equipment now in orbit over our heads, is attained.

Hence the importance which we, like many other delegations, attach to assuring the immunity of satellites.

In this connection, it must be noted that the existing legal instruments are entirely inadequate and fail to meet the needs of the present situation.

A number of these legal instruments have been referred to during our discussions, for example:

The 1963 Treaty on the partial suspension of nuclear weapon tests, in the atmosphere and, as it states, "beyond its limits, including outer space"; [3]

The 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, article V, paragraph 1, of which refers to the deployment of space-based ABMs and article XII, paragraph 2, of which refers to the principle of non-interference with national means of verification; [4]

The SALT I agreement, [5] which also provides for non-interference with "national means of verification", including satellites, according to the formal declaration made by President Carter on 1 October 1978 [6]—a declaration for which there is no Soviet counterpart;

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Use of Outer Space. [7]

Other agreements and international conventions relating to outer space, such as the Agreement on the Return and Rescue of Astronauts, [8] the Convention on Damage Caused by Space Objects, [9] the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon [10] and the Convention on Registration of Space Objects [11] are, for our purposes, only of minor interest.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197 ff.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid., 1978,* p. 586, and *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Oct. 8, 1978, p. 1686.

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967,* pp. 38–43.

[8] 19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 UNTS 119.

[9] 24 UST 2389; TIAS 7762.

[10] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 737–745.

[11] 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480.

It may be noted that:

First, the 1967 outer space Treaty offers only a partial solution to the problems of the arms race in outer space. Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty in fact restricts, as military activities in outer space, only the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty thus authorizes other military uses of outer space. This is clear, moreover, both from the statements made at the time by the Soviet representative and from the positions adopted by the United States.

We can go even further: from our point of view, the Treaty is of symbolic value only because the use of nuclear weapons in orbit is of doubtful military effectiveness, for the reason given on Tuesday by Mr. Arthur Clarke, speaking on behalf of the delegation of Sri Lanka, when he said that, in trying by that means to cripple or destroy its enemy's satellites, a country might well destroy its own.[12]

Secondly, uncertainty about the immunity of satellites extends, according to some interpretations, even to those satellites whose positive role in the verification of international agreements is nevertheless provided for as "national means of verification".

Articles I and III of the 1967 outer space Treaty do, of course, state that outer space shall be used in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Article III also refers to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The question of the immunity of military observation satellites, including their use in application of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, is therefore closely bound up with recognition of the international lawfulness of the role they play.

The above-mentioned declaration by President Carter in 1978 establishes a link between military observation satellites and national means of verification, whose lawful use is recognized in the international instruments in force.

With regard to the Soviet Union, the situation is formally less clear, and it is essential for us to know the position of the Soviet delegation on the following three points:

Does the international protection of "national technical means of verification" specifically include satellites? It would seem obvious that it should, but it would be useful if it were clearly recognized.

Is such immunity subject to restrictive interpretations concerning the extent of acceptable verifications, or is any observation capability automatically considered lawful? and lastly,

Does the non-interference clause embodied in Soviet-American bilateral agreements apply to third countries and international organizations?

An answer to these questions might not be necessary if the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on 11 August 1981[13] did not appear precisely to leave the door open for all possibilities. As the French and Italian delegations noted in earlier statements, the juxtaposition of article 1 of the draft text, which prohibits the stationing of weapons in outer space, although the term "weapons" is not—and in our view cannot—be defined, and article 3 thereof, which, on the other hand, legitimizes the destruction of satellites that might appear to any of the signatories to be designed for a purpose contrary to article 1, is extremely disturbing.

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[12] *Ante*, Aug. 31.

[13] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 334–336.

Article 3 not only in effect authorizes States to take the law into their own hands in outer space on the basis of their suspicions, thus creating mistrust and insecurity for all, but also legitimizes the deployment of such anti-satellite systems. In order to be used against possible violators, such systems would, of course, have to be tested, deployed and ready for use.

The wording of article 2 also gives rise to all kinds of questions: when, in the unilateral and subjective judgement of one of the parties, a satellite or space platform is considered as not being used "in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding", is it to be concluded that it is legitimate to interfere with its functioning?

This question is a valid one in view of another proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 10 August 1972 in connection with television satellites. The proposal provided that a State was entitled to use "the means available to it, not only in its territory, but also in outer space or situated outside its national jurisdiction" against programmes which it considered "unlawful".

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet draft treaty which, as indicated above, presuppose the possession of anti-satellite systems for use by what might be called self-appointed space sheriffs, thus limit the self-defence capability of space objects since "target" satellites are prohibited from disturbing the functioning or changing the flight trajectory of "hunter" satellites.

The difficulties we at once encounter as soon as we try to make an artificial distinction between satellites for military purposes and satellites for civilian purposes or to use terms as ambiguous as that of "weapons", should persuade us to contemplate a variety of measures rather than a global treaty. Such measures might include:

The use of language corresponding to the facts. Everyone knows that national means of verification include satellites. Why not say so?

The immunity of satellites. As a result of bilateral agreements, satellites benefit from some measure of protection. Why should such immunity not be specified, increased and extended beyond bilateral arrangements relating to non-interference with "national means of verification" to all existing satellites, if they are equipped only with passive means of defence?

The consideration of weapons systems as a whole and not of their space segments only. Why not recognize the fact that, as regards a weapons system of which only part is in orbit, it is the system as a whole that must be restricted, as in fact was done in the bilateral ABM Treaty. It should be recognized that the central problem is still that of the arms race, and its increasing use of outer space, and not that of the "militarization of outer space".

The adoption of measures designed to build confidence in the immunity of systems whose stabilizing value arises principally from their availability in times of crisis, for example, notification of the characteristics of space objects and the adoption of "co-operative" measures in order to remove any suspicions that might be aroused by certain actions on the part of a space object belonging to another State.

Recognition of the merit of a human presence in outer space because of the capacity for initiative and judgement that is thus introduced into the conduct of space missions. In this connection, the *a priori* suspicion implicit in the specific reference, in article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty, to reusable manned space vehicles, i.e. to the United States space shuttle, is unacceptable.

The giving of higher priority to the consideration of ways of promoting international co-operation with a view to using earth observation systems for the verification of arms limitation agreements and for crisis control. Mr. Arthur Clarke rightly recalled, at our last meeting, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, originally made by France, [14] which has been supported by a large part of the international community and forms the subject of a very useful report by the Secretary-General. [15]

This is not the place to repeat the reasons why we think that the development of technology inevitably raises the question of the internationalization of space observation and, consequently, that of the benefits which the international community may derive from it, especially in the matter of disarmament. It is, however, clear that the gradual establishment of such co-operation would, in many ways, be the best response the international community could offer to the real concern of peoples at the prospect of the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: Outer Space [Extract], September 2, 1982 [1]

. . . .

I would like to speak today on item 7 of our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the large number of speakers at our previous meeting indicates, this question is one in which all delegations in the Committee, including my own, share a considerable interest.

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[14] *Ibid., 1978*, p. 97.

[15] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 575–579.

[1] CD/PV.184, pp. 33–36.

During our spring session, I addressed the Committee on this agenda item during one of the two informal sessions devoted to this subject. Since that time interest has heightened and a number of delegations have urged the creation of a working group to deal with the issues. My delegation believes that the Committee should sharpen its focus by further discussion of this agenda item before considering whether to take such a step. I hope my statement today will serve to further that goal.

As a major space Power, the United States approaches the question of arms control and disarmament arrangements affecting outer space as an important and serious matter. This approach has shaped our policies and guided our actions in international forums. The United States attaches the greatest importance to the continued preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes, and to the prevention of activity there of an aggressive character. In its support of resolution 36/97 C at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, the United States joined in agreeing to "consider the question of negotiating further arms control measures in outer space . . ." here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are the beneficiaries of the efforts of our predecessors in the field of arms control and disarmament, who have endowed us with a number of agreements affecting outer space. These have already banned from outer space the most dangerous category of weapons—weapons of mass destruction—and have imposed other significant restrictions on weapons-related activities there.

The outer space Treaty of 1967 [2] is the broadest and most far-reaching of these agreements. It prohibits the orbiting of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. It forbids the installation of such weapons on any celestial body, including the moon, or their stationing in outer space in any other manner. This Treaty, moreover, also preserves the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and forbids "the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies."

Additionally, the outer space Treaty provides that its parties, "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding", shall apply the principles and regulations of international law, including, most notably, the Charter of the United Nations, to their activities in outer space. This point is worth stressing. A consequence of the application of the United Nations Charter and international law to outer space is the recognition that outer space can have an important role to play in the maintenance of world peace and security. And indeed, in the view of my delegation, outer space has served this end very well, by providing a place for satellites devoted to a wide range of useful purposes, from communications to navigation, to the monitoring of arms control agreements, to the stabilizing function of providing early warning against the possibility of a nuclear attack.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1967,* pp. 38–43.

In the view of my delegation, the arms control regime affecting outer space would be strengthened if States not already party to the outer space Treaty were to adhere to this agreement. Indeed, I regret to say, there are 11 members of this Committee who are not yet parties to this important Treaty.

The limited test ban Treaty of 1963 [3] prohibits, *inter alia,* nuclear explosions in outer space. In addition to the direct arms control benefits this Treaty has provided, namely, the absence of nuclear explosions in outer space, the Treaty has also had another great benefit relating to the continued development of the peaceful applications of outer space. As Mr. Arthur C. Clarke pointed out on Tuesday, [4] the many scores of satellites now performing a wide range of tasks would be placed in serious jeopardy were nuclear explosions to occur in outer space.

As with the outer space Treaty, the limited test ban treaty enjoys widespread, although not universal, adherence. One hundred and eleven countries are States parties to this important agreement. The adherence by additional States to this important agreement would serve to strengthen arms control arrangements for outer space.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, [5] negotiated in our predecessor body, the CCD, and signed in 1977, also applies to outer space. This Convention has now entered into force for some 30 States, a much smaller number than for the outer space and the limited test ban treaties. Again, much wider adherence to an agreement which effectively forestalls manipulation of the environment, including outer space, for hostile purposes would serve to strengthen the outer space arms control structure.

It is possible to point to a number of other agreements that affect the regime of outer space, its use for peaceful purposes and the prevention of its misuse for aggressive purposes. I should only add to my discussion here today the 1972 bilateral Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting anti-ballistic missile systems. [6] In so far as this Treaty relates to the prohibition of weapons in outer space, the two parties have undertaken not to develop, test or deploy space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or their components.

A fair assessment of the body of international law applying to the environment of outer space which I have just described would be that nations can have some confidence that the most destabilizing developments which might have been foreseen in the past—especially the orbiting or stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space—have already been renounced by those parties to the outer space Treaty. When the provisions of this Treaty and the other agreements I have described are considered, the widespread notion that an arms race in outer space is an immediate threat is placed into a more realistic perspective. I must therefore confess to some amazement at the view of some who seem to dismiss—or minimize—these agreements as "totally insufficient".

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[3] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ante,* Aug. 31.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1977,* pp. 322–326.

[6] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197–201.

It is also useful to examine the contribution which the use of outer space makes to the implementation of arms control agreements generally by providing a means whereby monitoring and verification can be carried out. It is abundantly clear that those arms control agreements which rely in part or in whole on national technical means of verification would probably otherwise have been impossible. At least, such agreements would have required intrusive verification measures, measures that no State wants to adopt lightly, especially if a better or more easily available alternative can be found. It is safe to say that given the reluctance of some States to agree to so-called "intrusive" means of verification, man's ability to make use of outer space for verification and monitoring purposes has in many cases made the difference between effective agreement and no agreement. It is interesting to note that a recent article on monitoring arms curbs in the 19 May issue of *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* pointed out that reconnaissance satellites "produced a real breakthrough in means of observing and monitoring arms limitation measures."

In addition to the specific arms control functions served by outer space, the great potential of outer space for peaceful purposes serves us in a great and ever-increasing variety of important ways. We are all aware of the just completed UNISPACE '82 conference, and of the many applications demonstrated and discussed in that forum. These show just how intimately connected with our daily lives the utilization of outer space for civil purposes has become. From the use of meteorological satellites to improve weather forecasting and warning of severe storms, to communications satellites which make possible the global transmission of live television coverage of both historical and recreational events, it is evident that outer space plays an important role in maintaining the structure of our international society. The United States has taken the lead over many years in making available to the world at large the technology and benefits from its space programme, which is dedicated to placing outer space in the service of peace, and to strengthening the bonds that link nations together.

We all recognize that outer space, and these satellites, have military value. There is no point in denying the simple fact that the use of outer space can and does serve important military functions such as early warning, communication and navigation. These functions can serve to strengthen international stability by strengthening the deterrent value of military forces and reducing the chances of strategic miscalculations. But as Professor Clarke, in his eloquent statement last Tuesday pointed out, "there are few of man's artifacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes: what matters is the intention".

And there is another simple fact which there is no point in denying. That is that the Soviet Union, for whatever purpose, has been actively engaged over a number of years in the development and testing of an operational anti-satellite weapon system. That system puts at risk the satellites of every nation. In light of this fact, my Government has concluded that it has had no prudent choice but to continue to pursue a programme of its own to develop a similar capability.

The United States is in full agreement that unrestrained competition in the development and deployment of weapons affecting outer space—what we often call an arms race—would not promote the larger goal of a more peaceful world. Indeed, it is for this reason that the United States supports discussion of this matter here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We continue to be willing to examine possible further measures to be added to the existing body of arms control agreements as they apply to the outer space environment. On 4 July of this year, President Reagan announced a national space policy for the civil, military and arms control uses of outer space. [7] These policies are outlined in a document, copies of which my delegation would be happy to supply to other interested delegations. I would like, however, to quote the appropriate passage from this document as it relates to arms control:

> The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security.

There are two points in this passage which I think are worth special note. First, the United States believes that attention should be focused on measures applicable to specific types of weapon systems. Obviously, measures which are vaguely worded, and contain only imprecise generalities whose applicability would be open to question, are not useful, nor, I think would they be of interest to delegations here. Secondly, the United States believes that arms control measures subject to consideration should be equitable and verifiable. These two tests are valid standards to be applied against any potential arms control agreements.

It should also be mentioned that, as with other aspects of our work in arms control and disarmament, our consideration of further outer space arms control measures cannot proceed in a vacuum. The international climate has an important bearing on the prospects for cooperation on such measures. As with all arms control measures the real world must affect our judgement.

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[7] *Ante.*

Finally, I believe I can confidently say that all of us here share a vision of mankind's future in space. As a boy, I recall being held in awe by the serialized exploits of "Buck Rogers" and "Flash Gordon", never dreaming that these were more than flights of fancy. Yet, in our lifetimes we have witnessed man's first tentative steps off our planet. We all remember the poignant comment of astronaut Neil Armstrong as he became the first man to set foot on the moon: "One small step for man, a giant step for mankind". It is not inconceivable that our grandchildren, or perhaps their children, will decisively break the bonds of earth and venture into a new age beyond our imagination. But only if the peace is kept can mankind reach out to that final frontier.

Statement by the Deputy Secretary of Energy (Davis) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Two of Its Subcommittees: Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, September 8, 1982 [1]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the two subcommittees and to comment on the proposed legislation to amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. [2]

You do have my entire statement, I will not go through it, but summarize it. I would like to have it and the attachments included in the record, if that is acceptable.

MR. BINGHAM. Without objection, it will be so included.

MR. DAVIS. I would like to start by saying that I have personally been involved in the development of nuclear energy and nuclear power for something in excess of 30 years. I believe it has great potential to benefit mankind, but recognize this can only be achieved with the parallel development of strong and effective measures to restrain nuclear proliferation.

ADMINISTRATION'S NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

Before addressing the two specific bills, H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318, I would like to briefly address the nonproliferation policy of this administration in the hope of clarifying some possible misconceptions that seem to have arisen over the last year. I believe there exist some unfortunate misunderstandings regarding the position of the administration, creating the impression that nuclear exports take priority over nonproliferation. Nothing could be further from the truth.

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[1] *Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade . . . , Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318,* pp. 193–197.

[2] The proposed legislation is printed *ibid.*, pp. 297–322. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 118–164.

First, let me stress that President Reagan and this administration are firmly and positively committed to the goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosives, as have all previous administrations. Like its predecessors, the Reagan administration is a strong supporter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT],[3] the Treaty of Tlatelolco,[4] the concept of full-scope safeguards, supporting and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards program, and other measures to avoid the spread of sensitive materials and technology to countries that might use them for making nuclear explosives. The method of approaching the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation may differ in some respects from that of the previous administration, but there should be no question about the seriousness of our commitment. Also, there should be no disagreement that we all share this common goal. For this reason, I believe it is absolutely essential that both the Congress and the executive branch work together toward that end. If we allow the matter of nuclear nonproliferation to become politicized, it can only be counterproductive and detract from our joint efforts to attain this goal.

PRESIDENT REAGAN

On July 16, 1981, President Reagan enunciated this country's policy on nonproliferation and nuclear cooperation.[5] I will not repeat the points which are listed in my testimony, but we can refer to them later, if necessary.

We believe that the United States must be selective in its international nuclear relationships, and differentiate between nations, regions, and circumstances that present proliferation risks and those that do not. Therefore, we will continue to refrain from selling critical or sensitive technology, facilities, or material except to a few countries where such cooperation is warranted and presents no proliferation risk. We will continue to take all possible steps to insure that the other nuclear supplier countries take similar approaches.

CIVIL REPROCESSING AND THE BREEDER

The President also stated in his July 16 statement that we will not inhibit or set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk.

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[3] *Ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465. Brackets in the source text.
[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.
[5] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 278–280.

JAPAN

For Japan and those countries in Euratom that have advanced nuclear power programs, we are seeking to remove the serious tensions that arose in our relationships with those countries in the past because of their perception that we were attempting to inhibit their domestic nuclear programs upon which their efforts at energy self-sufficiency depend. All these countries have excellent nonproliferation credentials and have either ratified the NPT or have agreed to abide by its obligations.

U.S. INFLUENCE

Another factor that we must consider in our nuclear relations with other countries is that the United States no longer possesses the dominant influence in international nuclear trade and in nuclear technology that we once enjoyed. This means we must turn away from unilateral actions and emphasize instead cooperation with our nuclear partners to achieve our nonproliferation goals. Failure to do so will cause further erosion of confidence in the United States, resulting in still further loss in influence and continuing friction with other countries.

The ability of the United States to influence in a positive way the nuclear direction and nonproliferation policies of other nations will depend in large part on our ability to regain foreign confidence, and their perception that the United States is a stable and reliable nuclear partner. Unfortunately, in recent years, due to some abrupt changes in U.S. nuclear export policies and procedures, there has been a loss in confidence in the United States as a nuclear supplier and a marked tendency by some consuming nations to turn to other suppliers for enrichment services and nuclear equipment.

EXPANSION OF THE FOREIGN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

While it was perhaps inevitable to expect some diversification in supply as foreign nuclear industry expanded, I believe that some of the shift away from the United States has been due to the perception that the U.S. export policies are unstable and prone to unilateral change. In any event, this perception has served to reduce U.S. influence abroad. To help counter this image, the administration has undertaken a major effort to reestablish the United States as a predictable and reliable nuclear partner. In my view, enactment of the legislation that I shall now comment on would seriously undercut these efforts.

H.R. 6312

I believe enactment of H.R. 6312, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act Amendments of 1982, would have a harmful effect on our ability to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation and trade with other countries, and on the attainment of the nonproliferation goals that I discussed earlier.

As you know, the administration, after careful consideration in 1981, decided to postpone consideration of changes to the law. This decision was strongly influenced by our judgment that the effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation policy has been harmed in the past by repeated revisions of the legal framework governing U.S. nuclear cooperation and exports. Our view has been, and continues to be, that another round of changes is ill-advised at a time when we are trying to foster a sense of stability, continuity, and confidence in our international nuclear relationships.

OBJECTION TO H.R. 6318

More importantly, however, we find the substantive approach embodied in H.R. 6318 to be seriously flawed as a basis for U.S. policy. As I mentioned earlier, effective nonproliferation policy requires careful distinctions between transactions that present a proliferation risk and those that do not. H.R. 6318 adopts a sweeping and indiscriminate approach that would undercut our ability to cooperate with our international partners and undermine U.S. efforts to advance the cause of nonproliferation. Its restrictions and prohibitions would undermine foreign confidence in the United States as a cooperating partner and would be perceived as a default on previous commitments and understandings.

It would turn other countries away from the United States and toward alternative cooperating partners, or increased nuclear autonomy, to the detriment of our nonproliferation objectives. If we are to succeed in reaching the objectives, we must work realistically with our most important allies to insure vigorous safeguards and controls over sensitive technology and materials.

The section 3 prohibition of the export of any material, equipment, or information for, or to provide any assistance to, foreign enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production facilities is an example of the unreasonable restrictions that I am referring to.

REPROCESSING APPROVALS

Further, the uncertainties associated with the ability of the United States to grant reprocessing approvals in a reasonable and timely fashion would, in our view, drive much existing and expected new U.S. enrichment business to other suppliers. This would also result in the loss of U.S. control over the reprocessed material, a result which would be inconsistent with our nonproliferation objectives. For these reasons, the administration strongly opposes enactment of H.R. 6318.

Mr. Chairman, I have attached more detailed comments on H.R. 6318 to my statement and I ask that these be included in the record of the hearing.

H.R. 6032

Turning now to H.R. 6032, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1982, we believe enactment of this bill would also be harmful to U.S. nonproliferation objectives, as well as the ability of the United States to associate constructively with the nuclear energy programs of several cooperating nations. Moreover, we believe that some of the proposed new procedures under the bill are not necessary and that any potential benefits would be greatly outweighed by the adverse effects of enactment.

Mr. Chairman, I have attached to my statement more detailed comments on H.R. 6032, and I ask that these be included in the record of the hearing. But I would like to address an effort within the administration which I believe speaks to some of the concerns in the proposed legislation. Specifically, I have provided the committee with a proposed revision to DOE's regulations, 10 CFR part 810, which is being submitted to the Federal Register for public comment.

PART 810

These regulations govern participation of U.S. persons in unclassified foreign nuclear energy programs. The revision that is proposed would continue in effect the list of countries presently in part 810 to which the general authorization does not apply and would add to that list all non-nuclear-weapon States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—except for those that accept full scope safeguards or for which the Treaty of Tlatelolco is currently in force—and Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology (Devine) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees: Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, September 8, 1982 [1]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to present the Department of State's views on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318, which would significantly alter the current statutory framework for certain U.S. nuclear export activities.

I will give a brief summary of my statement. May I request the full statement be inserted in the record?

Mr. Bingham. Without objection.

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[1] *Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Hearings and Markup Before the* *mmittee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on* *ernational Economic Policy and Trade of the House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second* *ssion, on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318*, pp. 215–218.

CHANGES IN THE NNPA

MR. DEVINE. We believe these bills would undermine our ability to pursue effectively our shared nonproliferation objectives. After a review of possible changes to the law, the administration last year concluded that contentious debate over the NNPA [2] would injure our ability to achieve our overall nonproliferation objectives.

Seeking changes at this time would be seriously disruptive and would undercut our efforts to restore the position of the United States as a predictable and stable nuclear trading partner.

Such changes would create a high degree of uncertainty both at home and abroad about the future content of U.S. nonproliferation law, policy, and procedures. This uncertainty would so undermine the U.S. role in international nuclear affairs that our ability to reforge cooperative ties with the other major nuclear suppliers and to strengthen the rulings of nuclear commerce would be seriously diminished.

The administration's views on these bills are set forth in letters we sent to Chairman Zablocki on June 2 and July 22, 1982. I would like to request that these letters be inserted in the record.

MR. BINGHAM. Without objection. [3]

H.R. 6302, TITLE I

MR. DEVINE. Let me briefly summarize our views. First, H.R. 6302 Title I would amend the procedures that currently apply to technology exports. We recognize the concern reflected here over blanket authorizations which might involve countries of proliferation concern. That is why the State and Energy Departments have agreed to revise part 810.

Changes that are needed can and will be made by the administration. This is an appropriate area for regulatory action. Legislative changes are not needed in our view.

H.R. 6032 would also require application of current export licensing criteria for facilities and nuclear fuels to the export of any nuclear technology exports. Such an approach, in our view, is misdirected. It would apply the most stringent controls we have in relatively insignificant technology. What is more productive than to review cases where there may be a specific nonproliferation concern under a specific authorization framework and to decide on a case-by-case basis what requirements should be attached to the technology transfer?

TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS

H.R. 6032 would further require that technology export or retransfer authorizations related to sensitive nuclear technology be subject to specific authorization requirements. This is unnecessary, as is already the case under 10 CFR part 810. The requirements of sections 123, 127, and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act and those in the nuclear supply guidelines already apply to any export of sensitive nuclear technology.

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[2] I.e., the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164.

[3] See app. 20 on p. 395 for State Department comments on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318. [Footnote in original.]

CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF HEU

H.R. 6032 would also impose specific controls on the export of highly enriched uranium [HEU]. [4] As you know, the administration's policy reflected in the President's July 16, 1981, statement encourages the use of low-enriched fuels where feasible. [5] This policy is reflected in procedures under which the executive branch prepares an analysis of the technical and economic justification for the use of HEU fuel prior to recommendation approval for any license to its exports.

In addition, the RARTR program promises in the future to reduce significantly the needs for exports of HEU. Thus, the substantive concerns of the bill in this regard are already being fully addressed. However, enactment of the provisions on HEU would have a number of significant disadvantages. The requirement for NRC findings under the bill would compel the U.S. Government to second-guess the judgment of foreign nations.

THE NRC

The requirement that the NRC determine an overall in-country kilogram limit on the amount of HEU of U.S. origin that will be allowed in each foreign country and in each reactor site at any time would impose on the Government an unworkable and intrusive administrative burden with respect to foreign stocks of HEU.

These provisions on HEU could well result in a sharp reduction in the readiness of foreign governments to cooperate in the RARTR program and to implement its results. Providing the NRC with these responsibilities would distort the relationship between the Commission and the executive branch.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND LEGISLATIVE VETO

H.R. 6032 would also provide for an expanded congressional review and a legislative veto of certain subsequent arrangements. We believe that the current review period, 15 days, is sufficient to permit Congress to call hearings on cases of particular interest.

To lengthen the processing and administrative burden for subsequent arrangements would, we believe, be damaging in that it would create a further and unnecessary procedural impediment that foreign nations would face in dealing with the United States as a nuclear supplier.

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[4] Brackets in source text.

[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

H.R. 6032 also contains provisions which would require that the Secretary of Defense make certain formal findings. DOD is already fully involved in our nonproliferation decisionmaking and the administration does not believe it desirable to establish by statute a formalized rigid requirement for DOD findings and participation.

Let me turn now to H.R. 6318. First I will comment briefly on the findings and declarations the bill would make. We fully agree that restraint must be exercised in the supply of any sensitive technologies to nonproliferation weapons States. However, vague and unsubstantiated findings and declarations by the Congress on matters such as whether safeguards may be effectively applied to reprocessing are not warranted and would create uncertainties abroad concerning the direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy and to implement this policy through appropriate U.S. exports and approvals under agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.

H.R. 6318

H.R. 6318 would result in a total ban of any exports of material, equipment or information, for any assistance to any facility for enrichment reprocessing or heavy water production. Such an across-the-board ban is not appropriate in our view.

Such exports are already subject to strict regulation. These restraints already provide an appropriate level of constraint and fully meet the needs of the U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

Sensitive nuclear facilities will exist where there is an advanced nuclear program and no proliferation risk as in Euratom and Japan, and if all of the applicable requirements in law and the nuclear supply guidelines are met we should not foreclose U.S. participation in the construction, design, and maintenance of such facilities in the future.

This could enhance our ability to shape the structure of the enterprise including its safeguards, and to achieve increased governmental cooperation from our allies and Japan and Euratom in dealing with real proliferation problems.

APPROVALS OF REPROCESSING

H.R. 6318 would also forbid approval of reprocessing U.S.-controlled special nuclear material in or under any agreement for cooperation until such time as Congress passes a joint resolution finding that effective international safeguards providing timely warning of possible diversion can be applied and international sanctions commitments have been established.

Highly technical judgments of these kinds in our view simply cannot be resolved by political debate in the legislative forum. They would undermine the cooperative efforts necessary to improve the existing nonproliferation regime and would be seen by our cooperating partners as a new and unjustified unilateral change in our cooperation arrangements. This would drive our nuclear trading partners to other nuclear suppliers or to increase nuclear self-sufficiency.

Further, it would be totally unwarranted to cease providing the approvals the United States has for some years been granting in accordance with statutory standards for reprocessing in the United Kingdom, France, and Japan.

NRC LICENSES

H.R. 6318 would also establish a requirement for a Nuclear Regulatory Commission license for the direct or indirect transfer or assistance outside the United States by any person, inter alia, any source or special nuclear material.

These provisions would discard the carefully tailored existing legal framework which provides varied levels of control for items or activities based on their proliferation sensitivity. U.S. companies would be eliminated from many areas of nuclear commerce without any convincing nonproliferation justification to the advantage of foreign nuclear suppliers.

H.R. 6318 would require NRC findings of safeguards adequacy and timely warning as a new export licensing criteria. Putting a U.S. regulatory agency in the position of unilaterally and publicly making findings would undermine U.S. efforts to cooperate with the IAEA and other nations to improve nuclear safeguards.

More importantly, the information on the basis of which judgments about safeguards effectiveness may be made is often classified as confidential information of the IAEA. Sufficient information would be rarely available, if ever, for the NRC to make the kind of safeguards effectiveness finding on a facility-by-facility basis which the Commission is expected to make for domestic facilities. This new export criterion would result in virtually a total nuclear export moratorium.

In conclusion, the administration strongly opposes both H.R. 6302 and H.R. 6318 in their entireties. They would undermine the position and influence of the United States in international nuclear affairs, and thereby seriously injure our nonproliferation efforts.

Statement by the ACDA Deputy Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control (Turrentine) Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Two of Its Subcommittees: Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, September 8, 1982 [1]

Your letter of invitation requested comments on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318 [2] and specifically asked us to address these amendments as they bear on the work of ACDA. The specific impact of the proposed changes on our staff resources is difficult to assess, except for an increase in time spent processing DOE 810 authorizations and NRC export license applications as a result of the expanded procedural and substantive criteria established in the bills.

NRC LICENSING REQUIREMENTS

In particular, we would see a substantial effort required to deal with the proposed NRC licensing requirements for foreign nuclear transactions brokered by U.S. citizens. However, the principal effect of these proposed amendments would not be on staff operations, but on the efforts of the United States to promote effective international cooperation in nonproliferation.

While ACDA continues to believe that the threat of nuclear proliferation requires a vigorous nuclear export control system, we also believe that such a system must be flexible enough to deal with the circumstances unique to each situation. A rigid application of a single approach to all is not likely to succeed, nor is an approach that fails to take into account the reality that there are nuclear suppliers other than the United States.

AEC ACT

We believe the AEC Act already contains provisions necessary to implement effective control of nuclear exports. Decisions or further inflexible legislative restrictions must consider whether such statutory changes are needed and their impact on states that pose no proliferation risk. The need for such changes should be substantial. There is significant risk that the changes will result in another serious disruption in our nuclear relations with trading partners having good nonproliferation policies.

ACDA

ACDA believes that H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318 do not meet this criteria. The additional controls they would impose on nuclear cooperation are unnecessary. They would make our nuclear export policy even more unpredictable and difficult to manage without significant corresponding nonproliferation benefits.

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[1] *Legislation To Amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Hearings and Markup Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade . . . , Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318*, pp. 227–228.

[2] Printed *ibid.*, pp. 297–322.

Passage of this legislation would reduce rather than enhance confidence in the United States as a reliable trading partner and would disrupt current efforts to achieve effective controls on plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the United States no longer has a monopoly on nuclear technology, and thus restrictive policies unilaterally adopted will have a diminishing impact. Passage of the proposed bills would accelerate the decline of our international influence on nuclear issues and aggravate countries that pose no proliferation risk, without any corresponding nonproliferation gain.

Finally, we must also recognize that nuclear export control is only one aspect of our nonproliferation strategy. We must be equally concerned with influencing a state's motivations for acquiring nuclear explosives. It is essential that the Congress and executive branch give increasing attention to policies that affect motivations, rather than focusing on increasingly restrictive controls on U.S. nuclear cooperation that only serve to disrupt the civil nuclear programs of countries that pose no proliferation risk.

Statement by the Under Secretary of State for Management (Kennedy) Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: Plutonium Use Policy, September 9, 1982 [1]

I genuinely appreciate the opportunity to come before the committee this afternoon to discuss recent developments in U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Let me start by echoing the concern which you expressed. There is no question in our mind, and the administration, certainly, that there can be no more dangerous possibility in the world than further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We would hope that policies that we are pursuing, espousing, would hopefully put an end to that possibility.

I am particularly concerned and appreciative of the opportunity to discuss this afternoon the approach the administration is taking toward the repossessing of nuclear material subject to U.S. consent rights and the use of the plutonium produced from that material in certain countries.

The hearing comes at a particularly, especially, appropriate time, in view of the numerous misunderstandings of the reprocessing and plutonium use policy which President Reagan approved in June of this year.[2]

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[1] *Plutonium Use Policy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes . . . , Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 2–9.

It is very important to set the record straight on this matter since in my view our approach represents the most realistic and effective means of advancing our nonproliferation objectives at this time.

In the course of explaining what our policy on these issues is and what it is not, I will seek to answer the specific questions which you have asked.

In his July 16, 1981, message on nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation,[3] President Reagan stressed a number of key themes. Two of these are particularly relevant to the administration's position on foreign reprocessing and plutonium use.

First, he stated that as one of the many elements of the administration's overall nonproliferation policy, the United States would continue to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment, and technology, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands.

Underlying this policy is a long-standing U.S. recognition of the serious risks associated with reprocessing and other sensitive technologies, the need for great caution and restraint in dealing with them, and the importance of limiting sensitive facilities and activities to as few locations as possible under adequate safeguards and only where there is no significant risk of proliferation.

The President also emphasized that an essential step in achieving our nonproliferation goals must be the reestablishment of this Nation as a reliable partner for nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards.

In this connection, he announced that the United States will not inhibit or set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not constitute a proliferation risk.

Consistent with this position, in June of this year, the President decided on a modified and limited approach toward the reprocessing of material subject to U.S. consent rights and the use of plutonium derived from that material in certain countries.

This approach is primarily designed to give our close allies in Euratom and Japan a firmer and more predictable basis upon which to plan their vital energy programs while at the same time furthering our nonproliferation objectives, including strengthened controls over civil plutonium.

Specifically, we are offering Japan and the countries of Euratom new, long term arrangements for implementation of U.S. consent rights over the reprocessing and use of material subject to our agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

This advance, long term approval would apply only for facilities and activities which we determine meet our strict statutory criteria. We are also prepared to state our intention to consent to such activities in future programs when we have sufficient information about those programs to make the necessary determinations under our law.

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[2] *Ante*, June 9.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 278–280.

These offers are being made in the context of seeking new or amended peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with Japan and Euratom, which would be subject to congressional review. The approvals would be valid only as long as the conditions provided in the agreement, including nonproliferation and statutory conditions, continue to be met.

Our willingness to take these steps presumes the continued strong commitment of these countries to our common nonproliferation efforts and to developing and implementing more effective controls over plutonium.

Providing advance consent will not open the floodgates to the widespread use of plutonium, as has been alleged. We are proposing this arrangement only to those few nations which have well-defined and coherent, advanced nuclear programs and where reprocessing and plutonium use do not constitute a proliferation danger.

The President's decision limits the offer of advance consent for these activities, therefore, to Japan and the countries of Euratom, nations, which regard the use of plutonium as crucial to meeting their future nuclear energy needs.

Moreover, some of these countries already have reprocessing technology as well as active research, development, and demonstration programs for advanced nuclear fuel cycles using plutonium.

Our policy does not endorse or encourage the spread of reprocessing and plutonium; on the other hand, it recognizes that major programs already exist and that we must work realistically with our most important allies to insure vigorous safeguards and controls over sensitive technology and materials, and to otherwise advance our nonproliferation objectives.

This policy acknowledges that our close allies with advanced nuclear programs which pose no proliferation risk must be distinguished from others. Such a distinction is based upon genuine differences between countries, and we need to tailor our policies to deal with those differences.

Past efforts to challenge the carefully considered programs of Japan and Euratom countries led only to rancorous debates which soured our relations with key allies without enhancing our nonproliferation goals. At the same time we must and we will continue to hold the line against the spread of sensitive nuclear activities, particularly where the danger of proliferation demands.

Moreover, our approach would not entail a blanket endorsement of the programs of Japan and Euratom. We will grant advance consent for reprocessing and the use of plutonium only for those facilities and activities which we can determine satisfy the strict criteria contained in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

We are offering this approach in the context of seeking new or amended agreements and the law requires that the President must "determine in writing that the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security."

In addition, since the advance consent arrangement involves reprocessing, we will also determine before entering into the arrangement that our approval will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation, as would be required under section 131 of the act. In making that determination foremost, consideration will be given to whether or not the reprocessing will take place under conditions that will insure timely warning to the United States of any diversion.

For other countries with which we have cooperation agreements, we will be working to provide advance, long-term consent for retransfers of U.S.-origin spent fuel to the United Kingdom and France for reprocessing in facilities which meet the applicable stratutory criteria.

Disposition of the recovered plutonium would be subject to further U.S. consent. Such arrangements will also be made in the context of seeking new or amended peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements.

During the past two administrations, requests for reprocessing or retransfer of plutonium were approved on a case-by-case basis. Past approvals have involved primarily reprocessing in Japan at Tokai Mura or the shipment of spent fuel from Japan and a few other countries to France and the United Kingdom for reprocessing. Both previous administrations and this administration have always approved such requests. However, the case-by-case approach was resented by these countries because it caused considerable uncertainty in their nuclear power planning.

The previous administration was, in fact, considering ways to reduce that uncertainty during its last year in office and was consulting with our key allies on possible approaches including the provision of more extended approvals.

Our approach is thus not a major break with past practices but a logical progression from them. It is also consistent with the approaches recently adopted toward Japan and Euratom by Canada and Australia which presently insist as a general policy on consent rights similar to our own.

Our approach includes as well an effort to strengthen our agreements for cooperation, safeguards and other controls on civil plutonium. As you know, the present agreements between the United States and Euratom do not provide for U.S. consent rights over the reprocessing of nuclear material which we export to the Community.

We are required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978[4] to seek such consent rights in Euratom and to expand the ones we have presently with Japan. The countries of Euratom are not likely to agree to expanding existing ones unless they are confident that we will exercise those rights in a responsible and a predictable manner.

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[4] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 118–164.

I believe our new approach will go a long way toward convincing these countries that their agreement to new or expanded consent rights will place our nuclear relations on a more sound and orderly basis.

In addition, advance, long-term approval of reprocessing with Euratom and Japan is clearly premised on the expectation of strengthened and broadened cooperation on nonproliferation matters, particularly in dealing with pressing proliferation problems in sensitive regions of the world and in implementing more effective controls on civil plutonium. Such approvals would be premised on continued commitments to improve the application of IAEA safeguards at reprocessing plants and other facilities which process, use or store plutonium as well as commitments to assure adequate physical security measures for plutonium.

Such cooperation from the major advanced nuclear countries is essential if we are to succeed in strengthening these aspects of the nonproliferation regime.

The United States no longer enjoys a position as the monopoly supplier of nuclear materials equipment and technology. Today, in fact, we supply only some 35 percent of the non-Communist enrichment market whereas we accounted for virtually all of it just a few years ago. But if we are to have the full cooperation of the other advanced nuclear powers in pursuing our nonproliferation objectives, we cannot continue to press a policy which is hostile to their reprocessing and breeder programs or which needlessly creates uncertainties and difficulties for their nuclear power planning which affects capital investments in the billions of dollars. In that kind of atmosphere, U.S. proposals to modify the design features of those facilities to strengthen the application of safeguards and other steps to insure more rigorous controls on the use of plutonium would be viewed with skepticism, if not as an effort to undermine foreign reprocessing and breeder programs.

It is, therefore, in our view, essential that we take steps to remove the tensions that have marred our nuclear relations with our close allies over the past few years so that we can work more effectively together.

Turning to issues raised by the possible export of sensitive reprocessing technology and equipment, we are prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis specific requests for such transfers, but again only to Japan and Euratom. This is not a blanket approval. Rather, each request will be viewed on its merits and will be approved only if we judge it to be in our overall nonproliferation interest and if it meets the stringent requirements in U.S. law as well as those in the Suppliers Guidelines (INFCIRC 254).[5]

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–25.

Japan and Euratom will build such plants with or without our assistance. However, by cooperating with them we would expect to be able to work more effectively to influence IAEA safeguards and physical security measures applied to new facilities in Japan and Euratom. In particular, cooperation with our key allies can provide us the opportunity to work with them to minimize the proliferation risks associated with such facilities, most importantly, by designing plants to facilitate the application of safeguards. Thus, we would strongly oppose legislation prohibiting the export of such reprocessing technology.

Your letter of invitation to this hearing suggests that adequately safeguarding reprocessing plants and other facilities where large quantities of plutonium are present will be an increasing challenge for the IAEA and its member states. We share that view. For that reason, it is all the more necessary, in our view, to work with our close allies in order to ensure improvements in safeguards at such facilities.

Turning to some of the detailed questions your letter raised, increased numbers of trained and experienced inspectors and new safeguards equipment and techniques should permit the IAEA to implement safeguards effectively at light water reactors involved in thermal recycle programs. In addition, we preceive no insurmountable problems which might forestall the development and implementation prior to breeder reactor commercialization of a safeguards approach for breeder reactors that ensures timely detection of diversion.

While the technology is available to safeguard small reprocessing plants currently under safeguards, the development and use of new safeguards techniques will be required for the large reprocessing plants planned by some countries.

For example, newly developed dynamic, or near-real time accounting techniques, involving frequent measurements of the material in process so that a material balance can be struck at short notice, may be an essential safeguards tool. Their use may require that appropriate instrumentation be designed into large reprocessing plants.

Continuous inspection—which the IAEA is now applying at Japan's Tokai reprocessing plant—will probably be necessary as well. New containment and surveillance equipment and techniques, including the concept of "extended" containment and surveillance, may also be needed to complement material accounting measures, for example, to help insure timely detection.

Similar techniques are likely to be required for effectively safeguarding large commercial mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants. Here, too, timely detection may require at least biweekly, and probably continuous, inspection regimes. New equipment such as nondestructive-assay equipment also will be needed to safeguard mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities; it is currently in use or in the final stages of development. Similarly, new containment/surveillance equipment for such plants is being developed by several countries.

Safeguarding plutonium in storage facilities is well within the capabilities of existing item accounting and containment/surveillance measures. Achieving our goals for the timeliness of detection is likely to depend heavily on whether sufficient resources are available.

In this regard, if an effective international plutonium storage system is eventually established, it would provide increased assurance that excess separated plutonium remains adequately accounted for and is not diverted to a proscribed use.

Clearly there are major challenges ahead in assuring an adequate IAEA safeguards system for nuclear activities involving the use of plutonium in Japan and Euratom. But we cannot meet that challenge by trying to force these countries to eschew steps or options they regard as essential to their future energy security. On the contrary, we believe that our cooperative approach is the only credible and realistic way to obtain the international support needed to achieve our vital safeguard objectives.

You have asked that I address the relationship of the plutonium use policy to section 403 of the NNPA. That section calls on the President to seek international agreement to limit reprocessing to as few facilities as feasible under effective international auspices and inspection.

You also asked about section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which requires a termination of certain nuclear exports to any nation found by the President to have entered into an agreement for the transfer of reprocessing equipment, material or technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state, except pursuant to international agreement or understanding to which the United States subscribes.

Our policy is consistent with section 403. Seeking international auspices for and inspection of reprocessing facilities, and seeking to limit the number of such facilities, does not mean that there will be no reprocessing facilities. Reprocessing facilities already exist—and they will continue to be built—in Japan and in the Euratom countries. In addition, as I have noted, our policy affords us the opportunity to work with our allies to maximize the effectiveness of international inspection and to move in the direction of multinational involvement in such facilities, both prime objectives of section 403. Not least, a readiness to provide approval for reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel in these plants on a longer term basis does not mean we will encourage such plants elsewhere, on the contrary.

Section 129(2)(C) requires termination of certain U.S. nuclear exports upon the entry into agreements between foreign nations for reprocessing transfers. However, in the period following the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation [INFCE] [6] this does not apply where the United States is prepared to certify that the terms and conditions in such an agreement are acceptable. The countries to which we would consider authorizing U.S. reprocessing technology exports are very limited and the requirements we would impose very stringent.

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[6] Brackets in source text.

Obviously, if another country, for example, France, contemplates reprocessing exports to another Euratom country or to Japan, and under the same stringent conditions I have described as applicable to U.S. exports, the United States would be prepared to confirm the acceptability of the arrangement. The arrangement would then constitute an understanding to which the United States subscribes and the provisions in section 129(2)(C) would not be applicable.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stressing once more that this administration's approach to reprocessing and plutonium use is a realistic and conservative one. It fully recognizes and understands the risks associated with plutonium, but it equally recognizes the fact that the United States will have consent rights over a decreasing amount of nuclear material worldwide and that we will have to rely increasingly on persuasion to achieve our nonproliferation objectives. Further, our new approach is based on our traditionally strict statutory criteria designed to ensure that our materials and technology are used only for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this discussion of the administration's policy toward foreign reprocessing and plutonium use has put the subject into better perspective. As we negotiate the specific arrangements which will implement the policy, I believe the Congress will be convinced that it represents a measured and a prudent response to the needs of our major allies, while furthering our nonproliferation goals.

There is a firm consensus, shared by the Congress and this administration, that restraining the proliferation of nuclear explosives is one of our most important national policy objectives. That policy is firmly grounded in Federal law, which this administration is determined to implement effectively.

We may have some differences on tactical and procedural approaches to achieving our shared goals. That is to be expected. However, we are committed to working with you to develop a successful nonproliferation policy. In that regard, we will be keeping you and the subcommittee informed of significant developments in negotiations in implementing this new policy.

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons [Extracts], September 9, 1982 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on

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[1] CD/328, pp. 1, 3–4.

Radiological Weapons on the basis of its former mandate, with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.[2] The Committee further decided that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group would report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group would also report to the Committee before the conclusion of the second part of its 1982 session.

II. Organization of Work and Documentation

2. At its 157th plenary meeting on 23 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener, representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Mr. Guennady Efimov and Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group during the first and second parts of the 1982 session respectively.

3. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held 14 meetings between 20 February and 21 April and between 2 and 8 September 1982.

4. At their request, representatives of the following States, not members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the 1982 session: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

5. In carrying out its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group took into account paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.[3] It also took into consideration the relevant recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in particular those adopted in connection with the Second Disarmament Decade in 1980.[4] In addition to various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its previous sessions, the Working Group further took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly, by which the Committee on Disarmament was called upon "to continue negotiations with a view to an early conclusion of the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, in order that it may be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982".

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[2] *Ante.*

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 426.

[4] G.A. res. 35/46, Annex.

III. Substantive Negotiations

A. First Part of 1982 Session

7. Pursuant to the appeal contained in the General Assembly resolution 36/97 B, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, in addition to informal consultations and informal meetings of a drafting group, held 12 meetings during the first part of the 1982 session with a view to submitting a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

8. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group submitted a special report to the Committee on Disarmament, as contained in Document CD/284/Rev.1, which contains a summary account of the negotiations during the 1980 and 1981 sessions as well as the first part of the 1982 session.[5] At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the special report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group, which is an integral part of the Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (Document CD/292 and Corr. 1–3).[6]

B. Second Part of 1982 Session

9. In view of the difficulties encountered in the first part of the 1982 session and taking into account the fact that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had not taken action in this field, the Chairman of the Working Group took the initiative to exchange views with delegations through a letter and attached questionnaire with a view to facilitating the future work of the Working Group. The questionnaire concentrated on the relationship between the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter and the problems inherent in the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which, *inter alia,* had threatened to bring the negotiations in the Working Group to a deadlock at an earlier point.

10. At the 1st meeting of the Working Group during the second part of the 1982 session, held on 2 September 1982, the Chairman reported on the replies to his letter and questionnaire as well as various views expressed by delegations during his informal consultations. A summary account of those replies and views is contained in the Chairman's statement (Document CD/RW/WP.38). In the presentation of his statement the Chairman emphasized that his reading of the replies received was necessarily of a personal and synthetic nature, and was designed to bring out the common ground he could discern among the various views offered by delegations.

11. At the same meeting, confirming developments to which the Chairman had drawn attention in his statement, a certain flexibility of positions of some delegations was revealed in connection with the

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[5] *Ante*, Apr. 23.

[6] It was also issued as *Official Records of the General Assembly*, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S–12/2). [Footnote in original.]

organization of the future work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group and the subjects addressed in the Chairman's questionnaire. However, it appeared from the discussions that the consultations initiated by the Chairman, especially those to which reference is made in paragraph 10 above, and the new positions of certain delegations had not yet succeeded in eliminating the difficulties encountered in the Working Group regarding the issue. Also, several delegations felt it necessary to restate the views of their governments as to a certain number of other issues of a substantive nature under negotiation in the Working Group, which had not been considered in detail in the second part of the 1982 session.

12. During the same meeting the representatives of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany introduced working papers as contained in CD/RW/WP.37 and Corr.1 and CD/RW/WP.40, respectively.

13. In spite of differences of opinion, there was a general recognition that negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament should be continued with a view to attaining rapid progress, taking also into account the consultations and discussions held during the second part of the 1982 session. Several delegations expressed the view that progress on the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter might be facilitated by basing future negotiations in this respect on the Compilation of Radiological Weapons Treaty Provisions submitted by the Chairman as contained in document CD/RW/WP.39. Certain delegations expressed the view that this issue should be negotiated simultaneously with the question of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Other delegations had reserved their position on this subject.

14. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that an *ad hoc* working group should be established at the beginning of its 1983 session to continue negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Address by ACDA Director Rostow: Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Strategic Arms Reductions [Extract], September 10, 1982 [1]

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Problems of INF and START Negotiations

I now turn to the specific problems of INF and START negotiations. A year ago a consensus emerged within the Administration on certain key propositions as the foundation for our negotiating approach in the two negotiations. The first and most important was that we should discard the premise that the United States and the Soviet Union shared the same view of nuclear weapons and the same goal for nuclear arms control negotiations. Ten years ago most Americans took that hypothesis for granted. Today it cannot be entertained at all. Officials used to assure us that the Soviet Union was only interested in equality, recognition as a great power, and a place in the sun and that when it achieved parity with the United States it would stop enlarging its armed forces. No one can say that after what happened during the 1970s.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 25. Mr. Rostow spoke before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council.

For the United States, the only acceptable use for nuclear arms is in defense of our supreme national interests and those of our allies against the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of aggression. Our nuclear arsenal is defensive in character, and its mission is to deter aggression by presenting a visible and credible capacity to retaliate.

It is now obvious that the Soviet Union marches to a different drummer. While we in the West have been primarily concerned with deterring both conventional and nuclear attacks, Soviet doctrine and forces emphasize the ability to fight and win a nuclear war. Of course, the Soviet Government would prefer to have the fruits of military victory without having to wage war. To achieve that end, it believes, the nuclear superiority it is trying so hard to attain would be a political force of overpowering influence—the ultimate instrument of coercion and intimidation. The function of Soviet military superiority is to paralyze the American nuclear deterrent by threatening to overwhelm it, and thus make Soviet aggression with conventional forces possible. More than 75% of the Soviet strategic nuclear force consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—swift, accurate, and extremely destructive first-strike weapons which could destroy missiles deployed in hardened silos. Less than one-third of the American force consists of ICBMs. In addition, the Soviet Union has an intermediate-range ballistic missile force which, as yet, has no American counterpart. The Soviets currently have deployed at least 324 SS-20 launchers, 265 SS-4s, and 15 SS-5s. They have 1,232 warheads in all. With one refire missile per launcher, these intermediate-range missiles may have over 2,000 nuclear warheads, almost all of which can reach West European targets. The balance, all deployed on mobile SS-20 launchers, are now targeted from eastern Siberia. Given the transportability and range of the SS-20, all of these could be moved within reach of Europe. The United States has no weapons at all in this class. Partially to counter this threat, our Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile and ground-based cruise missile are in development and are scheduled for modest deployment in Europe late in 1983.

The Soviet lead in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is one of the most serious foreign policy problems we face. This advantage gives the Soviet Union the potential to destroy all of Europe or Japan and many targets in other parts of the world at a time when a preemptive first strike with its intercontinental ballistic missiles could in theory also destroy all our ICBM force, that portion of our submarines that are in port, and those of our bombers that are at their bases.

The combination of these doomsday possibilities is a recipe for nuclear coercion that could split our alliances and leave us isolated in the Western Hemisphere. Henry Kissinger deepened Western anxiety about the nuclear imbalance a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers do not commit suicide on behalf of their allies. Former President Nixon has now made nuclear anxiety in this sense more acute. In an article in the *New York Times* on August 19, 1982, he says:

> The Soviet Union's achievement of superiority in land-based nuclear missiles has made our nuclear strength no longer a credible deterrent against Moscow's creeping expansionism, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. We will not again be able to use the threat of that power as President Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when we had a 15-to-1 advantage, or even as I was able to do during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, when our advantage was far less but still formidable. Even if we restore the balance of those nuclear forces, we will not fully restore their deterrent effect for such purposes. A threat of mutual suicide is simply not credible.

Political anxieties about the American nuclear umbrella would exist even if Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called "subliminal" emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the state of the Soviet-American nuclear balance. They are there because we allowed the nuclear balance to deteriorate during the 1970s. We shall have to live with the consequences of that mistake until the balance is restored by some combination of American force modernization and arms control agreements.

The fears generated by the changing nuclear balance are manifest in many forms—in the antinuclear demonstrations and other movements for unilateral disarmament, isolationism, and accommodation, on the one hand, and for nuclear proliferation, on the other. If these movements prevail, here, in Europe, and in Asia, we shall wake up one day soon in a different world.

In the light of these considerations, President Reagan decided to make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles the first goal of our nuclear arms control effort and the first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union. We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs in 1972.

In 1982 the Soviets have a lead in this crucial area of approximately three to one. It follows that they have the theoretical capacity to execute a preemptive first strike by destroying our ICBMs and other nuclear forces with a fraction of their forces, holding the rest in an ominous reserve which could paralyze our remaining strategic forces.

When the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles are counted, the Soviet advantage in this category becomes even higher. Until this Soviet advantage in nuclear forces is eliminated, it will not be possible to achieve political stability.

The *New York Times* put the issue well in an editorial entitled "How Much Is Enough?" on April 11, 1982. The task of arms control diplomacy, the *Times* said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence "which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history" and "to forbid the weapons which defy deterrence . . . . That done, the arms race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough."

U.S. Approach to INF Talks

This view of the matter is the basis for our approach to the INF and START talks. What we are seeking in these talks is to establish nuclear stability at equal and much lower levels of force—a posture on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy would deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on its present superiority in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The U.S. position in these talks was explained by President Reagan in his speech of November 18, 1981.[2] During the first round of the INF talks beginning in November 1981, the U.S. delegation laid out the broad principles underlying the U.S. approach, defined the elements of an agreement which would take into account the legitimate interests of the two sides, and in February 1982 presented the text of a draft treaty which would implement those elements. The Soviet side elaborated somewhat on the positions that had been set forth by Chairman Brezhnev before the negotiations had begun[3] and offered its criticism of the U.S. position. Mr. Brezhnev's plan has two elements: A moratorium for the duration of the negotiations and a program of reductions based on the assumption that both sides are now equal in intermediate-range missiles. The Soviets have proposed a limit of 300 "systems" for each side by 1990.

During the second round, beginning in May, the Soviet delegation presented a draft text of an agreement which would embody the Soviet position. The United States offered its criticisms of the Soviet position and a full analysis of the issues between the sides.

As the third round of the INF negotiations is scheduled to begin at the end of this month, it is appropriate to review some of the major issues as they have emerged. You will remember that in 1976 the Soviet Union began the deployment of a new mobile and MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] intermediate-range missile system—the SS-20—as a replacement for the older fixed single-warhead systems on which it had relied for many years. The SS-20s are highly accurate; can strike all important targets in Europe, even from locations in the middle of Siberia; and have a short time of flight. They represent a threat different in kind, not just in degree, from the systems they have been replacing.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 570–578.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 64–69, 617–620.

In 1979 the NATO nations unanimously agreed that it was necessary to counter this threat unless it was withdrawn.[4] It was decided that the United States should move to deploy in Europe two somewhat comparable systems, the Pershing II ballistic missile and the BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile and simultaneously seek negotiations with the Soviet Union for the limitation of comparable systems on both sides. On November 18, 1981, President Reagan proposed that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. entirely forgo such systems—the zero/zero solution.

The Soviet Union has not yet gone beyond its position that the INF talks are exclusively concerned with stability in the European theater. The United States insists that the INF problem is global and that the cause of world peace would not be advanced by exporting the Soviet INF nuclear advantage to Asia.

The Soviet Union also continues to claim that the United States and the Soviet Union have approximately the same number of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European theater and, therefore, that the NATO decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe is "provocative" and "destabilizing." The Soviet claim rests on two untenable propositions—first, that the British and French nuclear forces must be counted with the American forces and, second, that American bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and cruise missiles should be treated as equivalent to the Soviet SS-20. The Soviet calculations go beyond even these errors. In order to demonstrate the supposed equality of the two INF forces in Europe, the Soviet Union must count all American weapons as relevant—including American dual-purpose aircraft, as well as FB-111s, all of which are located in the United States—and also exclude many categories of the Soviet arsenal.

The principal issue between the sides centers on the treatment to be accorded the SS-20s and comparable missiles on the Soviet side, and the Pershing II and BGM-109G on the United States side. Whereas the United States draft treaty would ban them on both sides, the Soviet treaty would eliminate them only on the U.S. side; the Soviet side would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for such missiles in the European portion of the Soviet Union and an unlimited number in the far-eastern portion of the Soviet Union.

In addition to this wholly one-sided treatment proposed by the Soviets as to the central issues, their proposed treaty would have other unequal effects. The Warsaw Pact has some 7,000 nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, of which some 2,500 are assigned to nuclear combat roles. NATO has approximately one-third of the latter number; almost all U.S. nuclear-capable planes located in Europe are dual capable. The U.S. contribution to the conventional defense of Europe is almost wholly dependent on such dual-capable planes. Yet, the Soviet draft treaty would have the effect of forcing the almost total withdrawal from Europe of such U.S. dual-capable aircraft, while not affecting most Soviet dual-capable aircraft.

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[4] The NATO decision may be found *ibid., 1979*, pp. 814–816.

This effect results in part from the Soviet proposal that U.K. and French nuclear-capable systems be included under the aggregate ceiling limiting U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles and aircraft. This proposal is both technically flawed and inequitable in principle. First, most of these U.K. and French forces are not, in fact, intermediate-range (or what the Soviets call medium-range); they are SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] forces identical with Soviet and U.S. SLBM forces. Most of the remainder are nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviet predominance in intermediate-range, nuclear-capable systems in Europe is so great that there would be no justification for compensation to the Soviet Union for British and French nuclear forces even if they were under NATO command.

Beyond this technical flaw, the claim of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces equal to or superior to those of all other nations combined would be unjustified. It is a demand for absolute security for one country, which is tantamount to absolute insecurity for all other countries. In short, it is a Soviet demand for hegemony. This will never be acceptable to the United States.

This Soviet demand is inappropriate in another way as well. The INF negotiations are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.; neither the United Kingdom nor France has authorized either the United States or the Soviet Union to negotiate on their behalf. On the contrary, they have stated their refusal to have their forces limited or compensated for in negotiations between us. From their standpoint, their nuclear forces are strategic; they represent their last line of defense in a potentially threatened position.

There are a number of other important issues separating the two sides. Much progress, however, has been achieved by the two delegations in sorting out what is important to each side and illuminating the way to possible solutions. A serious atmosphere has evolved in the INF talks. It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence.

U.S. Position in START

The first 2-month round of the START negotiations has now been completed. They are, of course, at an earlier stage than the INF talks, but the atmosphere is correspondingly serious and businesslike.

The U.S. position was outlined in President Reagan's speech at Eureka College on May 9, 1982.[5] Its essential idea is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force—ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles proposed in the INF talks, such a result would enable us to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiation, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The focus of our efforts," the President said, "will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential."

While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration and the United States will negotiate in good faith on any topics the Soviets wish to raise, the United States proposes that the first topic to be considered in the negotiations should be the reduction of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half these warheads would be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw-weight. Our proposal calls for these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. evels.

In both START and INF, the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensable. For those provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national echnical means of verification, we will be proposing cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has ndicated that it will be prepared where necessary to consider cooperaive measures going beyond national technical means. This is an enouraging sign. Without satisfactory verification provisions, meaningul agreements will be impossible to achieve.

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair, on he ground that they call for unequal reductions—indeed, that they all for "unilateral Soviet disarmament." It is hardly obvious why this s the case. Each side now has approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the American proposal, each side would have to reduce to no more than 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 could be on ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBM warheads than we would in order to comply with the ICBM sublimit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability. It is discouraging that this feature of the American proposal was not mentioned in a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* by General Starodubov, a senior member of the Soviet START delegation. By omitting any reference to SLBMs, General Starodubov gives the reader an incomplete version of the American position.

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[5] *Ante.*

If the INF and START talks are successful, the huge Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles will be eliminated. These alone are the weapons which "defy deterrence." If the Soviet Union accepts nuclear arms control agreements based on the principle of "deterrence only," which is the heart of our negotiating position, a Soviet first strike would be impossible without expending most of the Soviet force. Given such a change in the balance of the two forces, we could hope to protect our ICBM force effectively. Then—but only then—nuclear tension would diminish.

There is another aspect of our START negotiating position which deserves emphasis. As President Reagan's speech at Eureka College makes clear, the American approach to START is directed in the first instance at the most destabilizing weapons and proposes a new unit of account as the basis for a treaty dealing with them and all other intercontinental nuclear weapons. That unit of account, replacing the "deployed launchers" used in SALT I and SALT II, would compare the Soviet and American forces both in the number of weapons on each side and their destructive capacity. The measure of destructive capacity we propose is that of throw-weight—the maximum weight of weapons a missile can propel. What we are seeking is an equal throw-weight limit for each side at levels below the present American level. This goal would require a greater reduction on the Soviet side than on the American side. But the Soviet Union can hardly claim a right to preserve an advantage which could only be used for intimidation or aggression. Nor is there anything inequitable in the idea of unequal reductions to achieve equality. The United States made larger reductions than any other power under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.[6]

The Need for Real Nuclear Parity

If we yield in the end and wearily settle for INF and START agreements which allow the Soviet Union to preserve its overwhelming advantage in ballistic missiles, we should find ourselves confronting former President Nixon's bleak prognosis. Such an outcome would legitimize the superiority in intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union has achieved under SALT and authorize it to consolidate and improve that advantage. On that basis, the Soviet leaders would be justified in continuing to believe that they could translate their nuclear edge over the United States into political and diplomatic hegemony.

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[6] T.S. 671.

This would be a most dangerous illusion—the kind of illusion from which major wars have arisen in the past. President Reagan's approach to INF and START calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing that the quest for hegemony is the greatest possible threat to the peace and that real nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States—parity, that is, in deterrent capacity—is the most feasible foundation for a joint program to establish world political stability based on the rule of law.

The state of world politics does not justify the apocalyptic gloom of those who believe that resisting Soviet expansionism would be suicidal and, therefore, counsel an American retreat to isolation and submission. The Soviet drive for unlimited power faces insuperable obstacles. It confronts deep-seated economic and social problems at home and the ineradicable hostility of the nations it is seeking to rule abroad. It has suffered major defeats in peripheral campaigns, especially in the Middle East. And what Mr. Brezhnev has called "the crisis" in Poland is one of supreme importance to the future of the Soviet Union. Even the magnitude of its nuclear arsenal cannot protect the Soviet Union from the deeply rooted yearnings for freedom shared by people everywhere. Finally, and most important of all, the Soviet Union, like every other country, must accept the implacable logic of the nuclear weapon. As Khrushchev once said, the nuclear weapon does not respect the difference between socialism and capitalism.

Foreign policy is not a mathematical exercise like chess. Like every other human enterprise, it must take account of the unforeseen. Chance, heroism, passion, and faith have greater influence in human affairs than the grim calculus of the nuclear equation.

The ultimate issue of Soviet-American relations since 1917 is defined in the nuclear arms talks with chilling clarity. It is whether the Soviet Union is a state like the others, willing to live as a member of the society of nations and to abide by its rules or, on the other hand, whether the Soviet Union will persist in the suicidal view that its mission is to lead a crusade to spread the "True Faith" by the sword. When the issue is raised with Soviet diplomats or professors, they say, "You are asking us to change a foreign policy rooted in the nature of our society and state." To that claim, the only possible answer is, "Not at all. So far as we are concerned, you can preach the gospel of communism as much as you like. But the rest of the world cannot tolerate the use of aggression to achieve it."

If the leaders of the Soviet Union are as rational and cautious as they are supposed to be, they should want a period of peace and stability in their relationship with the West. On the whole, I think they will. Like all his modern predecessors, President Reagan has made it clear to the Soviet leaders that he would welcome such a change and cooperate fully in making it a reality.

Statement Submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Group of 21: Establishment of Subsidiary Organs, September 13, 1982 [1]

The following addition to rule 25 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament is hereby proposed:

> The rule of consensus shall not be used either in such a way as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee, in accordance with the priorities established in the Final Document and in conformity with the provisions of rule 23.

Commentary

Since February 1980, the Group of 21, in its statement issued on the 27th of that month as document CD/64, [2] declared that it was "the considered view of the Group of 21 that working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament". It added therefore that "the Group of 21 in principle supports the establishment of working groups on the items on its annual agenda".

This position of the Group of 21 has been subsequently reiterated in the statements CD/72 of 4 March 1980, CD/116 of 9 July 1980, CD/134 of 6 August 1980, [3] CD/180 of 24 April 1981, CD/181 of the same date and CD/192 of 8 July 1981.

For reasons well known to all members of the Committee it has been so far impossible to implement the well substantiated proposal which the Group of 21 has submitted since two years ago for the creation of a working group of item 2 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", in spite of the fact that such proposal has had the support of more than 30 members of the Committee. During the current year another proposal of the Group of 21—which seems to have the support of 38 of the 40 members of the Committee—for the establishment of an *ad hoc* working group on the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" has not been carried out because of the negative attitude of two members of the Committee.

The Group of 21 believes that the paralysis of an important section of the negotiating function of the Committee which has thus occurred is contrary to the spirit of the rule of consensus included in rule 18 of the rules of procedure of the Committee. Consequently the Group has decided to submit this working paper with the intention that it may be studied by the members of the Committee during its recess. Thus, if, upon initiation of the Committee's session corresponding to 1983, it were not yet possible to give effect to the two above-mentioned requests of the Group of 21, the addition to the rules of procedure herein proposed may be formally considered in plenary session by the Committee.

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[1] CD/330.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 115–116.

[3] For CD/134, see *ibid.*, pp. 339–341.

Working Paper Submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disarmament: Issues Relating to a Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear Facilities in the Framework of a Radiological Weapons Treaty, September 13, 1982 [1]

I.

General remarks

1. In its proposal of 30 June 1980 and its memorandum of 13 March 1981 [2] Sweden expressed the view that there is a very real danger of mass destruction posed by the dissemination of radioactive substances in war. With this it had in mind the danger of military attacks on nuclear installations containing large amounts of radioactive materials. Consequently, it demanded that a treaty banning radiological weapons must also provide for the prohibition of radiological warfare so as to cover not only the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons but also attacks on civilian nuclear installations. Sweden therefore proposed "that the main source of radiological warfare, i.e. attacks on nuclear installations, should be mentioned explicitly" in Article III.

In this context, Sweden also contended that the protection of nuclear installations provided for in the additional protocols [3] to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 [4] (Article 56 of Protocol I and Article 15 of Protocol II) is not sufficient for two reasons: firstly, these protocols cover only nuclear electrical generating stations, thus omitting other installations containing large quantities of radioactive materials. Secondly, the purpose of the protocols is limited to providing protection for the civilian population in the vicinity of these installations and they permit military considerations to take precedence over humanitarian ones, thus allowing exceptions from the protective provisions. For the purpose of a comprehensive ban on radiological warfare, a radiological weapons treaty must, so as to "cover all important risks and have no loopholes", also ensure comprehensive protection for nuclear installations.

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[1] CD/331.

[2] For the Swedish statement of Apr. 7, 1981, on this subject, see *ante*.

[3] *International Legal Materials*, Nov. 16, 1977, issue No. 6, pp. 1391 ff. and 1442 ff.

[4] TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365; 6 UST 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516; 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 287.

2. The present paper deals in section II with the main substantive questions relating to a comprehensive ban on military attacks on civilian nuclear installations. This section is a rough summary of the remarks made by two experts from the Federal Republic of Germany at the 1982 spring session of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons. Section III then looks at the question of how such installations can be protected in practice and comes to the conclusion that one should examine how to improve the protection afforded by international customary law and by the first additional protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949. Section IV then deals with the question of whether protective provisions should be drawn up within the framework of a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (radiological weapons treaty) or elaborated in separate negotiations. It comes to the conclusion that the latter solution appears better and proposes that the link between the subject-matter of the radiological weapons treaty and improved protection for nuclear installations be underscored by including an obligation in the treaty for the early commencement of negotiations on the latter.

3. In the present paper the term "nuclear installations" covers the following nuclear power stations and other civilian installations containing a correspondingly high amount of radioactive materials, the release of which would lead to an unquantifiable loss of civilian life and/or render large areas of land unusable:

—power-generating and research reactors, even if they are temporarily or permanently shut down,

—intermediate stores for spent fuel elements,

—plants for reprocessing spent fuel elements,

—plants for producing mixed oxide fuel elements,

—containers for transporting radioactive material between the aforementioned plants.

Specifically military nuclear installations, which pose problems of their own, are not dealt with here.

II.

Aspects of military attacks on nuclear installations

1. *Significance of national safety regulations for nuclear installations*

A decisive factor in assessing the effects of military attacks on nuclear installations are the safety standards which relate to the design and operation of such installations and are, owing to the latter's dangerous potential, the prerequisite for the granting of planning permission by national authorities. These standards are aimed—as in the case of industrial plants—at protection against natural and civilian influences and not against military influences, but they also afford some limited protection against the latter. Of key importance in this respect are the design features for withstanding static and dynamic loads as a result of, for instance, earthquakes, aircraft crashes and lateral gas blast waves, for example from chemical explosions, as well as redundant and protective design features performing containment and filtering functions and thus preventing the escape of radionuclides in such cases.

Other nuclear installations might be designed in such a way that they are no more vulnerable to military attacks than nuclear power stations.

National safety standards relating to nuclear installations differ greatly. Moreover, in the course of time they have undergone substantial changes within individual countries so that various standards may apply in a single country, as a result of which older installations are less well protected against external effects than more recent ones. Obviously, in the case of low security standards nuclear power installations are much more susceptible to military influences than installations built in compliance with high safety requirements.

2. *Effects of military attacks on nuclear installations*

It must be assumed that there are still nuclear power installations in existence from which some of the radioactive substances would escape in the event of an attack with conventional weapons (for instance, 1,000 kg TNT in a high-explosive bomb). This applies all the more to attacks with nuclear weapons. The effects in the individual case depend on a number of factors, such as

—distance from the installation and point of impact of the weapon

—type and power of the weapon

—type of installation and its design features

—chemical and physical nature of the nuclear substances contained in the installation

—type and extent of the destruction of the installation

—meteorological conditions at the time of the attack

—possibility of short-term measures to limit the damage sustained by the installation.

The effects of a nuclear explosive device on the decisive concrete structures, i.e. containment, of a nuclear power station are confined to the blast wave. (Thermal and radioactive radiation do not yield any perceptible effects). If the explosive device impacts at a short distance from the installation, damage to the containment can no longer be ruled out, which can under certain circumstances lead to a core meltdown. This would, however, have effects only hours later. (Only if a sufficiently powerful nuclear explosive device directly hits the containment or impacts in its immediate vicinity is it likely that the containment will be immediately destroyed and that, in particularly unfavourable circumstances, the radioactive core will partly evaporate. Even in such a case the effects of the weapon's radionuclides predominate for the first few weeks.) Other nuclear installations, in so far as they have a containment similar to that of a reactor, behave more favourably in the event of an attack with nuclear weapons since, as a rule, all systems pass into a safe state (emergency cooling unnecessary) even without auxiliary energy supplies (electricity, water) and the effects of the evaporation of nuclides, which is to be expected in the event of a direct hit and may possibly exceed the effects of the nuclear weapon, are felt several weeks later.

Generally speaking, it can be said that the escape of radioactive substances from nuclear power installations produces barely calculable radiological effects which render large areas of land unusable to man for many decades.

3. *Probability of military attacks on nuclear installations*

The destruction of nuclear installations might in theory serve as a goal for military force since in this way, with only a limited use of special-purpose weapons, great damage can be achieved by releasing the radioactive material in an installation. For instance, the impairment of energy supplies and the resultant impact on industry, infrastructure and defence might be considered a feasible goal.

However, the escape of radioactive substances in such installations can have effects on the attacker's military operations, the nature and extent of which cannot be precisely determined. In other words, an attack on a nuclear installation would lead to uncertain and scarcely calculable factors in the attacker's operational planning. Furthermore, the deliberate destruction of such installations in conventional warfare would mean the start of an "indirect nuclear war" and could lead to unpredictable reactions by the other side. As it is, the adversary's energy supplies can be impaired without this risk by destroying conventional power stations, transformers, etc.

The use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear installation would, by destroying the installation, increase the radiological effects of the weapons used. However, nuclear-weapon States are not dependent on this effect. This effect would, moreover, be to their disadvantage owing to the above-stated results.

On the whole, the destruction of a nuclear installation entails a considerable element of uncertainty for the destroyer owing to the incalculable radioactive contamination. Moreover, the attacker is likely to be greatly interested in taking control of the valuable installations intact.

It can therefore be deduced from all these aspects that there are stronger arguments against a deliberate military attack on a nuclear installation. Furthermore, it would run counter to the trend in weapons technology towards precision weapons which permit targets to be eliminated by means of precision strikes with limited and precisely calculable effects if one were at the same time to plan to cause unquantifiable effects by destroying nuclear installations.

Destruction of such installations by accidental strikes is therefore more probable than deliberate destruction. Accidental strikes will depend primarily on the type and extent of battles and their distance from the installations. They will, of course, become all the more

robable if there are military targets in the vicinity of the installations.
onsiderable importance therefore attaches to the question of whether
ere are national safety regulations stipulating that military facilities
d other military targets must be located at a minimum distance from
iclear installations for reasons of safety.

4. *National regulations on safe distances between military targets and nuclear*
tallations

A number of countries have regulations stipulating safe distances
tween potential military targets and nuclear installations. They are
signed to ensure that, when military targets are attacked, neighbour-
g nuclear installations are not affected by accidental strikes or collat-
l damage. These distances are laid down in the licensing procedure
such installations. The military authorities have to ensure that the
a around a nuclear power installation is kept free from all kinds of
litary targets. The distance is calculated by taking into account the
apons that are likely to be used against a military target, their
ential area of dispersion, and the design of the installation.

III.

roved international protection for nuclear installations

. Protective zones for nuclear installations

he only way of fully protecting nuclear installations against mili-
attacks is to establish protective zones. These zones would serve
nsure that everyone is acquainted with the location of all poten-
y dangerous installations. They would thus help to make the
ibition of direct attacks on such installations more effective and
cause adversaries engaged in military action within the protective
e to take into account the proximity of the installation so as to
d accidental strikes or collateral damage. The latter would require
the protective zones be kept free from military installations and
r targets. In this connection, an inner and an outer circle within a
ective zone are conceivable: the inner circle would be kept free
all targets, and the outer one free from particular types of targets
hardened ones). The protective zones and the location of nuclear
er installations would have to be made known on acceding to the
ant treaty, for instance by exchanging lists. This would be neces-
not least because nuclear installations are not always identifiable
ch. Conspicuous markings visible from afar both in the air and on
round would also make for effective protection.

owever, the establishment of protective zones for nuclear installa-
poses considerable problems. As already mentioned, the safety
dards for such installations differ between States and, in some
, even within an individual country. If protective zones were to
onfined to the minimum requirements, zones of different sizes
d have to be established. Alternatively, zones of a single size
be established worldwide in line with (assumed) low safety
dards. In this case the zones would have to be fairly large.

Another problem is posed by the fact that some countries have a high density of nuclear installations, whilst in others they lie scattered far apart or exist only in small numbers. In the former countries, there would thus be a correspondingly large number of protective zones which, depending on the size of the countries and the zones, would cover a substantial part of the territory. As a result, sanctuaries would exist in these countries.

For these reasons it is a moot point whether protective zones can in fact be established in the near future.

2. *Alternative solution*

An alternative solution would be to lay down a general ban on attacks on nuclear installations, as already envisaged for international conflicts in Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Although a general ban would not afford the same comprehensive protection for nuclear installations as would the establishment of protective zones, it would none the less provide desirable additional protection for such installations against military attacks. In other words, this solution amounts to the proposal that one should examine how to improve the protection afforded by international customary law and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, specifically Article 56. In Article 56 (6) of the latter the High Contracting Parties are urged "to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces".

Improved protection for nuclear installations under international law would be desirable for various reasons. For instance, by including only nuclear power stations and not other nuclear installations in Article 56 of Additional Protocol 1—even if it is assumed that the latter are covered by the protection afforded by general international law and other provisions of the Protocol—one has not taken into account the fact that the escape of radioactive substances from nuclear installations has the same hazardous effects as the escape of such substances from nuclear power stations. The protection afforded by Article 56 of the Protocol could also be improved by other means: for example, by stipulating that certain types of military activity are not permitted within a specific area around nuclear installations or by agreeing on the international exchange of lists of protected installations.

IV.

Dealing with the protection of nuclear installations in a radiological weapons treaty

1. When drawing up provisions designed to improve the protection of nuclear installations, one would have to proceed from the existing legal situation and both reaffirm and define more closely the prohibition of attacks on such installations which already exists under international law.

nternational law already contains the principle that military attacks st be directed primarily against military targets. Furthermore, in an ned conflict the right of the parties to the conflict to choose meth- or means of warfare is not unlimited. The principle of commen- ability has to be respected at all times.

his protection is expanded and defined in Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims nternational Armed Conflicts.

owever, the elaboration of such provisions would greatly tran- d the framework initially envisaged for a radiological weapons ty and probably necessitate a considerable amount of additional . It therefore appears best to deal with the improved protection of ear installations in a separate agreement.

Another reason why it is preferable to deal with the improved ection of nuclear installations in a separate agreement is the fact there are major differences in subject-matter:

ban on radiological weapons is designed to prevent the use of active substances as weapons which, on decomposition, release uscular and/or electromagnetic radiation and thus constitute ons of mass destruction as defined in the 1948 United Nations lution.[5] The establishment of nuclear installations, on the other , is of course not designed to produce the effect of weapons. d, these installations would be used as weapons by another ry, not responsible for their establishment, when it destroys The principal military effect of attacks on nuclear installations d be a "multiplicator effect" sparked off by the weapon itself. s in principle comparable to the destruction of a dam by conven- weapons and the resultant devastating tidal wave.

adiological weapons treaty, one of its purposes being—as pro- by Sweden—the prohibition of radiological warfare, would thus two highly different subject-matters: one of them would be the ry use of ionizing radiation by employing devices, weapons or ment specifically manufactured or designed for radiological war- The other would be ionizing radiation and its harmful effects d by the unspecified impact of weapons when nuclear installa- are damaged or destroyed during military attacks. The only on denominator would be the use of ionizing radiation for mili- urposes. Furthermore, the actual content of a ban on radiological e would—in so far as it went beyond the prohibition of attacks lian nuclear installations—be hard to determine.

view of the great interest in improved protection for nuclear tions shown by numerous countries at the Geneva talks on a gical weapons treaty, it would appear advisable to include an in this treaty which underscores the link between the subject- of the treaty and improved protection for nuclear installations us leads to an early commencement of work on a specific

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ents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, p. 176.

agreement providing protection for such installations. In other words
the article should be worded to the effect that the Contracting Partie
undertake to start negotiations as soon as possible on this subjec

Report to the Committee on Disarmament From the *Ad Ho* Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, September 13 1982[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its 173rd plenary meeting, on 21 April 1982, the Committee o
Disarmament adopted the following decision relative to item 1 of i
agenda:

> In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarma
> ment negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of th
> Final Document of the first special session of the General Assem
> bly devoted to disarmament,[2] the Committee on Disarmame
> decides to establish an *ad hoc* working group under item 1 of i
> agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'.
>
> Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first i
> stance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear te
> ban, the Committee requests the *ad hoc* working group to discu
> and define, through substantive examination, issues relating
> verification and compliance with a view to making furth
> progress toward a nuclear test ban.
>
> The *ad hoc* working group will take into account all existi
> proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committ
> on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 19
> session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subs
> quent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibiliti
> in this regard. (CD/291)

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. At its 178th plenary meeting, on 12 August 1982, the Committ
on Disarmament appointed Ambassador Curt Lidgard (Sweden)
Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group.[3] In the absence of Ambass
dor Lidgard, Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, Deputy Head of the Deleg
tion of Sweden, acted as Chairman of the Working Group. Miss Ai
Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secr
tary of the Working Group.

3. At the 178th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmame
on 12 August 1982, the delegations of two nuclear-weapon Sta
announced their decision not to participate in the *Ad Hoc* Worki
Group. A number of delegations regretted that decision and express
the hope that it would be reconsidered at an early date.[4]

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[1] CD/332.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 433–434.

[3] CD/PV.178, p. 39.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 40–43.

4. At their request, the Committee on Disarmament decided to invite the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Senegal and Spain.

5. The Working Group held 10 meetings between 13 August and 13 September 1982.

6. In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under item 1 of its agenda, other documents were submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group during the 1982 session. These documents included the following:

Working paper entitled "Nuclear Test Ban", submitted by the Netherlands (CD/NTB/WP.1 and Corr.1)

Working paper on international verification systems for a nuclear test ban, submitted by Sweden (CD/NTB/WP.2)

In addition, the Secretariat prepared a list of documents relating to the question of a nuclear test ban, submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament (CD/NTB/INF.1).

7. On 17 August 1982, the delegation of Norway demonstrated for members of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group a prototype system for an international seismic data exchange under a comprehensive test ban, using a low-cost micro-processor based system.

III. Substantive Work During the 1982 Session

8. In carrying out its mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group bore in mind that, in accordance with the decision of the Committee on Disarmament referred to in paragraph 1 above, the Working Group should take account of all existing proposals and future initiatives.

9. It was generally recognized that in the examination of issues relating to verification and compliance, consideration should be given to all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban. In this connection, a number of delegations argued, on the basis of paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,[5] that a meaningful examination of issues relating to verification and compliance would only be possible after agreement had been reached on the scope of a nuclear test ban treaty. Other delegations argued that it was not necessary to reach agreement on scope; work could proceed on the basis of certain broad assumptions. Different views were expressed on various fundamental aspects of a nuclear test ban. Some delegations were of the view that the work of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should be based on the understanding that issues relating to verification and compliance should be examined as applied to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 418.

nuclear weapons in any environment, would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution, acceptable to all parties, of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States. Other delegations, calling attention to the preamble of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, [6] considered that a treaty on a nuclear test ban should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time. In their view, such a treaty should be equitable and non-discriminatory so as to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that guaranteed equal access to all States. Still other delegations held that any nuclear test ban must necessarily cover both nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and that issues of verification of and compliance with such a ban should be examined as applied to a future treaty which would ban all such explosions. Certain delegations considered that this ban should apply to all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time. In this connection, the view was also expressed that the importance of peaceful nuclear explosions should not be underestimated. Some delegations suggested that it was necessary to give consideration to all possible methods for the testing and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, such as laboratory tests and simulation techniques. Other delegations recalled the report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/86) [7] in which it was stated that "it can be contended that a comprehensive test ban could not cover laboratory tests because they are contained and not verifiable". The view was however expressed that more recent technological advances, especially in simulation techniques, have added a new dimension to nuclear testing and qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals. Laboratory tests, especially since these are not verifiable, provide an advantageous edge to some States.

10. It was not possible for the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to reach agreement on a work programme. A number of delegations strongly regretted this and pointed out that the lack of a work programme had only permitted the Working Group to have a general and largely unstructured exchange of views on the subject matter entrusted to it under its mandate. During the first part of the Working Group's proceedings, efforts were made to reach agreement on a programme of work based on the Chairman's proposal and those from delegations. At the same time, there was also a general exchange of views on basic questions relating to a nuclear test ban. In light of the absence of a work programme, the Working Group followed the oral suggestion of the Chairman and devoted its last three substantive meetings to a continuation of the exchange of views and focused on general aspects of the question of verification and compliance, including the purposes, general requirements and effectiveness of verification, and on various

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[6] *Ibid., 1963,* pp. 291–293.

[7] *Ibid., 1980,* pp. 157–164.

specific aspects, such as, international seismic monitoring, the question of the need to consider atmospheric detection methods, the role of national technical means, the role of on-site inspection, committee of experts and procedures and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation. A number of delegations stated that their acceptance of this method of work was only a temporary measure to allow the Working Group to proceed during this session. A number of other delegations were of the view that, in spite of the absence of a formal work programme, the Working Group had been able, under the guidance of the Chairman, to have a fruitful and streamlined consideration of issues of verification of and compliance with a comprehensive test ban in the exercise of its mandate.

11. It was felt that in discharging its task, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group should draw on the knowledge and experience that had been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and in the trilateral negotiations.

12. The examination of issues relating to verification and compliance covered general aspects of the subject. Some delegations stated that the majority of countries were convinced that the means of verification presently available were sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. In this connection, they made reference to the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972, relating to a comprehensive test ban, in which the Secretary-General had, *inter alia,* stated the following:

> I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement. . . .
>
> When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as "verification by challenge" or "inspection by invitation", it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.
>
> In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests. (CCD/PV.545, 29 February 1972)

Other delegations stated that the adequacy of verification was not simply a question of yield or detection level nor was it something that could be defined collectively. Rather it is based on a combination of factors and is determined by each State individually based on its national interests.

13. Some delegations, while recognizing that it was important to clarify technical problems connected with verification of a nuclear test ban treaty, held that at some point a political decision should be taken, for, otherwise, there would be a danger that, as in the past, the

question of verification would be used as a smoke-screen to cover up the lack of political will and delay indefinitely the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

14. Some delegations held that those delegations which felt that there were still obstacles to be surmounted should point out what those obstacles were. Certain specific queries were addressed to the nuclear-weapon States that had been engaged in the trilateral negotiations relating to the existing means of verification and those proposed under an international seismic data exchange system, in particular the specific technical parameters of what, in their view, would constitute adequate verification. The three nuclear-weapon States were also asked to specify what were the "important areas where substantial work [had][8] still to be done", as stated in paragraph 23 of the "Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament" (CD/130).[9]

15. One of the parties to the trilateral negotiations noted that it shared the conviction that the existing means of verification were adequate to assure compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It explained that, as far as verification on a multilateral basis was concerned, agreement had been reached in the trilateral negotiations and that the outstanding questions were those mentioned in paragraphs 12 and 22 of the Tripartite Report.

16. The other two participants in the trilateral negotiations reiterated the statement contained in paragraph 23 of the Report. They also pointed out that it could not be presumed that all technical problems had been solved. In their view, conclusions relating to the capabilities of the verification system could only be reached when the characteristics of the system were known, but, as yet, there was no agreement on the precise parameters of such a system nor was such a system in existence. Beyond that, they noted that the conduct of nuclear explosions, regardless of yield or ostensible purpose, could provide weapons-related benefits. They, therefore, argued that the question of adequacy could not be looked at as a question of merely establishing an "adequate" detection level in terms of yield of nuclear explosions. In their opinion, a determination of adequacy involved a whole complex of issues and was a matter for political decision by each Government in light of its national requirements and the circumstances prevailing at the time the decision was called for.

17. In connection with the above comments, some delegations made the following observations. First, it was said that it could not be argued that the characteristics of the verification system were, as yet, unknown for they had already been specified in great detail in the first two reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events (CCD/558 and Corr.1, CCD/558/Add.1 and Corr.1 and CD/43

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[8] Brackets in source text.

[9] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980,* pp. 317–321.

and Add.1).[10] Secondly, it was pointed out that the question of what would constitute an "adequate" detection level in terms of yield of nuclear explosions, had been raised because those two nuclear-weapon States had consistently held in the past that that question was crucial to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. Thirdly, the two nuclear-weapon States were asked to explain what was the whole complex of issues involved in a determination of adequacy. Finally, it was pointed out that the required political decision had to be taken on the basis of certain objective and mutually accepted norms and it should be the task of the Working Group to develop such norms.

18. Other delegations reiterated that the system proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts was not in operation. In response to this observation, it was argued that since the specific characteristics of the proposed system were already known it was not necessary to await its being put into operation in order to determine its capabilities.

19. Some delegations, referring to the purposes and general requirements of verification, held that any verification system should provide confidence that the Parties observed their treaty obligations, deter them from conducting clandestine activities contrary to the treaty and counteract unfounded suspicion about naturally occurring events. These delegations further considered that technical and political requirements to satisfy those three tasks might be quite different and that although some technical capabilities of a verification system could be agreed upon, it was difficult to assess the overall capabilities and the adequacy of any verification system without knowing the political requirements of individual countries. These delegations, therefore, suggested that it was neither possible nor necessary to make a general assessment of the adequacy of verification systems and that such assessment should be made on a national basis in light of national political requirements. The need to demonstrate the political will and firm commitment necessary for the fulfilment of treaty obligations was, however, stressed.

20. Some delegations pointed out that, due to a variety of factors, different countries had different possibilities to monitor compliance with a nuclear test ban by national technical means alone and that an international verification system should serve to even out such differences. Other delegations deemed that a combination of national technical means, international exchange of seismic data and other measures of international co-operation, such as, procedures for consultation and co-operation and on-site inspection "by challenge" in case of suspicious events, would provide adequate means of verification. As noted earlier, some delegations felt that the verification system of a nuclear test ban treaty should apply equally to all States and provide equal access to all. In that connection, it was suggested that clarification should be provided to the points raised in document CD/181[11] and in

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[10] *Ibid., 1978,* pp. 103–110; *ibid., 1979,* pp. 476–481.
[11] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 174–176.

the synthesis, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on agenda items 1 and 2 during the informal meetings devoted to those items in March and April 1981 (CD/UN.SUMM/1).

21. The discussion also covered specific aspects of the question of verification and compliance, as set forth below.

22. Reference was made to the work of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Mention was also made of the co-operative seismic monitoring measures envisaged in the trilateral negotiations, as outlined in the Tripartite Report, including the establishment of an international exchange of seismic data and the setting up of a committee of experts. Some delegations were of the view that the establishment of an international system for the exchange of seismic data was a task of the highest priority. In their view, such a system should be in place before a comprehensive test ban treaty entered into force. Other delegations considered that the system should be set up in connection with a comprehensive test ban treaty and after such a treaty had entered into force. Some delegations felt that in the implementation of the system account should be taken of advanced available scientific and technological developments. They pointed out that, otherwise, those countries that would have to depend on the services of the international seismic data exchange system, would not have equal access to all the available information. Other delegations argued that for the system to be accessible to all parties it should be based on widely used technology which all parties could afford. In addition, some delegations maintained that there was a close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty and technical work on a verification system and that the latter should not be carried out as if it were an open-ended exercise that could go on indefinitely so as to take account of every scientific and technological advance. Furthermore, these delegations felt that, as noted earlier, the basic elements of an international system for the exchange of seismic data were already contained in the first two reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts. A number of delegations suggested that consideration should be given to the institutional aspects of an international seismic monitoring system and attention was drawn to the illustrative list of subjects contained in document CD/95. In the opinion of various other delegations, it would not be appropriate for the Working Group to undertake the consideration of such subjects at this time.

23. Different views were expressed concerning the need to examine methods for the detection of airborne radioactivity. Some delegations held that a nuclear test ban should include an integrated international monitoring system, comprising atmospheric as well as seismic detection methods. In that connection, it was suggested that the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts should be broadened to include the examination of atmospheric detection methods. Other delegations felt that there was no need to revise the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Group

of Scientific Experts. In this view, it was unnecessary to devote attention to verification issues relating to tests within the scope of the prohibitions contained in the Partial Test Ban Treaty, since compliance with that Treaty had not given rise to problems in the nearly 20 years it had been in force.

24. A suggestion was made that under a new and broader mandate, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts should be subordinated to the *Ad Hoc* Working Group established under item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Some delegations stated that the current link between the Committee on Disarmament and the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts should be maintained.

25. With respect to national technical means, some delegations referred to the relevant sections of the Tripartite Report. In their opinion, national seismic stations would actually be the basis of the whole verification system, since those stations would provide the data on which judgments as to whether or not a ban was being observed by the parties would be made. In addition to this, an international exchange of seismic data as well as other international co-operative measures would give all parties ample opportunities to take part in the verification process. Other delegations held that national technical means alone were not adequate for the effective verification of a nuclear test ban and that, as noted earlier, given the differences in the national technical capabilities of States to monitor compliance with such a ban, an international verification system that provided equal access to all parties was needed to help reduce asymmetries or technical inequalities, thus creating the requisite confidence that the ban was being complied with by all parties.

26. Concerning on-site inspections, some delegations were of the view that provision for such inspections could be made on a voluntary basis along the lines of the procedure set forth in the Tripartite Report. At the same time, these delegations stressed that such inspections would not add much to the capability of the verification system. Other delegations emphasized the importance of on-site inspection to clarify the nature of ambiguous events and contended that provision for on-site inspection on a voluntary basis only would be insufficient to build confidence and to develop an effective verification system.

27. With respect to procedures for consultation and co-operation, some delegations pointed to the procedures envisaged in the trilateral negotiations as outlined in the Tripartite Report. A suggestion was made that, in addition to arrangements for bilateral and multilateral consultations among Parties, provision should be made in a nuclear test ban treaty for the establishment of two committees. One would be a technical body entrusted with the task, *inter alia,* of overseeing the operation of the international verification system and of solving any technical problem that might arise in the operation of that system. The other would be a consultative committee which would serve as a forum for political discussions of issues related to the implementation of the treaty, including its verification. Another view was expressed to

the effect that experience regarding the implementation of existing multilateral treaties in the field of arms limitation and disarmament indicated that it was not necessary to set up two committees. According to this view, in the case of a nuclear test ban treaty a committee of experts, as envisaged in the trilateral negotiations, would suffice.

28. Some delegations expressed the view that the possibility of bringing complaints to the Security Council would provide an additional guarantee of compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. Other delegations, referring to the experience with certain multilateral disarmament agreements, dwelt on the shortcomings of a complaints procedure that was limited to recourse to the Security Council.

29. Some delegations drew attention to the possible relevance of arrangements between two or more parties to a nuclear test ban treaty and commented that such arrangements could provide additional assurance of compliance and serve as a confidence-building measure.

30. Delegations also expressed views on the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group. Some delegations held that the mandate was inadequate in that it did not provide for negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. In the view of these delegations, the Working Group should use the time available to it in 1982 so as to enable the Committee on Disarmament to give it a broader mandate as envisaged in the Committee's decision on the establishment of the Working Group. Other delegations disagreed with this view and believed that the Working Group should proceed with substantive discussions based on its mandate without prejudice to any future decision regarding the mandate of the Working Group. Some delegations observed that, while the mandate was unsatisfactory, it provided an opportunity for making a start towards the resolution of verification problems in preparation for future negotiations. Still other delegations expressed the view that the mandate did not preclude negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty especially since the mandate directed the Working Group to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. It was pointed out by one delegation that, although it was not prepared to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty at this time, it desired to undertake substantive discussions on verification and compliance issues. Some delegations regretted that in the opinion of this delegation the time was not propitious for negotiations on a nuclear test ban and felt that the Working Group should not be used as a cover for the unwillingness to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The attention of that particular delegation was drawn by other delegations to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, in whose preamble it is stated "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances", and they expressed the view that this constituted a legal commitment. That delegation was asked how it reconciled being a party to that

Treaty with the position it had now taken. That delegation stated that
t did not accept the assertion that it had violated legal treaty commit-
nents. It, therefore, stated its intention to respond fully to that asser-
ion. Some delegations held the view that the Working Group had
ompleted the substantive examination of issues relating to verifica-
ion and compliance and that, therefore, the Committee should revise
vithout delay the mandate of the Working Group with a view to
nabling it to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon
ests, having in mind that this is a question of the highest priority and
aking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In the
iew of other delegations, a revision of the mandate was not called for
nder present circumstances; considerable work still remained to be
lone in resolving various issues relating to verification and compliance
ecause, *inter alia,* the Working Group had not been able to work on
he basis of a structured programme. Several delegations pointed out
hat they had accepted the terms of the present mandate only because
hey were persuaded that the explicit reference to the need to take
nto account existing proposals and future initiatives and to the adop-
ion of a decision by the Committee on Disarmament on subsequent
ourses of action, should necessarily be interpreted as meaning that
he Group's mandate should be broadened, as required by those pro-
osals and initiatives, not in the indefinite future but at a very early
ate.

tatement by the British Representative (Summerhayes) to the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban [Extract], September 14, 1982 [1]

* * * * * * *

During the summer session which is now drawing to a close, my
elegation has welcomed the chance to give particular attention to the
ork of two of our subsidiary bodies, those dealing with chemical
eapons and with a nuclear test ban. I would like this morning to
view briefly the progress we have made on the important issue of a
uclear test ban, for which we had a new Working Group with a
andate agreed and adopted in April this year. My delegation took
rt in the work from the start in the belief that the mandate of the
roup was clear and precise and that it would permit us without delay
o discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relat-
g to verification and compliance with a view to making further
ogress toward a nuclear test ban". Whatever interpretation some
elegations may like to put on this mandate, there is no doubt that it
aces verification and compliance in the centre of discussion. Some

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[1] CD/PV.186, pp. 11–14.

delegations none the less went on to argue that we must define the scope of a nuclear test ban before verification and compliance could be discussed; this attitude regrettably was a major factor in preventing us from adopting a work programme and undertaking the substantive examination of the issues expected of us.

It is of course true that, as paragraph 31 of the Final Document says,

> The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope, and nature of the agreement. [2]

But that does not, in the view of my delegation, mean that at this present stage we must narrowly define these parameters. It is quite sufficient to make broad common-sense assumptions on which our consideration of a verification system can be based. To concentrate the discussion on scope is to divert the attention of the Group from the substantive issues set out in its mandate. Nevertheless, we have been drawn into a discussion on scope and this has served to emphasize one difference of view, the resolution of which would be crucial to the successful negotiation of a nuclear test-ban treaty. I am referring, of course, to the treatment to be accorded to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). Some delegations have argued that PNEs should be excluded from the scope of a nuclear test-ban treaty; it has even been argued that only the State carrying out a peaceful nuclear explosion must decide whether it should be classified as such. This is not the time to answer these arguments in detail; but in my delegation's view the overriding consideration in this respect is to ensure that the purposes of a nuclear test-ban treaty are not frustrated; there would certainly be grave danger of this happening if nuclear explosions, labelled as being for "peaceful purposes", were freely allowed and their classification left to individual States. Whatever recourse is made to legal argument or to negotiating history, there remains the inescapable fact that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would provide information of potential military value and that in the system set up to monitor a test-ban treaty PNEs would, from a seismic verification point of view, be indistinguishable from nuclear-weapon test explosions. Is it conceivable that States would have confidence in a treaty with a loophole as large as this? And for those who seek support from negotiating history I would point out that while the trilateral negotiations envisaged a separate protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, that protocol would also have established a moratorium, and that the parties agreed that they would refrain from "causing, encouraging, permitting or in any way participating in and carrying out of such explosions until arrangements for conducting them are worked out which would be consistent with the treaty being negotiated." The problems involved in making such an arrangement have not yet been solved.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 418.

I will revert now to the central issue of verification. In our view the key element in discussing the verification of a test-ban treaty is whether it is possible to elaborate a system for detecting and identifying nuclear-weapon test explosions which would give adequate confidence of compliance with the treaty for all parties. As far as the seismic detection of nuclear-weapon test explosions is concerned, we already have available to us the proposals in documents CCD/558 [3] and CD/43 [4] for a global network of seismic stations, an international exchange of seismic data and the establishment of international data centres. The Group of Scientific Experts has done much valuable work and the experimental interchanges, although not entirely satisfactory, have demonstrated the potential of the exchange system. Our seismic experts are continuing to work on a number of unresolved problems. Some delegations, however, talk as though a global detection system were in existence already and as though it were of established rather than potential worth. They tend to brush aside all questions relating to technical matters and tell us that it is now "time to elaborate the political and legal framework and the elements of the verification system". They suggest that we must choose either to accept that all the technical means necessary for verifying compliance with a test ban already exist, or start a new detailed debate on highly technical issues.

My delegation does not think that the choice before us is as simple as this picture presents. We do not believe that the discussions we have had so far enable us to conclude that the means necessary for verifying compliance with a test ban treaty already exist. There are some important points, e.g. on-site inspection, which we have hardly touched upon. As the first practical step in the Working Group, we need to examine the proposals put forward by the Group of Scientific Experts and to establish what points of difference still remain. We do not see this as an "abstract" exercise. In our view, no amount of study of the "political and legal framework" will enable us to reach a successful conclusion unless we first agree on the technical basis of our detection and identification system. Examination of the records of the experts Group will show that there are important differences of view between delegations, particularly with regard to the use of Level 2 data. The distinguished representative of the USSR, in commenting on the report of the Group of Experts (CD/318) [5] on 31 August, claimed that there was no technically proved need to exchange Level 2 data on a regular basis. [6] He argued that the system proposed in document CCD/558 involving the exchange of Level 1 parameters was quite adequate. In the view of my delegation, Level 2 data are essential for identification purposes. For this reason it is necessary that we try to resolve the differences of view about how these data might be handled.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 103–110.

[4] *Ibid.*, *1979*, pp. 476–481.

[5] *Ante*, Aug. 19.

[6] CD/PV.183, pp. 40–42.

It has been suggested that in respect of a seismic network we should not let the best, or the better, be the enemy of the good. But I would remind the Committee that one of the purposes of a verification system, as has been pointed out, for example, in a thoughtful working paper distributed by the delegation of Sweden (CD/NTB/WP.2), is to provide confidence that the parties to a treaty are observing its obligations. Does it help to build confidence amongst potential parties to a treaty if one group of States insists that an adequate detection and identification system can be based on ideas and technology which many other delegations consider to be out of date? We would not quarrel with the suggestion that the system should be "no more and no less" than is needed; but such a statement does not solve the problem of what would constitute that optimum level. We would certainly not suggest that we should buy a Rolls Royce if another form of transport would serve our purpose equally well, but at the same time we want to be sure that we construct a vehicle that will take us to the end of the road.

There is one further issue which has so far been only briefly touched upon. This is the problem of possible evasion techniques, and here I should like to comment on the proposal advanced by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic that we should look to a political solution of this problem and on his suggestion that a treaty might contain an obligation to prohibit the use of evasion techniques. It seems to us that when a State undertakes an obligation in a treaty, for example, not to carry out nuclear explosions, it is implicit that it will not evade those obligations. An additional obligation not to evade the main provisions of the treaty seems to add little of substance. And of course it could in no way remove the concern of other States parties over the possibility of evasion since it would not overcome the technical problem of verifying whether or not evasion had occurred. Some of the technical background to this was given in document CCD/492,[7] to which reference has been made in the Working Group recently. We regard the assessments in CCD/492 as still generally valid and note that the seismic data on which they were based have been endorsed by the Group of Scientific Experts.

I have been able this morning to touch on some differences of view between delegations, which are confirmed in the report of the NTB Working Group. Indeed the Working Group report demonstrates how much work still remains to be done. My delegation can certainly not be counted amongst those which believe that after the preliminary discussions we have had so far the NTB Working Group can be said to have fulfilled its mandate. We believe on the contrary that much useful work can be done by further substantive discussion on the basis of a systematic work programme derived from the present mandate. We hope that agreement will be reached to pursue this substantive discussion at the beginning of the 1983 session.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 265–269.

Mr. Chairman, as this is my last statement in plenary, I would like now to say a few valedictory words to my colleagues. The rule of the alphabet ordained that I should sit between powerful neighbours. My situation is not that of a buffer State, but I trust that I have been at times a helpful interpreter. I have always enjoyed and appreciated the pleasure of personal friendship with those who sit and have sat on either side of me, and with all my colleagues in the Committee, past and present. I warmly thank those who have made kind remarks on my departure. More generally, I have no panacea to offer for the complexities we all face in discovering an acceptable basis for multilateral disarmament through the work of this Committee. I do believe, however, that we need to promote easier understanding of our work among those who take the most obvious interest in what we do. Here I am thinking of the representatives of non-member countries who come to join us in the Council Chamber, and of those NGO representatives who attend regularly but have to sit above us in the gallery. On their behalf, I want to make three small but practical suggestions: first, that copies of speaking texts should always be distributed to the representatives of non-member countries when they are made available to the rest of us; secondly, that the representatives of non-member countries should not be relegated by rule to the bottom of the speakers' list, and thirdly, that NGO representatives who regularly attend our plenary meetings should be allocated seats somewhere within the Council Chamber, a concession which has already been made for those taking part in the Fellowship Programme. Finally, I want to express my sincere thanks to those who serve the Committee behind the scenes—to the interpreters, the translators and all the staff who produce our documents. To them and to all members of the secretariat, to Vicente Berasategui, and above all to Ambassador Jaipal, I shall always be extremely grateful. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Report From the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament [Extracts], September 15, 1982 [1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. A review of the work of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of chemical weapons during the first part of its 1982 session is contained in the special report presented to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (document CD/292), which also covers the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject since 1979.

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[1] CD/334, pp. 1, 4–7, annex (1–44).

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

2. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee
Disarmament at its 174th plenary meeting held on 23 April 1982,[2] t
Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on
July 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Bogumil Sujka
Poland. Mr. A. Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer, United N
tions Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the *Ad H*
Working Group.

3. It should be recalled that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemic
Weapons was re-established for 1982 at the 156th plenary meeting
the Committee on Disarmament held on 18 February 1982, with t
following mandate:

> . . . In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation a
> elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral conve
> tion on the complete and effective prohibition of the develop
> ment, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and
> their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to e
> tablish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an *ad hoc* worki
> group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taki
> into account all existing proposals and future initiatives with
> view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at t
> earliest date. . . .[3]

4. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held 26 meetings from 20 July to
September 1982. In addition, the Chairman held a number of inform
consultations with delegations.

5. At the 177th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmamen
the Chairman reported on the progress of work of the *Ad Hoc* Workin
Group.

6. The representatives of the following States not members of th
Committee on Disarmament participated in the work of the *Ad H*
Working Group on Chemical Weapons: Austria, Denmark, Finlan
Greece, Ireland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.

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III. CHAIRMAN'S CONSULTATIONS WITH DELEGATIONS ON TECHNICAL ISSUE

10. Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman
hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the futu
Convention, the Chairman, during the second part of the 1982 sessio
of the Group, convened consultations with delegations on issues re
ommended for further examination and in his previous report co
tained in document CD/CW/WP.30 of 22 March 1982. These consu
tations were held from 2 to 6 August 1982 and dealt specifically wit
the following issues:

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[2] Apr. 21. CD/PV.173, pp. 6–7.

[3] *Ante.*

(a) With regard to scope, possible standardized physical, chemical or biological methods enabling determination of the toxicity of "other harmful chemicals" and products formed in different kinds of production processes (including the binary technique) for chemical warfare agents, particularly those belonging to super-toxic lethal chemicals;

(b) With regard to verification, possible technical methods to monitor destruction of chemical weapons, *inter alia,* by means of specialized information gathering "black boxes", including the means for transmission and processing of such information.

11. At its 6th meeting, held on 11 August 1982, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group presented the report on his consultations as contained in document CD/CW/WP.41 and Corr.1. The Working Group devoted its 8th meeting to an in-depth discussion of this report. The Group took note of this report. While the usefulness of these consultations was unanimously recognized, the need to structure them according to the requirements of the future convention was emphasized, bearing in mind the close link between its technical and political aspects. It was felt that the consultations with delegations on technical issues should be clearly relevant to the work of the Working Group. It was agreed that in the future the report should duly reflect the differing views expressed in these consultations. Some delegations emphasized that Chairman's consultations with delegations on technical issues can play a useful role only when they can contribute to the clarification of technical issues for such provisions of the future convention on which agreement in principle has been achieved. Other delegations held the view that these consultations could also help to provide a concrete basis for the consideration of key issues on which no agreement has yet been reached.

12. It was agreed that [the next] Chairman's consultations on technical issues should focus on the questions listed below. It was further agreed that during the time devoted to these consultations, between six and eight meetings should be devoted to each item, two meetings to the presentation of other technical issues of direct relevance to the work of the Working Group, aimed at facilitating the negotiating process, and four meetings for discussion of the report on the consultations.

Topics to be discussed:

A. On the basis of the working hypothesis on the definition of chemical weapons (see Annex, pages 3–10) including the concepts of *precursors* and *key precursors,* it is suggested that the following questions may be directed to the technical expertise of delegations:

(a) what are the views on the "working hypothesis" on definition of these concepts?

(b) to what extent—and by which method—would it be possible to compose lists of key precursors?

B. With respect to destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, verification procedures should

(i) verify the types and quantities of chemicals to be destroyed;
(ii) ensure that they have been destroyed.

In this connection technical experts of delegations may be asked to address the following questions:

(a) what technical procedures could be suggested in order to monitor destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons?

(b) what specific elements need to be included in declarations made by State Parties, in order to meet the requirements mentioned above?

(c) do methods of destruction of stockpiles need to be specified, and in what detail, in order to assure State Parties that stocks have been destroyed and are not capable of being diverted again to use as chemical weapons?

IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS DURING THE SECOND PART OF THE 1982 SESSION

13. During the second part of its 1982 session, the Group at the suggestion of the Chairman, proceeded to another detailed examination of the Revised Elements and of the Comments Thereto, contained in document CD/CW/WP.33 and Corr.1 with a view to elaborating the provisions of the future convention.

14. As a result of the consideration of the Revised Elements and of the Comments Thereto, and after extensive informal consultations in the Working Group, the Working Group accepted the Chairman's suggestion to establish nine open-ended contact groups in order to advance the process of elaboration of the convention. These informal contact groups, which are listed below, dealt with the following spheres of the convention:

(a) Element I: scope of the chemical weapons convention; (Co-ordinator: Mr. T. Melescanu, Romania)

(b) Element II: definitions; (Co-ordinator: Dr. J. Lundin, Sweden)

(c) Element IV: declarations; (Co-ordinator: Mr. T. Altaf, Pakistan)

(d) Element V: destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion; (Co-ordinator: Mr. S. Duarte, Brazil)

(e) Element IX: general provisions on verification; (Co-ordinator: Mr. G. Skinner, Canada)

(f) Preamble and Final Clauses of the future chemical weapons convention; (Co-ordinator: Mr. R. Steele, Australia)

(g) Element X: national implementation measures; (Co-ordinator: Dr. H. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

(h) Element XI: national technical means of verification; (Co-ordinator: Dr H. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

(i) Elements XII and XIII: consultation and co-operation; consultative committee. (Co-ordinator: Miss N. Nascimbene, Argentina)

15. The results of the work of these Contact Groups were reflected in the reports of the Co-ordinators which were discussed in-depth in the Working Group and subsequently revised by the co-ordinators. These reports are attached in-extenso in the Annex. The method of work adopted by the Working Group in the second part of its 1982 session, and in particular the functioning of open-ended contact groups, was recognised by all delegations as fully appropriate for the present stage. Delegations paid tribute to the Chairman, Ambassador Sujka, for his imaginative proposals in this regard.

16. The Chairman, having taken into account:

—the views expressed by different delegations at the plenary meetings of the Committee devoted to Chemical Weapons;

—the extensive discussions during the meetings of the Working Group;

—the equally extensive discussion in the contact groups;

—the thorough examination of and discussion on the report of each of the contact groups;

—and the consultations with numerous delegations,

presented his views on possible compromise wordings of the elements of the future convention. These views are contained in document CD/333(CD/CW/WP.44). The Working Group appreciated the Chairman's contribution and recommended to take it into consideration along with the reports of the contact groups in its deliberations during 1983.

17. The *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons has agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that the Group should continue its work under the present Chairman between 17 and 28 January 1983, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. During this period the Group will continue the work carried out in 1982, including through meetings of the contact groups established in 1982, and through the Chairman's consultations on technical issues envisaged in paragraph 12 above. It also agreed to recommend that the consultations on technical issues should continue to the end of the first week of the Committee's 1983 session, and that the 1982 Chairman of the Working Group should prepare a report on the basis of his consultations. It was further agreed that the work of the Working Group itself during the period 17–28 January should be reported as part of the 1983 report.

ANNEX

Report of the Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on the Scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention

I. Basic positions:

1. Text without a prohibition of use:

> Each State Party to this Convention undertakes, under no circumstances, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons, and to destroy or dispose for per-

READEX FICHE pages tightly bound

> mitted purposes of existing stocks of such weapons, and also to destroy or dismantle facilities and means of production of such weapons.

2. Direct inclusion of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in Element I:

> Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer or use chemical weapons and to destroy or otherwise dispose of existing stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of such weapons.

II. Proposals for optional alternatives concerning the reaffirmation of the "non-use" regime provided for in the 1925 Geneva Protocol,[4] *and its reinforcement through one or more of the following:*

(a) a preambular provision recalling the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirming the prohibition of use;

(b) a specific provision prohibiting use in situations not covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

(c) a provision stating that CW convention should not be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (along the lines of existing Element VII);

(d) a specific article in the body of the future convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons will constitute a violation of the chemical weapons convention and stipulating that as a consequence the provisions on verification included in CW convention will apply to such situations as well;

(e) a specific provision should be included in the section dealing with the "complaints procedure" of the future Convention. Such a provision should recognize that any use of chemical weapons by a State Party or with the assistance of a State Party would indicate a violation of one or more of the obligations assumed under the scope of the Convention. The competence of the Consultative Committee would consequently be extended to the allegations of use;

(f) provisions for the verification in CW Convention will include methods and mechanisms for the verification of the prohibition to use chemical weapons;

(g) separate mechanism for investigating suspected use of chemical weapons and biological weapons in combat;

(h) including the prohibition of use in the definitions of the chemical weapons convention;

(i) in the interests of enhancing the effectiveness of the Convention, the States Parties shall agree in due form to prevent any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States Parties.

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[4] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969,* pp. 764–765.

III. Co-ordinator's proposals for "a working hypothesis":

In the event that consensus is reached that Element I of the future convention may not include a reference to the prohibition of use, this question could be handled as follows:

In the preamble of the Convention, a paragraph will recall the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirm the prohibition to use chemical weapons; Element VII will also contain a reference to the Geneva Protocol stating that the Convention should not be interpreted in any way as limiting or affecting the obligations assumed by States on the basis of the 1925 Protocol;

In addition, a new article will be included in the Convention recognizing that any use of chemical weapons will *ipso jure* constitute an evidence of a violation of the CW Convention and, accordingly, the provisions on verification included in CW Convention will apply to such situations as well.

* * *

[IV.] Prohibition of the planning, organization and training in chemical warfare capability

In the last meeting of the Group, a short exchange of views on the possible inclusion of the prohibition of the planning, organization and training into a CW convention took place. It appeared that the basic positions expressed on this subject remain the same. It was consequently agreed to postpone a discussion on this item till after further discussions on other problems like verification or non-use.

Report of the Co-ordinator of the Contact Group on Definitions

1. The Contact Group has considered basic definitions for the purpose of the convention of "chemical weapons", "precursors" and toxicity criteria, and of "permitted purposes". Discussions have also been held on the possible meaning of expressions concerning other aspects of the convention as "production capability/capacity" and "destruction".

2. In its work, the Contact Group has recognized that the possible outcome of its deliberation could not be perceived as in any way binding for the delegations, who took part, or for any other delegations. The basic positions of delegations still are those reflected in CD/220 [5] and WP.33, both in the "elements" and in the comments to them, and also in CD/294. [6]

3. The co-ordinator feels, however, that he was supported by the Contact Group in his endeavours to present "working hypothesis" regarding the possible content of the definitions mentioned, at the same time accounting for the main divergent or optional views on the

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[5] *Ibid., 1981,* pp. 374–395.

[6] See Soviet proposal submitted to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, *ante,* June 16.

suggested content. The report, therefore, presents such working hypothesis and comments on them, and, when necessary, preceded by an introduction to the subject. The introduction contains points of view which were offered by delegations as explanations for suggested parts of definitions.

4. Even if it is the hope that the working hypotheses might serve delegations in their work to narrow differences of views on definitions, they should be considered to be only basic approaches. Thus they are not intended to reflect all the controversial issues which are discussed to be included in the scope, even if occasionally some reference may be made to that.

5. Before starting the work on definitions, the Contact Group discussed the "purpose criterion". It was agreed that this concept need not be defined for the purpose of the convention. However, the following *tentative* description seemed to be generally acceptable:

(1) It allows a State to determine what it is allowed to do and what it must not do.

(2) It provides a guideline for one State to evaluate another State's activities.

(3) It provides, together with the quantity criterion, a starting point for elaborating more specific criteria (e.g. toxicity, lists). Such criteria can serve as a guide to selection and application of specific verification measures.

6. Working hypothesis regarding a basic definition of chemical weapons.

(a) The definition should comprise only such concepts which are necessary for the purpose of the convention.

(b) The definition should express the typical effects of chemical weapons, i.e. that their effects are due to the utilization of the toxic properties of chemicals to cause death or other harm.

> *Comments:*
> Weapons utilizing other properties of chemicals, e.g. radioactivity or their content of energy, are not to be considered as chemical weapons even if such chemicals happen to be more or less toxic. It may be a question of presentation where in the definition this idea should be expressed, whether in an introductory part of the definition or in the body of the definition.
> Suggestions have been made that reference has to be made to the use in war, armed conflict or combat in this connection.
> The formulation suggested about toxic properties of chemicals could imply a reference to toxic effects of chemical weapons to all living organisms.

(c) The term "chemical weapons" should be applied to each of three different categories of items:

(i) Toxic chemicals which meet certain criteria, and their precursors.

(ii) Munitions and devices which meet certain criteria. This category includes binary and other multi-component munitions or devices.

(iii) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

Comments:

The above mentioned part of the definition that chemical weapons utilize the toxic properties of chemicals could as well appear in the body, (i)–(iii), of the definition.

Another approach might be to define "chemical warfare agent" and apply the criteria referred to under (a) to such chemical warfare agents.

(d) The general undertakings in an Article I of a future convention shall not apply to chemicals, which can be shown to be produced etc. for certain permitted purposes in quantities appropriate for such purposes. However, such chemicals may have to be subject to certain clarification procedures concerning the provisions in Article I, as may be expressed in appropriate future articles on verification.

Comment:

The way to express this in the convention is not agreed upon yet.

(e) The criteria for placing chemicals in toxicity categories as super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, and other harmful chemicals, could be expressed as follows:

(i) A "super-toxic lethal chemical" is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m^3 (by inhalation), when measured by the methods set forth in

(ii) Any "other lethal chemical" is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m^3 (by inhalation) and which is less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m^3 (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in

(iii) Any "other harmful chemical" is any toxic chemical with a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m^3 (by inhalation) when measured by the methods set forth in

Comments:

Preliminary agreed protocols for toxicity determinations by subcutaneous administrations and by inhalation have been worked out during technical consultations.

The category "other harmful chemical" might be subdivided into categories, which referred to other toxic effects than lethal effects. This would presume agreements on methods to measure such other harmful effects as sensory irritant effects, mentally and physically incapacitating effects, skin lesion effects, etc.

No attempts have been made as yet to evaluate the possible coverage of a definition as expressed in the present Working Hypothesis with regard to toxins and tear gases. Only the possibility that it may cover herbicides was pointed to in the last comment under (b) above.

7. Working hypothesis regarding a basic definition of "permitted purposes".

(a) Permitted purposes would consist of two main elements

(i) non-hostile purposes, and
(ii) military purposes not related to the use of chemical weapons.

(b) Non-hostile purposes would include research, industrial, agricultural, medical or other peaceful purposes, law enforcement purposes, purposes directly connected to protection against chemical weapons.

8. Working hypothesis of a basic definition of "precursor".

(a) Introductory remarks

For the purpose of a chemical weapons convention there seems to be a need (a) to ensure a ban on production, etc. of any chemical used for production of chemicals to which the term chemical weapon might be applied and (b) to determine which of these chemicals, which may require particular attention from the standpoint of verification.

The former chemicals may be identified in a general way in the convention as "precursors" to fall under the provisions in Article I, prohibiting development, production and stockpiling chemical weapons, in order to preclude the *theoretical* possibility that the convention might be interpreted as allowing production etc. of these precursors for chemical weapons purpose.

In order to meet the requirement under (b) it would probably be necessary to identify the particular chemicals among the precursors, which are in some way critical for the production of chemical weapons, e.g. by determining the main type of compound formed, and which may not have any peaceful use. These precursors might be singled out in the convention, e.g. as "key precursors". Key precursor stockpiles may have to be declared and destroyed, and these activities be subject to verification measures, which might also apply to their future non-production. These measures would not apply to precursors in general, because these would under the future ban only be produced etc. for permitted purposes according to the purpose criterion.

(b) For the purpose of the convention a general and broad definition of "precursor" could contain the following:

(i) Precursors as mentioned in , are chemicals, which, when made to react chemically from chemicals as are mentioned in (reference to the place where super-toxic lethal, other lethal, and other harmful chemicals first are mentioned in the definition of chemical weapons).

Comment:
An alternative formulation might be:
"Precursor" means any chemical, which may be used as a reactant in production of a super-toxic lethal chemical, other lethal chemical, or other harmful chemical.

(ii) It would be prohibited under the convention to develop, produce, stockpile, otherwise acquire, retain or transfer precursors as defined above other than for permitted purposes.

(c) A definition of "key precursor" could contain the following:

(i) A key precursor would be the reactant(s) in one or in a few consecutive chemical syntheses leading to the formation of a super-toxic lethal, other lethal, or other harmful chemical, which determines the class of chemical (expressed in the chemical structure) of the toxic chemical(s) formed when the reaction(s) is taking place

—in a production facility producing super-toxic lethal, other lethal or other harmful chemicals,
—in a chemical weapon warhead or other disseminating device for chemical weapons, before the dissemination of the intended final, toxic product(s); or outside the dissemination device during or after dissemination.

(ii) Key precursors would have to be destroyed i.e. transformed into chemicals without significance themselves for production of toxic chemicals. Such destruction as well as non-production of key precursors should be subject to verification as set out in

Comments:

A definition of key precursors thus could contain the following characteristics:

The key precursor would
—be a precursor in the final stages of the production process,
—be particularly important in determining the end product,
—be of relatively little use for non-hostile purposes,
—pose a serious risk from the standpoint of an effective ban and therefore require particular attention with respect to verification.

A definition of key precursor may also serve State Parties to a convention as a guide for evaluation of future developments with respect to key precursors which have not previously been generally known or were discovered in the future.
For the latter purpose, alleged key precursors, and for which data proving this were lacking, could be related to any of the three types of toxic chemicals by means of toxicity determinations on their end products formed in their reactions with other precursors. The existence of the definition would also serve as a guideline when chemicals falling under the general definition of precursors above may not need to be destroyed or could be diverted or produced for permitted purposes.
Optional to having an explicit definition of key precursors, it might be possible to have only a list of key precursors. Such a list could be established and revised as necessary by the Consultative Committee on the basis of agreed criteria similar to those discussed above. This might make it possible to have a simple definition like e.g.:
"Key precursor" means a precursor which has been identified by the Consultative Committee, on the basis of agreed criteria, as

requiring particular attention from the point of view of destruction.

A list of key precursors could also be made up in addition to a definition of key precursors.

The question of lists of key precursors was not thoroughly discussed during the consultations but seems to be favourable to most delegations. Nor was it discussed as to which extent they might be revised.

9. A preliminary discussion was held with respect to possibly needed definitions, for the purpose of the convention, of "production facility", "production capacity" and of "destruction". The background material presented as a basis for the discussions by the co-ordinator are presented below, amended in accordance with the few points of view there was time to obtain on these matters during the consultations.

(a) "Production facility" could mean the plant, or part of plant, where chemical weapons [will] be produced.

(b) "Production capacity" could mean the amount of chemical weapons that might be produced during a given period of time under agreed assumption, and/or

the number of production facilities, which might produce chemical weapons and their combined output during one year under agreed assumptions.

Comment:

Instead of their combined output, the output of each production facility might be given.

(c) "Destruction" could mean one or more of the following activities to eliminate chemical weapons and production facilities.

(i) With regard to chemical weapons

Chemicals:

Change of the chemical into degradation products, which may be uneconomical to utilize for repeated production of the same chemical. The process should be performed in a way that is not detrimental to the environment. This might include utilization of the chemical directly in a (irreversible) production process leading to other chemicals, which could not economically be utilized for production of the same chemical or facilitate production of such chemicals. Such a change of the chemical may be referred to as diversion or conversion instead of destruction, and would have to be declared and performed according to agreed procedures, and be subject to particular verification measures.

Munitions and devices:

Make such munitions or devices unserviceable for chemical weapons purposes, preferably by crushing them into pieces.

Specifically designed equipment:

Make such equipment unserviceable and removed from weapons systems etc.

(ii) With regard to production facilities

—physically take apart or disintegrate the facility and remove all parts in an unserviceable state from the facility, leaving the site empty,

—dismantle and disperse for other purposes some or all of the parts of a production facility. Removed parts and the purposes of their utilization should be declared and verified.

APPENDIX

Reference material:

Document CD/112, 7 July 1980, p. 2–3, entitled
"Letter dated 7 July 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament." [7]

Document CD/220, 17 August 1981, entitled
"Report of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament." [8]

Document WP.33, 28 April 1982, p. 5–11, entitled
"Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts."

Document CD/266, 24 March 1982, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled
"Working paper, Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification."

Document CD/294, 21 July 1982, submitted by the USSR, entitled
"Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, Proposal of the USSR." [9]

Document CD/CW/CRP.62, 26 July 1982, submitted by China, entitled
"Suggested alternative wording for Element II and Annex I."

Document CD/CW/WP.30, 22 March 1982, Annexes III and IV, entitled
"Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations."

Document CD/CW/WP.38, 28 July 1982, submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled
"Suggested alternative definitions of Chemical Weapons."

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 285–289.
[8] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 374–395.
[9] See *ante*, June 16.

Document CD/CW/CRP.31, CD/CW/CTC/13, 19 March 1982, submitted by United States of America, entitled
"Precursors."

Document CD/CW/CTC/15, 26 July 1982, submitted by Sweden, entitled
"Chairman's Consultations on Toxicity Criteria."

Document CD/CW/CTC/19, 5 August 1982, submitted by China, entitled
"Chairman's Consultations on Toxicity Criteria."

Document CD/CW/CTC/27, 9 August 1982, submitted by USSR, entitled
"Some problems associated with the prohibition of binary weapons and the verification of compliance with such prohibition."

A number of written suggestions from delegations, as well as many earlier contributions to the Working Group, have not been listed here.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT IV (DECLARATIONS)

1. POSSESSION OR NON-POSSESSION

Possession or non-possession of "Chemical Weapons" (as defined in the relevant element of CW Convention including all components) and production facilities in use or inoperative whether on State's own property or abroad or belonging to other State(s) on one's own property including those whose ownership is not well defined.

Timings: Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

(A) "Chemical Weapons" Stocks

(a) *Agents:* Description by weight in metric tons including quantities in bulk and filled into munitions and

Alternative I Description by toxicity category:
—Supertoxic lethal nerve gases (G-gases, V-gases);
—Supertoxic lethal blister gases (H-gases);
—Other supertoxic lethal chemicals;
—Other lethal chemicals;
—Other harmful chemicals including incapacitants, psychotropic chemicals, convulsants and disabling chemicals; irritants including those meant for law enforcement purposes.

Alternative II Description by toxicity category (supertoxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful) and by chemical names.

(b) *Precursors:*

Alternative I Precursors including those of binary type and individual chemicals in accordance with the categories mentioned in (a) Alternative I above.

Alternative II Description by weight in metric tons filled and unfilled and by chemical names.

(c) *Munitions and devices:*

Alternative I As described through toxicity categories quantities of agents and precursors.

Alternative II

(i) Types, weight and number of unfilled.
(ii) Types, weight and number of filled.

(d) *"Equipment specifically designed for use in CW":*

Alternative I As described through toxicity categories quantities of agents and precursors.
Alternative II Types and number including of auxiliary filling equipment.
Location:
Alternative I No declarations.
Alternative II Exact description of location by precise geographic co-ordinates.
Timing: Not later than 30 days after the convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

(B) Production Facilities

(a) *Type*

Alternative I Declaration for purposes of destruction

(i) Agent production and key precursor production facilities including types of products.
(ii) Filling facilities.
(iii) Key precursor production facilities.

Alternative II Declaration for purposes of destruction as well as Confidence Building Measures

(i) Agent production and key precursor production facilities including types of products.
(ii) Filling facilities.
(iii) Key precursor production facilities.
(iv) Munitions and devices production facilities which are exclusively or partially designed or used for this purpose.

(b) *Capacity of Production Facilities*

Alternative I Types, weight and/or quantity in terms of time as follows:

(i) Capacities for production of chemicals are declared directly in units of chemicals weight.
(ii) Capacities for filling of munitions are declared in units of chemical weights.
(iii) Capacities for production of filled munitions of binary or multicomponent charges are declared in units of chemicals weight as applied to the chemicals of a specific type which could be formed in combat use.
(iv) Capacities for production of unfilled munition of binary or multicomponent charges are declared in units of weight of the chemicals which could be formed after filling the munitions.

Alternative II Types, weight and/or quantity in terms of time.
Location: Exact geographical location of facilities will be declared in degrees, minutes and seconds.

Declarations will also include description of following types of facilities:

(i) Existing facilities: Last date of operation.

(ii) Converted; present use; last date used for CW.
(iii) Dual purpose facilities:

Alternative I No declaration of dual purpose facilities.
Alternative II Dual purpose facilities which are specifically designed or used in part for production of any chemical which is primarily used for CW.
Alternative III Dual purpose facilities which are capable of conversion to proper CW facilities.
Alternative IV The number and location of all industrial facilities for the production of organophosphorous substances.

Timings:

Alternative I

(i) Possession of facilities 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.
(ii) Capacity of facilities not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Location: Not later than one year before destruction.

Alternative II All declarations regarding possession, capacity and location of facilities be made not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

[(C)] Stocks and production facilities belonging to other States

(a) Total quantity [in units of weight] [10] according to each type of chemical [super-toxic lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals];
(b) Facilities for the production of chemical weapons or any of their elements, controlled by any other State, group of States, organization or private individual [indication of capacity of such facilities].

Possible need for declaration of findings of old stocks of chemical weapons, which were not known to a Party itself, when the convention entered into force, and of plans for the destruction of such stocks.

2. PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS

Declarations regarding plans and time frames for destruction of stocks will cover "Chemical Weapons" as defined in the relevant element of the Convention.

Description of destruction process will cover the following:

(i) Type of operation.

(ii) Time schedule including percentage quantities planned for destruction in specific time frames.

(iii) What is being destroyed and at what location.

(iv) Aimed at end production.

Alternative I Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.
Alternative II Within 90 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.
Alternative III Within six months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

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[10] Brackets in this and following paragraphs are in the source text.

3. PLANS FOR ELIMINATION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

Declarations regarding plans and time frames for elimination of production facilities will cover the following:

(i) Location of facilities.

(ii) Plans for (a) dismantling; and (b) destruction.

(iii) Time frames for completion of separate stages of elimination (if necessary).

Description of destruction process will cover the following:

(i) Type of operation.

(ii) Time schedule.

(iii) What is being destroyed and at what location.

(iv) Aimed at end product (if any including description of equipment elements for peaceful purposes).

Timings:

Alternative I Within 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative II Within six months after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

Alternative III Within seven years after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS FOR DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS

(i) Progress report of stocks destroyed during last year/period including details of types, quantities and destruction methods.

(ii) Plans for destruction during next year/period including details of types, quantities and destruction methods.

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLANS FOR DISMANTLING/DESTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES

(i) Progress report of facilities dismantled/destroyed during last year/period including type and location and elimination method.

(ii) Plans for dismantling/destruction of facilities during next year/period including location, type and elimination method.

Timings: Annual/Periodical.

6. COMPLETION OF ELIMINATION ACTIVITIES

Declaration of completion of elimination activities of all "Chemical Weapons" and production facilities.

Timings: Not later than 10 years.

7. STOCKS OF SUPER-TOXIC LETHAL CHEMICALS FOR PERMITTED PURPOSES AND THE FACILITIES FOR PRODUCTION OF SUCH CHEMICALS

(a) Super-toxic lethal chemicals produced, diverted from stocks, acquired or used:

Alternative I

(i) For purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons;

(ii) For industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes and for military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

Alternative II

(i) For purposes directly connected with protection against chemical weapons.

(b) Location and capacity of the specialized facility for the production of super-toxic lethal chemical for protective/permitted purposes.

Timings: Within 30 days—(for stocks held at entry into force) Annual/Periodic—(subsequently).

8. *Alternative I* Production and use of other lethal chemicals for permitted purposes.

Alternative II Production and use of commercial chemicals which pose a special risk.

Alternative III Production of organophosphorous substances.

Other lethal chemicals and precursors produced, acquired, retained or used for permitted purposes including their quantities, total production, chemical names, uses and location and capacity of facilities where produced.

Timings:

(i) Within 30 days—(for stocks held)

(ii) Annual/Periodic—(subsequently).

9. TRANSFERS

Alternative I

(i) Volume of transfers since 1 January 1946.

(a) Quantities of chemicals transferred/super-toxic, lethal, other lethal and other harmful chemicals.

(b) Quantities of transferred munitions and other means of combat use/weight of the chemicals filled in those munitions;

(c) Technological equipment for the production of chemical weapons and corresponding technical documentation/in units of weight of the chemicals which could have been produced as a result of such transfers.

(ii) Declare type and quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals transferred for *permitted* purposes and names of recipient State(s).

Alternative II Declare type and quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals transferred for *protective* purposes and names of recipient State(s).

Timings: For Alternative I (i) Not later than 30 days after the Convention's entry into force or the State Party's adherence to it.

For Alternative I (ii) and Alternative II 30 days in advance of transfer.

10. DIVERSION OF STOCKS

Details of types, quantity and intended use.

Timings:

Alternative I Along with/as part of the declaration of plans for destruction of the stocks.

Alternative II Along with/as part of the declaration of implementation of destruction of stocks.

11. CONVERSION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES TO DESTRUCTION FACILITIES

Details including location, type, capacity.

Timings:

Alternative I Along with/as part of plans for elimination of facilities.

Alternative II At the time of declaration of plans for destruction of stocks.

12. CESSATION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO POSSIBLE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

(a) Issue an open general order to the effect that planning, organization and training intended to enable the utilization of toxic properties of chemicals as weapon in combat should not take place;

(b) Ascertain that all organization charts, plans, manuals etc. containing provisions intended to enable the utilization of toxic properties of chemicals as weapon in combat, are withdrawn or revised;

(c) Declare the composition of equipment intended to protect against chemical weapons.

Timings: Not later than 10 years.
OPTION: No such declaration.

SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS

All declarations will be submitted to the Consultative Committee who will inform all States Parties.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT V (DESTRUCTION, DIVERSION, DISMANTLING AND CONVERSION)

A—DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS:

I—ARTICLE: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

(a) general obligation to destroy all existing stocks of chemical weapons; [11]

(b) possibility of diversion of stocks for peaceful purposes, subject to conditions and circumstances set forth in the Annex;

(c) obligation to utilize sage methods of destruction that will avoid harm to the environment and to populations; [12]

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[11] Suggested addition: "This includes all items defined as 'chemical weapons', including all types of precursors". If under the Element "Definitions", all precursors fall within the definition of "chemical weapons", this addition would render unnecessary the proposed sub-element (a) for the Article. [Footnote in original.]

[12] This obligation could be stated in a separate Article applying to the destruction of both stocks and facilities. [Footnote in original.]

(d) provision on international co-operation to facilitate implementation of the Convention,[13] including the possibility of transfer of chemical weapons to another State Party for the purpose of destruction;

(e) indication of the over-all duration of the process of destruction, to be counted from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party (suggestion: 10 years):

—time of start of actual destruction (alternatives):

(i) not later than six months after the Convention enters into force for each State Party;

(ii) not later than two years after the Convention enters into force for each State Party

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

(a) obligation to destroy precursors that may be used for binary weapons;[14]

(b) placement of all stocks under international supervision at the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party;

(c) obligation to utilize methods of destruction that permit adequate verification.

II—ANNEX: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

(a) conditions and circumstances for permitted diversion of stocks for peaceful purposes (to be further elaborated);

(b) procedures and operations to be accomplished during the over-all period of destruction:

—initial stage (from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party to the time of start of actual destruction):
—submission of plans for destruction of stocks; such plans should include:

•quantities and types of agents to be destroyed;
•time scheduled for the process of destruction;
•description, in general terms, of method(s) to be employed for destruction;
•indication of place(s) of facility(ies) used for destruction.

—destruction stage (from the start of actual destruction to the end of over-all period of destruction):

•(to be seen in connection with the declarations required from Parties relating to destruction of stocks).

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

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[13] This provision could be stated in an appropriate place so as to apply both to the destruction of stocks and of facilities. [Footnote in original.]

[14] Suggested conditions and circumstances: (a) list of agents the diversion of which would be permitted; (b) international supervision of diversion; (c) diversion to be carried out in an irreversible manner, so as to prevent the re-utilization of component agents as weapons. [Footnote in original.]

(a) provisions for ensuring adequate balance during destruction stage so as to avoid the acquisition of military advantage by one State Party over another (p.ex., agreed rates of destruction);

(b) provisions for ensuring minimization of economic damage and for avoiding unnecessary or burdensome interference with peaceful chemical industry.

B—DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES

I—ARTICLE: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

(a) general obligation to destroy and dismantle facilities,[15] and not to construct new ones;

(b) obligation to close down such facilities at the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party, and to cease production of chemical weapons at that time;

(c) provision for temporary conversion of production facilities into facilities for the purpose of destruction of stocks;

(d) obligation not to reconvert such converted facilities, and to destroy or dismantle them as soon as they are no longer needed for the purpose of destruction of stocks;

(e) indication of over-all maximum duration of the process of destruction, to be counted from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party (suggestion: 10 years)

—time of start of actual destruction:

(alternative suggestions)

(i) six months after the Convention enters into force for each State Party;

(ii) not later than eight years after the Convention enters into force for each State Party.

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

(a) provision for the possibility of building special facilities for the purpose of destruction of stocks;

(b) provision for the possibility of re-utilization in peaceful industry of certain types and categories of equipment, according to specification to be set forth in the Annex;

(c) obligation to utilize methods of destruction that permit adequate verification.

II—ANNEX: Agreed sub-elements to be included:

(a) elaboration of procedures and operations to be accomplished during the over-all period of destruction:

(i) initial stage (from the time the Convention enters into force for each State Party to the time of the start of actual destruction)

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[15] The term "facility" should be understood as defined in Element II. The following definition was suggested by some Delegations: "Facilities and/or equipment designed or used for the production of any chemical which is primarily useful for chemical weapons purposes, or for filling chemical munitions". [Footnote in original.]

—immediate cessation of production and closing down of facilities;

—submission of detailed plans for destruction of facilities; such plans should include:

•location of facility(ies);

•description of method(s) to be employed for destruction;

•indication of facility to be temporarily converted for destruction of stocks;

•plans for destruction of such converted facility.

(ii) destruction stage (from the start of actual destruction to the end of the over-all period): (to be seen in connection with the declarations required from Parties relating to the destruction of facilities).

Other sub-elements proposed by some Delegations:

(a) specification of types and categories of equipment that could be reused in peaceful industry;

(b) provisions for ensuring adequate balance during the destruction stage, so as to avoid the acquisition of military advantage by one State Party over another (p.ex., agreed rates of destruction).

C—QUESTIONS BEARING ON ELEMENT V THAT SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ELSEWHERE IN THE CONVENTION

(a) issues pertaining to "Definitions":

—definition of weapons and agents prohibited under the Convention and which should thus be destroyed (see Section A on "Destruction of Stocks" and note to agreed sub-element (a) of the Article and to proposed sub-element (a));

—definition of facilities and/or equipment for the production of chemical weapons, which should thus be destroyed (see Section B on "Destruction of Facilities" and note to agreed sub-element (a) of the Article);

—definition of the concept of destruction/dismantling, both with regard to stocks and with regard to facilities.

(b) issues pertaining to "Declaration":

—specification of all declarations to be required from States Parties relating to the process of destruction/dismantling, both of stocks and facilities, including periodical declarations (suggestion: annual declarations during the destruction stage):

—specification of the authority to which plans for destruction of stocks and facilities should be submitted (suggestion: the Consultative Committee);

(c) issues pertaining to "Verification":

—adequate procedures for the verification of compliance with the obligations set forth in Element V.

(d) issues pertaining to the prohibition of transfer of chemical weapons:

—exception to the obligation not to transfer chemical weapons, so as to permit the transfer of stocks for destruction purposes as set forth in the Article on stocks (see Section A, "Destruction of Stocks", sub-element (d) of the Article).

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT IX (GENERAL PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION)

Element IX—Might Contain the Following Points:

1. *Purpose* of verification: to provide assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention (CD 220).

2. *Scope* of verification: appropriate and agreed verification measures should be applied on the basis of the principle of reciprocity to, *inter alia:*

(a) Elements I–IV, concerning prohibition of development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons;

(b) Elements I and V, concerning destruction or otherwise disposal of existing stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production; over an agreed period of time;

(c) Element VI concerning super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes;

(d) Enquiry into facts, including on-site verification on an agreed basis, on questions related to alleged contravention of the terms of the convention.

3. *Means* of verification:

(a) Technical means of verification: Element IX could indicate that agreed techniques of verification appropriate to the task required are identified under each substantive head (now contained in Elements II–VI);

(b) *Organizational* means of verification: Element IX could provide for the establishment of a Consultative Committee to act as a permanent body for the monitoring of the implementation of and compliance with the terms of the Convention.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE PREAMBLE AND FINAL CLAUSES OF THE FUTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

SECTION A: CONCEPTS AND OPTIONS

PREAMBLE

Concepts

(i) Bringing about general and complete disarmament

(ii) CW ban as a necessary disarmament step

(iii) Determination to exclude possibility of use; CW use repugnant to the conscience of mankind

(iv) Strengthening peaceful co-operation in scientific fields

(v) BW Convention undertaking on CW negotiations

(vi) Recognizing significance of 1925 Protocol and BW Convention
(vii) Charter of the United Nations
(viii) CW convention important for social and economic development

Options

—inclusion of prohibition of use in first preambular paragraph
—chemistry for the benefit of mankind
—principle of non-diminished security (at lower levels of armaments)

SECTION B: VARIOUS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

PREAMBLE

(i) *Disarmament*

Reaffirming their adherence to the objectives of general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction;

(ii) *CW*

Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction represent a necessary step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(iii) *Use*

Determined, for the sake of all mankind to exclude completely the possibility of chemical agents being used as weapons; convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk;

(iv) *Peaceful co-operation*

Considering that peaceful co-operation among States should strengthen international co-operation in scientific fields, especially in that of chemistry;

Alternative Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind

(v) *BW Convention*

In conformity with the undertaking contained in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,[16] to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

(vi) *1925 Protocol*

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at

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[16] *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 133–138.

Geneva on 17 June 1925 and also of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, in force since 26 March 1975, and calling upon all States to comply strictly with the said agreements;

(vii) *United Nations Charter*

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(viii) *Social and Economic Development*

Recognizing the important contribution that the Convention can make through its implementation to the social and economic development of States, especially developing countries.

Option

Guided by the principle of non-diminished security of any State or group of States.

ELEMENT VII—RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TREATIES

No limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed under 1925 Protocol or any other international treaties.

Options

—specific reference to obligations under Biological Weapons Convention

—specific reference to obligations under ENMOD

—possibility of linking CW convention to 1925 Protocol.

ELEMENT VII—RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TREATIES

Draft Element

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

Reference to BW

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

Reference to ENMOD

Nothing in this Convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, or under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and the Convention on Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), [17] or any other international treaty or any existing rules of international law governing armed conflicts.

ELEMENT VIII—INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Concepts

(i) Avoidance of hampering international co-operation in peaceful and protective chemical activities;

(ii) Undertaking to facilitate, promote and participate in exchange of materials and information;

(iii) Undertaking to allocate any savings as a result of CW convention.

Options

—facilitate international co-operation in peaceful chemical activities

—participate in fullest possible exchange (including co-operation on training and equipping with protective measures)

—undertaking to assist other Parties on request.

ELEMENT XIV—AMENDMENTS

(i) Amendments proposed by any Party; submitted to Depositary; circulated to other Parties;

(ii) Entry into force of amendments for each Party accepting amendments upon acceptance by majority of Parties; thereafter for each remaining Party on date of acceptance by it.

Options

—Amendments considered at Review Conference

—Party after entry into force, failing expression of a different intention, considered as party to treaty as amended.

ELEMENT VIII—INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Draft Element

(1) This Convention should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful and protective chemical activities, including the inter-

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[17] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.

national exchange of chemicals and equipment for production, processing or use of chemical agents for peaceful and protective purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to facilitate, promote and participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemicals for peaceful and protective purposes consonant with the aims of this Convention.

(3) Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to allocate a substantial part of possible savings in military expenditures as a result of disarmament measures agreed upon in this Convention to economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

Fullest possible exchange

Each State Party to this Convention should undertake to facilitate, promote and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes consonant with the aims of this Convention. Where appropriate such exchange should extend to co-operation on protective measures.

Assistance to Parties

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention, which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

ELEMENT XV—REVIEW CONFERENCE

Concepts

(i) Review after five years if majority of Parties agree
(ii) Five year intervals.

ELEMENT XVI—DURATION AND WITHDRAWALS

Concepts

(i) Unlimited duration;
(ii) Right of withdrawal; three months notice to Depositary; statement of extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme interests;
(iii) Notification to Security Council.

ELEMENT XIV—AMENDMENTS

Draft Element

(1) Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to the Convention. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

(2) An amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining States Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ELEMENT XV—REVIEW CONFERENCE

Draft Element

(1) Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary, a conference of States Parties to the Convention should be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Convention are being realized. Such review should take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

(2) Further review conferences should be held at intervals of five years thereafter, and at other times if requested by a majority of the States Parties to this Convention.

ELEMENT XVI—DURATION AND WITHDRAWALS

Draft Element

(1) This Convention should be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention should in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It should give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary three months in advance. Such notice should include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

(3) The Depositary on its part should immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the submission of a notice of withdrawal from a State Party to the Convention.

ELEMENT XVII—SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION

Draft Element

(1) This Convention should be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Element could accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention should be subject to ratification by signator States. Instruments of ratification or accession should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(3) This Convention should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by . . . Governments, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Element.

(4) For those States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it should enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary should promptly inform all signatory States and States Parties of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention should be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

(7) Annexes of the Convention should be considered an integral part of this Convention.

ELEMENT XVII—SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION

Concepts

(i) Open to all States; accession at any time

(ii) Subject to ratification; deposited with United Nations Secretary-General

(iii) Entry into force with specified number of ratifications

(iv) Entry into force for late accession

(v) Depositary to notify all Parties of each signature, ratification or accession

(vi) Registered in accordance with United Nations Charter

(vii) Annexes of convention integral.

Options

—twenty ratifications for entry into force

—entry into force requires ratification by all permanent members of Security Council.

ELEMENT XVIII—DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION

Texts, in all United Nations languages, distributed by Depositary.

Options

Twenty Ratifications

This Convention should enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Element.

All Security Council members

This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by . . . Governments, including the Governments of the States permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

ELEMENT XVIII—DISTRIBUTION OF THE CONVENTION

Draft Element

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, should be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should send duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of States members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT X (NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES)

1. Article on national measures

Working hypothesis:

Each State Party should take any measures it considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement the Convention, and in particular to prohibit and prevent any activity in violation of the Convention anywhere under its jurisdiction or control.

Each State Party would also inform the Consultative Committee of what legislative and administrative measures it had taken with respect to the implementation of the Convention.

2. Possible article on national body

Options:

—Each State Party would designate a central authority and point of contact having responsibility with regard to overseeing the implementation of the Convention and to co-operating with the Consultative Committee and the central authorities of other States Parties. Guidelines concerning the functions of this central authority could be set out in Annex . . . .

—Each State Party would identify its point of contact being responsible for the co-operation with the Consultative Committee.

—No special reference to national body, since this question could be regarded as covered by the article on national measures.

3. Possible Annex containing guidelines concerning the functions of the national body

In case there will be agreement on the first option in paragraph 2 such an Annex could be necessary. The contents of this Annex should be further discussed. The following ideas with regard to possible guidelines are quoted from different Working papers and serve only illustrative purposes:

(a) The central authority to be designated by each State Party under Article . . . . should be organized and employed by each State Party in accordance with its own legislation.

(b) "national aspect":

—to oversee the implementation of the obligations concerning

—prohibition of development, production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of chemical weapons;

—destruction of stocks of chemical weapons;

—destruction or dismantling of means of production of chemical weapons;

—temporary conversion of means of production of chemical weapons for the purpose of destroying stocks of such weapons;

—super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes;

(This list would be specified in accordance with the final agreement on the scope of prohibition.)

—to oversee the implementation of the above mentioned obligations the central authority should be in a position

—to get the relevant information from the corresponding executive organs, agencies and enterprises to investigate the actual state of affairs concerning compliance with the Convention;

—to examine reports on development activities as well as the productive and commercial activities of enterprises of the chemical industry and related fields, including productive commercial documentations of the enterprises of industrial firms engaged in the manufacture of chemical and other products which could be related to the scope of the Convention;

—to visit enterprises producing supertoxic lethal chemicals, harmful chemicals and precursors, which fall under the scope of the Convention;

—to visit enterprises being dismantled or already dismantled, or converted to the production of the above mentioned chemicals for permitted purposes;

—to sample probes of waste gases, waste water and soil;

—to install in the above mentioned enterprises sensing devices and make the necessary measurements;

—to get the financial means necessary for the implementation of its functions;

—to submit to the government concerned reports on its activities which would be publicized.

(c) "international co-operative aspect":

—to provide the Consultative Committee with all data necessary to the execution of the task of the Committee with respect to verification of compliance with the Convention;

—to extend in case of international inspections all assistance requested including technical assistance and the provision of data;

—to have access to a selection of inspection personnel both technical and non-technical;

—to be prepared to maintain documentation of the type required to satisfy international verification requirements;

—to co-operate in providing expertise to the Consultative Committee;

—to co-operate with the central authorities of other States Parties and with corresponding international organizations concerning issues connected with the implementation of the Convention.

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENT XI

(NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION)

1. Paragraph on the compatibility of the use of NTM with international law

Options:

—Any use of national technical means of verification for the purpose of monitoring compliance by other States with the provisions of the Convention must be consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

—Each State Party to the Convention may use national technical means of verification at its disposal for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the provisions of the Convention in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Paragraph on assistance and the provision of information

Options:

—Verification pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own national technical means of verification, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party.

—Any State Party which possesses national technical means of verification may, where necessary, place at the disposal of other Parties information which it has obtained through those means and which is important for the purposes of the Convention.

—Any information so obtained should be confidential to the State Party which carried out monitoring, unless or until evidence was sufficient to suggest non-compliance by another State Party. In this case the Consultative Committee should be informed.

—All States parties to the Convention should have access to information gathered by the use of national technical means of verification through the Consultative Committee, at which disposal States Parties possessing such information would place it.

3. Paragraph on non-interference with NTM

Working hypothesis:

Each State Party to the convention should undertake not to impede, including through the use of deliberate concealment measures or in any other manner, the national technical means of verification of other States Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1.

(In the view of some delegations provision on non-interference with NTM should depend on a paragraph on the provision of information along the lines of the fourth option in paragraph 2. The question of non-concealment should be further clarified.)

Alternative to Element XI on the lines of Article III, paragraph 5 of the Sea-bed Treaty:

"Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter".

(*Note:*

—first part may be regarded as covered by the first option in paragraph 2 of this paper;

—second part may be regarded as covered by Element XIII).

REPORT OF THE CO-ORDINATOR OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON ELEMENTS XII AND XIII

(CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION: CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE)

ELEMENT XII: CONSULTATION AND CO-OPERATION

I. It was generally agreed that the Convention should include a provision regarding normal consultations and co-operation according to the following lines:

(a) Commitment by States parties to consult and co-operate.

(b) Consultations and co-operation may be undertaken: directly between two or more parties; through appropriate international procedures including the services of appropriate international organizations and of the Consultative Committee. (It was generally agreed to include a specific reference to the Consultative Committee underscoring its special role).

(c) Substance of consultations and co-operation: any matter in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of, the provisions of the Convention.

For further consideration:

—Specific reference to the United Nations General Assembly and/or Security Council.

II. Fact-finding procedures concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention

(a) General formulation encouraging States parties to hold bilateral contacts.

(b) Right for every State party (challenging or challenged) to request the Consultative Committee to carry out a fact-finding procedure, including its right to request a specific activity to be carried out by the Consultative Committee (e.g. on-site inspections).

(c) Such request must be substantiated.

(d) Obligation to co-operate in the fact-finding procedure.

(e) Appropriate explanations must be provided in case of a refusal to an on-site inspection.

(f) Obligation of the Consultative Committee to inform States parties about the results of its procedures.

(g) General reference to the right of every State to resort to the mechanisms provided by the Charter of the United Nations.

For further consideration:

—Decision by the Consultative Committee on the merits of a request and on the appropriate activity to be carried out for a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention.

—Provision containing a strong commitment by States parties to co-operate with the Consultative Committee in its investigations.

—Action the Consultative Committee might take after a refusal by a State party to an on-site inspection:

—request further information
—request a reconsideration of the decision.

—Provision of assistance to a State party in case of a breach of the Convention:

—subsumed in the general reference to the United [Nations] Charter
—or formulated in specific terms

—Question of falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with the Convention by other States parties.

ELEMENT XIII: CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

A. *Organizational Questions*

1. *Chapeau*

It was agreed that there should be a general formulation stating the purposes of the Consultative Committee, i.e.:

—to carry out broader international consultation and co-operation
—to ensure the availability of international data
—to provide expert advice
—to oversee the implementation of the Convention
—to promote the verification of the continued compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

2. *Timing for the Establishment*

—Consultative Committee: shortly, e.g. 30 days, after entry into force of the Convention.

—It was generally agreed that some preparatory work before the establishment of the Consultative Committee would be needed.

For further consideration:

Preparatory Committee
—temporary body
—established after X number of signatures of the Convention
—open to every signatory
—functions: to carry out preparatory technical work, make recommendations to the Consultative Committee

3. *Composition*

—1 representative by each State party
—advisers by each State party

For further consideration:

—President.—Options:

—Depositary (United Nations Secretary-General or his personal representative)
—elected by the States parties
—rotative presidency
—collective presidency

—Right or obligation of every State party to become members of the Consultative Committee

4. *Subordinate Bodies*

It was generally agreed that the Consultative Committee would have:

—A technical secretariat
—A sub-organ or sub-organs of a reduced membership to operate on a permanent basis

For further consideration:

—Membership of the sub-organ(s). It was suggested:

—equitable geographical distribution
—renewed every X years
—some permanent members

—Functions

Suggested additions:

—Fact-finding panel: operational body composed of political representatives with appropriate technical support of a reduced number of States parties to carry out, at the request of a State party, a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention

—Expert study groups: to be created on an *ad hoc* basis to elaborate specific studies on matters of importance for the implementation of the Convention

—Verification teams: for carrying out systematic on-site inspections under the aegis of the technical secretariat.

5. *Meetings*

—Extraordinary meetings.—Options:

—at the request of one State party
—at the request of an X number of States parties
—at the request of the sub-organ(s)
—at the request of the depositary

For further consideration:

—Regular meetings.—Options:

—every year
—at longer intervals, e.g. depending on the need to appoint members of the secretariat or of the sub-organ(s)

Note: The final placement of the sub-elements listed above in an article or in an annex will depend on the decision to be taken with regard to the general structure of the Convention. [Footnote in original.]

6. *Rules of Procedure*

—On questions of substance: no voting. If the Committee is unable to provide for a unanimous report it shall present the different views involved.

For further consideration:

—On questions relative to the organization of its work.

It was suggested that the Committee should work where possible by consensus but otherwise by a majority of votes

—Decision on a request by a State party for a fact-finding procedure concerning alleged ambiguities in or violation of the compliance with the Convention

7. *Co-operation of States Parties With the Consultative Committee*

For further consideration:

8. *Expenses*—It was suggested:—borne by States parties

9. Specific provision stating the right of the Consultative Committee to REQUEST ASSISTANCE OR INFORMATION TO APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

B. *Functions of the Consultative Committee*

Generally agreed functions:

1. To carry out broader international consultation closely co-operate with the States parties [authorities responsible for National Verification/Implementation] [18] provide the States parties with the necessary technical assistance.

2. To receive, request and distribute data relevant to the provisions of the Convention which may be available by States parties [authorities responsible for National Verification/Implementation] and to analyse such information.

3. To elaborate technical questions relevant to the implementation of the Convention, e.g. drawing up and revising lists of precursors, agreed technical procedures.

4. To carry out and/or participate in systematic on-site inspections in order to:

—monitor destruction of CW stockpiles

—monitor the single facility for small-scale production of supertoxic lethal chemicals [for non-hostile military purposes] [for permitted purposes].

Suggested additions:

—monitor the inactive status of CW production and filling facilities

—monitor destruction/dismantling of CW production and filling facilities

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[18] Brackets in this and following paragraphs are in the source text.

—monitor production of certain commercial chemicals which are agreed to pose a special risk

—monitor the inactive status of CW stockpiles

For further consideration:

—The role of the Consultative Committee in the systematic on-site inspections:

—sole responsibility

—shared responsibility, e.g. with the State party concerned

—The characteristics of the systematic on-site inspections (permanent basis-periodicity-random selection—agreed procedures).

5. To receive a request of a State party for a fact-finding procedure in case of alleged ambiguities in or violations of the compliance with the Convention

—To request further information as appropriate

—To carry out and/or participate in a challenge on-site inspection

Suggested addition:

—to carry out a challenge on-site inspection concerning allegations of use of chemical weapons by or with the assistance of a State party

6. To present an annual/periodic report of all its activities prepared, if appropriate, by the secretariat or by the sub-organ(s)

APPENDIX

It was generally agreed that it should be elaborated in an annex containing:

I. Technical procedures for systematic and challenge on-site inspections

—Rights and functions of the inspectors

—Rights and functions of the host-State personnel

—General kinds of inspection procedures

—General kinds of equipment to be utilized in the inspections and who provides it.

For further consideration:

—Sources of inspection personnel.

II. General framework for the activities to be carried out during the inspections to be performed, e.g.

—for the regular monitoring of the destruction of CW stockpiles

—for the regular monitoring of the single facility for small-scale production of super-toxic lethal chemicals

—in the course of fact-finding procedures.

Note. The elements listed above could be separated in two different annexes depending on the final decision to be taken with regard to the general structure of the Convention.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the Committee on Disarmament: U.S. Compliance With Limited Test Ban Treaty [Extract], September 16, 1982 [1]

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During the course of the discussions of the nuclear test ban Working Group, and during the preparation of its report, one delegation had occasion to raise the question of whether the United States was acting in violation of its legal obligations pursuant to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. [2] In relation to this question, the report of the nuclear test ban Working Group (CD/332) states the following, on pages 10 and 11:

> The attention of that particular delegation was drawn by other delegations to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, in whose preamble it is stated "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances", and they expressed the view that this constituted a legal commitment. That delegation was asked how it reconciled being a party to that Treaty with the position it had now taken. That delegation stated that it did not accept the assertion that it had violated legal treaty commitments. It therefore stated its intention to respond fully to that assertion. [3]

Let me categorically state that my Government does not accept any assertion that the United States has violated its legal treaty commitments under the partial test ban treaty, any more than we accept the inference of other delegations that the United States views Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty [4] as a dead letter. The position of the United States regarding a complete cessation of all nuclear explosions remains as I described it on 11 March of this year: a comprehensive test ban is an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives. While present circumstances have not appeared propitious for us to undertake negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at this time, I believe that our efforts to pursue successfully the objectives of the nuclear test ban Working Group in good faith speak for themselves as to the seriousness of purpose of the United States.

From the vantage point of my years in the legal adviser's office in the Department of State dealing with this specific issue and the interpretation of treaties, I feel qualified to address these matters on their merits. There is no doubt that the preambular language of the partial test ban Treaty states that the States parties to that Treaty will seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, [and are] [5] determined to continue negotiations to this end". On 16 August 1963, Secretary of State Dean Rusk articulated the United States policy vis-à-vis this question in a press conference in these words:

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[1] CD/PV.187, pp. 19–20.
[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.
[3] *Ante*, Sept. 13.
[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

> The policy of the United States is, as expressed among other places in the preamble of this limited Treaty itself, to seek a comprehensive test ban. But that will require a fully adequate assurance, inspection arrangements, so that we would know that there would not be any significant cheating that could affect our security. [6]

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, [7] generally recognized to be the codification of customary international law and practice, provides that "[A] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose". Thus, measured against this standard, the States parties have expressed their determination to seek to achieve the objective of the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and indeed all other nuclear explosions, as required by article I, paragraph 1, of the partial test-ban Treaty, through continued negotiations. That cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean that the parties have bound themselves to *continuous* negotiations but rather to achieve the objective through a process of negotiations. This, I submit, the United States has sought to do and continues to pursue. Our participation in the trilateral process between 1977 and 1980 is but one manifestation of this determination. We have never rejected a comprehensive test ban as an objective of our Government. Indeed, we have reiterated that intent, as I pointed out earlier. The history of this process of negotiation is rife with illustrations of the verification obstacle. That is why my delegation continues to attach importance to our nuclear test ban Working Group, in the hope that some means to resolve this impediment to progress can be found.

In conclusion, the answer to the question whether the United States position regarding the objective of a comprehensive test ban "constitutes a denunciation, *de jure* or *de facto*", of the partial test-ban Treaty, is emphatically "No".

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[5] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[6] *Document on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 374.

[7] *International Legal Materials*, vol. 8, July 1969, p. 679.

Statement by ACDA Director Rostow Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Outer Space, September 20, 1982 [1]

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure to be here, and a privilege.

I have a prepared statement, and since it does respond to your opening statement, I think I shall read it.

During the first months of the administration and for some time thereafter, the position of the United States on many arms control issues was that we were reviewing the problems and would come up with a position in due course.

Naturally, this posture—wise and inevitable as it was—embarrassed our negotiators, who were forced to suffer the slings and arrows reserved for immobile targets at international meetings, in congressional hearings and in the media. On many occasions before this and other committees of the Congress during the last year or so, I vowed to press for a decision on a number of outstanding arms control issues.

This has been done. President Reagan has made a series of forward-looking and realistic policy decisions on the nuclear arms negotiations; on the mutual and balanced force reduction [MBFR] [2] talks in Vienna; on nonproliferation policy; on chemical and biological warfare; and on a number of other topics. As a result, the United States is conducting a vigorous and dynamic arms control diplomacy, firmly rooted in the principles of our national security, and seeking to achieve genuine progress toward the goal of peace.

In the field of arms control possibilities for outer space, nevertheless, beyond those already achieved through the Limited Test Ban [3] and Outer Space Treaties, [4] our policy must remain that we will continue to study space arms control options, as President Reagan recently announced. [5] This is not a passive policy nor an evasion in any way. On the contrary, it is the only responsible course the Government of the United States could take at this moment, given the difficult nature of negotiations on this subject, the extent of the Soviet space threat, and the possibilities of change in the areas of science and technology which dominate the future of space.

I can sum up what I have to tell you today in two anecdotes which do respond to the conclusion of your opening statement and your excellent article in the *Christian Science Monitor*. We do not disagree with that article in its evaluation of the evidence, although we do somewhat disagree with the inference you draw as to the next steps.

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[1] *Arms Control and the Militarization of Space: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session, on S. Res. 129 . . .*, pp. 7–13.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[5] *Ante*, July 4.

During the late sixties, when I was, among other things, the State Department's senior officer for economic policy, Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and I were in Paris, calling on M. Michel Debre, the French Minister of Finance, a colleague we appreciated and enjoyed. Discussing the military balance and its implications, our French friend said, "What the world needs most is a trade union of Finance Ministers to suppress the scientists." Alas, there is no way in which his utopian goal can be achieved. And I must add that in the field of space technology many of the potentialities for the future are hopeful rather than sinister, on the side of defense and deterrence rather than of terror.

The second anecdote which brings out the nature of our problem in defining a reasonable arms control policy for space is a comment the British Foreign Minister of the day, Lord Carrington, made to me and Ambassador Nitze last fall at the end of a long conversation in London about our INF problems. "Don't let anybody rush you," Lord Carrington said. "For this job, good preparations are indispensable."

This has been my conviction from the beginning, as I said here during my confirmation hearings in June 1981.[6] Careful, analytical, and thorough preparations were the hallmark of our INF and START positions; and they are the essence of our approach to the problems of arms control potentialities for space.

But the military implications of scientific and technological developments for outer space, and the implications as well of Soviet space programs, present a series of daunting problems. In my judgment, it would be the height of folly to rush into negotiations on these subjects unless we are ready with verifiable proposals that will enhance national security.

The electrifying launch of Sputnik took place in 1957. A year later the United States launched its first satellite. Thirteen years have passed since Armstrong first put man's footprint upon the moon. The launching of satellites has now become commonplace, and with the new Space Shuttle, manned space flight will occur on regular schedule. Yet, custom has not staled the power of outer space to enchant us, to provoke our imaginations, and to stir our hopes.

One such hope—reflecting mankind's deep longing for peace and the wish to use space for the benefit of all mankind—has been to make space a sanctuary from the conflicts that beset us here on Earth. This is a noble aspiration, and we all share it. Yet, we must recognize that outer space is not a distant place way out there. Missiles traverse outer space. The orbits of satellites can carry them close to every point on the globe. Satellites thus occupy important vantage points for military functions—both those which threaten us and those which protect the security of the United States and is allies. For this reason, we cannot regard space as a place totally apart—it is an inextricable element of our national security concerns.

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[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 231–244.

The United States has sought, through such major international agreements as the Limited Test Ban and Outer Space Treaties, to control and to limit arms in space. President Reagan reaffirmed, in his recent announcement of our national space policy, that the United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit the testing and deployment of specific space weapons systems, if such measures would enhance our national security.

In my remarks today I shall first review briefly some existing international space law, then address international discussion on space arms control, and finally talk about some of the complexities of space arms control that drive the prospects for meaningful progress.

The United States is a party to a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, including the U.N. charter, that constitute significant arms control achievements and impose other constraints upon military activities in outer space.

Among the bilateral and multilateral treaties that bear upon military activities in outer space are the following:

The Outer Space Treaty, signed and ratified by the United States in 1967, is currently the principal international agreement addressing space-related activities. It prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction in Earth orbit, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of such weapons in outer space in any manner. It specifies that the Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, provides for reciprocal inspection of stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and requires that all activities in outer space be conducted in accordance with international law, including the charter of the United Nations.

The treaty prohibits the following activities on celestial bodies: The establishment of military bases, installations or fortifications; testing of any type of weapons; and the conduct of military maneuvers. However, military personnel may be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose and any equipment or facility may be used for peaceful exploration. The treaty also provides that any activity or experiment which would cause potentially harmful interference to another party's activities shall not be conducted without appropriate international consultations.

As far as the charter of the United Nations is concerned, article 3 of the Space Treaty confirms that its provisions are specifically applicable to outer space. What is most germane to our problem are the provisions of article 2(4), that states may not in their own installations use force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and the provision in article 51 that nothing in the charter shall interfere in any way with the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear explosions in outer space.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty prohibits the development, the testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems and their components. That is in article V. It also prohibits interference with national technical means of verification, which include satellites. There are comparable prohibitions on interference with national technical means and the SALT I Interim Agreement. [7]

The Environmental Modification Convention prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state party if such usage has effects that are widespread, long-lasting, or severe. These terms are defined in a separate understanding, and environmental modification techniques are defined as any technique for changing, through deliberate manipulation of natural processes, the dynamics, composition, or structure of the earth or outer space. [8]

It goes without saying that all U.S. space programs are in full compliance with these requirements.

I turn now to recent international discussions of space arms control and what we have learned of its difficulty.

In 1978–79, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in bilateral negotiations on antisatellite weapons limitations. The talks covered both limits on actions against satellites and limits on capabilities for attacking satellites. They took place in Helsinki in June 1978, in Bern in January–February 1979, and in Vienna in April–June 1979.

During the first round of negotiations, the two sides outlined their general concerns, and during the second and third rounds some progress was made in examining and clarifying the key issues. However, important areas of disagreement emerged, both with regard to limits on actions against satellites and with regard to limits on ASAT capabilities.

I do not wish to belabor those differences here. I would note that there were important verification questions raised which must be resolved if ASAT arms control is to make progress, and I will return to these questions in a few minutes.

In addition, as you will recall, the international environment deteriorated toward the end of 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was especially important in this connection.

Arms control measures for outer space have been a topic of discussion in the United Nations and in sessions of the Committee on Disarmament [CD] this year. The United States supported resolution 36/97C, introduced by U.S. allies at the U.N. General Assembly last fall, which requested the CD to consider the question of negotiating further arms control measures in outer space.

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[7] *Ibid., 1972,* pp. 197–205.

[8] *Ibid., 1977,* pp. 322–326.

In the summer of 1981, the Soviet Union sent to the U.N. a draft treaty that would ban the stationing of weapons in outer space. A U.N. resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union and its allies, calling for CD negotiations on such a treaty, also passed the General Assembly. [9] The Soviet draft treaty neither defined a "weapon" nor seriously addressed questions of verification. In the 1982 spring and summer sessions, the United States participated in CD discussions on the highly complex, technical issues of space arms control.

We are deeply concerned about the wide-ranging scope of Soviet military activities in space—in particular the continuing Soviet deployment, development and testing of weapons for intercepting and destroying satellites, and the threat posed by Soviet satellites to our own military forces. Soviet development of ASAT weapons puts at risk not only U.S. satellites vital to national security but also the satellites of all nations which have been launched and are used for commercial, scientific, and other civil purposes.

This past June, at nearly the same time that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was speaking before the U.N. about banning weapons from outer space, the Soviet Union was conducting another in a continuing series of tests of its ASAT weapon, which we have considered operational for more than a decade.

Finally, in connection with the U.N. and CD discussion, I should emphasize some of the broad problem areas we see. Military and arms control issues in outer space are complex; they present difficult obstacles to international negotiations, as you and I agree, Mr. Chairman. Furthermore, arms control in space is inseparable from broader arms control issues, and must be considered in that context. President Reagan continues to give serious attention to the prospects for space arms control that could contribute to U.S. national security. However, there are obstacles to progress in such areas as assuring effective verification, minimizing so-called residual ASAT capabilities, and countering the space components of threats to U.S. forces.

Some of these issues are technical ones for which we are seeking technical solutions. Such solutions are essential to any responsible and effective approach to space arms control.

The first question to be addressed in evaluating the wisdom of limits on space weapons in general and ASAT weapons in particular is whether the United States can afford to give up acquiring an ASAT weapon of its own. Two issues are important here. The first is the threat posed by present and prospective Soviet satellites to our military forces. There are a number of Soviet satellites that can be used to direct Soviet military forces against United States and allied forces. Any space weapon limitations which limit the threat to U.S. satellites will necessarily protect threatening Soviet satellites as well. Therefore, when we consider arms control limits on ASAT weapons, we must weigh how we are to balance two national security concerns, the need to preserve our own satellites versus the need to protect U.S. forces from threatening Soviet satellites. Dr. DeLauer will review these technologies in detail.

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[9] G.A. res. 36/99.

A further complication is that a ban on ASAT's could not completely banish the threat. Some inherent ASAT capabilities or potential would remain in other weapon systems and space programs. This residual ASAT threat must also weigh in our evaluation.

The second important issue with regard to the U.S. acquisition of an ASAT weapon of its own is the deterrent effect such a system would have in contrast to the asymmetrical situation that confronts us at present. The Soviets have been conducting space tests of their ASAT interceptor for over a decade and are judged to have an operational ASAT system. The United States, on the other hand, has not yet conducted tests of the ASAT interceptor it is developing.

Any interruption in the U.S. program at this time would leave the Soviets with both a ready ASAT capability and a considerable body of ASAT test experience from more than a decade of testing. Additionally, the threat to our national security from advances in Soviet space programs will grow. Finally, the knowledge that the United States is making steady progress toward an operational ASAT of its own could be an important inducement for the Soviet Union to explore constructive limits on space weapons.

The second set of problems we face in evaluating the wisdom of negotiating limits for ASAT and outer space weapons is that of verification.

Effective verification is central in all arms control; it is important in space arms control for several particular reasons. Satellites which serve U.S. national security purposes are relatively few in number and yet in many instances they are vital and their tasks cannot readily be taken over by other systems. A variety of weapons could potentially be used for ASAT attacks, including some weapons such as certain ABM interceptor missiles that are permitted under other arms control accords.

If the Soviet Union should succeed in destroying even a small number of vital American satellites, while its own remain immune rom attack, it might hope to secure an important military advantage n some cases. In these circumstances, even a few acts of cheating to cquire or retain a modest ASAT capability could have significant ational security implications.

We would thus, under a complete ASAT ban, have to insure both hat the existing Soviet ASAT system was dismantled and could not e readily reassembled and that no other Soviet systems could effecvely perform this mission. There are, in addition, other verification roblems. Without effective verification, an ASAT ban would simply ot be in the U.S. interest.

ACDA and other agencies are studying possibilities for cooperative easures that could supplement national technical means to provide fective verification of space arms control agreements. However, the problem remains an extremely difficult one, and I cannot report any breakthroughs at this date.

These are enormously complex issues, involving not only evaluation of existing space and weapons technology but also the anticipation of future developments; space technology is evolving at a rapid rate, and these advances bring with them implications for the use of space, space weapons, and of course space arms control. We know that future developments may be important for our security, and yet our vision of the future is unavoidably clouded.

I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in my opening remarks that outer space was an inseparable element of our broader security concerns. Space arms control, too, is inextricably linked to our broader arms control initiatives. The President has now made a series of arms control proposals to the Soviet Union, on strategic and intermediate range nuclear missiles and on conventional forces in Europe. The outcome of these negotiations will have a profound effect upon our security concerns and upon our defense forces and requirements. Satellites serve the needs of both arms control verification and of defense. Hence, the demands we will place upon our satellites, and the risks we would be willing to accept under space arms control limitations, must be influenced by the course of these other negotiations.

I remarked in a speech I made last week in Los Angeles summing up where we stand in the INF talks in Geneva that a serious atmosphere has evolved in those talks, and that we have come far enough to make it obvious that the analytical concepts used by both sides can be reconciled, but I said that what is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to consider an agreement in the INF talks based entirely on the principle of deterrence. That is the fundamental issue that is being explored there and will be explored in the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] negotiations and the MBFR talks, and it is critical to the possibility of space arms control as well.

The issues I have briefly discussed here today have been and are being actively and carefully reviewed by the administration. One of the products of that review was the President's recent far-reaching decision on national space policy. He said that the administration will continue to study space arms control options and will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons, should those measures be compatible with U.S. national security.

We are vigorously pursuing these issues, Mr. Chairman, with studies such as those on cooperative measures I cited above. I cannot predict we shall surmount the obstacles to meaningful space arms control, but should we see a potential for verifiable space arms control measures that enhance the U.S. security we are ready to take appropriate initiatives.

Statement by President Reagan, September 21, 1982 [1]

In our efforts to help build a more stable and peaceful world, there is no more essential objective than to shape defense and arms control policies which will guarantee the safety of our nation and of our allies. Shortly after assuming office, I called for a comprehensive evaluation of our arms control policies and proposals for new initiatives. In doing so, I outlined the general principles which should guide formation of our arms control policies.

—Arms control must be an instrument of, and not a substitute for, a coherent security policy aimed in the first instance at the Soviet advantage in the most destabilizing class of weapons, those on ballistic missiles, and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). We will work for agreements that truly enhance security by reinforcing peace through deterrence.

—We must seek agreements which involve substantial and militarily significant reductions on both sides.

—Agreements must be based on the principle of equality of rights and limits.

—Arms control agreements must include effective means of verification. They cannot be based on trust alone.

—Our efforts will be guided by seriousness of purpose, reflected in our willingness to seek reduction to significantly lower levels of nuclear forces, based on equal, balanced levels of comparable systems.

These principles are in full accord with the basic purpose for both U.S. and NATO security policy—ensuring the peace through deterrence of aggression. Deterring nuclear or conventional attack against ourselves or our allies must guide our approach to defense and arms control. These principles also lie at the heart of the comprehensive and innovative arms control approaches which this administration has adopted. In each of the three most important areas of arms control—strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and conventional forces in Europe—we have presented to the Soviet Union bold and equitable proposals, proposals which are in our mutual interest and which provide the opportunity to enhance world security and peace by significantly reducing the arsenals of both sides.

In each of these three negotiations the United States has presented considered and equitable proposals which seek to establish a military equilibrium at reduced levels, eliminate the most destabilizing factors in the existing military balance, and enhance the security of both sides. When our national security and that of our allies is at stake, we must approach arms control realistically. We do not seek agreements for their own sake, we seek them to build international security and stability.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 27, 1982, pp. 1184–1185. On the same day, the President met in the Oval Office with Ambassadors Paul H. Nitze, Edward L. Rowny, and Richard F. Staar, who were about to return to Europe for the next round of the three major arms reduction negotiations in which the United States was involved: INF, START, and MBFR.

This administration's reductions proposals for strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and for conventional forces, reflect this approach. We are encouraged by the serious and businesslike conduct of these negotiations thus far. Although much hard bargaining lies ahead, I am determined to bargain in good faith until our objectives can be realized. We urge on our Soviet negotiating partners equal seriousness of purpose.

Our arms control policies will continue to receive my close personal attention. Ambassadors Rowny, Nitze, and Staar have been in Washington recently during scheduled recesses in the negotiations. In each area we have carefully assessed the status of negotiations and our positions. In each case the negotiations remain on course, and our three negotiators will return shortly with a renewed mandate to pursue our objectives.

Prior to their departure, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will brief the Congress on the negotiations. Such regular consultations are also an essential part of our approach. This administration can have no higher purpose than to achieve progress toward meaningful arms control which promotes international peace and security.

Address by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi [Extract], September 21, 1982 [1]

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Mr. President: I am aware of your dedication to the cause of peace and your efforts to avert the threat of a nuclear holocaust. India reacted positively to your statesmanlike declaration that the Soviet Union would refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons. It was particularly pleasing for us to observe that last year the Soviet Union backed the UN General Assembly resolution which declared the use of nuclear weapons a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity. [2] Moreover, the resolution contained a demand for a ban on the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons pending the implementation of nuclear disarmament. Although there were no reassuring results during the UN second special session devoted to disarmament or during the other talks, we do hope that the great powers will continue to stick to the path of talks in the disarmament sphere. India and the entire community of nonaligned states will warmly support any measures which help to strengthen trust and reduce the threat of a catastrophe.

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[1] Moscow *Pravda* in Russian, Sept. 21, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, Sept. 28, 1982, p. D3. Mrs. Gandhi spoke in Moscow at a Kremlin dinner.

[2] G.A. res. 36/92 I of Dec. 9, 1981.

India has always actively assisted UN efforts to achieve general and total disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. At the recent disarmament session we put forward a number of proposals, some of which, I believe, are of paramount, overwhelming significance. They are:

—talks on a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons;
—the freezing of nuclear arms, including a total stop to production;
—an immediate temporary halt to nuclear weapons tests.

I believe these proposals can form the basis for a final solution of this complex problem acceptable to all. Apart from the problem of disarmament, the world is currently faced with other serious and frightening problems.

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Report of a Subcommittee to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Nuclear Arms Reductions, September 22, 1982 [1]

I. Subcommittee Action

The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary, having studied the issue of the power of Congress to bind the United States to international treaty obligations by joint resolution and having held hearings on this matter, finds that Senate Joint Resolution 212 is not a constitutional exercise of the powers of Congress in the area of foreign affairs and recommends that the proposed resolution be rejected by the Senate.

II. Witnesses and Testimony

The Subcommittee conducted a hearing on Senate Joint Resolution 212 on July 30, 1982, at which the following individuals testified:

Honorable Jake Garn, United States Senator from Utah; Honorable Jesse Helms, United States Senator from North Carolina; Honorable Steve Symms, United States Senator from Idaho; A. Richard Richstein, Esquire, General Counsel of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Dr. Harry Almond, Professor, National War College; Paul Kamenar, Esquire, Director of Litigation of the Washington Legal Foundation; and, Grover Rees III, professor, University of Texas Law School.

In addition to these distinguished witnesses, the Subcommittee received written testimony from Professor Charles Rice of the University of Notre Dame Law School. Letters were also received from Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein, Assistant to the President of the United States.

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[1] *Joint Resolution With Respect to Nuclear Arms Reductions: Report on S.J. Res. 212 to the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Made by its Subcommittee on Separation of Powers* (S. Com. prt; 97th Cong., 2d sess.), Sept. 1982, pp. 1–9. The appendix (a letter from Assistant to the President Kenneth M. Duberstein to Senator East, Subcommittee Chairman, and the text of S.J. Res. 212) is not printed here.

III. THE RESOLUTION AND ITS BACKGROUND

(A) SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 212

Senate Joint Resolution 212, with respect to nuclear arms reductions, was reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 12, 1982. [2] The purpose of the Resolution is to express support for the President's recent actions on strategic arms negotiations and "to formalize an interim policy on mutual SALT restraint that will contribute to stability and continuity while the United States pursues far-reaching reductions in nuclear weapons it seeks in START," the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks.

Of particular concern to the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers is the following language of Senate Joint Resolution 212:

> Whereas President Reagan has declared that the United States would continue to refrain from actions that would undercut existing SALT agreements [3] as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint: Now, therefore, be it
>
> Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That—
>
> (3) to provide a basis for progress during the START negotiations, the United States shall continue to refrain from actions which would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agreements, provided the Soviet Union shows equal restraint * * *

The accompanying report on Senate Joint Resolution 212 (S. Rep. 97–493, hereinafter referred to as "Report") states that the purpose of Paragraph 3, which establishes an "interim restraint regime," is:

> [T]o formalize the announced policy of the Reagan Administration on interim Salt (sic) restraint, and in doing so make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States government is unified in its determination to exercise restraint so long as the Soviet government behaves in a comparable way. It is the intention of the Committee thereby to strengthen the position of the President in the START negotiation. (Report, p. 6)
>
> By setting forth the President's statement in a joint resolution, to be considered by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, the Committee intends that it will have the full force and effect of law. (Report, p. 10)

(The President's statement referred to in the Report was made in his 1982 Memorial Day speech at the Arlington National Cemetery.) [4]

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[2] For an extract of the report, see *ante*, July 12.

[3] For the SALT agreements, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff. and *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] *Ante*, May 31.

The latter statement from the report is qualified, however, by the subsequent declaration of the Committee on Foreign Relations that it does not intend the Resolution to "give rise to any private standing or cause of action to challenge the actions of the Executive Branch in the courts." (Report, p. 8; see also however, p. 10 of the same Report.)

While Paragraph 3 speaks in terms of SALT I and SALT II, the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations indicates that the "interim restraint regime" would not apply to the restrictions set forth in the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty "since the agreed term of that document has already expired." (Report, p. 7) Nor does the Foreign Relations Committee necessarily intend that the effect of the proposed Resolution "extend beyond the originally agreed upon termination date of the SALT II Treaty itself, December 31, 1985, or beyond the point at which these interim restraints are replaced by START limitations." (Report, p. 8) However, because of statements by members of the Administration announcing the Administration's intent to remain within the limitations of the SALT I Interim Agreement (which originally was set to expire in 1977 but which both parties to the agreement extended by unilateral declarations until the completion of the SALT II negotiations, i.e., May 11, 1979), the Committee on Foreign Relations does intend the proposal to apply to the SALT I Interim Agreement. (Report, pp. 9–10)

(B) THE SALT I AND SALT II AGREEMENTS

Because the Resolution makes reference to the SALT I and SALT II agreements, it is important to take note of their present status in international and American constitutional law.

The SALT I agreements consist of three documents signed in 1972 by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. The first is a treaty known as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (the "ABM Treaty") which sets limits to the number of ABM sites, radars, and missiles each side may test and deploy. The second is the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the "Interim Agreement") which provides, inter alia, that no new ICBM, sea-launched ballistic missiles, or ballistic missile submarines shall be constructed and that compliance by the parties shall be verified by "national technical means." The third document of SALT I is a protocol establishing numerical limits on SLBM's and strategic submarines. The protocol was regarded as an "integral part" of the Interim Agreement.

The ABM Treaty was to be of "unlimited duration," although in its first Unilateral Statement the United States asserted that the treaty could be withdrawn if an agreement providing for a more complete strategic offensive arms limitation was not achieved within five years. The terms of the Interim Agreement provided that it, too, would expire in five years unless it was superseded by a subsequent agreement. The protocol would presumably expire on the same date as the Interim Agreement.

In 1977, both parties agreed upon a three-tiered general framework for a new SALT accord (SALT II). Rather than formally extend SALT I at that time, each country issued unilateral, parallel declarations of policy expressing the intention of each to comply with the goals and terms of SALT I until the negotiations leading to SALT II were completed. President Carter maintained that these declarations did not bind the United States in any way, and the Administration did not seek formal Congressional approval of the de facto extension. On May 11, 1979, the SALT II negotiations were formally completed; accordingly, the SALT I Interim Agreement and the Protocol expired at that time, if they had not already expired in 1977 as a matter of domestic constitutional law. The ABM Treaty, by the terms of the United States Unilateral Statement, may be withdrawn at any time, although it is in theory still in force and is currently undergoing the five year review provided by its terms.

The SALT II agreements likewise consist of three documents. However, the principal instruments of SALT II are a treaty and a protocol to the treaty and not executive agreements. The third document is a joint statement that stresses the principles of "equality," "equal security," and "adequate verification by national technical means." The treaty places ceilings on strategic delivery vehicles, limits on the number of launchers of missiles equipped with MIRV's, and limits on the number of heavy bombers equipped with long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's). The number of heavy ICBM's is restricted to existing levels, while the number of re-entry vehicles (RV's) on existing ICBM's is limited to the maximum number tested on May 1, 1979. The parties promise "not to develop, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload of ICBM launchers." Although the treaty permits modernization and replacement of existing systems, it prohibits development or testing of certain new weapons, with the exception that each party may develop one "new type" of light ICBM. Like SALT I, the SALT II accord also permits verification by "national technical means," while it prohibits "deliberate concealment measures."

The SALT II treaty and protocol were formally submitted to the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services held hearings on them in 1979. On January 3, 1980, however, President Carter asked that the Senate delay further consideration of the accord in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [5] It is apparent also that the treaty lacked the necessary support of two-thirds of the Senate at that time.

IV. Discussion of the Major Issues

(A) CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

Paragraph 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 212 poses several significant questions concerning the separation of powers principle of the Constitution and concerning present American and international law. The constitutional questions stem from the fact that the Resolution seeks to circumvent the Constitution's treaty-making process set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 and to give the "full force and effect of law" both to the now-expired SALT I agreements and to the SALT II treaty pending in the Senate. This attempt at circumvention arguably violates the Constitution in several ways.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, p. 1

First, by proposing to give the force of law to what is presently Administrative policy regarding strategic arms talks, the Resolution improperly limits the negotiating powers of the President, who "alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation. He *makes* treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates." *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) Second, the Resolution would attempt to give binding effect to obligations of a treaty which has never received the requisite approval of two-thirds of the Senate and would therefore cause a Congressional transformation of a treaty made by the President into an executive agreement submitted for Congressional approval. Under normal and recent practice, it has become the province of the President to determine the legal forms as well as the terms of America's international obligations. This Resolution violates that practice.

Finally, and most obviously, the attempt to give treaty obligations the force of law by the approval of simple majorities of both Houses of Congress instead of by constitutionally mandated two-thirds majority of the Senate violates the exclusive advice and consent function of the Senate prescribed by the Constitution.

By giving the force of law to a statement of mere policy, the proposed Resolution improperly limits the President's power to carry out his function as America's negotiator with foreign nations. Several witnesses who appeared before the Subcommittee argued persuasively that the proposed Resolution would "tie the hands" of the President in his negotiations with the Soviet Union over strategic arms agreements. (Transcript of the Hearings by the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers on Senate Joint Resolution 212, hereinafter referred to as "Transcript", Mr. Richstein, pp. 42–43; Mr. Kamenar, p. 65; and Professor Rees., p. 74.)

A. Richard Richstein, General Counsel of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated the case quite succinctly:

> It is clear from both the language of the Constitution and the practice that has developed under it that it is the President who is responsible for the conduct of foreign policy and negotiates the treaties which are sent to the Senate for advice and consent. By giving legally binding effect to the President's announced policy of interim restraint, the proposed resolution would affect the President's ability to negotiate strategic arms agreements in the START and INF talks currently underway in Geneva. (Transcript at pp. 41–42.)[6]

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[6] *Ante*, July 30.

More recently, in a letter dated August 11, 1982, from Mr. Kenneth M. Duberstein, Assistant to the President, and addressed to the Chairman of this Subcommittee, the White House expressed its continuing disapproval of this aspect of the proposed Resolution:

> The language in Section 3 of the Resolution, however, is inappropriate for a number of reasons. If the Committee's intent was to endorse the President's restraint policy, we believe that would be better accomplished in a non-binding and advisory form. This would avoid the legal, technical and political problems that have been raised by the existing language.
>
> With respect to interim restraints, our current policy is to refrain from actions which would undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. This should improve the environment for negotiations on reductions, and avoid irreversible acts which would complicate the negotiation of the limitations and provisions we seek in our START proposal. We base our policy of not undercutting existing agreements on our forward-looking commitment to START and not on any change in our assessment of the flaws of past SALT agreements. (Letter of August 11, 1982, from Kenneth M. Duberstein to Senator John P. East, Chairman of the Separation of Powers Subcommittee)[7]

Given the function of the President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution as the prescribed negotiator of treaties entered into by the United States, and given the testimony of knowledgeable witnesses that the proposed Resolution would seriously hamper the President's ability to negotiate agreements vitally affecting the security of our country, the Subcommittee finds the Resolution, if enacted, would be not only an imprudent, but a constitutionally impermissible, intrusion by Congress into the treaty-making powers of the President.

The proposed Resolution also attempts to bind the United States to treaty obligations that have been approved by neither two-thirds of the Senate nor the President. It was established early in the history of our Republic that the "President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." John Marshall in the House of Representatives, March 7, 1800. In 1816, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported:

> The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with greatest prospect of success. 8 U.S. Senate Report, Committee on Foreign Relations 24 (1816).

The President's authority in the area of foreign affairs is based upon express statements in Article II of the Constitution and upon cases and commentaries concerning those powers over the past two centuries. See, especially, *U.S.* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

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[7] *Treaty Ratification Process and Separation of Powers: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee of the Judiciary . . . on S.J. Res. 212 . . .* , p. 200.

The function of the Senate in foreign affairs is nevertheless substantial. Regarding treaties, the Senate may advise the President and, of course, must approve by two-thirds majority any treaty made by the President before the treaty may become effective. Even Senate approval, however, does not necessitate such effect: the President may still refuse to complete the treaty with the other parties by declining to exchange instruments of ratification with them.

Senate Joint Resolution 212 does violence to the prescribed functions of both the President and the Senate. The Resolution proposes to give binding effect to international agreements which have expired (SALT I) and to treaty obligations which have not yet been approved by two-thirds of the Senate and which appear to have no reasonable prospects of approval. While the effect of the Resolution, if enacted, on domestic and international law is not clear, the purpose of the proposal is objectionable on two grounds.

First, as Senator Symms noted (Transcript, p. 33), the proposal is an attempt to transform a treaty made by the President into something like an executive agreement. Second, by making the effectiveness of the international obligations contingent on Congressional approval and, in the event of a Presidential veto and subsequent Congressional override, not on the President's necessary approval, the Resolution replaces the President as our "sole organ of the nation" in international relations with the Congress.

Regarding Congressional transformation of a treaty into some other form of international agreement, the President's function of determin-
ing the form of our international agreements has been acknowledged.
(8 S. Rep. Comm. on For. Rel. 24 (1816); *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright,*
299 U.S. 304, 321 (1936); McDougal and Lans, "Treaties and Congres-
ional Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instru-
nents of National Policy: I", 54 Yale Law Journal 181, 187–88 (1945)).
he determination of the form an agreement shall take—be it treaty,
xecutive agreement, protocol, or any of the other recognized instru-
ents of international agreement—is often inextricably linked to the
egotiation of the terms of the agreement. (*United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright*
port Corp., supra, at 321.) This statement is not to deny that Congress
ay sometimes authorize the President to enter into executive agree-
ents in areas in which Congress has authority under the Constitu-
n. The SALT Treaty, however, was not made pursuant to any prior
ngressional authorization of this kind. The Treaty was made by the
sident and was submitted to the Senate as a treaty. The attempt to
nsform a negotiated treaty into another form of agreement exceeds
Senate's function of giving advice and consent and is not a power
nted by the Constitution.

he second flaw is even more significant. To attempt to bind the
ted States to international obligations through the form of a joint
lution makes possible in principle what the Constitution and sub-

sequent cases and commentary most certainly reject. The joint resolution, if vetoed by the President, may become law if Congress were to override the veto. While this scenario is most unlikely in the present instance, it is the principle itself that is fatally flawed. The President must represent our nation in foreign affairs. This was recognized by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the same 1816 report cited above:

> For his conduct [the President] is responsible to the Constitution. The committee considers this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign relations calculated to diminish that responsibility and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.

In the present instance, these words apply with as much force today as they did one hundred sixty-five years ago.

(B) QUESTIONS OF AMERICAN STATUTORY LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

In addition to these possible constitutional defects, the proposed Resolution is not justified on the basis of statutory law, i.e., Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, or on the basis of international law in the form of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

The Committee on Foreign Relations argues that Senate Joint Resolution 212 is justified by Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. Section 2573). Section 33 provides, in part:

> No action shall be taken under this chapter or any other law that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.

As explained by its sponsor, Representative L. H. Fountain of North Carolina, Section 33 is intended to forbid the President from acting on his own, i.e., without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or without authorization by affirmative legislation of the entire Congress. Cong. Rec. 87th Cong., Vol. 107, p. 20309, Sept. 19, 1961. Thus the purpose of Section 33 is not to give Congress the option of binding the United States to agreements but to limit the powers of the President in the area of disarmament by eliminating simple executive agreements and requiring either a treaty or an agreement backed up by the Congressional approval. Senate Joint Resolution 212 is seen by the Foreign Relations Committee as the affirmative legislative authority required by Section 33, and "(i)n this regard, enactment of this joint resolution increases the President's options in dealing with the Soviet Union." (Report, pp. 9–10).

The problem with the proposed Resolution when it is offered as prospective authorization for the President "to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments" is that Senate Joint Resolution 212 simply does not appear on its face to be an authorization for the President. By its clear terms it is a self-executing prohibition of United States' actions that would undercut one expired set of agreements and one set of agreements presently pending Senate approval. The Resolution attempts, not to increase the President's options, but to impose an immediate international obligation on the President and the United States. Indeed, far from welcoming the Resolution as another arrow in the President's quiver, the White House believes that the endorsement of the President's interim restraint policy "would be better accomplished in a non-binding and advisory form." (Duberstein letter, August 11, 1982; see also General Counsel Richstein's testimony, Transcript, pp. 42–43.)

In sum, as an authorization under Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, the proposed Resolution seems an example of misapplied law and, as a proffered weapon for the President, an unwanted one. Senate Joint Resolution 212 cannot be justified under Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Finally, the Foreign Relations Committee Report contends that the Resolution is "generally consistent with the applicable standard for a treaty signatory under international law," referring to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 18 of that Convention provides:

> A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when:
>
> (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or,
>
> (b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.[8]

While neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has ratified the Vienna Convention, the United States government has interpreted Article 18 as reflecting "generally acceptable norms of international law" and, therefore, as binding customary international law on the United States during the period between the signing of a treaty or its ratification." (Turner, "Legal Implications of Deferring Ratification of SALT II," 21 Va. J. of Intl. Law 747 (1980–81))

The difficulty with this argument is that it proves too much. If we ccept Article 18's authority, only SALT II would seem to be affected because SALT I, by its own terms, has expired. But SALT II presents a problem of applicability as well. If it is argued that SALT II is "pending entry into force," then Senate Joint Resolution 212 seems superfluous in light of Article 18: under customary international law, the United States is already obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the purpose of SALT II and the Resolution is not necessary.

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[8] For the convention, see Shabtar Rosenne, *The Law of Treaties: A Guide to the Legislative istory of the Vienna Convention* (Dobbs Terry, N.Y.: Oceanna Publications, Inc., 1970), pp. ff.

On the other hand, if the President's repeated assertion that SALT II is unacceptable is interpreted as it appears it must be—that the United States, speaking through its President, has clearly expressed its intention not to become a party to SALT II—then Article 18 and customary international law appear not to apply, and a defense of the Resolution based upon Article 18 is misplaced.

While the clearest answer to the question of the applicability of international law would result from the President withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from the Senate, such action is not necessary in order to see that Senate Joint Resolution 212 cannot be justified by reference to the Vienna Convention or to customary international law.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The Subcommittee concludes that Senate Joint Resolution 212 should be rejected by the Senate because it is of questionable constitutionality and because it is imprudent as well. In attempting to bind the United States to treaty obligations without securing the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, the Resolution improperly limits the President's negotiating powers in the area of foreign affairs; it improperly attempts to transform a treaty into some other form of international obligation; and it improperly ignores the exclusive advice and consent function of the Senate by making the obligation dependent upon approval by the House of Representatives. Nor is the measure justified by the authority of Section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, whose purpose is not to extend the power of Congress in the area of foreign affairs but to limit the power of the President in the area of disarmament. Finally, Article 18 of the Vienna Convention does not provide a foundation for the Resolution in international law.

The Subcommittee on Separation of Powers therefore recommends that Senate Joint Resolution 212 be rejected by the Senate.

Interview With Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq: Pakistan's Nuclear Policy [Extract], September 28, 1982 [1]

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The: One has been hearing a lot about the development of a Pakistan nuclear programme. The public in Southeast Asia would be most interested to hear the views of the president of Pakistan on this important question. Both India and China have nuclear capability. How does Pakistan feel about this?

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[1] *Bangkok Post* in English, Sept. 26, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. VIII, Sept. 28, 1982, p F3. The interview was conducted by The Chonghadikit, editor-in-chief of the *Bangkok Post*.

Zia: Pakistan has a modest programme of research and development in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes which is essential to develop self-sufficiency in energy resources, since it is poor in fossil fuel resources. At the moment Pakistan has one of the lowest levels of energy consumption in the world. With the process of economic and social development the energy requirements of the country are increasing at a very fast rate. Pakistan has been most seriously affected by the increasing prices of oil. Our oil import bill has gone up from $84 million in 1972 (8 percent of foreign exchange earnings) to $1.5 billion in 1981, (60 percent of foreign exchange earnings) and could increase further. Such a large drain on our foreign exchange earnings is bound to retard our development plans and programmes.

If we are unable to develop alternate sources of energy particularly nuclear energy the problems of our economy could become unmanageable, and by 1985 or 1986, we might have to spend our entire export earnings on oil imports.

Fully committed as we are to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy we believe in the right of each state to have access to nuclear technology and to pursue scientific research and development in accordance with its own priorities. We have indicated on a number of occasions that we would be prepared to place our nuclear research and development programme under any safeguard arrangements provided they are applied universally and on a non-discriminatory basis.

We have no intention of acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons since we are committed to the concept of non-proliferation. We have supported measures for nuclear non-proliferation at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. For example we have advocated the establishment of nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean and provision of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These initiatives enjoy a wide measures of support at the United Nations.

Bilaterally we had proposed a joint declaration by India and Pakistan renouncing the nuclear option, inspection of each other's nuclear installations and the signing of the non-proliferation treaty by both countries. These proposals have not been agreed to by India so far. We hope that in view of India's declared policy of not manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons that country will give serious consideration to these ideas.

As regards the nuclear capability of China you know that China made an unconditional pledge long ago not to be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. As such, non-nuclear weapons states have no cause to have any apprehensions about China's nuclear weapons capability.

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Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs (Devine) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, September 29, 1982 [1]

First of all, let me thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss elements of U.S. nonproliferation policy. From the beginning of the nuclear age, all administrations have been firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear explosives. While detailed policy approaches have varied, the last eight Presidents have recognized the critical relationship between nonproliferation and U.S. security interests. That recognition is at the core of President Reagan's policy.

In preparing for this appearance, your staff asked that I address the policy to restore the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier. I would note at the outset that merely announcing an intent to adhere to a policy of reliability does not make one reliable in the eyes of our trading partners.

Unfortunately, although it is easy to demolish a reputation quickly, restoring a broadly shared perception that the United States will act sensibly and predictably in its nuclear relations cannot be accomplished overnight. That requires a uniform course of conduct extending not only over weeks or months, but over years. In that sense, we are only beginning our effort. However, I would like to say a few things about this policy to redress some of the misunderstandings and misrepresentations which have attended the initiative.

First, the reliability of supply policy extends to those nations who share our basic nonproliferation objectives. There is a linkage here between U.S. nuclear supply and adherence by our trading partners to firm nonproliferation commitments. Those who undertake these commitments should have the benefit of a predictable and assured source of U.S. nuclear supply. Those who will not supply such assurances will not receive those benefits.

Second, an important way in which we have attempted to stabilize and improve our reliability is the administration's decision not to seek changes in the basic statutory framework for our nuclear commerce. Although there are aspects of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

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[1] *U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session,* Sept. 29, 1982, pp. 2–7.

[NNPA][2] which might have been amended to be more consistent with the administration's views, we decided not to seek such changes, feeling that a disruptive legislative debate over the NNPA would cause further doubt on the constancy of our national policy.

However, we are now regrettably faced with damaging proposals to change the statute emanating from the House of Representatives. If enacted, these amendments will not only be harmful in themselves, but would be viewed by other nations as evidence that the U.S. nuclear export process is capricious and unpredictable.

Therefore, I would urge the Senate to reject such proposals if they should be brought forward for your consideration.

Third, we are receiving positive reactions from other nations as to what they regard as a less confrontational and more cooperative approach on the part of the United States to nuclear issues. With the support of the Congress, we hope to build on this growing spirit of cooperation to advance the nonproliferation goals that we all share. In matters of nonproliferation, just as in every other aspect of foreign policy, concrete distinctions sometimes have to be made among the various nations of the world. President Reagan has stated that the United States will not inhibit civil reprocessing and breeder development in countries with advanced nuclear programs where it is not a proliferation risk.

Consistent with this position, the President approved in June a modified and limited approach toward the reprocessing of material subject to U.S. consent rights and the use of plutonium derived from that material.[3] This approach is designed to give our close allies and nuclear trading partners a firmer and more predictable basis upon which to plan their vital energy programs while at the same time furthering our nonproliferation objectives, including strengthened controls over civil plutonium.

Specifically, we are now offering Japan and the countries of EURATOM new long-term arrangements for the implementation of U.S. consent rights over the reprocessing and use of material subject to our agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. This advance, long-term approval would apply only for facilities and activities which we determine meet our strict statutory criteria. These offers are being made in the context of seeking new or amended peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements, which would be subject to congressional review.

The approvals would be valid only as long as the conditions provided in the agreement, including nonproliferation and statutory conditions, continued to be met. Our willingness to take these steps presumed the continued strong commitment of these countries to our common nonproliferation efforts, and to developing and implementing more effective controls over plutonium.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 118–164. These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] *Ante*, June 9.

Providing advance consent will not open the floodgates to the widespread use of plutonium. We are proposing this arrangement only to those few nations which have well-defined and coherent advanced nuclear programs, and where reprocessing and plutonium use do not constitute a proliferation danger.

Moreover, these countries already have reprocessing technology as well as active research development and demonstration programs for advanced nuclear fuel cycles using plutonium. They already possess sizable quantities of separated plutonium. Our policy does not endorse or encourage the spread of reprocessing and plutonium, but recognizes that major programs already exist, and that we must work realistically with our most important allies to ensure vigorous safeguards and controls over sensitive technology and materials.

It is not the radical departure from past practice which uniformed critics have charged. During the past two administrations, requests for reprocessing were approved on a case by case basis. Past approvals have included primarily reprocessing in Japan at Tokai Mura or the shipment of spent fuel from Japan and a few other countries to France and the United Kingdom for reprocessing. Both previous administrations and this administration have always approved such requests.

Such cooperation from the advanced nuclear countries is essential if we are to succeed in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.

I would like now to turn to events at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna last week. Let me begin by reading parts of the statement delivered by Deputy Secretary Davis of the Department of Energy, the leader of the U.S. delegation to the IAEA's General Conference on September 24, just prior to the U.S. walkout. It is a brief but comprehensive summary of our reaction to the illegal rejection of Israel's credentials.

> The United States Government voted to accept the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the IAEA General Conference because they were properly presented under the criteria of the statutes and rules of procedure of the General Conference. I cannot overemphasize the damage that has been done to the integrity of the IAEA and the whole U.N. system by this vote today to illegally reject the credentials of the Israeli delegation to the General Conference. It totally ignores the strictly procedural mandate given to us to determine whether the credentials have been signed by the head of state or government or minister of foreign affairs of a duly constituted government of a member state in good standing.
>
> Second, it blatantly introduces into this procedure strictly political issues, issues that can have no proper place in this technical agency with specialized responsibilities. This is a very painful moment for me, because the United States has for over 20 years been committed to support and strengthen the IAEA and its program. However, the degree to which the IAEA has now become politicized as evidenced by the resolution just adopted is completely unacceptable to my Government.

> This is an agency which was founded as a technical body to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy available to all under safeguards which would reassure the world as to the peaceful use of that energy. Instead, it has become a forum for debating political issues. The pattern of abusing the U.N. system to carry on political vendettas is corrosively dangerous. The politicization of the specialized international organizations such as the IAEA must cease.
>
> In these circumstances, the United States delegation must now withdraw from this General Conference. I further have to advise you that the Government of the United States will now reassess its policy regarding U.S. participation in the IAEA and its activities. I can assure that these decisions have not been taken lightly. We are not prepared, however, to stand idly by where legal principles are sacrificed for political expediency.[4]

That is the end of Secretary Davis' quote.

I want to emphasize that the action of rejecting Israel's credentials applied only to that meeting. Israel's membership is not suspended. On the contrary, it can continue to participate in all Agency activities and meetings, including next year's General Conference. Of course, Iraq or any other country could choose to challenge Israel's or any other member's credentials at that time. If that should happen, we will make every effort, as we did this year, to defeat it. In the meantime, we will make it very clear to the 110 member states as well as to the Agency itself that the United States will not condone such blatantly political actions that should have no place in a technical agency.

The reassessment announced by Deputy Secretary Davis has begun. We will study the entire range of options, not excluding withdrawal. We will also look at reducing our funding and other support for Agency activities, reducing our participation in IAEA-sponsored meetings, symposia, conferences, et cetera, and what actions might be taken against those specific members responsible for what happened last week.

While I cannot promise a target date for the completion of this reassessment, I can promise that the study will be done as quickly as practicable. We will carefully weigh the potential effect on our nonproliferation policy in which the IAEA plays such an important role against the potential snowballing effect of illegal actions against the principle of universality in the U.N. system.

While the reassessment is underway, the United States will reduce the level of its participation in Agency activities, but will attempt to insure that its safeguards-related functions do not suffer, given the importance safeguards have to the national security of the United States. But the politicization of the IAEA will certainly decrease its ability to apply efficient and effective safeguards.

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[4] Cf. GC (XXVI)/OR.246, Sept. 24, 1982, pp. 11–12.

We are determined to prevent this politicization from continuing to the detriment of the IAEA's safeguard system. Our actions at the General Conference are the first step in our campaign to reverse this trend. At the same time we are reassessing our policy toward the IAEA, we are continuing our efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards. While the technical effectiveness of IAEA safeguards has improved steadily over the recent past, it still is more uneven than we would wish.

We are working both bilaterally, in cooperation with the IAEA Secretariat, and multilaterally, through a number of special projects to improve IAEA safeguards. Several of these efforts focus on the particular problem of safeguarding sensitive nuclear facilities.

The United States is currently engaged in a multinational exercise to define effective safeguard approaches for gas centrifuge enrichment plants. In addition to the United States, Australia, Japan, and the URENKO governments and the safeguards inspectorates of EURATOM and the IAEA participate in this project, called the Hexapartite Safeguards Project. All six countries now have or plan to have gas centrifuge enrichment facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Much progress has been made, but there are still problems remaining to be solved, such as the frequency of access by inspectors. We hope to be able to announce the successful conclusion of this project at the February meeting of the Board of Governors.

We are also continuing our work on reprocessing plant safeguards. The Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise [TASTEX], was successfully concluded about 1 year ago. Since then, instruments and techniques developed through TASTEX are gaining acceptance internationally. Work on safeguards techniques also is being conducted at the Barnwell facility. We are continuing our efforts to have the new techniques and equipment incorporated into IAEA safeguards approaches for reprocessing facilities.

Another area in which the administration has recently taken action in support of our nonproliferation policy involves tightening of administrative controls over nuclear technology transfers. On September 17, revisions to these regulations were published in the Federal Register by the Department of Energy. Exports of sensitive nuclear technology are subject to stringent controls under the Atomic Energy Act and under the nuclear suppliers' guidelines. Activities not involving technology sensitive from the point of view of proliferation, are generally authorized for the free world.

Any retransfer by a foreign licensee or other entity of a U.S. company of sensitive nuclear technology would require specific Government approval. Until the recent changes, the export of reactor technology by a U.S. firm to a foreign licensee would have been authorized to all but certain embargoed destinations, generally COCOM countries. Now this list has been expanded to include nations which have not ratified the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] [5] or accepted full scope safeguards.

Four countries in unstable regions, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, have also been listed, even though they are NPT signatories. In the latter case, specific authorization again is needed before such nonsensitive technology can be exported. We believe this revision will provide us with a prior opportunity to review technology exports and is consistent with our efforts to provide an incentive for countries to ratify the NPT or accept full scope safeguards.

It also meets concerns which have been expressed that general authorizations might permit the export of reactor technology to a country of significant proliferation concern.

We also have continued the U.S. program to reduce or eliminate the need for highly enriched uranium in research reactor programs, and we have been working very closely with the principal nuclear supplier states to assure that nuclear trade is subject to effective conditions and controls.

A so-called trigger list was established by parties to the NPT in order to carry out their obligations under article 3 of the treaty. [6] The London Supplier Guidelines established an expanded trigger list to include exports of sensitive nuclear technology. These lists have been generally effective in assuring that significant nuclear exports are not being made to unsafeguarded programs. However, many items on the list are quite general, and there is a need to clarify and make more precise what particular equipment belongs on these lists.

Moreover, certain dual use items which do not fall on any list should be subject to export controls to assure that they only go to safeguarded nuclear facilities. We have taken important initiatives on both these fronts.

Another area in which we have taken action is promoting more widespread acceptance of full scope safeguards. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act requires that nonnuclear weapon states have all their peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as a condition of U.S. nuclear exports. In addition, the President's nonproliferation message of last July stated that we would continue to urge other suppliers to require full scope safeguards as a condition of any significant new supply.

Thus, this administration has taken the initiative on a number of fronts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. This sometimes is overlooked because little publicity has been given to these efforts, but if we are to realize our shared nonproliferation goals, we also need, Mr. Chairman, to restore and nurture that basic spirit of bipartisan cooperation to which President Reagan referred, rather than engaging in contentious dispute. The executive branch and the Congress must work together.

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[5] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.
[6] *Ibid., 1978*, pp. 17–23.

To that end, I reaffirm our readiness to consult closely with you on the critical issues and choices that lie ahead. Above all, a spirit of restored cooperation in the nuclear realm is required with other countries. A unilateral approach which too readily overlooks the particular energy needs, security perspectives, and domestic political requirements of other countries, makes our common task more difficult. We cannot dictate to other countries. We must convince them of the desirability and benefits of cooperating with us to insure that the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not lead to further nuclear explosives proliferation.

Here, too, failure to work together can only lead to a broader failure of our nonproliferation policies.

Address by Secretary of State Shultz to the U.N. General Assembly [Extract], September 30, 1982 [1]

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Arms Control. In addition to the imperative need to resolve regional problems, there is an equally significant global imperative: to halt, and reverse, the global arms buildup. As an American, I am aware that arms control and disarmament are a special responsibility of the world's most powerful nations—the United States and the Soviet Union. And as an American, I can report that we are fulfilling our responsibility to seek to limit and reduce conventional and nuclear arms to the lowest possible levels.

With this goal in mind, President Reagan has initiated a comprehensive program for negotiated arms reductions. In central Europe, the most heavily armed region on this planet, the Western allies are seeking substantial reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact troops to equal levels. To achieve this goal, we have recently introduced a new proposal designed to revitalize the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced reductions in military manpower.

In the area of strategic arms, the United States has also taken the initiative by calling for a one-third reduction in the number of nuclear warheads that American and Soviet ballistic missiles can deliver. And in the talks in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the United States has gone even further, by asking the Soviet Union to agree to a bold proposal for eliminating an entire category of weapons from the arsenals of the two sides.

But as important as these negotiations are, the problem of arms control cannot be left to the two superpowers. The threat of nuclear proliferation extends to every region in the world and demands the attention and energy of every government. This is not solely, or even primarily, a concern of the superpowers. The non-nuclear countries will not be safer if nuclear intimidation is added to already deadly regional conflicts. The developing nations will not be more prosperous if scarce resources and scientific talent are diverted to nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Nov. 1982, pp. 8–9.

Unfortunately, as the task becomes more important, it also becomes more difficult. Greater quantities of dangerous materials are produced, and new suppliers emerge who lack a clear commitment to nonproliferation. But the technology that helped to create the problems can supply answers as well. Vigorous action to strengthen the barriers to aggression and to resolve disputes peacefully can remove the insecurities that are the root of the problem. The United States, for its part, will work to tighten export controls, to promote broader acceptance of safeguards, to urge meaningful actions when agreements are violated, and to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. As our action last week in Vienna should make clear, we will not accept attempts to politicize—and, therefore, emasculate—such vital institutions.

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Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Intensification of Efforts To Remove the Threat of Nuclear War and Ensure the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy, October 1, 1982[1]

The General Assembly,

Noting that the increasingly widespread use of nuclear energy is an objective necessity for meeting the growing needs of mankind in various fields of activity as other, non-renewable energy sources are being depleted,

Taking into consideration the fact that the irreversible process of the development of nuclear energy involves the establishment of a large number of peaceful nuclear installations with a high concentration of radioactive materials,

Bearing in mind that the destruction of such installations would bring about a considerable release of radioactive nuclear materials even if conventional weapons were used, and if nuclear weapons were used it would have totally disastrous consequences on a global scale,

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[1] A/37/242, Annex. The draft resolution was transmitted to the Secretary-General as an annex to a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko requesting inclusion of the subject of the draft resolution in the agenda of the 37th General Assembly. Ambassador Issraeiyan introduced the draft resolution in the First Committee as A/C.1/37/L.7 on Nov. 9, but he withdrew it on Nov. 24, stating that the fundamental ideas in the draft had been reflected in draft resolutions already adopted by the Committee. He was referring to drafts that the General Assembly subsequently adopted as res. 37/99 C, 37/100 A, and 37/100 B.

Expressing its concern at the fact that under such circumstances the unleashing of nuclear war would be all the more dangerous,

Reaffirming the will of the States Members of the United Nations, as expressed in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, [2]

1. *Calls upon* all States to intensify their efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy;

2. *Declares* that the deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations even by means of conventional weapons is essentially equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, that is to say, to actions of a kind which the United Nations has already described as the gravest crime against humanity;

3. *Notes* that the limitation and reduction of the nuclear arms race will produce more favourable conditions for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the energy of the atom;

4. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards the reduction and ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals, to agree on a simultaneous suspension (freezing) of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons.

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, October 1, 1982 [1]

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned over the continuing nuclear-arms race and the growing danger of nuclear war,

Convinced that an immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by all states in all environments and the prohibition of such testing in the future would be a serious obstacle to the development of ever-new types and systems of nuclear weapons, as well as to the emergence of new nuclear States,

Taking note of the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the current session (see appendix below),

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[2] Resolution 36/100. [Footnote in original.]

[1] A/37/243. The draft resolution and its appendix (*infra*) were transmitted in an annex to a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko requesting the inclusion of the subject of the draft resolution as an additional item in the agenda of the 37th session. Ambassador Troyanovsky formally submitted the draft resolution and its appendix as A/C.1/37/L on Oct. 18, *post*. They were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/85.

1. *Urges* the Committee on Disarmament to proceed promptly to practicial negotiations with a view to elaborating a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

2. *Refers* to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration the basic provisions of such a treaty, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the text of which is attached to the present resolution, as well as the proposals and observations made by other States on this question in the course of the current session;

3. *Calls upon* all the nuclear-weapon States, as a gesture of goodwill and with a view to creating more favourable conditions for the formulation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, not to conduct any nuclear explosions, starting from a date to be agreed among them and until the above-mentioned treaty is concluded, after the appropriate declarations have been made by them to that effect well in advance.

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session an item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests."

Soviet Proposal Submitted to the U.N. General Assembly: Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, October 1, 1982 [1]

The objective of averting nuclear war, towards which the efforts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of other peace-loving States are directed, makes it imperative to take such measures, *inter alia*, as would impede the development of ever new types and systems of nuclear weapons.

One such effective measure would be the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments, which at the same time would promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Motivated by these goals, the Soviet Union is submitting to States Members of the United Nations, for their consideration, the following basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of uclear-weapon tests.

A. Scope of the Prohibition

1. Each State party to this treaty shall undertake to prohibit, to revent and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon explosions at any ace under its jurisdiction or control, in any environment—in the

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[1] A/37/243, Annex. The proposal was submitted as an appendix to the Soviet draft olution on "Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests," *supra*.

atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water or under ground.

2. No party shall cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of any nuclear-weapon-test explosions anywhere.

3. A moratorium shall be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under which the parties to this Treaty shall refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in carrying out such explosions until the relevant procedure has been evolved.

4. Promptly after the entry into force of this Treaty, consideration shall be given to the question of procedure for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such procedure, to be agreed upon may take the form of a special agreement or agreements constituting an integral part of this Treaty.

B. Ensuring Compliance With the Treaty

1. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION

5. The States parties to this Treaty shall base their activities in verifying compliance with the provisions of this Treaty on a combination of national and international measures.

6. For the purpose of verifying compliance by other States parties with the provisions of this Treaty, any State party shall have the right to use the national technical means of verification which it has at its disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

7. States parties which possess national technical means of verification may, in case of necessity, place the information which they obtained through those means, and which is important for the purposes of this Treaty, at the disposal of other parties.

8. The States to this Treaty undertake not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of other States parties.

9. International measures of verification shall be carried out through international procedures within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter, and through consultations and co-operation between States parties, as well as through the services of the Committee of Experts of States parties to this Treaty.

2. CONSULTATIONS AND CO-OPERATION

10. The States parties to this Treaty shall, in case of necessity consult each other, make inquiries and provide information in connection with such inquiries with a view to solving any questions that may arise with regard to compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

11. The States parties shall exchange, bilaterally or through the Committee of Experts, information which they consider necessary to provide assurance of compliance within the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

12. Consultations and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter.

13. In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of this Treaty, the States parties to this Treaty shall agree in an appropriate way on the prevention of any actions aimed at deliberately falsifying the actual state of affairs with regard to compliance with this Treaty by other States parties.

3. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA

14. For the purposes of better assuring compliance with obligations under this Treaty, each party may participate in an international exchange of seismic data. Such international exchange shall be carried out in accordance with the following guidelines.

4. GUIDELINES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA

15. Each State party to this Treaty shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of seismic data, to contribute data from seismic stations on its territory which it designates for participation in the international exchange and to receive all the seismic data made available through the international exchange.

16. Each party that decides to participate in the international exchange shall designate an appropriate body through which it will communicate with the international exchange.

17. Seismic data shall be transmitted through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization or through any other agreed communication channels.

18. International seismic data centres shall be established in agreed locations, taking into account the desirability of appropriate geographical distribution. These centres shall receive all seismic data contributed to the international exchange by its participants, process seismic data without interpreting the nature of seismic events, make the processed seismic data available to all participants and maintain records of all seismic data contributed by participants and processed by the centre. Each centre shall be under the jurisdiction of the party on whose territory it is located.

19. The Committee of Experts, whose establishment is provided for in this Treaty, shall draw in its work upon the recommendations contained in the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events [2] established by the Committee on Disarmament. Such

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[2] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session,* Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), annex II, documents CCD/558 and Add.1, and CD/53/Appendix III/V. II, documents CD/43 and Add.1. [Footnote in original. Summaries of the *Ad Hoc* Group's reports may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 103–110; *ibid., 1979,* pp. 476–481; *ibid., 1980,* pp. 50–51; *ibid., 1981,* pp. 337–339; *ibid., 1982,* Mar. 18 and Aug. 19.]

measures include the elaboration of standards for the technical and operational characteristics of participating seismic stations and international seismic data centres, for the form in which data are transmitted to the centres, and for the form and manner in which the centres make seismic data available to participants and respond to their requests for additional seismic data regarding specific seismic events.

5. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OF STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY

20. A Committee of Experts of States parties to this Treaty shall be established to consider questions related to the international exchange of seismic data. Any State party shall have the right to appoint a representative to this Committee.

21. The Committee, which will function on the basis of consensus, shall hold its first meeting not later than ninety days after the entry into force of this Treaty and shall meet thereafter as necessary.

22. The Committee shall develop, in accordance with the guidelines, detailed arrangements regulating the establishment and operation of the international exchange; it shall facilitate its implementation and co-operation between States parties to enhance the effectiveness of such exchange.

23. The Committee shall facilitate more extensive international consultations and co-operation, exchange of information and assistance in verification, in the interests of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

24. Other questions relating to the organization and procedures of the Committee of Experts, its possible subsidiary bodies and their functions, rights, duties and proceedings, its role in promoting international exchange and in on-site inspection, as well as other matters, are to be elaborated.

6. FACT-FINDING PROCEDURE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY ON-SITE INSPECTION

25. Each State party to this Treaty, if it has doubts regarding an event on the territory of another State which may have been a nuclear explosion, may send that party a request for an on-site inspection. The request should state the reason why it is being made, including relevant seismic and other physical data that could be associated with a possible nuclear explosion, its time and location.

26. The party which has received the request, being aware of the importance of providing assurance of compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, shall state whether or not it is prepared to agree to an inspection. If the party which has received the request is not prepared to agree to an inspection on its territory, it shall communicate the reasons for its decision to the requesting State and the Committee of Experts.

27. If the requesting State party is not satisfied with the explanation received and the information provided on a bilateral basis, it may ask the Committee of Experts for additional information and consultation

regarding that request and assistance in ascertaining the facts in the form of scientific and technical expertise.

28. For the purpose of conducting inspection on the territory of the States parties which may give their agreement, procedures shall be elaborated for such inspections and the manner in which they are to be conducted, including the list of rights and functions of the inspecting personnel and the definition of the role of the receiving party during the inspection.

29. This Treaty shall also contain a provision enabling any two or more of the States parties to agree, by mutual consent, in view of special interests or special circumstances, on additional measures which would facilitate verification of compliance with this Treaty.

31. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of a complaint received by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the State parties of the results of the investigation.

32. Each State party to this Treaty undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to any State party which requests it, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger or is perhaps being exposed to danger as a result of violation by another State party of the obligations assumed under this Treaty.

C. Concluding Provisions of the Treaty

33. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty Governments, including the Governments of all States permanent members of the Security Council.

34. However, the States parties may agree that this Treaty should enter into force for an agreed limited period, given the participation of three States permanent members of the Security Council—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

35. Provisions should be made for the procedure for the signing and ratification of this Treaty, for the depositary, for accession by States to this Treaty and for amendments.

Address by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the U.N. General Assembly [Extracts], October 1, 1982 [1]

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A session of the United Nations General Assembly is a unique opportunity to review the international reality in all its diversity and to sense more profoundly what is of greatest concern to people on different continents. And, one becomes convinced once again that of the multitude of problems in today's world the main problem, the one that stands out, is that of averting the threat of nuclear war.

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[1] A/37/PV.13, pp. 26–36, 51–66.

Virtually everyone agrees that world developments have been evolving in an alarming way. People are asking themselves whether the insane arms race can be halted and the slipping towards the abyss prevented. What should be done to counter the policies of those who are playing out various scenarios of nuclear war as if it were some kind of a game of chance rather than a matter that affects the destinies of mankind?

Those are legitimate questions. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that peace, which is of the greatest universal value, can and must be preserved; and it must be a just peace, worthy of those heights which civilization on earth has attained. We draw this conviction from history itself, which contains many a tragic page but also examples of brilliantly devised solutions to the most acute international problems.

Let us recall how the United Nations Charter, which is a universally recognized code of rules that must govern relations between States, came into being. The establishment of this Organisation and its Charter crystallized, as it were, the experience of the struggle against and the great victory over fascism. At that time the hope was held out to the world that it would be possible to avert another global tragedy. For almost 40 years now, that hope has been a reality.

Now let us look at the changes in international relations brought about in the 1970s, when the peoples of the world were given an opportunity to breathe the air of détente. Surely the differences in social systems and ideologies or in the world outlook were no less then than they are today. But even taking these differences fully into account, States and the leaders who guided their policies did find ways leading to constructive relations between nations. This constant in the experience of peaceful coexistence has taken root in the minds of peoples and in the fabric of inter-State relations, and it is not easy to discard. The urge to give orders to other countries, to dominate the world, must not be allowed to overshadow the experience of the past or muffle the voice of reason.

The Soviet people reject the gloomy view that mankind has no other path to follow than building up piles of armaments and preparing for war. It would be a mistake to underestimate the rising menace of war. But it is an even greater mistake to fail to see that possibilities do exist for putting up an insurmountable barrier against war. The Soviet Union and the Soviet people are placing all their political and moral potential and all the prestige of their policy on to the scales of peace.

This is surely demonstrated by the obligation unilaterally assumed by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, an obligation solemnly stated in the message of Leonid Brezhnev to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.[2] That was an act of historic importance and it was seen as such throughout the world. Is it not time for our Western partners, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to assess in earnest the opportunities opened up by the Soviet Union's initiative? We expect them to weigh it carefully once again. In seeking to minimize the importance of the Soviet Union's peace initiatives, many Western leaders speak of the need for trust in relations between States. But how would that purpose best be served? It would be best served by renouncing preparations for war, the policy of the arms race and of whipping up world tensions. Why do they not assume the obligation, as the Soviet Union has done, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

Sometimes one can hear it said that it is not merely a question of nuclear weapons alone, for there are conventional weapons as well. Yes, there are. But there is a convincing reply to that too: we insist that all States assume an obligation to renounce any use or threat of force in their relations.

As far back as 1976 the Soviet Union proposed that a world treaty be concluded on the non-use of force in international relations and it submitted a draft treaty to the United Nations for its consideration.[3] The draft treaty expressly provides that States would refrain from the use of force involving any types of weapons—and I emphasize, any types of weapons. It would be a good idea to inscribe this on the doors of every agency in Washington that is concerned with United States foreign policy.

We note with satisfaction that the initiative concerning the non-use of force was endorsed by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations. Indeed, an *ad hoc* committee was even established to draft such a treaty. Why, then has no such treaty been worked out? Because States Members of NATO are thwarting it. Can the situation be remedied now? Yes, it can. The Soviet Union is prepared even today to come to the negotiating table in order to formalize strict obligations not to use force in settling disputes and differences which exist between States. No one would venture to deny that quite a few such disputes and differences have accumulated. But there are no problems among them that would not lend themselves to peaceful solutions. There are none in any part of the world or in any area of world politics—if, of course, one is motivated by the objectives of peace.

It has to be noted, however, that the United States of America has chosen a different policy for itself. The essence of this policy is the desire to impose its will upon other States and peoples. That desire underlies all plans for the production of weapons. It underlies United States foreign policy. The Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that such a policy poses a serious threat to peace.

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[2] *Ante*, June 12.

[3] The proposal may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 641–643.

The objective of gaining an edge in armaments has been openly proclaimed in the United States. The idea that it has to be number one militarily has become something of an obsession. Huge sums are being allocated for building up the United States war machine and the pyramid of weapons is getting higher and higher. In the meantime there is continuously at work an assembly line fabricating all kinds of falsehoods about the Soviet Union's armed forces and its foreign policy. People are being deliberately misled.

Why is all this being done? Simply because in an atmosphere of lies, hysteria and chauvinistic intoxication it is easier to get astronomical military budgets approved; it is easier to divert the country's resources to war preparations and away from peaceful purposes such as eliminating unemployment and fighting inflation, away from using them for the benefit of people, which is what the Soviet Union is calling for.

There is no dearth of versions of nuclear war being planned by the apostles of the arms race: a blitzkrieg, a protracted war, a limited war, an all-out war. Every conceivable and inconceivable definition is being put into circulation. With the cold-blooded composure of grave diggers, they are speculating on the number of casualties the sides would sustain in a nuclear catastrophe. They deliberately hush up the fact that if a nuclear war were to break out under present conditions, there would be no winners, and few people today would disagree with that.

The Soviet Union has, on a number of occasions, including the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, pointed to the dangerous nature of Washington's course aimed at upsetting the military equilibrium which has evolved between the USSR and the United States of America, and on the whole, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Everywhere, on land and on sea, the United States is seeking to impose or strengthen its military presence and to set up new bases. Look at the bloody orgy that is taking place in the Middle East where a frantic search is under way for new clients to be harnessed to the Pentagon's militaristic strategy.

It should, of course, be clear that the Soviet Union does not recognize anyone's right to military superiority. And it will see to it that that does not happen.

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If there was any lack of evidence that the peoples and States consider the continuing arms race to be one of the most critical issues of our time, the second special session of the United Nations General

Assembly devoted to disarmament has provided such evidence in abundance.

Ardent appeals to avert nuclear war and halt the arms race were voiced from its rostrum. The session failed to reach agreement on concrete steps in this field, and it is well known who is responsible for that. Still, the determination of the overwhelming majority of States to ensure peace and achieve disarmament was expressed in no uncertain terms.

The Soviet Union submitted to that session a detailed programme of measures to curb the arms race, ranging from nuclear and chemical weapons to limiting conventional weapons and naval activities of States.

As has been repeatedly emphasized by Leonid Brezhnev, there is no type of weapon which our country would not be prepared to limit or ban on the basis of reciprocity. And if the accumulation of arms is not only continuing but accelerating, if this tragic competition is proceeding at a pace that leaves behind accords on arms limitation, and if the agreements already reached in this field are called into question, all this is the direct result of the United States policy aimed at building up its military muscle. It makes no secret of this policy line; indeed, it is bragging about it.

To take a problem such as the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, that is, the most destructive weapons, the problem which is of utmost importance under present-day conditions, there had been many delays on the part of our partners before the Soviet-American talks started. Undoubtedly, the fact that they are being held is in itself of positive significance. But that alone is not enough. What is required is the desire on both sides to seek agreement.

Without going into the details of the talks, it should, however, be emphasized that so far the other side has failed to show the desire to come to agreement. Surely one cannot take for such a desire the attempt to single out from the totality of weapons possessed by the USSR and the United States only those types of weapons—in this particular case land-based missiles—which constitute the backbone of the Soviet Union's strategic potential, and to make them alone the subject of reduction, leaving out all the rest, that is, submarine-launched missiles, strategic bombers and cruise missiles, where the United States preponderance is obvious?

Certainly this lopsided approach promises no hope for the success of the negotiations. The principle of the equality and equal security of the sides must remain their unshakable foundation. Accuracy, science, balance of parameters, together with a careful evaluation of all elements of the problem—all these must be taken into account. There must be no room for deception, guile or juggling with facts, either in large or in small doses.

It should be recalled that the Soviet Union has put forward an important proposal, namely, to agree to freeze the strategic armaments of the USSR and the United States quantitatively as soon as the talks begin, and at the same time to restrict their modernization to the utmost. We have proposed that for the duration of the talks the sides should take no actions that might upset the stability of the strategic situation.

That is our concrete response to the sentiments mounting in many countries of the world in favour of a freeze on the existing levels of nuclear arms, to be followed by their drastic reduction, which is advocated by the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, those who are conducting negotiations with us on this problem shudder at the mere words "a freeze on arms". What has actually been frozen on their side, and quite deeply at that, is the realization that the talks must be frank, in good faith and free from any lopsidedness.

What is the state of affairs at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe?

Sometimes encouraging statements are heard from the United States side in this respect. But this is an assumed optimism. The so-called zero option—or, to be more precise, pseudo-zero option—proposed by the United States does not offer a solution to the problem. It provides for the elimination only of Soviet land-based missiles, including those which the Soviet Union has possessed for over 20 years now. As to the medium-range nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they are not to be subject to reduction by a single unit and can even be built up.

We have no doubt that Washington realizes that the Soviet side would not agree to a one-sided solution that would run counter to the security interests of the USSR and its allies. Therefore, what is doubtful is whether Washington is really seeking an agreement.

The Soviet Union's desire to come to agreement with the United States is buttressed by practical steps. As is well known, it has unilaterally discontinued further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR. And, what is more, it is carrying out the reduction of a part of that force. Finally, we are not stationing any additional medium-range missiles beyond the Urals, from where Western Europe would be within their reach.

The Soviet Union has faithfully kept its word in this matter too.

Throughout the post-War period, since the emergence of the first atom bombs, the Soviet Union has been persistently seeking approaches to putting an end to the nuclear arms race. At that time it was much easier to ban the atomic weapon than it is nowadays, when there exists a huge arsenal of nuclear armaments.

But even today this problem can be resolved. Mankind has no other reasonable option but to reduce the nuclear threat gradually though consistently, step by step, and ultimately eliminate it.

In this context, it is extremely important to erect a barrier against the development of ever new types and systems of nuclear weapons—a process which tends to destabilize the strategic situation for it entails the emergence of weapons which because of their characteristics, would hardly lend themselves to verification. If this is so, the working out of relevant international agreements on their limitation and reduction is becoming more difficult.

That is the reason why it is becoming increasingly urgent to stop nuclear weapons tests and to erect a tangible physical barrier to the development of ever new kinds of nuclear weapons and thus slow down the arms race.

The States of the world, with very few exceptions demand a ban on all nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments and for all times. Their will was reflected in a series of decisions adopted at the United Nations. Moreover, when signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,[4] all the parties to it, including the United States, undertook to do away with nuclear-weapon tests for good.

In our view, it is the direct responsibility of the United Nations to demand that all countries, and the nuclear Powers in the first place, do their utmost to achieve that goal.

As a nuclear Power, the Soviet Union declares that for its part, it is ready to do that. We propose the inclusion in the agenda of this session of an important and urgent item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests".

What is proposed specifically? It is proposed to speed up the working out and signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to put the talks on that subject in the Committee on Disarmament on a practical footing.

The Soviet Union is submitting to this Assembly for its consideration "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", a document which takes into account the measure of agreement reached during the discussion of that problem in recent years.[5] It also takes into account the views and suggestions advanced by many States, *inter alia* on questions of verification.

In order to create more favourable conditions for the elaboration of the treaty, we propose that all nuclear-weapon States declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including peaceful ones, as of a date to be agreed upon among them. Such a moratorium would be effective pending the conclusion of the treaty.

In the context of the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, I wish to single out two more aspects of importance.

First, the Soviet Union is prepared at any time to ratify—on a reciprocal basis—the treaties concluded with the United States on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests[6] and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[7]

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[4] Text of the treaty is printed *ibid., 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[5] *Supra*.

[6] *Documents on Disarmament, 1974*, pp. 225–229.

[7] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

Secondly, we are in favour of the resumption of the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and Britain.

Those talks were under way. Then they were broken off, and it is public knowledge who was responsible for that.

In the context of the struggle to lessen the nuclear threat, there is still another important problem to which the Soviet Union would like to draw the Assembly's attention.

The number of non-military nuclear facilities, above all power installations, is increasing in various countries. This is an inevitable process, which is bound to grow in scope in the future.

However, intentional destruction, even with the help of conventional weapons, of atomic power plants, research reactors and other similar installations might cause the release and dissemination of a huge amount of radioactive substances, which would have fatal consequences for the population. In other words, it would be tantamount in its effect to a nuclear explosion.

As calculated by experts, the consequences of the destruction of a large atomic power plant are comparable to the radioactive contamination occurring after the explosion of a one-megaton nuclear bomb. Therefore, the need for ensuring a safe development of nuclear energy is closely linked with the task of preventing the unleashing of nuclear war.

Being desirous of lessening the nuclear threat in this area too the Soviet Union proposes the inclusion in the agenda of this session of an urgent item entitled "Multiplying efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy".[8]

The Soviet Union proposes that the General Assembly declare the destruction of peaceful nuclear facilities with conventional weapons equivalent to an attack involving the use of nuclear weapons—that is to say, it should equate such destruction with those actions which the United Nations has already qualified as the gravest crime against humanity.

The question of a speedy elimination of chemical weapons presents itself in all its magnitude. This weapon is one of the means of mass annihilation. The unrestrained build-up of chemical weapons in the West, far from enhancing anybody's security, is only aggravating the risk of military conflicts with the use of these lethal weapons.

The Soviet Union has consistently been advocating the exclusion of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. The relevant proposals submitted by it have been referred to the Committee on Disarmament. We hope that its members will proceed, with all due sense of responsibility, to the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of these barbaric weapons.

There is an increasing danger that the arms race will acquire a qualitatively new dimension unless the necessary measures are urgently taken. Washington is now planning a military thrust into outer space.

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[8] A/37/242.

We are convinced that the arms race must not be permitted to spread into the boundless expanses of outer space. The United Nations can and must play its part in this respect.

For a number of years now the Soviet Union has been seeking the conclusion of an international treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The expanses of outer space should be an area only for the peaceful co-operation of States.

A separate question and a major one is the reduction of conventional armaments and of the numerical strength of armed forces. The Soviet Union wishes to see this problem, too, firmly integrated into the fabric of international negotiations and agreements.

In relation to Central Europe, these problems are under discussion at the Vienna talks. For nine years now, these talks have been, figuratively speaking, marking time, and the time to find agreements that would ameliorate the situation in an area with the highest concentration of the opposing armies is long overdue. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies are doing their utmost to achieve that.

It is a favourite allegation in the West that the Warsaw Treaty countries are superior to NATO in terms of conventional armaments in Europe. Yet at the Vienna talks the socialist countries are proposing to establish for both sides equal levels of armed forces stationed in Central Europe.

Unfortunately, the conduct of our Western partners in the negotiations is not conducive to reaching such an agreement. Although some rouge, figuratively speaking, has recently been applied to their position, the essence has remained unchanged.

So what is left of the so-called concern of the Western countries regarding the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Treaty over NATO?

And what is worse, steps are being taken outside the framework of the talks, which can only be described as provocative. What is there to say, for instance, about the recent agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States concerning the bringing from overseas of additional contingents of American troops under far-fetched pretexts? In other words, instead of reducing forces in that region, conditions are being prepared for increasing them by several more divisions. That is, of course, a mockery of common sense. The same applies to the planned redeployment of United States military units to the immediate vicinity of the borders of the German Democratic Republic.

In Europe, as well as on other continents, the Soviet Union is countering the policy of confrontation with the policy of good-neighbourliness and co-operation. We understand and appreciate the desire of the Europeans to follow the path opened up by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

There exists a possibility of further progress towards making Europe a continent of peace and stability. The attainment of this goal would be largely facilitated by the implementation of the idea of convening a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

That is one of the principal issues at the Madrid meeting of the States participants in the European Conference. If all its participants adopt a constructive approach at its resumed session in November, general agreement could be reached both with regard to the convening of the conference and to ensuring the success of the Madrid meeting.

Seeking to alleviate tensions throughout the world, we have recently proposed that the decision-making bodies of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization make declarations on the non-extension of the sphere of action of the two military and political groupings to Asia, Africa and Latin America. That would constitute a major step towards detente. All the members of the Warsaw Treaty support this proposal. We hope that the NATO countries will study this proposal and respond to it in a positive manner.

In recent years serious obstacles have emerged in restructuring international economic relations on a democratic and equal basis. The root cause lies in the policies of certain Western Powers aimed at keeping the developing countries in an unequal position, at facilitating the attempts of the monopoly capital to exercise its sway over those countries.

A recent vivid example of that is the attitude of some Western Powers to the enormous work accomplished by States in preparing an international convention on the law of the sea. Many years of effort have produced a document whose provisions do not prejudice anybody's interests. And what has become of it? The United States is hampering the adoption of that convention. We would like to express the hope that it will stop being in opposition to a vast majority of States and will adhere to the convention.

The USSR is in favour of democratization of both political and economic relations between States. As to our participation in rendering assistance to the newly-freed States in overcoming their economic backwardness, in this respect too the Soviet Union is doing at least as much if not more than any of the developed capitalist countries.

It is common knowledge that the foreign policy course of any State is an extension of its domestic policy. Our country sets itself economic and social tasks of vast magnitude. We need peace to accomplish them.

The Soviet Union is extending its hand to every State which, for its part, is willing to maintain and develop good relations with us.

That applies to Europe. We are prepared for a further expansion of co-operation with West European countries on a peaceful and mutually beneficial basis.

That applies to Asia, where the Soviet Union has long-standing and stable ties with many States.

That applies to Latin America, where normal, business-like relations are being established between the USSR and a number of countries, including Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

The same applies to the United States of America. We are convinced that from the viewpoint of a long-term policy of principle the deterioration of relations between the USSR and the United States is not in the interests of the United States itself. The American people is hardly different from other peoples as far as the desire to live in peace is concerned. Our country has on several occasions pronounced itself—in particular at the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and at the USSR Supreme Soviet—in favour of developing normal relations with the United States.

The policy of the Soviet Government aimed at preserving and strengthening peace and preventing another war is endorsed by all Soviet people, since all they aspire to is a peaceful—and only peaceful—future.

At the end of this year the Soviet people will mark an important event—the sixtieth anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Land of the Soviets is invariably faithful to the peaceful behests of the founder of our State, V. I. Lenin.

As Leonid Brezhnev has recently stressed once again, "concern for peace is paramount in the policy of the Soviet Union". This concern determines the fundamental direction of all foreign policy activities of the Soviet State, which are based on the Programme of Peace for the 1980s adopted by the 26th Congress of the CPSU.

This Programme is being implemented by the Soviet Union together with other countries of the socialist community, cemented together as they are by a common political system and world outlook, by the identity of goals and ideals.

All the activities of socialist countries convincingly prove that peace is their policy aim. Every step, every foreign policy move made by them, serve the attainment of that noble goal.

The Soviet Union has rebuffed and will continue to rebuff policies based on the cult of force. Those who come out for preventing a nuclear disaster and for strengthening peace can always count on its support and co-operation.

All our actions in the international arena will continue to be inspired by our deep-held belief in the necessity and the possibility of saving the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Remarks by President Reagan: Nuclear Freeze [Extract], October 4, 1982 [1]

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Coming in here, I passed a lot of your fellow Ohioans out there on the street. And some were generously applauding and waving, but there were some who were demonstrating. They were demonstrating in behalf of a movement that has swept across our country that I think is inspired by, not the sincere, honest people who want peace, but by some who want the weakening of America, and so are manipulating many honest and sincere people.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 11, 1982, pp. 1259–1260. The President was speaking with members of Ohio Veterans' Organizations.

It is the nuclear freeze movement and the peace movement. Well, I, too, want a nuclear freeze after we have been able to negotiate the Soviet Union into a reduction on both sides of all kinds of weapons—and then have a freeze when we're equal and not freeze them now in a superiority that would bring closer the chance of nuclear war. [*Applause*] [2] Thank you very much. Thank you.

You know, when I see them I wonder why they haven't realized this, how they haven't realized, for example, that a nuclear freeze would cancel the development of the B-1 bomber. Why is that important? It's important because that would leave us with a bomber that is older than the men who are flying it, that is obsolete, and that could not possibly offer the deterrent that we need to maintain peace in the world.

So, why are we rebuilding our defenses? Not because we want a war. All of you who wore the uniform, all of us who've been in wars, all of us know the horror of it, and we want to see no more. But we also know that we never got in a war because we were too strong. We got in wars because someone on the other side didn't think we had the will or the strength to defend our freedoms and our country and our rights. They had to learn the hard way.

So, what is really back of our great attempt to refurbish our military is to strengthen three delegations of Americans, two of which are in Geneva—one, I believe, is still in Switzerland. One delegation is negotiating a reduction to zero, if possible, of the intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe on both sides. The other is seeking to reduce to equality the strategic nuclear weapons on both sides so that there is a deterrent that can prevent war. And the third is seeking to reduce the conventional weapons. What position would our negotiators be in if those who were demonstrating out there have their way and those sitting on the opposite side of the table from our people look across and say, "Why should we give up anything? The Americans are giving it up without trading for anything."

They're strengthened by the knowledge on the other side of the table that this country will do whatever it has to do to maintain its security, safety, and peace in the world.

Thank you all, and God bless you.

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[2] Brackets in source text.

Final Act of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Countries Interested in the Promotion of Democracy in Central America and the Caribbean [Extracts], October 4, 1982 [1]

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The participants agreed on the following points as the final result of their deliberations:

1. They expressed their conviction that it is the ineludible task of governments that have been legitimized by the will of the people, expressed at the polls, to defend, promote, and develop a democratic, representative, pluralistic, and participatory system, and that the time has come to define the conditions that will permit the reestablishment of a lasting and stable peace in Central America;

2. They recognized the challenges facing the democratic institutions of our countries, and the unavoidable duty to face them firmly;

3. They likewise recognized that it is necessary and desirable to establish organizations to help maintain and improve democratic institutions;

4. They noted that democratic institutions, in addition to serving as a means of expressing the sovereignty of the people, should contribute to the strengthening of peace and solidarity among peoples and the promotion of economic development, freedom, and social justice;

5. They reaffirmed the fundamental importance of respect for international law and treaties as the basis of regional cooperation and security;

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They Therefore Declare:

I. Their faith in and support for the principles of representative, pluralistic, and participatory democracy which, when properly understood, constitute a way of life, of thinking, and of acting which can accommodate within its scope different social and economic systems and structures having a common denominator, which is respect for life, for the security of the individual, for freedom of thought, and for freedom of the press, as well as the right to work and to receive proper remuneration, the right to fair living conditions, to the free exercise of suffrage, and of other human, civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 1982, pp. 70–72. The Final Act was signed by the representatives of Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Colombia, United States, and Jamaica. The Panamanian observer at this meeting did not sign.

III. Their conviction that, in order to promote regional peace and stability, it is necessary to support domestic political understandings that will lead to the establishment of democratic, pluralistic, and participatory systems; to the establishment of mechanisms for a continuing multilateral dialogue; to absolute respect for delimited and demarcated borders, in accordance with existing treaties, compliance with which is the proper way to prevent border disputes and incidents, observing, whenever applicable, traditional lines of jurisdiction; to respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states; to the rejection of threats or the use of force to settle conflicts; to a halt to the arms race; and to the elimination, on the basis of full and effective reciprocity, of the external factors which hamper the consolidation of a stable and lasting peace.

In order to attain these objectives, it is essential that every country within and without the region take the following actions:

a) Create and maintain truly democratic government institutions, based on the will of the people as expressed in free and regular elections, and founded on the principle that government is responsible to the people governed;

b) Respect human rights, especially the right to life and to personal integrity, and the fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and religious freedom, as well as the right to organize political parties, labor unions, and other groups and associations;

c) Promote national reconciliation where there have been deep divisions in society through the broadening of opportunities for participation within the framework of democratic processes and institutions;

d) Respect the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states, and the right of peoples to self-determination;

e) Prevent the use of their territories for the support, supply, training, or command of terrorist or subversive elements in other states, end all traffic in arms and supplies, and refrain from providing any direct or indirect assistance to terrorist, subversive, or other activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the governments of other states;

f) Limit arms and the size of military and security forces to the levels that are strictly necessary for the maintenance of public order and national defense;

g) Provide for international surveillance and supervision of all ports of entry, borders, and other strategic areas under reciprocal and fully verifiable arrangements;

h) On the basis of full and effective reciprocity, withdraw all foreign military and security advisers and forces from the Central American area, and ban the importation of heavy weapons of manifest offensive capability through guaranteed means of verification.

The preceding actions represent the essential framework that must be established in each State in order to promote regional peace and stability.

The signing countries call on all the peoples and governments of the region to embrace and implement these principles and conditions as the basis for the improvement of democracy and the building of a lasting peace.

They note with satisfaction the efforts being made in that direction, and deem that the achievement of these objectives may be reached more fully through the reestablishment of the rule of law and the organization of election processes that will guarantee full participation of the people, without any discrimination whatsoever.

THEY RESOLVE

IV. To create a democratic organization to provide development assistance and advisory services for elections, the purpose of which organization will be to maintain the electoral system and to develop, strengthen, and stimulate its utilization in the inter-American area, providing advice to countries that request it about its practice and implementation. The organization will operate either autonomously, sponsored by the countries represented in the meeting and by other interested countries, or as a section or branch of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, since suffrage is an essential part of the theory and practice of human rights.

To request the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica, Mr. Fernando Volio Fernandez, to prepare an appropriate document, containing the comments of the participants in this meeting and of the representatives of other democratic countries and to circulate it among them and implement it as soon as possible.

V. Lastly, they agree to participate in a Forum for Peace and Democracy, the purpose of which will be to contribute to the implementation of the actions and the attainment of the objectives contained in this document, and, within the framework of this declaration, to study the regional crisis and analyze the various peace proposals or initiatives aimed at solving it. The Forum may be broadened by the inclusion of the collaboration of other democratic States.

The Forum may entrust specific tasks to representatives of given participating countries, who will report on the results; and will transmit the final act of this meeting, so that comments and opinions deemed advisable, may be presented to the Forum.

The representatives requested the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica, on behalf of the participating governments, to transmit this declaration to the governments of the region and other interested governments, and to obtain their views on the principles and conditions for peace that it contains.

They agreed to convene a new meeting as soon as possible, in order to evaluate the development of the objectives of the declaration.

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Remarks by President Reagan: Prospects for Arms Control Negotiations [Extract], October 14, 1982

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Arms Reduction Talks

Mr. Dietler. Mr. President, what is the best method to as
mutually verifiable reduction in the weapons of war that will
more security to the world?

The President. Courtland, I believe that we're on the way, if
possible at all, that we're going to do it now with the polic
we've been following. As you know, we have negotiating teams
tiating—well, three of them in Geneva, Switzerland, one in Vi
and we're negotiating for a reduction of conventional arms and
ons. But in Switzerland, we're also negotiating—two teams—ne
ing a reduction, a legitimate reduction in the strategic nuclear
ons. And the other one is negotiating, and we have proposed, d
zero, the intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Now, the Soviets have 945 warheads aimed at targets in Eur
their medium-range missiles. And we have no deterrent whats
but have promised our allies, at their request, that we're go
provide the Pershing II missiles as a deterrent force aimed at R
targets. We have proposed that if they will eliminate their
weapons, we will refrain from installing those Pershing II miss
ours in Europe.

Now, the reason that I am optimistic is because in years pa
have tried to negotiate arms limitation treaties with the Soviet
at the same time—that is, in the previous few years, we were un
ally disarming. We were canceling the B-1 bomber, we were re
our forces in strength, and so forth. We have embarked on a co
a legitimate buildup to ensure our own national security, and
what has brought the Soviets to the bargaining table, ready to n
ate.

Whether we'll get all we ask—of course, we probably won't.
think we have a good chance of getting legitimate reduction, b
now that we are reinstituting our Armed Forces, the Soviet
knows they don't want that. I think it was all explained in a c
recently. It was Brezhnev talking to a Russian general, and h
saying, "I liked the arms race better when we were the only o
it."

Now, we'll be ready to reduce instead of build up when they
with us that they will reduce down to equal terms with us.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 25, 1982, p. 1331. The Preside
speaking via satellite to 11 Republican campaign events.

Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1982, October 15, 1982 [1]

AN ACT

To authorize appropriations under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, and for other purposes.

Oct. 15, 1982
[H.R. 3467]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1982".

Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1982
22 U.S.C. 2551 note.

SEC. 2. (a) Section 49(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2589(a)) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 49. (a) To carry out the purposes of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated—

"(1) for the fiscal year 1982, $18,268,000,

"(2) for the fiscal year 1983, $19,893,852, and

"(3) such additional amounts, for each such fiscal year, as may be necessary for increases in salary, pay, retirement, other employee benefits authorized by law, and other nondiscretionary costs, and to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates.

Amounts appropriated under this subsection are authorized to remain available until expended.".

SEC. 3. Section 45(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2535(a)) is amended by inserting the following new sentence after the second sentence thereof: "In the case of persons detailed from other Government agencies, the Director may accept the results of full-field background security and loyalty investigations conducted by the Department of Defense or the Department of State as the basis for the determination required by this subsection that the person is not a security risk or of doubtful loyalty.".

22 U.S.C. 2585.

SEC. 4. Section 31(c) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2571) is amended by inserting "and of all aspects of antisatellite activities" immediately before the semicolon.

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[1] P.L. 97-339, 96 Stat. 1635, 97th Cong. The report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 184-195. The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was submitted May 26, *ante.* The report of the Committee of Conference was submitted Aug. 3, *ante.*

Approved October 15, 1982.

Legislative History—H.R. 3467 (S. 1193):
House Report No. 97–55 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs).
Senate Report No. 97–430 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).
Congressional Record:
Vol. 127 (1981): June 8, considered and passed House.
Vol. 128 (1982): Oct. 1, considered and passed Senate, amended; House agreed to Senate amendment.

Communique of the Commonwealth Heads of Government [Extracts], October 18, 1982 [1]

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5. As at their previous Meetings, Heads of Government reaffirmed the inadmissability of the use of force in international relations and of interference in the internal affairs of states, and stressed the need to resolve differences by peaceful means based on respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and equality. They recognised that adherence to these precepts and progress towards disarmament were essential and complementary aspects to the achievement of international security. They were therefore greatly disturbed by the failure of the international community to reach any agreement on the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament considered at the recent United Nations Special Session devoted to disarmament. They expressed the hope that the World Campaign, which had been launched at the Special Session would help to create a climate of world public opinion that would bring effective pressure to bear on governments to tackle difficult disarmament issues with greater determination.

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15. Heads of Government took note of the desire of the South Pacific island states to establish their region as a nuclear weapon-free zone, recalling the resolution already adopted on the subject by the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. [2] They agreed that the continuation of nuclear weapon testing in the region was a matter for deep concern. They fully supported the South Pacific Forum's strong condemnation of France's continued test programme as well as its failure to provide information on the effects of past tests on the human and natural environment of the Pacific. They also expressed anxiety over the possibility of the South Pacific becoming an interna-

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[1] A/37/586–S/15472, pp. 3, 5.

[2] G.A. res. 3477 (XXX), printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 791–793.

tional dumping ground for nuclear waste and called on all states to desist from the storage or dumping of nuclear wastes in the Pacific.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Troyanovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Immediate Cessation and Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests [Extract], October 18, 1982 [1]

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The question of a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is not a new one, of course. But in the present circumstances of a growing threat of war and of stepped-up military preparations it acquires particular urgency.

In accord with our serious and responsible approach to this task—tackling which is long overdue—we now propose a joint search for a solution to this problem in all possible areas, whether radically or by means of a series of consecutive steps. In other words, the new Soviet proposal presents a comprehensive set of programmes, including measures both radical and partial, permanent and temporary—but all quite concrete and practical.

At the same time we are trying to be very realistic in our approach to the question of a nuclear weapon test ban. The Soviet proposals are not an academic scheme divorced from real life: quite the contrary. They are based on many years of experience in dealing with this problem in various international forums, and they take into account various factors which are relevant to the present situation.

On the one hand, there is no need to start from scratch on the question of a test ban, for we have an impressive record of accomplishments in that area.

The Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, concluded in 1963, was a very useful measure in this area. [2] However, it failed to cover the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and, furthermore, not all the nuclear Powers are party to it.

It is understandable, therefore, why for so many years now the peoples of the world and the majority of States have been seeking a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests without exception, and the conclusion of agreements on that subject. The United Nations has adopted many important decisions in that regard, and the Committee on Disarmament has also spent a great deal of time on the matter.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.3, pp. 66–73.

[2] For text of the treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

We also have some useful experience of co-operation and interaction among the three nuclear Powers which are parties to the 196 Treaty.

In 1974 and 1976, the USSR and the United States signed the Treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests to tests of weapons with a yield of not more than 150 kilotons,[3] and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.[4] Since 1977 the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have been holding negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. In the course of those negotiations considerable progress was achieved; there was virtual agreement on the entire draft text of a possible treaty and it remained only to agree on some of the draft provisions, mainly provisions of a technical nature. The results of the negotiations were presented by the delegations of the three countries to the Committee on Disarmament in August 1980,[5] and they were given a positive reception from many other States, which at that time saw them as truly encouraging.

At the same time, in order to get the true picture of the current situation regarding this question, we must also be aware of certain ominous and alarming elements of that situation. Those elements, moreover, have been making more frequent appearances of late, and we cannot rid ourselves of the impression that they are being deliberately and consistently injected into the picture.

The trilateral talks were suspended due to a unilateral decision of the United States. The current United States Administration has refused to reopen them, and had been alleging for the past year and a half that it was studying the problem. What, one might ask, has been the result of that "study"? As a result of the study, the President of the United States announced the decision never to resume the talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. Another decision was taken at the same time: not to ratify the Soviet-United States treaties signed in 1974 and 1976. What is more, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency stated at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in view of the need for the development of new weapons systems and modernization of such systems, the United States would have to continue carrying out tests for a long time to come, perhaps even tests of weapons with a yield in excess of the agreed limit of 150 kilotons.[6]

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that, under the Moscow Treaty of 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[7] all parties to those treaties, including the United States, assumed an obligation to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests once and for all.

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[3] *Ibid., 1974*, pp. 225–227.

[4] *Ibid., 1976*, pp. 328–332.

[5] *Ibid., 1980*, pp. 317–321.

[6] *Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals: Hearings . . . Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session . . . .* p. 381.

[7] For the Non-Proliferation Treaty text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of our Organization believe that this problem, far from having lost its relevance, has become particularly urgent in the present international situation. The Soviet Union concurs with that view entirely, and proposes that we intensify our efforts finally to break the deadlock on the problem of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, to speed up preparation and signing of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and to put on a practical footing the talks on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. To that end, the Soviet Union has submitted for consideration at this session the basic provisions for a treaty on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. [8] That document takes into account the measure of agreement achieved during the discussion of this problem in recent years, as well as the points of view and wishes expressed by other States.

The document provides that each party to a future treaty would assume the obligation to prohibit, prevent and refrain from carrying out any experimental tests of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any environment: in the atmosphere and beyond it, including outer space, under water and underground.

The provisions relating to the enforcement of the treaty embrace a wide range of verification questions, reflecting the idea of combining national and international measures, the questions of consultation and co-operation, the international exchange of seismic data, the establishment of a committee of experts, the carrying out of on-site inspections on a voluntary basis making use of international procedures within the United Nations framework in accordance with the Charter, and other matters. All these questions have been worked out comprehensively and in detail.

The provisions on consultation and co-operation stipulate that for the purpose of resolving any problems that might arise over compliance with the treaty and in order to ensure that the obligations under the treaty would be carried out States would exchange information on a bilateral basis or through the committee of experts and would make the necessary inquiries.

Each State party to the treaty would have the right to take part in the international exchange of seismic data, which would be channelled through the global telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization or through any other agreed channels. Provision is made for the establishment of international seismic data centres which would receive all the information coming in through the international exchange from its participants.

An important role in the consideration of questions relating to the international exchange of seismic data could be played by the committee of experts. It could work out detailed measures for the establishment and operation of this international exchange, promote fuller international consultation and co-operation and the exchange of information, and facilitate verification in the interest of compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

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[8] *Ante*, Oct. 1.

The final provisions of the treaty provide that it would be of indefinite duration and it would enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 Governments, including the permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time the draft envisages that the treaty could enter into force for an agreed period of limited duration and with the participation of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom only.

In our view, the document submitted by the Soviet Union offers considerable possibilities for agreement in the very near future, on the condition, of course, that other States, and the nuclear States in particular, show at least a minimum of political will in resolving one of the most urgent problems in the limitation of armaments.

In order to create more favourable conditions for the preparation of the treaty and so that the constructive negotiations are not marred by the ominous accompaniment of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union proposes that all nuclear-weapon States declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, beginning from a mutually agreed date. Such a moratorium would remain in force until the actual conclusion of the treaty.

In the view of the Soviet Union, the cessation of nuclear tests everywhere and by everybody would be facilitated by the implementation of certain interim measures with the same objective. As far as my country is concerned, as stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in the general debate, we are ready at any time to ratify on a reciprocal basis the treaties concluded with the United States in 1974 and 1976 and to resume the trilateral talks with the United States and the United Kingdom.

We certainly claim no monopoly in the search for ways and means of resolving this important problem in its entirety. On the contrary, we are ready to examine most attentively and seriously the views and considerations on this subject of other countries, large or small.

The fundamental elements of the approach of the Soviet Union to the problem of the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests are reflected in draft resolution (A/C.1/37/L.1 [*L.6*] [9]) which is now being formally submitted in this statement to the First Committee for its consideration. It is important that the results of our present discussion, which we hope will be constructive, are followed up. We should like these results to be taken up by the Committee on Disarmament and to contribute to the conduct of practical negotiations in that body with a view to the conclusion of an international treaty on the subject.

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[9] Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/85.

In its statement today the Soviet delegation has touched upon only a few aspects—although extremely important ones—of the problem of averting the danger of a nuclear war. The effective solution of this problem requires hard work in a number of different areas simultaneously in connection with curbing the arms race and strengthening the political and legal guarantees of international peace and security. It includes the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles, up to and including their total elimination, the prohibition and destruction of other types of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, and so on. None of these problems has lost any of its relevance; in fact, they have become even more urgent. In due course, the Soviet delegation will set forth its approach to the solution of those problems.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982, October 18, 1982 [1]

AN ACT

To amend title 18 of the United States Code to implement the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and for other purposes.

Oct. 18, 1982
[H.R. 5228]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982".

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982
18 USC 831 note

IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION AND PROHIBITION OF RELATED OFFENSES

SEC. 2. (a) Chapter 39 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by inserting after the table of sections at the beginning of such chapter the following new section:

§831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials

18 USC 831

"(a) Whoever, if one of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section occurs—

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[1] P.L. 97-351, 96 Stat. 1663, 97th Cong.

"(1) without lawful authority, intentionally receives, possesses, uses, transfers, alters, disposes of, or disperses any nuclear material and—

"(A) thereby knowingly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property; or

"(B) knows that circumstances exist which are likely to cause the death of or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property;

"(2) with intent to deprive another of nuclear material, knowingly—

"(A) takes and carries away nuclear material of another without authority;

"(B) makes an unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer, of nuclear material belonging to another; or

"(C) uses fraud and thereby obtains nuclear material belonging to another;

"(3) knowingly—

"(A) uses force; or

"(B) threatens or places another in fear that any person other than the actor will imminently be subject to bodily injury;

and thereby takes nuclear material belonging to another from the person or presence of any other;

"(4) intentionally intimidates any person and thereby obtains nuclear material belonging to another;

"(5) with intent to compel any person, international organization, or governmental entity to do or refrain from doing any act, knowingly threatens to engage in conduct described in paragraph (2)(A) or (3) of this subsection;

"(6) knowingly threatens to use nuclear material to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person or substantial damage to property under circumstances in which the threat may reasonably be understood as an expression of serious purposes;

"(7) attempts to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection; or

"(8) is a party to a conspiracy of two or more persons to commit an offense under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of this subsection, if any of the parties intentionally engages in any conduct in furtherance of such offense

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

"(b) The punishment for an offense under—

"(1) paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a) of this section is—

"(A) a fine of not more than $250,000; and

"(B) imprisonment—

"(i) for any term of years or for life (I) if, while committing the offense, the offender knowingly causes the death of any person; or (II) if, while committing an offense under paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, the offender, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the life of an individual, knowingly engages in any conduct and thereby recklessly causes the death of or serious bodily injury to any person; and

"(ii) for not more than 20 years in any other case; and

"(2) paragraph (8) of subsection (a) of this section is—

"(A) a fine of not more than $250,000; and

"(B) imprisonment—

"(i) for not more than 20 years if the offense which is the object of the conspiracy is punishable under paragraph (1)(B)(i); and

"(ii) for not more than 10 years in any other case.

"(c) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) of this section are that—

"(1) the offense is committed in the United States or the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301));

"(2) the defendant is a national of the United States, as defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101);

"(3) at the time of the offense the nuclear material is in use, storage, or transport, for peaceful purposes, and after the conduct required for the offense occurs the defendant is found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States; or

"(4) the conduct required for the offense occurs with respect to the carriage of a consignment of nuclear material for peaceful purposes by any means of transportation ntended to go beyond the territory of the state where he shipment originates beginning with the departure rom a facility of the shipper in that state and ending vith the arrival at a facility of the receiver within the ate of ultimate destination and either of such states is he United States.

10 USC 371 et seq.

"(d) The Attorney General may request assistance fro the Secretary of Defense under chapter 18 of title 10 i the enforcement of this section and the Secretary c Defense may provide such assistance in accordance wit chapter 18 of title 10, except that the Secretary of Defense may provide such assistance through any Department of Defense personnel.

18 USC 1385

"(e)(1) The Attorney General may also request assistance from the Secretary of Defense under this subsectio in the enforcement of this section. Notwithstanding section 1385 of this title, the Secretary of Defense may, i accordance with other applicable law, provide such assistance to the Attorney General if—

"(A) an emergency situation exists (as jointly determined by the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense in their discretion); and

"(B) the provision of such assistance will not adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States (as determined by the Secretary of Defense in such Secretary's discretion).

"Emergency situation."

"(3) As used in this subsection, the term 'emergency situation' means a circumstance—

"(A) that poses a serious threat to the interests of the United States; and

"(B) in which—

"(i) enforcement of the law would be seriously impaired if the assistance were not provided; and

"(ii) civilian law enforcement personnel are not capable of enforcing the law.

"(4) Assistance under this section may include—

"(A) use of personnel of the Department of Defense to arrest persons and conduct searches and seizures with respect to violations of this section; and

"(B) such other activity as is incidental to the enforcement of this section, or to the protection of persons or property from conduct that violates this section.

"(5) The Secretary of Defense may require reimbursement as a condition of assistance under this section.

"(6) The Attorney General may delegate the Attorney General's function under this subsection only to a Deputy, Associate, or Assistant Attorney General.

Definitions

"(f) As used in this section—

"(1) the term 'nuclear material' means material containing any—

"(A) plutonium with an isotopic concentration not in excess of 80 percent plutonium 238;

"(B) uranium not in the form of ore or ore residue that contains the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature;

"(C) uranium that contains the isotope 233 or 235 or both in such amount that the abundance ratio of the sum of those isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature; or

"(D) uranium 233;

"(2) the term 'international organization' means a public international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288) or a public organization created pursuant to treaty or other agreement under international law as an instrument through or by which two or more foreign governments engage in some aspect of their conduct of international affairs;

"(3) the term 'serious bodily injury' means bodily injury which involves—

"(A) a substantial risk of death;

"(B) extreme physical pain;

"(C) protracted and obvious disfigurement; or

"(D) protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; and

"(4) the term 'bodily injury' means—

"(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;

"(B) physical pain;

"(C) illness;

"(D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or

"(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.".

(b) The table of sections for chapter 39 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 831 through 835 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"831. Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials.".

AMENDMENT TO DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS USED IN DEFINING OFFENSES AGAINST INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS

SEC. 3. Section 1116(b)(5) of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by inserting before the period the following: "or a public organization created pursuan to treaty or other agreement under international law a an instrument through or by which two or more foreig governments engage in some aspect of their conduct o international affairs".

Approved October 18, 1982.

Legislative History—H.R. 5228 (S. 1446);
House Report No. 97–624 (Comm. on the Judiciary).
Congressional Record, Vol. 128 (1982):
  July 19, 20, considered and passed House.
  Sept. 14, considered and passed Senate, amended.
  Sept. 28, House concurred in Senate amendment No. 1; disagreed to certain amendments; concurred in others with amendments.
  Oct. 1, Senate concurred in House amendments and receded from its disagreements.
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 18, No. 42 (1982):
  Oct. 19, Presidential statement.

Statement by President Reagan: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982, October 19, 1982 [1]

I have signed into law H.R. 5228, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Implementation Act of 1982.

This step symbolizes our firm commitment both to preventing the spread of nuclear explosives and to fighting the scourge of terrorism. Nuclear proliferation threatens global security, and preventing it is critically important to the United States. Terrorism threatens the fabric of society by indiscriminately aiming violence at the innocent. The commitment of this administration against these global problems has been, and will continue to be, firm and unshakable.

The step I have taken also symbolizes longstanding objectives of the United States people and Congress. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material [2] and the implementing law drew strong, bipartisan support. Such a bipartisan approach is essential for effective action in this area.

The act implements an international convention negotiated at the initiative of the United States and signed in March 1980. This convention calls for adequate physical protection of nuclear material during international transport and for international cooperation in recovering stolen nuclear material and in dealing with serious offenses involving such material. The Senate approved the Convention by 98–0 in July

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 25, 1982, p. 1352. The act is printed *supra*.

[2] The convention is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1980*, pp. 129–138.

1981, but deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification has awaited enactment of this implementing legislation.

It, too, had overwhelming legislative support. The implementing act amends the Federal Criminal Code to make theft of nuclear material, nuclear extortion, and similar serious offenses involving nuclear material Federal crimes. This fills a gap in U.S. Federal criminal law and establishes jurisdiction over most of these offenses wherever committed, and the offenders are subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution. In emergencies, the Attorney General can obtain assistance from the Department of Defense in enforcing the act.

The United States is a leader in the international campaign to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and the Congress is to be commended for its important contributions in these fields. With respect to the act I have signed, Senators Thurmond, Percy, and Mathias and Congressmen Hughes, Sawyer, Rodino, and McClory, among others, deserve special credit for their efforts. I am pleased that the Congress and the administration are taking this step together.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Petrovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of Nuclear War [Extract], October 21, 1982 [1]

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. . . In an earlier statement the Soviet delegation pointed to the promising prospects which would be opened up by the adoption by all the nuclear powers, following the example of the Soviet Union, of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. [2] The nuclear threat could also be reduced by a strong statement, by the General Assembly in favour of a general and complete prohibition of all nuclear tests, as proposed by the Soviet Union at this session.

Today we would like to draw the attention of the Assembly to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war from yet another angle, from the standpoint of ensuring the safe development of nuclear power. The practical need to raise this question is related to the irreversible process of the rapid development in that field. At this time, in various countries, there are more and more non-military nuclear plants, mainly power plants. Thus, by the end of 1981, in 23 countries of the world, 272 nuclear reactors were already in operation with a capacity of more than 152,000 megawatts, and were producing 9 per cent of all the electric power generated in the world. Moreover, another 239 nuclear power plants were under construction, and when they come into operation the total power of all these nuclear plants will rise to 376,000 megawatts.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.7, pp. 16–25.
[2] *Ante*, Oct. 1.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) information, by 1985 nuclear reactors will produce 17 per cent of the total electric power produced in the world, and by the end of the century, almost 25 per cent.

The further development of nuclear energy is consistent with the interests of human civilization. All the data of contemporary science indicate that this is an inevitable process, and will be even more far-reaching in future, particularly in view of the depletion of the non-renewable reserves of organic fuel in the world; thus the peaceful use of atomic energy will make it possible to satisfy the ever-increasing needs of mankind in the fields of energy, industry, agriculture, scientific research, and so forth.

We can be sure that nuclear energy will be developed in more and more countries, practically on all continents of the earth, and accordingly there will also be an increase in the number of such nuclear installations, atomic power plants, research reactors, plants for the production and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, stores of radioactive materials, and so forth.

At the same time, a deliberate destruction of nuclear power plants, of test reactors and other installations of that kind, may very well produce an enormous quantity of emissions and dispersions of radioactive materials, with lethal consequences for the population. In other words, it can produce the same effect as a nuclear explosion. According to the computations of the experts, the destruction of a single nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1 million kilowatts could be compared to the radioactive contamination attendant upon the explosion of a 1-megaton nuclear bomb in the short term, and the effect would be 10 times as great for a period of one year or more.

Research conducted at Princeton University in the United States, and also the calculations of Swedish experts, have indicated that after a major incident at a power plant of such capacity, there would be a zone of radioactive contamination extending 16 kilometres, in which an estimated 58 per cent of the population would suffer lethal effects, and the total surface contaminated could well extend to 10,000 square kilometres. The long-term effects of radiation would produce cancer in the zone and also various harmful genetic effects among the population. To this it may be added that as a result of a different combination of radioactive isotopes than those which occur during the explosion of a nuclear bomb, the radioactive contamination resulting from the destruction of such plants would be of longer duration than the case of the effects of the explosion of a nuclear weapon, and would last for a period of 50 or 100 years, or longer.

Moreover, it is important to note that an attack on a nuclear plant can have very serious consequences not only for the State which is the victim of such an aggression but also for neighbouring States, since the radioactive particles liberated as a result of this action can very well be scattered far beyond the boundaries of that State. All this indicates that the results of the destruction of nuclear plants designed for peaceful purposes, even by conventional weapons, would be in fact tantamount to an attack with nuclear weapons. In other words, it can be compared to actions which our Organization has already qualified as the worst crime against mankind, but the destruction of nuclear plants designed for peaceful purposes by nuclear weapons would generally have absolutely catastrophic consequences of a global character.

Accordingly, the need to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy is organically linked to the problem of how to prevent a nuclear war. But it is not only the disastrous consequences of the destruction of a peaceful nuclear plant which so closely link this problem with the problem of preventing a nuclear war; ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear war are but two components of the over-all task of eliminating the nuclear threat. The development of international co-operation in the nuclear field and therefore also the more effective development of nuclear energy throughout the world for constructive purposes require the limitation and, in the final analysis, the elimination of the use of nuclear energy for the purpose of producing weapons which, as often pointed out by the General Assembly, are fraught with the greatest dangers for mankind and for the very existence of civilization. Thus, the broader use of nuclear energy pre-supposes the need to increase efforts to eliminate the very possibility of a nuclear war, in other words, to reduce and finally to eliminate nuclear armaments. Such are the dialectics of our nuclear age.

As a first step, which is the easiest to take on the path towards nuclear disarmament, it will be necessary in our view to implement a simultaneous freeze by all States of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and also of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of the various types of nuclear weaponry. Such a freeze would eliminate the possibility of a further growth of nuclear armaments and, in combination with the proposal of the Soviet Union to institute a ban on nuclear weapon tests, it would become a serious obstacle to the qualitative improvement of such weapons. To use a metaphor, such a freeze would be an emergency brake applied to the express rushing towards nuclear destruction, which is how we can describe the nuclear arms race. The freeze would also lead to the strengthening of military and strategic stability and to mutual trust among States.

It is not coincidental, therefore, that the idea of a nuclear freeze has recently received more and more active support, both on the part of numerous States and on the part of broad sections of the international community. This was demonstrated at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament during which many delegations put forward specific ideas on that point. We view with understanding, in particular, the proposals on freezing nuclear weapons which were

READEX FICHE pages tightly bound

put forward at the special session by India, Mexico, Sweden and Ireland. Of course, we fully agree with those supporters of the freeze who feel that this specific, realistic and tangible action should not be regarded as designed to perpetuate the situation which has now arisen, when the arsenals of States are replete with nuclear weapons, or as a means to legalize nuclear weapons. On the contrary, this freeze must become the first and easiest step towards a radical agreement on nuclear disarmament. It is important also to note that an end to the nuclear arms race, combined with the ensuring of a safe development of nuclear energy, would be an additional stimulus to further development of international co-operation for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

These considerations are basic to the proposal of the Soviet Union to increase efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy, in document A/C.1/37/L.7.[3] The new Soviet proposal is prompted by the desire to give a response worthy of mankind, a response to the central question which the nuclear era has put before us: whether atomic energy, which mankind has developed as a result of scientific and technological progress, will help to improve the welfare of peoples and satisfy the increasing needs in the various areas of social and economic development, or whether it will turn the earth into a lifeless, empty planet. There can be only one reply: nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes, only for the good of mankind. This is in fact the appeal contained in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, which was adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 36/100. This is also the aim of the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in whose charter it is particularly emphasized that the Agency will make every effort to develop the use of nuclear energy to preserve peace, health and welfare throughout the world.

This was pointed out by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

> It is the duty of all who cherish the future of life on our planet to make their contribution to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war and in the search for ways to strengthen peace.

This is the basic thrust of the draft resolution on increasing efforts to do away with the threat of nuclear war and to ensure a safe development of nuclear energy, which the Soviet delegation has submitted to the First Committee. We are firmly convinced that its adoption by the General Assembly would open new important prospects for joint action by States to perform the noble task of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction.

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[3] An item entitled "Intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy" was included (as agenda item 139) in the agenda of the 37th session in accordance with a letter dated Oct. 1, 1982, from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. On Nov. 9, the Soviet delegation submitted draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.7 under this agenda item in the First Committee only to withdraw it on Nov. 24, explaining that its provisions were adequately covered in a number of other draft resolutions relating to nuclear disarmament already adopted by the Committee at that session.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Petrovsky) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space [Extract], October 25, 1982 [1]

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The consideration this year of questions of arms limitation and disarmament makes it essential for us to dwell in particular on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There are some very good reasons for this.

On 4 October this year, the whole world observed the twenty-fifth anniversary of the launching of the first artificial earth satellite in history which opened up the space age for mankind. The citizens of the Soviet Union are justifiably proud that "Sputnik" was the product of their hands. Soviet man began the conquest of space in the interests of advancing science and of mankind as a whole, in doing so pursuing peaceful purposes. The next epoch-making event of the space age following the launching of the first Sputnik was the launching of the "Vostok" space craft piloted by the first cosmonaut of all time, Uri Gargarin. That flight demonstrated the fundamental possibility of man's safe presence and work in space. Today, as we sit in this Committee, 167 whole days of fruitful work have taken place in orbit with the valiant Soviet cosmonauts Anatoly Berezovoi and Valentin Lebedev.

The Soviet Union regards the accomplishments of Soviet cosmonauts as being the general accomplishment of the human mind and actively participates in international co-operation in the peaceful conquest of outer space. Working together with Soviet cosmonauts, there have been on Soviet spacecraft daring space explorers from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, Viet Nam, Cuba and France. At the present time a similar flight is being prepared by representatives of India who will be together with Soviet cosmonauts. It is with satisfaction that we recall our co-operation in the peaceful exploration of space with the United States, a manifestation of which was the joint "Soyuz-Apollo" flight. We wish to pay all due tribute to the contribution made to the peaceful conquest of space by the astronauts of the United States who were the first to set foot on the surface of the moon as well as to the scientists and specialists of France, India, Japan, the Chinese People's Republic, Austria and other countries.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.9, pp. 17–27.

One can really say that man is now beginning to move into space. In a quarter of a century, 111 cosmonauts and astronauts have been in space and the total duration of man's presence in a weightless state amounts to eight-and-a-half years. Today space technology is an important instrument for enhancing work in fields such as telecommunications, weather forecasting, the study of earth-based natural resources and the protection of the environment.

From the very first days of this space age, the Soviet Union has persistently proceeded from the notion that space and peace are inseparable and that outer space must serve the progress of mankind and be used for creative and not destructive ends.

As was emphasized by the Chief of the Soviet State, Mr. Brezhnev, the Soviet Union has been and remains a convinced advocate of the development of business-like international co-operation in space. Let the boundless ocean of space be clean and free of weapons of any sort. What we want is the attainment, through joint efforts, of the great and humane goal of prevention of the militarization of space. It is to be noted with satisfaction that, thanks to the joint efforts of many States, certain progress has been made towards this common task of mankind.

On 10 October it had been 15 years since the adoption of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,[2] which, as one of the most important attainments in the sphere of limitation of the arms race, was designed to protect space from the deployment of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and, together with the 1963 Moscow Treaty,[3] from nuclear-weapon testing.

If we add to that the provisions of the 1977 Convention relating to this matter—the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques[4]—as well as the Soviet-American SALT Agreements of 1972 to 1979, the conclusion of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, and the Additional Protocol thereto,[5] it is no exaggeration to say that at the present time space is, in many instances, a symbol of the attainment of the human intelligence, not only in the scientific and technological sphere, but also in the political sphere.

Seeking to consolidate and develop this positive trend, the Soviet Union, as is well known, advocated the consideration by the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly of an initiative the essence of which was to prevent the further militarization of space and to preclude the possibility of its being turned into an arena for the arms race, an additional source of tension in relations among States.

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[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38–43.

[3] *Ibid., 1963*, pp. 291–293.

[4] *Ibid., 1977*, pp. 322–326.

[5] The ABM Treaty and its Additional Protocol may be found *ibid., 1972*, pp. 197–201 and *ibid., 1974*, pp. 229–231, respectively. The 1979 SALT agreements may be found *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

The Soviet Union has proposed the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The purposes and content of that proposal have been stated in detail in the letter of 10 [*11*] August 1981 from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/36/192) and in the annexed draft treaty,[6] as well as in statements of Soviet representatives at the last regular and twelfth special sessions of the General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament and in the recent Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held in Vienna.

One need not be a prophet to assert that an arms race, if it were to get into orbit, would accelerate to astronomic levels, and the associated military threat would asume even more global dimensions, not to mention the truly astronomic amounts of money that would be diverted in that case from the terrestrial needs of peoples.

As is well known, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to hold practical negotiations on the elaboration of urgent measures to prevent the spread of the arms race to space, and an appropriate item was included on the agenda of the Committee. However, it has proved impossible to translate the will of the majority into specific acts. We agree with the opinion of the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, to the effect that the refusal to set up a working group on this question in the Committee on Disarmament is a blatant example of obstruction of efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament.

What lies behind the sabotaging of attempts to draft measures for the prevention of an arms race in space? One can easily imagine what those reasons are, and a hint is provided by the stepped-up activities of the United States aimed at the establishment of means of waging war in and from space, which involves the danger of turning space into another arena for the arms race.

As the American press itself has pointed out, despite the spirit of the 1967 Treaty, which was designed to preclude an arms race in space, the United States has in the recent past been working extensively to militarize space in keeping with special directives of the present Administration. During the past fiscal year, more money has been appropriated in the American budget for the Pentagon space programme—$6.4 billion—than the $5.5 billion that has gone to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In addition, according to the assessment of the situation offered by David Ritchie, author of *Space War*, a book recently published in the United States, the Pentagon is now "the boss" of NASA because it controls the shuttle, which constitutes the main purpose for NASA's existence.

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[6] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 333–336.

In Washington, honours are lavished on the father of the American hydrogen bomb, Mr. Teller, who quite openly proposes that weapons based on the use of nuclear energy be launched into space, in disregard of obligations assumed by the United States under international agreements. In the next five years, the United States intends to increase its military space budget by 10 per cent per annum.

The New York Times has quoted the utterances of Pentagon generals who have said that they view space as a proper place for the deployment of weapons and as a potential theatre for military operations. Indeed, projects are under way for the establishment and deployment of missile and laser weapons in space, and intensive work is being done to set up means of destroying space objects. Pentagon plans, agreed upon in keeping with deadlines in order to step up the production of strategic offensive weapons and the deployment of anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, are designed to complete the creation, in the 1980s, of a so-called first-strike potential.

Washington's military thrust into space is obviously intended to achieve military supremacy and to implement its position-of-strength policy on earth. As *The New York Times* states, there is a link between military space systems and the preparation, in the form of the Rapid Deployment Force, of an instrument of military interference in the affairs of various parts of the world.

As a pretext for building up military muscle in outer space, the representatives of the military frequently talk about the existence of some sort of Soviet military threat in outer space. But the following question arises: why was it the United States which broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite systems, and why is it avoiding the resumption of such negotiations? Why did it not seize upon the idea of preventing an arms race in outer space as a way of eliminating the notorious "Soviet threat"? The answer is clear: the "Soviet military threat" in outer space is just as much a malicious fabrication as the "Soviet military threat" on earth. But the threat posed to the militarists by the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals is a very real one.

The Soviet draft treaty provides that States parties will undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or to station such weapons in outer space by any other means, including reusable manned space vehicles.

The conclusion of such a treaty would place obstacles in the way of using outer space as a theatre for military operations.

In the draft treaty, States parties would undertake not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal function of, or change the flight trajectory of, space objects of other States parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with the purposes of the treaty.

The draft treaty provides also for the appropriate system of verification that would be needed, in accordance with the current technology and with generally recognized practices.

In submitting its draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, the Soviet Union is in no way claiming any monopoly in the search for solutions to this problem. As we all know, several States have made proposals regarding the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. As a matter of principle we do not object to the consideration of their proposals as well; it will already have been noted that our draft treaty embodies such a prohibition. But to reduce this whole question to a matter of anti-satellite systems would be to restrict the nature of the task in an artificial manner.

The substance of the problem is the prevention of the arms race in outer space as a whole, and the question of anti-satellite systems can be considered within the context of the adoption of effective measures to resolve that problem.

My delegation proposes that we approach this goal from all directions. The Soviet delegation considers it essential to spur on the work in the Committee on Disarmament on the drafting of an international agreement on the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space. At the same time, I am empowered to confirm the Soviet Union's readiness to resume negotiations with the United States on anti-satellite systems. Thus, it is now for the United States side to respond.

Many States have advocated preventing an arms race in outer space. In the work of our Committee this year alone, the representatives of Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Mexico, Yugoslavia, India, Austria, Brazil, and a large number of other countries have spoken along those lines. The representative of Argentina, speaking recently in this Committee, clearly expressed a general concern, in wondering whether mankind was to be doomed to an arms race in outer space as well: it is important to see quite clearly that there is no malign fate at work here, merely an absence on the part of some easily identified States of the political will to renounce militaristic programmes in outer space.

The Soviet delegation calls upon this Committee and the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly to oppose this dangerous trend and, by expressing a clear determination, to prevent space from being used as an arena of confrontation in the arms race. For its part, the Soviet Union is absolutely determined to do its utmost to prevent that happening.

Address by the Department of State Counselor (Buckley): Nuclear Policy, October 27, 1982[1]

I want to talk to you today about nuclear arms and the Administration's policy for reducing the risks of nuclear war. It is a subject replete with paradox. Nuclear war is too gruesome to contemplate or to ignore. The intricacies of the nuclear balance require great expertise to master; and yet we don't always trust the experts. No subject places so great a demand on calm, rational thought; but few subjects so stir our emotions.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 428. The address was given before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco.

Let me begin with two simple but often overlooked truths: First, we all want peace. Yet in the intensity of the current debate over nuclear policy, it sounds at times as if some groups believe they hold a monopoly on the abhorrence of nuclear war. Let there be no such confusion here. We are all united in our desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust. President Reagan spoke for all Americans when he said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. So to those who protest against nuclear war, I can only say, I'm with you . . . No one feels more than I the need for peace."

A second simple but often overlooked truth is that despite the outbreak of more than 100 military conflicts in the 37 years that have elapsed since World War II, the general peace has been preserved.

The policy that has maintained the general peace for so long is known as deterrence. It is not a Democratic or Republican policy; it has been American policy in every administration since the Second World War. The basic premise of deterrence is simple: No matter how strong our enemies become, or how successful a surprise attack they may launch, enough of our nuclear forces must survive to inflict such terrible losses that no one could ever benefit from attacking us.

Deterrence—the prevention of war by making the cost of aggression unacceptably high—is the only strategy that makes sense in the nuclear age. But while its premise is simple enough, it is not always so easy to determine whether we are, in fact, strong enough to successfully deter any attack. Because enough of our forces must survive an attack to inflict unacceptable costs on our enemies, the sufficiency of our strength depends in part on how strong our adversaries become; and, because the stakes are so great, there must never be any room for doubt.

Unfortunately, over the last decade the strength of our deterrent has steadily eroded. The balance that has kept the peace for over 35 years is today endangered.

The Soviet Challenge

Our current danger—mankind's current danger—stems from two long-term trends: one well known, one more obscure. It is well known that over the last 20 years the Soviets have engaged in the greatest arms buildup the world has ever seen. It is less frequently appreciated that during most of this period the United States chose not to keep pace. As the Soviets raced forward, we sat on our hands. As a result, while over three-quarters of Soviet strategic forces were built within the last 5 years, over three-quarters of ours are 15 years old or older.

•Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed three new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19—capable of a first strike. The most destructive of these weapons carries up to three times the number of warheads as our most powerful missile. All of them pose a major threat to our land-based ICBMs. Yet, it will be 4 years before we begin deployment of the MX, our first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

•Since 1972, the U.S.S.R. has added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine earlier this year marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build a single new ballistic-missile submarine.

•Since 1975, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern bombers and are continuing to build them at a rate of more than 2 a month. By contrast, the newest U.S. heavy bomber was built more than 20 years ago. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has built a massive air defense system, while the United States has no effective defense against Soviet bombers.

As a result of their massive buildup, the Soviets now surpass the United States in most significant measures used to judge nuclear weapons, including total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, and total destructive potential. For example, the Soviets possess 40% more delivery systems than we and surpass us in missile throw-weight, an important measure of their nuclear punch, by a factor of over 2½ to 1. Their most advanced weapons have the capacity to destroy our land-based missiles and command, control, and communications systems, while their own hardened installations remain relatively immune to U.S. counterattack.

Because for the first 25 years of the nuclear era America had the mightiest arsenal in the world, it is tempting to disbelieve the awesome change the last decade has witnessed. It is tempting to assume our technical advantages counterbalance Soviet advances. It is tempting to disbelieve claims that our land-based missiles and bombers are increasingly vulnerable to Soviet attack. Yet these are facts accepted even by groups that oppose this Administration's policies.

The massive Soviet buildup in strategic forces, coupled with a similar buildup in their conventional forces, is significant in two major ways. First, to the degree that it diminishes the credibility of our deterrent, it increases the danger that the Soviets may see force as an attractive option. But just as importantly, the Soviet increases allow them to exercise leverage over countries which once felt secure because of the assumed reliability of the American nuclear umbrella.

Thus the prices we pay for ignoring a 20-year surge in Soviet strength are these: The nuclear balance has shifted greatly; our forces are less secure; and Soviet influence in the world has grown. These are facts undisputed by serious analysts. Where opinions—and policies—differ is in our assessment of what we must do about these facts.

The Response

President Reagan's response to the challenge of the Soviet buildup has been twofold. One track of that response has been a vigorous commitment to reducing strategic arms; the other, to launching an overdue modernization of our strategic forces to protect and strengthen our ability to deter attack.

In a bold stroke to open the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva, the President proposed, as an initial step, a one-third reduction in strategic missile warheads together with reductions in the numbers of missiles per side to almost half the current U.S. levels, such reductions to be verifiable. [2]

I emphasize verification because it is essential to the goal of long-term stability. Trust, even in the best of situations, is not an adequate safeguard where the safety of the world is concerned.

But the critical reason why we cannot rely on trust is that the Soviets so constantly prove themselves unworthy of trust. We have conclusive proof that the Soviets are currently violating international arms control agreements by using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and supplying biochemical weapons for use in Southeast Asia. Ask an Afghan if Soviet agreements on arms control can be trusted.

In March, the Soviets announced a temporary unilateral ban on further deployment of intermediate-range missiles [3]—a not so grand gesture considering that the Soviets have raced to an advantage of over 600 missiles to none. Even so, we have conclusive evidence that the Soviets promptly violated even this announcement.

In other areas the Soviets have proven themselves no less unreliable. Soviet violation of the Helsinki accords are only the most visible recent instances of Soviet disregard for international accords.

The U.S. START proposal points the way to a more stable strategic balance at equal and reduced levels of strategic forces. Its terms would be verifiable and fair and its limits in the mutual interest of both East and West. If the Soviets are indeed serious about seeking substantial reduction in forces, there is much that they can work with here.

Moreover, an agreement along the lines of the U.S. proposal would be an historic first. No arms control agreement to date—not SALT I [4] [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], not SALT II— [5] has ever led to such fundamental cutbacks in existing strategic forces. An agreement such as that envisaged by the START proposals would be the first. Despite the necessarily cautious pace of the initial START negotiations, they offer the prospect for dramatic and fundamental progress.

But, as sensible as the U.S. arms proposals are, there will be little progress in the negotiations unless the Soviets are convinced that the United States has the will to restore and then maintain the nuclear balance. What is essential to remember, however, is that in the past, the Soviets have made concessions in arms control negotiations only when the United States threatened to redress imbalances.

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[2] *Ante*, May 9.

[3] *Ante*, Mar. 16.

[4] The SALT I agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff. Brackets in source text.

[5] *Ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

- The Soviets agreed to negotiate an antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty only when the U.S. Senate approved an ABM system.
- Having unilaterally introduced new and revolutionary intermediate-range nuclear weapons into the European nuclear balance, the Soviets agreed to negotiate limits on such missiles only when it was made clear that NATO would deploy similar missiles.
- In 1977 the Soviets rejected out-of-hand U.S. proposals for deep reductions in nuclear forces. Only now, after the United States had shown its determination to modernize its forces, have the Soviets begun to take arms reductions seriously.

The President's proposal to modernize our forces in response to the massive Soviet buildup will maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent in years to come. Only the production of the MX—our first new type of intercontinental missile in 16 years—and the proposed Trident II-launched D-5 missile will give us survivable forces capable of destroying hardened military targets. Only the Tridents—our first new nuclear submarines in 15 years—will insure the continued viability of our sea-based forces. Only the B-1 and Stealth bombers—our first new models in over 20 years—will protect our ability to penetrate Soviet air space into the future. Only with these new forces can we revitalize the balance that has maintained the peace for three decades.

Thus do the two tracks of President Reagan's response to the massive Soviet arms buildup reinforce one another. The President's commitment to modernize and strengthen U.S. nuclear forces is essential to the preservation of deterrence. At the same time, that commitment greatly enhances our prospects for achieving Soviet agreement to major reductions in our respective nuclear inventories.

Yet these twin objectives, which all Americans share, would be placed in jeopardy by a nuclear freeze of the kind now being urged as an alternative to the Administration's policies. Freeze proponents argue that it is safe for both the United States and the Soviets to "stop where they are," freeze all testing, production, and deployment of missiles and then proceed to negotiate reductions. While there are many versions of freeze proposals, all are based on three assumptions:

- First, they assume that the credibility of our deterrent would not be endangered by a freeze;
- Second, they assume that the Soviets are eager to reduce the level of their nuclear arms but have been prevented from making such reductions because of the arms race; and
- Third, they assume that changes in nuclear forces make the balance less stable and more destructive.

If any one of these assumptions were questionable, a nuclear freeze would prove not only unwise but dangerous. In fact, all three assumptions are not only questionable, they are wrong.

Credibility of U.S. Deterrent. The first assumption is that the credibility of our deterrent would not be endangered by a freeze. Freeze proponents acknowledge the Soviets' massive buildup over the last decade but argue that even sizeable inequalities are irrelevant given the vast destructive power at our disposal. If we simply total all of our missiles, this is probably true. But the key to deterrence is the ability of our forces to survive a surprise attack in sufficient numbers to inflict unacceptable losses on the Soviets and the plausible will to do so. Here, the picture becomes more murky.

For over three decades our strategy of deterrence has been based on a defensive triad of intercontinental missiles, bombers, and nuclear submarines. In the past, this triad has proven stable because a Soviet buildup or technological breakthrough that would defeat one element would still leave two able to carry out their missions. A freeze, however, would put the future of our triad in grave doubt.

Due to just such a technological breakthrough in missile accuracy in combination with the huge size of Soviet warheads, the first leg of our triad—intercontinental missiles—is already in jeopardy. The Soviets can today destroy as much as 90% of our ICBMs.

The second leg, bombers, may not fare much better. As I've noted, our intercontinental bombers are already over 20 years old and rapidly reaching the point where they must be retired. In addition, the Soviets have invested huge sums in erecting air defenses.

Fortunately, the third leg of our triad—our submarine fleet—still remains relatively safe. But, with the exception of our two new Trident submarines, our current fleet of missile-launching submarines was built in the mid-1960s and will need to be replaced. If the Soviets should achieve the breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare on which they are concentrating so great an effort, our nuclear deterrent would be fragile indeed.

Thus a freeze would leave us with one leg of our triad greatly vulnerable, one increasingly so, and our overall forces faced with dangerous deterioration. In short, we cannot assume that freezing current forces will be safe even into the near future.

Soviet Motivations. The second assumption critical to freeze proposals concerns Soviet motivations. The freeze assumes that only the arms race has forced the Soviets to build as many missiles as they have; therefore, once the arms race ends, the Soviets will be eager to reduce their forces. Unfortunately, Soviet deeds, as opposed to Soviet words, show that the freeze proponents are wrong in their assessment.

First, the Soviets' recent buildup is vastly greater than what would be needed either for a policy of deterrence or to "keep up" with American efforts. We voluntarily froze the number of our delivery systems in the mid-1960s. By 1972 the Soviets had achieved an equal number, except that theirs were substantially more powerful. Today, as a result of cutbacks in ours and increases in theirs, their delivery systems exceed ours by about 40%. They are not a reluctant party to the current arms race; they are its cause.

Second, the character of the Soviet arms buildup belies a passive role. The Soviets have concentrated on developing land-based missiles having a first-strike capability and, therefore, the type of missile most likely to intimidate. This is not the effort of a reluctant nation forced to build arms for defense but of a nation which seeks the political benefits of intimidating force.

Third, if the Soviets are only building arms to counter our buildup, then why did the Soviets introduce intermediate-range nuclear missiles into Europe? NATO has no intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Yet the Soviets have built 600 of them, most of which are now deployed and targeted against West European capitals. The Soviets did not reluctantly continue an arms race in Western Europe. They started one where there had been none. They did so to garner the benefits of intimidation.

The Soviets are not likely to relinquish the advantages they have worked so hard to achieve if we agree to a freeze. Far from speeding reductions, as a practical matter a freeze would preclude them.

Impact of Technological Improvements. The third assumption that underlies the freeze is that technological improvements will increase both the quantity and megatonnage of our nuclear forces, thus feeding visions of a reckless, runaway spiraling of destructive power. Thus advocates of the freeze would stop all further improvements in our weapons and delivery systems. But in the case of the United States, new technology has actually resulted in a net decrease in the destructive power of our strategic forces. In the past 10 years, technological advances have allowed us to reduce our total megatonnage by almost 30% and by roughly 60% since the peak levels of the early 1960s; reductions, incidentally, a freeze 10 years ago would have made impossible.

Other advances that we contemplate would make weapons safer and less vulnerable to attack or to unauthorized or accidental use. The freeze movement, for example, would have us forgo more survivable land-based missiles, the deployment of less vulnerable submarines, and other measures designed to insure their survival and hence the credibility of deterrence.

By condemning all technological advances, in short, the freeze movement throws out the baby with the bathwater.

Conclusion

In sum, a freeze only makes sense if it will preserve our security and quickly lead to significant reductions in arms. This assumes that our deterrent would not be endangered by the freeze, that the Soviets would be willing to reduce their forces, and that further improvements in weaponry would make the peace less stable. These assumptions are not only questionable but false—particularly as it would remove incentives for serious Soviet participation in arms reductions talks. As a result, a freeze would not only prove unwise, it could prove disastrous.

In 1934, England, paralyzed by the prospective horror of war, refused to maintain its defenses. Winston Churchill, then merely a Member of Parliament, warned his country of the danger posed by a growing Nazi Germany in these words:

> Everyone would be glad to see the burden of armaments reduced in every country. But history shows on many a page that armaments are not necessarily a cause of war and that the want of them is no guarantee of peace. . . . This truth may be unfashionable, unpalatable, unpopular. But it is the truth . . . the only choice open is the old grim choice our forebears had to face, namely, whether we shall submit to the will of a stronger nation or whether we shall prepare to defend our rights, our liberties and indeed our lives. [6]

President Reagan's twin policies of force modernization and arms reduction will leave us a secure and stable deterrent at greatly reduced levels and will work to prevent war by accident. Deterrence is a proven, effective policy. It is our safest and wisest course. It is also our boldest.

Statement by ACDA Director Rostow to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly [Extract], October 27, 1982 [1]

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In his speech of 18 November 1981 [2] President Reagan outlined our approach to four important items on the arms-control agenda: the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear weapons known as INF, and those on strategic nuclear arms reductions, known as START; the negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions of conventional forces in Europe, generally called the MBFR talks; and the continuing process of discussion and negotiation stemming from the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. [3] In addition, the United States has revised and revitalized its unilateral and multilateral programmes for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, eliminating the menace of chemical weapons, studying the feasibility of imposing further limits on the military use of outer space and developing new and more effective measures to assure confidence and minimize the risks of war by miscalculation.

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[6] Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897–1963,* vol. V, "1928–1935" (New York: Chelsea House Publishers in association with R. R. Bowker Company, 1974), p. 5435.

[1] A/C.1/37/PV.13, pp. 14–35.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 570–578.

[3] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found *Ibid., 1975,* pp. 304–308, the complete text in *Department of State Bulletin,* Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

I shall now comment briefly on each of these aspects of the arms control programme of the United States.

The place to begin, manifestly, is with the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the reduction of nuclear arms through verifiable agreements which strengthen security and help to make stability possible. The outcome of these negotiations will affect the prospects for many other arms control efforts and, indeed, the prospects for peace itself. Success in the effort to curb and confine the nuclear weapon is indispensable to the possibility of peace. Under present circumstances, nuclear arms agreements must be shaped by the principle that nuclear arsenals can be justified only if they are confined to the function of deterring aggression. To put the proposition another way, useful and constructive nuclear arms agreements presuppose that the Soviet Union commit itself to obey the rules of world public order embodied in the Charter.

It is the view of the United States Government that achieving true nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the foundation of the principle I have just stated is the most important challenge before us in the field of arms control. We must reduce our dependence on these dangerous weapons. We must seek a more stable balance at lower levels of armament. The present situation is unacceptable to us.

How did the present situation arise? The answer is as regrettable as it is simple. It arose as a result of the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the arms build-up on which it is based—an unprecedented increase of both conventional and nuclear military forces sustained over a period of more than 25 years. During that period, the Soviet Union claimed immunity from the Charter rules against aggression, and the rest of the world tacitly accepted its claim. That course is no longer tolerable. The process of Soviet expansion and the menace of the Soviet Union's growing military power have come to threaten the foundation of the State system. That system cannot continue to accept the Soviet practice of aggression through the use of its own forces and those of its proxies and satellites, whether organized as armies, guerrillas, armed bands or terrorists, backed by the implicit threat of its growing nuclear forces. During the 1970s, a period when the United States nuclear arsenal was held relatively stable, the Soviet Union expanded both its intermediate-range and intercontinental nuclear forces far beyond any conceivable requirements of deterrence and defence.

The size, scale and structure of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, its steady growth, and, above all, its emphasis on intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles are the source of the nuclear anxiety which haunts the world. Ground-based ballistic missiles are swifter, more accurate and more destructive than other nuclear weapons, and far less vulnerable to defences. The Soviet advantage in this category of nuclear weapons creates the potentiality for a disarming first strike. And the consciousness of that possibility is generating currents of fear which have great political importance throughout the world.

The purpose of the American nuclear arsenal is to deter aggression against the supreme interests of the United States. The implacable growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal suggests that the Soviet Union looks upon nuclear weapons as instruments of intimidation and coercion, precisely because such weapons, if they are sufficiently numerous, create the capacity to execute a pre-emptive first strike. This is why the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles is politically destabilizing, and this is why the first objective of the United States in the field of nuclear arms policy is to eliminate this factor of instability in world politics, preferably by reasonable INF and START agreements, but by force-modernization if necessary.

The START and INF negotiations must be viewed together, because the weapons with which they deal are closely related. Intercontinental weapons can, after all, be fired from the Soviet Union not only against New York or Washington, but against targets in Europe, Japan or other places vital to the security of the United States and its allies as well.

The INF talks have now been going on for 11 months. They have been conducted in a businesslike and professional atmosphere. Much progress has been achieved by the two delegations in sorting out what is important to each side, and illuminating the way to possible solutions. It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept an agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence.

In the INF talks, the United States has proposed the complete elimination of an important class of nuclear weapons on both sides; the Soviet Union, in response, urges the elimination only of the United States weapons of comparable military significance. Under the Soviet proposal, the Soviet Union would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for its mobile SS-20 systems in the European part of the Soviet Union and an unlimited number in the Far Eastern portion of that country, while the United States would be forbidden to deploy any equivalent systems in the European area. The Soviet Union also proposes a moratorium for the duration of the negotiations—a feature of its plan designed to preserve the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles and to remove any Soviet incentive for agreeing to serious reductions in the most destabilizing class of weapons.

The Soviet Union defends its proposal by contending that there is in fact a balance at the moment in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in and near Europe at least, and that the deployments planned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would disturb that balance. The Soviet negotiators achieve this remarkable feat of arithmetic by counting all British and French nuclear weapons with the American forces, treating American bombers, submarine-launched missiles and cruise missiles as equivalent to the SS-20, counting all American weapons as relevant, including American dual-purpose aircraft located in the United States, and excluding many categories in the Soviet arsenal.

The Soviet Union has so far refused to negotiate about its mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Far East; the United States insists that the negotiations must deal with all such Soviet and American weapons, wherever they are located. After all, the world is round, and nothing can be gained by exporting a security problem from Europe to Asia.

On 21 October 1982, President Brezhnev commented, according to TASS, that the INF talks were making "difficult progress", and that

> these difficulties are rooted in the unwillingness of the United States to reach agreement . . . on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.[4]

The United States notes with interest President Brezhnev's statement that the INF talks are making progress. As I remarked a few moments ago, the United States agrees with President Brezhnev's assessment, in the sense that the negotiating process is clarifying the concepts used by both sides, and revealing patterns of possible congruence in their positions. Furthermore, we welcome the fact that both sides accept the principle of equality as the basis for a fair agreement.

But we cannot agree with President Brezhnev that the present position of the Soviet Union in the INF talks is one based on the principle of equality.

The American concept of equality is defined with precision: zero on both sides for the most destabilizing intermediate-range ground-based ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union, however, uses at least four quite different definitions of equality simultaneously: equal reductions on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States; an equal level of force, measured in packages of weapons of different destructive capacities, sometimes between the Soviet Union and the United States, sometimes between the Soviet Union and NATO as a whole. Most often, the Soviet Union uses the term "equal security" to mean that the world must acknowledge its claim of a right to possess a nuclear arsenal equal to the sum of all the other nuclear arsenals in the world. This is a claim for hegemony, not equality.

The nuclear arsenals of Great Britain, France and China exist to protect the ultimate sovereignty of those nations. Those weapons are not under American control. These arsenals are entirely defensive in character; given their size, they could not be used for any conceivable act of aggression against the Soviet Union. There is no basis therefore for the claim that such arsenals have any role in bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Sometimes representatives of the Soviet Union say that the mutual security of the

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[4] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIV, No. 42 (Nov. 17, 1982), p. 23.

Soviet Union and the United States is indivisible. This is a suggestive formulation of the problem defining equality. Thus far, at any rate, it turns out to be as elusive as the others.

The United States believes that achieving equality between the Soviet Union and the United States on the basis of the principle of deterrence, with primary but not exclusive emphasis on equality in the most destabilizing categories of weapons, would in itself be a major political event and a step of genuine importance in the quest for peace.

The Soviet-United States talks on intercontinental nuclear weapons are of course at an earlier stage than the INF talks. Their atmosphere is also serious and businesslike. The United States position was outlined in President Reagan's speech at Eureka College on 9 May 1982.[5] Its essential idea is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force—ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Coupled with the elimination of the existing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as proposed in the INF talks, such a result would enable the United States to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiations, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. President Reagan said:

> The focus of our efforts will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry and their overall destructive potential.

While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration, and the United States will negotiate in good faith on any topic the Soviet Union wishes to raise, the United States proposes that the first topic to be considered in the negotiations should be the reduction of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half these warheads would be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw weight, a reliable measure of the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

In a second phase closely linked to the first we shall seek equal ceilings on other elements of the United States and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw weight at less than current United States levels.

In both START and INF the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensable. For those provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification we shall be proposing co-operative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will be prepared where necessary to consider co-operative measures going beyond national technical means. That is an encouraging sign. Without satisfactory verification provisions, it would be impossible to achieve meaningful agreements.

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[5] *Ante.*

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair on the grounds that they call for unequal reduction—indeed, that they call for unilateral Soviet disarmament. That is not the case. Each side now has approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the United States proposal, each side would have to reduce the number to no more than 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 could be on ICBMs. It is true that the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBMs to comply with the sub-limit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability.

The Soviet position in START, as Soviet spokesmen have made clear in public statements, consists of two parts: a proposal for a moratorium and a series of reductions and restrictions on modernization which would result in preserving the present Soviet advantage in heavy, accurate, swift and extremely destructive ground-based missiles. The Soviet Union seems to treat stability as a quantitative, not a qualitative, problem and its proposal offers no incentive to move away from destabilizing systems, nor would it lead to substantial reductions in the key indicators of destructive potential. If the INF and START talks are successful, the huge Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles will be eliminated. In addition, the achievement of success in these two negotiations would eliminate the menacing Soviet lead in throw weight, which is equally important. If the Soviet Union accepts nuclear-arms-control agreements based on the principle of deterrence only, which is at the heart of our negotiating position, a Soviet first strike would be impossible. Then—but only then—nuclear tension would be diminished.

In President Reagan's statement on arms control on 18 November 1981 he spoke of the importance which we attach to progress in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe—the so-called MBFR negotiations. As all of the Committee members are aware, these negotiations that have been under way for almost a decade, have been bogged down primarily as a result of Soviet intransigence over acknowledging exactly how many Warsaw Pact forces there are in the area of reductions to be covered by the treaty. The Soviet view applies the principle of *caveat emptor* with a vengence. Meaningful progress towards the established goal of reductions to equal levels is hardly possible if we cannot agree on the number of forces now deployed on each side—the basis needed to negotiate the reductions. Unless both sides are satisfied about the adequacy of the data used in the negotiations, it is hard to imagine how an atmosphere of trust can be expected to develop.

The West has taken a new initiative in moving the MBFR negotiations forward. In July the West formally submitted a draft MBFR treaty embodying a new, comprehensive proposal designed to give renewed momentum to the negotiations. The new proposal highlights the primary Western objective in these negotiations, which is the lowering of tensions of central Europe through a reduction in conventional forces and the establishment of parity at lower force levels in the form of common collective ceilings on the military manpower of each side. This proposal, submitted as a draft treaty, goes far to meet Eastern concerns and underscores Western seriousness and willingness to bring about militarily significant reductions in central Europe. We can only hope that the Soviet Union and its allies will understand the significance of the Western draft treaty and respond in a positive way.

At this point let me add a brief note about the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Madrid meetings, since the CSCE process is decidedly relevant to the over-all climate for arms control efforts. Like the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act recognizes that basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are an essential element in the over-all equation that defines security and co-operation between States. The United States is committed to the Helsinki Final Act and to the CSCE process in its entirety. As part of this commitment, we seek balanced and substantive improvements both in the implementation of previously-made agreements and in strengthening the provisions of those agreements. That was our intent when the Madrid meeting first convened two years ago and that will be our intent when it resumes on 9 November. Unfortunately, however, events in Poland and the brutal intensification of repression in the Soviet Union clearly indicate that other States do not share our commitment to the integrity of the process begun at Helsinki. This will make progress at Madrid extremely difficult.

Another important arms control challenge facing the international community is the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union have assumed special responsibilities to work together in order to limit and reduce nuclear arms. The United States has been trying to carry out that responsibility through a long series of nuclear-arms-control proposals, starting in 1946. It will continue to do so. But the problem of non-proliferation is not merely one of negotiating nuclear-arms-control agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. The issue runs deeper. Every State, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, has the same interest in preventing nuclear proliferation. A world of numerous and dispersed nuclear-weapons States would be unstable and unpredictable. As Secretary Shultz said to the General Assembly a month ago:

> The threat of nuclear proliferation extends to every region in the world and demands the attention and energy of every government. *(A/37/PV.11, p. 97)*[6]

International co-operation in non-proliferation is essential if we are to confront this major threat to international peace.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty[7] are the most universally accepted instruments of non-proliferation policy and deserve continued broad support. They alone cannot guarantee the world against nuclear proliferation; but they are indispensable weapons in the effort.

Like a number of other international institutions, the IAEA has recently been made the victim of a damaging attack. Some member States have attempted to use the Agency as a forum for political warfare. The procedures used in these deplorable episodes are contrary to the Charter and the statutes of each of the agencies involved. The United States and a number of other nations are resolved to resist this trend as a major threat to the efficacy of our international institutions. All that has been achieved in nearly 40 years of devoted effort is imperilled by such shortsighted and illegal behaviour. The United States calls on all Members of the United Nations to join in protecting—and strengthening—these invaluable international resources, which are and must remain universal in their reach.

The United States continues its efforts to seek wider acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and earlier this month, in Washington, we were pleased to welcome Uganda into the ranks of parties to the Treaty, the 119th country to recognize it as an important element of international security.

The United States continues to believe that nuclear-weapon-free zones can, under appropriate conditions, enhance regional security. The Treaty of Tlatelolco[8] has contributed significantly to the prospects for long-term security in Latin America and we remain hopeful that progress can be made towards its full entry into force throughout the region. We believe that nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements could contribute to the security and peace of other regions as well. We commend efforts towards this end and would urge the relevant countries to explore more actively the possibilities for progress in this area.

I should like to turn now to a subject to which my Government attaches major importance: the matter of chemical weapons, their use, and efforts to ban them. When I spoke to this Committee last year[9] I underlined the deep and continuing concern of my Government over the use of chemical warfare in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. Since that time, even more compelling evidence of this activity has come to light. The United States brought this new evidence to the attention of the United Nations in March of this year, in the form of a report which compiled all of the evidence we had before us into a single document.[10] The conclusions contained in that report are unassailable: that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under the direct supervision of Soviet personnel, have used lethal chemical weapons, including prohibited toxins, since 1976 at least, and that Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used a variety of lethal and non-lethal chemical agents since the December 1979 invasion.

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[6] *Ante*, Sept. 30.

[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[8] *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

[9] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 482–491.

Since the release of that report, others have conducted their own investigations and have come independently to similar conclusions. The Canadian Government, for example, recently submitted a report to the United Nations which cited further evidence of the use of such lethal chemical substances in South-East Asia. I regret to say that such use continues. My own Government has obtained further significant evidence of such use, which we shall shortly submit to the United Nations.[11] Finally, there is the United Nations' own group of experts, whose report on this subject we expect before the end of this Assembly session.[12] Their task is not an easy one. Therefore, as President Reagan stressed this summer in his address to the second special session on disarmament, we urge the Governments of the Soviet Union, Laos and Viet Nam to grant full and free access to the areas in which chemical attacks have been reported. Ending the use of these horrible weapons should be given the highest priority by the international community. Violations of existing legal constraints have a negative impact on the entire arms control atmosphere.

It is against this backdrop that efforts have continued in the Committee on Disarmament to develop a draft convention which would ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Is it any wonder that the United States, along with many other delegations, insists that such a convention should contain effective verification provisions? Is it any wonder that the Committee is devoting so much careful consideration to this critical aspect of a convention? We only wish that it had been possible to make more progress on the matter this year.

Many members of this Committee will no doubt recall that in June, when Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament, he unveiled a new Soviet proposal on chemical weapons, in the form of "basic provisions" for a draft convention.[13] Part of that draft convention addressed the issue of verification in terms which suggested that the Soviet Union might now be prepared to accept systematic international on-site inspection in certain circumstances. This appeared to be an interesting and constructive step. Most of us believe that systematic international on-site inspection, which cannot be vetoed, is essential to the verification of a ban on chemical weapons; but when our delegation to the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, together with many others, sought to obtain elaboration from the Soviet delegation about its own proposal we were met with equivocation and evasion. We hope and expect that a more constructive attitude will prevail at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

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[10] *Ante*, Mar. 22.

[11] See the letter from Shultz, *infra*, and the report, *post*, November.

[12] *Post*, Nov. 26.

[13] *Ante*, June 16.

Mention of the Committee on Disarmament leads me to discuss another issue, important to all of us, which has preoccupied the Committee for many years: the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The United States does not believe that in the present circumstances a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would reduce the threat of nuclear war, because such a ban could not reduce the threat implicit in the existing stockpiles. Furthermore, the verification of a comprehensive test ban would remain a serious problem. As yet we see no definitive solution. However, I repeat here what I said earlier in the year to the Committee on Disarmament,[14] that a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term United States arms-control objective. With that objective in mind we proposed that the verification aspects of the nuclear-test ban problem be discussed in a working group of the Committee on Disarmament, a proposal which ultimately won the approval of the Committee.

What happened next is instructive. The Soviet Union and its allies, having agreed to the mandate for the Working Group, sought to obstruct effective work in the Group. Then it put forward the proposition that the Working Group had fulfilled its mandate.

In his speech before the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Gromyko called for the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and in the meantime proposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.[15] The Foreign Minister has also submitted a draft treaty for our consideration,[16] as well as draft resolutions on the subject.[17] The United States will, of course, study these proposals with care. Much of the material in these proposals is already familiar.

The Soviet proposal makes no reference to verification. By its very nature it lacks any means to ensure compliance. I should note that the last time we had a moratorium on nuclear testing, some 20 years ago, it was abruptly followed by a large series of Soviet nuclear tests, tests the clandestine preparation of which had clearly been under way during the moratorium. They included the two largest nuclear tests ever carried out, one of which had a yield of about 60 megatons.

The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis in its public statements on its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.[18] The Soviet position is a cynical exploitation of one of the most troublesome moral issues of our age. The controversy about no-first-use pledges underscores the wisdom of the Secretary-General's advice that all nations recommit themselves to the principles of the Charter. NATO has long followed a policy—one it has recently reiterated—that none of its weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We see no value in a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons if a right, or at least the power, to use conventional weapons in contravention of the Charter is claimed and reserved. The main effect of nuclear-arms-control agreements should not be to make the world safe for conventional aggressive war. In any event, the Soviet no-first-use pledge is unverifiable and unenforceable. Its credibility is belied by the nature of Soviet military doctrine and by the ominous Soviet buildup of massive land-based ballistic missiles, which present an obvious threat of first use.

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[14] *Ante*, Feb. 9.
[15] *Ante*, Oct. 1.
[16] *Ante*, Oct. 1.
[17] *Ante*, Oct. 1.
[18] *Ante*, June 12.

I have often spoken of the problems which an excessive devotion to secrecy can pose to arms-control efforts. Many in this chamber have long argued that greater openness in military matters could help reduce tensions and lessen the danger of war. Some measures along these lines have already been instituted in Europe as an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and indeed they have made a modest contribution to the reduction of tensions in that most heavily armed area of the world.

My Government is among those which would like to see a wider application of the principle of openness. In particular, we should like to see greater participation of States in the reporting of their military budgets to the United Nations, as repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly, and in the work of United Nations experts to improve the comparability of statistics. President Reagan emphasized this policy in his speech to the General Assembly at its second special session in June. It is our hope that this session of the General Assembly will encourage a broadening of the effort to promote full disclosure and we shall be suggesting ways in which this might be done.

Similarly, I think that the World Disarmament Campaign, which was debated at the special session on disarmament, holds some promise for promoting more widespread, open and thoughtful debate on the subject. This is to be welcomed, provided agreed principles for the Campaign are universally observed. As the Committee knows, the United States worked hard at the special session to ensure that those principles are included in the Campaign. We think that this point is worth emphasizing again in any draft resolution which the Assembly may consider this fall on the Campaign.

The Secretary-General's call to nations to recommit themselves to the Charter should be the dominant theme of this meeting. One place to begin the effort he recommends is in the nuclear-arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States now going on in Geneva. We urge the Soviet Union to abandon the claim of a right to retain a nuclear arsenal which goes beyond any conceivable limits of defence and deterrence. To accept the principle of deterrence as the foundation of the INF and START talks would be a giant step towards the goal of peace.

In conclusion, I return to the theme with which I started, that arms control and disarmament efforts can be useful instruments of a strategy for obtaining and preserving peace, but in no sense can they be a substitute for such a strategy. In the absence of general respect for the rules of the Charter, arms-control negotiations can be futile at best and damaging to the cause of peace at worst. As the Secretary-General has reminded us, peace can be ensured only by enforcing the prescriptions of the Charter against aggression. Since no one can be certain that the escalation from conventional to nuclear war will not occur, the only way to free mankind from the threat of nuclear war is to stop conventional war as well. The draft pastoral letter of the Committee on War and Peace of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States, released on 25 October 1982, puts the issue with austere eloquence:

> We must reemphasize with all our being . . . that it is not only nuclear war that must be prevented, but war itself, the scourge of humanity. [19]

Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to the Congress and the United Nations: Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, November 1982 [1]

Chemical and toxin weapons are of special concern to mankind. Used against civilian populations, or even against soldiers with protective equipment, they can cause protracted and indiscriminate physical and psychological suffering and, as we witnessed in World War I, widespread death as well. For such reasons, the international community has outlawed the use of these weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, one of the oldest arms control agreements still in force, forbids the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. [2] The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the mere possession of toxin weapons. [3] In an effort to extend such legal constraints still further, the United States—together with other countries in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva—is seeking an outright ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

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[19] *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1982, p. A22.

[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 104, "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update; Report From Secretary of State George P. Shultz", Nov. 1982, p. 2.

[2] The text of the protocol may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

[3] *Ibid., 1972*, pp. 133–138.

I regret, then, to report that chemical and toxin weapons are nevertheless being used today in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its allies. In March of this year, we reported on this subject to the Congress, the United Nations, and to the members of the international community. [4] Our report, which contained a comprehensive and detailed compilation of the evidence available to the United States Government, was designed to bring the issue to the attention of the world community. In presenting it, we invited others to join us in examining the evidence and in confirming the truth.

These efforts have not led the Soviets and their allies to halt their illegal use of chemical and toxin weapons. Instead, they continue to deny the truth about their illegal activities. The world cannot be silent in the face of such human suffering and such cynical disregard for international law and agreements. The use of chemical and toxin weapons must be stopped. Respect for existing agreements must be restored and the agreements themselves strengthened. Respect for the dignity of humanity must be restored. Failure to achieve these goals can only have serious implications for the security of the world community, particularly for the security of smaller nations, like those whose people are being attacked. If such basic elements of human rights can be so fundamentally ignored, how can we believe any pledges to respect human rights?

All who would seek to promote human rights, and all who would seek to maintain the credibility of international agreements, have a duty to call world attention to the continuing use of chemical and toxin weapons, and to seek a halt to their use. It is for this purpose that the United States provides the following report. [5]

Department of State Report: Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan [Extract], November 1982 [1]

This report presents conclusions based on further evidence about chemical and toxin warfare activities in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan that has become available to the U.S. Government since publication of the special report on this subject on March 22, 1982. [2] *The evidence includes new information on events occurring since the first of this yea: as well as additional information from a variety of sources on activities described in that report. The current report is accompanied by tables listing recent and newly reported attacks and annexes providing additional sample analysis results, medical evidence, and other supporting data.*

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[4] *Ante*, Mar. 22.

[5] *Infra.*

[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 104, "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update; Report From Secretary of State George P. Shultz," Nov. 1982, pp. 3–8.

[2] *Ante.*

UPDATED FINDINGS

Based on a thorough analysis of this new information, we are able to conclude the following:

•Reports of chemical attacks from February through October 1982 indicate that Soviet forces continue their selective use of chemicals and toxins against the resistance in Afghanistan. Moreover, new evidence collected in 1982 on Soviet and Afghan Government forces' use of chemical weapons from 1979 through 1981 reinforces the previous judgment that lethal chemical agents were used on the Afghan resistance. Physical samples from Afghanistan also provide new evidence of mycotoxin use.

•Vietnamese and Lao troops, under direct Soviet supervision, have continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and toxins against the H'Mong resistance in Laos through at least June 1982.

•Vietnamese forces have continued to use lethal and incapacitating chemical agents and toxins against resistance forces in Kampuchea through at least June 1982.

•Trichothecene toxins were found in the urine, blood, and tissue of victims of "yellow rain" attacks in Laos and Kampuchea and in samples of residue collected after attacks.

•We continue to find that a common factor in the evidence is Soviet involvement in the use of these weapons in all three countries. Continued analysis of prior data and newly acquired information about Soviet mycotoxin research and development, chemical warfare training in Vietnam, the presence of Soviet chemical warfare advisers in Laos and Vietnam, and the presence of the same unusual trichothecene toxins in samples collected from all three countries reinforce our earlier conclusion about the complicity of the Soviet Union and about its extent.

INTRODUCTION

Our March study showed that casualties and deaths resulted from chemical attacks in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and that trichothecene toxins were used in both Laos and Kampuchea. The new evidence shows that these attacks are continuing in all three countries and that trichothecene toxins have been used in Afghanistan as well.

The same rigorous analytical processes employed in our March study, and outlined in detail there, were followed to arrive at the judgments contained in this update. In light of the widespread publicity given the March report, special efforts were made by U.S. Government analysts to preclude being led astray by any possible false reports that might be generated for propaganda or other purposes and to eliminate the possibility of making erroneous judgments about the chemical or toxin agents involved because of tampering or improper handling. Every report has been carefully checked.

The evidence in the March study was based on a broad range of data, including testimony by physicians, refugee workers, journalists, and others. Although some of the new reports are anecdotal, we have been able to corroborate most of them by other sources and sample analysis. Moreover, personal testimony tends to add credence to other accounts which, taken together, form a coherent picture. The material presented in this report represents only a relatively small amount of the total accumulated evidence. This additional information is examined in greater detail in the annexes. Improved sample collection procedures, a better quality of medical histories and physical examinations, documentation including photographs of lesions and hospital charts from Southeast Asia, and interviews by trained personnel have reinforced our earlier conclusions and led to new discoveries.

As international concern about this subject has increased, based on the development of evidence from many countries, independent analyses have been initiated by foreign chemical warfare experts, physicians, journalists, and independent nongovernmental scientists and laboratories. Analysts in the United States have found this research very helpful both in supporting their own conclusions and, more importantly, in expanding on them.

Summary of Evidence

Afghanistan

Evidence indicates that the Soviets have continued the selective use of toxic agents in Afghanistan as late as October 1982. For the first time we have obtained convincing evidence of the use of mycotoxins by Soviet forces through analyses of two contaminated Soviet gas masks acquired from Afghanistan. Analysis and quantification of material taken from the outside surface of one mask have shown the presence of trichothecene mycotoxin. Analysis of a hose from a second Soviet mask showed the presence of several mycotoxins. In addition, a vegetation sample from Afghanistan shows preliminary evidence of the presence of mycotoxins. (See Annex A.)

Our suspicions that mycotoxins have been used in Afghanistan have now been confirmed. Reports during 1980 and 1981 described a yellow-brown mist being delivered in attacks which caused blistering, nausea, vomiting, and other symptoms similar to those described by "yellow rain" victims in Southeast Asia. Because of limited access to survivors who still exhibited symptoms, as well as great difficulties in collecting environmental and other physical samples from attack sites, we were unable to conclude with certainty in the March 22 report that mycotoxins were being used in Afghanistan. We have now concluded that trichothecene mycotoxins have been used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan since at least 1980.

A number of reports indicate that chemical attacks are continuing in 1982. While we cannot substantiate every detail, the pieces of evidence in these reports add up to a consistent picture. For example, a physician in a facility treating casualties among the *mujahidin* (resistance fighters) has reported that he treated 15 *mujahidin* for red skin lesions that he said were caused by Soviet chemical attacks in Qandahar Province in May-June 1982.

TABLE 1

Afghanistan: Reported Attacks, 1982

Date	Village Location	Method of Attack	Form of Material	Persons Killed	Persons Taken Ill
early Feb.	north of Shindand	aircraft	yellow substance	4	?
Feb. 4, 5	south of Shindand	helicopter	yellow substance	0	?
Feb. 19	Badakhshan Province	aircraft	yellow crystals	?	?
May-June	Qandahar Province	helicopter rockets	black, yellow, white gases	3	15
June	Farah Province	aircraft bombs	red, black, white smoke	?	?
June 11	Qandahar Province	aircraft bombs	?	15	30
June	Baghlan Province	helicopter	?	?	?
July	Panjsher Valley	aircraft	nerve gas	0	0
Sept. 13	Lowgar Province	pumped from armored vehicle	gas	73	0
Sept. 20	Lowgar Province	pumped from armored vehicle	gas	?	?
Sept.	Lowgar Province	?	?	?	?
late Sept./ early Oct.	Baghlan Province	aircraft bombs	?	?	?

? = Undetermined

Three *mujahidin* died within 12 hours of one attack in the general area of Maharijat south of Qandahar. The *mujahidin* claimed that Soviet helicopters fired rockets that emitted black, yellow, and white gases on impact. The physician said that the surviving victims failed to respond to conventional medical treatment.

We have received reports that on September 20, 1982, Soviet soldiers poisoned underground waterways in Lowgar Province south of Kabul where the *mujahidin* were hiding. According to a *mujahidin* commander in Pakistan, a similar event occurred in the same province on September 13, 1982, resulting in the deaths of 60 adults and 13 children. These two independent accounts described a Soviet armored vehicle pumping a yellow gas through a hose into the waterways.[3]

According to the accounts of the September 1982 attacks, the victims' bodies decomposed rapidly, and the flesh peeled away when attempts were made to move the bodies. Since 1979, *mujahidin* resistance leaders, refugees, journalists, and Afghan defectors have described chemical attacks causing almost identical symptoms. Most reports have described the skin as being blue-black after death. Although such symptoms seem bizarre, the large number of reports from a variety of sources since 1979 suggests that they cannot be dismissed (see our March 22 report, p. 16).

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[3] We know from other sources that Soviet chemical agent delivery methods include this technique, as reported, for example, by a Cuban emigre trained by the Soviets in the use of chemical weapons. [Footnote in original.]

In 1982, a Soviet soldier who defected to the *mujahidin* said in an interview with a British journalist that a Soviet toxic agent, termed "100 percent lethal," causes the flesh to become very soft. The Soviet defector stated that the Soviets maintained stores of "picric acid" (probably chloropicrin, a potentially lethal tear gas), the "100 percent lethal" agent, and an incapacitating agent near the cities of Qonduz and Kabul. The defector also reported that:

•Unidentified toxic agents had been used in June 1982 on the highway between Termez and the Salang Pass north of Kabul;

•The "100 percent lethal" agent was delivered by rockets; and

•"Picric acid" and an incapacitating agent were delivered by air-dropped canisters.

The defector stated that the Soviets have been preoccupied with protecting the roads and that chemicals were sprayed by planes along the areas adjacent to highways. Chemical grenades reportedly have been used, but the data are inadequate to allow us to hypothesize about the contents, although some symptoms are indicative of mycotoxins.

The reports of rapid skin decomposition as quickly as 1–3 hours after death continue to concern us. There is no recognized class of chemical or biological toxin agents we know of that could affect bodies in such a way. If we assume occasional inaccuracies in reporting by journalists and survivors of attacks, it is possible that phosgene or phosgene oxime could cause such effects after 3–6 hours but with much less softening of tissues than is consistent with stories of "fingers being punched through the skin and limbs falling off." The reported medical effects of other toxic agent attacks are consistent with use of the nerve agent tabun. We have information that both phosgene oxime and tabun are stored by the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The British journalist, who interviewed the Soviet defector, also reported on two attacks described to him by the *mujahidin,* which have not yet been confirmed. One was an attack in the spring of 1982 on Kaiba, where Soviet soldiers reportedly shot victims already rendered unconscious by a gas; the other was in the summer of 1982 near Herat where Soviet troops reportedly loaded the bodies from a gas attack onto a truck and removed them. Reliable information indicates that the Soviets used chemical bombs against *mujahidin* forces in late September 1982 and in early October 1982 in Baghlan Province.

Our earlier findings are reinforced by several reports received this year about earlier attacks not covered in our March report:

- According to a former Afghan Army officer, in September 1981 a Soviet helicopter sprayed a yellow mist in Paktia Province (Sheikn Amir) causing 16 deaths. The survivors had bloody noses and tears; extensive bleeding was reported in those who died. The Afghan officer described a similar attack in Nangarhar Province during the same month in which four persons were killed.

- In early December 1981, according to interviews with survivors, 15 refugees attempting to escape to Pakistan were attacked by a helicopter using gas; four or five people were killed (the youngest and the eldest), while the rest became unconscious for 5–6 hours. The attack occurred about 60 kilometers northwest of Jalalabad.

- According to a Soviet soldier who served in Afghanistan in 1980 and personally observed the use of chemical weapons, the Soviets dispersed chemicals from fighter-bombers and assault helicopters. He said that an aircraft or helicopter first would drop a container and then, on a second run, drop a bomb, resulting in a mixture of two different chemicals that killed everything within the contaminated area. We believe that the soldier may have been describing the delivery of two separate chemical agents, an occurrence described by other eyewitnesses.

- An Afghan veterinarian recently has described an incident in May 1979 in which 20 people and a number of sheep were killed near Qandahar. Soviet lab technicians explained that the incident resulted from anthrax, but the doctor knew that the explanation did not fit the effects observed. Local Afghans told the veterinarian that Soviet vehicles had been in the area spraying a yellow/white powder before the incident.

- In June 1980, an airport official described seeing 200–300 gas containers painted in greens and browns at Qandahar Airport. The containers averaged 35–40 inches high and 26–30 inches in diameter. A subordinate reported three types of gases in the containers: one causing burning in the throat as well as suffocation; one causing what looked like smallpox and blistering; and one making victims tired and sleepy and unable to run or fight. Further, the subordinate stated that the containers were placed in special casings that were dropped from aircraft and exploded on impact, emitting a large cloud of smoke, usually yellow but sometimes other colors. He said he had heard *mujahidin* describe these gas attacks and had himself seen animals that had been killed by the gases. We lend credence to this report because we know from other evidence that chemicals are stored at Qandahar Airport, which is an important staging area for Soviet military operations.

- Finally, information received this year revealed that a Soviet adviser inspecting sites for housing Soviet troops before the Afghan invasion indicated that Soviet chemical defense forces entering Afghanistan would bring in extensive stores of toxic materials. The adviser indicated that a proposed garrison in Kabul would be inappropriate for the Soviet chemical defense unit because the materials it transported could devastate the city if an accident occurred.

Laos

H'Mong refugees, recounting details of toxic agent attacks and exhibiting severe medical symptoms from exposure to the agents, fled to Thailand every month from January through June 1982. They brought out more samples contaminated by a yellow, sticky substance described as a "yellow rain" dropped by aircraft and helicopters on their villages and crops. We have preliminary reports on attacks as recent as October 1982. We now know that the yellow rain contains trichothecene toxins and other substances that cause victims to experience vomiting, bleeding, blistering, severe skin lesions, and other lingering signs and symptoms observed by qualified physicians. Experts agree that these people were exposed to a toxic agent and that no indigenous natural disease, plant, or chemical caused these unique physical effects.[4]

Laboratory analyses of blood samples from these victims and studies on experimental animals have shown that trichothecene toxins are retained in the body for much longer periods of time than previously thought. Scientific research has shown that the multiple-phase distribution pattern in animals includes a secondary half-life of up to 30 days. We believe that the severe skin lesions observed on victims by doctors are also relevant. Victims whose blood proved on analysis to have high levels of trichothecene mycotoxins exhibit such skin lesions.

Descriptions of the 1982 attacks have not changed significantly from descriptions of earlier attacks. Usually the H'Mong state that aircraft or helicopters spray a yellow rain-like material on their villages and crops. In some reports the symptoms are similar to those described in our March 22 study, and we attribute them to the use of trichothecene toxins. However, in many cases there was no bleeding, only abdominal pains and prolonged illness. These symptoms, described in previous years, suggest that another agent or combination of agents is still being used. The explanation is complicated because different symptoms are ascribed to men, women, children, and animals. It is possible that different agents, lower concentrations of the same agents, or climatic conditions have affected the efficacy of the agents.

Medical personnel in Lao refugee camps in Thailand were much better organized in 1982 to screen victims than in past years. Doctors now routinely use extensive questionnaires and conduct comprehensive medical examinations, including some onsite, preliminary blood analysis. Skilled paramedical personnel oversee preparation of blood and serum samples for proper transport and shipment to the United States or other countries for chemical analysis. Some patients with active symptoms are now being monitored extensively over time.

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[4] See Canadian report to the United Nations: "Study of the Possible Use of Chemical Warfare Agents in Southeast Asia," Dr. H. B. Shiefer, University of Saskatchewan. [Footnote in original. The report is printed *ante*, June 21.]

TABLE 2

Laos: Reported Attacks, 1982

Date	Village Location	Method of Attack	Form of Material	Persons Killed	Persons Taken Ill
Jan. 3, 6, 11	Phou Bia *	helicopter spray	yellow rain	0	?
Jan. 4	Phou Bia	aircraft	green chemical **	?	?
Jan. 9	Phou Bia	artillery	white/yellow cloud	0	?
Feb. 13	Phou Bia	aircraft spray	yellow rain	0	?
Feb. 21, 22	Phou Bia	helicopter	white powder	0	?
Feb. 28	Phou Bia	helicopter	white powder	10	30
Mar. 10	Phou Bia	helicopter, aircraft	red, yellow/white clouds	many	many
Mar. 17	Phou Bia	helicopter spray	yellow rain **	20	?
Mar. 25	Phou Bia	helicopter spray	yellow rain **	1	40 families
late Mar., early Apr.	Phou Bia	aircraft	yellow rain **	27	many
Apr. 1	Phou Bia (3 villages)	?	yellow rain	many	4
Apr. 17, 18, 30	Phou Bia	aircraft	yellow rain	10	?
Apr./May	Phou Bia	aircraft, helicopters	yellow rain	0	many
May 20	Phou Bia	aircraft	yellow rain	4	100
May 24	Phou Bia	aircraft	yellow rain	9	many
May	Phou Bia	poisoned river	?	0	many
June 17	Phou Bia	aircraft spray	yellow rain	4	many

? = Undetermined

* Phou Bia refers to mountain area where H'Mong villages are located.

** Samples from this attack contained mycotoxin (see Annex A).

A number of blood samples have been collected from Laos for analysis in the United States. All biological specimens were drawn by qualified medical personnel, and samples were refrigerated until analyzed in the United States. Analysis of these samples shows that trichothecene mycotoxins continue to be used against H'Mong villages. In addition to blood and urine specimens from victims exposed to chemical warfare, we have collected additional physical samples this year. These physical samples consist of more residue of yellow rain containing mycotoxins from the same attacks that yielded human biological specimens positive for these same toxins. (See Annex A.)

The number of reported attacks in Laos in 1982 did not differ significantly from the frequencies reported for comparable periods in the years 1977 through 1981. Reported fatalities per attack during 1981 and 1982 showed an apparent decrease, suggesting the possibility that less lethal toxic agents, or lower concentrations of the same agents, are now being used. This apparent decrease, however, was not statistically significant and could have been caused by a number of other factors, including the following:

•Due to emigration and the high number of fatalities since at least 1976, the H'Mong were living in smaller, more scattered communities.

•H'Mong survivors still in Laos were warier and quicker to take cover and to use rudimentary protective measures at the first sign of attack.

•The H'Mong were not taking time to count victims—this is supported by the existence of very few reports that indicate the precise number of people affected by a toxic agent attack.

As stated in the March report, the Soviet Union maintains in Laos significant numbers of advisers who provide maintenance assistance, technical support, and training in both conventional and chemical warfare. A former Lao transport pilot who defected early this summer has described the aerial movement, under Soviet supervision, of toxic agents within Laos.

Kampuchea

Most reports of toxic attacks in Kampuchea for the period 1978-June 1982 come from Democratic Kampuchean (DK) sources, including interviews with DK military personnel. Evidence from other sources confirmed most of these reports. In 1982, most reported attacks occurred near the Thai border, making it easier to obtain samples and other direct evidence of toxic agent use.

In the first 6 months of 1982, the number of reported toxic agent attacks in Kampuchea was about half the number reported during the same periods in 1980 and 1981. The number of reported deaths per attack also decreased, but data were insufficient to determine if this decrease was statistically significant. We also have preliminary reports on attacks through early November 1982.

In February and March 1982, several attacks occurred just across the Kampuchean border in Thailand. Analysis of samples collected from the attacks was performed in Canada, Thailand, and the United States. Although differing sampling techniques give rise to significant sampling error and lead to slightly different analytical results, both the U.S. and Thai analysts, using different analytical techniques, found trichothecene mycotoxins in their samples.[5] The Canadian team investigating these attacks has published a detailed medical assessment of the victims' symptoms; it concluded that illness had in fact occurred and was caused by a toxic agent, although preliminary tests for trichothecenes proved inconclusive in the Canadian sample.

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[5] It was thought initially that a harmless yellow powder had been dropped on Thai villages as part of a disinformation campaign attempting to discredit U.S. sample analysis results. Within days of such an attack, the Thai Ministry of Health announced that only ground-up flowers had been found. However, Thai officials later stated that further analysis showed traces of toxin and that the earlier Health Ministry announcement was based on incomplete investigation. [Footnote in original.]

TABLE 3

Kampuchea and Thailand: Reported Attacks, 1982

Date	Village Location	Method of Attack	Form of Material	Persons Killed	Persons Taken Ill
Kampuchea					
Feb. 13	border near Khao Din	artillery	? *	1 **	100
Feb. 23	border near Pailin	spread along border	yellow powder	0	?
Mar. 3	Battambang Province	artillery	?	0	?
Mar. 5, 7	Pailin area	aircraft spray, artillery	white powder *	0	10
Mar. 7–11	Sokh Sann	artillery, ground spray	yellow substance	0	many
Mar. 10	Battambang Province	aircraft	toxic substance	25	12
Mar. 10–13	Battambang Province	aircraft, artillery	toxic substance	30	?
Mar. 17	Sokh Sann	artillery	yellow/white powder	0	many
Mar. 24	Battambang Province	poisoned water	yellow powder	4	?
Apr. 29	Battambang Province near border	aircraft spray	yellow powder	3	7
May 23, 26	Sokh Sann	aircraft spray	?	0	?
June	Preah Vihear Province	poisoned food and water	?	2	many
June 24	border near Nong Chan	mortar	yellow cloud	0	4
Thailand					
Feb. 19	Pong Nam Ron District	aircraft spray	yellow powder *	0	many
Mar. 3	southeast of Pong Nam Ron District near border	aircraft (powder wind-blown over border)	powder	0	many
Mar. 5	Pong Nam Ron District	mortars	gray/black smoke	0	18
Mar. 6, 8	southeast of Pong Nam Ron District near border	aircraft spray	yellow powder	0	many

? = Undetermined
* Samples from this attack contained mycotoxin (see Annex A).
** See Annex B for detailed analysis of autopsy results of the victim.

Blood and urine samples from Kampuchean victims of a toxic agent artillery attack on February 13, 1982, contained trichothecene toxins (Annex A). In addition, post-mortem tissue from a victim of this same attack confirmed the presence of trichothecene toxins (Annex B). Analysis of additional samples showing the presence of trichothecenes taken from other attacks is also found in Annex A.

The Vietnamese conducted toxic agent attacks this year against another resistance group, the Kampuchean People's National Liberation Forces. On several occasions in March–May 1982, the resistance camp at Sokh Sann was hit with toxic artillery shells and bombs. Samples of contaminated vegetation and yellow residue from these attacks are now being analyzed. Attacks occurred in Kampuchea through June 1982, providing new samples; qualitative tests indicate that the presence of trichothecenes is probable. The results of confirmatory analyses are pending.

Several Vietnamese military defectors from Kampuchea have provided valuable information in 1981 and 1982 on chemical weapons use and on the Vietnamese chemical warfare program and have reported that some types of agents are supplied by the Soviet Union. Information from other sources also confirms our earlier view that the Vietnamese possess toxic agent munitions and are equipping their own troops with additional protective equipment.

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Statement by the U.S. Deputy Representative (Adelman) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Campaign, November 4, 1982 [1]

I speak today to agenda item 133 (d), concerning the World Disarmament Campaign. The United States supports the achievement of a truly universal, comprehensive and objective world-wide discussion of disarmament.

Over and over again in this century wars have been started by Governments opposed to the principle of free expression. Governments which deny their people a true voice in their governance and instead purport to speak on their behalf. Free nations do not want or choose war. Free speech leads them towards justice; freedom of opportunity offers progress without recourse to violence; and political freedom ensures that Governments reflect the views and concerns of their people.

Throughout this troubled century the United States has never been at war with another country committed to democracy and the free expression of ideas, whatever their content. Indeed, it has supported the process of democratic change from its inception as a nation, and it champions peaceful change today. In the contemporary world, as it has always been, the least free and most repressive countries are the main instigators of international tension and conflict. It is Soviet troops which are in Afghanistan today; Vietnamese troops which are in Laos and Cambodia today; and Cuban troops which are in Angola and Ethiopia today. And it is Soviet weaponry, introduced through Cuba and Nicaragua, which is playing so active a destabilizing role in Latin America and which fuels the ambitions of such irresponsible dictatorships as Libya.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.25, Nov. 10, 1982, pp. 21–32.

A working group of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament produced a consensus document last summer for a truly universal and effective World Disarmament Campaign. The language of the document is clear and unequivocal. It stipulates that the Campaign:

> should be carried out in all regions of the world in a balanced, factual and objective manner

and that its universality:

> should be guaranteed by the co-operation and participation of all States and by the widest possible dissemination of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war. (*A/S-12/32, annex V, p. 1*)

It also says that the Campaign "should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions."

Those are admirable goals. Now it is up to all Governments of the world to put those clear principles into practice, to realize in concrete deeds and in their day-by-day actions what all Member States of the United Nations have already endorsed in words.

In the United States and in all other open, democratic societies, the workings of a free, multi-sided media ensure that essential information about security and disarmament is readily available to the public. Scores of public and private institutions are working actively to propagate their views on arms control and security issues. No censors or commissars impede the flow of public information. Demonstrations are not staged, nor is participation in them restricted to those invited by the Government.

Unfortunately, this is not the case everywhere. In the Soviet Union and in other countries following similar domestic repressive policies, only that information which supports official Government positions can circulate freely and be openly and publicly discussed, even when it affects the most profound issues for mankind as a whole. Those who do demonstrate for peace and disarmament without permission run the risk of prison or internal exile.

It is particularly ironic that the Soviet Union's domestic actions contrast so sharply with its rhetorical support for peace movements in free countries. While the Soviet Union cynically seeks to exploit the noble aspirations of the peace movement in other States, it simultaneously inveighs against pacifism and arrests those who take part in unauthorized peace activities in its own country. The message is clear: for the Soviet Union, peace and disarmament are issues for propagandist exploitation abroad, but not for free discussion at home.

If the Soviet representative speaks, as he did here yesterday, of 20,000 demonstrations with over 60 million participants, the question is not one of peace, but only whether those persons had the option of not participating, or of expressing their views freely. They had no such choice, because freedom of expression—much less spontaneous demonstration—does not exist in the Soviet Union.

Let me cite a few examples—all recent, some continuing—from a dismal Soviet and Eastern European record in the treatment of their own incipient, authentic peace movements.

In contravention of the Helsinki Accords, [2] the Soviet Union regularly jams Western radio broadcasts and strictly limits the circulation of foreign books and newspapers to keep its citizens from hearing about or discussing disarmament, as well as other topics, with foreigners. Ordinary Soviet citizens are admonished not to be in contact with foreigners, and KGB surveillance of foreigners generally intimidates Soviet citizens from contacting outsiders.

In the German Democratic Republic we even witness the remarkable spectacle of government repression of peace movements which use symbolic arm patches showing the beating of swords into ploughshares, a symbol reflecting the most basic ideals of the United Nations Charter itself and a symbol similar to the monument that the Soviet Union presented as a gift to the United Nations. These arm patches were denounced by a frightened East German régime that considered such a pacifist image to be "the expression of a mentality hostile to the State and proof of membership of an illegal political association". Students and workers wearing "swords into ploughshares" patches face expulsion from school or their jobs.

In Czechoslovakia, members of Charter 77, a reformist group dedicated to the upholding of the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Accords and the United Nations Charter, have been harassed, arrested, and told not to discuss disarmament, as well as other topics.

During August the Polish authorities cynically sought to manipulate the Pugwash Conference in Warsaw to legitimize the ruling Jaruzelski régime. To their credit, the American contingent voted beforehand at Boston not to participate as an official group, and many individual European scientists chose to boycott the Conference. An open letter to the Conference from Nobel Peace Prize laureat Andrei Sakharov, dealing with issues of the arms race and condemning the closed nature of the Soviet Union and other "socialist" countries, was never put on the agenda—nor was the destabilizing and repressive situation outside the halls of the Pugwash Conference in Poland itself.

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[2] The accords may be found in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. The arms control portions have been printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308.

In regard to the arms race, the Sakharov letter reads:

> In the last decade there has been a very substantial increase in the Soviet army, navy, missile arsenal and air force, while the countries of the West, Europe especially, have weakened their defence efforts. The SS–20 missiles have changed the strategic equilibrium in Europe, although those who take part in pacifist demonstrations seem not to notice this fact.

Sakharov concludes his letter by urging that:

> there must be international efforts, efforts made by all honest people, to defend human rights, to overcome the closed nature of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. [3]

It is incumbent upon all countries in the United Nations to heed Sakharov's plea.

In January the official Soviet newspaper *Pravda* carried an enthusiastic editorial hailing the anti-war movement in Western Europe as "the vital cause of the peoples". The same newspaper had earlier declared that the Soviet internal

> propaganda must decisively rid itself of the traces of pacifism that are occasionally to be found in some instructional or propaganda materials.

And in February, on the occasion of Soviet Army-Navy Day, the Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, published a booklet deploring "elements of pacifism" among citizens of the Soviet Union.

Last spring several people attempted to unfurl a little hand-lettered banner in Red Square in Moscow with the Russian words for "Bread, Life and Disarmament". They were immediately arrested by the Soviet State Security Police. One wonders which of these three words was considered so dangerous that it had to be hidden from the people of Moscow.

In early summer an international group of peace advocates was towed out from Leningrad harbour after releasing 2,000 balloons carrying the message "USSR Stop Nuclear Testing Now". The Soviet explanation: "The peace advocates' vessel 'Greenpeace' was polluting the harbour". In reality it seems clear that the Soviet authorities regard spontaneous peace movements as the most dangerous pollutant of them all.

In July a group of several hundred Scandinavians who visited several Soviet cities on a peace march—billed in the Soviet press as the counterpart of similar marches in the West—learned that their marches had to be done the Soviet way. Soviet speakers, ignoring previous agreements, introduced Soviet political themes and disarmament proposals. Marching was cut to a minimum and where permitted, was tightly controlled. An effort was made to exploit the group by setting up a rally at Katyn, the site of the infamous Soviet execution of 4,000 Polish officers during the Second World War. Discussions were orchestrated and translations of speeches falsified, and two members of an independent Soviet peace group seeking contact with the marchers were sentenced to 15 days detention to keep them away from the marchers. So much for the international walks for peace cited yesterday by the Soviet representative here.

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[3] *The New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1982, p. 6.

Also this past summer, just after one of the largest peaceful disarmament rallies in American history took place in New York, Soviet police moved against 11 Soviet citizens who had announced the formation of a fledgling independent disarmament group called the "Group to Establish Trust between the USA and the USSR". The group appealed—very much in the spirit of the second special session on disarmament Working Group that same month—for the widest possible access to information on questions relating to disarmament and arms limitation. They called on my Government, as the Soviet Government has, to ratify the SALT II Treaty.[4] They called for a four-sided dialogue to include the Soviet and American publics along with their Governments on the issue of peace. They asked for permission to hold a real demonstration—one not planned, sponsored and orchestrated by the Soviet Government—in Moscow in support of disarmament.

As a result of these activities several members of the group were arrested and charged with "hooliganism". And on 6 August, the spokesman for that group, 25-year-old Sergei Batovrin, the son of a Soviet diplomat attached to the Soviet United Nations Mission from 1965 to 1970, was confined for a month in a psychiatric institution where he was forcibly treated with a powerful debilitating drug. His main sin seems to have been that in a country where suspicion is all-pervasive, he was notable for his openness and lack of suspicion. Perhaps, like anyone who had grown up in the United States, he had taken freedom for granted.

Just this week—last Monday, 1 November—Soviet authorities once again prevented a news conference by Batovrin's battered group of peace advocates, barring both members and Western reporters from the building where the meeting was to take place. Batovrin, who would have been making his first public appearance since his release from detention, was prevented by Soviet security agents from even leaving his apartment. The meeting was to have dealt with Oleg Radzinsky, a young linguist arrested last week for "anti-Soviet agitation". Before his arrest Radzinsky had had the temerity to call for an international observance of 10 minutes of peace during which all work would be stopped in the name of disarmament.

The very virulence with which these peace advocates have been harassed and suppressed illustrates the utter intolerance of the Soviet and Eastern bloc authorities of any challenge to the official Soviet policy of "peace" or to its carefully nurtured official image of a nation totally supportive of the ruling Communist Party's peace initiatives and policies. The Soviet Union yesterday pledged 1.5 million rubles to the disarmament campaign, a gesture of rich irony from a country where no true disarmament movements are allowed.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

The Governments of the free world cannot and do not persecute or stifle their critics, whether we like them or not. We know that much of the progress of mankind—in the arts and sciences, in the mastery of disease or the conquest of space, in the persistent assertion of human dignity and the rights of man—is due to the work of courageous individuals who challenge falsehood in the name of truth, who speak for justice in the face of repression. We know better than to condemn critics to psychiatric wards, and we will not recoil if the passion for truth leads people to question our weaknesses or to expose our wrongs.

We have welcomed dissidents from the inception of the American Republic, beginning in fact with those who landed at Plymouth Rock in 1620. Nor have these dissidents come only from Western Europe. Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and people subjected to totalitarian Governments elsewhere have flocked to these shores in search of self-expression and the right of individuals to shape their own lives. Those seeking freedom of intellectual and artistic expression have not threatened but vastly enriched the quality of thought and the fabric of our culture. Each, whether Solzhenitsyn, Rostroprovich, Baryshnikov, General Grigorenko or a lesser known figure, has made a unique impact.

In early September, 20 American leaders of the Movement to Freeze Soviet and American Nuclear Arsenals—including among them a Nobel Prize winner, the chairman of the Council for a Livable World and one of the few American members of the Soviet Union's Academy of Sciences—sent a letter to President Leonid Brezhnev protesting the Soviet efforts to "harass and persecute" their Soviet counterparts. A portion of that letter reads:

> The double standard by which the Soviet Government abides—applauding widespread debate in the West, while crushing the most benign form of free expression at home—only strengthens the complex of forces that impel the nuclear arms race. [5]

That is from the letter of the nuclear-disarmament leaders in the United States.

The United States Government fully subscribes to that sentiment. That is why the United States would welcome a truly universal disarmament campaign allowed by all the Governments of the world, a campaign that meets the criteria established and agreed to by all Member States at the second special session on disarmament.

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[5] *The New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1982, p. 11.

For our part, we are giving concrete expression to our commitment to increase freedom and openness, not only at home but in the international arena as well.

Let me review briefly some of the recent initiatives which the United States has undertaken in this regard.

The United States has engaged in an extensive active dialogue with the Soviet Union on important world issues. As one element of this, President Reagan offered recently in Berlin to provide President Brezhnev with an opportunity to speak on world issues directly to the American people on United States television if the Soviet leader provided a reciprocal opportunity. He also proposed that Soviet and American journalists exchange views in their respective media.

President Reagan also proposed, then and there, a number of new strategic confidence-building measures to foster greater openness and greater understanding. These include reciprocal United States-Soviet Union exchanges on advanced notification of major strategic exercises and on launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles within as well as beyond national borders; and an expanded exchange of strategic force data.[6]

The United States also has supported and respected arrangements promoting greater openness in military matters as an outgrowth of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

At the second special session on disarmament this summer, President Reagan proposed the convening of an international conference on military expenditures to give a much-needed stimulus to the reporting of military budgets by countries,[7] some of which continue to shroud their real military spending in secrecy and mask it behind patently false statistics.

In yet another effort to shed light on an important matter of world concern, the United States has strongly supported the efforts to induce the Governments of the Soviet Union, Laos and Viet Nam to facilitate access to areas where chemical weapon attacks have taken place over the last several years, so that the United Nations Group of Experts can conduct an impartial and complete investigation of these profoundly disturbing illegal and inhumane practices.

In arms control negotiations, we have pressed for acceptance, on a mutual basis, of appropriate verification measures to enhance mutual confidence, credibility and trust.

All these proposals represent specific and practical steps to increase freedom, openness, understanding and confidence; to flood light into areas hitherto shrouded by excessive obsession with secrecy and control; and to lessen the dangers of international miscalculation and misunderstanding. We would welcome the free flow of information on disarmament among citizens of all countries. Two days ago Americans in nine states exercised their right to vote in referendums on various disarmament issues. We regret that supporters of peace elsewhere still lack these basic rights. But we urge all other countries to undertake—in deeds, not only in words, at home as well as abroad—concrete efforts to promote an unhindered flow of information to all peoples of the world and to permit the widest possible freedom of public expression and assembly on the crucial issues of world peace and disarmament.

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[6] *Ante*, June 11.

[7] *Ante*, June 28.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: Nuclear Freeze, Weapons Programs, and Arms Control Initiatives [Extract], November 11, 1982 [1]

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Nuclear Arms Freeze Initiatives

Q. Mr. President, you've said recently that you believe a number of sincere Americans who support a nuclear arms freeze are being manipulated by those who want the weakening of America. Could you elaborate on this for us? Do you have any evidence of foreign involvement in the U.S. peace movement?

The President. Yes, there is plenty of evidence. It's even been published by some of your fraternity. There was no question but that the Soviet Union saw an advantage in a peace movement built around the idea of a nuclear freeze, since they are out ahead. And I want to emphasize again that the overwhelming majority of the people involved in that, I am sure, are sincere and well intentioned and, as a matter of fact, are saying the same thing I'm saying. And that is, we must have a reduction of those nuclear weapons, and that's what we're trying to negotiate now in Geneva. But to put the freeze first and then believe that we have not weakened our case for getting a reduction, when the other side is so far ahead, doesn't make sense.

But, yes, there has been in the organization of some of the big demonstrations, the one in New York and so forth, there is no question about foreign agents that were sent to help instigate and help create and keep such a movement going.

Q. Is that the extent of the involvement as you know it, or has there been money involved, or are there other ways that the Soviet involvement has manifested itself?

The President. I can't go beyond what I've done, because I don't discuss intelligence matters, and that's what I would be getting into.

Now—

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Nov. 15, 1982, pp. 1462–1463.

Weapons Programs

Q. Mr. President, evidence mounts that key weapons in your $400 billion weapons procurement buildup are in trouble. Navy testers say that the F-18, on which you'd spend 40 billion, is too heavy for its major mission. Your closest military science adviser says the latest basing plan for the MX won't fool the Soviets. The Pershing missile, on which NATO defense would depend, literally can't get off the ground. The antitank weapon the Army wants to buy seems to be ineffective against modern Soviet tanks. The Maverick missile can't find its targets. [*Laughter*] [2]

I wonder whether in light of all these failures you have any reason to wonder whether a $400 billion arms buildup is money well spent.

The President. Well, it isn't 400 billion in any single year that I know of. That's exaggerating. I've read also the same articles, also, and having access to information closer to the source, I don't believe those things about the weaponry.

Obviously in any new weapon system there are problems and there are bugs that have to be worked out. But I have faith in our technology and the level of that technology, and I know that we have been markedly increasing our defensive capability with what we're doing. And as I say, some of my sources I can't reveal.

Arms Control Initiatives

Q. Mr. President, as you may recall, last June in Berlin you talked about the danger of accidental nuclear war and put forward the idea that this might be a new initiative that the administration could consider in the arms control field. [3] I wonder whether in your planning for next year you have some arms control initiatives in the works.

The President. Well, all of the these things are in the works, and that's why we have three teams negotiating—one on the matter of conventional arms, one on the matter of strategic missiles, and the other on the matter of the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Force], the zero option that I announced a year ago. But I tell you what I'd rather ask you to do and wait for is in the very near future I am going to be speaking in a major address on that entire subject.

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Joint Communique by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany [Extracts], November 15, 1982 [1]

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The President and the Chancellor reaffirmed the Alliance's overall concept for successfully safeguarding peace in Europe as embodied in the declaration made by the heads of state and government of the Atlantic Alliance in Bonn on June 10, 1982.[2] As stressed in that declaration, they agreed that in accordance with current NATO defense plans, and within the context of NATO strategy and its triad of forces, they will continue to strengthen NATO's defense posture, with special regard to conventional forces.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

[3] *Ante*, June 11.

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 22, 1982, pp. 1481–1484. The communique was issued on the occasion of FRG Chancellor Kohl's visit to Washington.

The Alliance has demonstrated that it serves the cause of peace and freedom. Even in difficult situations, it has been able to do so because its members have acted in a spirit of solidarity. The Alliance does not threaten anyone. Nor does it aspire to superiority, but in the interests of peace it cannot accept inferiority either. Its aim is, as before, to prevent any war and safeguard peace and freedom. None of the weapons of the Alliance will ever be used except in response to attack.

The Chancellor paid tribute to the crucial contribution that the United States renders to the joint security of the Alliance through the indispensable presence of American troops in Europe. The President and the Chancellor agreed that a unilateral reduction of American troops would have a destabilizing effect and, at the same time, would undermine efforts for negotiated force reductions.

The President expressed his great appreciation for the significant and uninterrupted German contribution to the common defense. In particular, he paid tribute to the German-American agreement of April 15, 1982 on Wartime Host Nation Support, which entails considerable additional expenditure by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America for common defense.[3]

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The President and the Chancellor agreed that the CSCE review conference, which was resumed in Madrid on November 9, 1982, should agree on a substantive and balanced final document which leads to progress in the important humanitarian field of East-West relations and contains a precise mandate for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), envisaging militarily significant confidence and security building measures covering the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The President and the Chancellor noted that arms control and disarmament as well as defense and deterrence were integral parts of NATO's security policy. They agreed that significant progress towards reduction of the levels of nuclear and conventional forces through balanced and verifiable agreements would be an important contribution to the reduction of international tensions. The incessant unilateral increase in Soviet armaments in recent years has threatened the security of the Alliance and international stability and made even more urgent the need to establish a balance of forces between East and West. The goal of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany remains to achieve a stable balance of both nuclear and conventional forces at the lowest possible level.

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[2] *Ante.*

[3] TIAS 10376.

The President and the Chancellor recalled the comprehensive program of arms control proposals put forward by the United States on the basis of close consultation and adopted by the entire Alliance at the Bonn Summit on June 10, 1982. They stressed their common belief that this program provides the best hope for true reductions in arsenals of both intermediate and intercontinental strategic weapons. They rejected the proposals to freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, or for one-sided reductions by the West, as inadequate for substantive arms control and as harmful to the security of the Atlantic Alliance. They noted also that the Soviet Union had in recent years refused to reciprocate the unilateral restraint in this field by the United States. They expressed the strong judgment that true reductions in nuclear armaments would be possible only when the Soviet Union is convinced of the determination of the West to maintain its defenses at the level necessary to meet the threat posed by massive increases in Soviet nuclear forces.

In this connection they attached particular importance to negotiations on reductions of strategic arms and of intermediate range nuclear forces now underway between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. President Reagan reaffirmed his determination to do his utmost to achieve true reductions in nuclear armaments through balanced and verifiable agreements. The President and the Chancellor pointed out that negotiations in Geneva are serious and substantial. At the same time they expressed concern at the refusal of the Soviet Union to take into account legitimate Western security concerns.

In conformity with their policy for actively safeguarding peace through firmness and negotiation, the President and the Chancellor reaffirmed their commitment to both parts of the NATO dual-track decision of December 12, 1979,[4] consisting of a program of INF modernization and an offer to the Soviet Union of arms control negotiations on INF. An important aspect of Western security policy remains the common determination to deploy modernized longer-range INF missiles in Europe beginning at the end of 1983 if negotiations on this subject now underway in Geneva do not result in a concrete agreement making deployment unnecessary. The President and the Chancellor noted that the decision to deploy the systems in Europe was based on a unanimous finding by members of the Atlantic Alliance that increases in Soviet weapons, in particular introduction of SS-20 missiles, had endangered the security of Western Europe and thus of the entire Alliance. They stressed that the complete elimination of Soviet and United States land-based, longer-range INF missiles, as proposed by the United States, would be an equitable and fair result and would be a substantial contribution to serious arms control. They called upon the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously toward this end. The Chancellor restated his full confidence in the American negotiating effort in Geneva and welcomed the close and continuous process of consultations within the Alliance.

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[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

President Reagan described the ideas behind his Berlin initiative of June 10, 1982 for an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on measures to help avoid the danger that accident or miscalculation could lead to a nuclear exchange between East and West.[5] He stated that the United States was preparing proposals for nuclear confidence building measures which would be presented by American representatives at the Geneva negotiations. The Chancellor and the President expressed their hope that the Soviet Union would join with the United States in progressing rapidly to an agreement on such measures. They also remain commited to halting the spread of nuclear weapons through the pursuit of vigorous non-proliferation policies.

The President and the Chancellor underscored their undiminished interest in substantial reduction in conventional forces in central Europe. They recalled the new draft treaty which the Western participants had presented at the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. This proposal provides an excellent foundation for a balanced agreement on reduction of conventional forces in Europe. The President and the Chancellor called upon Warsaw Pact participants to react positively.

They stated that agreement on a comprehensive and fully verifiable ban on chemical weapons in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament remained a prime objective of their policies.

They also attached great importance to efforts in the United Nations to secure transparency by promoting military openness, verification, and wider availability of information on defense spending.

Interview With FRG Chancellor Kohl: Soviet Aggressiveness, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, and the German Peace Movement [Extracts], November 15, 1982[1]

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On East-West tensions: The fact is that Communist ideology throughout the past decade has been and continues to be aggressive. On top of that it has been linked to the old Russian claim to being a world power. There are the immense armaments that have been built up in the East. Next, take the fact that treaties have not been honored. There is the Final Act [1975] of Helsinki [2] [which enshrined détente], and contrary to that there is the invasion of Afghanistan and martial law in Poland. All of these facts arouse the fears and the worries of people living here. However, it is necessary to meet this challenge. And we have met it by adopting the double-track decision of NATO. This means that we are genuinely ready for disarmament, for détente on a worldwide and controlled basis. But at the same time, if there are no results in the first half of that decision, then we shall not remain silent and simply keep on watching.

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[5] Cf. the President's remarks in Berlin on June 11, *ante*.

[1] *Time*, Nov. 15, 1982. Copyright 1982 Time Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission from TIME.

On the possible deployment of new intermediate-range-missiles in West Germany: We will abide by our commitment. And we shall do so with the consent of the vast majority of the people. Of course, there will be resistance, perhaps even major resistance. But we will still do it. It is not the West, it is not the Americans that have started the arms race. It is the Soviet Union that keeps on arming, that keeps on deploying batteries of SS–20 missiles. We have now come to a point when we in the West say: This far and no farther. We are not arming with a view to waging war. We have been forced to meet this challenge to be able to defend our peace and freedom. Nuclear arms, terrible as they may be in themselves, by their sheer existence have preserved peace in Europe for the past 35 years.

On the peace movement: There is no such thing as *the* peace movement in Germany. Rather it is a sum of many individual groups or individuals and of many divergent currents. There are pacifists who very often act out of religious motives. These are people to be highly respected. During the Third Reich, many pacifists were murdered under Hitler simply because they were pacifists. How could I ever deny my respect to their grandchildren? However, pacifism is a personal idea. I can renounce arms for myself. But I do not have the right to do so for my country, nor can I oblige my neighbor to remain unarmed, hence defenseless.

The second group is composed of people who are afraid. They are afraid of unemployment, of the economic developments ahead of us, of the technological developments in modern society, which they feel they cannot cope with. They are afraid of war. And, of course, there are those who want to profit politically from the fears of others.

Furthermore, there is a third group: those who basically act on behalf of the Soviet Union. Their slogan, "Ami [Americans], go home," their permanent criticism of the Americans, their very one-sided moral judgments, and in a general way their efforts to disorient people reveal the seductive art of Kremlin experts. These efforts will not be successful. The vast majority of people in this country, very clearly, back the partnership and friendship with the U.S. They know to whom they owe their peace and security.

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[2] For the arms control portions of the Final Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The complete text of the Final Act may be found in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350. These and following brackets in original.

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Letter From National Security Adviser Clark to the Chairman of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on War and Peace (Bernardin): Proposed Pastoral Letter on Nuclear War, November 16, 1982 [1]

I would like to take this opportunity to respond, on behalf of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Director Rostow, and other Administration officials, to the request for our views on the second draft of the pastoral letter recently prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace for review by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. [2] Let me assure you that we have read these drafts with great interest and care.

As officials, citizens and laymen, we share a profound interest in your answer to the question posed in the draft letter of "whether and how our religious-moral tradition can assess, direct, contain, and hopefully help eliminate the threat posed to the human family by the nuclear arsenals of the world."

We note that in your attempt to answer this question, you are drawing upon "a broad spectrum of advisers of varying persuasions" to examine the nature of weapons systems, military doctrines, and consequences. We recognize both the seriousness and the difficulty of the task you have set for yourself "in concert with public officials" to try "charting a moral course in a complex public policy debate." All must surely work together conscientiously if we are "to persevere in the long-term effort needed to move the world toward a stable and secure peace."

It is because of such objectives expressed by your committee that at the time when the first draft of the pastoral letter was circulated earlier this year, we provided extensive commentaries in response to your request. I am enclosing copies of our prior correspondence for consideration by your committee. We understood then that our comments would be fully considered by the committee as it continued its important work. We commented in some detail because we recognized fully that while the issues are complex and involve serious moral dilemmas, "the possibility of peace must be continually protected and preserved in the face of obstacles and attacks upon it."

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[1] *The New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1982, p. B4.

[2] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1982, p. A22.

Policy is Designed to Achieve

I believe we can agree that the purpose of any moral theory of defense is "not, in the first place, to legitimize war, but to prevent it," and this, of course, is what American deterrence policy is designed to achieve. I believe we can also agree that any proposed change in strategic systems or doctrines, as well as any recommendation, whether proposed by the U.S. Government or by your committee, should be judged "in light of whether it will render steps toward arms control and disarmament more, or less, likely." We believe that our weapons systems (which are not designed to be "first-strike" systems), our deterrence posture (which is defensive), and our arms control initiatives (which call for deep and verifiable reductions) do conform to these objectives.

Because we share an enormous sense of responsibility for the protection of our people and our values, we have welcomed the involvement of the Catholic bishops in the effort to secure effective arms control and to reduce the risks of war. We, therefore, regret all the more that the committee's latest draft continues to reflect fundamental misreadings of American policies, and continues essentially to ignore the far-reaching American proposals that are currently being negotiated with the Soviet Union on achieving steep reductions in nuclear arsenals, on reducing conventional forces and, through a variety of verification and confidence-building measures, on further reducing the risks of war.

Thus, while the committee's draft calls for alternative approaches to current nuclear arsenals and strategies, it does so without presenting the citizen who is concerned with issues of peace and war with any information whatsoever about the initiative undertaken by the United States to bring the world closer to arms reductions, peace and reconciliation.

Previous Administration comments that were forwarded to you, such as my letter to a member of the Pope John Paul II Center for Prayer and Studies for Peace, Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, summarized a number of these arms control initiatives and sought to correct the prior draft's mistaken depictions of U.S. nuclear strategy. We find the virtual omission of these perspectives puzzling, in view of the stated purpose expressed in the pastoral letter that "our arguments in this pastoral must be detailed and nuanced," and that "this pastoral letter in its complexities be used as a framework in forming consciences," so as to "learn together how to make correct and responsible moral judgments."

Troubled in Reading Draft

As with the committee's first draft, I am especially troubled in reading the second draft of the pastoral letter to find none of the serious U.S. arms control efforts, including major initiatives and ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations, described or even noted in the text. Ours are not proposals for freezes on current high ceilings. Such freezes would remove incentives for achieving reductions and would, in any case, require extensive prior negotiations to reach agreement on what numbers and systems to freeze, and on how such freezes might be effectively verified. Ours are initiatives for reduction, or even elimination, of the most destabilizing systems. They involve new verification and confidence-building measures designed both to build trust and to assure compliance.

Because these important initiatives and negotiations have again been ignored in the draft pastoral letter, although they so clearly conform to the hopes of all concerned with reducing the arsenals and the risks of war and promoting the path of peace, I would like to summarize them for you again. I do so with a renewed hope that the comments your committee receives from U.S. Government officials in response to the committee's requests will be carefully considered, just as your committee asks that its draft letter "receive a respectful consideration" from others.

Summary of Initiatives Given

This Administration's arms control efforts include the following major initiatives:

In the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on strategic arms (START), which began on June 30, 1982, we are proposing to begin with a one-third reduction in the number of warheads on the land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and a reduction in the most destabilizing systems of all, the land-based ballistic missiles, to about one-half of the current U.S. levels. In a second phase, we propose to reduce the destructive potential of the remaining missiles to equal levels, lower than we now have, and we could include other strategic systems as well.

In the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which began on Nov. 30, 1981, we have proposed to begin with the total elimination of the forces considered the most destabilizing and threatening by both sides, the land-based missile systems. We and our NATO allies have offered to cancel plans for the deployment of U.S. Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the corresponding destruction of Soviet SS–20, SS–4 and SS–5 missiles. Other elements of the balance could be limited subsequently.

In the multilateral negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), the U.S. and its NATO allies are proposing to the Warsaw Pact nations major initial reductions in military personnel to common ceilings and a wide range of new verification measures.

In the areas of limiting nuclear testing and chemical and biological weapons, the U.S. is actively participating in discussions in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva to develop the verification and compliance procedures that would make such limitations truly effective. We are, of course, particularly distressed by the extensive and inhuman use by the Soviet Union and its allies of toxins and chemicals against the defenseless populations of Afghanistan, Laos and Cambodia.

Value of Early Reductions

In all of our ongoing arms control negotiations and discussions, we are emphasizing the importance of substantial early reductions and of effective verification and confidence-building measures. Your committee will surely recognize that the Administration's nuclear reductions proposals clearly conform to the pastoral letter's recommendations for cuts in nuclear arsenals, and that the other multilateral efforts in which we are currently engaged conform closely with the letter's call for efforts "aimed at reducing and limiting conventional forces and at building confidence between possible adversaries, especially in regions of major military confrontation, as well as those addressed to outlawing effectively the use of chemical and biological weapons."

I continue to believe that as the Bishops Conference reviews new drafts of the pastoral letter, a clear presentation of these initiatives should lead to the Bishops Conference's strong support for them. As I noted in my comments on the first draft, such support would prove enormously helpful in making clear to the world America's seriousness in our efforts and would, in particular, add to Soviet incentives to agree to the reductions and verifiable limitations that we are seeking.

In urging you to assure that the commission's future drafts include a description, and I hope support for, the important American arms control initiatives currently being negotiated, it also appears particularly significant to note that the deterrent posture upon which our nation's armed forces and our nuclear strategy are based is judged in the pastoral letter as being morally defensible.

It is quite clear that the judgments cited in the letter as reflecting the views of Pope John Paul II and of the Bishops Conference, support the continued requirement and morality of maintaining effective nuclear deterrent forces. This pastoral judgment is support because, while nuclear deterrence is considered "unsatisfactory," unilateral disarmament is rejected, and we are urged instead to seek truly effective arms limitations agreements of the kind we are, in fact, currently seeking. I believe this is a fact of critical importance for conscientious clergy, laymen and citizens to understand.

Message of Pope John Paul II

Let me explain further what I mean by the above. According to the pastoral letter, the bishops state that "we do not advocate a policy of unilateral disarmament," and the letter, in fact, argues that if, in the face of independent U.S. initiatives for arms control, "an appropriate response is not forthcoming, the U.S. would no longer be bound to steps taken." Pope John Paul II is cited in his message of Dec. 13, 1981, as stating that we must move, as we have, to the "reduction of nuclear armaments, while waiting for their future complete elimination, carried out simultaneously by all parties, by means of explicit agreements and with the commitment of accepting effective controls."

Pope John Paul II is further cited, in his address to the United Nations June 1982 Special Session on Disarmament, as stating that "deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable." [3]

Cardinal Krol is cited as stating for the Bishops Conference that "it is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing reductions," and that "as long as there is hope of this occurring, Catholic moral teaching is willing, while negotiations proceed, to tolerate possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence as the lesser of the two evils."

Would Be Even Greater Evil

In recognition that our deterrent forces have the critical positive role of preventing war, the draft pastoral letter reflects the bishops' conclusion that "as clearly unsatisfactory as the deterrent posture of the U.S. is from a moral point of view, use of nuclear weapons by any of the nuclear powers would be an even greater evil." In sum, as the letter says, "we have held that possession of nuclear weapons may be tolerated as deterrents, while meaningful efforts are under way to achieve multilateral disarmament."

As we negotiate seriously to achieve the steep reductions and the effective limitations we all want in the arsenals of war, it must be clearly understood that our military forces are armed and organized to deter attack and coercion and to prevent war. It is our policy, and that of our allies, not to use any force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, except to deter and defend against aggression. We must, therefore, assure that in view of the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the last decade, and longer, our deterrent forces remain sufficiently strong and credible to assure effective deterrence.

The draft pastoral letter does not describe either the facts or the impact of the Soviet buildup which we face and which goes far beyond defensive needs. Neither does the letter describe any of the many past unilateral initiatives taken for arms limitation in the last decade by the United States, including reduction in our defense budgets, in real terms, and the eliminating or delay of important U.S. military modernization programs. These are important factors the commission will need to take into account in its future assessments.

A Contrast With Marxism

The draft pastoral letter reminds the reader that the bishops' 1980 Pastoral Letter on Marxism described significant differences between Christian teaching and Marxism. The letter also notes that the "fact of a Soviet threat, as well as the existence of a Soviet imperial drive for hegemony, at least in regions of major strategic interest, cannot be denied." The letter recalls memories of repressive Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and recently in Afghanistan and Poland. It might have added Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America as areas where the military power of the Soviet Union and its allies has increasingly expanded by force of arms.

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[3] A/S-12/PV.8, p. 57.

In this connection, the draft letter importantly urges its readers to reject "romantic idealism about Soviet intentions and capabilities," and declares that "Americans need have no illusions about the Soviet system of repression, or about the lack of respect in that system for human rights."

It is important for the Bishops Conference to know our decisions on nuclear armaments, and our defense posture are guided by moral considerations as compelling as any which have faced mankind. The strategy of deterrence on which our policies are based is not an end in itself but a means to prevent war and preserve the values we cherish: individual liberty, freedom of worship, freedom of conscience and expression, respect for the sanctity of human life and the rule of law through representative institutions. As Americans, we are among the fortunate few in the world who enjoy these blessings.

These traditions and values are not shared by the Soviet Union, which subordinates all individual rights to the needs of a totalitarian state. Individual voices, including those who seek to worship freely and who raise concern about the preservation of peace, are uncompromisingly suppressed both within the Soviet Union and in those countries to which it has extended its sway. While oppression is common to much of the world, in the case of the Soviet Union it has been wedded to military arsenals and a militant dogma that threaten peace and freedom everywhere.

We are confident that as the bishops continue to study the problem of reducing arms, preventing war, and fostering genuine peace, you will also take note of the importance in this effort of building support for international standards of rights and law, such as those proclaimed in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Agreement. [4] As we work to reduce the risks and the causes of war, we have more than just an interest in preserving the traditions of freedom; we have a moral responsibility to future generations. As heirs to the tradition of freedom, we must carry the burden of its preservation and growth.

We believe that by maintaining effective deterrence and working for effective arms control, we will preserve the peace while protecting the fundamental values of Western civilization which you share. We would value opportunities to discuss these vital issues with you and your colleagues, and we ask that you consider and circulate our comments. As we continue our earnest efforts toward genuine peace, we believe that to turn our backs on a course that has kept the peace for over three decades of the nuclear age would increase the risks of war and endanger the cause of freedom throughout the world.

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[4] For the arms control portions of the agreement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The complete text may be found in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–325.

Address by the Under Secretary of State for Management (Kennedy): Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, November 17, 1982 [1]

Forty years ago, in December 1942, in a laboratory under the stands at Alonzo Stagg Stadium in Chicago, an international team of engineers and scientists created the first sustained and controlled nuclear chain reaction. Their success that night changed the world for all time. And it brought to the world some of its most awesome opportunities and some of its gravest problems. Their work opened many doors and afforded opportunities for good things—to light our cities, to power our factories, to diagnose and cure the illnesses of mankind. But their work also made possible the manufacture of nuclear explosives and brought problems we still are wrestling with today. And that is what I want to talk about tonight—the opportunities and the problems we have before us and what they may mean for the future of the nuclear industry, the people of the world, and ultimately the future of life on our planet.

From the dawn of this new age, U.S. policy has had two fundamental objectives. From the first, we have tried to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, we have continuously sought to make the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy—the most astounding technology of the age—available for all mankind. Those twin goals are enumerated in the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and they are enshrined in the Nonproliferation Treaty. [2] They are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they are compatible and complementary. Those goals are the goals of the Reagan Administration today.

Some have alleged that this Administration does not have a nonproliferation policy. Nothing could be further from the truth. President Reagan articulated in clear, unmistakable terms in July 1981 the policy of this Administration—a policy which has been pursued ever since. [3] But let me emphasize that the policy of this Administration is not a radical departure from that of the past.

In historic terms, the dual goals we profess today were the bases of the Atoms for Peace program which President Eisenhower announced in his December 1953 address to the U.N. General Assembly. [4] That program was undertaken at a time when we possessed a virtual monopoly on peaceful nuclear technology. But we believed then, as we still believe, that the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be available for all the peoples of the world. It also has been true from the outset that all must share in the commitment and the burden to assure against its potential problems. Thus, we sought in the Atoms for Peace program to create an international regime that could, in an orderly way, begin to deal not only with the opportunities of nuclear energy but with its problems as well.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 434. The address was delivered before the American Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society in Washington, D.C.

[2] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461–465.

[3] *Ibid., 1981*, pp. 278–280.

[4] *Ibid., 1945–1959*, vol. I, pp. 393–400.

Nonproliferation Position

We do not believe that nuclear power necessarily means nuclear bombs. Rather our position is founded on the notion that the peaceful use of nuclear power does not, per se, present a proliferation risk. This is the bargain implicit in the nuclear nonproliferation treaty—that nations which renounce the idea of nuclear weapons can and should enjoy the benefits of nuclear power. I regret that this relationship has been widely misinterpreted and misunderstood. Some allege that this implies nuclear commerce conducted without regard to its potential problems and dangers. They would argue that thus our policy is critically flawed. Perhaps this misunderstanding arises because the thesis is not a simple one; perhaps because we have not explained our position well enough. Whatever the reason, I repeat, this is a misunderstanding of our objectives and of our policy.

Our strong commitment to the goal of preventing further proliferation rests on the very valid—I think indisputable—notion that the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations could eventually mean the end of world order as we know it. The spread of nuclear weapons endangers not only American security interests, it is equally threatening to the security and well-being of every country on Earth—a fact which they should understand.

To realize our nonproliferation objectives, as President Reagan has made clear, we are working to inhibit the spread of sensitive technologies, facilities, or material, particularly where there is a danger of proliferation. We also are working with other suppliers to strengthen the international rules of nuclear trade. These steps are important elements in our policy, but it would be a mistake to think that the policy could rest on export controls alone. They can buy time. But we must use that time wisely to get at the causes and not simply the symptoms of proliferation.

There are many countries today—especially the highly developed industrial nations—which could produce nuclear explosives if they chose to do so. But they do not for a number of diverse reasons. Their security does not require it, their perceived political interests do not warrant it, or their domestic political opinion will not accept it. The basic causes of proliferation, in other words, are not present.

Yet, we cannot be blind to the fact that there are serious proliferation risks in several regions of the world. Where there is such a risk, this Administration is trying to get at the root causes which might impel a nation to embark on a weapons program. We seek to improve regional stability and to lessen tensions and security concerns. We must try to convince those who might be bent on such a course that acquisition of nuclear weaponry will not promote their security. For the plain truth is the opposite: The further spread of nuclear weapons will not enhance anyone's security. Instead, it will promote instability and rivalry, and it could lead to tragic miscalculations for all.

Where animosities are old and stubborn, the lessening of regional tensions is an exceedingly difficult task. But, we must use the tools we have—political, diplomatic, security—to assuage old passions, to reduce those tensions, and to foster a stable order.

The Nonproliferation Treaty and the Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco [5] are critical instruments in the attack on the causes of proliferation—116 non-nuclear-weapons states today adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty and 22 countries have embraced Tlatelolco. Thus, an overwhelming majority of nations in the world accept the idea that renouncing nuclear explosives is entirely compatible with and, indeed, essential to their security. We can and will continue our strenuous efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty and full implementation of Tlatelolco.

To achieve our nonproliferation goals, we must also maintain a position as a leading and reliable nuclear exporter. For only from this position can we expect to influence international standards and norms in a way consistent with our own nonproliferation goals.

We reject the unilateral approach of yesteryear because, in a word, times have changed. America can no longer call the shots by itself. We no longer possess a monopoly on nuclear technology. Common sense tells us that we must take this fact into account as we fashion our policies. We must view the world as it is; not as it once was; not as we would like it to be in our imaginings. This realistic view will, I suggest, better help us to achieve our nonproliferation goals.

It follows then that we are seeking to insure that our domestic nuclear industry can compete on a fair and equitable basis with the nuclear industries of other supplier nations. But this must be a cooperative effort. For a refusal to recognize the existence of very real proliferation risks and the sacrifice of nonproliferation goals in the pursuit of commercial and economic advantage cannot be the policy of any responsible state.

Support for the IAEA

As we recognized both the opportunities and the problems of nuclear energy, we also saw the need 25 years ago for an agency which could address both. Since its beginnings, we have vigorously supported and relied heavily on the International Atomic Energy Agency. For most of these 25 years the IAEA worked quietly and effectively.

But as with many such institutions, its growth and development have not come without some pain, some dissidence. Unfortunately, political concerns which motivate nations, and which often excite great passions and rhetorical flourish, intrude. So it has been in recent years in Vienna. Increasingly, political concerns, which we and many others believe to be extraneous to the mission and purposes of the agency, began to corrode the atmosphere of its deliberations. Pressures mounted last year, but sensible heads prevailed and accommodations were found.

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[5] The Tlatelolco Treaty and its protocols may be found *ibid., 1967*, pp. 69–83.

Unfortunately, at the agency's general conference last September, a majority of member states violated the statute and illegally rejected the credentials of another member state. The U.S. delegation withdrew from the conference, as it was pledged to do, and we began a serious, thorough assessment of the nature and extent of our participation in the agency. I cannot tell you tonight what the outcome of the reassessment will be, but I can share with you some thoughts about how the problem looks to us.

Let us recall why the IAEA came to be. As its statute makes clear, the agency has two equally important goals:

First, to encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy so as to realize that technology's enormous potential benefits mankind; and

Second, to provide effective international safeguards against the misuse of the technology.

Each of these missions is vital. Together they give the institution its philosophical underpinnings. The member states are pledged to accept and support each of these missions. But the agency cannot achieve its dual goals if extraneous political issues divert attention from its legitimate tasks, generate controversy and confrontation, and sap its effectiveness. Nor can the agency function effectively if its members are willing to violate its statute, as when they illegally rejected a member state's credentials. That is why we are so concerned about what has been happening in Vienna culminating in the events of this past September.

The agency, after all, is the sum of its membership. It is a democratic institution, governed by democratic principles. If the members do not support and abide by the principles in its statute, if they are unwilling to rededicate themselves to those principles, the institution will inexorably decline.

We have strongly supported the agency from its earliest beginnings. We continue to hope that it can live up to the promise of its founding, bringing the benefits of the peaceful atom to the world under an effective safeguards regime. To make that possible—and so to assure that its next 25 years can be as fruitful as the first 25—a renewed dedication to that goal by all of its members is essential. If, on the contrary, the trend toward heightened extraneous political debate cannot be reversed, the IAEA's future may be bleak.

The stakes are considerable. Effective international safeguards are an important component of the international nonproliferation regime. The IAEA's technical assistance program helps a growing number of countries. And international nuclear commerce, as we understand it today, depends in no small measure on the success of this agency. I mean this in real terms but also in terms of the perceptions of the political authorities around the world. If the agency is seen to be weak, divided, and inconstant; if its actions are seen to be inconsistent with its statute, then questions inevitably will arise about the agency's ability to carry out its work—about our ability to prevent the misuse of this powerful force. From that time forward, more efforts will be devoted to restraining commerce, more issues of reliability will arise, and it will be all the more difficult to realize the atom's peaceful benefits. The efforts of nearly three decades will be jeopardized.

In the final analysis, it really comes down to the attitude of the member states. We have reached a critical turning point in the history of the IAEA. The members must now decide which course the agency will pursue. For our part, we want to see the IAEA reinvigorated and refocused on the principles on which it was founded.

Our objective is now, as it always has been, an independent agency in which the international community can continue to repose its confidence, an agency that can be relied upon to carry out faithfully the purposes enumerated in its statute. Achieving that requires a change in the attitudes of many members. And it requires a commitment from all members, not just a few, to the fundamental principles on which the institution was created. That is a tall order, but one which we believe can be achieved. That is our objective.

Future Prospects

What about the future? Is there a basis for optimism? I say emphatically: "Yes." Twenty years ago, many academics and even some policymakers seriously anticipated a world with 25 to 30 nuclear-weapons states by the beginning of the 1980s. Although technical capabilities have slowly spread, those gloomy forecasts, thank heaven, have not come to pass.

Instead, today there are only five [6] declared nuclear-weapons states, and India has carried out a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion. Against that, there are 116 states, as I mentioned earlier, which have solemnly renounced nuclear weaponry by adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Striking that balance, I am optimistic. I believe that there is still a solid basis for hope. I do not believe that a world with many more nuclear powers is inevitable. That notion in my view is the counsel of despair. Widespread nuclear proliferation is avoidable. But to accomplish that goal requires skill, common sense, and careful diplomacy; and hard work, I might add.

It is not, as I'm sure you will agree, a simple issue. It is not, and should not be, a partisan issue. It does not lend itself to speedy solutions in neat little packages. The solutions we seek cannot be reduced to catchy slogans. Achieving our nonproliferation goals requires patience and sober, deliberate action. It requires cooperation with our friends and allies, firmness with our adversaries. It requires support for sensible long-term goals and policies of our government by industry and public alike even where there may be some short-term seeming disadvantage or setback. We must stand together in this effort for there are no quick fixes or short-term palliatives. What we do today will have its effects for decades to come.

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[6] Of these, the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty. [Footnote in original.]

As we are committed to see the fulfillment of the promise of nuclear energy, so too are we committed to assuring that the essential safeguards and nonproliferation controls are in place. But our objectives cannot be achieved by fiat or by unilateral action on our part alone. Only through the shared commitment and cooperative efforts of nations working together can we succeed. But succeed we must.

Address by President Reagan: Deterrence and Arms Control, November 22, 1982 [1]

The week before last was an especially moving one here in Washington. The Vietnam veterans finally came home once and for all to America's heart. They were welcomed with tears, with pride, and with a monument to their great sacrifice. Many of their names, like those of our Republic's greatest citizens, are now engraved in stone in this city that belongs to all of us. On behalf of the nation, let me again thank the Vietnam veterans from the bottom of my heart for their courageous service to America.

Seeing those moving scenes, I know mothers of a new generation must have worried about their children and about peace. And that's what I would like to talk to you about tonight—the future of our children in a world where peace is made uneasy by the presence of nuclear weapons.

A year ago I said the time was right to move forward on arms control. I outlined several proposals and said nothing would have a higher priority in this Administration. Now, a year later, I want to report on those proposals and on other efforts we are making to insure the safety of our children's future.

The prevention of conflict and the reduction of weapons are the most important public issues of our time. Yet, on no other issue are there more misconceptions and misunderstandings. You, the American people, deserve an explanation from your government on what our policy is on these issues. Too often the experts have been content to discuss grandiose strategies among themselves and cloud the public debate in technicalities no one can understand. The result is that many Americans have become frightened, and, let me say, fear of the unknown is entirely understandable. Unfortunately, much of the information emerging in this debate bears little semblance to the facts.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 435, pp. 1–6. The address was broadcast from the White House.

To begin, let's go back to what the world was like at the end of World War II. The United States was the only undamaged industrial power in the world. Our military power was at its peak, and we alone had the atomic weapon. But we didn't use this wealth and this power to bully; we used it to rebuild. We raised up the war-ravaged economies, including the economies of those who had fought against us. At first, the peace of the world was unthreatened, because we alone were left with any real power, and we were using it for the good of our fellow man. Any potential enemy was deterred from aggression because the cost would have far outweighed the gain.

As the Soviets' power grew, we still managed to maintain the peace. The United States had established a system of alliances with NATO as the centerpiece. In addition, we grew even more respected as a world leader with a strong economy and deeply held moral values. With our commitment to help shape a better world, the United States always pursued every diplomatic channel for peace. And for at least 30 years after World War II, the United States still continued to possess a large military advantage over the Soviet Union. Our strength deterred—that is, prevented—aggression against us.

This nation's military objective has always been to maintain peace by preventing war. This is neither a Democratic nor a Republican policy. It's supported by our allies. And most important of all, it has worked for nearly 40 years.

What do we mean when we speak of nuclear deterrence? Certainly we don't want such weapons for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces, or what some people have called "overkill." Basically, it is a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.

We desire peace, but peace is a goal not a policy. Lasting peace is what we hope for at the end of our journey; it doesn't describe the steps we must take, nor the paths we should follow to reach that goal. I intend to search for peace along two parallel paths—deterrence and arms reductions. I believe these are the only paths that offer any real hope for an enduring peace.

And, let me say, I believe that if we follow prudent policies, the risk of nuclear conflict will be reduced. Certainly the United States will never use its forces except in response to attack. Through the years, Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war; and if we maintain a strong deterrent, they are exceedingly unlikely to launch an attack.

The Military Imbalance

Now, while the policy of deterrence has stood the test of time, the things we must do in order to maintain deterrence have changed. You often hear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in an arms race. The truth is that, while the Soviet Union has raced, we have not.

As you can see from this blue U.S. line (see "Defense Spending"), in constant dollars our defense spending in the 1960s went up because of Vietnam, and then it went downward through much of the 1970s. Now, follow the red line, which is Soviet spending. It has gone up and up and up. In spite of a stagnating Soviet economy, Soviet leaders invest 12%–14% of their country's gross national product in military spending, two to three times the level we invest.

DEFENSE SPENDING



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I might add that the defense share of our U.S. Federal budget has gone way down, too. Watch the blue line again (see "Defense Share of Federal Budget"). In 1962, when John Kennedy was president, 46%, almost half of the Federal budget, went to our national defense. In recent years, about one-quarter of our budget has gone to defense, while the share for social programs has nearly doubled. And most of our defense budget is spent on people, not weapons.

The combination of the Soviets spending more and the United States spending proportionately less changed the military balance and weakened our deterrent. Today, in virtually every measure of military power, the Soviet Union enjoys a decided advantage.

This chart (see "Strategic Missiles and Bombers") shows the changes in the total number of intercontinental missiles and bombers. You will see that in 1962 and in 1972, the U.S. forces remained about the same, even dropping some by 1982. But take a look now at the Soviet side. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets could not compare with us in terms of strength. In 1972, when we signed the

DEFENSE SHARE OF FEDERAL BUDGET



STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS



SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Treaty, [2] we were nearly equal. But in 1982, well, that red Soviet bar stretching above the blue American bar tells the story.

I could show you chart after chart where there is a great deal of red and a much lesser amount of U.S. blue. For example, the Soviet Union has deployed a third more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles than we have. Believe it or not, we froze our number in 1965 and have deployed no additional missiles since then.

The Soviet Union put to sea 60 new ballistic missile submarines in the last 15 years. Until last year we hadn't commissioned one in that same period. The Soviet Union has built over 200 modern Backfire bombers and is building 30 more a year. For 20 years, the United States has deployed no new strategic bombers. Many of our B-52 bombers are now older than the pilots who fly them.

The Soviet Union now has 600 of the missiles considered most threatening by both sides—the intermediate-range missiles based on land. We have none. The United States withdrew its intermediate-range land-based missiles from Europe almost 20 years ago.

The world has also witnessed unprecedented growth in the area of Soviet conventional forces; the Soviets far exceed us in the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships they produce every year. What is more, when I arrived in this office, I learned that in our own forces we had planes that couldn't fly and ships that couldn't leave port, mainly for lack of spare parts and crew members.

The Soviet military buildup must not be ignored. We've recognized the problem, and, together with our allies, we have begun to correct the imbalance. Look at this chart (see "Projected Defense Spending," p. 4) of projected real defense spending for the next several years. Here's the Soviet line. Let us assume the Soviets' rate of spending remains at the level they have followed since the 1960s. The blue line is the United States. If my defense proposals are passed, it will still take 5 years before we come close to the Soviet level. Yet the modernization of our strategic and conventional forces will assure that deterrence works and peace prevails.

Decision To Proceed With MX Missile

Our deployed nuclear forces were built before the age of microcircuits. It's not right to ask our young men and women in uniform to maintain and operate such antiques. Many have already given their lives in missile explosions and aircraft accidents caused by the old age

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[2] The text of the treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197 ff. These and following brackets are in the source text.



of their equipment. We must replace and modernize our forces, and that is why I have decided to proceed with the production and deployment of the new ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] known as the MX.

Three earlier presidents worked to develop this missile. Based on the best advice I could get, I concluded that the MX is the right missile at the right time. On the other hand, when I arrived in office, I felt the proposal on where and how to base the missile simply cost too much in terms of money and the impact on our citizens' lives.

I have concluded, however, it is absolutely essential that we proceed to produce this missile, and that we base it in a series of closely based silos at Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. This plan requires only half as many missiles as the earlier plan and will fit in an area of only 20 square miles. It is the product of around-the-clock research that has been underway since I directed a search for a better, cheaper way. I urge the Members of Congress, who must pass this plan, to listen and examine the facts before they come to their own conclusion.

Increasing Prospects for Arms Reductions

Some may question what modernizing our military has to do with peace. Well, as I explained earlier, a secure force keeps others from threatening us and that keeps the peace. And just as important, it also increases the prospects of reaching significant arms reductions with the Soviets, and that's what we really want. The United States wants deep cuts in the world's arsenal of weapons.

But unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength and restore the military balance, the Soviets—since they're so far ahead—have little incentive to negotiate with us. Let me repeat that point, since it goes to the heart of our policies. Unless we demonstrate the will to rebuild our strength, the Soviets have little incentive to negotiate. If we hadn't begun to modernize, the Soviet negotiators would know we had nothing to bargain with except talk. They would know we were bluffing without a good hand, because they know what cards we hold—just as we know what's in their hand.

You may recall that in 1969 the Soviets didn't want to negotiate a treaty banning antiballistic missiles. It was only after our Senate narrowly voted to fund an antiballistic missile program that the Soviets agreed to negotiate. We then reached an agreement.

We also know that one-sided arms control doesn't work. We've tried time and again to set an example by cutting our own forces in the hope that the Soviets will do likewise. The result has always been that they keep building.

I believe our strategy for peace will succeed. Never before has the United States proposed such a comprehensive program of nuclear arms control. Never in our history have we engaged in so many negotiations with the Soviets to reduce nuclear arms and to find a stable peace. What we are saying to them is this: We will modernize our military in order to keep the balance for peace, but wouldn't it be better if we both simply reduced our arsenals to a much lower level?

Let me begin with the negotiations on the intermediate-range nuclear forces that are currently underway in Geneva. As I said earlier, the most threatening of these forces are the land-based missiles, which the Soviet Union now has aimed at Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

This chart shows the number of warheads on these Soviet missiles (see "Missile Warheads"). In 1972, there were 600. The United States was at zero. In 1977, there were 600. The United States was still at zero. Then the Soviets began deploying powerful new missiles with three warheads and a reach of thousands of miles—the SS-20. Since then the bar has gone through the roof—the Soviets have added a missile with three warheads every week. Still you see no U.S. blue on the chart. Although the Soviet leaders earlier this year declared they had frozen deployment of this dangerous missile, they have, in fact, continued deployment.

Last year, on November 18, I proposed the total, global elimination of all these missiles. I proposed that the United States would deploy no comparable missiles—which are scheduled for late 1983—if the Soviet Union would dismantle theirs. We would follow agreement on the land-based missiles with limits on other intermediate-range systems.[3]

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[3] *Ibid., 1981,* p. 570–578.



The European governments strongly support our initiative. The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels. Yet I believe and I am hoping that—as the talks proceed and as we approach the scheduled placement of our new systems in Europe—the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement.

This summer we also began negotiations on strategic arms reductions, the proposal we call START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. Here we're talking about intercontinental missiles—the weapons with a longer range than the intermediate-range ones I was just discussing. We are negotiating on the basis of deep reductions. I proposed in May that we cut the number of warheads on these missiles to an equal number, roughly one-third below current levels. I also proposed that we cut the number of missiles themselves to an equal number, about half the current U.S. level. Our proposals would eliminate some 4,700 warheads and some 2,250 missiles. I think that would be quite a service to mankind.

This chart (see "Strategic Ballistic Missiles") shows the current level of U.S. ballistic missiles, both land and sea based. This is the Soviet level. We intend to convince the Soviets it would be in their own best interest to reduce these missiles. Look at the reduced numbers both sides would have under our proposal—quite a dramatic change. We also seek to reduce the total destructive power of these missiles and other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.

In 1977, when the last Administration proposed more limited reductions,[4] the Soviet Union refused even to discuss them. This time their reaction has been quite different. Their opening position is a serious one, and even though it doesn't meet our objective of deep reductions, there's no question we're heading in the right direction. One reason for this change is clear. The Soviet Union knows that we are now serious about our own strategic programs and that they must be prepared to negotiate in earnest.

We also have other important arms control efforts underway. In the talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions, we've proposed cuts in military personnel to a far lower and equal level. And in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we're working to develop effective limitations on nuclear testing and chemical weapons. The whole world remains outraged by the Soviets' and their allies' use of biological and chemical weapons against defenseless people in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Laos. This experience makes ironclad verification all the more essential for arms control.



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[4] President Carter's remarks on the proposals may be found *ibid., 1977*, pp. 170–177; Secretary Vance's *ibid.*, pp. 177–179.

Reducing the Risks of Accident and Misunderstanding

There is, of course, much more that needs to be done. In an age when intercontinental missiles can span half the globe in less than half an hour, it's crucial that Soviet and American leaders have a clear understanding of each other's capabilities and intentions.

Last June in Berlin and again at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I vowed that the United States would make every effort to reduce the risks of accident and misunderstanding and thus to strengthen mutual confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union.[5] Since then, we've been actively studying detailed measures to implement this Berlin initiative.

Today, I would like to announce some of the measures, which I've proposed in a special letter just sent to the Soviet leadership and which I've instructed our ambassadors in Geneva to discuss with their Soviet counterparts. They include but also go beyond some of the suggestions I made in Berlin.

The first of these measures involves advance notification of all U.S. and Soviet test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. We will also seek Soviet agreement on notification of all sea-launched ballistic missiles as well as intermediate-range land-based ballistic missiles of the type we're currently negotiating. This would remove surprise and uncertainty at the sudden appearance of such missiles on the warning screens of the two countries.

In another area of potential misunderstanding, we propose to the Soviets that we provide each other with advance notification of our major military exercises. Here again, our objective is to reduce the surprise and uncertainty surrounding otherwise sudden moves by either side.

These sorts of measures are designed to deal with the immediate issues of miscalculation in time of crisis. But there are deeper, longer term problems as well. In order to clear away some of the mutual ignorance and suspicion between our two countries, I will propose that we both engage in a broad-ranging exchange of basic data about our nuclear forces. I am instructing our ambassadors at the negotiations on both strategic and intermediate forces to seek Soviet agreement on an expanded exchange of information. The more one side knows about what the other side is doing, the less room there is for surprise and miscalculation.

Probably everyone has heard of the so-called hotline, which enables me to communicate directly with the Soviet leadership in the event of a crisis. The existing hotline is dependable and rapid with both ground and satellite links. But because it is so important, I've also directed that we carefully examine any possible improvements to the existing hotline system.

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[5] *Ante*, June 11 and June 17.

Now, although we've begun negotiations on these many proposals, this doesn't mean we've exhausted all the initiatives that could help to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. We'll leave no opportunity unexplored, and we'll consult closely with Senators Nunn, Jackson, and Warner, and other Members of the Congress who've made important suggestions in this field.

We are also making strenuous efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would be tragic if we succeeded in reducing existing arsenals only to have new threats emerge in other areas of the world.

Reaffirming America's Destiny

Earlier I spoke of America's contributions to peace following World War II, of all we did to promote peace and prosperity for our fellow man. Well, we're still those same people. We still seek peace above all else. I want to remind our own citizens and those around the world of this tradition of American goodwill, because I am concerned about the effects the nuclear fear is having on our people. The most upsetting letters I receive are from schoolchildren who write to me as a class assignment. It's evident they've discussed the most nightmarish aspects of a nuclear holocaust in their classrooms. Their letters are often full of terror. This should not be so.

The philosopher Spinoza said, "Peace . . . is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." Those are the qualities we want our children to inherit, not fear. They must grow up confident if they are to meet the challenges of tomorrow, as we will meet the challenges of today.

I began these remarks speaking of our children, and I want to close on the same theme. Our children should not grow up frightened. They should not fear the future. We are working to make it peaceful and free. I believe their future can be the brightest, most exciting of any generation. We must reassure them and let them know that their parents and the leaders of this world are seeking above all else to keep them safe and at peace. I consider this to be a sacred trust.

My fellow Americans, on this Thanksgiving when we have so much to be grateful for, let us give special thanks for our peace, our freedom, and our good people. I've always believed that this land was set aside in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans to be found by a people from every corner of the Earth who had a special love of faith, freedom, and peace. Let us reaffirm America's destiny of goodness and goodwill. Let us work for peace, and, as we do, let us remember the lines of the famous hymn, "O God of love, O King of peace, make wars throughout the world to cease."

Letter From President Reagan to the Congress: MX Missile Basing, November 22, 1982 [1]

For many years, U.S. strategic forces have helped protect our Nation and the Free World by providing a capable and effective deterrent. Maintenance of these forces has historically enjoyed broad bipartisan support.

In recent years, our deterrent has become increasingly vulnerable in the face of a relentless Soviet military buildup. As part of our program to modernize the U.S. deterrent, I asked last year that you support improving the capability and survivability of the land-based component of our strategic forces by authorizing development and deployment of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. I also agreed earlier this year to provide you with a permanent basing decision by December 1.

In response to this requirement, the Department of Defense forwarded to me a series of basing options, with associated analyses of technical, environmental, arms control, and other factors. I have also received the counsel of my senior advisers, former Presidents and Administration officials, and Members of Congress. After careful study, I have decided to emplace 100 MX missiles, now known as "Peacekeeper," in superhard silos in a closely-spaced basing mode at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyoming. Given Congressional support, these missiles will have an initial operational capability late in 1986. I am prepared also to consider deception and possibly ballistic missile defense, which are options if the Soviet Union continues its military buildup.

We all hope, however, that the Soviets will join us in seeking meaningful progress in arms control negotiations. This MX decision supports and complements the U.S. approach to arms control. While the U.S. must and will improve its forces to maintain a credible deterrent, we remain fully committed to our standing proposals for significant reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals. We seek to reduce ballistic missiles by about one-half and ballistic missile warheads by about one-third.

Under separate cover, I am sending you a copy of my full statement on the decision outlined above. [2] I ask that you keep an open mind on this complex and important question and permit the Administration to make its case for the decision. We are prepared to respond, at your convenience, to formal and informal requests for additional information that you may desire. I look forward to receiving your counsel and assistance as we work toward our common goal of improving the security of our Nation.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 29, 1982, p. 1515. A footnote in the source text indicates that letters were also sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, notifying them of the deployment decision.

[2] *Infra.*

Statement by President Reagan: MX Missile Basing, November 22, 1982 [1]

For nearly 2 years my Administration has examined the matter of the MX missile, the development of which has been supported by my three immediate predecessors, Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon. We all have strongly agreed that strengthening our land-based missile system is absolutely essential to maintain America's deterrent capability to deter war and to protect our nation.

I have sought the counsel of my predecessors, the opinion of Members of Congress, and the advice of the best technical and scientific minds in the field. My Administration, as well as the ones before it, has examined a wide variety of options, including smaller or bigger missiles, the development of one missile for common use on land or at sea, and the possibility of greater mobility. And, like the preceding administrations, we have concluded that MX is the right missile and that now is the time.

Deciding how to deploy the missile has not been that easy. A variety of basing modes has been studied by previous administrations and by ours. The concept of deceptive basing, as employed in previous planning, was a fundamentally sound one for assuring the stability of land-based ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] [2] forces in times of crisis.

It complied with our strategic arms control objectives. Other sensible growth options were studied as well. As these plans progressed through the two previous administrations, however, they grew enormously in cost. Not only was the financial cost high—$40–$50 billion—but the cost to our western citizens in terms of water, land, social disruption, and environmental damage seemed unreasonable.

For these reasons, we considered other approaches while proceeding with the development of the MX missile itself. The missile work is now nearly complete. The first test flight is scheduled for early next year. While test flights are just that—tests—I have no doubts about the technical success, in fact, excellence, of this missile.

In reexamining how to base the missiles, we concluded that by pulling the launch sites much closer together and making them a great deal harder, we could make significant savings. We would need fewer silos, much less land, and, in fact, fewer missiles. We would achieve a system that could survive against the current and projected Soviet rocket inventory. Deployment of such a system would require the Soviets to make costly new technical developments if they wish to even contemplate a surprise attack. Most of the Soviet counter-measures proposed are really no more than technical dreams on which no Soviet planner or politician would bet the fate of his country. Thus, closely spaced basing is a reasonable way to deter attack, which is our objective.

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[1] Dept. of State Current Policy No. 435, p. 7.

[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Now let me outline our overall plan for our ICBM force.

First, we recognize that the best survivability, and thus the best deterrence, lies in the modernization of all three legs of the triad: submarines, bombers, and land-based ballistic missiles. Each gains security as all are rendered less susceptible to technological or operational surprise.

Second, we are closing down our force of huge Titan missiles at the rate of one missile every month or two. Their immense warheads and antiquated fuels have no place in our current inventory.

Third, we will maintain an appropriate Minuteman force, but many of these could be removed if we reach agreement with the Soviets on strategic arms reductions.

Fourth, we plan to produce the MX missile, now named "Peacekeeper," and deploy it in superhard silos at Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, near Cheyenne, Wyoming. That seems to be the most cost-effective location, but I appreciate the enthusiastic offers by the citizens of Nevada to base the missile in their state.

We will emplace 100 of these missiles (versus the 200 in some of the earlier plans) in launch canisters which can be moved, if necessary, between closely spaced superhard silos. We plan to build only 100 such silos, but we will design the system so that we can add more silos later, again within the confines of a small land area, if the Soviets will not agree to strategic arms reductions, or if they persist in the development and production of more powerful and deadly weapons. We would prefer that the Soviets dismantle SS-18s, rather than we build more holes. But we can accommodate either and maintain stability.

As far as an active defense is concerned, we do not wish to embark on any course of action that could endanger the current ABM [anti-ballistic missile] Treaty [3] so long as it is observed by the Soviet Union. Likewise, we do not wish to build even the minimal ABM system allowed us by the treaty, even though the Soviets have done so.

We plan to continue research on ballistic missile defense technology—the kind of smart, highly accurate, hopefully non-nuclear, weapons that utilize the microelectronic and other advanced technologies in which we excel. The objective of this program is stability for our ICBM forces in the 1990s, a hedge against Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty, and the technical competence to evaluate Soviet ABM developments. We currently have no plan to deploy any ballistic missile defense system.

The entire missile and basing program will cost about $26 billion in 1982 dollars, commencing with this fiscal year. That's a reduction by half, both in cost and in numbers of missiles deployed, from the other plans on the drawing boards when I entered office. The ongoing ballistic missile defense research and development will cost about $2.5 billion. Both of these programs are already reflected in the FY 1983 budget projections, but the specific decisions announced today allow us to proceed with the reductions from my February budget request for this year of a billion dollars, which we have so carefully worked out with the Congress.

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[3] The text of the ABM Treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

Continuity of effort in national security affairs is essential. Turbulence is wasteful beyond words. These programs to increase the stability and security of our strategic nuclear forces are urgently needed. The planning by my predecessors made them possible, but it is for my successor that I make these decisions. With every effort, the Peacekeeper missile still will not be fully deployed until the late 1980s when yet another president shoulders these burdens.

I urge the Congress, and all Americans, to support this program, developed under several presidents: those in the past who conceived and urged the deployment of MX and the current President who has made these difficult decisions. It is only by such steadfastness of purpose that we can maintain the peace which every nation needs to work out the hopes and dreams of its own people.

Statement by the Department of Defense: MX Missile Basing, November 22, 1982 [1]

THE NEED FOR ICBM MODERNIZATION

For over 20 years the United States has relied on a combination of land-based missile, sea-based missiles, and bombers to deter Soviet aggression. This Strategic Triad, as the combination is called, insures that U.S. forces will be able, under all conditions, to survive a Soviet first strike and to retaliate. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) offer a unique contribution to the effective deterrent value of the Strategic Triad. They are accurate and responsive; have realizable, real-time communications with command authorities; possess short time-to-target capability; and offer alert rates approaching 100 percent. ICBM's make it more difficult for the Soviets to plan and execute a successful attack on all three Triad components.

Since the late 1960's, the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive and destabilizing strategic arms buildup that threatens the survivability and retaliatory effectiveness of the Triad. Specifically, the Soviets have developed and deployed numerous large and highly accurate weapons capable of destroying most of the U.S. ICBM force in a first strike, while expending a relatively small proportion of their ICBM force in the process.

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[1] *The New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1982.

The Soviets have also taken steps to reduce our ability to retaliate. They have hardened their ICBM silos and critical command and control facilities to the point that Minuteman missiles have only limited capabilities against them. This imbalance in such a critical component of strategic capability seriously undermines the strength of our nuclear deterrence.

The MX missile is designed to resolve this imbalance. Unlike the Minuteman, the MX has the prompt, hard target capability necessary to effectively retaliate against the full range of Soviet targets. The MX also has the necessary basing flexibility to insure its survivability.

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MODERNIZATION PLAN

In October 1981 President Reagan announced a comprehensive plan for modernizing U.S. strategic forces.[2] A key part of that plan was his proposal to remedy the U.S. land-based ICBM deficiencies. His plan called for deployment of the MX missile with an initial operational capability in 1986. To insure this early deployment, the President directed an aggressive research program to identify a permanent, survivable means of basing the MX. This research work has shown that Closely Spaced Basing (CSB) is the most effective basing option.

THE MX MISSILE

The MX is a four-stage ICBM that carries 10 independently targetable nuclear re-entry vehicles (RV's). It is 70 feet long, 92 inches in diameter, and weighs approximately 192,000 pounds. It has many advantages over missile weapon systems currently in the U.S. inventory. MX will be more accurate, can carry more warheads, and has greater range and targeting flexibility than the Minuteman ICBM's. Its greater resistance to nuclear effects and its more capable guidance system provides the MX with a greatly enhanced hard-target kill capability.

The first three stages of the MX use solid propellant and provide the thrust needed to achieve intercontinental range. The fourth stage uses liquid propellants to carry out the maneuvers that properly deploy the RV's. Along with the liquid propellant, the fourth stage carries the computers and electronic equipment that guide and control the missile from the time of launch through the release of RV's. The MX guidance and control system uses an advanced inertial reference sphere (AIRS) that provides the flight computer with information on missile movement during flight.

The re-entry system consists of two main subsystems, the deployment module and the shroud. The deployment module, attached to the fourth stage, carries the RV's. The titanium shroud covers the deployment module and protects the RV's during the first two stages of flight.

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[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 461–464.

Closely Spaced Basing

Traditionally, hardness and spacing decisions for missile deployments have been based on the objective of insuring that no more than one missile could be destroyed per attacking warhead. Greater hardness allows closer spacing because it is more difficult to damage harder targets with a given warhead.

Titan and early Minuteman launch facilities were conservatively spaced several miles apart because of the relatively low silo hardness levels. As more sophisticated hardness measurements and testing techniques were developed, they were applied in an upgrade program that hardened Minuteman silos. In mid-1981 the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) reported on series of tests and analyses to validate silo hardness levels. The conclusion of that work was that superhard silo designs are feasible. This breakthrough permitted the development of the close spacing concept. Air Force studies, under way for some time, indicate that severe fratricide effects would occur to attacking weapons as a result of close spacing and would be a greater problem as spacing became smaller and smaller. The Townes Panel, studying MX basing alternatives during 1981, recognized this fact and recommended serious consideration of exploiting fratricide effects to advantage in MX basing. With new evidence in superhard design technology, an understanding of fratricide effects and the impetus provided by the President's ICBM Modernization Program, the CSB concept was defined, analyzed and is now the MX permanent basing recommendation.

CSB involves deploying 100 MX missiles in superhard capsules at close distances that maximize the phenomenon of fratricide while still far enough apart to prevent one weapon from destroying two capsules. The major features of the CBS concept are the superhardened capsule, close spacing, and array shape.

The superhard capsule contains the MX missile and its canister/launcher. It protects the missile against the effects of nuclear detonations. The objective is to build a capsule so hard that air burst attacks are ineffective. This is desired because the nuclear effects (and resulting fratricide) of incoming weapons are more severe for a surface burst than for an air burst.

Another objective of hardness is to prevent the Soviets from fractionating (reducing the yield and increasing the number of) the reentry vehicles on their missiles. Since high yield and good accuracy are both required to damage hard targets, harder targets will require higher yield or better accuracy to destroy them.

The distance between capsules must be small enough to assure prompt fratricide on incoming warheads but great enough to prevent the Soviets from successfully targeting multiple capsules with one warhead. A spacing of 1,800 feet between the capsules is an optimum distance to assure these objectives.

An array is the term given to the CSB deployment field. Different array shapes will create different fratricide problems for the Soviets. The most promising shape, and the one now considered for CSB, is a column or segmented column arrangement.

The Theory of the "Dense Pack" Missile Site



The "dense pack" missile site would be a long, slender column of about 20 square miles with 100 MX missiles in hardened capsules. Soviet warheads in a strike would hit and destroy some missiles in their silos, but those explosions would also destroy Soviet warheads coming alongside or behind the first group. This is known as "fratricide."

The Soviet Union would need a slowly paced, drawnout attack because of the slender column, and about 70 percent of the U.S. missiles would survive. The shape of the field would also force the Soviet Union to explode many more megatons per minute in an attempt to pin down the MX force, depleting Soviet nuclear resources. Surviving MX's could be used to retaliate.

Source: *Department of Defense*

In summary, the baseline CSB concept consists of one array of 100 MX missiles in 100 capsules hardened to very high levels for ground bursts and providing even greater protection from air bursts, and spaced at 1,800 feet. This results in a system deployable on about 20 square miles of land.

CSB Concept of Operations

The facilities for CSB are divided into three separate groups: those in the deployment area in addition to the MX capsules, those at the Area Support Center, and those at the Main Operating Base.

The deployment area will be the array of capsules. Security police will use facilities inside the array to monitor security. Also in the array will be two underground launch control facilities to provide communications between the capsules and higher authority and command and control over the day-to-day operations in the missile field.

The Area Support Center contains the Missile Assembly Facility for assembling the major missile components and support equipment. This center will be served by rail transportation for shipment of large components. At this center there will also be a Weapon Storage Area, a Site Security center for controlling entry to the deployment area and monitoring security throughout the area and finally, a Maintenance and Support Facility for general maintenance and administrative requirements for personnel.

The Main Operating Base will make use of existing military facilities to the maximum extent possible to support the MX system. Additional construction may be needed to support the required MX manpower and missile requirements. Included will be an Operations Support Center for staff functions to maintain the operational readiness of the MX weapon system, and substantial warehousing and storage areas.

For normal day-to-day operations the Launch Control Center provides command and control of the missiles. This involves monitoring the status of and issuing commands to maintain system readiness.

During and after an attack, survivable command and control would be provided by Airborne Launch Control Center (ALCC) aircraft and satellite relays. Besides mobility, the ALCC has the advantage of communicating to the MX weapon system and attack assessment sensors through secure radio links. The ALCC will also communicate to higher authority through numerous and redundant radio links.

MX target storage and reprogramming capability will be used to optimize the capability of the surviving force.

CSB EFFECTIVENESS

CSB is effective because the close spacing of the MX capsules forces attacking weapons to be closely spaced. When early-arriving warheads detonate, the nuclear effects caused by the detonation destroy or deflect off-course those weapons that follow (fratricide). The Soviets do not now have, nor are they projected to have in the near-term, the capability to avoid these fratricide effects.

The major nuclear effects that combine to make an attack on CSB ineffective are both prompt and longer term. The prompt nuclear effects include radiation air blast and fireball. These effects destroy or degrade the performance of incoming weapons and prevent the Soviets from executing a precisely timed attack on all CSB capsules, as well as fast-paced attacks. While the Soviets might consider a slow-paced attack to avoid these prompt effects, they will find that the longer term effects, such as dust and debris, foreclose their ability to reattack after an initial wave for extended periods of time. Consequently, MX in CSB remains survivable and can be used in retaliation as necessary.

Fratricide, then, puts a limit on the size of an attack on the capsule array and reduces the usefulness of the large numbers of warheads the Soviets possess. Since the Soviets are unable to generate an effective attack on MX in CSB, they will see no advantage in initiating a conflict, and thus, deterrence will be enhanced.

The Soviets may choose to seek improvements to their ICBM forces in order to threaten MX in CSB. In the near-term through the early 1990's, they could increase the yield of their re-entry vehicles in an attempt to overcome the hardness level of CSB capsules, but the larger yield significantly increases the fratricide effects, therefore the CSB deployment of 100 MX missiles in 100 capsules will remain a strong and viable deterrent against the near-term threat.

For the longer term, mid-to late-1990's, the Soviets may seek technological breakthroughs, which may allow them to deploy low yield, highly accurate, earth-penetrating weapons that could threaten the hard CSB capsules and avoid fratricide. If so, the United States would have a number of options to enhance CSB and maintain its viability. These options include straightforward countermeasures, concealment in additional capsules, ballistic missile defense, or deep basing. In all cases, expensive and risky Soviet development programs can be countered effectively by relatively simple and quickly deployable U.S. responses.

White House Fact Sheet on Confidence-Building Measures, November 22, 1982 [1]

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) do not directly affect the size, weaponry, or structure of the parties' military forces, but instead are designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities, to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication, and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis.

Background

Over the last two decades, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on several measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

—The "Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link" (Hotline Agreement), signed in 1963, established a direct communications link, the Hotline, between Washington and Moscow, in the form of a teletype circuit. [2] A second agreement, signed in 1971, provided for the upgrading of the Hotline by the addition of satellite circuits to the land line already in use. [3] These circuits began operation in 1978.

—The "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (Accidents Measures Agreement), signed in 1971, requires each side to maintain safeguards and control against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; to notify the other side in advance of planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party in the direction of the other party; and to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war.[4]

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[1] White House press release, Nov. 22, 1982.

[2] For text of the Hot Line agreement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236–238.

[3] *Ibid., 1971*, pp. 635–639.

—The "Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas" (Incidents at Sea Agreement), signed in 1972, enjoins the two sides to observe strictly the letter and the spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea; to refrain from provocative acts at sea that could increase the risk of war; and to provide advance notice to mariners of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.[5]

In addition, Article XVI of the SALT II Agreement contained a provision requiring notification in advance of all multiple ICBM launches (more than one ICBM in flight at the same time) or single ICBM launches which are planned to extend beyond the national territory of the notifying side, regardless of direction.[6]

The President's Initiative

In his Berlin speech of June 11, 1982,[7] and at the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament on June 17, 1982,[8] the President pledged to leave no stone unturned in the effort to reinforce peace and lessen the risk of war. Recognizing the need to improve mutual communication and confidence, and lessen the likelihood of misinterpretation, he suggested various ways in which the US and Soviet Union could deal with this problem, including reciprocal exchanges in such areas as advance notification of major exercises, advance notification of ICBM launches within, as well as beyond, national boundaries, and an expanded exchange of strategic forces data. As the President stated in Berlin, "Taken together, these steps would represent a qualitative improvement in the nuclear environment. They would help reduce the chances of misinterpretation in the case of exercises and test launches. And they would reduce the secrecy and ambiguity which surround military activity."

Since then, the US Government has been engaged in a thorough study of detailed ways for implementing and expanding the President's proposals. As a result of this study, the US has officially proposed to the Soviet Union in Geneva those measures mentioned by the President. In addition, we will be proposing within the next few days two additional measures developed since the President's June speeches: advance notification of launches of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and of land-based longer-range INF ballistic missiles. The US also believes that the expanded exchange of forces data proposed for the strategic context should be applied to INF as well, and already is seeking such an exchange.

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 634–635.
[5] 23 UST 1168; TIAS 7379; 852 UNTS 151.
[6] The SALT II agreement may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.
[7] See *ante*.
[8] *Ante*.

The confidence-building measures to be proposed by the US are briefly outlined below.

Notification of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Launches

A number of previous US-USSR agreements have provided for advance notification of some ICBM launches:

—The 1971 "Accidents Measures" Agreement requires each side to notify the other in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party.

—In accordance with standard maritime practice, Notices to Airmen and Mariners (NOTAMs) giving impact areas are provided in advance of launches of missiles which will impact in international waters. NOTAMs consist of warning which announce "closure areas" within which the impact will take place.

—Article XVI of SALT II would have obligated each party to notify the other well in advance before conducting multiple ICBM launches, or single ICBM launches which are planned to extend beyond its national territory. There was no obligation to notify of single launches not intended to extend beyond national territory.

None of the previous agreements, however, provides total coverage of all ICBM launches, since none covers single launches which impact within the territory of the launching nation. Because any launch can create uncertainty and ambiguity, the US has proposed in the START negotiations that both sides provide notice of all ICBM launches, whether they occur single or in multiples, whether their flights remain within national boundaries or extend beyond them.

Notification of Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)

At present, the US and USSR do not notify each other of SLBM launches, although they do issue standard notices to airmen and mariners, announcing "closure areas," if an SLBM is expected to impact in international waters. To reduce any possibility of misinterpretation, the US will propose that the sides provide advance notification of all their SLBM launches, including any launches which impact within national territory.

This, combined with the ICBM notification measure, will mean that for the first time notification will be required in advance for all launches of strategic ballistic missiles in the arsenals of either side.

Notification of LRINF Ballistic Missile Launches

The US will also propose in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) that advance notification be provided for all launches of land-based longer-range INF ballistic missiles. These include the Soviet Union's SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, and the US Pershing II. We will continue to seek the elimination of all land-based, LRINF missiles. At present, however, despite the fact that Soviet INF missiles are deployed in large numbers, and the Pershing II is in advanced development, there is no provision for advance notification of launches of such missiles. During the near term, while we are negotiating to eliminate and ban such missiles, this step would be a useful confidence-building measure. Moreover, it is consistent with our ICBM and SLBM notification proposals.

Advance Notification of Major Military Exercises

Each year the US and USSR conduct a number of large scale military exercises intended to develop, perfect or refine plans, procedures or operations, and to provide training. Such exercises potentially are subject to misinterpretation. The US has proposed that each side provide notification in advance of major exercises which are of such a scope as to raise the concerns of the other side.

Expanded Exchange of Forces Data

As the President stated in his Berlin and SSOD speeches, the US will seek an expanded exchange of data on strategic nuclear forces. Implementation of this proposal is already under way in Geneva, where the US START delegation has proposed to the Soviets a reciprocal exchange of a broad variety of specific types of information. In addition, in the INF negotiations we are pursuing the same expanded exchanges in the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces. The detailed exchange of information on the makeup of each side's forces will help to reduce the risk of misinterpreting actions involving those forces, and enhance the understanding each side has of the capabilities and limitations of the other. Moreover, such exchanges will be important to the successful negotiation and implementation of any START or INF agreement, since those agreements will entail substantial reductions and restrictions on many systems, requiring exchange of detailed information on those systems. The expanded exchange of data proposed will be an important step in the verification of these agreements.

Address by Soviet General Secretary Andropov [Extract], November 22, 1982 [1]

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Comrades! The death of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev gave rise abroad to a good many conjectures concerning the future course of the CPSU and the Soviet state in international affairs. Just think how many attempts there have been in the past few years to ascribe all kinds of sinister intentions to the Soviet Union, to portray our policy as an aggressive one that jeopardizes the security of first one state, then another. But now it turns out that they're worried that this policy might change. They see its continuation as an important precondition for peace and tranquillity in the international arena.

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[1] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXIV, No. 47 (Dec. 21, 1982), pp. 6–7; *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Nov. 23, 1982. The address was delivered at the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee.

I must say most emphatically that Soviet foreign policy has been and continues to be as it was defined by the decisions of our Party's 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses.[2] Ensuring a lasting peace and defending the right of peoples to independence and social progress are the invariable goals of our foreign policy. In the struggle for these goals, the leadership of the Party and the state will act in a principled way, consistently and thoughtfully. (*Applause.*)

We believe that the difficulties and tension that characterize the international situation today can and must be overcome. Mankind cannot endlessly put up with the arms race and with wars, if it does not want to put its future at stake. The CPSU is against turning the dispute of ideas into a confrontation between states and peoples, and it is against making arms and the readiness to use them the yardstick of the social systems' potential.

Imperialism's aggressive intrigues compel us, together with the fraternal socialist states, to show concern—serious concern—for maintaining our defense capability at the proper level. But, as Leonid Ilyich stressed more than once, military rivalry is not our choice. A world without weapons—that's the ideal of socialism.

Strengthening the socialist commonwealth will continue to be a primary concern of our Party. Our strength, and the pledge of ultimate success even in the most terrible trials, lies in unity.

All the plans of the commonwealth of socialist states are plans of peace and creation. We are trying to make comradely cooperation and socialist mutual assistance among the fraternal countries deeper and more effective, especially in the joint accomplishment of scientific, technical, production, transportation, energy and other tasks. Further joint steps in this area are now being mapped out.

The CPSU and the Soviet state sincerely want the development and improvement of relations with all socialist countries. Mutual goodwill, respect for one another's legitimate interests and common concern for the interests of socialism and peace should prompt correct solutions even where, for various reasons, the proper trust and mutual understanding are still lacking.

This also refers to our great neighbor, the Chinese People's Republic. The ideas formulated by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in his speeches in Tashkent and Baku,[3] the emphasis he placed on common sense and is in advanced development, there is no provision for advance notification of launches of such missiles. During the near term, while we are negotiating to eliminate and ban such missiles, this step would be a useful confidence-building measure. Moreover, it is consistent with our ICBM and SLBM notification proposals.

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[2] For Brezhnev's report to the 26th Congress, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 64–69.

[3] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXIV, No. 12, pp. 4–8, and *ibid.*, No. 39, pp. 1–5, 13.

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This also refers to our great neighbor, the Chinese People's Republic. The ideas formulated by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in his speeches in Tashkent and Baku, [3] the emphasis he placed on common sense and on the need to overcome the inertia of prejudices, expressed the conviction of all our Party and its desire to look ahead. We are paying great attention to every positive response from the Chinese side.

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[2] For Brezhnev's report to the 26th Congress, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 64–69.

[3] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXIV, No. 12, pp. 4–8, and *ibid.*, No. 39, pp. 1–5, 13.

The importance in international life of the group of states that created the nonaligned movement is growing. With many of them, the Soviet Union has diversified, friendly ties that benefit both sides and facilitate greater stability in the world. One example of this is the USSR's relations with India. Solidarity with states that have been liberated from colonial oppression and with peoples who are defending their independence has been and remains one of the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy.

Since the first days of Soviet power, our state has invariably expressed its readiness for open, honest cooperation with all countries that respond in kind. Differences in social systems should not prevent this—and they don't, when there is goodwill on both sides. Convincing confirmation of this is the appreciable progress in the development of peaceful cooperation between the USSR and many countries of Western Europe.

We are deeply convinced that the 1970s, whose hallmark was detente, were not, as certain imperialist leaders are now asserting, a fortuitous episode in the difficult history of mankind. No, the policy of detente is by no means a stage that is over and done with. The future belongs to it. (*Applause.*)

Everyone has an equal stake in preserving peace and detente. Therefore, statements in which readiness for normalizing relations is linked with the demand that the Soviet Union pay for this with various preliminary concessions in a variety of fields do not sound serious, to say the least. We will not agree to this. (*Applause.*) And, in fact, we have nothing to take back: We didn't impose sanctions against anyone, renounce signed treaties and agreements, or break off talks that had begun. I want to stress once more that the Soviet Union is for agreement, but it must be sought on a basis of reciprocity and equality. (*Applause.*)

We do not see the point of talks with the US and other Western countries, first of all on questions of checking the arms race, as merely registering disagreements. For us, talks are a way of pooling the efforts of various states in order to achieve results useful to all sides. The problems will not disappear by themselves if talks are held only for the sake of talks—which is frequently the case, unfortunately. We favor a search for a healthy basis, acceptable to both sides, for solutions to the most complicated problems—above all, of course, the problem of curbing the arms race, in both nuclear and conventional weapons. But let no one expect unilateral disarmament from us. We are not naive people. (*Applause.*)

We don't demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are for equality, for consideration of the interests of both sides, for honest agreement. We are ready for this. (*Applause.*)

As far as the strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the USSR and the US, in particular, are concerned, the Soviet Union, as is known, has agreed that the two sides should "freeze" their arsenals as a first step on the path to a future agreement, thereby creating more favorable conditions for the continuation of talks on their mutual reduction.

In general, the USSR rejects the viewpoint of those who are trying to impress on people the idea that force and weapons decide everything and always will. Today, as never before, the peoples are coming to the forefront of history. They have won the right to speak, and no one will muffle their voice. They are capable, through vigorous and purposeful actions, of eliminating the threat of nuclear war and of safeguarding peace, and hence life on our planet. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state will do everything to promote this effort. (*Applause.*)

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Statement by the FRG Representative (Wegener) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Non-First Use of and Freeze on Nuclear Weapons [Extract], November 23, 1982 [1]

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I turn now to the freeze. In our view, the following arguments can be advanced against the freeze philosophy and can show its serious flaws.

A freeze could be justified only if the participants in a freeze decision would at that time fully enjoy and preserve their right to security; in other words, if there was a genuine balance, both in the global context and at relevant sub-global levels. If not, the freeze decision would be in direct contradiction of paragraph 29 of the Final Document. [2] If that paragraph is taken seriously, the freeze decision should never be taken totally separated from a profound analysis of the underlying security situation and force relationships.

Secondly, proponents of the freeze assert that there is parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. This claim of parity is constantly repeated but rarely substantiated. In the context of the security situation in Europe, the Soviet Union, without any corresponding arms development on the Western side, has in the last couple of years deployed many hundreds of nuclear warheads of great destructive effect and have substantially reinforced its conventional capability. The Soviet Union claimed parity in 1978 and still pretends that it exists now—hundreds of Soviet nuclear warheads later. That is a logical impossibility. The difficulty with the freeze is that, in the absence of approximate parity, it would amount to unilateral disarmament and codify the superiority of one side at an arbitrarily chosen moment.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 13–17.

[2] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* p. 418.

Thirdly, if the consequence of the freeze is a mere codification of imbalances, it destroys the incentive for deep cuts for genuine nuclear reduction. One of its psychological flaws is that it arbitrarily separates the two components of the concept of halting and reversing the arms race.

Fourthly, the freeze therefore leaves existing nuclear arsenals in place. In the East-West context, which depends on a balanced nuclear relationship between the two major Powers, the mere continued existence of such vastly superior arsenals in a region produces grave psychological results, instils fear and mistrust and deeply affects the general political atmosphere.

Fifthly, even if a freeze were based on a balanced situation and thus acceptable, it would need adequate verification embodied in firm contractual commitments. A freeze without such a basis would do nothing to allay fear and suspicion and would not be durable. Obviously, however, an agreement on a verified freeze could hardly be reached more rapidly than a much more urgently needed agreement on arms reduction.

Sixthly, the preparedness of Western Governments to embark on freeze moves is greatly complicated by the traumatic experiences with earlier unilateral or agreed moratoria. It is an uncontested fact that the Soviet Union has unilaterally abandoned the 1958–1961 moratorium on testing and, equally, that it has not responded to the unilateral United States renunciation of the production of chemical weapons in 1969.

Furthermore, in spite of the Soviet Union's declaration earlier this year that it would cease deploying SS-20 nuclear weapons, construction work on additional deployment sites has continued unabated.

In conclusion, I should like to restate our deep conviction that instead of freeze proposals at this juncture, instead of codification of existing balances, we need an effective reduction through balance and verifiable agreements and thus the establishment of a stable nuclear balance at the lowest possible levels. Whoever is in favour of genuine arms control and arms limitation should work actively towards that end.

I now turn to the issue of the non-first use of nuclear weapons. My delegation has twice offered a critical analysis of commitments relating to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons at the 1981 session of the First Committee and again during the general debate of the present session. In parenthesis, I might add that unfortunately the argument contained in last year's statement and the arguments put forward at that time by some of the other Western delegations have not been reflected in the

1981 Disarmament Yearbook, making the presentation of these problems in the Yearbook somewhat lacking in balance.

In each of the two statements, my delegation has underlined that the concept of non-first-use must be judged by whether it meets the overriding exigency of preventing war. I do not wish to enumerate our arguments in full. Suffice it to recall the following two considerations that are of decisive importance for us. First, anyone who undertakes not to make first use of a specific type of weapon obviously intends to reserve the right to use other weapons. That is the attitude of a Power which feels it has superiority in those other weapons. Nobody can expect the inferior side to applaud such a position. Secondly, a declaration of intent not to make first use of certain weapons is insufficient and futile as long as those weapons remain ready for use. It is not possible to verify such a self-imposed obligation, because of its declaratory nature. It would only become clear whether the obligation was really being honoured in the event of a confrontation, at which point it could be too late for the international community to react. Therefore it is not enough to forswear the first use of nuclear weapons to meet the professed purpose. What we need is a strict observance of the comprehensive ban on the use of force, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

The time allotted to my delegation for this explanation of vote is running out. I have to limit myself to these few arguments. There are others. In conclusion, and before we proceed to the vote on the many nuclear resolutions before the Committee, I should like to express my regret that in our opinion many of the resolutions do not objectively promote the purposes they purport to serve.

In this universal body dealing with security and disarmament problems, I should like to reiterate the readiness of my delegation to join in any venture which in our view can make a more forceful and effective contribution to the prevention of war, including nuclear war. We have a broad range of possibilities to deal within that subject, even below the level of the controversial strategic doctrine. We must be more imaginative in devising ways by mutual agreement to make the outbreak of nuclear war and war in general by accident or miscalculation impossible. We could do more to regulate the behaviour of States in the pre-war stage. Confidence-building measures in the nuclear rounds, including those just proposed by President Reagan, are among these possibilities.

My delegation, together with two other delegations, took an initiative in this direction at the second special session devoted to disarmament. We remain prepared to identify, within a suitable multilateral organizational framework, appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, provided that the context of war prevention in general is not lost.

My delegation regrets that the work of this Committee has not focused sufficiently on the preparation of a consensus text on this partial but vital topic. Yet there is hope that we shall shortly tread that more promising ground. That would certainly lead us further than many of the other resolutions to which I have had to voice my objections in this explanation of vote.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Lin Cheng) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, November 23, 1982[3]

In general, to demand a freeze on nuclear weapons to stop the nuclear-arms race is understandable. However, the situation of the various nuclear States is quite different. The nuclear Powers possess massive nuclear arsenals. They use them to carry out a policy of nuclear threat and blackmail, while the countries with very small nuclear defence capacity and the many States without nuclear weapons are the victims of the nuclear threat.

In view of this situation an indiscriminate demand that all nuclear States should freeze nuclear weapons obviously can be only to the advantage of the nuclear Powers, thus legalizing their nuclear superiority over other countries and making their nuclear threat and blackmail legitimate, perpetrated and permanent. This is not in the interest of the security of States and world peace. That is why the Chinese delegation abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.1/Rev.1.[4]

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Freeze on Nuclear Weapons, November 23, 1982[1]

The Soviet delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.2,[2] for the Soviet Union, in principle, takes a positive attitude to the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons and stockpiles as a first step towards reducing these stockpiles, which should be followed up by real and tangible nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that the nuclear arms race must be halted once and for all. Therefore, all the nuclear Powers must participate in a freeze. We understand that this idea is set forth in the draft resolution we have just adopted. In this context the Soviet delegation does not oppose the fact that the first appeal for a freeze was addressed only to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We also proceed from the premise that the freeze proposed in the draft resolution should be limited to a certain time frame and that the question of its continuation has to be settled taking into account the actions of other nuclear States. As for verification of a freeze, this question requires further agreement through talks between the parties to it.

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[3] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 23–25.

[4] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/100 A.

[1] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 35–41.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/100 B.

I should like to say just a few words about the idea of a freeze in connection with the statements made by some delegations in explanation of vote. It is a mark of the times that the idea of a freeze of nuclear stockpiles—even though there are many different views involved here—is supported by the overwhelming majority of Governments, something which has just been reflected in the vote. The broadest possible sectors of public opinion in the various countries also agree with this idea, but some, including some here in the First Committee—and this was heard in the statements of a number of representatives from countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—continue to maintain that a freeze on nuclear weapons would be beneficial or advantageous only to the Soviet Union on the grounds that it supposedly has nuclear superiority.

However, the facts show that what was agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and also between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO was that there existed approximate parity, and such parity still exists today both in the area of strategic and other nuclear weapons and in the area of conventional forces. The existence of this approximate parity has more than once—and I emphasize, more than once—been recognized by political and military leaders of the West, particularly by those who are well informed about the substance of this matter. This has been referred to by Presidents of the United States of America, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State Secretaries and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of a number of Western countries. It has been regularly confirmed by specialists and, some three or four days ago, the Director of the London International Institute on Strategic Research, Mr. Robert O'Neil, said the same thing. The balance of forces was reflected in the Soviet-American agreements, including the second strategic arms limitations agreement (SALT II). [3] There was approximate parity and the United States was not lagging behind; but claims to that effect were designed in order to cover up an unjustified build-up of nuclear weapons in the United States.

Serious attention should not be given to affirmations such as we have heard today about the so-called violation by the Soviet Union of the moratorium on nuclear tests in the 1960s. The statements that the Soviet Union, despite its unilateral decision to stop deploying medium-range missiles aimed at Europe, [4] is continuing to do so were totally groundless.

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[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] *Ante*, Mar. 16.

I should also like to recall something else, that is, the frequent unilateral steps we have taken to limit armaments, to which there has been no response from the Western States. These were concrete steps which included the withdrawal of 20,000 troops and thousands of tanks and other military equipment from the German Democratic Republic, a unilateral cessation of the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR, the reduction of a considerable number of those missiles, and other measures. The Soviet Union rejects, as a matter of principle, this argument about military superiority. We do not strive to achieve it and we do not recognize that it exists; we also do not recognize that anyone else should have that superiority. Parity is something that would be in the interests of preserving peace. However, it is not yet a guarantee that it would free mankind from the threat of war, particularly in conditions when the level of military confrontation is high.

It is essential to move on further and to reduce the level of arms. Military parity must be at the lowest possible level of arms. That is our approach to nuclear disarmament.

In a statement made yesterday in Moscow, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, stated:

> We do not demand unilateral disarmament from the West. We are in favour of parity, with regard for the interests of both parties, for honest agreements. This is what we are ready for.

He also emphasized:

> As to the nuclear strategic arms possessed by the USSR and the USA, the Soviet Union, as is known, agrees that the two sides should, as the first step on the way to a future agreement, freeze their arsenals and thus create more favourable conditions for the continuation of talks on the mutual reduction of these weapons.[5]

That is the position of the Soviet Union on the question of a nuclear arms freeze.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Lin Cheng) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, November 23, 1982 [1]

Many peaceloving countries out of a desire to oppose the nuclear arms race and prevent nuclear proliferation hope to see the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is fully understandable. It is our conviction that the cessation of nuclear tests should be a component part of a comprehensive nuclear disarmament process and should be carried out in close link with concrete nuclear disarmament measures in order to have some effect on halting the nuclear arms race. If there is only a cessation of tests but no cessation of the improvement and production of nuclear weapons, accompanied by substantial reduction, nuclear disarmament cannot be realized.

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[5] *Ante*, Nov. 22. Variant translation.

[1] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 51–52.

Today when the nuclear technology of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals has developed to the point that their emphasis is on raising their target precision and prevention-alert ability, a mere cessation of tests is certainly of no use in stopping the nuclear arms race. The 19-year history since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty [2] fully demonstrates this point.

As a nuclear State, China shoulders an unshakable responsibility and obligation towards nuclear disarmament. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, China proposed that when the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals have stopped the testing, improvement and production of nuclear weapons and have reduced by 50 per cent their arsenals of all types of nuclear weapons, then all nuclear States should stop nuclear tests and cease to improve and produce nuclear weapons. They should then reduce their own nuclear weapons according to reasonable proportions and procedures. We deem this to be a reasonable and feasible way for the realization of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and for nuclear disarmament.

Now, a nuclear Power with the largest nuclear arsenals has submitted a proposal requesting the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests which has no connection whatsoever with nuclear disarmament; and it asks all nuclear States not to conduct any nuclear explosions pending the conclusion of such a treaty. It is worthy of note that that country not only has already conducted close to 600 nuclear test explosions but also this year alone has conducted more than a dozen nuclear tests. It has not slowed its pace in the nuclear arms race in the least.

In the past that country also made use of the so-called moratorium on tests, but facts show that that was for it but a pause between a number of nuclear tests, its purpose being for it to consolidate the achievements it had already gained in tests and to make better preparation for future tests.

Today when that country is feverishly pushing its nuclear arms race, maintaining its nuclear hegemony and fighting for its nuclear superiority, its submission of a draft resolution on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests cannot be taken to indicate a genuine desire for disarmament, nor is this in the interest of nuclear disarmament.

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291–293.

On the basis of the aforementioned position that I have just stated, the Chinese delegation will vote on the various draft resolutions on the prohibition of nuclear tests. We cannot but vote against draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6. [3]

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Arms Control, November 23, 1982 [1]

The Soviet Union responds with understanding to the concern expressed by many delegations in the United Nations over the absence of any progress in the talks to limit and reduce strategic arms and to limit and reduce arms in Europe, talks that the Soviet Union is conducting with the United States. It appears that that concern is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 [2] now before the Committee. The reason for this situation in the bilateral talks has been explained in statements made both by Soviet leaders and also by Soviet representatives here in the United Nations.

The Soviet Union for its part has declared on more than one occasion that it is doing everything possible to make progress at these talks. It intends in future to continue to give its evaluation, in accordance with its principles on the situation at the talks in the manner it deems appropriate. However, in view of the nature of the talks, and of paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, [3] we cannot take it upon ourselves to accept the obligation to deal with the situation as reflected in operative paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, nor can we support operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

In view of what I have said, the Soviet delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Arms Control, November 23, 1982 [4]

The United States delegation deeply regrets that for the first time in its memory a draft resolution dealing with the most important subject of United States-USSR negotiations on nuclear arms was put to a vote despite the evident absence of consensus on it.

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[3] The General Assembly subsequently adopted this draft resolution as res. 37/85.

[1] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 58–60.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/78 A.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, p. 432.

[4] A/C.1/37/PV.40, pp. 63–67.

As in previous years, we had been ready and willing to work with the sponsors to achieve a consensus resolution that all of us could support. The United States is committed to the principle stated in paragraph 27 of the Final Document adopted at the first special session on disarmament and cited in the preamble of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1. [2] The Final Document states that:

> the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. (*resolution S-10/2*) [3]

We firmly believe, however, that this principle is an indivisible one, that the timing and scope of any information on such steps must not be arbitrary, but rather appropriate from the standpoint of what we trust is the general wish of all United Nations Members to advance rather than prejudice the progress of these sensitive negotiations, nor should this principle be applied selectively only to bilateral negotiations between specific States.

We fully understand and appreciate the great interest of the world community in the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms reductions and on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The result of those negotiations will have a profound effect on world stability and indeed on international security. We have therefore endeavoured to provide this Committee, and through it the General Assembly of the United Nations, with as much information on those negotiations as would be consistent with the principle I have already mentioned and with our mutual understanding with the Soviet Union on the confidentiality of those negotiations. In his statement on 27 October in this Committee, Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the senior official in the United States Government responsible in this field, gave an authentic, official and as extensive a description as possible under present circumstances of the United States approach in the Geneva nuclear-arms negotiations, as well as of the correct state of affairs there. His information on this subject covered seven pages, in document A/C.1/37.PV/13. [4] We intend to continue our endeavours in this regard in the future as well. In so doing, however, we shall always be mindful of the need to safeguard our paramount objective, that of achieving successful results in those negotiations. As experienced and wise diplomats and negotiators, representatives in this Committee know that in any negotiations, especially those on a highly complex and sensitive matter dealing with national security, there is always a trade-off between publicity and progress in negotiations. As I mentioned earlier, in the Geneva talks the two negotiating parties have agreed upon confidentiality necessary for real progress towards agreement. The United States did not enter those talks to propagandize the issues involved nor do we intend to play to the galleries and public forums. We entered those talks to seek real, verifiable and militarily significant arms reductions.

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[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/78 A.

[3] The Final Document may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978*, pp. 411 ff.

[4] *Ante*.

It is for these reasons that the United States cannot undertake in advance to provide information on the Geneva negotiations in a specific format or by a specific date. The nature and the timing of any information that could be released will clearly depend upon the status of those negotiations. Frankly, we hope that by 1 September of next year the respective delegations will have their hands full hammering out areas of agreement. We do not believe that anyone would wish to see their energies diverted to the preparation of reports which, apart from the risk they could entail for future progress, would also undoubtedly be difficult and time-consuming projects. Neither my Government nor anyone in this room, I am sure, doubts the commitment of the peoples of the world to securing a lasting peace. The substance of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.12/Rev.1 and the manner in which the draft resolution has been handled since it was first announced raise, however, questions as to how delegations represented here seek to achieve that goal.

The question we are faced with is not the objective itself, but the means by which we seek to achieve it. My Government does not believe that solemn calls for reports by deadline and for their subsequent debate is the means to achieve that vital end. The negotiations addressed in this draft resolution cover a subject recognized by all to be of the utmost importance and sensitivity. These negotiations are, by the very nature of the forces they seek to restrain, complex and difficult. By their very nature they require a degree of confidentiality. No serious advocate of progress in these negotiations should willingly pursue a course that could prove prejudicial or harmful to the progress of those negotiations. My Government cannot in good conscience accept such a course. For those reasons my Government was unable to support this draft resolution and we did so with a heavy heart.

In conclusion, the United States delegation cannot but reiterate its Government's sincere regret that the unfortunate approach embodied in this draft resolution has prevented consensus this year. We stand ready to work towards consensus on these vital subjects in the future.

Sadly, this option has been foreclosed to the Assembly in its thirty-seventh session.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Fields) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones, November 23, 1982 [1]

The United States voted in favour of the draft resolution just adopted by the Committee, namely, A/C.1/37/L.14, calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. [2]

When we voted for this same resolution last year, I noted that it reflected our continuing support for the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and in other appropriate regions of the world. We believe that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones, negotiated and supported by the States of the region, can not only enhance their security, but reinforce non-proliferation goals on a regional basis. The criteria by which the United States judges the effectiveness of any nuclear-weapon-free zone have been elaborated by my delegation at previous sessions of the Committee. However, it may be useful to mention them again briefly.

First, the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from the States in the region concerned. Secondly, all States whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone. Thirdly, the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions. Fourthly, the establishment of a zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security. Fifthly, the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose. Sixthly, the zone arrangement should seek not to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, in particular the principle of freedom of navigation of the high seas, in international air space and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. Lastly, the establishment of a zone should not affect existing rights of parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights to other States.

While we strongly support this draft resolution, we want to make it clear that our vote is not directed against any particular State in the region. Moreover, it is our firm belief that in the nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements must effectively preclude the conducting of any nuclear explosions. Moves by any State towards the development of nuclear weapons concerns us all equally.

As we did last year, I should like to take particular note of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution which urges all States in the region to refrain from any conduct contrary to the objective of the draft resolution. The United States decision to vote for the draft resolution is based on our expectation that the sponsors and others supporting it will demonstrate that they also take this provision with the utmost seriousness.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.41, pp. 16–17.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/76.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Gunderson) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons, November 23, 1982 [1]

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.47 presents an important challenge to the wisdom and serious purpose of this Committee. [2] Its basic idea is disarmingly simple: unilateral declarations by States that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

At first blush the idea also might strike most as obvious and unassailable: is not nuclear war, after all, a horror, the threat of which all men can agree must be reduced and eliminated?

But the members of this Committee are not addressing a new idea, for although the proposal of unilateral declarations of non-first use of nuclear weapons is of recent vintage, the issue of selective prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has appeared here in one form or another for many years. The representatives to this Committee thus understand that the superficial appeal of such resolutions is deceptive. The underlying issues are, indeed, complex and troubling, and they cry out not to be ignored.

In the view of the United States, the starting-point for considerat of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.47 should be the United Nations Ch ter. The essential provisions of the Charter bind all Members to avoi the use or threat of use of force against any State, whether such force be nuclear or conventional. If all Member States fulfilled this binding obligation, there would be no fear of the possible use of nuclear weapons.

The United States, like its North Atlantic Alliance partners and other allies and friends, is dedicated to upholding and strengthening that central provision of the Charter. As the NATO member States declared again in Bonn, Germany, in June of this year:

> None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. [3]

But just as the Charter prohibits all military aggression, so does it recognize the right of self-defence. In an environment of flagrant and unremitting violations of the Charter, and confronted with large and growing forces, the United States and its allies must insist that the right of self-defence cannot be fettered.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.41, pp. 81–82.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution that was subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 37/78 J.

[3] "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn, June 10, 1982," *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1982), pp. 25–26.

Thus it is clear that in the light of the Charter the proposals for declarations on non-first-use of nuclear weapons are unnecessary and redundant; they divert attention from the need to address the danger of war itself; they also misdirect attention from the threat posed by the massive build-up of the strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces of one bloc of States, which my Government has repeatedly detailed.

In present circumstances, calls by that side for unenforceable unilateral pledges are hollow. The proper place seriously to address the questions brought up and the threat they pose is in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations. Furthermore, given the present long-standing imbalance, particularly in Europe, of conventional forces, departure by NATO from its established policy of flexible response to any act of aggression would be seriously destabilizing thus increasing the danger of war.

The solution to that conventional imbalance is a positive Eastern response to proposals for mutual balanced and verifiable force reductions to equal levels in Central Europe.

My Government believes that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.47 is not only superfluous but mischievous, in that it attempts to direct attention away from the binding character of the provisions of the Charter and from the serious challenge of negotiated agreements that fairly and verifiably reduce the level and instability of both nuclear and conventional military forces.

Therefore, my delegation voted against that draft resolution.

Statement by the Chinese Representative (Lin Cheng) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Chemical Weapons, November 24, 1982 [1]

he prohibition of chemical weapons is an important and urgent we face. The Chinese Government consistently stands for the ete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weap- d has made efforts towards this purpose.

Chinese delegation would like to make the following explana- ns with regard to a number of draft resolutions on the prohibition of chemical weapons we are about to vote upon.

First, China sincerely hopes that a convention for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons can be concluded as early as possible so as to save the world's peoples from again becoming victims to chemical weapons. We hold that this future convention

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.42, pp. 11–15.

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should be comprehensive and sound and should not have loopholes. Therefore we should include among its contents the prohibition of use.

Secondly, the United Nations should attach importance to reports and allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons and should conduct investigation and verification, drawing the necessary conclusions. Appropriate measures should be taken on the basis of such conclusions. This is not only the obligation it owes to the victim country and people, but also its responsibility towards the people of the world. Therefore it should receive the support and help of all parties.

Thirdly, all draft resolutions on the question of chemical weapons adopted by the United Nations and actions taken on chemical weapons should be genuinely in the interest of prohibition of these weapons; it should not be the reverse, which will only divert attention and cover up the development and use of such weapons.

On the basis of this position we have just stated, the Chinese delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15/Rev.1 [2] and vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.44 [3] and L.54. [4] However, we take this opportunity to explain that as to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, [5] mentioned in draft resolutions A/C.1/37/L.44 and L.54, China is not a party to this Convention for reasons already stated in the past.

Report of the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts To Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons: Conclusions [Extract], November 26, 1982 [1]

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VII. Conclusions

185. In pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/96 C, which requested the Secretary-General to continue his investigation pursuant to Assembly resolution 35/144 C, the Group, *inter alia,* addressed itself to the submissions at hand and undertook on-site visits to Pakistan and Thailand, in accordance with paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 35/144 C. In the course of those on-site visits, it interviewed alleged victims and eyewitnesses of alleged chemical attacks as well as medical per-

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[2] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/98 A.

[3] An amended version of this draft resolution was subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 37/98 B.

[4] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/98 D.

[5] For text of the convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

[1] A/37/259, pp. 48–50.

sonnel and explored other sources of information as well. During the on-site visits, the Group was handed various samples and also collected specimens of blood and urine from alleged victims.

186. In its evaluation of the written submissions, the Group noted that, while alleged victims and/or eyewitnesses would be in a position to provide firsthand accounts, it could not overlook the fact that such accounts might be incomplete or distorted for various reasons. The Group therefore found it difficult to make a definitive assessment regarding the veracity of the accounts given by the alleged victims or eyewitnesses mentioned in the submissions.

187. Many of the medical signs and symptoms reported by the alleged victims and medical personnel, referred to in the submissions, could be explained by trichothecene poisoning whether due to natural occurrence or other causes. However, because of the vagueness of the symptomatology presented in most of the reports, explanations other than the use of trichothecenes cannot be excluded. The Group considers that the methods described in the submissions for trichothecene analysis are adequate to ensure correct identification and to give quantitative results with satisfactory precision. As to the analytical results presented in the submissions, the Group concluded that the presence of T-2 and HT-2 toxins in the blood and urine samples would be consistent with previous exposure of the alleged victims to mycotoxins of the trichothecene type but it was unable to decide from the analytical results whether such exposure was due to a chemical attack or could be attributed to natural causes.

188. The Group considers the reported presence of synthetic substances, such as polyethelene glycol and lauryl sulphate, in samples of yellow powder from Laos to be significant. However, with respect to the origin of the samples, the Group felt that while, on an *a priori* basis, it would not wish to question that the samples were collected in the areas specified in the submissions, it was not in a position to ascertain beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not these samples were obtained from areas that had been exposed to chemical attacks.

189. Because of the prolonged lapse of time between the alleged exposure to chemical attack and the time when it conducted the interviews and medical examinations of the alleged victims during its on-site visits, the Group was not able to detect signs and symptoms pathognomonic of exposure to chemical attack. However, the Group had the opportunity to interview two Hmong refugees who claimed to have been exposed to the yellow powder only two weeks earlier. Medical examination, in consultation with two dermatologists, proved that their skin condition was due to fungus infection of at least three months' duration. Analyses of their blood did not show any trace of trichothecenes (sensitivity of the method is 10–100 ppb) and there was no leucopenia.

190. As reflected in this report, due to circumstances beyond its control, the Group was not in a position to proceed to the territories where chemical attacks had allegedly occurred and it was, therefore,

unable to conduct any on-site investigations on those territories. This made it impossible for the Group itself to collect samples, including munitions and/or remnants thereof, in those territories. Nevertheless, the Group received samples allegedly collected in some of the areas of conflict during its visits to Pakistan and Thailand. The Group also collected blood and urine samples from alleged victims during the on-site visits.

191. The results of chemical analyses of samples received or collected by the Group are inconclusive. In most cases, no presence of chemical warfare agents beyond the detection limits of the analytical methods used could be demonstrated. In one case, a Hmong refugee handed to the Group a sample of granular matter allegedly used to poison food. Analysis of this material showed that it contained a highly toxic substance, carbofuran, in a concentration of 1–5 per cent mixed in sand. But the unclear origin of the sample and the fact that it is probably identical with a commercially available preparation made it difficult for the Group to draw any conclusions from this finding.

192. While the Group was in Thailand in October 1982, it was informed by the Thai authorities about the appearance of a yellow substance, on 19 February 1982, in two Thai villages and it was invited to visit those two villages. This, of course, could not be considered a timely access to those areas. However, from the interviews and medical records available, it was evident that following exposure to the yellow substance there was a marked increase in the incidence of skin complaints in one of the villages, as reported to the Group.

193. In its evaluation of the allegations mentioned in the course of the interviews, the Group noted that some allegations were only supported by scanty circumstantial evidence and that alternative explanations other than the one of chemical warfare agents were possible and, in most of those cases, even likely. One example is the allegations concerning poisoning of water supplies, which could be explained by natural occurrences of pollutants in the water. In some cases, because of lack of adequate information or evidence of any kind presented, it was not possible to arrive at any conclusion.

194. Other allegations were supported by more circumstantial evidence but alternative interpretations of the causative agent could still be possible. This is exemplified by some of the allegations concerning various forms of coloured smokes in Afghanistan, which probably could be attributed to the use of incendiaries.

195. In some cases, however, more circumstantial evidence was obtained by the Group both from written submissions as well as during its on-site visits. One such well-supported allegation concerned the possible use of harassing agents in the underground water canals (*karez*) in Afghanistan.

196. Another example is the allegation of the use of some toxic material in the area in Laos where the Hmong people live. The Group was not able to pin-point any specific chemical warfare agent or other

toxic compounds as the causative agent. Most of the circumstantial evidence concerning the Hmong allegations is contained in the written submissions. Furthermore, additional circumstantial evidence was obtained by the Group during its visit to Thailand.

197. While the Group could not state that these allegations had been proven, nevertheless it could not disregard the circumstantial evidence suggestive of the possible use of some sort of toxic chemical substance in some instances.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Prohibition of Antisatellite Systems, November 26, 1982 [1]

The Soviet delegation wishes to make certain comments on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 [2] and I should like to take this opportunity to mention also draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1, [3] which is devoted to the same subject.

As a space Power, the Soviet Union attaches great importance to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we took an important initiative to resolve this problem. We proposed the conclusion of an international treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Notwithstanding the decisions of the General Assembly, negotiations on this problem met with resistance in the Committee on Disarmament. As could be seen by the whole of the work of the First Committee, the overwhelming majority of States advocate the initiation of new negotiations and the formation of a working group in the Committee on Disarmament to draft an agreement or agreements designed to be a real barrier to the spread of the arms race to outer space. This is clearly and precisely expressed in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1. We note this with satisfaction and thank the co-sponsors for their constructive and business-like co-operation in this regard.

However, unfortunately draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 has been put forward in a different spirit. In the first place, it singles out a particular question, that is, the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, and this is presented as providing the solution of the whole question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space—which is the main task at the present time. As a matter of principle, the Soviet Union does not object to consideration of proposals for the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. As is well known, the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, presented a year ago, deals with that problem, but to reduce the whole question to anti-satellite systems would be to narrow the task artifically. The substance of the problem is the prevention of the arms race in space generally, and the question of anti-satellite systems can be considered in the context of effective measures designed to solve that problem, which is truly a matter for mankind as a whole.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.44, pp. 43–47.

[2] I.e., the draft resolution subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 37/99 D.

[3] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/83.

It is essential to approach this goal from all directions. The Soviet Union has again confirmed its readiness to enter into negotiations with the United States on anti-satellite systems. The favourable effect that such negotiations would have is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1. However, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 takes a backward step in this regard, even when compared with last year's resolution, adopted on the initiative of a group of Western countries.

In light of these considerations, the Soviet delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 and will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1, which is in accordance with the task of keeping the arms race out of outer space.

Statement by the Argentine Representative (Carasales) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Prohibition of Antisatellite Systems, November 26, 1982 [1]

On the subject now under discussion—draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41, [2] relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, my delegation wishes to point out that it is a co-sponsor of a draft resolution on the same topic, namely, A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1, [3] on which we shall be voting later.

My delegation sees a need for consistency, and we therefore cannot support simultaneously two draft resolutions on the same topic when they take a different approach, in particular when one of those draft resolutions—A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1—correctly conveys the thinking of the Argentine delegation on the subject—for which reason we became one of its sponsors. My delegation will therefore abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41.

Moreover, there are other reasons for our position. In the case of other draft resolutions which have already been voted on, my delegation has pointed out that it is a general position of principle for us not to single out particular types of weapons from broader categories in order to give them special treatment in negotiations. In draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41, this is the case with anti-satellite systems. For example, operative paragraph 3 specifically refers to them.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.44, pp. 47–50.
[2] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/99 D.
[3] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/83.

Apart from this position of principle, my delegation would like to point out, with reference to the particular case of anti-satellite systems, that there can be no doubt that satellites are being used for military and warlike purposes. My country, Argentina, suffered directly in the recent South Atlantic conflict from the consequences of the military use of satellites; consequently it makes no sense to seek the elimination of anti-satellite systems unless at the same time we regulate, in an integrated way, the use of satellites for purely peaceful purposes.

For these reasons, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Verification of Compliance With the Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Convention, November 26, 1982[1]

The view of the Soviet delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.61[2] was set out in the statement by the representative of Czechoslovakia.[3] I should like to reaffirm what my colleague from Czechoslovakia said.

In our view, the proposal to hold a conference to draft a procedure for considering matters relating to compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction[4] is in no way justified and can serve no useful purpose. There can be no reason for any suggestion that the mechanism provided is inadequate or ineffective. If we start a review of separate provisions of the Convention, which in fact is what draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.61 calls for, that will probably lead to the complete undermining of this extremely important international agreement and do irreparable harm to it. Such developments could have very dangerous—indeed, lethal—implications for all international agreements relating to disarmament.

We did not want at this point to pass judgement on the motives that guided the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.61. In consultations we told them quite frankly of our views on it. However, to speak forthrightly and be precise, we must say that some States are moving in the direction of undermining the authority of existing international agreements in the area of disarmament. We do not want to have anything to do with such actions.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.45, pp. 19–21.
[2] Subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 37/98 C.
[3] A/C.1/37/PV.45, pp. 12–16.
[4] For text of the convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 133–138.

We should like to say once again to all the sponsors that no votes can undermine the principle of consensus which exists in talks and negotiations on disarmament. We should like to tell them what we have already told them on many occasions: they have set forth on a most dangerous path and if the edifice represented by the Convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons is destroyed, they will be responsible for it and be recorded in the annals of disarmament negotiations as those that were guilty of destroying the first disarmament agreement in the history of mankind.

That is why the Soviet delegation voted against this draft resolution.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Milton) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and Prohibition of Antisatellite Systems, November 26, 1982 [1]

My delegation wishes very briefly to explain its vote against draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1. [2]

We realize the great deal of effort on the part of a number of delegations, motivated by sincere concerns, went into the drafting of that resolution. The United States shares the concerns of many for possible destabilizing, aggressive, military use of outer space, and we will co-operate with practical efforts to stop and prevent such use. As Mr. Eugene V. Rostow said before this Committee on 27 October, the United States has moved forward studying the feasibility of imposing further limits on the military uses of outer space. [3]

The Committee will also have noted the support of my delegation for draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.41 [4] earlier today. The United States has a positive attitude and is hopeful that the fears of aggression from outer space can be assuaged. We cannot, however, support impractical or one-sided resolutions that we believe might actually discourage progress on constructive initiatives here or in the Committee on Disarmament.

The unfortunate focus of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1 on the term "militarization", taking it to require an overly simplistic ban on any and all military devices in outer space, is a major reason that my delegation could not support it. The question is one of use—aggressive, military use of space through the use of any device. What may appear to be the most benign satellite may have important military applications. At the same time, many military devices in space are defensive and serve vital stabilizing purposes—quite the opposite results that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.64/Rev.1 contemplates coming from military uses of space. The issue, again, is the use of outer space, not the devices therein.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.45, pp. 38–41.

[2] Subsequently adopted as G.A. res. 37/83.

[3] *Ante.*

[4] Adopted as G.A. res. 37/99 D.

Finally, I ask the Committee to recall that only one country has tested and deployed an operational anti-satellite system which could destroy any satellite which it may deem objectionable, and there is no international instrument to prevent such activity. Only one country has a space programme that is predominately military in direction and orientation. That country is not the United States. On the contrary, this morning's *New York Times* informs us that American space technology is even applied to the archaeology and prehistoric geology of the Sahara. The thrust of the United States space programme is towards the maintenance of peace and the promotion of scientific achievement, goals that I believe all of us living together on this planet should share.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Nazarkin) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Reduction of Military Budgets, November 26, 1982 [1]

The Soviet Union has always spoken in support of the reduction of military expenditures. We regard this question as an integral part of the principled policy which we follow in favour of the limitation of armaments and of disarmament.

As far back as 1973, the Soviet Union took the initiative in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly relating to the reduction of military budgets, General Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII), on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and allocation of part of the funds thus saved to the development of the developing countries. [2] That resolution established a sound basis for the solution of the problem of the increase in military budgets. Moreover, we were prepared to agree on the amounts that would be earmarked for the economic development of the developing countries by each of the States which was ready to reduce its military budgets and expenditures.

Over the past years, the Soviet Union has proposed several variants of that resolution and has proved its readiness to seek flexible and mutually acceptable solutions. We are ready today to tackle the preparation of specific reduction measures either in percentages or in absolute terms without delay, as a first step, for the three coming years or for any other initial period of time. We could also begin by freezing military budgets.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.45, pp. 42–45.

[2] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1973*, pp. 876–878.

The realization of a practical agreement relating to the reduction of military budgets would not require much time if the Member States of the Organization evinced the necessary political will and desire for a rapid solution of this urgent and exceptionally important problem. However, progress has not been achieved on the question of reduction of military budgets. A number of States refuse to accept practical agreements and seek to establish a control system over military budgets and their comparison with a system of standardized reporting in order to mask their refusal to accept a reduction in military budgets. That is also the thrust of the draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.22/Rev.2 [3] before the Committee at present, wherein particular appreciation is expressed at the organization of an international conference for the comparison of military expenditures of different countries. The aim of this proposal is to depart from the reduction of military budgets and divert attention from the increase in military budgets as such.

In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.22/Rev.2 would have the effect of bringing the question of the reduction of military budgets to an impasse. For that reason, the Soviet delegation will vote against the draft resolution.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Environmental Modification for Hostile Purposes, November 26, 1982 [1]

On 10 December 1976, almost six years ago, the delegation of Mexico voted against draft resolution A/31/382, which had been submitted to the plenary of the General Assembly by the First Committee and was to become resolution 31/72, to which was annexed the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, which was referred to all States for their consideration, signature and ratification. [2]

That is the resolution which is recalled in the first preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.57, [3] to be put to the vote shortly in the First Committee and on which, given its antecedents we shall be compelled to abstain, although our abstention does not in any way whatsoever imply a change in our earlier position, since, were this not purely a procedural aspect but, rather, a substantive one, we would again have to cast a negative vote, as we did on the occasion I have just recalled.

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[3] Adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/95 B.

[1] A/C.1/37/PV.45, pp. 63–67.

[2] For the Mexican representative's explanation of vote in 1976 and text of the resolution and convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1976*, pp. 920–924 and 924–930, respectively.

[3] Adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/99 I.

Since the majority of the representatives taking part in the work of the Committee this year—1982—are not the same who took part in the Committee's proceedings in 1976, I believe that it is worth while mentioning two basic documents on the subject, whose perusal is most enlightening about the main reasons which, in our view, explain why, although more than five years have elapsed since the Convention was opened to signature, the number of ratifications is barely higher than the rather small number of 20 ratifications provided for in article IX for its entry into force.

The first of those documents is the report of the Rapporteur of the First Committee, dated 9 December 1976, under the symbol A/31/382. A summarized historical account is given therein of the procedural strategems which, unfortunately, were resorted to by some delegations in order to prevent the First Committee from taking a decision on the draft resolution which a number of delegations, Mexico among them, had put forward in order to enable all Member States to consider the draft resolution which had been received from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with the thoroughness its contents deserved.

The second document bears the symbol A/C.1/31/8 and is dated 16 November 1976. It reproduces in its entirety the text of the working paper submitted by the delegation of Mexico to the First Committee wherein, with an abundance of historical and legal arguments, it gave the reasons why the Mexican Government considered that the wording of article I of the draft convention was "totally unacceptable" to it. Those reasons could be summarized by saying that the wording of that article is tantamount to legitimizing such monstrous actions as, "the deliberate manipulation of natural processes to produce earthquakes, tidal waves, cyclones of different types and hurricane-style storms or to modify the ozone layer or the ionosphere and the ocean currents, provided that they do not have widespread, long-lasting or serious effects". This is all the more incomprehensible and alarming if we bear in mind that among the effects of environmental war techniques which would thus be permitted because they would not be regarded as being sufficiently widespread there would be, as was explained by the two sponsors of the draft convention, those encompassing an area smaller than "several hundreds of square kilometres", and among those similarly tolerated because they do not fall into the category of lasting effects as defined in the Convention there would be those whose duration does not extend to "several months or approximately a season".

My delegation trusts that participation at the review conference referred to in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.57 would not be confined to the States parties to the Convention in question but would also be open to the largest possible number of Member States of the United Nations which, in keeping with the established practice for similar cases, would no doubt have a right to put forward their views and would endeavour to obtain a modification of the aforementioned article I, so as to remove the very serious limitation which the present text contains, thus making it possible for paragraph 1 of the article in question to be drafted as follows:

> Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques . . . as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. (*General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex*)

We are convinced that this highly justified modification is the only way to give the Convention the scope and effectiveness which appear to be so desirable in the area at which it is aimed. That is why we take the liberty of recommending to all delegations here that when they report to their respective Governments on the deliberations of the Assembly on this question they send to their Governments copies of the two documents I mentioned earlier, namely, the report of the Rapporteur of the First Committee (A/31/382) dated 9 November 1976 and the working paper of the Mexican delegation (A/C.1/31/8) of 16 November 1976.

In the meantime, my delegation, as I said earlier, will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.57.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Verification of Compliance With the Geneva Protocol of 1925, November 29, 1982 [1]

The Soviet delegation would also like to make some comments in connection with the forthcoming vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/37/L.54. [2]

It is not by chance that this draft has provoked such a lively discussion. It relates to one of the most acute issues of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The draft resolution introduced by France contains some useful provisions, for example the appeal to States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol [3] and to comply with it and also the call to expedite negotiations on finalizing a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. However, the other provisions not only cancel out the positive aspect of the first paragraphs of the operative part of the draft resolution, but in our view those other provisions—and I am happy to see that this view is shared by a broad circle of delegations—are directed to a completely contrary goal—the undermining of the Geneva Protocol. Since many delegations have already spoken on this I shall be very brief and I shall try to present in summary form the fundamental reasons that prompt us to vote against this draft resolution.

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[1] A/C.1/37/PV.47, pp. 46–52.

[2] Adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/98 D.

[3] For text, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764–765.

The first reason is, I would say, of a legal nature. What we are being offered here, specifically, is a procedure fundamentally contradictory to international law. This procedure, *inter alia,* provides for the implementation of certain functions relating to a specific international treaty even by States which are not parties to that instrument. If this anti-legal line were continued it would be possible to pursue it *ad absurdum* when decisions can be taken by voting to change agreements between a group of States or even between two States. This is something which has already been said here and I fully agree with the very well-founded and, I would say, apposite statement made by the representative of Argentina, Mr. Carasales. On the other hand, I simply cannot agree with the representative of Norway, who said, for example, that the French draft changed nothing. He said that it does not in any way affect the Geneva Protocol, but that is not the case, it is not correct. And I think that everybody present here must agree with me. At present, all States parties to the Geneva Protocol have exactly the same rights and duties. There are no categories or divisions among the parties. But the adoption of the French draft resolution would create a new situation in which there would appear among the parties to the Protocol on the one hand States, including the Soviet Union, which did not support the French proposal and which, apparently, will not participate in the investigation mechanism—and it would seem that there will be quite a few such States, judging by the statements made here. On the other hand, there will be a second group of States, States parties to the Protocol which supported the French proposal and which will take part in the investigation mechanism, unlike the first group of States parties to the Geneva Protocol.

But this is not all; this is not the main point at all. There would also be a third group of States which are not parties to the Geneva Protocol, but which might support the French proposal and which would thus be entitled to take part in the procedure for investigation of compliance with the Geneva Protocol, even though they are not parties to that Protocol.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask you a question, and through you I should like to ask all delegations: is this not a legal muddle? I think it is.

Another point that does not bear criticism is the attempt to impose on the Secretary-General the excessive burden of implementing the arbitrarily established procedures for verifying compliance with the Protocol. For instance, we do not understand by what principle the Secretary-General will be guided in determining the group of experts or selecting the laboratories to which the materials will be sent for a decision. Allow me to ask you, Mr. Chairman, who has empowered the Secretary-General, and on the basis of what statute, to carry out such a function as this when he is not the depositary of the Protocol?

The second reason is, I would say, of a constitutional and procedural nature. As everybody knows, there is an unwritten law for all negotiations on disarmament: the texts of agreements on questions of armaments limitation and any mechanisms, any procedures relating to those agreements are drafted and adopted on the basis of consensus. Incidentally, France has been well known to us to date as a firm advocate of that very approach, the consensus approach. How can it therefore propose the establishment of this procedure for verifying compliance of a most important international instrument not on the basis of negotiations and general agreement, but by voting?

And so we feel that the draft that has been proposed is seriously detrimental and we should like particularly to emphasize this. It is seriously detrimental to the fundamental principle of negotiations on disarmament, the principle of consensus.

It seems to us that the draft resolution in document A/C.1/37/L.54 sets a dangerous precedent for future disarmament negotiations as well. If we were to follow this logic it would easily be possible to envisage a situation whereby an agreement worked out in the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of France and other sponsors of this draft on the basis of consensus would then be subjected to review by a vote in the General Assembly. I do not really think this would serve the purpose of reaching agreement on disarmament questions.

My third and last reason is what I would call a political reason. I remember the statement made by the representative of France on 19 November, when he tried to prove that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54 had absolutely nothing in common with earlier attempts to investigate so-called reports of the use of chemical weapons. Is that really the case? I think that everybody has had an opportunity to read the report in *The New York Times* of 24 November of this year, where it was stated outright that the United States was disenchanted with the work of the present Group of Experts and would continue its campaign using the mechanism provided for in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54. I have here a copy of that report in *The New York Times,* and if any representatives have not had the opportunity to read it I should be happy to lend it to them.

Indeed draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.54 almost calls for an institutionalization of the Group of Experts, planning it on a permanent basis and expanding it—that is the effect. That is not an objective approach. If the sponsors of this draft resolution were really trying to be objective, if they were really trying to find an effective measure in regard to this matter, they would have consulted with all the participants and all the groups. They would not have ended up in a situation in which a significant number of countries, including the socialist countries and many non-aligned countries, were simply unwilling to support this draft resolution.

I will end my statement here. Perhaps everything is possible. Perhaps anything can happen in the United Nations. This draft resolution proposed by France and its sponsors might be adopted, but it would be a stillborn child, and it would poison the atmosphere of the negotiations here and in the Committee on Disarmament, and those that had given birth to it would not deserve any honour or praise. I have no doubt that the time will come when the sponsors of this draft resolution will try to forget all about it.

As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, we believe in constructive efforts to ensure a total and complete ban on chemical weapons. We are actively participating in the negotiations now under way in Geneva on this very subject. Probably everybody knows about our proposals and how active we have been. At the same time, we feel that any steps designed to undermine the constructive spirit prevailing in the negotiations—and we believe that that is the purpose of this draft resolution—should be defeated, and the vote will show who is for or against. It is for this reason—because it would poison the atmosphere—that we shall vote against it, and we urge other delegations to do likewise.

Thirteenth Semiannual Report by President Reagan to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act: Confidence-Building Measures [Extract], November 30, 1982 [1]

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The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act [2] are required by the Act's "Documents on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament" to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBM's) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBM's include invitation of observers to maneuvers, military exchange visits, prior notification of major military movements, and prior notification of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

The United States and its NATO Allies have scrupulously notified all major maneuvers of more than 25,000 troops. Warsaw Pact notifications frequently fail, through the sparseness of information offered, to live up to the spirit of the CSCE notification requirement, and

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[1] Dept. of State Special Report No. 105, Jan. 1983, p. 15.

[2] The arms control portions of the Final Act may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. For the complete text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

Soviet failure to notify the "Soyuz 81" exercise raised questions about Eastern compliance with the letter of the Final Act.

As regards smaller scale maneuvers, a number of NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned states have made voluntary notifications; of the Warsaw Pact states, only Hungary has made such notifications.

Since the signing of the Final Act, both NATO and Neutral/Non-Aligned signatories have regularly extended invitations to Eastern and other observers, and given them the opportunity to carry out their duties. NATO members have invited observers to 17 of their 22 major maneuvers. In contrast, the Eastern states have invited observers to only 7 of their 16 major maneuvers. In addition, Eastern states are frequently unwilling to permit those observers who are invited to in fact adequately observe the exercise.

CBM Compliance in Reporting Period

The United States gave detailed notification of its maneuver "Carbine Fortress," which took place from September 13–23 and involved 73,000 U.S. and other troops; the F.R.G. notified the exercises "Starke Wehr" and "Bold Guard," taking place on September 13–17 and September 20–24 and involving about 45,000 and 50,000 Allied troops, respectively.

Bulgaria notified that "about 60,000 men" would be participating in the "Shield 82" Warsaw Pact exercise between September 25 and October 1. This notification displayed a typical Warsaw Pact minimalist approach to CSCE obligations. Particularly egregious was the failure to name either the specific area or the countries which would be taking part in the exercise. A comparison of this notification with the U.S. notification of "Carbine Fortress" gives a clear indication of the difference between Eastern and Western commitment to living up to the spirit of the Final Act.

Austria notified its maneuver "Area Defense Exercise 1982" which took place from October 15 to 22, and involved 14,000 troops; France notified its exercise "Langres 82" (September 19–20; 17,000 troops). Both of these voluntary notifications contained the information on precise area of activity lacking in the mandatory "Shield" notification.

Invitation of Observers

The NATO Allies invited observers to "Carbine Fortress," "Starke Wehr," and "Bold Guard." The Warsaw Pact did not invite Western representatives to the "Shield 82" exercise.

Exchange of Military Visits

Two U.S. naval vessels, the U.S.S. *Valdez* and the U.S.S. *Yarnnel* visited Romania during the period June 9–13, 1982.

Questions Relating to Disarmament

The Final Act expresses the interest of the signatories in "lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament." Through its earnest approach in the START, INF, and MBFR negotiations, the United

States is clearly demonstrating its commitment to equitable arms control agreements which will contribute to "strengthening peace and security throughout the world," as called for by the Final Act.

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Statement by the U.S. Representative (Luce) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Military Research and Development, November 30, 1982[3]

I take the floor to set forth some of the difficulties which my Government has with draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.62 and which have prevented the United States from supporting that draft resolution.[4]

The draft resolution implies that military research and development can be defined and verifiably controlled through international agreement. We do not believe this is the case, if only because of a lack of an identifiable borderline between civilian and military research and development. The terms of reference for the study requested in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.62 therefore cannot in our view be implemented in any meaningful way. But even if they could be, verifiable arrangements limiting the effect of research and development in the military area are extremely difficult to envision, especially in a world where some countries keep their military plans and activities under the veil of deep secrecy.

Consequently, the United States is very pessimistic about the possibility of a constructive outcome of the proposed study. This, as well as our concern about using the limited financial resources available to the United Nations in as effective a way as possible, has led the United States to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.62.

Statement Submitted by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: NATO Troop Withdrawals, November 30, 1982[1]

Thank you. I have with me Mr. Bader from the Department of Defense, who will be prepared to answer questions along with me this morning.

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[3] A/C.1/37/PV.48, pp. 11–12.

[4] Subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as res. 37/99 J.

[1] *NATO Troop Withdrawals: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session,* Nov. 30, 1982, pp. 9–14.

I welcome the opportunity to testify today on the American role in NATO. Too often in foreign policy, as elsewhere, we take the most important things for granted. Too rarely do we examine the foundations of our security and our role in the world.

This is an important time for the United States to examine and state clearly our policies toward European security. We are now almost 2 years into the Reagan administration.

In the Soviet Union, a new leadership has just taken up the reins of power. While it is unlikely that Mr. Andropov and his associates will veer far from existing Soviet policies, they are undoubtedly now studying the opportunities and constraints they face. They are sizing up our resolve and our steadiness, and, in particular, our ability to maintain a unified Western Alliance.

In Europe, we and our allies are succeeding in putting behind us contentious questions regarding the Siberian gas pipeline and are about to start an effort to shape a coordinated Western approach to East-West economic relations for the rest of this decade and perhaps beyond.

Against this backdrop we are now hearing voices in this country calling for a scaling down of the American role in NATO. Most disturbingly, we are facing specific proposals in the Senate and the House which would, among other things, reduce the level of U.S. forces in Europe and interfere with our ability to meet our commitment to modernize NATO's nuclear forces.

When such views surfaced in the past, the national commitment to a strong Atlantic Alliance prevailed. Having fought two wars to defeat aggression in Europe, the American people know that our interests cannot be insulated from events across the Atlantic. We decided after the second of those wars—as we should decide again now—that alliance with the other Western democracies is vital to our national security and prosperity. If we have learned anything from the history of this century, it is that we cannot retreat to a fortress America, nor safely disengage from European affairs.

Europe has become more, not less, important for us over the three decades since the Alliance was formed. The European and North American economies are now so tightly knit together that neither can grow without the other. The allied countries are our main export market. American direct investment in Europe is an important positive factor in our balance of payments and contributes heavily to the profitability of American business.

The United States and Western Europe are more than simply trading and political partners, however. Our security is unalterably linked with theirs. Western Europe is quite literally our first line of defense. It is the center of our global competition with the Soviet Union and by far the most alluring object of Soviet ambitions.

NATO's strength and cohesion have protected Western freedom and democracy and kept Europe peaceful for over three decades, despite a menacing Soviet military presence. If we sometimes forget that our

European allies stand face to face with Soviet tanks and with Eastern totalitarianism, if the Soviet challenge sometimes seems distant to us, it is because NATO has been effective.

In recent years, Soviet military might has grown more rapidly than ever. Soviet foreign policy has become more assertive and aggressive. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan is Moscow's first attempt since the end of the second world war to expand by force the area under its direct control. The assault on the people of Poland shows that the Soviet leaders will not permit free institutions in countries where it has military dominion.

The new leadership in Moscow faces basic choices about the Soviet role in the world. If they see an America drawing inward, a demoralized Western Alliance, and our European partners in doubt about the U.S. commitment, their incentive to act with greater restraint will be diminished.

The need for a strong Atlantic Alliance based on unity of purpose and steady American leadership has never been more critical.

The Reagan administration is particularly concerned, therefore, by the prospect of legislation that would cast doubt on the steadiness of the U.S. commitment to NATO. The current Senate defense appropriations bill, which contains provisions to cut back American participation in NATO defense programs, would, if passed, signal a broad U.S. retreat from its responsibilities and its leadership.

Passage of this legislation would be a fundamental departure from the historical bipartisan post-war U.S. approach to national security. Never has the American role in the defense of Western Europe been reduced through legislation. Never has the United States backed away from its NATO commitments. And never have the elected representatives of the American people voted not to stand by our Allies and back up our defense commitments.

Are we really ready now to take such a fateful step? Do we really want to greet the new Soviet leadership with a sharp deviation from the policies that have so successfully preserved Western security and American leadership in Europe?

The provisions that have been inserted in the Senate version of the proposed appropriations act that would be most damaging are: first, the reduction by 18,900 troops of the American force planned for the end of fiscal year 1983; second, the elimination of funds to procure heavy equipment for prestocking at two sites provided by Belgium and the Netherlands; third, the elimination of the American portion of the funding for 93,000 German reservists who will support our units in wartime under the Host Nation Support program, fourth, cuts in funding for the ground-launched cruise missile, which would force us to stretch our deployment schedules; and fifth, restrictions on transatlantic defense cooperation and trade.

Let me emphasize one point right away. This administration, like the Congress, is seriously concerned about the budget. We recognize that a sound economy is the necessary foundation for a successful foreign policy. But the provisions I have just outlined have almost nothing to do with budgetary austerity. The total saving contemplated by these anti-NATO proposals before the Senate is about $150 million, which is less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the total defense budget.

If the political consequences of these measures were as insignificant as the budgetary savings, I would not be here today. But the impact of these measures on our security would be out of all proportion to their budgetary significance.

I am aware that this legislation reflects a concern about the fairness of the distribution of defense burdens within the Alliance. Like you, we want the allies to do more for the common defense. And it is true that U.S. defense spending is now growing faster than that of the allies. But let me remind you that we in the United States neglected military programs for nearly a generation and that only today are we repairing the resulting gaps in our forces. We must sprint now because we went so slowly for so many years.

In contrast, the allies have kept up a strikingly steady performance. During the 1970's, their defense spending rose at a rate of 2 percent per year in real terms. Our defense spending declined in real terms by 1 percent per year during the same period. If we had matched the allied growth rate during the 1970's, we would not need to accelerate now. Conversely, had the allies failed to maintain their steady effort in those years—had their defense spending decisions been dominated by considerations of what some here in the United States now call "equity" rather than need—the Alliance would not be as secure as it is today.

In any case, it would be a tragic mistake to allow concerns about burden-sharing to prevent us from doing what is necessary for our own security. Following that policy would allow those whose defense performance is weakest to set the standard. We are fortunate that the allies did not adopt such an attitude during a time of less-than-adequate U.S. performance.

After all the arguments and counterarguments about burden-sharing have been heard, we must, at the end of the day, ask ourselves one basic question. Will the United States be more or less secure if these provisions are enacted? I believe the answer is clearly "less secure." Let me outline the effects I foresee.

First, the American commitment to NATO would be placed in doubt. I do not see how the advocates of this legislation could dispute this or argue that causing doubts about our commitment would advance our interests. Nothing could weaken the Alliance more than the perception in Europe that the United States is not determined to preserve European security.

Our allies would take little comfort in the fact that the amount of money involved is small. They would see passage of these cuts as a statement of U.S. intentions; they would interpret it as the beginning of a more general American retreat from Europe.

The Soviets would undoubtedly try to exploit the inevitable doubts and fears of the Europeans. Dividing us from our allies and pushing us out of Europe are, of course, central goals of Soviet foreign policy. The administration has, as you know, recently made progress in healing divisions and rebuilding consensus and confidence in the Alliance. This legislation could undo what has been achieved.

Second, reductions, especially reductions in the number of American troops in Europe, would send the worst possible signal to European publics about the importance of a strong defense. NATO and U.S. leaders have been warning Europeans that the Soviet threat is growing. Reducing American forces or abandoning planned improvements would make these warnings sound hollow and undermine European public and Parliamentary support for defense expenditures.

Proponents of this legislation may claim that our doing less would jolt our Allies into doing more. I see no basis for such wishful thinking. U.S. cuts would have the opposite effect. If we do less, the Europeans will do less, and we will all be less secure.

Third, these cuts, while small in dollar amounts, would hit priority, cost-effective programs especially hard. The proposed troop cuts could leave our combat forces undermanned, or force the withdrawal of other essential units. Reductions in funding for prepositioning combat equipment and our share of the host nation support agreement would compound the difficulties and costs of wartime deployment.

We are constantly striving to make our dollars buy more fighting strength. These programs enhance our combat capacity by improving what is sometimes called our "teeth-to-tail" ratio. The proposed cuts would therefore reverse a major effort to improve our forces' effectiveness, while saving very little money. Moreover, they would not simply penalize our allies but our own forces as well, by denying them the means to carry out their rapid reinforcement mission.

Fourth, these cuts would damage the very programs in which allied performance has been especially good. The Europeans have joined the host nation support and prepositioning programs with the clear and correct understanding that we would match or supplement them. If we now back down on our side of the bargain, we will not only lose the benefits of these programs but will undermine our credibility for the development of any future cooperative efforts.

In 1978, at a summit meeting in Washington, Alliance leaders agreed to a long-term program providing, among other things, for rapid U.S. wartime reinforcement of Europe. Since then, our allies have fulfilled their commitment. For example, Belgium and the Netherlands, both small and densely populated countries, have gone to considerable effort and expense to obtain the land required to store prepositioned U.S. equipment.

The Federal Republic of Germany has allocated half the funds for 93,000 additional German reservists to support U.S. deployments. The proposed appropriations bill would threaten both of these programs. Is this a sensible way to respond when the allies have done just what we proposed that they do?

If restrictions on our contributions to the long-term defense program stand, the entire program will atrophy. We will turn a notable success into failure. We will cancel out much of what we and the allies have already achieved and paid for.

Last June in Bonn, President Reagan and his allied counterparts committed themselves in a special summit charter to specific plans for improving NATO's conventional capabilities. [2] This charter called for the achievement of demanding force goals, and identified priority programs. I cannot now guarantee that this charter will be implemented in every detail, though we will work very hard to that end. But I can say with absolute confidence that if these cuts are legislated, that charter will not be translated into concrete improvements.

Let me restate unequivocally our agreement that the allies need to do more. This administration has made that clear at every opportunity, here and abroad, and is working to produce a greater allied contribution to our common defense effort.

Our attempts to foster better cooperation, better coordination of United States and European defense spending, and to have our allies take greater responsibility for our common defense are bearing fruit, but only if we ourselves keep the commitments that we have made can we count on the allies to improve their performance.

Finally, a legislated, unilateral U.S. pullback from our military commitments to NATO would damage prospects for arms control. Unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals would remove any incentive for the Soviets to agree to mutual reductions that would lower the threat and ease the military confrontation in the heart of Europe.

At the MBFR talks in Vienna we are seeking to negotiate the new Western draft treaty put forward by the President last spring. That treaty would correct the present imbalance between Soviet and Western forces in Central Europe through significant verifiable reductions to equal levels.

A cut in funding for the ground-launched cruise missile and the deletion of funds for the deployment of the Pershing II missile, which has been voted in the House, would dash our hopes for a negotiated solution to the problem posed by the Soviet SS–20 intermediate range nuclear missiles. In the INF talks in Geneva, we have proposed a treaty that would ban this whole class of Soviet and U.S. intermediate range nuclear missiles, but only if we and our allies show that we are resolved to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe can we get to the Soviets to negotiate seriously.

The advocates of this legislation owe it to us all to explain how it would help arms control and thus contribute to reduction of the threat. Is there any evidence that unilateral limits and cuts can have anything other than a destructive effect on negotiated arms control? Should we not be more concerned about reducing the threat than about reducing our ability to counter it?

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[2] See "Document on Integrated NATO Defense," Bonn, June 10, 1982, in *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 3, (Aug. 1982), p. 27.

Let me conclude with a few basic points. The Atlantic Alliance has provided well for Western security for 30 years. That alliance is built upon the forces that we and our allies have deployed in Europe and the conviction that the United States is fully committed to the defense of Europe. When those forces and that conviction are strong, deterrence in Europe is sturdy and we are secure. We weaken them at our peril.

The world will be dangerous enough in this decade. It is not in our interest to tamper with North Atlantic security.

Article by the ACDA Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs (George): New NATO Proposal for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks [Extract], December 1982 [1]

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Elements of the proposal

While this new approach builds on what has been agreed up until now in the negotiation, it differs importantly from previous Western proposals in that it provides for one comprehensive agreement in which all direct participants would undertake, from the outset, a legally binding commitment to make the reductions required to reach the common collective ceiling of 900,000 ground and air force personnel for each side. This reduction would take place in four stages and be completed within seven years. Withdrawals and the maintenance of the interim ceilings after each reduction stage would be verified through the implementation of a set of associated measures for verification and confidence-building. Parity would thus be achieved when each side reached the agreed ceiling of 700,000 ground forces and 900,000 ground and air force personnel combined.

Under this new approach, a major stumbling block to an agreement is removed because it solves the question of linkage between two separate negotiating phases—a persistent Eastern preoccupation. In this respect, the West is proposing stronger reduction commitments than ever before.

Data

Resolution of the second major issue which has obstructed an MBFR agreement will require Eastern cooperation. That is the question of the very large discrepancy between Eastern and Western data on Eastern manpower. It was not until 1976 that the East presented any data on Warsaw Pact military manpower. However, those Eastern figures were considerably less than Western estimates and today the West believes that the East has about 160,000 more ground troops in Central Europe than official Eastern figures admit. This discrepancy has now become the pivotal issue in the MBFR talks. The West's position is simple, straight-forward and easily understood: agreement to force reductions and limitations requires agreement on the number of forces to be reduced and limited. Such agreement is needed to provide unambiguous standards for verifying compliance, resolving disputes and building confidence.

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[1] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 5, (Dec. 1982), pp. 10–11.

The East, for its part, has not cooperated in clarifying in adequate detail the sources of the data discrepancies, nor has it ever responded seriously to Western proposals to break the deadlock caused by this data issue. On the contrary, Warsaw Pact representatives have consistently argued that a data understanding is not required for agreement to modest first phase Soviet and US withdrawals under the terms of a two-phase negotiation. They have, however, acknowledged the need to agree on data for the purpose of establishing the size of reductions needed to reach the common ceiling. The Western draft treaty, by embodying a single comprehensive agreement, does away with the Eastern "rationale" for not resolving the data dispute at the outset.

In yet another effort to engage the East in meaningful discussions aimed at resolving the data issue, the West is proposing that a special working group on data be instituted which would undertake to define a work programme for the early clarification of the discrepancy. The data group would complement work being performed by other groups concentrating on an overall comparison of the position taken by the two sides and on associated measures.

Associated measures

Seven associated confidence-building and verification measures are included as an integral part of the Western draft treaty. They are a cohesive set, designed to build confidence and support an agreement on reductions and limitations through the exchange of information on military forces and activities and through cooperative measures of verification.

Briefly summarized, these measures are:

—pre-notification of out-of-garrison activity by one or more division formations;

—observers at out-of-garrison activities;

—pre-notification of major movements of ground forces into the area of reductions;

—an annual quota of inspections to be conducted from the ground, or air, or both;

—permanent exit/entry points, with observers, through which forces would move into or out of the area of reductions;

—exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn and continuing periodic exchanges of information on personnel strengths and organization of forces remaining in the area;

—non-interference with national technical means of verification.

In the US view, verification is the linchpin in any arms reduction agreement. In emphasizing verification, the US is proceeding on the basis that verification is necessarily a cooperative effort, a tool to help ensure undiminished security for each side as well as the continued viability of the agreement in question and of the arms control process as a whole. In MBFR, the US is dedicated to the principle that any agreement must enhance peace and stability in Europe as an element of overall Western security policy. Thus, the associated measures package is an essential and indispensable part of the Western draft treaty.

Concluding observations

While we seek commitments and agreements which will lead to equitable, militarily significant and verifiable reductions of forces, NATO, in order to protect its interests and deter conflict, must retain the military capability to implement its defence plans, if attacked. The armed forces of the United States form an integral part of those plans. Negotiated reductions and agreements can play a very positive role in achieving our objectives of security, stability, and peace in Europe, but they must maintain and support the US military commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance. The United States will therefore continue to insist that any MBFR agreement be based on sound principles that preserve the ability of US forces to fulfil Alliance obligations. The new Western draft treaty embodies these principles and provides the basis for achieving an agreement after more than nine years of discussions.

President Reagan has characterized the Atlantic Alliance as a partnership motivated primarily by the search for peace. Peace must be founded on security, and the NATO allies must demonstrate the will and capacity to deter any conventional attack or any attempt at intimidation. As President Reagan told the Bundestag, we are deeply committed to continuing efforts to restrict the arms competition to preserve peace and security. The recent presentation of a draft treaty in the MBFR talks is tangible evidence of that commitment.

Statement by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (Marshall) Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward South Africa, December 2, 1982 [1]

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with your subcommittees the nuclear policy aspects of this country's relations with South Africa. Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs, has presented an overview of U.S. policy toward that country and has reviewed several nonnuclear matters on which you requested the Department's views. [2]

Let me begin my testimony by describing for you current U.S. nuclear export policy regarding South Africa and the role of the Department of State in the review and approval of nuclear exports. As you are aware, this Administration announced a strong nuclear nonproliferation policy in 1981 [3]—one that is supported by a foundation of effective export controls. As part of that policy, we are committed to continuing efforts to persuade South Africa, and other nations which have not ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, [4] to do so and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear activities (full-scope safeguards). We have told the South African Government on several occasions that this is our position for the basis on which U.S. supply of uranium fuel to South Africa could take place.

I want to make clear that until South Africa accepts full-scope safeguards and takes other steps to meet the requirements of U.S. law, no export from the United States will be made of uranium fuel or any nuclear equipment licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I find this, contrary to what has been said already, to be a rather significant policy of denial.

It is, however, this Administration's view that export approval of a few carefully selected nonsensitive, nuclear-related commodities or dual use items, can make a contribution to U.S. nonproliferation efforts.

Approval of such a narrow range of nonsensitive exports is subject to careful case-by-case interagency review. Such nuclear-related commodities have been exported for use in safeguarded facilities for health and safety applications. Approvals of dual-use commodities have been conditioned upon the receipt of written South African Government assurances of no nuclear explosive use and no retransfer for another use without prior consent of the U.S. Government. One example of such exports is a hydrogen recombiner for the Koeberg nuclear power plant. It was approved because it could be used only at that facility to meet health and safety objectives identified in the Three-Mile Island reactor accident investigation.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin,* May 1983, pp. 66–69. The statement was made before Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 25–28.

[3] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981,* pp. 278–280.

[4] Printed *ibid., 1968,* pp. 461–465.

We believe that these few export approvals for the South African nuclear program can assist the United States in maintaining a dialogue with South Africa regarding nonproliferation issues and objectives. Our ability to influence other nations to act in accordance with our nonproliferation objectives requires that we continue to talk to them and that they listen to what we say. We believe that a willingness to approve a small, carefully selected number of nonsensitive exports to South Africa for its nuclear energy program can help to persuade South Africa to be more forthcoming on nonproliferation issues.

Export Review Process

With respect to the role of the Department of State in the export review process, we are responsible, under the Atomic Energy Act,[5] for the preparation, coordination, and transmittal to the NRC of executive branch views on applications for NRC export licenses. Also under the Atomic Energy Act, the concurrence of the Department of State is required for approval of so-called subsequent arrangements authorized by the Department of Energy (DOE). This term applies to transactions such as retransfers abroad of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing or the conclusion of a DOE enrichment contract with a foreign entity. Department of State concurrence is also needed for nuclear technology transfers approved by the Secretary of Energy pursuant to Section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act (Part 810 of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations) and for approvals of Department of Commerce licenses for export of commodities, including nuclear-related and dual-use items, which require interagency review.

Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination

The heart of this export approval activity is found in the work of the subgroup on nuclear export coordination—more commonly known as the SNEC. The operations of the SNEC were described last June in testimony before Congressmen Zablocki's and Bingham's subcommittees by the current SNEC chairman, Carlton Stoiber, Director of the Office of Nuclear Export Control in the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.[6]

The SNEC was established in the summer of 1977 as a subgroup to the National Security Council (NSC) ad hoc group on nonproliferation to meet the need for a "working level" (i.e., office director) forum within the Administration where controversial or sensitive export matters and issues could be reviewed and discussed.

Participants in the SNEC are: 1) the Department of State, which chairs; 2) the Department of Energy; 3) the Department of Commerce;

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[5] 42 U.S.C. 2153.

[6] *Ante*, June 24.

4) the Department of Defense (DOD); 5) the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); and 6) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Information from the U.S. intelligence community has always been available to the SNEC, and recently representatives of intelligence agencies have become regular participants in SNEC meetings. If circumstances warrant, other agencies are invited to participate. There are no restrictions on the number of participants from each agency, within reason, provided all have appropriate security clearances. There is no quorum, although the SNEC normally operates on a consensus basis with the concurrence of all participating agencies needed for export approvals.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 [7] which amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, provided in Sections 126a(1) and 57b a statutory basis for an interagency coordinating body to monitor nuclear exports licensed by the NRC or authorized by DOE. The role of SNEC as a body to resolve interagency differences on nuclear exports was set forth under Section 5 of the *Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.*

The SNEC acts on an advisory basis only, and its recommendations are not formally binding upon any agency. Subgroup agendas, minutes, and discussions during meetings are classified and are exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act to protect predecisional interagency views which are an integral and necessary part of the review process, quite apart from the specific national security classification of a matter under discussion. Final recommendations on specific applications including reasons for denials and conditions, if any, for approvals, are unclassified.

The SNEC meets at intervals of approximately 3 weeks to review proposed nuclear-related exports which could conceivably pose proliferation risk. The SNEC, as noted, serves as a forum for review and discussion of nuclear export policy issues and specific case applications. The SNEC can review NRC license applications, DOE subsequent arrangements and 10 CFR 810 applications, and Department of Commerce export license applications, since Commerce controls a far wider range of commodities and technology then either DOE or NRC.

All Commerce export license applications that have any actual or potential nuclear-related use are reviewed by DOE. In this review process, DOE follows policy guidance from the State Department, the SNEC, and other sources. DOE refers most of the cases it reviews back to Commerce for licensing action because the country, end use, or the nature of the items in question make clear the lack of any proliferation significance. For some cases where it is clear that an item would present a proliferation concern, or where export would be contrary to U.S. policy, denial is recommended. The remaining cases which raise some questions of proliferation significance are referred by DOE to the SNEC for consideration. DOE reviews about 8,000 cases a year. Of that number, only about 200–300 are referred to the SNEC. Other agencies may also refer cases to the subgroup for review.

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[7] *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 118–164.

In reviewing license applications for exports of possible proliferation concern, the SNEC takes into account a range of factors, including:

- Past practice concerning supply of the commodity in question to the intended recipient country and end-user;
- Equivalent commodities already in the recipient country and available to the end-user;
- Foreign availability;
- Intelligence information regarding activities of proliferation concern on the part of the recipient country and the end user;
- Technical capabilities and significance of the commodity to be exported;
- Foreign policy considerations; and
- Applicable statutory criteria.

If, on the basis of its review of the factors described in the preceding paragraph and any other relevant considerations, the SNEC determines that the proposed export involves significant proliferation risk, a recommendation for denial of the export will be made to the licensing agency.

If participating agencies are unable to reach agreement regarding the disposition of a particular export application to the SNEC, the *Procedures Established Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978* provide a series of steps which can be taken to resolve the disagreement. The matter can be referred to the successor to the NSC ad hoc group on nonproliferation, a body comprised of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries charged with oversight of nuclear proliferation and export control responsibilities in each of the concerned agencies. If resolution of the disagreement proves impossible at that level, the matter can be referred to the Cabinet level and even to the President.

State Department Study

The subcommittees have asked about the status of an "intensive study" focusing on South African nonproliferation issues. Although it is not possible to say now that the study will be completed when originally anticipated, progress has been made in clarifying many of the concerns involved. The issues under consideration in the study are those which we have been addressing for some time, such as the question of supply to South Africa of Commerce-licensed, nuclear-related items needed for the safe or environmentally sound operation of the Koeberg nuclear power plant. An overall objective of the study is to develop further our policy goals vis-a-vis South Africa.

Fuel for Koeberg Reactors

I would like now to turn to the subcommittees' question about the acquisition by South Africa of fuel to start up the Koeberg nuclear power station. The Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESCOM), which is to operate the two French-built reactors sited near

Cape Town, concluded contracts with the predecessor to DOE on August 16, 1974, for the enrichment of South African uranium at U.S. facilities. ESCOM thus became obligated to deliver natural uranium, and DOE was obligated to enrich it to approximately 3% or less for delivery to ESCOM at the DOE enrichment facility. ESCOM was obligated to obtain the necessary export licenses for shipment from the United States. However, as is well known, because of unsafeguarded nuclear activities in South Africa, export criteria in U.S. law are not now met by South Africa to permit the NRC to issue export licenses for nuclear fuel.

Numerous meetings on this issue have taken place between the two governments; however, the U.S. position has remained firm—the executive branch would not recommend NRC issuance of any export license until all South African nuclear activities were subjected to IAEA safeguards and South Africa adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

ESCOM and the South African Government have continued efforts to obtain the necessary NRC export licenses. In fact, ESCOM has carefully complied with the enrichment contracts and has delivered feed material to DOE which has been enriched and stored at a DOE enrichment facility.

French Arrangements To Supply Koeberg Reactors

The French firm FRAMATOME built the reactors for ESCOM at Koeberg. In addition, ESCOM concluded a contract in the mid-1970s with a French-controlled company for the fabrication of low enriched uranium into fuel elements for the reactors. The United States has been aware of this contract and has held discussions with French Government officials about our position on supply of nuclear fuel to South Africa. The Government of France told us that it would not at this time enter into any new supply obligations with South Africa. Their contract for fabrication was a pre-existing obligation.

In 1981 ESCOM acquired, in a private transaction, previously enriched uranium located in Europe. ESCOM then delivered this material to the French fabrication facility for production of fuel elements for the initial core of one of the two reactors. The Department of State and other concerned U.S. agencies have carefully examined the activities of Edlow International, Inc., a Washington-based firm, in connection with the acquisition by ESCOM of this low enriched uranium. We concluded that there was no violation of U.S. law or regulations. These services provided by Edlow are readily available from non-U.S. companies, could have been performed by ESCOM itself, and, to our knowledge, are not controlled by any other government. Officers of Edlow apprised us that they had been in contact with ESCOM officials and had arranged for the purchase by ESCOM in Europe of non-U.S., previously enriched uranium. We were not advised by them of additional details of this arrangement.

We were aware, of course, that South Africa desired to find another source of fuel for the Koeberg reactors. We told the South African officials that as a matter of policy, we were asking all supplier governments not to enter into new commitments for significant nuclear supply with any non-nuclear-weapons state which engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities. We had such discussions with France and, as I have testified, France did not conclude any new commitment. We do not believe that the actions of Edlow have significantly undermined the influence or nonproliferation policies of this Administration.

You may ask why the United States did not try to prevent this arrangement from going forward. In answering this question, let me first emphasize again that no nuclear material subject to U.S. control was involved in this transaction, and, therefore, the United States possessed no jurisdiction over it. At the end of the previous Administration, our nonproliferation discussions with South Africa were at an impasse. By contrast, however, this Administration sought to develop and carry on a dialogue with South Africa in order to foster our nonproliferation and other objectives in that country. To that end, we are willing to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the export of nonsensitive, Commerce-licensed commodities—but not, as I have mentioned, nuclear fuel in the absence of full-scope safeguards. And this policy has had some tangible benefits. We have had very useful technical discussions with South African officials on the application of safeguards to enrichment facilities. In addition, South Africa is moving toward development and use of reduced enriched fuels for its Safari research reactor.

Outlook in South Africa

The subcommittees have also asked for an assessment of the likelihood of South Africa adopting full-scope safeguards and adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Frankly, we do not expect favorable action by South Africa toward ratification of this treaty or acceptance of full-scope safeguards in the near term. However, we continue to raise this issue with officials in Pretoria in an effort to persuade the government there that it would be in its own self-interest to adhere to the treaty and to accept international safeguards on all its nuclear activities. While we have not received any indication that they are inclined to take such action in the near term, this assessment will not lead us to abandon our effort or to view it with less urgency. Nuclear nonproliferation is not an undertaking for the short run. It is a fundamental, long-term policy objective, and we will continue to use our best efforts to persuade other nations, including South Africa, to take actions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Current NRC Export Application

The subcommittees have asked for our position on the April 1982 application by Transnuclear, Inc. to the NRC for authorization to export low-enriched uranium to South Africa. The application was referred to the executive branch by the NRC but is not under active consideration as the export criteria in the law are not met. No exports of this nuclear fuel from the United States to South Africa would be authorized by this Administration until the criteria are satisfied.

While the law does provide for Presidential waiver of licensing criteria to permit exports under Executive order in cases of overriding national interest, such actions must be submitted to the Congress for review. No consideration is being given to proposing such a Presidential waiver.

Status of DOE Enrichment Contract

The subcommittees' question regarding the current status of the DOE-ESCOM contract will be answered in detail by the Department of Energy. In sum, the situation is that ESCOM, the South African utility, and DOE are still obligated to comply with the terms of the enrichment services contract, but for reasons already explained, ESCOM is unable to obtain an export license for transfer of any of the enriched uranium from the United States to South Africa. As you can imagine, this rather peculiar contractual situation raises a number of legal and policy difficulties which we desire to resolve. A solution to the contractual impasse, which would not involve export to South Africa of any U.S. nuclear fuel except on the basis I have mentioned, is under review as part of the study I referred to earlier.

The subcommittees have asked if the Administration foresees a time when the export of enriched uranium to South Africa would be approved short of our current stated requirements of full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty. This is our position which we have communicated to South Africa, and I do not see any likelihood that we would change this view in the near future.

Embargo On All Nuclear Exports

The subcommittees have asked for the Department of State's views on H.R. 7220, which would prohibit the export or transfer to the Republic of South Africa of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. While we deplore apartheid and are vigorously seeking more universal adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Administration strongly opposes this bill, because its enactment would significantly undermine important U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

In preface to my comments on the likely effects with respect to South Africa, let me express our broader concern about the impression that passage of such legislation would give to other countries, in particular those which cooperate with the United States both in nuclear commerce and in attempting to achieve shared nonproliferation goals.

Adoption of the Nonproliferation Act was viewed by many abroad as a nondiscriminatory, unilateral, and retrospective changing of U.S. export conditions. Rightly or wrongly, this perception caused problems for us with our allies and other suppliers abroad. To deal with this situation, this Administration set as a high priority the reestablishment of the U.S. reputation as a reliable nuclear partner. We believe a great deal has been accomplished in countering the impression of unreliability and, more importantly, in developing credibility in furthering international consensus on supplier restraint.

Passage of H.R. 7220, however, would reawaken those earlier concerns abroad. We would be seen by many as remaining prepared to unilaterally modify our conditions for nuclear cooperation—even when no substantive impact can be anticipated. The resulting damage to our reliability and credibility would, we fear, be severe. Enactment would also seriously undercut achievement of our nonproliferation objectives in South Africa. Despite its apparent aim of forcing South Africa to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and to accept full-scope safeguards, passage of this bill would eliminate the possibility of any meaningful nuclear dialogue with South Africa and, in fact, effectively destroy any chance of our influencing them to accept full-scope safeguards and to ratify the treaty.

It must be appreciated that significant nuclear commerce with South Africa was effectively precluded by the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, the only effect of H.R. 7220 would be to preclude export of dual-use or nuclear-related items or nonsensitive nuclear technology which are widely available from non-U.S. suppliers. Almost no leverage would, therefore, result from such a step, particularly in view of the negative political reaction to such a law which can be expected from South Africa. Since other nations are quite able and very willing to supply such commodities, the only practical effect of the bill would be to transfer trade and work from U.S. companies and American workers to foreign firms.

It is also important to note that U.S. dual-use exports to South Africa to nuclear and other government end-users have been carefully conditioned upon receipt of assurances regarding end-use, no retransfer, and, when appropriate, inspection rights. If U.S. exports are embargoed, there is every likelihood that non-U.S. suppliers will provide these commodities to South Africa without such conditions. An embargo of all exports and other forms of nonsensitive nuclear cooperation with South Africa would eliminate U.S. access to and influence upon South Africa's nuclear program.

Letter From President Reagan to the House of Representatives: Production of the MX Missile, December 6, 1982 [1]

On November 22, I informed you of my MX basing decision and underlined the absolute necessity of modernizing the Triad so that we can restore the strategic balance and maintain effective deterrence.[2] Of equal importance, we must move forward with the MX to have any hope of achieving meaningful progress at the arms negotiations in Geneva. History shows that unilateral restraints by the United States have not led to arms reductions by our adversaries.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 1580–1581.

Having sought the counsel of my predecessors, the views of Congressional leaders, and the advice of America's best technical and scientific minds, I am convinced that Peacekeeper is the right missile and that now is the right time. I, therefore, urge you to support the MX program—as approved by the Appropriations Committee—when the House considers my fiscal year 1983 defense budget request this week. The Appropriations Committee language permits us to continue work on the MX and to protect an initial operational capability in 1986, while providing Congress with additional time to conduct a thorough review of my basing plan. This strikes me as a reasonable approach as we work together toward the common goal of maintaining peace.

On a related matter, the Appropriations Committee has already significantly cut my fiscal year 1983 defense budget request. Any further reductions in my request would deal a serious setback to our overall defense buildup and would have adverse foreign policy consequences. In particular, I urge you not to support an across-the-board reduction in appropriations for defense.

Let us thus join together in rebuilding America's defense posture, in enhancing our deterrence posture, and in enriching the prospects for meaningful arms reductions.

White House Statement on Production of the MX Missile, December 7, 1982 [1]

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's remarks [2] are a clear effort to influence the American political process. He fails to mention that the Soviet Union has already deployed 308 SS-18 ICBM's, which are larger and heavier than the MX, and 300 SS-19 ICBM's, which are roughly equivalent to the MX in size. All are capable of destroying hardened targets in the United States.

The Soviets have failed to mention openly that they already have the first of their next generation of ICBM's in flight testing. This testing began prior to the President's decision on the Peacekeeper. While we have openly explained the purpose and the characteristics of the Peacekeeper, the Soviets have yet to provide any information on the purpose and capabilities of their new missile.

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[2] *Ante.*

[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 1583–1584.

[2] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* vol. XXXIV, No. 49 (Jan. 5, 1983), pp. 8–9.

For the Soviets now to cast the MX in the role of another excuse to build more missiles makes no sense when the United States is trying to redress the balance which the Soviet Union has upset.

Statement by President Reagan on the House Denial of Funds for Production of the MX Missile, December 7, 1982[1]

Today's vote by the House of Representatives was a grave mistake. Unless reversed in coming days, it will seriously set back our efforts to protect the Nation's security and could handcuff our negotiators at the arms table.

I had hoped that most of the Members in the House had awakened to the threat facing the United States. That hope was apparently unfounded. A majority chose to go sleepwalking into the future.

The facts on the Peacekeeper missile are clear and straightforward:

—For 37 years, we have kept world peace because we have been adequately protected on land, sea, and air. We maintained a margin of safety.

—But in recent years, a vital part of that defense—our land-based missile system—has become increasingly obsolete. The United States hasn't built a new land-based missile system in 15 years; the Soviets are now in their fifth generation of new missiles.

—As a result, a window of vulnerability has opened for the United States, a window the Peacekeeper is designed to close.

—Unless we act soon, the Soviets cannot only discount our land defenses, but they can also concentrate their new research on defeating us at sea and in the air.

—And of great importance, we should know from experience that the Soviets will not negotiate with us when we disarm ourselves. Why should they negotiate seriously when we give up weapon systems voluntarily, asking nothing of them in return?

It would be tragically ironic if this of all days—December 7th—once again marked a time when America was unprepared to keep the peace.

Fortunately, there is still time to reverse this grievous error. Soon the issue will be taken up by the United States Senate. If it succeeds there, a conference of the House and Senate can be convened and the production program can be saved. Then we can engage in a longer debate on the best way to house the missile.

In the meantime, I plan to do everything I can to take this case to the country. Jefferson said the American people if given the facts would never make a mistake. I will present those facts and urge our citizens everywhere to join in trying to restore America's margin of safety.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 1584–1585.

Statement by the U.S. Representative (Lodge) to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly: Military Expenditures [Extract], December 7, 1982[1]

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The dedication of any nation's resources to military ends is unfortunate—even when unavoidable. It is undeniable that in many parts of the world today families which are hungry might be fed and dying infants might be strong and growing, were their governments to spend less on armaments.

Even in the United States the cost of modernizing our military forces is far more than we would like to see as we set the goals and priorities for the national economy over the next few years. However, this is the world we live in. General Marshall, when Secretary of State, once said to his staff: "Gentlemen, don't fight the problem, solve it."

Mr. Chairman,

In his lengthy intervention in this Committee on November 29, the Soviet First Deputy Permanent Representative challenged some of the United States figures on Soviet military spending.[2] As always, of course, the Soviet representative quoted U.S. sources, from Henry Kissinger to the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, to buttress his argument. How many times have we heard Soviet representatives quote *The New York Times* to lend credibility to their case? Have you ever found an article in "Pravda" or "Izvestia" that was at variance with the Soviet Government? Be that as it may, we welcome the opportunity to discuss the question of military spending freely and openly.

Nevertheless, it is difficult seriously to discuss the issue when one side shrouds its military spending and programs in secrecy, when one side refuses to submit its military data to the U.N., utilizing the standardized U.N. reporting instrument. In short, it is difficult to conduct a dialogue with a stone wall.

Mr. Chairman,

We have heard much theoretical musing over the past weeks in this Committee about United States military doctrine and programs. However, the fact remains that the actual U.S. military posture has changed little over the past decade. What has changed is the level and character of the Russian military establishment. If the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union wish to refute any of the following facts, let them open up their books, let them accept President Reagan's offer to the Soviet leadership to speak on issues of war and peace directly to the American people on U.S. television for a reciprocal opportunity.

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[1] Press Release USUN 176-(82), Dec. 9, 1982.

[2] A/C.1/37/PV.46, p. 62.

We may not like the facts which confirm the rapid expansion of Soviet military spending; they make us all uncomfortable. However, if history teaches us anything, it teaches that self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is the road to perdition. We must not, like the proverbial ostrich, stick our heads in the sand.

Mr. Chairman,

—Today the estimated dollar cost of Soviet defense activities is some 50 percent more than corresponding U.S. outlays;

—The United States spent 5.5 percent of its GNP on defense during FY 1981 compared to approximately 12 percent for the USSR;

—Today, the United States estimates the Soviet Union's defense budget is 40 percent larger in real terms than it was ten years ago, while the U.S. defense budget is 10 percent lower than it was ten years ago;

—Over this same period, the Soviet Union has spent at least 150 percent of what the U.S. has on defense;

—During this same period, the Soviet Union has spent twice as much on conventional armament as the United States;

—The outlays for Soviet strategic offensive weapons (ICBMs, submarines, and bombers) nearly doubled U.S. spending on comparable systems during the past decade. Soviet emphasis on ICBMs is well known. However, the Soviets have outspent the U.S. on submarines as well. During the same period Soviet expenditures on strategic defense (e.g., civil defense programs) have also clearly outpaced U.S. programs;

—Soviet military investments (research and development, procurement and military construction) have exceeded U.S. efforts even more markedly, ranging from 80 to 90 percent more than U.S. spending during the past five years;

—The Soviet Union has twice as many personnel under arms as the U.S. (USSR—4.3 million to U.S.—2.1 million). The difference in ready reserve strength is even more dramatic (USSR—9.2 million to U.S.—1.2 million).

These startling and alarming realities, Mr. Chairman, are not figments of our imagination. There are disagreements, of course, about some specific figures, but no one can doubt the trends of military spending and their implications. They have been documented by all recognized centers of disarmament and military studies and by all objective governmental analyses.

Despite these spending realities, Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union routinely reports—year after year—the same single defense budget figure of 17 billion rubles. This evokes the chilling memory of "newspeak" described in George Orwell's novel *1984*. Converted into dollars at the arbitrary Soviet rate of exchange, this now is stated by the USSR to be equivalent to $23 billion. This is outrageous. To accept their patently inaccurate figure would create a humpty dumpty world in which "True is false and false is true." The irrefutable fact remains that *over the past ten years the Soviet Government has launched the greatest and most expensive military build-up in world history—and has produced and deployed more potential explosive power than has ever before in all recorded history been compiled in any given period of time by any single state—or combination of states.*

The Soviet military build-up has taken place while the United States has tried to restrain the arms race unilaterally—a period in which not one single new strategic weapon system was introduced into the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a result of their accelerated build-up during the 1970's decade, the Soviets now lead the U.S. by almost all quantitative indicators of strategic capacity, especially in ICBMs and nuclear throw-weight.

One corollary of the massive Soviet build-up is the fact that *the USSR is now the most militarized industrial society that has ever existed during so-called peacetime.* Another corollary is that, while the USSR has been generally reluctant to extend significant economic assistance to so-called "developing nations," it has shown a willingness to pour lethal weapons into these areas. *Between 1977 and 1981, while the USSR sent only $2.3 billion in economic assistance, it disbursed over $36 billion in military hardware to the Third World.* According to internationally recognized disarmament centers, the USSR out-delivered the United States in all major categories of conventional weapons transfers, often by ratios of 5 to 1.

The stark contrasts between the great volume of Soviet weapons transfers on the one hand, and the meager amount of development assistance, on the other, illuminates in bold relief the true intentions of the Soviet Union toward the developing nations. The human toll is also devastating: The USSR and its allies have created some 10 million refugees from Indochina through Afghanistan to the Horn of Africa and across the Atlantic to Cuba and Central America.

Mr. Chairman,

In his address to the SSOD II, President Reagan reminded us of the tragic fact that since the end of WW II over 100 conflicts—all of them using conventional weapons—have disturbed the peace of the world. The tragedy of destabilizing arms transfers to the developing world is compounded by the sad fact that, today, this same developing world now devotes a higher percentage of its GNP to military expenditures than does the industrialized world. We should all share a concern with rising military expenditures; a concern that affects—or should affect—most nations represented in this forum.

While we are all aware of the huge potential destructive power contained in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers—and we can all agree that these superpowers have primary responsibility for nuclear arms control and disarmament, this should not make us overlook the *actual*—present and ongoing—realities of conventional armed conflict in the developing nations, including the spiralling military expenditures of many of these states. For example:

—The developing world now accounts for nearly one-quarter of the world's total military spending (23 percent in 1979). In 1970, the share was 17 percent.

—In the decade of the 1970's, for the developed countries taken together, the average annual growth rate of military spending after inflation was 1.5 percent; for the developing countries, it was 5.5 percent.

—If these rates were to continue at the same pace, the military spending of the developing countries would *exceed* that of the developed countries soon after the year 2000 (2008).

The military spending of any country, however necessary it may be for security reasons, usually diverts resources from alternative economic uses, including social and economic development. This is especially poignant in the developing countries. The average burden of military spending relative to GNP in developing countries was 5.5 percent in 1979, compared to 5.3 percent for developed countries.

Where legitimate security needs do not require such spending, it is to be deplored. Where it is necessary for national survival, we should all seek ways to relieve the security threat. Those states attempting economic and political destabilization of other countries should cease such illegal and immoral activities.

Mr. Chairman, let us not labor under any illusions. We will not solve the complex problem of spiralling military spending by ignoring it. We will begin to address the real causes and solutions to the problem only if we address them openly and frankly and with the objective of finding solutions.

Statement by the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Rowny) Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: The MX Missile and Strategic Arms Reduction, December 8, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman, the greatest risk of the nuclear war today is caused by the large number of weapons and especially the large imbalance in ICBM's—intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is the ICBM's which are the most destabilizing of the weapons. They have the combination of yield, accuracy, short flight times, and constant availability to make them the most threatening weapons. Moreover, they are the most vulnerable of the weapons today.

During SALT II, while we built no ICBM's, no new ICBM's, the Soviets built four new types of ICBM's. Although we made some improvements in the yield of our Minuteman warheads, the Soviets have built up much more. They have built up to the point where they have three times the number of ICBM warheads and at least four times the throw weight, which is the strategic capability of these ICBM warheads, and moreover, as the Secretary has said, they have caught up to us in accuracy.

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[1] *The MX Missile and Associated Basing Decision: Hearing . . . Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 20–21.

Amb. Rowny was also designated Special Representative for Negotiations.

As the Secretary also said, Marshal Ustinov said [2] that the Soviets, in response to our MX, will build a new weapon equivalent to it if we deploy the MX. The Soviets already have built up over 600 of such weapons and have them in their inventory today.

These 600 weapons are roughly comparable in some respects, and their potential is superior, to the MX. Besides, on October 26, the Soviets tested a new so-called light missile, which is the same category in which the MX falls.

Now the President's proposal, the one I am negotiating in Geneva—and I just left there Saturday, having finished the second round of now 5 months of intense negotiations with the Soviets—is based on significant cuts, deep cuts. That proposal was formulated on the assumption that we would modernize our ICBM force and that we would put it in a survivable mode.

Now if we don't get the MX, which is clearly a measured response to this huge Soviet threat, it is my opinion we will have to reevaluate our proposal and see if we can reduce as much as we are now proposing to reduce. In the over-10 years now that I have been negotiating with the Soviets, I find them rather tough-minded people. They don't give up something for nothing.

I recall several years ago when Senator Tower was visiting us, and it was the day the B-1 was given up, and Senator Tower said to the chief negotiator on the other side, "Mr. Schuken", then the acting head, "we have given up the B-1. Now what are you going to give up?"

Mr. Schuken said, "Senator Tower, you should know we Soviets are neither pacifists nor philanthropists." I think that was exactly their attitude then and is today. The Soviets, in short, need incentives to negotiate. The fact that they are in Geneva today shows that they believe that they have such an incentive.

Now I accepted this job of negotiating a new agreement because I am a believer in the possibilities of arms control. I believe that an agreement which takes care of our security needs is possible to achieve, but it must be based on our security requirements.

Therefore, MX to me is not a bargaining chip. I will repeat that: It is not a bargaining chip. I am convinced that we need it for our security. However, it is a measured response to the threat and, very importantly, it provides incentive for the Soviets to negotiate.

In short, without MX in a survivable basing mode, my chances of getting an acceptable agreement, one which takes care of our security, one which provides for deterrence, one which allows for deep cuts, one which enhances strategic arms stability, all of these possibilities are greatly undermined if we don't field this Peacekeeper system.

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[2] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXIV, No. 49 (Jan. 5, 1983), pp. 7–8.

News Conference Remarks by President Reagan: MX Missile and Nuclear Freeze [Extract], December 10, 1982 [1]

The President. I have a statement here first. I just wanted to say a word about the importance of the defense issue in the closing days of this congressional session.

It's vital that we in government demonstrate to friends and potential foes alike that the United States is determined to remain a credible force for peace in the world. There are several critical decisions now facing the Senate, including their votes on the B-1 and a second carrier. But none is more critical than their vote on the production of the Peacekeeper missile.

Frankly I was disturbed by the debate in the House earlier this week because of the confusion over what the vote meant. The key vote in the House and now in the Senate is over money for production of the missile, not for the basing mode. And I believe it's absolutely essential to a strong, secure defense that we vote now on funds for that missile. Then next year, as we have more time, I'd welcome a vigorous debate on the best way to base the missile.

I agree that more time is needed before we achieve a consensus in Congress on the basing mode, but the need for the missile itself has long been apparent. Both Presidents Ford and Carter before me have vigorously argued that the country needs this new system. Later today I am meeting with our arms negotiator, Ed Rowny, and I'm sure that his message will be the same as in the past—a vote against MX production today is a vote against arms control tomorrow.

I also think it's fair to mention a couple of headlines that I came across earlier this week after the House voted. One said, "Soviets Voice Satisfaction on MX Rejection." The other read, "Soviets Cheer House for Rejecting MX Missile Appropriation." Well, if the Soviets are so pleased, perhaps we should be a little more concerned.

I can tell you that I'm vitally concerned about this matter, and I urge the Senate to stand together and assure adequate funds for the Peacekeeper.

And now I just have a faint suspicion that you may have a few questions.

Q. Are you ready to go back to the drawingboard on the dense pack? And you do sound like you are maybe willing to compromise on the whole question.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 1602–1605.

The President. Well, in the selection of a basing mode there was long study, and there was long consideration of any number of proposals. Now, any proposal for basing faces a time in which the other side is going to create a vulnerability of this system. This one did finally come down as probably offering the best opportunity. But from the very first, and in all my conversations with the Congress and the debate up there, I said that there's a time element involved here in which, yes, if there is more debate needed and if the Congress wants to debate and discuss and see if there are possible other options that could conceivably be improvements over this, we're willing for that.

All this bill entailed is money to start production of the missile. And yet, unfairly, the opponents—or the proponents of that amendment in the House made the entire debate not on whether we need the missile, but on the basing mode. And this was unfair, and it was lacking a little in honesty to do that. And I think that the message that came out was that they were opposed to the basing mode.

Q. Mr. President, aren't you wavering then on the dense pack? How willing are you to listen to a vigorous debate?

The President. Why is it wavering when you've spent months trying to find—and gone over months—there have been basing modes suggested before we even came here, and there was great debate over those and my own opposition to one that had been proposed. But when you've spent that much time—and the Congress, on the other hand, has not been engaged in the debate on that—I made it plain from the first that we were asking for money to start production of the missile and that I would welcome further discussion and debate on the basing mode. That's not as if we made—we made a decision in answer to a demand by the Congress. They demanded that we make a recommendation of a basing mode, so we chose the best one of all those that had been proposed.

Q. Are you concerned that dense pack is going to be defeated in the Senate the way it did in the House? Is that why you're trying to deemphasize dense pack?

The President. I tried to deemphasize it in the House.

Q. Sir, are you apprehensive that up on Capitol Hill the MX might become not just a symbol of defense, but a symbol of the deficit—you've got to cut somewhere, this might be it.

The President. Well, as I said all during the campaign and continue to say, the first responsibility of the Federal Government is the security and the freedom of the people of this country. And if it comes down to a choice, in a deficit period of this kind of—deficit or national defense, national security, I have to come down on the side of national security, and the Congress should also.

And the drumbeat, constant drumbeat, with which I'm sure many of you are familiar, about supposedly excessive defense spending at this time ignore the fact that the percentage of the budget that is devoted to defense—even in this attempt to rectify the errors of years past—is a smaller percentage than has been customary in times past for defense spending. It normally has been about a half of the budget. It is down to about a fourth of the budget.

Q. Mr. President, there's such confusion about—

The President. Wait a minute. There's a hand back here.

Q. Mr. President, assuming the Senate does go with the production funds, do you have any reason to believe the House conferees will reverse their own body's action in the conference? Will they go along with it in a conference report?

The President. Well, there's always that opportunity. You have a second go at it.

Q. Mr. President, there's such confusion about dense pack. Can you explain why it's the best system and how it would work?

The President. Well, it was the best system in that there is scientific evidence—and from pretty reputable people—given that it presented an obstacle to an enemy attempting to zero in with nuclear weapons to destroy our missiles, that what was called fratricide—that they would have to come in at such proximity that the first explosion would render the incoming ones harmless, and, thus, where you might lose one or two missiles, you would have the others then to reply. And there's a great deal of confidence and a great many scientists—that this is true.

But it also lends itself down the line a ways. It lends itself to future defense without violating the ABM treaty [2]—and that has been a dishonest statement that it violates that treaty. It also lends itself to further deception, the possibility of additional silos and leaving some question to an enemy as to which ones had missiles in them.

Q. Mr. President, are you saying that you're backing the MX but you are not specifically backing the dense pack—main basing system. That's flexible?

The President. I'm saying in answer to the demand of the Congress that we come forth with a basing mode, we came up with the best one in all the discussion and all the alternatives that have been presented and met their deadline for presenting such a system. At the same time, I said in submitting this that the Congress has not had time to debate that particular basing mode. And there is time available and that they can go forward with the missile. At the same time, we're perfectly willing to sit down with them and debate and discuss and see if there are other alternatives.

Q. But, Mr. President—

Q. Was there undue pressure on you—

The President. What?

Q. Was there undue pressure upon you to make a decision by this deadline?

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[2] Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197–201.

The President. This is what had been—the deal that had been made with the Congress. This is what they asked for, and I met the deadline.

Q. But, Mr. President, if Congress overwhelmingly rejected this—

Q. Mr. President, if—

The President. Wait a minute.

Q. If this, you know, dense pack set-up is so good in your estimation, why did the Joint Chiefs vote three to two against it, and why did you move against their decision on this? I mean, these are supposedly the military experts of the country.

The President. Because, except for one, the others favored the one thing that we had first proposed to Congress and that Congress refused to accept, which was placing the missiles as they came off the assembly line in Minuteman silos. And Congress refused that absolutely.

Well, it wasn't a bad idea, as is evidenced by the fact that two of the three Chiefs of Staff—that was the thing that they advocated. But they did all agree that, since we couldn't use that system, that they would support whatever decision I made.

Q. But, Mr. President, Congress overwhelming rejection of a missile that you're saying is so essential, does it concern you now that you have perhaps lost your ability to have your way with Congress—to work your will with Congress?

The President. Well, I never went to bed every night with great confidence that I could work my will with Congress. They're a stubborn bunch, and you ride 'em the best you can. The—no—the— [*laughter*] [3]—

I would like to call to your attention that from the very first, I have never gotten all that I asked for. I didn't get the tax program that I asked for. And I think that had I gotten it, we might find less of a recession today. I never got all the cuts that I asked for in spending, but I accepted what I could get and said we'll come back again and try again for more the next time around.

Q. But, are you fearful that you're now going to start to get an awful lot less?

The President. You know me. I'm an eternal optimist.

Q. Mr. President, sir, you mentioned earlier that the MX vote was good news in the Kremlin. Do you accept the House Intelligence Committee report that proponents of the nuclear freeze are not being manipulated by Soviet agents?

The President. There have been several rather well documented articles that have appeared in print with regard to, let us say then, participation in the peace move by the Soviets. We know that the originator—the originating organization of that was the World Peace

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[3] Brackets in the source text.

Council, which is a Soviet organization supported by and maintained by them.

I can tell you that I have made inquiry on some of the articles that have appeared and asked for an analysis of whether they were factual or not, and the reports that I have received back, though, is that with here and there, an exception for journalistic exaggeration, they did check out.

I say again that the millions of people who are supportive of that movement, I'm sure, are sincere and well-intentioned and from that standpoint that we share the same goals. I think that a freeze would be just fine if we can get down first to equality between the two countries. But this country today, we have less megatonnage, less force in our ballistic missile system, land-based system, than we had 20 years ago. And the Soviets, in the meantime, are now producing their fifth generation of missiles. They have improved in accuracy. They have improved in MIRV'ing. They've improved in the megatonnage. And all I'm saying is that one must look to see whether, well-intentioned though it may be, this movement might be carrying water that they're not aware of for another purpose.

Incidentally, the first man who proposed the nuclear freeze was on February 21st, 1981, in Moscow—Leonid Brezhnev.[4]

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North Atlantic Council Communique [Extract], December 10, 1982 [1]

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5. In unremitting pursuit of its military build-up, which has long passed the level required for defence, the Soviet Union is increasing its superiority in conventional arms and expanding its naval power. It is simultaneously strengthening its nuclear capability, particularly through the deployment of intermediate-range missiles. As stated in their Bonn Declaration,[2] the Allies are left no choice but to maintain an effective military deterrent adequate to meet their legitimate security concerns in a changing situation. It therefore remains essential for the Allies to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of conventional and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggression and intimidation. To that end they agree to continue their efforts towards greater cooperation in armaments and, in particular, to take full advantage of emerging technologies and to continue action in the appro-

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[4] See *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 64–69.

[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 1983, pp. 16–17. The Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels Dec. 9 and 10.

[2] *NATO Review*, vol. 30, No. 3 (Aug. 1982), pp. 25–26.

priate fora restricting Warsaw Pact access to Western militarily-relevant technologies.

The presence of North American forces on the European Continent and the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe are essential to Allied security. Equally important are the maintenance and continued improvement of the defence capabilities of the European members of the Alliance.

6. Arms control and disarmament together with deterrence and defence are integral parts of Alliance security policy and important means of promoting international stability and peace.

Firmly committed to progress over arms control and disarmament, the Allies have initiated a comprehensive series of proposals for militarily significant, equitable and verifiable agreements, which are designed to lead to a balance of forces at lowest possible levels. They seek from the Soviet Union a constructive and serious approach in current negotiations.

7. In the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), the Allies fully support the efforts of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union significant reductions in United States and Soviet strategic forces emphasizing the most destabilizing systems in the first phase of the negotiations. The Allies urge the Soviet Union to contribute in a concrete way to speedy progress in these important negotiations.

8. The Allies underline the importance of both parts of the decision of 12th December 1979 which provided for a limited modernization of United States intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) combined with a parallel offer of negotiations on United States and Soviet weapons of this kind. This decision, which was prompted, in particular, by the deployment of SS–20 missiles, led to the current INF talks in Geneva within the framework of negotiations on strategic arms reductions.[3]

The Allies fully support the United States efforts to enhance security through the total elimination of all existing and planned Soviet and United States longer-range land-based INF missiles. The United States proposal was developed in close consultation within the Alliance among the member countries concerned. The Ministers of these countries welcomed the continuing United States commitment to serious negotiations, and to consider carefully with these Allies any serious Soviet proposal.

Ministers reiterated that, in the absence of concrete results, INF deployments would begin according to schedule at the end of 1983.[4]

9. The Allies welcomed the recent proposals by President Reagan for new confidence-building measures in the nuclear field between the United States and the Soviet Union intended to enhance stability.

10. The Allies participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna are confident that the comprehensive

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[3] For the 1979 decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

[4] The Greek delegation recalled its position on various aspects of this declaration. [Footnote in original.]

approach embodied in the draft treaty text presented by Western negotiators has given new momentum to the negotiators. This Western initiative is aimed at achieving real progress towards substantial reductions of ground forces, leading to parity in combined ground and air force manpower at equal collective levels in Central Europe. Western participants in the negotiations call upon the East to respond adequately to the need for prior agreement on data for current Warsaw Pact force levels and to agree to effective associated measures for verification and confidence-building.

11. The Allies also attach great importance to efforts in the United Nations to secure improved verification procedures, wider availability of information on defence spending and other measures likely to enhance transparency and thus build confidence.

12. The Allies are gravely concerned about strong evidence of continued use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan in violation of international law, including Soviet involvement in the use of such weapons. [5]

They stress the need for progress in the Committee on Disarmament towards a convention on the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with appropriate provisions for verification including on-site inspection.

13. At the Madrid CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] [6] followup meeting the Allies have deplored infringement of the principles and provisions of the Final Act. [7] They noted in this respect that the situation in Poland remained a source of concern. The Allies are continuing their efforts to arrive at a substantial and balanced concluding document and they regard the draft submitted by the neutral and non-aligned states in December 1981 as a good basis for negotiations. They have introduced a number of amendments to bring it up-to-date with realities in Europe and to call for progress on human rights, free trade unions and freer movement of people, ideas and information. To facilitate a positive outcome in Madrid, the Allies urge the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states to abide by the principles and provisions of the Final Act.

As part of a substantial and balanced concluding document, the Allies reaffirm their support for a Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe on the basis of a precise mandate to negotiate in a first phase militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures applicable to the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

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[5] Greece has expressed its views on this sentence which were recorded in the record of the meeting. [Footnote in original.]

[6] Brackets in the source text.

[7] For the arms control portions of the Final Act, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire act is printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323 ff.

They will also strive to achieve significant progress in the important humanitarian aspects of East-West relations.

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Address by President Reagan: Production of the MX Missile, December 11, 1982 [1]

A few weeks ago, I talked with you about our quest for peace—for a secure world in which our children and our children's children can grow up without fear, enjoying the blessings of peace and freedom. As President, my first duty is to do everything in my power to achieve these goals.

Two of the keys to preserving the peace are deterrence and arms reduction. One of these keys has worked perfectly for 37 years. Since the end of World War II, we've prevented the outbreak of a new global war by a national policy of deterrence. To do that meant maintaining our defense forces so that any enemy knew in advance that an attack on us or our allies would bring disaster, not victory, to the attacker. Now, when a potential enemy knows that by starting a war he'll lose more than he hopes to gain, he just won't start a war in the first place. That's what deterrence is all about.

A key feature of this policy has been to maintain strong strategic forces. Our triad, as it's called—our three-legged plan of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and manned bombers—makes clear to any aggressor that if he attacks us, we will still have the strength to strike back, the ability to retaliate. That's because no potential attacker has the strength to knock out all three legs of our defense triad at the same time.

If we only had two parts to this force, then preserving the peace would be more difficult. Potential attackers might even come to believe they could launch and win a nuclear war. We must never let this happen. That's why last year I ordered all three legs of our strategic forces to be modernized.

There's no question about the need for modernizing them. Today all three are made up mainly of weapons we developed more than 10 years ago—more than 20 years ago in the case of our bombers. Sooner or later older systems become ineffective and vulnerable. Our most pressing problem today is that the Soviet Union, because of its massive buildup of nuclear weapons, could destroy virtually all of our land-based missiles in a single nuclear attack. If we do nothing to correct that situation, we will have weakened the chances for peace.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 1616–1617. The President addressed the nation from Camp David, Maryland.

This is why we need the new MX Peacekeeper missile—to help restore our strategic deterrent and literally to keep the peace.

The Peacekeeper is a modern missile, and it is survivable. I agree with my scientific and military advisers that the closely spaced basing plan we proposed will work. Congress had ordered us to submit a basing proposal for the MX by December 1st, which we did. However, we're prepared to review this matter with the Congress in the new year.

The basing mode is not an issue. There's plenty of time to decide on that. What we need now is a clear, positive vote on the missile itself, to go forward on production of the missile. Why? Because we're negotiating with the Soviet Union at Geneva to reduce substantially nuclear arsenals on both sides—the other key to protecting the peace in the nuclear age. These are tough negotiations, but our team is hanging in there. However, if we just cancel the Peacekeeper, the MX—if we say we won't deploy it—we remove a major incentive for the Soviets to stay at the table and agree to reductions.

Look at it from their perspective. If we're willing to cancel a weapon system without getting something in return, why should they offer to eliminate or reduce weapons that give them an advantage over us?

In 1977 my predecessor sent his Secretary of State to Moscow with a proposal that the Soviets reduce the number of their heavy SS-18 missiles.[2] At the time, we had nothing comparable to the SS-18 and no new missiles to deploy. The result was what you'd expect. The Soviets refused to even consider the proposal. I can't believe the American people want to make that mistake a second time. The stakes are just too high.

Without the Peacekeeper, we weaken our ability to deter war, and we may lose a valuable opportunity to achieve a treaty to reduce nuclear weapons on both sides. With it, we make progress on both paths to peace. On both counts, there's no doubt that we need it.

In the weeks ahead, we'll continue to bring the facts to you, the American people, and your representatives on this vital issue. We've already done it in hearings before the Senate. I only wish the House had given us the opportunity to do the same before it voted last Tuesday to cut funds for the Peacekeeper missile. It's hard to make a good decision before you've heard the facts. And in my opinion, the House of Representatives voted without really considering the facts.

As we present our case for the Peacekeeper missile to you, I hope you'll keep in mind that by continuing to maintain our ability to deter attack, we make it less likely that the horror of nuclear war will ever occur. And by keeping our defenses credible, we offer the Soviet Union a realistic incentive to reduce tensions and to agree to significant and verifiable arms reductions.

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[2] For statements on this proposal, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1977*, pp. 170–191, 199–211.

These are vital objectives. But I can't achieve them without the support of the American people and the United States Congress. To protect the peace, we must provide the funds necessary to offset the enormous Soviet military buildup and restore a military balance, particularly in nuclear weapons. And to achieve the arms reductions we want, we must give the Soviets the incentive to negotiate. We must go to the bargaining table in a position of strength, not weakness.

My fellow Americans, with your continued support for a strong defense and for the Peacekeeper missile—but only with your support—we can achieve both of these crucial goals.

Thanks for listening, and God bless you.

Interview of Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq on NBC's "Meet the Press": Pakistani Plans for Developing a Nuclear Device [Extracts], December 12, 1982 [1]

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Mr. Freudenheim: Mr. President, you have said you are not planning to explode a nuclear device. But is Pakistan getting ready to test a so-called peaceful nuclear device, as India has done?

President Zia: In our opinion, there is no such thing as a peaceful device or a nonpeaceful device. It's like a sword. You can cut your throat; you can save yourself. We are planning neither.

Mr. Freudenheim: On another nuclear question, Mr. President, is Pakistan prepared to accept the improvements in monitoring of its nuclear program which the International Atomic Energy in Vienna is striving for?

President Zia: Sir, for your information, we have already accepted unilaterally all additional safeguards that the International Atomic Energy Commission has imposed on our nuclear reactor in Karachi. There's only one item left and I hope that will also be solved very soon.

Mr. Freudenheim: That item?

President Zia: It's very funny. It will take fifteen minutes for me to explain, but I'll let you know later on. It's a question of safety against the airlock and there's nothing to it, just a very simple thing.

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Mr. Smith: Mr. President, if it's true that Pakistan is not developing a nuclear weapons capability, why is it that American intelligence reports suggest that you are going ahead with programs to produce both weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium, elements that would seemingly have no part in a peaceful program in your country?

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[1] NBC's "Meet the Press" transcript. The panel interviewing President Zia were Marvin Kalb, NBC News; Milt Freudenheim, *New York Times;* Marcia Gauger, *Time;* and Richard Smith, *Newsweek.*

President Zia: Sir, all I can say is it's up to the American Administration to accept or reject the intelligence report, but if they indicate this, then they are certainly incorrect.

Mr. Smith: Is it true that you have recently strengthened your antiaircraft defenses around your nuclear facilities? If they're peaceful, is that necessary?

President Zia: No. All sensitive installations are well-guarded. The gold reserves in Fort Knox are not—They're very sensitive and you can go and see how well they are guarded.

Mr. Smith: Are you concerned that the Israelis might perceive that you are going ahead with a nuclear weapons program and take action against those facilities?

President Zia: There are rumors that Israel might indulge in such an act of irresponsibility.

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Question and Answer Session of President Reagan With Reporters: Production of the MX Missile [Extract], December 14, 1982 [1]

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Well, this morning I met with a group of leading Republican and Democratic Senators to discuss the future of the MX Peacekeeper missile. And I'm pleased to report that we've reached a bipartisan agreement that we hope will preserve funding for the missile and enable us to continue the restoration of America's defense capabilities.

In recent days, it's become apparent that many Members of Congress agree with my assessment that production of the Peacekeeper is in the national security interests of the United States. At the same time, however, they want to take a closer look at the question of how to base the missile. The agreement we've reached today is a reasonable balancing of those interests.

All of us who met today pledged that in the next few days we'll work with others in the Senate and with Members of the House to secure full congressional assent to this plan.

In closing, let me reaffirm my very strong view that the United States needs to move forward with an effective land-based missile, one that will not only enhance the prospects for a secure America but will also strengthen the hand of our negotiators at the arms conference and the arms control talks in Geneva.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 1621–1622.

The world in which we live is uncertain at best. And we must be fully prepared in order to protect our interests and defend the cause of peace.

Q. Does the Peacekeeper get dumped?

Q. Mr. President, does that mean dense pack is dead?

The President. That was the first hand up, right there. What?

Q. Does that mean dense pack is dead? Have you agreed to forgo dense pack to reevaluate basing?

The President. No. And let me straighten something out on that whole thing. First of all, our first proposal was—with the MX—that, because they don't all come out of the oven at the same time—there's a progression as they're made—that the first certain number that came off the line simply be placed in Minuteman missiles [silos] [2] while we continued to work on a basing mode, because there was great disagreement about the original concept of the previous administration of the racetrack idea and 4,000 shelters for 200 missiles. We're building—we're only asking for 100.

Congress decided against the idea of placing any of them in Minuteman missiles. And so we continued and the Defense Department continued with a study of various methods of basing them. And finally the one that—as I've said before and used the expression—that came up with the least warts was the dense pack system. And Congress had also asked that by December we come up with a recommendation. So, we came with that recommendation.

But I have made it clear to them all the time that the important thing is to let us get started with the production of the missiles, because there's going to be a considerable delay in getting them. And if there had been no opportunity, we simply presented the plan, no opportunity to debate or discuss with the Congress on this decision, and so we said, "We're perfectly willing to sit here, if you'll let us start making the missiles, and discuss with you, negotiate, and see if there's any improvement or better plan." And that's always been our position.

Q. Mr. President, what's the compromise? You haven't told us anything about—where is the compromise, and who was involved?

The President. Well, the compromise is going to involve—would you like to explain what the compromise is, John Tower?

Senator Tower. The compromise is simply this: that the funding for production of the MX missile would be retained in the bill, but would be fenced. And the bringing down of the fence would be contingent on two things. The President is required to resubmit a certification of his selection of basing modes, along with information on alternative basing modes. Then the Congress would act under expedited procedure, within 45 days of the submission of the certification, to approve the basing mode recommended by the President or any alternative they might select. But it would require affirmative approval of both Houses of Congress, under expedited procedure so it could not be filibustered.

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[2] These and following brackets are in the source text.

Q. Mr. President, do you have any—

The President. Bill's [Bill Plante, CBS News] hand was up.

Q. Mr. President, let me just ask you this. The Soviets have made it plain that if we build, they'll build more missiles. Can this really lead to any kind of arms control, do you think?

The President. Yes, it can, because participating in our meetings has been General Rowny—is home. They're taking an interlude here in the arms negotiation talks. And he has spoken of the impact that this has had and the seriousness of the negotiations, that the Soviet Union is willing and is negotiating.

And the thing is, this is not in the sense of a bargaining chip that somebody can say, "Well, you're building it just to tear it down." No. We need a modernization. Even if we get the reduction of arms which we're seeking and which there has been some indication that the Soviets are seriously considering, this would not be the missile that would be taken out of circulation.

We need to modernize to catch up with the five generations of missiles that they have been developing while we have stayed static and have not improved in the last 15 years in any of our missiles. We do not match them in accuracy. We do not match them in megatonnage. This is a missile that is comparable to their big missiles, their SS-18's.

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News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Shultz and French Foreign Minister Cheysson: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Extracts], December 14, 1982 [1]

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Q. You have spoken of 1983 as the most difficult year since the war. Have you discussed this today? Do you feel any better?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. Oh certainly not. Despite my great pleasure to meet my friend, George Shultz, he has not relieved my concerns about 1983. I don't think I put it that way to the Secretary of State in the course of the day so I have to tell him that the two reasons why I consider 1983 will be the most difficult year we have known since World War II is: (1) when the December 1979 two-fold decision of NATO [2] will have to be implemented which means either the negotiations in Geneva will succeed or the missiles should be installed. This is the first reason why it will be a very difficult year. There is little doubt that the Soviets will have that very much in mind and will make every effort to try and prevent this installation of Pershings and cruise missiles. Will you be ready to pay for that noninstallation by a success in the negotiations in Geneva? This is our hope, but, if not, we repeated it in Brussels in the last few days, then the missiles must be installed as provided for.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 1983, pp. 28–29. The remarks were made at a joint news conference in Paris.

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Q. How committed is the French Government to President Reagan's zero option? Have you discussed the possibility of a compromise with the Secretary?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. I can answer the first part of the question. The second I leave it to George. The first part of the question—we are not in that negotiation. We rely completely on our American friends to try to achieve success there. We support their position. Their position is option zero. We support option zero. Of course, if we think of possible developments, we can't exclude that in the course of the negotiation, there might be slight changes. But a position taken in that negotiation is option zero—we support that position. Now was it discussed between the President and Mr. Shultz, I don't know. We did not discuss it together.

Q. Do you believe that the Soviets can or should have the right to negotiate on the basis of the French or British nuclear capability?

Foreign Minister Cheysson. We have never accepted that our own nuclear potential be taken into account. And we haven't changed our mind.

Secretary Shultz. We didn't discuss any alternatives to the zero option. I think the name Kraft was mentioned once. Our position is that the zero-zero approach is the best approach. It's very desirable to eliminate entirely that class of missiles from the European soil, and we think that is a good position. And I don't have any further comments beyond what I made this afternoon on alternative proposals.

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[2] The NATO decision may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1979,* pp. 814–816.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Weinberger Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: The MX Missile, U.S. Strategic Doctrine, and Strategic Arms Control, December 14, 1982 [1]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we appreciate very much as always the opportunity to appear before you and to discuss these critically important matters. I was at a White House meeting with the President this morning; so, I regret being late for the earlier hearing. But I am delighted to have the opportunity to be here now, and I have an opening statement.

I also have a second opening statement, which was prepared for the closed session we were to have had earlier this morning.

Mr. Chairman, you have indicated the shortness of time, and I will ask, if I might, that both statements, be put in the record in full. I would like to highlight one or two points from my statement for this hearing and then turn to the points that you, Senator Pell and Senator Boschwitz just raised to see if I could, in an informal, impromptu sort of way, deal with those points.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Without objection, the full statements will be incorporated in the record.

Secretary WEINBERGER. The part I would like to raise at this point in the opening statement is the paragraph which states that the central characteristic of the Soviet strategic forces is an enormous and destabilizing, prompt, hard target kill capability. The United States today has no such capability. It is essential, therefore, that we secure that kind of capability, and it is this basic requirement that has lead to the development of this missile over some 10 years of discussion and debate and through three or four previous administrations.

There are other key points in that statement, and others that I think can be referred to as I try to deal with the points that you have raised. But the MX missile does work to counter this monopoly that the Soviets have developed in strategic weapons. The MX is flexible and it is responsive. It has reliable and real time communications with command authorities, offers alert rates that approach 100 percent and can be maintained at low operating cost. There is no other single strategic system that possesses all these important qualities.

So I would like to have that more or less as a background for my remarks, Mr. Chairman, when we talk about one of the possible options which has been discussed, to move away from a Triad, give up the land-based system and rely on the other two legs of the Triad.

Mr. Chairman, in your remarks you referred to a point that Marshal Ustinov made. [2] I do not find myself in any way surprised that his current speech differs from his earlier commitments or discussions with you. That is more or less a pattern, and I do not find it in any way surprising. I do think there are a couple of interesting points in the talk he made—aside from the intimidating portions—just about the time the NATO meeting began for the NATO defense ministers. Fortunately his remarks had no effect on them.

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[1] *U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-seventh Congress, Second Session*, pp. 9–14.

[2] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXIV, No. 49 (Jan. 5, 1983), pp. 7–8.

But he charged that the MX close-spaced basing proposal violated SALT.[3] We have been advised by our counsel and all the arms control people who have examined the proposal—and they were numerous—that there is no violation of SALT, that this is a system that is not covered in the SALT Treaty. It is a system that provides for the ability to move the missile and its canister about. All of its launch mechanisms are in the canister, and it can be, as I said, picked up and moved from one silo to another silo. So there is no violation of SALT, and we have been assured of that by all of the people who have familiarity with both the treaty and the law involved.

The other point that Marshal Ustinov made and you referred to is even more interesting. He said that if we deployed peacekeeper, the Soviets would go ahead and deploy a matching missile. The problem with that statement, Mr. Chairman, is that the Soviets went ahead and deployed the so-called matching missile 3 or 4 years ago; and the MX is designed to provide us with the capability which the Soviets now have. The Soviets can now destroy the Minuteman system effectively in a first strike, leaving us without an ability to respond and inflict retaliatory damage that they would find too costly to bear and so be deterred. The whole essence of deterrence is lost, and that is why it is essential to regain that deterrent capability for our land-based ICBM force.

That is why I mentioned the particular qualities that are possessed by our ground-based ICBM forces, why it is so essential to continue with them. But it is not true for Marshal Ustinov or anyone else to say that the Soviets would retaliate or respond with new missiles of their own if MX were deployed—they already did that long ago. It is because of these Soviet deployments that we need to have this kind of capability to regain our effective deterrent.

You also asked me to mention the possibility of an alternate proposal or an alternate system deploying a small number of MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos. That, sir, has a familiar ring to it, and it is familiar because it is what the President proposed on October 2, 1981.[4] It is a proposal which the Congress forbade him to pursue. It was not a fence around the funds; it was a flat prohibition preventing the DOD from expending any money to pursue this option. So that was dropped because we, of course, respect the directions of Congress.

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[3] The SALT I agreements may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972*, pp. 197 ff.; the SALT II agreements, *ibid., 1979*, pp. 189 ff.

[4] *Documents on Disarmament, 1981*, pp. 461–464.

We also had another—

The CHAIRMAN. Would, though, Mr. Secretary, if it were left to the administration, would you like the Congress to reconsider that position now, and would you like to put that forward again as a recommendation that we consider?

Secretary WEINBERGER. That is a point I want to take up in some detail with you, sir, and I might as well do it now since you have raised it.

The other part of the prohibition was that we not consider any other mode that involved an airborne deployment of the missile, and that again was a flat prohibition. And while it had never really been thoroughly evaluated, it was no longer taken up or considered.

The third thing that was directed by the Congress was that the President report by December 1, 1982, on the mode he had chosen for permanent basing of the MX. Originally the suggestion or direction was that he do it by July 1, 1983, but it was moved back to December 1, 1982.

That, of course, meant that all of the studies and other evaluations we needed had to be telescoped, accelerated, and hurried to meet that particular date. In the course of doing that however, we did do all of the things that we planned to do over a somewhat longer term in examining the various alternate modes. We also did what the first Townes Commission directed or suggested, and that was to look very carefully at the possibility of a basing mode which takes advantage of the phenomenon called fratricide. As you know, that involves putting the missiles in a narrow, closely spaced basing mode so that the Soviet attack coming in would have to come through a very narrow corridor. We did make these various examinations. We also looked at the possibilities of defending a field.

The proposal that the President made last October 2, was clearly presented many times as an interim proposal to put them in existing silos while we spent more time examining a more permanent mode. We did not have much time under the direction of the Congress to do that, but we made that examination. It led us to the conclusion that a more survivable basing mode was possible in this close-spaced basing mode, not only because of the phenomenon of fratricide but also because it should be more easily defended by a ballistic missile defense system such as we now possess or one that could even be improved.

Incidentally, I might say immediately to try to forestall questions on that point that we were also advised unequivocally that that would not be a violation of the ABM Treaty that permits each side one system. We had previously designated Grand Forks, N. Dak., as the site of our BMD system. We are advised that that can be changed unilaterally and that the one system permitted under that treaty can be deployed to protect this field should that be necessary.

All of these factors led us to the conclusion that to put it in this closely spaced field would be the most survivable method of deploying the MX.

Now the problem with all of this, Mr. Chairman, is, that there is no basing mode that can be recommended to the President that is absolutely invulnerable. We have to blame ourselves largely for that because the Soviets have acquired a degree of accuracy with their missile system, at least in part with technology they took from us, that makes it impossible for them or anyone on either side to have a complete confidence that a field is totally survivable.

Bearing that in mind, we then looked for the one that was the most survivable, knowing that it was perfectly possible to criticize various bits and pieces of any proposal or any system suggested. That, in fact, was why 1 year ago October the President asked for an interim basing of the kind you suggested while we spent time searching for a better solution.

We have spent that time, and we now believe that the close-spaced basing is the proper and most survivable method even though it is possible to find various things that are wrong with it or various vulnerabilities that it has. The important thing is that a very large portion of it would survive a first strike, which would leave us with a retaliatory capability that is the essence of deterrence and would enable us to fulfill our basic goal which is to deter war.

Now you suggested a second alternative—to hold off for another year. Unfortunately, I would find that unacceptable because that would delay further the time when we gain the capability that we do not now have with respect to the ground-based ICBM force. We have spent some 10 years debating and discussing this About $4.2 billion has been sunk into it already, and I think the time is now long overdue to move forward with its development and its production.

We are very close to production now, and we believe its deployment is essential. Even though we know no solution is perfect—and it is possible to point out various things wrong with every basing mode, we must deploy the MX in the most survivable mode that we believe exists, and that is the one we have recommended to you.

Senator Pell asked about an article by somebody named Scheer that appeared in one of the newspapers. That article contains a vast number of total falsehoods, Senator. The 6-month duration for a protracted conflict is totally wrong. There has not been the slightest suggestion of that by anybody that I know of in the Defense Department or indeed anywhere else. The suggestion that any number of dead is acceptable is a contemptible lie and should be treated as such. There is not the slightest suggestion that there has been any acceptable number of casualties or anything of the kind. It is a figment of that particular writer's imagination, and it is, describable only in the way that I described it.

You and I have had correspondence and discussion about the term "prevailing" and the way in which that fits into the generally accepted belief that a nuclear war is not indeed winnable. We believe that a nuclear war is not winnable. We used to think the Soviets believed that, but we doubt that now. We think they may very well have the belief that they could win a nuclear war by making a first strike.

We think it is very significant that they have added so much to their various defenses, including civil defense. We can debate whether it is effective or not. The important thing is that they are spending about 1 percent of their gross national product on civil defense. Whether it is effective or not is not the point. The point is that they appear to believe that it is effective. They appear to believe that they could protect a large portion of their population and that therefore they would be free to make a first strike. That is something I think we cannot overlook.

Our whole policy is deterrence. Our whole policy is based on the idea that we should do everything we can to deter war. The best way we can deter war is to have sufficient retaliatory capability, both conventionally and strategically.

We believe that the President's proposals to restore the strategic strength of the United States, to modernize, something we have not done effectively for 20 years, is an essential first step in regaining a deterrent capability. That takes a long time, and it is very expensive, although it will never exceed 15 percent of the total defense budget. But it is something that must be done, and that is what the President's program will provide if we stay with it for the number of years required. We will have regained that deterrent strength—not military superiority, not one more warhead than the Soviets have or one more tank or anything of that kind. We will not be anywhere near that, but what we will have regained will be the retaliatory capability that can preserve deterrence, and that in turn can preserve the peace of the world as it has been now for nearly 40 years between the superpowers. That is our goal. That is what we seek.

We must bear in mind, however, that it is possible that deterrence will fail and that you will get some policies in the Soviet Union in the hands of people who will not bother to count the retaliatory cost and who will not be deterred. Under those circumstances we cannot do anything other than plan—and you would not want me to do anything other than this—to try to deal with that kind of contingency in such a way that does not subjugate the United States. That is essentially what we are trying to do.

Senator Boschwitz raised points with respect to the SALT Treaties and the ABM Treaty. I trust I dealt with the latter two. I have tried to, Senator, in reporting that we have found no violations of any of these treaties in the plans that we have before you.

With respect to the Senator's point on the Joint Chiefs, I think it is important to understand in detail what occurred. First of all, they were fully consulted, as indeed they should be, and as I insisted should be. They were consulted in ample time. They all supported producing and fielding the MX. Some of them did feel that the December 1 deadline forced the President into making a final decision before they would have liked. They would have liked to have had an opportunity to explore all other methods.

Two of them wanted to deploy the missile in the way that you have mentioned, Senator, which has been forbidden by the Congress and which we felt was not, therefore, a viable option. Two supported the plan completely, and one pointed out some problems with it but did not make any specific suggestions. All five said that if the President chose this plan, their objections did not go so deeply that they would oppose it. They would, in fact, support it. They were giving him the benefit of their advice as they are required by statute to do, and they were reporting to Congress the effect of those results, as I think they should do.

If this has created the impression of a lot of disunity or dissension, I think it is a very wrong impression. These are honest, capable people who have risen to the top of their very difficult professions, and they are giving their professional advice, and that advice essentially is that we need the MX; we should deploy it. Some of them would rather have done it in a way Congress has forbidden; two of them think closely spaced basing is exactly right—and that included the chairman—and none of them have objections so deep that they cannot support the system.

So I think that should be quite clear. I do not think there should be any surprise or shock that honest men can have differences of opinions about these basing modes when, as we all know, the real problem is that there is no system that is invulnerable. What we seek is the most survivable system we can find.

Now in trying to answer those two questions I perhaps have gone much longer than you would have liked me to, but I have tried to deal with all three statements that were made, and I would be delighted to try to take questions as you wish.

Communique of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission on the Second Review of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, December 15, 1982 [1]

Pursuant to the provisions of Article XIV of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, which entered into force on October 3, 1972, [2] and was amended by the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974, [3] the Parties together conducted a review of the Treaty after its second five-year period of operation. By agreement between the Parties, the review was conducted from November 9, 1982, to December 15, 1982, in a session of the Standing Consultative Commission specially convened for that purpose.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] The text of treaty may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1972,* pp. 197–201.

[3] *Ibid., 1974,* pp. 229–231.

During the course of the review, the Parties carefully examined the Preamble and Articles of the Treaty and Protocol and evaluated their implementation in the period covered by the review.

The United States and the Soviet Union each reaffirmed its commitment to the aims and objectives of the Treaty, and to the process of consultation within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission to promote the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the Treaty and the Protocol thereto of July 3, 1974.

White House Statement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, December 16, 1982 [1]

As you know, the U.S. has proposed the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet land-based, longer range INF missiles—the zero-zero solution. As you also know from Soviet public statements, the Soviets have proposed that after 5 years, the U.S.S.R. and NATO reduce to a ceiling of 300 "medium-range" nuclear missiles and aircraft located in or "intended for use in" Europe, to include British and French forces. This long-standing position, which is basically unchanged, would allow them to maintain their monopoly over the U.S. in longer range INF missiles, especially their mobile, triple-warhead SS-20 missiles in Europe and the Asian U.S.S.R. The number of deployed SS-20's currently stands at 333 launchers.

A missile subceiling, as mentioned in recent press accounts, would at most require the reduction of some of these highly mobile systems in or "intended for use in" Europe, while requiring us to cancel entirely our deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles planned to begin in December 1983. This would leave the Soviets with a substantial monopoly over the West in long-range, land-based INF systems, would not constrain the overall levels of Soviet systems, would draw into the bilateral negotiations the nuclear forces of other countries, and is patently inadequate as a solution to the INF issue, since it would not eliminate the political and military threat to the Alliance posed by Soviet longer range INF missiles.

We will continue the negotiations on a serious basis. During these negotiations, we and the Soviets have elaborated our positions in both formal and informal contacts. We will continue to study the Soviet position, and it will be among the things we will be discussing when the next round begins on January 27.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 20, 1982, p. 1628. The statement was read by Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes at his daily briefing at the White House.

We have kept our allies fully informed about negotiations as they have occurred. We and they have reaffirmed in three recent NATO meetings at the Foreign Minister or Defense Minister level that the zero-zero solution remains the best arms control result, since it would eliminate the systems of greatest concern to both sides. The President and his administration are fully convinced of the reasonableness of this carefully developed proposal. Nothing could be fairer to all concerned.

News Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (de Vos) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, December 16, 1982 [1]

As you know, in July of this year, the West tabled a draft treaty, which represented a major comprehensive move in our negotiations.[2] It incorporated a far-reaching compromise on what has been a longstanding fundamental Eastern concern, namely, the Eastern requirement for legally-binding reduction and limitation obligations to be assumed from the outset by all direct participants. Setting aside its own earlier and legitimate concept of separately negotiated reduction phases, the West now proposes one comprehensive treaty. Thus, the West fully meets the Eastern concern regarding the unity of the reduction process and does away with the so-called linkage problem. The treaty would accomplish this by specifying in contractual form, both as regards amounts and timing, the full reduction program to be undertaken by the two sides in order to implement the common collective ceiling of approximately 700,000 on ground force personnel and a combined common collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 on ground and air force personnel. Details of this program and of the relevant contractual obligations by all direct participants would be spelled out in Annex I to the treaty which would form an integral part thereof.

During the current round, the West completed the presentation of its new proposal by submitting two additional annexes which provide details on certain other important issues to be resolved in connection with a force reduction and limitation agreement.

The first of these two annexes—Annex II—concerns associated measures, which are required for effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and for general confidence building. Annex II, which now incorporates in treaty language the seven interactive measures the West first proposed in December 1979, constitutes a comprehensive, realistic and effective program for meeting these essential requirements.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] The Western news conference statement on the tabling, made July 8, is printed *ante*

The other annex to the Western draft treaty tabled in this round—Annex III—sets out the terms under which both sides, on a reciprocal basis, may temporarily exceed military manpower levels permitted by the agreement. Such provisions are necessary in order to allow, under carefully regulated conditions, the continuation of routine and non-threatening peacetime military activities like the rotation of troops, training, and exercises. They are central to the concept of an equitable and practical reduction and limitation agreement which is to preserve undiminished the security of all participants.

In addition to thus completing the presentation of their draft treaty, Western participants, during this round, have focused on explaining the purport and significance of the proposal's features and specific provisions, showing how these provide for reasonable solutions to the major issues that have divided the two sides so far. In this process, we have devoted our efforts, first of all, to demonstrating how the Western proposal meets all the essential Eastern requirements on contractual linkage between reduction phases, in a fully equitable way. The major move which the West thus has undertaken on this question, in order to end the stalemate in our negotiations and finally open the way toward agreement, makes it all the more necessary for the East now to face squarely the two remaining issues central to our negotiations and take the necessary steps to resolve them. These issues are the need for agreed data and for effective associated measures.

As we have explained many times, a force reduction and limitation agreement can only be workable, and conducive to the essential purposes of strengthening confidence and enhancing stability, if it is based on a common view of the underlying facts and, at the same time, provides for adequate measures for cooperative verification and confidence building. It is up to the East now to take the political decisions required to make possible resolution of these two remaining major issues. By its constructive and serious proposal of July 8, 1982, the West has demonstrated its political commitment, reaffirmed in the December 10 NATO Ministerial Communique, [3] to reach an equitable, mutually acceptable agreement. It would be an unfortunate error if the spirit and substance of the Western move were not perceived. We hope that the East will now respond in an equally serious and constructive manner.

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[3] *Ante.*

News Conference Statement by the Representative of the German Democratic Republic (Wieland) to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, December 16, 1982 [1]

In October, at their session in Moscow, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member states gave an evaluation of the state of affairs at the Vienna talks which also after additional eight weeks of negotiations, i.e., at the end of the 28th round, remains fully valid.

1) In spite of the persistent efforts of the socialist countries to achieve agreement at them these talks have been dragged out further, and no real progress has been achieved there.

2) Nevertheless they believe that there exists a possibility for making headway in the Vienna talks. The draft proposal, submitted by the USSR, GDR, the Polish People's Republic and the CSSR on 18th February, 1982, represents a realistic basis in this respect, but, unfortunately, we did not receive a constructive response by the Western states-participants so far.

3) A retreat from the fully critical attitude by the socialist states to the proposal of the Western side from 8 July, 1982, is not possible even after an additional examination of it.

The core of the content of the socialist states draft agreement repeatedly was explained to the public. It is therefore sufficient to rehearse its main objectives. By taking into account all the experiences and previous difficulties, as well as former Western wishes, it is oriented towards starting the process of reductions of armed forces and armaments and at the same time ensuring its continuity and integrity up to the reaching of a final outcome.

The draft proposal contains in the first line provisions specifying the reductions in a first stage of 20,000 Soviet and 13,000 U.S. military personnel along with their arms and combat equipment, the respective provisions for the freeze of the armed forces manpower of all the other states—direct participants, as well as a set of reasonable measures for monitoring the compliance with the Agreement and for building up confidence. At the same time this draft defines the final objective of the reduction process, i. e., the reduction of ground force personnel of both sides to a level of 700,000 men respectively and the establishing of a ceiling for air force manpower of 200,000 men. Thus a reduction of the ground forces in Central Europe by not less than 170,000 men together with arms and combat equipment is envisaged, which consequently will lead to a significant reduction of the degree of military confrontation in Central Europe.

One of the special merits of the draft, tabled by the socialist states, lies in the fact that it provides a realistic possibility for overcoming the main obstacle in the negotiations, which was artificially created by the Western side, namely the so-called data issue. Since the West is not ready to accept the official data, submitted by the Warsaw Treaty member states with respect to their armed forces, the only politically acceptable alternative consists in throwing off the drag of this fruitless and unpromising dispute. As is demonstrated by our draft, this would be possible without leaving unresolved any question of the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments.

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[1] ACDA files. Informal translation from German.

In view of their major concessions the socialist states had and continue to have any reasons to insist on a constructive reply by their Western partners. The current position of the West, as it is laid down in its draft treaty from 8 July, 1982, along with the annexes to it, which were tabled only during this round, however, give rise to concern. What the West intends to present to us and to the public as a "dramatic" initiative and change of the position is in essence a rejection of our proposals, aimed at reaching an understanding, and a refusal to search together for settlements, which would be in keeping with the indispensable principle of undiminished security.

The analysis of the general concept underlying the Western proposal, as well as of its individual provisions, carried out in the 28th round, reaffirms our assessment, that during the elaboration of the Western draft the strive for unilateral military advantages in favor of NATO had led the pen. In this connection one also cannot but note the concrete link between the mainstays of the Western position in the negotiations and the decisions to speed up the implementation of military programs currently approved again by NATO bodies in Brussels. Let us hint only to some of the most topical issues:

—Western participants, without having any reasons, try to enforce much larger reductions of the ground forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, compared to those by the NATO. And this despite the fact that in Central Europe there is an approximate balance of forces, that additional reinforcements of U.S. forces are envisaged, and in Europe as a whole NATO maintains already now approximately 300,000 men more than the Warsaw Treaty does.

—The total renunciation by the West of the obligation to agree along with the reduction of personnel also on the reduction of armaments, as it was commonly agreed upon in the mandate of the negotiations, obviously is connected with the multitude of plans to increase the nuclear and conventional stockpiles in the Western part of the reduction area. A typical example in this respect is the plan for the construction of ordnance depots for six additional U.S. divisions to be deployed into the F.R.G. at short notice, which was currently approved in Brussels.

—The rejection of the "50% rule", which was proposed by the socialist states, and according to which none of the states after the completion of the reductions should have more than half of the armed forces of its respective alliance in the area of reductions, it cannot be seen in isolation from the discussion within the NATO on the so-called burden sharing. After all, already now figures in the order of 80,000 men are mentioned, which some of the Western European NATO-states would have to call up additionally in case, that the United States would withdraw from Central Europe support troops for deployment outside the NATO area.

—While the socialist states hold the position that after the completion of the reduction process no exceeding of the agreed collective ceilings shall be admissible, NATO states reject this provision. In their draft treaty and in one of its annexes they provide for a system of practically permanent exceptions, as a result of which neither confidence in the stability of an agreement, nor a reduction of military activities in Central Europe would have been achieved. Even those plans, like the currently discussed transformation of the territories of Western European states participating in the negotiations into a turntable for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, shall be kept unaffected by any agreement reached in Vienna.

Obviously, all this is at direct variance with the task and objectives of the Vienna negotiations. The same should be said also with respect to other elements of the Western position, as for instance, to the proposed package of associated measures.

The mere fact that the Western package of associated measures, tabled as early as December 1979, was submitted in the current round practically without any changes as Annex II to the Western draft treaty, must be regarded as an unambiguous signal indicating the absence of any readiness for compromises. After all, in the course of three years we had been thoroughly critisizing this package, had drawn attention to its unacceptable elements and in our draft agreement had shown a reasonable solution of the control issue.

The attempts by the Western side to cover this state of affairs with a camouflage coat, to develop a superficial pseudo-optimism in connection with the Western draft treaty and to hasten "positive signals" from the East are inappropriate. Indeed, such signals were given by the socialist states to a sufficient degree and they included, as it is known, even unilateral steps, as it was the case with the withdrawal from the GDR of 20,000 Soviet military personnel, 1,000 tanks and other combat equipment.

Therefore nothing releases the West from the responsibility, that it still has to enter into a constructive cooperation with the socialist states. Our draft agreement from February, 1982, which remains to be of undiminished significance, continues to offer the respective possibilities.

At this year's United Nations General Assembly the GDR again has initiated a resolution, which calls for an intensification of current negotiations in the field of disarmament. In Vienna one must now allow for 1983 becoming the tenth year of negotiations, which passes away without any results. We know that negotiations in the field of disarmament are not a simple matter at all. But in Vienna no issue exists, which could not be solved, if there is only the respective political will.

Statement by President Reagan: Senate Action on Production of the MX Missile and Formation of a Bipartisan Commission To Study Basing Options, December 17, 1982 [1]

The action taken early this morning by the Senate with regard to the MX missile program is both welcome and wise. It expresses solid understanding and support for the need to modernize the land-based leg of the Triad. As the Senate recognizes, it is only through this Triad approach that we can hope to preserve an effective deterrent and go forward with negotiations toward real arms reductions.

Beyond that, the Senate was also expressing some rather serious concerns which I take very much to heart. Foremost among these was uncertainty with respect to the approach for basing the missile. This concern is reasonable, since the survivability of this system must be assured and an effective basing plan plays the central role. This extremely complex problem deserves very careful and deliberate consideration, and I am pleased that this will be allowed to take place early in the new Congress.

Between now and the time the final decision must be taken next spring, it is essential that every Member of Congress and, indeed, as many as possible of the American people gain a full appreciation of alternative solutions to this problem. Toward that end I pledge to the Congress and to all Americans the most exhaustive, renewed analysis possible of every apparent option. To assist in this effort, I am today announcing my intention to appoint a bipartisan commission, comprised of senior officials from previous administrations as well as technical experts. I will ask the members to work with the Department of Defense and join together in a bipartisan effort to forge a consensus as to the plan which will best assure the national security interests of our country in the years ahead.

The contributions of this panel of distinguished Americans will be extremely important. In addition, I pledge to the Congress the fullest possible coordination of the work of this commission with Senators and Members. It is essential that if we are to reach our common goals within the time required by last night's vote, the Congress play a central role in shaping this, the most important strategic modernization decision of the post-war period. Again, I would like to express my appreciation for the responsible position taken by the Senate and ask that this wisdom be reflected in the House, as together we join in this important undertaking.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 1634–1635.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Shultz and British Foreign Secretary Pym: Control of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Extracts], December 17, 1982 [1]

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Q. You said that you had discussed defense issues and NATO issues. Could I ask you about the issue of the cruise and Pershing missiles which may be deployed in this country later or next year? Is your government prepared to allow an element of joint control over the operation of those missiles, and if not, why not?

Secretary Shultz. Of course, Mr. Pym briefed me on the discussions that you've had here in this country on that issue, and we agreed that the arrangements for a joint decisionmaking that have been going on here for some 20 years and have covered U.S. nuclear systems in the United Kingdom work well. The December 1979 decision [2] was taken by the alliance as a whole, and so all INF issues continue to be discussed in the alliance, and we had discussed in the NATO ministerial meeting and in bilateral discussions, but nevertheless within the context of the alliance, all manner of issues. Now, of course, Mr. Pym and I will be in touch on this issue and a full range of issues—and there are very many, particularly in the year 1983—and talk about them continuously. But as I said, from all that I can hear and sense the way in which this has been handled has worked well, but I'll leave it up to Mr. Pym.

Secretary Pym. No, I agree with that. It certainly has worked well for over 20 years now.

Q. I think the demand being made in some quarters here, and I think the foreign secretary himself has said it would be highly desirable to have some kind of joint key arrangement, or duel key arrangement as it's called, some actual decision that has to be taken by both governments before those missiles could be fired.

Secretary Shultz. I don't think that image accurately describes any arrangements that have literally been in place in the past. But there has been a wide variety of arrangements, and they vary by countries. I think that we have to look upon this as an alliance matter and discuss it on that basis and not get into further detail about right at this point.

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Q. You said that the arrangements for the last 20 years had worked well over control of nuclear weapons which has been the single American control here. But surely in the 1950s, there was the joint U.S. and British control over Thor missiles in this country. Why are you not prepared to allow a return to that system?

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 1983, pp. 32, 33. The remarks were made at a joint news conference in London.

[2] For the decision, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1979*, pp. 814–816.

Secretary Shultz. As I understand it, there have been a variety of arrangements and what has happened is, bilaterally and now of course, we have to consider this as an alliance matter as well as a bilateral matter. We keep confronting new situations, and I think the answer that I've given may be interpreted as meaning that somehow we've been able to work these problems out and the result has worked well in everybody's eyes. We feel that the arrangements that were made in 1979, those were mutually agreed, and we are proceeding on that basis. But we're constantly talking not only about this but a variety of other issues as we move along in this process.

Q. Under what conditions would you ask the United States for joint control over the firing of these weapons?

Secretary Pym. The arrangements which Mr. Shultz has referred to are, in fact, joint decisionmaking. That has been the basis of our arrangement for the last 20 years, and those are the arrangements to which Mr. Shultz has referred. I've talked to him about the views that were expressed in the House of Commons and elsewhere, and he's quite right that these are matters that have been decided by the alliance and are considered in that context, as well as bilaterally.

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News Interview of President Reagan: MX Missile [Extract], December 18, 1982 [1]

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MX Missile

Q. Mr. President, the continuing resolution will probably also contain the MX proposal, and you've just appointed a commission to look into the basing options for MX. I was wondering, given the complexity of that task, is it realistic to expect them to report by March 1st, or could that date somehow be slipped?

The President. I think it is, because of all the study and research that has gone into this before. This whole thing came about—we asked originally for money to begin the process of building the MX. We don't even have an assembly line for building missiles. That was done away with—the previous administration. And we asked for the right to put them—the first ones off the line—into Minuteman silos, while we continued to study a basing plan. The Congress denied us the right to do this, the ability to do it, and so we continued study. And the dense pack basing mode—and it may still turn out to be the one that has the least warts—there's something wrong with every system. But I was required to come up by December 1st, having selected a basing mode, and this was the best one that we had on hand.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Dec. 27, 1982, pp. 1641–1642. The President was interviewed by independent radio network correspondents.

So, there was no opportunity to consult with them or for them to have access to all the study and the research that had gone on. We hope, now, in these few months, that we can present everything. And if some of our scientists come up with a new and improved mode, why we'll take a good look at that one.

Q. Are you willing to accept whatever the commission comes up with?

The President. Well, it would depend on whether there was other agreement with the commission, too. And by that, I mean the expertise of our own military people who are going to have to use these weapons if they're ever used.

And let me add here, lest there's misunderstanding of that line, the real purpose of those missiles is to never be used. We're trying to create a deterrent that will prevent there ever being a need for them or a war.

U.S. Armed Forces

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to follow up on Bill Groody's question here. You have spoken about a window of vulnerability, and you've said that the United States, in terms of defenses, is inferior to the Soviet Union in many areas. My question is, looking at U.S. defenses overall, would you trade American forces for Soviet forces?

The President. Obviously, the answer would be, as it's been for many military men, no, because of my faith in America and in the young men and women of America who are in our Armed Forces. But I still have to say that to continue as we had been in the previous decade and the last several years, leaving those fine young men and women with tools incapable of doing the job, endangering their lives by lack of training because we were denied the fuel through budgetary restrictions to fly airplanes as often as they should—on any given day, when we came into office here, only half the airplanes in our Air Force could be flown because of lack of spare parts. Only half the ships could leave harbor for lack not only of spare parts, but of a complete crew.

So, what we're trying to do is make sure—and we have made remarkable progress. There is an esprit de corps in our military today and a pride in the uniform that I think would bring a glow to every American's heart if they were as aware of it as I, of necessity, am.

And so the answer would be no, in that one way. But if you asked me is there still a window of vulnerability, do they have a superiority in firepower and so forth, the answer is an unqualified yes. You can't help but look at the NATO line with more than 300 triple warhead missiles, intermediate-range, aimed at the targets of all of Europe, the Middle East, and northern Africa, and we have none in that theater—is a valid comparison.

Submarines

Q. But, Mr. President, we also have submarine missiles in the area which would serve an intermediate missile function.

The President. And they have submarines and submarine missiles. And a part of the threat is not only what's on hand, it is that at the moment their rate of increase in their weapons compared to ours. In the last 15 years, I think, they added some 60 submarines, nuclear submarines, while we were adding none.

Q. Just one last followup question. We are adding the Trident submarine, though, are we not at this point?

The President. Yes. And they're adding one that's bigger and carries more missiles.

MX Missile

Q. Mr. President, what if this commission that you're going to appoint comes back to you and says, "The MX may not be such a good idea after all. Let's have a modification of the Trident or some other variation on the missile." Would you be willing to accept that kind of recommendation?

The President. Well, we'd certainly look at it. It would be difficult for me to think that we could, knowing the length of time that it takes to get something researched, tested fully, and then into operation. Even with this MX and with all of the work that's been done so far, that system won't begin to be installed until 1986, won't be operational.

Q. So for logistical reasons, you would be inclined to stand firm on the MX as a system?

The President. Yes. Let me just say, though, lest you think I have a closed mind, if a miracle happened and someone came along with something that could be implemented better and sooner, obviously, we'd choose that.

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Report by Soviet General Secretary Andropov: Nuclear Arms Reduction Proposals and Confidence-Building Measures [Extracts], December 21, 1982 [1]

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We are squarely and unswervingly on the side of those who still have to fight for freedom, independence and the very survival of their peoples, those who are forced to rebuff or are threatened with aggression. Our position here is inseparable from the Soviet Union's consistent and tireless drive for durable peace on earth.

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[1] Moscow TASS in English, Dec. 21, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, vol. III, Dec. 21, 1982, pp. B8–B11. The report was delivered at the joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation devoted to celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR.

Over these six decades the position of our Soviet state has changed radically; its prestige and influence have grown enormously. Close peaceful cooperation links the Soviet Union with countries on all continents. Its voice commands respect at international forums. The principles of peaceful coexistence—the basis of Soviet foreign policy—have won broad international recognition and have been incorporated into scores of international instruments, including the Final Act of the European Conference in Helsinki. Soviet proposals have been the basis of major U.N. decisions on strengthening peace and security.

But each step along the road to more durable peace has taken and does take a lot of effort; it calls for intense struggle against imperialist warhawks. This struggle has become especially acute now that the more warlike factions in the West have become very active, their class-based hatred of socialism prevailing over considerations of realism and sometimes over plain common sense.

The imperialists have not given up the scheme of economic war against the socialist countries, of interfering in their internal affairs in the hope of eroding their social system, and are trying to win military superiority over the USSR, over all the countries of the socialist community.

Of course, these plans are sure to fail. It is not given to anyone to turn back the course of historical development. Attempts to "strangle" socialism failed even when the Soviet state was still getting on its feet and was the only socialist country in the world. So, surely, nothing will come of it now.

But one cannot help seeing that Washington's present policy has sharpened the international situation to dangerous extremes.

The war preparations of the United States and the NATO bloc which it leads have grown to an unheard-of, record scale. Official spokesmen in Washington are heard to discourse on the possibility of "limited", "sustained" and other varieties of nuclear war. This is intended to reassure people to accustom them to the thought that such war is acceptable.

Veritably, one has to be blind to the realities of our time not to see that wherever and however a nuclear whirlwind arises, it will inevitably go out of control and cause a worldwide catastrophe.

Our position on this issue is clear: A nuclear war—whether big or small, whether limited or total—must not be allowed to break out. No task is more important today than to stop the instigators of another war. This is required by the vital interests of all nations. That is why the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons first was received with approval and hope all over the world.

If our example is followed by the other nuclear powers, this will be a truly momentous contribution to the efforts of preventing nuclear war.

It is said that the West cannot take such a commitment because, allegedly, the Warsaw Treaty has an advantage in conventional armaments. To begin with, this is untrue, and the facts and figures bear witness to it.

Furthermore, as everybody knows, we are in favour of limiting such armaments as well, and of searching for sensible, mutually acceptable solutions to this end. We are also prepared to agree that the sides should renounce first use of conventional, as well as nuclear arms.

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Of course, one of the main avenues leading to a real scaling down of the threat of nuclear war is that of reaching a Soviet-American agreement on limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear armaments. We approach negotiations of the matter with the utmost responsibility, and seek an honest agreement that will do no damage to either side and will, at the same time, lead to a reduction of the nuclear arsenals.

So far, unfortunately, we see a different approach by the American side. While calling for "radical reduction" in word, what it really has in mind is essentially a reduction of the Soviet strategic potential. For itself, the United States would like to leave a free hand in building up strategic armaments. It is absurd even to think that we can agree to this. It would, of course, suit the Pentagon, but can on no account be acceptable to the Soviet Union and, for that matter, to all those who have a stake in preserving and consolidating peace.

Compare to this the proposals of the USSR. They are based on the principle of preserving parity. We are prepared to reduce our strategic arms by more than 25 per cent. U.S. arms, too, must be reduced accordingly, so that the two states have the same number of strategic delivery vehicles. We also proposed that the number of nuclear warheads should be substantially lowered and that improvement of nuclear weapons should be maximally restricted.

Our proposals refer to all types of strategic weapons without exception, and envisage reduction of their stockpiles by many hundreds of units. They close all possible channels for any further arms race in this field. And that is only a start: The pertinent agreement would be the point of departure for a still larger mutual reduction of such weapons, which the sides could work out with reference to the general strategic situation in the world.

And while the negotiations are under way, we offer what is suggested by common sense: to freeze the strategic arsenals of the two sides. The U.S. Government does not want this, and now everyone can understand why: It has embarked on a new, considerable build-up of nuclear armaments.

Washington's attempts to justify this build-up are obviously irrelevant. The allegation of a "lag" behind the USSR which the Americans must close, is a deliberate untruth. This has been said more than once. And the talk that new weapons systems, such as the MX missile, are meant "to facilitate disarmament negotiations" is altogether absurd.

No programmes of a further arms build-up will ever force the Soviet Union to make unilateral concessions. We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the American side by deploying corresponding weapons systems of our own—an analogous missile to counter the MX missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are already testing, to counter the U.S. long-range cruise missile.

Those are not threats at all. We are wholly averse to any such course of events, and are doing everything to avoid it. But it is essential that those who shape U.S. policy, as well as the public at large, should be perfectly clear on the real state of affairs. Hence, if the people in Washington really believe that new weapons systems will be a "trump" for the Americans at negotiations, we want them to know that these "trumps" are false. Any policy directed to securing military superiority over the Soviet Union has no future and can only heighten the threat of war.

Now a few words about what are known as confidence-building measures. We are serious about them.

Given the swift action and power of modern weapons, the atmosphere of mutual suspicion is especially dangerous. Even a trivial accident, miscalculation, or technical failure can have tragic consequence. It is therefore important to take the finger off the trigger, and put a reliable safety catch on all weapons.

A few things have already been accomplished to this effect, particularly in the framework of the Helsinki accords.[2] As everybody knows, the Soviet Union is also offering measures of a more far-reaching nature and of a broader scope. Our proposals on this score have also been tabled at the Soviet-American Geneva negotiations on limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments.

We are also prepared to consider pertinent proposals made by others, including the recent ones by the U.S. President. But the measures he referred to are not enough to dispel the atmosphere of mutual suspicion, and to restore confidence. Something more is needed: to normalise the situation, and to renounce incitement of hostility and hatred, and propaganda of nuclear war. And, surely, the road to confidence, to preventing any and all wars, including an accidental one, is that of stopping the arms race and going back to calm, respectful relations between states, back to detente.

We consider this important for all regions of the world, and especially for Europe, where a flare-up of any kind may trigger a worldwide explosion.

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[2] The arms control portions are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1975*, pp. 304–308. The entire act may be found in *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 1982, pp. 323 ff.

At present, that continent is beset by a new danger—the prospect of several hundred U.S. missiles being deployed in Western Europe. I have got to say bluntly: This would make peace still more fragile.

As we see it, the peril threatening the European nations, and, for that matter, the nations of the whole world, can be averted. It is definitely possible to save and strengthen peace in Europe—and this without damage to anyone's security. It is, indeed, for this purpose that we have been negotiating with the United States in Geneva for already more than a year on how to limit and reduce nuclear weapons in the European zone.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go very far. As everybody knows, we have suggested an agreement renouncing all types of nuclear weapons—both of medium range and tactical—designed to strike targets in Europe. But this proposal has come up against a solid wall of silence. Evidently, they do not want to accept it, but are afraid to reject it openly. I want to reaffirm again that we have not withdrawn this proposal.

We have also suggested another variant: that the USSR and the NATO countries reduce their medium-range weaponry by more than two-thirds. So far, the United States will not have it. For its part, it has submitted a proposal which, as if in mockery, is called a "zero option." It invisages elimination of all Soviet medium-range missiles not only in the European, but also in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, while NATO's nuclear-missile arsenal in Europe is to remain intact and may even be increased. Does anyone really think that the Soviet Union can agree to this? It appears that Washington is out to block an agreement and, referring to collapse of the talks, to station its missiles on European soil in any case.

The future will show if this is so. We, for our part, will continue to work for an agreement on a basis that is fair to both sides. We are prepared, among other things, to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France—and not a single one more. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce hundreds of missiles, including dozens of the latest missiles known in the West as SS-20. In the case of the USSR and the USA this would be a really honest "zero" option as regards medium-range missiles. And if, later, the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be additionally reduced by as many.

Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft stationed in this region by the USSR and the NATO countries.

We call on the other side to accept these clear and fair terms, to take this opportunity while it still exists. But let no one delude himself: We will never let our security or the security of our allies be jeopardised. It would also be a good thing if thought were given to the grave consequences that the stationing of new U.S. medium-range weapons in Europe would entail for all further efforts to limit nuclear armaments in general. In short, the ball is now in the court of the USA.

In conclusion, let me say the following. We are for broad, fruitful cooperation among all nations of the world to their mutual advantage and the good of all mankind, free from diktat and interference in the affairs of other countries. The Soviet Union will do everything it can to secure a tranquil, peaceful future for the present and coming generations. That is the aim of our policy, and we shall not depart from it.

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Statement by the Department of State: Soviet Proposal Regarding Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions, December 21, 1982[1]

The President has proposed to eliminate all land-based INF missiles at the Geneva talks. This proposal has been reaffirmed in recent days by the defense and foreign ministers of the NATO Alliance.[2]

The Soviet proposal contained in Mr. Andropov's speech today[3] is unacceptable because it would leave the Soviets with several hundred warheads on SS-20s, while denying us the means to deter that threat.

We cannot accept that the United States should agree to allow the Soviets superiority over us because the British and French maintain their own national deterrent forces.

Nor can we agree that INF limits should apply only in Europe. This would leave the Soviets free to threaten our Asian friends as well as to maintain a highly mobile missile force that can be moved at any time into position to threaten NATO.

In sum, we hope the Soviets will now come to realize that we cannot give up the means to counter the nuclear threat they pose to NATO unless the threat is eliminated all together.

Soviet Appeal Addressed "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties, and Peoples of the World," December 22, 1982[4]

We, the representatives of all the peoples of the USSR, assembled at Moscow for the solemn observance of the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on behalf of the 270 million Soviet people, send this message of peace to the parliaments, Governments, political parties, and peoples of the world.

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[1] ACDA files.

[2] *Ante*, Dec. 10.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] A/38/59.

What the finest minds of mankind have dreamed of for ages—the ending of national hostility and discord and the attainment of genuine equality and friendship between different nations—has become a reality in our country thanks to the Leninist policy pursued by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the implementation of the Socialist principles of national and social freedom, and the abolition of all forms of oppression and exploitation.

The USSR's foreign policy is likewise determined by the new relations between people and between nations in our Socialist State. Our ideal, our unchanging aim and our constant concern are that there should be universal peace, friendship, and co-operation among peoples. The Great October Socialist Revolution marked the beginning of a new era in history. Having shaken off social and national oppression, working people created the Land of the Soviets, a State that has affirmed fraternal friendship and relations of equality among peoples, ensuring true freedom, progress, and prosperity to all nations.

Durable, dependable, and stable peace is the first and most compelling need of all people, all nations and all mankind.

The need for peace takes on special significance today, when States possess weapons capable of destroying human civilization and all life on earth and when the threat of war, which had been made appreciably more remote in the 1970s, has again begun to intensify and international tension is growing visibly more severe.

All the efforts of States, the activities of Governments, organized political forces and all citizens of every country should now be addressed to preventing a nuclear catastrophe. Nothing is or can be more important than this.

We, the authorized representatives of the Soviet people, solemnly declare that, in keeping with the Leninist policy of peace and international co-operation, the Soviet Union will do all in its power to avert war.

We reaffirm that, in accordance with the commitment it has undertaken, the Soviet Union will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and we call once again upon the other nuclear Powers to undertake a similar commitment.

We declare that the Soviet Union is prepared, on a basis of reciprocity with the United States of America, to freeze its arsenal of nuclear weapons.

We urge the speedy and productive completion of the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, and we urge the early conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We propose reaching agreement without delay on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, so that no more new kinds and types of nuclear weapons may be developed.

We urge the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

We call for the early resumption of suspended negotiations on all other matters relating to the limitation and reduction of armaments.

We call upon the legislative bodies and Governments of all States of the world to contribute actively to the settlement of conflict situations and to the extinguishing of hotbeds of tension exclusively by political means.

We favour strengthening the United Nations and enhancing its role in consolidating international peace and security.

In furtherance of these aims, the Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate with all States of the world irrespective of their political and social systems.

All the States of the world today bear a great and historic responsibility for the present and the future.

Soviet citizens are convinced that if States and peoples join forces, they will be able to eliminate the threat of war, preserve and consolidate peace on earth and ensure the human right to life. It is for such a joining of forces that we call upon the parliaments, Governments, political parties and peoples of the world.

Remarks by President Reagan on the Recommissioning of the U.S.S. *New Jersey* [Extract], December 28, 1982[1]

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Our status as a free society and world power is not based on brute strength. When we've taken up arms, it has been for the defense of freedom for ourselves and for other peaceful nations who needed our help. But now, faced with the development of weapons with immense destructive power, we've no choice but to maintain ready defense forces that are second to none. Yes, the cost is high, but the price of neglect would be infinitely higher.

Another great power in the world sees its military forces in a different light. The Soviet Union has achieved sheer power status only by—or I should say superpower status only by virtue of its military might. It has done so by sacrificing and ignoring achievement in virtually any and every other field.

In contrast, America's strength is the bedrock of the Free World's security, for the freedom we guard is not just our own. But over the past years we began to drift dangerously away from what was so clearly our responsibility. From 1970 to 1979, our defense spending, in constant dollars, decreased by 22 percent. The Navy, so vital to protecting our interests in faraway trouble-spots, shrank—as you've been told by the Secretary—from more than a thousand ships to 453.

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[1] *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 3, 1983, pp. 1670–1671.

Potential adversaries saw this unilateral disarmament, which was matched in all the other services, as a sign of weakness and a lack of will necessary to protect our way of life. While we talked of détente, the lessening of tensions in the world, the Soviet Union embarked on a massive program of militarization. Since around 1965, they have increased their military spending, nearly doubling it over the past 15 years.

In a free society such as ours, where differing viewpoints are permitted, there will be people who oppose defense spending of any kind at any level. There are others who believe in defense, but who mistakenly feel that the Department of Defense is inherently wasteful and unconcerned about cost cutting. Well, they're dead wrong.

Waste in government spending of any kind is an ever-present threat. But I can assure our fellow citizens there is no room for waste in our national defense. A dollar wasted is a dollar lost in the crucial effort to build a safer future for our people. Secretary Weinberger and the members of this administration are committed to spending what is necessary for defense to secure the peace and not a penny more. As the recommissioning of this ship demonstrates, we are rearming with prudence, using existing assets to the fullest.

To those who've been led to believe that we've gone overboard on national security needs and are spending a disproportionate share on the military, let me state: This is not true.

In spite of all the sound and fury that we hear and read, defense spending as a percentage of gross national product is well below what it was in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. The simple fact is that, by reforming defense procurement, by stressing efficiencies and economies in weapons system production, we have been able to structure and fund a defense program our nation can afford. It meets the threat, and it provides wages and benefits that are more akin to what our men and women in uniform deserve.

Already, we're realizing tremendous dividends from our defense program. The readiness of our forces is dramatically improved. As you've just been told, we're more than meeting our recruitment goals. And we've had congressional support for such key initiatives as the purchase of two aircraft carriers, the B-1 bomber, and the C-5 transport plane.

As a nation, we're committed to take every step to substantially reduce the possibility of nuclear war, while providing an unshakable deterrent to such a war for ourselves and our allies. To this end, we're closing the window of vulnerability by instituting a comprehensive strategic force modernization program.

But while we do this, we're advancing vigorous arms control proposals aimed at deep and verifiable reductions in strategic nuclear missiles. We have proposed that intermediate-range nuclear missiles in

Europe be reduced to zero on both sides at the same time we cut conventional forces in Europe to balanced levels. And I may say, the news is encouraging. The Soviet Union has met us halfway on the zero option. They've agreed to zero on our part. [*Laughter*] [2]

We can't shut our eyes to the fact that, as the Soviet military power increased, so did their willingness to embark on military adventures. The scars are plainly evident in a number of Third World countries. We're also aware that, though the Soviet Union is historically a land power—virtually self-sufficient in mineral and energy resources and land-linked to Europe and the vast stretches of Asia—it has created a powerful, blue-ocean navy that cannot be justified by any legitimate defense need. It is a navy built for offensive action, to cut the Free World's supply lines and render impossible the support, by sea, of Free World allies.

By contrast, the United States is a naval power by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic import of vital strategic materials. Over 90 percent of our commerce between the continents moves in ships. Freedom to use the seas is our nation's lifeblood. For that reason, our Navy is designed to keep the sealanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sealanes at strategic choke-points.

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Interview of Soviet General Secretary Andropov, December 30, 1982 [1]

Question: What wishes would you like to convey to the American people on the occasion of the New Year of 1983?

Answer: I would like to begin by congratulating every American family on the coming New Year of 1983 and by sincerely wishing them wellbeing and happiness. This means, first and foremost, wishing all Americans peace—a lasting peace and prosperity based on peaceful work and fruitful cooperation with other peoples.

Today the Soviet people and the Americans have one common enemy: the threat of war and everything that enhances it. The Soviet Union wants peace to be safeguarded and strengthened and is doing everything within its power for this, being well aware that today there is no more important task in international politics than that of staving off the growing threat of nuclear war and imposing control on and putting an end to the nuclear arms race. I would like to wish that America, too, make its contribution, worthy of such a great country, not to spurring on the arms race and whipping up belligerent passions, but to strengthening peace and friendship among peoples.

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[2] Brackets in source text.

[1] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Dec. 30, 1982; FBIS Daily Report, Jan 3, 1983, vol. III, pp. A1–A2. The interview was conducted by the American political observer Kingsbury-Smith.

Question: What do you think are the most important measures which could be taken in cooperation by the USSR and the United States in 1983 to promote the interests of world peace and improve Soviet-American relations?

Answer: I think our two countries together could do a good deal of what would be useful both to themselves and to other countries and peoples, such as reducing on a reciprocal basis their troops and armaments in Central Europe, cooperating in removing the more dangerous seats of armed conflicts, for instance, in the Middle East, et cetera.

But the most important thing, of course, is to achieve fair and mutually acceptable agreements in accord with the principle of equality and equal security at the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, to achieve agreements and to take practical measures to implement them.

Question: Do you think that as a result of the continuing talks, differences in the positions of the Governments of the USSR and the United States on questions of nuclear arms can be narrowed sufficiently to create conditions for working out a compromise agreement?

Answer: Yes, of course. Objectively speaking there is every possibility for this because there are solutions to the questions under discussion which do not prejudice the interests of either side and which lead to a radical reduction of the armaments of both sides—to the great benefit of universal peace and security. It is this aim that is pursued by the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union, including those we have made most recently. I will remind you of the main essence of these proposals. It is very simple and logical. With regard to strategic armaments, we suggest that both sides cease building them up further—that is, freeze them at the present level and then reduce the existing arsenals by roughly 25 percent on each side, bringing them down to equal levels.

[Moscow TASS in English at 1607 GMT on 30 December carries the "full text" of Andropov's replies to questions asked by Kingsbury-Smith. The preceding sentence in TASS English reads: "As regards strategic armaments, we suggest that both sides stop to build them up right now, that is, freeze them at the present level . . ."] [2]

From there, progress can be made to new reductions.

With regard to nuclear weapons in the European zone, we offer different options: either to have no weapons at all there, neither medium-range nor tactical ones, on the Soviet side or on the side of the NATO states—this would mean absolute zero, so to speak, for both sides—or reduction of their medium-range weapons, missiles, nuclear-capability planes, by both sides by more than two-thirds. In this case there would be no Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles confronting each other there and the USSR would retain only as many such missiles as Britain and France have. Regarding planes, we also stand for complete equality at a far lower level than today. In short, we do not want to have in the European zone a single missile or a single plane more than the NATO countries have.

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[2] Brackets in source text.

It is to be hoped that the United States will reciprocate this fair and constructive position with a manifestation of goodwill on its part. This could help ensure the success of the talks. This success, I am positive, could make 1983 a good year for the whole of mankind.

Question: Former President Richard Nixon called for a meeting between you and the U.S. President. What is your attitude to this?

Answer: The Soviet leadership has always believed summit level contacts to be a very effective method of developing relations between states. We continue to hold this opinion; but, of course, good preparatory work is needed for the success of such a meeting. In any case, we stand for improving Soviet-American relations and for implementing mutually beneficial treaties and agreements concluded between our countries, and we welcome everything that leads to this objective.

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[6] Statements by the Department of State Director of the Office of Nuclear Export Control Stoiber and ACDA Deputy Assistant Director Turrentine have been excerpted and are printed *ante.*

[7] A statement by the Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director Howe (July 13) before the subcommittees has been printed *ante.*

[8] U.S. IAEA Representative Kennedy's statement before the subcommittees on Mar. 18 has been excerpted and printed *ante.*

[9] Statements by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Devine and ACDA Deputy Assistant Director Turrentine have been excerpted and printed *ante,* Sept. 8.

[10] Statements by ACDA Director Rostow, Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Director Burt, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle at these hearings have been excerpted and printed *ante,* Feb. 23.

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[12] The statement by ACDA Nuclear Safeguards Division Chief Menzel at these hearings on Aug. 3 has been reprinted *ante*.

[13] Reprinted *ante*.

[14] Includes appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

[15] Reprinted *ante*.

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[16] Ambassador Rowny's statement at the hearing has been excerpted and printed *ante.*

[17] ACDA Director Rostow's statement before the subcommittee has been excerpted and printed *ante.*

[18] The statement submitted by Under Secretary of State Eagleburger has been printed *ante.*

[19] Statements by Secretary of Defense Weinberger (Apr. 29), JCS Chairman Jones (Apr. 29), Secretary of State Haig (May 11), and ACDA Director Rostow (May 13) before the Committee have been reprinted *ante.*

[20] Under Secretary of State Buckley's statement before the Committee and the ACDA report submitted to the Committee have been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

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[21] Secretary of Defense Weinberger's statement before the Committee has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[22] Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Devine's statement at this hearing has been reprinted *ante.*

[23] Under Secretary of State Kennedy's statement at this hearing has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[24] The statement by Under Secretary of State Kennedy at this hearing has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[25] Reprinted *ante,* Sept. 22.

[26] ACDA General Counsel Richstein's testimony before the subcommittee has been excerpted and reprinted *ante.*

[27] A portion of Adm. Rickover's statement before the Joint Economic Committee has been excerpted and printed *ante,* Jan. 28.

[28] The Congressional Research Service Digest of the Arms Control Impact Statements has been excerpted and reprinted *ante,* Mar. 1982.

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The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* series, which began in 1977, summarizes on an annual basis U.N. activities in the disarmament field, the positions of the member states on the various subjects in the field, and the votes on resolutions on pertinent questions. Vol. 1 covers 1976; vol. 6, 1981 [sales no. E.81.IX.6 (paperbound)]; and vol. 7, 1982 [sales no. E.83.IX.7 (paperbound)]. The years before 1976 are dealt with in the three volumes of *The United Nations and Disarmament*—1945–1965, 1965–1970, and 1970–1975. The *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements,* originally issued in 1978 as a special supplement to the 1977 *Yearbook,* has been updated to include all disarmament agreements as of Dec. 31, 1982 [sales no. E.83.IX.5]. Another useful series, *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations,* is issued in five languages two or three times a year. It offers news of activities in the disarmament field such as review conferences of disarmament treaties, articles by U.N. officials, complete texts or relevant excerpts of speeches by world leaders, texts of important documents, book reviews, chronicles of disarmament events, and summaries of disarmament resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Vol. V comprises the 1982 issues. Issued monthly (except in Aug.), the *UN Chronicle* reports on the activities, proceedings, and decisions of the General Assembly and its committees and affiliated organs. It also includes lists of current documents and publications of the United Nations. Another useful reference book is the *Yearbook of the United Nations,* the most recent of which (Vol. 34) is that for 1980 [sales no. E.83.I.1]. The Disarmament Study Series now include the following reports prepared by the Secretary General's groups of experts pursuant to General Assembly resolutions: No. 5—*Relationship Between Disarmament and Development* (A/36/356), prepared in compliance with paragraph 97, res. S–10/2 of June 30, 1978[32] [sales no. E.82.IX.1]; No. 6—*Study on Israeli*

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[29] Hardcover or microfiche version available by subscription through National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Department of Commerce (5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161). The Daily Reports are also on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at public and university libraries throughout the United States.

[30] 1314 Kinnear Road, Columbus, Ohio 43212.

[31] In the United States, English language editions may be obtained from the Bureau of Public Affairs (PA/OAP), U.S. Department of State, Room 5815 A, Washington, D.C. 20520. Further details may be obtained from NATO Information Service, 1110 Brussels, Belgium.

[32] I.e., the Final Document of the special session of the UNGA devoted to disarmament, the full text of which may be found in *Documents on Disarmament, 1978,* pp. 411 ff.

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Other reports include *Prevention of Nuclear War,* prepared pursuant to G.A. resolution of 36/81 B of Dec. 9, 1981, issued as A/S–12/11 and Adds. 1–5, with U.S. and Soviet replies in Add. 4; *Reduction of Military Budgets* undertaken pursuant to resolution 35/142 B of Dec. 12, 1980, issued as A/S–12/7; *Study on the Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency,* prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/83 E of Dec. 11, 1979, issued as document A/AC.206/14; the report on the replies of governments on *The Relationship Between Disarmament and Development,* prepared in accordance with G.A. resolution 36/92 G of Dec. 9, 1981, issued as A/S–12/13 and Add. 1; *Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Security* pursuant to resolution 36/97 L of Dec. 9, 1981 (views of governments on), issued as A/S–12/16 and Add. 1; report on replies of governments on their opinions of the World Disarmament Campaign study, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C of Dec. 9, 1981, issued as A/S–12/14 and Adds. 1–3; and the report on the views of governments on *World-wide Action for Collecting Signatures in Support of Measures To Prevent Nuclear War, To Curb the Arms Race, and for Disarmament,* pursuant to resolution 36/92 J of Dec. 9, 1981, issued as A/S–12/15.

LIST OF PERSONS

Adelman, Kenneth L. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1976–1977; Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1979–1981; U.S. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 1981–1983; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1983– .

Adeniji, Olu. Director General, Directorate of International Organizations, Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs; Ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative at the U.N. European Office, Geneva, and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its successor, the Committee on Disarmament, 1977–1982; President, U.N. Preparatory Conference on Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1979–1980; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament, 1979–1980; Chairman, Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1980–1982; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Alessi, Mario. Italian Representative at the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and Vice Chairman of its *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1982; Permanent Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

Almond, Harry (Dr.). Professor, National War College.

Ambeva, Edward E. (Dr., MD., F.R.C.S.). Chief Surgeon and Orthopedic Consultant, Kenyan Ministry of Health, Coast General Hospital; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts To Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 1982.

Andropov, Yuriy V. Member, Secretariat, CPSU, 1962–1969; head, KGB and candidate member Politburo, 1967,1973; full member, 1973; Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and General Secretary, 1982–1984.

Arbatov, Georgi A. Director, Soviet Institute of the United States of America and Canada, 1967– ; member, Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1967– .

Atkins, Marvin C. Executive Secretary, President's Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Ayewah, Isaac E. Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations in New York; member, Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Baker, Howard H., Jr. U.S. Senator (R., Tenn.), 1967–1985; member, Committee on Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Representative to 31st U.N. General Assembly, 1976; Senate Minority Leader, 1977–1980; Majority Leader, 1981– .

de Beausse, Jacques. First Counselor and Deputy Representative of France to the Committee on Disarmament, [Feb.] 1980– .

Bedell, Berkley W. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Iowa), 1975– .

Bernardin, Joseph L. Archbishop and Chairman, National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on War and Peace.

Biden, Joseph R., Jr. U.S. Senator (D., Del.), 1973– ; member, Committees on Foreign Relations and Judiciary, and Select Committee on Intelligence.

Bingham, Jonathan B. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., N.Y.), 1965– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; member, U.S. delegation to four U.N. General Assemblies, 1961–1963.

Blix, Hans (Dr.). Head of Department, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Legal Adviser on International Law, 1963–1976; Under Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1976–1978; Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1978–1979; Under Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1979–1981; member, Swedish delegation to U.N. General Asembly, 1961– ; member, Swedish delegation to ENDC, CCD, and CD, 1962–1978; third IAEA Director-General, Dec. 1, 1981– .

Blum, James L. Assistant Director for Budget Analysis, Congressional Budget Office.

Boschwitz, Rudy. U.S. Senator (R., Minn.), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Boss, Walter (Dr.). Head, delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks.

Bouquard, Marilyn L. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Tenn.), 1975– ; member, House Committee on Science and Technology and Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production.

Boyd, Susan J. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, 1982– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1982– .

Brady, Nicholas F. Former U.S. Senator (R., N.J.); member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Force, 1982–1983.

Brezhnev, Leonid I. Member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1952–1982; Politburo member, 1957–1982; General Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU, 1964–1982; Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1977–1982.

Broomfield, William S. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Mich.), 1957– ; ranking Republican, Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs; U.S. Ambassador, 22d session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1967; Congressional Adviser, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1970–1974; delegate, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1977–1980 (SALT II); delegate, North Atlantic Assembly, 1955, 1960, and 1973–1980; 67th Interparliamentary Union Conference, 1980.

Brown, Harold. Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, 1961–1965; Secretary of the Air Force, 1965–1969; President, California Institute of Technology, 1969–1977; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1977–1981; Senior Counselor to the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Buckley, James L. U.S. Senator (R., N.Y.), 1971–1977; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; private business consultant and corporate director, 1977–1981; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 1981–1982; Counselor, Department of State, 1982.

Bundy, McGeorge (Dr.). Dean, faculty arts and sciences, Harvard, 1953–1961; professor, 1954–1961; Special Assistant to the President for National Security, 1961–1966; president, Ford Foundation, 1966–1979; professor of history, New York University, N.Y.C., 1979– .

Burt, Richard R. National security affairs correspondent, *The New York Times*, 1977–1980; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1981–1982; Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, 1982–1983; Assistant Secretary, 1984– .

Busby, Morris D. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 1975– ; U.S. Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982–1983.

Calle y Calle, Juan Jose (Dr.). Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Caporaso, Vito. General Programming Officer, Defense General Staff, Italian Ministry of Defense; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Carasales, Julio Cesar. Ambassador and Special Representative of Argentina for Disarmament Affairs at the Committee on Disarmament, 1981; Head of Delegation, 1982– ; Argentine Representative to the First Committee on the 37th General Assembly, 1982.

Carney, William. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., N.Y.), 1979– ; member, House Committee on Science and Technology.

Cars, Hans Christian. Head of Division, Planning and Budget Secretariat, Swedish Ministry of Defense; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Carter, James Earl, Jr. (Jimmy). U.S. President, 1977–1981.

Ceauşescu, Nicolae. General Secretary, Romanian Communist Party, 1965– ; President, Socialist Republic of Romania, 1974– .

Chatti, Habib. Tunisian Ambassador [to Syria, 1957; Arab League Meeting, Sept. 1968; Great Britain, 1962–1964; Morocco, 1964–1970; Algeria, 1970–1972]; Director, President's Office, August 1972– ; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1974– ; Secretary General, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 1980– .

Cheysson, Claude. French Foreign Minister, 1981– .

Clark, William P. Deputy Secretary of State, 1981–1982; National Security Adviser to the President, 1982–1983; Secretary of Interior, 1983– .

Clark, Arthur C. British science writer and underwater explorer; originated communications satellites, 1945; Chairman, British Interplanetary Society, 1946–1947, 1950–1953; engaged in underwater exploration on Great Barrier Reef of Australia and coast of Sri Lanka, 1954– ; author with Stanley Kubrick, *2001: A Space Odyssey* (novel and screenplay), 1968, and *2010,* 1983.

Clements, William P., Jr. Chairman of the Board, chief executive officer, and founder of SEDCO Inc., Dallas, Tex., 1947–1973, 1977; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973–1977; Governor of the State of Texas, 1978–1982; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Consalvi, Simón Alberto. Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Nations, 1974–1977; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1977–1979; Representative to the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1978; member, first session, Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, 1981.

Cranston, Alan. U.S. Senator (D., Calif.), 1969– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law; Senate Democratic Whip, 1977– .

Cutler, Lloyd N. U.S lawyer; Counsel to President of the United States, 1979–1981; Senior Counselor to Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Davis, W. Kenneth. Vice President, planning and advance development, Bechtel Corp., 1973–1981; Deputy Secretary of Energy 1981– .

de Vos. See Vos van Steenwyck.

Derwinski, Edward J. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Ill.), 1959–1983; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs; delegate to 26th session of U.N. General Assembly, 1971; treasurer, U.S. delegation to, and member, Executive Committee of Interparliamentary Union.

Detinov, N.N. (Lt. Gen.). Deputy Chief, Soviet delegation to Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, 1981–1983.

DEUTCH, JOHN M. (Dr.). Member, faculty Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970– ; professor of chemistry, 1971– ; chairman of the department, 1976– ; Vice Chairman, National Defense Scientific Board, 1977; Director, Office of Energy Research, U.S. Department of Energy, 1977–1979; Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology, 1979; Under Secretary, 1979; member, Army Science Advisory Panel, 1975– ; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

DEVINE, JAMES B. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 1982– .

DJOKIĆ, DRAGOMIR. Counselor, Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the U.N. Office, Geneva; member, Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978, and his Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1983.

DODD, CHRISTOPHER J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Conn.), 1975–1980; Senator, 1981– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations, 1981– .

VAN DONGEN, FRANS (Dr.). Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the U.N. Office at Geneva; Head of Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982–1983.

DORNAN, ROBERT K. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Calif.), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

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DUBERSTEIN, KENNETH M. Assistant to the President of the United States, 1981– .

EAST, JOHN P. U.S. Senator (R., N.C.), 1981– ; member, Judiciary Committee.

ELLIS, RICHARD H. (Gen., USAF, ret.). U.S. Ambassador and Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission, 1982– .

ENCINAS DEL PANDO, JOSÉ A. Professor (on research leave), University of Lima; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1981; also member of his Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

ENE, CONSTANTIN. Ambassador, Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department of International Organizations; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

ERICSSON, ULF, Dr. (Sweden). Chairman, CCD *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, 1976–1978; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Group of the same name, 1979–1982; Counselor, Swedish Embassy in Austria and Representative to IAEA, 1977–1982.

ERSUN, OMER. Counselor, Turkish Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 1978–1980; Deputy Permanent Representative, 1981; *Rapporteur*, Preparatory Committee for the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1980–1981; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session.

EZZ, ESMAT A. (Maj. Gen., Dr., M.B., B.Ch., D.M., Ph.D.). Head, Scientific Research Branch, Egyptian Armed Forces; Chairman, Group of Experts To Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 1982.

FIELDS, LOUIS G., JR. Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1970–1974; Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems, 1974–1981; member, U.S. delegation to the First Committee of the 36th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1981; Ambassador and head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982–1984.

FONSEKA, IGNATIUS, B. Ambassador of Sri Lanka and leader of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979–1980; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1981– ; Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1981– .

Forsberg, Randall. Director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Brookline, Mass.

Fuentes, Max de la. Counselor, Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations, 1981– ; *Rapporteur*, Disarmament Commission, 1982.

Gallik, Daniel. Senior Economist, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1981; also member of his Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Gandhi, Indira. Prime Minister of India, 1966–1977; 1980–1984.

García Robles, Alfonso. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mexico, 1964– ; Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1965– ; leader of the delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament, 1967– ; head, Drafting Group on "Introduction" in Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1978; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament, 1981; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982. Awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 1982.

Garn, Jacob (Jake). U.S. Senator (R., Utah), 1975– ; member, Committee on Appropriations, and Select Committee on Intelligence.

Garthoff, Raymond L. Special Assistant, Soviet bloc Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, 1961–1968; member, U.S. delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Conference, 1962, 1964; Counselor for Politico-Military Affairs, U.S. Mission NATO, Brussels, 1968–1970; member, U.S. delegation to U.S.-USSR SALT negotiations, 1969–1972; Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1977–1981; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program, 1982– .

Gayler, Noel (Adm., USN, ret.). former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Pacific; former Director, National Security Agency.

Gbeho, James V. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations; Chairman, First Committee of the 37th session of the General Assembly, 1982.

Genscher, Hans Dietrich. Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1974– .

Glenn, John H., Jr. U.S. Senator (D., Ohio), 1975– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs; member, Committee on Governmental Affairs and Democratic Policy Committee.

Glitman, Maynard V. Deputy Head, U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe, 1981–1983.

Gonzalez, Oscar. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, New York; member, final session of the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1982.

Gore, Albert, Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Tenn.), 1977– ; member, Committee on Science and Technology and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Grinberg, Baruch. Representative of Bulgaria at the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and Vice Chairman of its *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1982.

Gromyko, Andrei A. USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1957– ; member, Politburo of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1973– .

Grozea, Traian. Colonel Doctor, Head of Section, Romanian Center for Studies and Research of History and Military Theory; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Guerra, Humberto (M.D., Ph.D.). Professor, *Instituto de Medicina Tropical Alexander von Humboldt, Universidad Peruana Cayetana Heredia,* Lima; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 1982.

Gundersen, J. Adviser to the U.S. delegation at the First Committee of the 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1982.

de Haan, Hendrik. Professor of International Economic Relations, University of Groningen, The Netherlands; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

Haig, Alexander M., Jr. (Gen., USA, ret.). Military Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, 1969–1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970–1973; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1973; White House Chief of Staff, 1973–1974; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, 1974–1978; President and chief operating officer, United Technologies Corporation, Dec. 1979–Jan. 1981; U.S. Secretary of State, 1981–1982.

Hart, Gary. U.S. Senator (D., Colo.), 1975– ; member, Armed Services Committee.

Hatfield, Mark O. U.S. Senator (R., Oreg.), 1967– ; member, Appropriations Committee; Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

Hayakawa, Samuel I. U.S. Senator (R., Calif.), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Hazoumé, Guy. Representative of Benin at the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and Vice Chairman of its *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1982.

Helms, Jesse. U.S. Senator (R., N.C.), 1973– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Helms, Richard. Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1966–1973; Ambassador to Iran, 1973–1976; consultant, 1976– .

Hepburn, Davidson Lincoln (Dr.) Member, delegation of the Bahamas to the United Nations, 1973–1977; Ambassador and Permanent Representative, 1978– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1978; Chairman, First Committee of the 34th session of the General Assembly, 1979; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Herder, Gerhard (Dr.). Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the U.N. Office at Geneva, head of delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and Alternate Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, 1978; head of delegation to the CD, 1975– ; Vice Chairman, Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Hiatt, Howard H. (M.D.). Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, 1972– ; Dean, Harvard School of Public Health, 1972–1981; Dean Harvard Medical School, 1981– .

Holdridge, John H. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1981– .

Hollai, Imre. Ambassador and Representative of Hungary at the 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1982; President, 37th session, 1982.

Huang Hua. Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations and Vice Chairman, 1971–1976; Chairman, 1977–1978; Vice Premier of China and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1977–1982.

Hyde, Henry J. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Ill.), 1975– ; member, House Judiciary Committee.

Ibrahim, Izhar. Minister Counselor, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1982– .

Inman, Bobby R. (Adm., USN, ret.). Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Staff of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1973–1974; Director, Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy, 1974–1976; Vice Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1976–1977; Director, National Security Agency, 1977–1980; Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981–1982.

Issraelyan, Viktor L. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, 1968–1973; Chief, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973–1979; member, Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975– ; leader of delegation to CD, 1979– ; Alternate Representative to the United Nations General Assembly, 1979– .

Jackson, Henry M. U.S. Senator (D., Wash.), 1953–1983; member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; Chairman, Committee on Armed Services and of Subcommittee on Arms Control.

Javier, Hugo B. (Col. MC [GSC], FMPMS). Deputy, The Surgeon General, AFP, Philippines Ministry of National Defense; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts to Investigate Reports on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, 1982 (from the 5th session).

Jones, David C. (Gen. USAF, ret.). Commander in Chief, USAF in Europe, and Cammander, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, 1971–1974; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 1974–1982; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978–1982.

Kahn, Siegfried. Counselor, Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations, 1981– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Indian Ocean, 1982– .

Kamenar, Paul, Esq. Director of Litigation, Washington Legal Foundation.

Kampelman, Max M. U.S. attorney and Chairman, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Ambassador and Co-chairman, U.S. delegation to the review meeting (in Madrid) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1980–1981; Chairman, 1981–1983; adviser, Department of State, 1983– .

Karpov, Viktor P. Representative of Soviet Foreign Ministry at first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1972; Deputy Soviet Commissioner at Standing Consultative Commission, 1972–1978; Chairman, Soviet delegation at the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), 1978–1979; Chairman, Soviet delegation to the preliminary exchange of views on theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe, 1980; Chairman, Soviet delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 1982–1983.

Kassebaum, Nancy L. U.S. Senator (R., Kans.), 1979– ; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Chairman, Subcommittee on African Affairs.

Kennedy, Edward M. U.S. Senator (D., Mass.), 1962– ; member, Committee on the Judiciary and Joint Economic Committee.

Kennedy, Richard T. Assistant Director, Deputy Director, and Director, Africa Region, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 1964–1969; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Council Planning and senior member, National Security Council staff, 1969–75; Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975–1980; Under Secretary of State for Management, 1981– ; Ambassador and U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1982– ; leader, U.S. delegation at U.S.–USSR talks on nuclear nonproliferation, 1982– .

Kikuchi, Yasunori. Counselor, Embassy of Japan in Yugoslavia and participant, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, 1981–1982.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. (Dr.). Professor, department of government, Georgetown University; U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981– .

Kissinger, Henry A. Consultant, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1959–1960; National Security Council, 1961–1962; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1961–1968; U.S. Department of State, 1965–1968; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1969–1975; Secretary of State, 1975–1977; faculty member, Georgetown University, 1977– ; consultant, NBC, Inc., 1977– ; Chairman, National Bipartisan Commission in Central America, July 19, 1983– .

Kittani, Ismat. Director, International Organizations and Conference Department, Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1975–1980; Ambassador and Representative at the United Nations, 1976– ; Chairman, Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1980; President, 36th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1981; President, Second Special Session Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Komatina, Miljan. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, Vice Chairman of the delegation, 1978–1979; Chairman, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Kómives, Imre (Dr.). Hungarian Permanent Representative to the U.N. Office at Geneva and Head of Delegation at the Committee on Disarmament, 1980– ; Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Radiological Weapons, 1981– .

Krystosik, Ryszard. Counselor, Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations, 1980– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1982– .

Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A. Soviet Ambassador and leader of delegation to the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF), 1981–1983.

La Rocque, Gene R. (Adm., USN, ret). Director, Center for Defense Information.

Laclaustra, Arturo. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations, 1981; Counselor of Embassy, 1982– ; *Rapporteur, Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1982.

Lagomarsino, Robert J. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Calif.), 1974– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Laird, Melvin R. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Wisc.), 1953–1969; Secretary of Defense, 1969–1972; domestic adviser to the President, 1973–1974; senior counselor, national and international affairs, Reader's Digest Association, 1974– ; Senior Counselor, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Lasater, John R. (Brig. Gen., USAF). Senior Military Adviser, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1979–1981; Acting U.S. Commissioner, Standing Consultative Commission, 1981 (May).

Leach, Jim. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Iowa), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

Lidgard, Curt. Swedish Ambassador and Alternate Leader of the delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1978–1982; leader of the delegation, 1982–1983 (through Spring session); Chairman, CD *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Comprehensive Program for Disarmament, 1981.

Lin Cheng. Alternate Representative of China to the First Committee of the 37th session of the General Assembly, 1982.

Litvinov, Pavel M. Russian physicist and dissident activist (grandson of former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov); sentenced to 5 years exile, 1968–1973; released and exiled from USSR, 1974.

Lobo, Jose Carlos. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations, 1979– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1982.

Luce, G.C. U.S. Representative to the First Committee of the 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1982.

Lugar, Richard G. U.S. Senator (R., Ind.), 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Select Committee on Intelligence.

Lyons, John H. Vice president, AFL–CIO building and construction trades department and of metal trades department, 1961– ; vice president, AFL–CIO, 1967– ; member, advisory committee, White House Conference on Balanced National Growth and Economic Development, 1978; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

McCone, John. Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1958–1960; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1961–1965.

McNamara, Robert S. U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968; president, World Bank, 1968–1981, Ford Foundation, 1981– .

Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese. Prime Minister of Fiji, 1972– ; Chairman, Commonwealth Heads of Government IIId regional meeting, 1982.

Markey, Edward U. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Mass.), 1977– ; member, Committee on Energy and Commerce.

Marshall, Harry, R., Jr. Attorney Adviser, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976–1981; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1981– .

Martinez, Ifigenia. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations in New York; member, 1st and 2d sessions of the meetings of the U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures, 1981–1982.

Matejka, Ladislaw. Deputy Minister, Presidium of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

Mathias, Charles McC., Jr. U.S. Senator (R., Md.), 1961– ; member, Committees on Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, and Judiciary; member, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law and Office of Technology Assessment.

Menzel, Joerg H. (Dr.). First Officer, Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1973–1976; Chief, Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976– .

Mikhailov, Valerian P. Soviet Ambassador and Chief Representative at Negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR), Sept. 1981– .

Miller, Mark E. (Dr.). Author: *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine.*

Molander, Roger. Executive Director, Ground Zero.

Mrani Zentar, Mehdi. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Morocco to the United Nations, 1981– ; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Nadel, Semen N. Professor and Head of a Section, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

Nazarkin, Yuri K. Soviet Alternate Representative to the First Committee of the 37th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 1982.

Nitze, Paul H. Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1946–1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1961–1963; Secretary of the Navy, 1963–1967; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1967–1969; member, U.S. delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, 1969–1974; self-employed consultant, 1974–1981; head, U.S. delegation to Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF), 1981–1984; Ambassador, 1982– .

Nozu, Kenji. Staff Official, Defense Division, Defense Policy Bureau, Japanese Defense Agency; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Nunn, Sam. U.S. Senator (D., Ga.), 1972– ; member, Committees on Arm Services and Governmental Affairs.

Okawa, Yoshio. Japanese Ambassador and leader of the delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Onkelinx, Andre. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Belgium at the U.N. Office, Geneva; Representative and leader of the delegation at the Committee on Disarmament, 1981– .

Palme, Olof. Swedish Prime Minister (Social Democratic Party), 1969–1976, 1982– ; founder, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

Parwoto, Benjamin. Deputy Assistant for Planning, Indonesian Department of Defense and Security; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets, 1981–1982.

Pell, Claiborne. U.S. Senator (D., R.I.), 1961– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Percy, Charles H. U.S. Senator (R., Ill.), 1967– ; Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, 1981– ; member, Governmental Affairs Committee and Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Governmental Processes, 1981– .

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. (Peru). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Jan. 1, 1982– .

Perle, Richard N. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Department of Defense, 1981– .

Perry, William J. Technical Consultant, Department of Defense, 1967–1977; Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 1978–1981; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Petrovsky, Vladimir F. Chief, International Organizations Department, Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1979– . Alternate Soviet Representative to the United Nations, 1982– .

Pillsbury, Michael. Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981.

Pressler, Larry. U.S. Senator (R., S. Dak.), 1975– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations and the Interparliamentary Union.

Price, Charles M. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Ill.), 1944– ; Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services.

Pryor, David H. U.S. Senator (D., Ark.), 1965–1975; Governor of Arkansas, 1975–1979; Senator, 1979– ; member, Committee on Governmental Affairs.

Rahman, Waliur. Deputy Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, New York; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race (first and second sessions), 1981–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, 1982.

Rasolondraibe, Henri. First Counselor and Deputy Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the United Nations, 1976– ; *Rapporteur, Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1978– ; Vice Chairman, 1979; *Rapporteur,* Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1979, and of *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1980.

Reagan, Ronald W. Motion picture and television actor, 1932–1966; Governor of California, 1967–1974; President of the United States, 1981– .

Reed, Thomas C. Director, telecommunications and command and control systems, Department of Defense, 1974–1975; Secretary of the Air Force, 1976–1977; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Rees, Grover, III. Professor, University of Texas Law School.

Rice, Charles. Professor, University of Texas Law School.

Richstein, A. **Richard.** General Counsel, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–1983.

Rivlin, Alice M. Director, Congressional Budget Office.

Rostow, Eugene V. Dean, Yale University Law School, 1955–1965; Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale Law School, 1964; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1966–1969; visiting professor, Balliol College, Oxford University, 1970–1971; Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University Law School, 1976; Chairman, Committee on the Present Danger, 1976–1981; Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–1983.

Roth, Toby. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Wis.), 1979– ; member, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Rothschild, Kurt. Professor of Economics, University of Linz, Austria; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

Rowny, Edward L. (Lt. Gen., USA, ret.). Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, 1968–1969; Deputy Chief of Army Research and Development, 1969; Deputy Chairman, NATO Military Committee, Brussels, and Chairman, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Group, 1971–1973; Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative at Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, 1973–1979; Ambassador and Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmanent Negotiations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981– ; leader of U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), 1982–1983.

Rumsfeld, Donald. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Ill.), 1963–1969; Director, Office of Equal Opportunity, 1969–1970; Director, Cost of Living Council and Counselor to the U.S. President, 1971–1972; U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO, 1974–1975; Secretary of Defense, 1975–1977; Senior Counselor to the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Sadleir, David. Representative of Australia at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament and Vice Chairman, Special Session's *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1982.

Sarbanes, Paul S. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Md.). 1971–1977; Senator, 1977– ; member, Committee on Foreign Relations.

Scheppach, Raymond C. Deputy Director, Congressional Budget Office.

Schlesinger, James R. Director of strategic studies, Rand Corporation, 1967–1969; Assistant Director and Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969–1971; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971–1973; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Feb.–July 1973; Secretary of Defense, 1973–1975; visiting Scholar, Johns Hopkins

University, 1975–1976; Secretary of Energy, 1977–1979; Senior Counselor to Presidential Commisison on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Schmidt, Christian. Director, Center of Scientific Analysis of International Conflicts, University of Paris, France; member, U.N. Secretary-General's Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race, 1981–1982.

Schmidt, Helmut. Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1974–1982.

Scowcroft, Brent. (Lt. Gen., USAF, ret.). Deputy Assistant Director, Plans for National Security Matters, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, Department of Defense, 1969–1970; Special Assistant to Director, Joint Staff of Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970–1971; military assistant to President, 1972–1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1973–1975; member, President's General Advisory Commission on Arms Control, 1977–1981; Chairman, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Sethna, Homi N. (Dr.). Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission of India, 1972–1983.

Shultz, George. U.S. Secretary of Labor, 1969–1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1972; Secretary of the Treasury, also assistant to the President, 1972–1974; executive vice president, Bechtel Corp., 1974–1975, president, 1975–1982; Secretary of State, 1982– .

Sloss, Leon. Consultant, Leon Sloss Associates; head, Strategic Targeting Planning Group, Department of Defense, 1977–1981.

Smith, Levering. (Vice Adm., USN, ret.). Former Director, Special Products, U.S. Navy; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Staar, Richard F. Chester W. Nimitz professor of social and political philosophy, Naval College, 1963–1964; visiting professor on national security affairs, National War College, 1967–1973; principal associate director, Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 1969–1981; Ambassador and chief U.S. Representative at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks, 1981–1983.

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr. U.S. Ambassador to Poland, 1968–1972, to the USSR, 1974–1976, to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976–1981; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1981–1982.

Stoiber, Carlton R. Director, Office of Nuclear Export and Import Control, Department of State.

Stratton, Samuel S. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., N.Y.), 1959– ; member, House Committee on Armed Services.

Sutresna, Nana S. Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the U.N. Office, Geneva; Representative and head of delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

Symms, Steve. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Idaho), 1973–1981; Senator, 1981– ; member, Joint Economic Committee.

Theorin, Maj Britt. Ambassador and Member of the Swedish Parliament; Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission and head of delegation *ex officio* when in attendance at the Committee on Disarmament.

Thomas, Helen. White House Correspondent, United Press International, 1974– .

Thorsson, Inga. (Mrs. Sture). Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974– ; Chairman, Swedish delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1974–1978; and to the Committee on Disarmament, 1979–1982; President, Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1975; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, 1976; Chairman, U.N. Secretary-General's *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, 1978–1981;

Representative to the First Committee of the General Assembly, 1980–1982; recipient, Nobel Peace Prize, 1982.

Tower, John G. U.S. Senator (R., Tex.), 1961–1985; Chairman, Armed Services Committee.

Troyanovsky, Oleg A. Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations, 1977– .

Tsongas, Paul. U.S. Senator (D., Mass.), 1975–1985; member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

Turrentine, Archelaus. U.S. Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Deputy U.S. Representative to the Committee on Disarmament, 1976–1978; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, 1978–1980; Director, Office of Science and Technology Support, 1980–1981; Acting Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1981–1983; Deputy Assistant Director, Nuclear and Weapons Control Bureau, 1983– .

Ustinov, Dmitriy F. Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense; member, Politburo, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1976– .

Vance, Cyrus R. General Counsel, Department of Defense, 1961–1962; Secretary of the Army, 1962–1963; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1964–1967; Special Representative of the President, Cyprus, 1967, Korea, 1968; U.S. Secretary of State, 1977–1981.

Venkateswaran, A.P. Indian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office, Geneva; Head of Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, 1980–1982; Vice Chairman, *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1982.

Volio Jimenez, Fernando. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica; Chairman, Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Countries Interested in the Promotion of Democracy in Central America and the Caribbean, 1982.

Vos van Steenwijk, Willem J., Baron de. Netherlands Ambassador and Representative at the Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks—MBFR), 1974– .

Warner, John W. U.S. Senator (R., Va.), 1979– ; member, Committee on Armed Services.

Warnke, Paul C. General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, 1966–1967; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1967–1969; Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977–1978; Ambassador and Chairman, U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and trilateral comprehensive test ban talks, 1977–1978; special consultant to the Secretary of State for arms control affairs, 1978–1981.

Weinberger, Caspar W. Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1970–1972, Director, 1972–1973; counselor to the U.S. President, 1973; Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973–1975; general counsel, vice president, and director, Bechtel Corp., 1975–1981; U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1981– .

Winn, Larry, Jr. U.S. Congressional Representative (R., Kans.), 1967– ; member, Committees on Foreign Affairs and Science and Technology.

Woolsey, R. **James,** Jr. Program analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1968–1970; adviser, U.S. delegation to SALT, 1969–1970; General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 1970–1973; Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977–1981; member, Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces, 1982–1983.

Wyzner, Eugeniusz. Polish Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Poland to the U.N. Office at Geneva; leader of the delegation to the CCD, 1973–1978; Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Alternate Representative to the United Nations, N.Y., 1976–1978; Permanent Representative, 1978– ; Vice Chairman, Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, 1980– ; Chairman, Disarmament Commission, 1981, 1982.

YU MENGJIA. First Secretary, Permanent Mission of China at the U.N. Office, Geneva, 1980–1981; Counselor and Deputy Head of Delegation at the Committee on Disarmament, 1982– .

ZABLOCKI, CLEMENT J. U.S. Congressional Representative (D., Wis.), 1943–1983; Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

ZELADA JURADO, DON FERMÍN. Counselor and Adviser, Spanish Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 1979– ; *Rapporteur, Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1978– .

ZHAO ZIYANG. Premier of China, 1980– ; Vice Chairman, Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, 1981– .

ZIA-UL HAQ, MOHAMMED. President of Pakistan, 1979– .

ZORINSKY, EDWARD. U.S. Senator (D., Nebr.), 1977– ; Committee on Foreign Relations.

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